[Marxism] -ismic doctrine or science? (was: Cockburn contrarianism)

[Haines Brown]

Luko, you raise an interesting question:

> > Marxism is the application of the scientific method to social and
> > political problems of the world in which we live. Marxism isn't a
> > frozen, religious doctrine.
> 
>   Why then not dropping this name "Marxism" (even with a big "M")
> which makes it appear as a doctrine?
> 
>   Why not simply talking about science? About a scientific analysis
> of all which exists? Without the slightest fear neither from our own
> discoveries, nor from conflict with the powers that be, as Charlie
> Marx happend to write in 1843?

There seem to be three issues here, but only one seems to be your
major concern. 

One is the use of "ism". I don't believe the "ism" necessarily implies
any doctrine. Alcoholism is not a doctrine. I'm not sure, but I get
the feeling the "ism" merely implies a certain coherence of things,
whether it be of ideas or symptoms. And I see nothing wrong with
coherence.

Incidentally, I take it that the word "doctrine", as used pejoratively
here, implies that it is a coherent body of thought that is
authoritative and therefore either rigid or not open to question. I
fear this introduces a "red herring" not relevant to your
question. Any body of ideas can become a doctrine and be represented
as authoritative. This is more often than not good and necessary. I
often accept truths based on some authority, which I don't challenge
simply because I'm ignorant of the field. In such cases, I need some
authority. It is very useful, not something necessarily pernicious.

So let me turn to what I see as the real issue here.

I suppose many would insist that what we commonly refer to as
"Marxism" refers to a particular coherent and scientific world
view. The question then becomes, is it distinguished by this
scientific content? 

What scientific features characterize Marxism? Well, it seems widely
accepted that Marxism is an example of "scientific realism", which
locates explanation in causal mechanisms rather than subsuming events
under general laws. It clearly seems to exemplify what we today would
call process theory; Marxists today like to speak of this as a
dialectical approach. Although perhaps implied by these first two
points, I like to toss in probabilistic causality as an important
feature of Marxist science.

I mention these points only by way of illustration, not to invite
debate over the specifics.

The problem is that such a list of features does not adequately
distinguish Marxism from what Kuhn called "normal" science. Scientific
realism has been the implicit assumption of scientists since before
Marx's time, and recently has even acquired philosophical
respectability. Process theory has also long been an attractive
alternative to static empiricism, although the process theory we have
seen (William James' "fringes", Henri Bergson's elan vitale, people
like Nicholas Rescher) strikes me as too intuitive or
superficial. Nevertheless, process theory is very much a part of
mainstream science. Finally, a probabilistic causality is not alien to
normal science, for it is the implicit assumption of nearly all
historians and has a secure place in the natural sciences (statistical
and quantum mechanics, for example).

In short, there is nothing so far about the Marxist approach that
really differentiates it from western/bourgeois science. Furthermore,
my sense is that Marxism is not just another branch of normal science.

I believe the reason for this is rather subtle, but important. The
whole western scientific enterprise had its roots in 16th century
Platonism, which really made science as we know it possible by
assuming that the universe is coherent. It can be argued that any kind
of science (as opposed to engineering) must presume some kind of
universal framework. The problem with normal science (a problem often
more in theory than practice) was that this coherence was
metaphysical.

Although I may be skating on thin ice here, I believe that this is
where Marxism breaks away from normal science. What distinguishes
Marxism is that the universality that makes science possible is not a
metaphysical coherence, but a social universal - the modern working
class. It makes the universal concrete, not an abstraction.

But I skirt the interesting question you raise. I've indicated why I
would not reduce Marxism to science, but left open the possibility
that Marxism is simply a mature working class ideology, which reponds
to emergent circumstances and its own inner growing sophistication and
self-awareness. So why then cling to the term "Marxism" if the ideas
of Marxists are increasingly distant from what Marx himself thought?
Should we drop the term "Marxism" and replace it with something like
"working-class ideology"?

Perhaps so. I have certainly been tempted to go in that
direction. However, there is a basic distinction here that is being
obscured. Marx articulated a working-class ideology that was
responsive to the _potential_ of the working class; it was not simply
a description of what workers in a developed capitalist economy
actually were thinking. As such, it is not a mirror of circumstance,
but a reflection of socio-economic contradictions, including the
_real_ potencies of the working class.

Here is where the term "Marxism" seems to retain some value. As long
as it does not imply a thoughtless clinging to Marx's particular
ideas, many of which are naturally undeveloped, nascent, or out of
date, the term Marxism can refer, not to a coterie of ideas, but a
socio-economic contradictory process.

Marxism is a critique of empiricism, and so we should not try to
define Marxism in static empiricist terms - as a collection of ideas
that happen to be associated with Marx, but as an aspect of a
contradictory process that engages society, the economy and
thought. Once Marxism is understood as an aspect of a contradictory
process, it can never go out of date as long as there is a working
class.

Thanks for the opportunity to speculate a bit.

Haines Brown