No subject

In practice, the Red Army's ability to create new divisions as fast as 
Germans  smashed existing ones was a principal cause of the the German 
failure in 1941.

[Note-- this is in 1941.  Before Kursk, before the disaster of Operation 
Mars.]

For much of the 1920s and 1930s, the Red Army had emphasized the idea of 
cadre and mobilization forces, formations that had very few active duty 
soldiers in peacetime but would gain reservists and volunteers...in wartime. 
As war approached in the late 1930s, the Red Army tended to neglect this 
concept, gradually mobilizing most of its existing units to full-time, 
active-duty status.  Still, prewar Soviet theory estimated that the army 
would have to be replaced every four to eight months during heavy combat. 
To satisfy this need, the 1938 Universal Military Service Law extended the 
reserve service to the age 50 and created a network of schools to train 
those reservists...

...on 23 July force generation was delegated to Commissariat headquarters 
and the military districts.  The districts OUTSIDE THE ACTUAL WAR ZONE 
[emphasis supplied] established a system for cloning existing active-duty 
units to provide the cadres that were filled up with reservists.  A total of 
5,300,00 reservists were called to the colors by the end of June, with 
successive mobilizations later.  Thirteen new field armies appeared in July, 
14 in August, 1 in September, 4 in October.  Yet this mobilizations system, 
in conjuction with active duty units that moved FROM EASTERN MILITARY 
DISTRICTS TO THE WEST [emphasis again supplied], retained enough strength to 
provide 8 more armies to defend Moscow in November and December and another 
10 new armies in the spring of 1942.

By 1 December 1941, the Soviet mobilizagtion system had deployed 97 existing 
divisions to the west, while creatring 194 new divisions and 84 separate 
brigades from the mobilization base."

Did you get that?  194 new division and 84 separate brigades from the 
mobilization bases that were outside the war zones.

According to Glantz, these mobilization centers functioned throughout the 
war and played critical roles in resupply of fresh troops, before, after, 
and during battles.  In 1944, in preparation of the attack to destroy 
Germany's Army Group Center, the Stavka estimated that Group Center had 42 
divisions and 850,000 men.   Stavka estimated its attacking forces of one 
million men in 77 division and 5 mobile corps and determined the number was 
insufficient.  The Soviet forces were then reinforced by 5 combined-arms 
armies, 2 tank armies, 1 air army, 1 Polish field army, and 11 mobile corps, 
more than 400,000 troops in total.

Glantz writes that during actual combat operations 2,331,000 troops engaged 
in Operation Bagration as it was called.  Of these 178,500 were killed and 
587, 308 were wounded.  Still Soviet troop strength on the entire Eastern 
Front rose to 6,500,000.  Armored forces increased from 7753 tanks to 8300 
by the end of 1944.  Artillery strength increased by 14% while German 
decline 16%.

And were did this resupply come from? Soviet military casualties prior to 
1944 were 26 million killed, missing, captured-- not including the wounded. 
The resupply came from outside the direct fire war zones.

As Glantz says "Speer could not generate the resources Germany need most--  
trained and ready military manpower."

While the battles of 1944 were disasterous for the German military, the 
Soviets had paid a huge price as casualties for that year reache 8 million 
killed, captured, or missing.

During March and April 1945, the Soviet mobilization bases went to work on 
resupply and reinforcement for the push to Berlin.


Let me know when you find the documentation of every Red Army soldier losing 
a relative to rape.



----- Original Message ----- 
From: <Jscotlive at aol.com>
To: <sartesian at earthlink.net>
Sent: Wednesday, August 05, 2009 4:40 PM
Subject: [Marxism] Red Army and rape