[Marxism] LetterfromSerbiansocialistssupportingKosovarself-determnation

[Michael Karadjis]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: marxism-bounces+mkaradjis=theplanet.net.au at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:marxism-
> bounces+mkaradjis=theplanet.net.au at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> Paula


> Michael wrote:
> 
> > Well, as I explained, I thought in some detail, in my last post, the
> UN
> > authority (UNMIK) that has ruled Kosova for the last 9 years has had
> > MUCH more power than the EU authority, whose mandate is more
> specific
> > (see my last post).
> 
> Perhaps, but the UN is not an outside power in the way the EU is. The
> UN is
> not a major imperialist power in its own right. It does not seek
> regional or
> global hegemony for itself. The EU does, and its new role in Kosovo
> increases *its* influence in the region.

In a way yes, but substantially no. The entire UNMIK operation since
1999 has in essence been run by the EU. It has been almost all (if not
all) EU member states (France, Germany etc) which have been the UNMIK
Proconsul with absolute power in Kosova. That absolute power has allowed
some very direct intervention into areas that have nothing to do with
'human rights' or 'minority protection'. The example I gave you of
cancelling a favourable German mobile contract in favour of a less
favourable French one when Kouchner was Proconsul was just one example
of many. This change is very important - there will be a much greater
degree of economic independence to make such decisions for themselves
than before, a crucial issue in a land with over 50% unemployment and no
economy after a decade of UNMIK imperialist rule and 2 decades of legal
limbo.

Presumably you saw the excellent article by Adam Novak, sent to this
list a couple of days ago by Fred Fuentes, on the devastating result of
the decade of UNMK rule, and of the last 20 years, called a country
without an economy'. 

But that does not mean we support this new power either, as has been
clarified many times. But it is still wrong to see this significant
*reduction* in direct imperialist power as an increase. Also bear in
mind that every ruling class in Europe, including those in both Serbia
and Kosova, spire to EU membership, as d the great majority of people,
and so however much self-determination they got the EU would have a lit
of power. 
> 
> > But whatever about all that, Serbia is not a state of Russia. Serbia
> is
> > the centre of the Balkans. The EU wants Serbia in and NATO wants
> Serbia
> > in. Yet by supporting independence for Kosova, they drive Serbia
> more
> > into Russia's arms. This is not a 'strategic gain" at all.
> 
> But Serbia is, at present, in Russia's sphere of influence. Driving it
> further into Russia's arms is a small price to pay for slicing a
> strategic
> portion off that sphere and establishing direct control over it.
> Russia's
> reaction makes it quite clear whose gain this is.
> 
Serbia is no more in Russia's sphere than anyone else's in particular.
Serbia has developed excellent relations with all EU countries, has vast
economic relations with them, has considerable foreign investment from
EU countries and the US (far more than Kosova has), interestingly,
Russia actually has a stronger foothold in independent Montenegro than
in Serbia, having bought up a large part of the coast. Moreover, given
the vast economic relations between EU countries and Russia, even the
concept of "spheres of influence" between them being different is
somewhat vague.

However, what is clear is that the US and EU's recent decision to bite
the bullet and recognise that there was no alternative (other than a
counterinsurgency war) to ceding the Kosovars some kind of independence
(and then being sure to try to control and limit it as much as possible)
has led to a dramatic strengthening of Russian influence, including
economic presence, in Serbia. IF the battle was between "the west and
Russia" (which as I explained I not exactly think, but there's an
element of it), then "the west" has lost influence in the much bigger
prize, the very centre of the Balkans, through which road, rail and
water links pass, as well as pipelines etc. In return, they've got a
little piece of third world misery in Kosova in exchange. 

If it had been possible for the EU to keep Kosova in Serbia in some
form, as they battled to do for many years, it would have been a far
more preferable outcome for EU imperialism. It is of course possible
that US imperialism, precisely in order to assert its relevance, and
that of NATO, into the region, and to head off such a joint EU-Russia
outcome, acted in ways to mess this up, particularly its blunt
diplomatic strategy. However, even this was predicated upon the fact
that nothing could be done to stop independence: if the US thought NATO
could maintain the stability there forever on behalf of the EU, this
would be a victory for US and NATO 'relevance'. But at the end of the
day, it was the very recent and quite dramatic switch of the main EU
countries themselves which was the major factor. And that cannot be
understood outside of understanding that the K Albanians were going to
declare their independence, which they had been putting off for years,
whoever liked it, and the EU's late decision that recognising it would
be the best way to control it.        

Ultimately what all the other discussion is leaving out, even the better
discussion, much of which I have a great deal of sympathy with, is this
crucial question of the actual agency of the 2 million Albanians
themselves.