No subject

Constitution there was an absolute division between the civilian and
military command functions; and no pyramidal state structure. At the Toky=
o
trials, British chief prosecutor Comyns Carr complained it was hard
formulating a prosecution because during the war, because 'all the
politicians, soldiers and sailors were all squabbling and double-crossing
one another all the time.'

Wartime Japan saw several changes of government. Tojo came to power in 19=
41
on a militarist policy, but was 'never a dictator the way Hitler was.'  H=
e
was forced to resign after the fall of Saipan because his cabinet enemies=
,
supported by zaibatsu representatives, united to force him out.  Tojo's
replacement was Kuniaki Koiso, who resigned in April 1945, to be replaced=
 by
Kantaro Suzuki. Suzuki favoured ending the war. His foreign minister, the
career diplomat Shigenori Togo, 'had been repelled by the trickery at Pea=
rl
Harbor' and later became a forceful critic of both the war and the milita=
ry.

In 1940 the Imperial Rule Assistance Association absorbed all political
parties, but the Association itself was highly factionalised. When Tojo
called elections in 1942, an independent right wing group called the Toho=
kai
ran 46 candidates against the government, and there were quite a few
independent candidates, of whom 85 were elected. Veteran politician Ozaki
Yukio was charged with of l=E8se-majest=E9 during the campaign - but the =
Supreme
Court cleared him in 1944.

We are apt to think Japan was fascist because it joined the Axis alliance=
,
but the Axis was loose and pragmatic. 'Germany and Japan took opposing si=
des
in World War I,' L.H. Gann points out, and 'in World War II they failed t=
o
cooperate.'  We've seen that before 1939 Nazi Germany was more sympatheti=
c
to the Chinese Nationalists than to Tokyo. General George C Marshall
provided an affidavit to the Tokyo trials saying there was no evidence of
close strategic co-operation between Germany and Japan, which was putting=
 it
mildly.  Hitler's attack on the USSR came as a surprise to the Japanese, =
and
Tokyo didn't give the Germans advance notice of its assault on Pearl
Harbour.  All that the Japanese and German states really had in common wa=
s
being late arrivals amongst the imperial powers.

Unlike Hitler, the Japanese state didn't persecute the Jews: in fact more
than 21,000 of them spent the war in Shanghai under Japanese jurisdiction=
.
Within Japan they were treated according their various national
citizenships, whilst Japanese consulates abroad issued visas allowing the=
m
to reach China and escape Nazi persecution. Sugihara, consul in Lithuania=
,
issued thousands of visas.

The Tokyo regime did arrest Seventh-Day Adventists and Holiness Christian=
s
for refusing to acknowledge the emperor as more than human. That sounds
fascist. But in Australia it was little different: both Menzies and Curti=
n
banned the Jehovah's Witnesses because they refused military service; and=
 in
Western Australia the RSL asked why the Witnesses weren't put into
concentration camps.

Neither did the Japanese people passively accept their lot. There was muc=
h
opposition and informal dissent. Three years into the Pacific war, advise=
rs
told the Emperor: 'Criticism against the military and government is stead=
ily
becoming more active'. By mid 1944, a secret police official said Japanes=
e
society was 'like a stack of hay, ready to burst into flame at the touch =
of
a match,' while others fretted about potentially disruptive social
movements.  A Chinese saying had appeared on a telephone pole: "Thousands
die for the glory of a single general. "

Struggles between workers and bosses, and tenant farmers and landlords
continued throughout the war despite strict government controls. 17,738
tenant farmers engaged in 2,424 disputes in 1943; and 8,213 tenants engag=
ed
in 2,160 disputes in 1944.  As for labour conflicts: between January 1943
and November 1944 the Home Ministry counted 740 disputes in the industria=
l
sector, with another 612 disputes being forestalled. The final stages of =
the
war saw mass absenteeism.  Even in the Foreign Ministry,  'one finds an
official ruminating on reports of industrial sabotage and passing on rumo=
urs
about drunken workers shouting "Stalin banzai" [whilst] students conscrip=
ted
to work in the Nakajima Aircraft plant had boldly announced that it was
useless to work so that big capitalists could profit.'

Some dissenting journals managed to survive:

"Masaki's Chikaki yori and Yanaihara's Kashin were the most open forms of
legal intellectual opposition during the war. Issues of both journals wer=
e
frequently banned, and both men were pressured to stop publication.
Nevertheless, they continued to put out their magazines every month, neve=
r
missing an issue and never surrendering to the official line. Even after =
the
heavy air raids in the spring of 1945, the magazines came out in
mimeographed form until the day the war ended. Masaki and Yanaihara showe=
d
equal fortitude against the Japanese police and US B-29s [bombers]."

But far to the south, tragically, Australian leftists were cheering on th=
e
American bombers.

Prince Konoe's 1945 Memorial urged Hirohito to surrender quickly to avoid=
 'a
communist revolution' and it seems others among the authorities harboured
similar fears.  Konoe was partly concerned with the discovery of a
pro-Russian spy ring, partly with external Soviet threats; but he was als=
o
worried about mass discontent. And with some reason judging by the
anti-emperor sentiments expressed at the 1946 May Day rally.

We can legitimately call wartime Japan an authoritarian state; it
undoubtedly qualified as militarist under Tojo; and it was certainly
imperialist. But it was never fascist.

***
Sources available if you write to me off list.





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