No subject

in the
run-up to the election makes it all the more difficult to manage the =
rival
factions, as he has done for the past two decades.

Undoubtedly, this is shaping up to be the most important presidential
election in Iran=92s history, especially because it is a bellwether of =
what is
happening at a higher level:  a potential unraveling of the political =
system
that has been in place since Iran=92s 1979 revolution.  As we have noted
previously, the cohesiveness of the Iranian state has been =
deteriorating,
with a rift between the president=92s ultra-conservative camp and the
pragmatic conservative camp led by Rafsanjani.  The United States=92
offer of rapprochement has made the situation even more urgent, as =
Tehran
needs to arrive at an internal consensus on the direction of foreign =
policy
and seek economic rehabilitation.

Ahmadinejad=92s policies have been exacerbated divisions that have long
existed, especially since the 1989 death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. =

Until fairly recently, his successor, Khamenei, kept this internal =
dissent
contained by balancing between different factions that have controlled
various state institutions.  During Ahmadinejad=92s presidency, the =
internal
struggle has shifted:  Where it once was a matter of the policy =
preferences
of rival camps within a conservative-dominated political establishment, =
it
has become a situation in which the nature of the Islamic republic=92s
political system is in question.

Because he is the first Iranian president who is not also a cleric,
Ahmadinejad sought to strengthen his position by claiming that his =
policies
were guided by the highly revered and hidden 12th imam of the Shia, the
Mahdi.  This claim has unnerved the clerics:  It undermines their =
privileged
position, not only in the Iranian political system but also in religious
terms.  The implication of this is that if laypeople have access to the
messiah, there is no need for them to rely on clerics
-- who historically have had tremendous influence among the masses.

Meanwhile, the =E9lite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is =
emerging
as a powerful player in Iran, currently second only to the clerics.  But =
as
the clerical community becomes marred by internal disagreements and the
aging ayatollahs who founded the republic anticipate the day when they =
will
be succeeded by a second generation, the IRGC is very likely to emerge =
as
the most powerful force within the state.  The ayatollahs have used =
their
religious position to control the ideological force; if they should =
become
weaker, the non-clerical politicians and technocrats will have a tough =
time
dealing with the IRGC.

The first step in the trajectory of Iran will become evident with the
outcome of the June 12 election.  But regardless of who wins, the =
Islamic
republic is reaching a point where the political system, facing a great =
deal
of stress and strain, is likely to evolve into something else.  It is =
too
early to predict the exact outcome of this struggle, but what is clear =
is
that the clerics are under pressure from many sides.