No subject

Constitution there was an absolute division between the civilian and=20
military command functions; and no pyramidal state structure. At the Toky=
o=20
trials, British chief prosecutor Comyns Carr complained it was hard=20
formulating a prosecution because during the war, because 'all the=20
politicians, soldiers and sailors were all squabbling and double-crossing=
=20
one another all the time.'

Wartime Japan saw several changes of government. Tojo came to power in 19=
41=20
on a militarist policy, but was 'never a dictator the way Hitler was.'  H=
e=20
was forced to resign after the fall of Saipan because his cabinet enemies=
,=20
supported by zaibatsu representatives, united to force him out.  Tojo's=20
replacement was Kuniaki Koiso, who resigned in April 1945, to be replaced=
 by=20
Kantaro Suzuki. Suzuki favoured ending the war. His foreign minister, the=
=20
career diplomat Shigenori Togo, 'had been repelled by the trickery at Pea=
rl=20
Harbor' and later became a forceful critic of both the war and the milita=
ry.

In 1940 the Imperial Rule Assistance Association absorbed all political=20
parties, but the Association itself was highly factionalised. When Tojo=20
called elections in 1942, an independent right wing group called the Toho=
kai=20
ran 46 candidates against the government, and there were quite a few=20
independent candidates, of whom 85 were elected. Veteran politician Ozaki=
=20
Yukio was charged with of l=E8se-majest=E9 during the campaign - but the =
Supreme=20
Court cleared him in 1944.

We are apt to think Japan was fascist because it joined the Axis alliance=
,=20
but the Axis was loose and pragmatic. 'Germany and Japan took opposing si=
des=20
in World War I,' L.H. Gann points out, and 'in World War II they failed t=
o=20
cooperate.'  We've seen that before 1939 Nazi Germany was more sympatheti=
c=20
to the Chinese Nationalists than to Tokyo. General George C Marshall=20
provided an affidavit to the Tokyo trials saying there was no evidence of=
=20
close strategic co-operation between Germany and Japan, which was putting=
 it=20
mildly.  Hitler's attack on the USSR came as a surprise to the Japanese, =
and=20
Tokyo didn't give the Germans advance notice of its assault on Pearl=20
Harbour.  All that the Japanese and German states really had in common wa=
s=20
being late arrivals amongst the imperial powers.

Unlike Hitler, the Japanese state didn't persecute the Jews: in fact more=
=20
than 21,000 of them spent the war in Shanghai under Japanese jurisdiction=
.=20
Within Japan they were treated according their various national=20
citizenships, whilst Japanese consulates abroad issued visas allowing the=
m=20
to reach China and escape Nazi persecution. Sugihara, consul in Lithuania=
,=20
issued thousands of visas.

The Tokyo regime did arrest Seventh-Day Adventists and Holiness Christian=
s=20
for refusing to acknowledge the emperor as more than human. That sounds=20
fascist. But in Australia it was little different: both Menzies and Curti=
n=20
banned the Jehovah's Witnesses because they refused military service; and=
 in=20
Western Australia the RSL asked why the Witnesses weren't put into=20
concentration camps.

Neither did the Japanese people passively accept their lot. There was muc=
h=20
opposition and informal dissent. Three years into the Pacific war, advise=
rs=20
told the Emperor: 'Criticism against the military and government is stead=
ily=20
becoming more active'. By mid 1944, a secret police official said Japanes=
e=20
society was 'like a stack of hay, ready to burst into flame at the touch =
of=20
a match,' while others fretted about potentially disruptive social=20
movements.  A Chinese saying had appeared on a telephone pole: "Thousands=
=20
die for the glory of a single general. "

Struggles between workers and bosses, and tenant farmers and landlords=20
continued throughout the war despite strict government controls. 17,738=20
tenant farmers engaged in 2,424 disputes in 1943; and 8,213 tenants engag=
ed=20
in 2,160 disputes in 1944.  As for labour conflicts: between January 1943=
=20
and November 1944 the Home Ministry counted 740 disputes in the industria=
l=20
sector, with another 612 disputes being forestalled. The final stages of =
the=20
war saw mass absenteeism.  Even in the Foreign Ministry,  'one finds an=20
official ruminating on reports of industrial sabotage and passing on rumo=
urs=20
about drunken workers shouting "Stalin banzai" [whilst] students conscrip=
ted=20
to work in the Nakajima Aircraft plant had boldly announced that it was=20
useless to work so that big capitalists could profit.'

Some dissenting journals managed to survive:

"Masaki's Chikaki yori and Yanaihara's Kashin were the most open forms of=
=20
legal intellectual opposition during the war. Issues of both journals wer=
e=20
frequently banned, and both men were pressured to stop publication.=20
Nevertheless, they continued to put out their magazines every month, neve=
r=20
missing an issue and never surrendering to the official line. Even after =
the=20
heavy air raids in the spring of 1945, the magazines came out in=20
mimeographed form until the day the war ended. Masaki and Yanaihara showe=
d=20
equal fortitude against the Japanese police and US B-29s [bombers]."

But far to the south, tragically, Australian leftists were cheering on th=
e=20
American bombers.

Prince Konoe's 1945 Memorial urged Hirohito to surrender quickly to avoid=
 'a=20
communist revolution' and it seems others among the authorities harboured=
=20
similar fears.  Konoe was partly concerned with the discovery of a=20
pro-Russian spy ring, partly with external Soviet threats; but he was als=
o=20
worried about mass discontent. And with some reason judging by the=20
anti-emperor sentiments expressed at the 1946 May Day rally.

We can legitimately call wartime Japan an authoritarian state; it=20
undoubtedly qualified as militarist under Tojo; and it was certainly=20
imperialist. But it was never fascist.

***
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