Kein Betreff

in the region could serve. Missiles could be based in many places in
the region, but only Cuba could bottle up the Gulf of Mexico. Any
Soviet planner looking at a map would immediately identify Cuba as a
key asset; any American planner looking at the same map would
identify Cuba in Soviet hands as a key threat. For the Soviets,
establishing a pro-Soviet regime in Cuba represented a geopolitical
masterstroke. For the United States, it represented a geopolitical
nightmare that had to be reversed. 

Just as U.S. medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in
Turkey put the Soviet heartland in the crosshairs during the Cold
War, Soviet missiles deployed operationally in Cuba put the entire
U.S. Eastern Seaboard at risk. Mere minutes would have been available
for detection and recognition of an attack before impact. In
addition, the missiles' very presence would serve as a significant
deterrent to conventional attack on the island -- which is why it was
so important for the United States not to allow an established
missile presence in Cuba.

The final outcome of the U.S.-Soviet standoff pivoted on the Cuban
Missile Crisis of 1962, which ended in an American blockade of Cuba,
not a Soviet blockade of the Gulf. It was about missiles, not about
maritime access. But the deal that ended the crisis solved the
problem for the United States. In return for a U.S. promise not to
invade Cuba, the Soviets promised not to place nuclear missiles on
the island. If the Soviets didn't have missiles there, the United
States could neutralize any naval presence in Cuba -- and therefore
any threat to American trade routes. Fidel Castro could be allowed to
survive, but in a position of strategic vulnerability. One part of
Washington's strategy was military, and the other part was economic
-- namely, the embargo.

Throughout Cuba's history as an independent nation, the Cubans
simultaneously have viewed the United States as an economic driver of
the Cuban economy, and as a threat to Cuban political autonomy. The
Americans have looked at Cuba as a potential strategic threat. This
imbalance made U.S. domination of Cuba inevitable. Cuban leaders in
the first half of the 20th century accepted domination in return for
prosperity. But there were those who argued that the island's
prosperity was unequally distributed, and the loss of autonomy too
damaging to accept. Castro led the latter group to success in the
1959 revolution against U.S.-supported Cuban President Fulgencio
Batista. The anti-Castro emigres who fled to the United States and
established an influential community of anti-Castro sentiment had
been part of the elite who prospered from Cuba's high level of
dependence on the United States. 

Cuban history has been characterized by an oscillation of views about
the United States, with Cubans both wanting what it had to offer and
seeking foreign powers -- the Spanish, the British the Soviets -- to
counterbalance the Americans. But the counterbalance either never
materialized (in the case of the British) or, when it did, it was as
suffocating as the Americans (in the case of the Soviets). In the
end, Cuba probably would have preferred to be located somewhere not
of strategic interest to the United States. 

The U.S. obsession with Cuba does not manifest itself continuously;
it appears only when a potentially hostile major power allies itself
with Cuba and bases itself there. Cuba by itself can never pose a
threat to the United States. Absent a foreign power, the United
States is never indifferent to Cuba, but is much less sensitive.
Therefore, after the end of the Cold War and the Soviet collapse,
Cuba became a minor issue for the United States -- and political
considerations took precedence over geopolitical issues. Florida's
electoral votes were more important than Cuba, and the status quo was
left untouched. 

Cuba has become a bit more important to the United States in the wake
of the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war. In response to that conflict,
the Americans sent warships into the Black Sea. The Russians
responded by sending warships and strategic bombers into the
Caribbean. High-profile Russian delegations have held talks with Cuba
since then, increasing tensions. But these tensions are a tiny
fraction of what they once were. Russia is in no way a strategic
threat to American shipping in the Gulf of Mexico, nor is it going to
be any time soon, due to Russia's limited ability to wield
substantive power in such a distant theater.

But Cuba is always an underlying concern to the United States. This
concern can subside, but it cannot go away. Thus, from the American
point of view, Russian probes are a reminder that Cuba remains a
potential threat. Advocates of easing the embargo say it will help
liberalize Cuba, just as trade relations liberalized Russia. The
Cuban leadership shares this view and will therefore be very careful
about how any liberalization is worked out. The Cubans must be
thoroughly convinced of the benefits of increased engagement with the
United States in order for Havana to sacrifice its ability to blame
Washington for all of its economic problems. If Cuba opens too much
to the United States, the Cuban regime might fall. In the end, it
might be the Cubans who shy away from an end to the embargo. The
Americans have little to lose either way.

But that is all politics. The important thing to understand about
Cuba is the historic U.S. obsession with the island, and why the
Cubans have never been able to find their balance with the United
States. The answer lies in geopolitics. The politics in play now are
simply the bubble on the surface of much deeper forces.


This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with
attribution to www.stratfor.com.

Copyright 2009 Stratfor.


...................End Forwarded Message..................



L=FCko Willms 
Frankfurt/Main 
/ Lueko.Willms at T-Online.de