[shniad at sfu.ca: [R-G] Chile: no future without a past]

[Hans Ehrbar]

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http://mondediplo.com/2002/11/10chile

Le Monde Diplomatique  November 2002

A country with an identity shakier than the economy

Chile: no future without a past

Chile must confront its past yet again. Patricio Ríos, the head of the
Chilean air force, resigned in October after covering up information on
political prisoners meant for an investigation into the Pinochet military
dictatorship. At risk is Chile's illusory, and limited, economic 'miracle'. 


by our special correspondent Nira Reyes Morales *

Ricardo Lagos Escobar, the first Socialist president of Chile since Salvador
Allende, had just returned from signing an agreement establishing political
and trade links with the European Union, when he told Congress in May: "I
was very proud that the EU members see Chileans as respectable, serious and
responsible partners. Chile is making a dignified entrance into the
developed world. Sometimes I ask why the world shows such interest in
forming alliances with our small country." 

Chile is anything but secure, though: its government is worried about
self-preservation should the Latin American financial crisis spread. The
president set out the priority measures that his centre-left government
(Coalition of Parties for Democracy, CPD) hopes to implement. Through the
Chile Solidario (Chilean solidarity) subsidy system, the government aims to
eradicate poverty, which affects 20% of Chile's 15m people. It also intends
to use the Auge programme of universal cover to provide direct access to
health care, and hopes to create a developed economy by 2010, the
bicentennial of Chile's independence from Spain (1). 

Lagos repeated his wish to finalise Chile's transition to democracy by
amending the 1980 constitution, bequeathed by the military dictatorship. The
government has repeatedly relegated constitutional reforms they have
proposed for over a decade. Chile's economically correct neo-liberal
policies, which favour key macroeconomic indicators, and its historical
preference for institutional stability, have ensured its exceptional
political and economic standing in Latin America. Chile has mythic status in
the eyes of citizens and foreign observers. Chileans are torn between
national pride and feelings of disillusionment as they try to live their
lives bewildered by the economic miracle. 

Chile's role as the Latin American tiger stems from its high annual growth,
which soared to 7% between 1990 and 1997. Inflation is currently 3.6%, the
budget deficit is under 1%, foreign debt is still under control and the
country's annual growth, currently 2.2%, is South America's highest,
outpacing Brazil's 1.5% (2). A presidential adviser, Fernando Reyes Matta,
says: "Ricardo Lagos and his administration want to start a
social-democratic revolution from within the third world." But Chile, as it
struggles with the region's economic devastation, has paid a price for
stability. Although the UN development programme describes Chile as low-risk
for foreign investors (3), it also maintains that Chile should rebuild its
fractured national identity (4). 

The government's secretary general, Heraldo Muñoz, often says: "Chile is a
credible nation." Yet according to Tomás Moulian, a sociologist,
"governability and democracy are two separate things. What we have in Chile
is a governable democracy. It reinforces our economic model. But fear is
still with us and Chileans are fatigued (5)." People suffering from
depression, stress, disillusionment - or euphoria - have a shaky sense of
national identity (6). 

Contrary to a strong media belief, Chile's economic success is not the
result of General Pinochet's policies. The "Chicago Boys", a group of
University of Chicago-trained economists, became his advisers in 1975, yet
Pinochet's "successful" stewardship led to a major economic collapse in
1982. Under 12 years of democratic CPD governments (1990-2002), annual
growth held steady at 5.8%. During the military regime of 1973-1990, annual
growth was just 2.4%. 

Chile is still feeling the effects of that 1982 recession, as the president
pointed out earlier this year in response to criticisms of Chile's lower
growth rates, set against previous years. Under pressure from business and
the right (both groups are quick to see a threat of chaos whenever economic
conditions seem inauspicious), Lagos said these were the critics who had
pushed Chile into one of its worst economic downturns: "In this country,
people either remain silent or only partially speak their minds. I want to
remind them that since 1982 this crisis has cost Chile $500m every year, and
there's still a balance due." 

Justice where possible

Threats from economic and rightwing interests have continued since democracy
was reinstated in 1990. These groups were a real danger to the first CPD
government, led by Patricio Aylwin. The military contemplated a power grab
at the slightest sign of instability, and to counter this, the government
chose to implement policies based on "justice insofar as justice is
possible" and to impose a socially paralysing consensus. This guaranteed
governability and smoothed a transition to democracy, without military
involvement. But Chile remains divided politically and ideologically, as
shown by the 2000 election results. Lagos, the CPD standard-bearer, won in
the second round with only 51% of the vote, against 49% for Joaquín Lavín.
Lavín, a member of Opus Dei (a rightwing Catholic group) and currently mayor
of Santiago, represented the ultra-right Independent Democratic Union (UDI),
still unswerving in its support for Pinochet. 

According to government officials, one goal holds Chile together: "If it
wishes to reassert itself, the nation must open its doors to the world and
stay with that decision to the end." This applies especially to Chile's
political and economic elites, which have taken a gamble by positioning the
country within the globalised economy. The strategy has had some success,
but it also has its flaws. Despite a highly diversified trade policy with
Latin America, Asia, the United States and the EU, Chile is vulnerable to
fluctuations in the global economy as an export-dependent nation. Following
the Asian financial crisis, Chile's unemployment rate jumped from 5.3% in
1997 to 9.8% in 1999, dropping to 9.1% last year. 

After three decades of extreme socio-cultural change, Chilean society has
become more complex and fragile than national achievements might suggest.
Chile's economic model has propelled its people to seek growth and
individual success. Under pressure, Chileans have become addicted to work.
They often live in contradiction to their own personal values, in order not
to find themselves outside the system. Chileans share a common obsession.
But the government's lack of a strategic cultural plan is a real problem. 

In an act of collective amnesia, all historical connection between Chile's
post-dictatorship success and its military past seems to have disappeared
(7). But actually re-establishing such a link is essential to the task of
rebuilding a nation still in mourning. When, on 4 July, Pinochet resigned
his constitutionally guaranteed position of senator-for-life. Chileans had
mixed feelings: relief at his final departure from public life and
bitterness at the way he had escaped justice. They were only observers as
their sole chance to assess the historic and moral implications of Chile's
darkest period slipped away. That day, in the words of Secretary General
Muñoz, the government expressed hope that "the past will remain in the past
and Chileans will turn the page forever". Though the government had
previously assured the international community that Pinochet would face
trial, it chose stability over justice, fearing that legal proceedings would
worsen social tensions, although this was a hypothetical possibility. 

Chileans were eager for a trial. Pinochet's supporters were sure he would
prove his innocence while defending the legality of his actions. His
opponents could see a judgment day, a chance to strengthen Chile's
democratic foundations. But Pinochet will never face trial. All charges
against him were dropped because of what was claimed to be his mild cerebral
dementia, which did not, however, prevent him from writing his own letter of
resignation or declaring "I'm not crazy!" in a phone conversation with the
president of the senate, Andres Zaldivar. Ideals of democracy and justice
were ridiculed. And Chile's malaise continues. 

Chileans have yet to come to terms with their sudden transformation from
social actors to consumers. In a climate of competitiveness, the economic
losers have internalised their helplessness (8). "Since the people can't
change the way things are, they're just doing their best to get by," said a
man who sells cell phones, alarms and phone cards on buses and streets of
downtown Santiago. 

Beginning with the 1988 plebiscite, which the anti-Pinochet "no" forces won,
and continuing into the prosperous 1990s, there were many, perhaps too many,
fast changes. A government bureaucrat, once a leader of the University of
Chile's Federation of Students (FECH) says: "We were supposed to celebrate
'springtime and change' [the slogan of the no campaign] but we ended up
paying tribute to neo-liberalism. The push for change led to years of
economic success yet brought almost no constitutional or social reforms. We
were worn out, and growth lulled us into complacency" - which may be a more
accessible version of happiness. 

Adapting to changing times and strengthening its bases, Chile's rightwing
regrouped within the Alliance for Chile, which includes the UDI and National
Renewal. The demagogic Alliance, blending ideology, militancy and
cohesiveness, cleverly stole a page from the opposition's book, which the
presidential candidate, Lavín, used as his slogan: "Long live change!"
Chile's right, which includes management interests and former military
figures now in business, has proved much stronger than parties within the
CPD coalition, divided and weary from the strain of governing. 

On 16 July, after two years' work, a bill setting up a cultural council and
cultural development fund - the centre of the CPD's programme - was
presented to the Congress for approval. Poor planning meant that many CPD
deputies were absent, and voting could not take place without a quorum.
Lagos spoke of the deputies' parliamentary duties and used the powers in
Article 65 of Chile's constitution to reintroduce the bill, which was
eventually passed in August. 

Disillusionment

Even though the path of consensus may have suited the needs of the first
democratic government of the post-Pinochet era, it has become an obstacle to
Chilean participation in civil society. Chile's transition to democracy
demobilised social forces that had once been at the forefront of the fight
against dictatorship. Feelings of disillusionment and resignation are now
commonplace, and many observers agree with sociologist Tomás Moulian:
"Despite his charisma, Ricardo Lagos arrived at the wrong time, economically
speaking. He came too late to change the constitution." 

Stripped of their political reasons for existence, activist groups now
appear as unruly and antisocial forces. This July secondary school students
demonstrated against proposals to raise public transport fares. Although
they won their battle, they paid a high price, since newspapers, television
and government officials all focused on the disruption and the damage to
public order caused by their demonstrations. The media ignored the students'
long list of complaints, even though the government invited them into
discussions. Demonstrations also happened on 11 September in the suburbs of
Santiago to mark the anniversary of the coup that had toppled Salvador
Allende in 1973. After 14 police officers were injured and 505 people were
arrested, the police and government blamed "marginalised youths". 

Now that competitive individualism has replaced the public interest,
Chileans refuse to pay taxes to fund public education. They prefer to work
desperately hard to enrol their children in expensive private schools
instead. Given the fascination with individual success, involvement in the
welfare of others is seen as misguided. Chileans and, at times, their
political representatives no longer understand the relationship between
cause and effect. 

The military dictatorship managed to destroy Chileans' sense of social
equality, their collective imagination and their potential for mobilisation.
With the government split between neo-liberals and social democrats, some
within the administration have also given up these ideals. Chilean society
remains convinced of (or perhaps just resigned to) the idea that rectifying
social inequalities depends on growth and individual success. 

Take Mauricio, born in Valparaíso. His father, a watchmaker, sent him to
Santiago to study engineering. Mauricio boasts that he can navigate any
obstacles in the labour market: "I'm better off than my parents. Sure, I
feel a little insecure. I'm scared that I might lose my job and not be able
to find another. But if I keep up with my training, things will get better.
All my money goes to pay for my medical insurance, retirement plan and other
deductions. Since my kids aren't in university yet, all I can do is further
my education and work harder than others so my employer doesn't fire me." 

According to the World Bank, poverty in Chile has decreased. Between 1987
and 1998 cases of extreme poverty (less than $1.60 a day) dropped from 13%
to 4%, and less extreme cases (under $3 a day) fell from 40% to 17%. But in
the absence of official income redistribution policies or comprehensive
anti-poverty measures, there is now entrenched poverty. "With all our
wealth, maritime and mineral resources, and all the talk of national
success, I wonder why I can't make the grade," says unemployed Pedro.
Originally from the north, he relocated to Santiago but found no work: "I
wonder why should Chileans like me still go hungry?" The top 10% of Chilean
households consume 41% of national income, while the bottom 20% get by on a
total share of only 3.7% (10). Although financial aid is available and there
are assistance programmes, these stopgap measures do not provide
opportunities for effective long-term social reintegration. 

The Chile Solidario programme is ostensibly supported by social workers and
anti-poverty groups, including sociologists from the SUR centre for social
studies, the ministry of planning and the urban poverty programme (PPU).
Participants in the programme get follow-up attention for problems including
re-integration, alcoholism, depression, isolation and inadequate training.
The programme intends to create a safety net for the 226,000 poorest
families. 

"Poverty and indigence are often invisible," says Fernando Munita, an
anthropologist and co-director of the PPU. "From the outside it may look
like a nice house, but inside you find all the problems of poverty. The good
thing about Chile Solidario is that it addresses employment concerns while
taking the whole situation into account. But I believe its funding levels
are inadequate." 

The Latin American crisis now threatens Chile directly. Its oasis of
stability will suffer unless the government makes reforms to halt social
fragmentation. Chileans want to take charge of their future, and move beyond
a pre-fabricated consensus that can no longer accommodate their desire for
change.

* Journalist

(1) The CPD coalition includes the Christian Democratic party (PDC), the
Socialist party (PS), the Party for Democracy (PPD) and the Radical Social
Democratic party (PRSD).
(2) Country Briefings (Chile), The Economist Intelligence Unit, New York,
July 2002. 
(3) The Economist Intelligence Unit, October 2002.
(4) Desarrollo humano en Chile 2002 - Nosotros los Chilenos: un desafío
cultural, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Santiago, 2002.
(5) Tomás Moulian, Chile actual: anatomía de un mito, Lom/Arcis University,
Santiago, 1997.
(6) Lo chileno, una herencia cuestionada, UNDP Chile, 2002. The report
distinguishes between "proud" Chileans (32%), who see their lives in
historical and traditional terms and tend to be in their mid-50s; "insecure"
Chileans (38%), who lack the capacity for self-definition and are unsure
which version of history applies to them - they are mostly middle-class. And
there are "discontented" Chileans (30%) who do not believe in Chilean
identity, have no stake in their country, and tend to be from the lower
classes.
(7) See Patrick Zachmann, Chili: les routes de la mémoire, Marval, Paris,
2002.
(8) Chilean social workers call this helplessness "acquired despair"
(desesperanza aprehendida), connoting disappointment and acceptance, and
summed up as "discouragement".
(9) International Monetary Fund, New York, August 2002.

  
Translated by Luke Sandford 
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