[Marxism] A Setback for Autoworkers and a New Beginning

[Bonnie Weinstein]

A Setback for Autoworkers and a New Beginning
By the Editors
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2008
SOCIALIST VIEWPOINT
Socialistviewpoint.org

United Auto Workers President Ron Gettelfinger instructed his dues-paying
members that they must do what no self-respecting union had ever done
before: help their employers compete more successfully with their non-union
competitors. How? By agreeing to a massive reduction in autoworkers¹wages
and benefits! 

Even more self-destructive is the new contract¹s division of the union into
three groups‹first-tier, second-tier, and temporary workers‹directly
violating the union principle that is the only source of workers¹ power:
class solidarity. 

Nevertheless, by November 15,autoworkers employed by the Big Three U.S. auto
giants, General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford, voted to accept a contract that
by the time it expires in 2011 will have reduced wages and benefits by
half‹providing it holds up until then.

The explanation provided by employers and widely reported in the mass media
was that they voted ³yes² in order to save jobs. But since such trade-offs
of wages, benefits, and a little bit of union power has been going on for
decades, autoworkers already knew it would really contribute further to the
decline in UAW membership from the 1.5 million-strong it was in 1979 to the
half-million it is today. One doesn¹t need a crystal ball to see that such a
trade-off is an exchange of something for nothing.

In fact, so contemptuous of autoworkers and their union have the Big Three
become that no sooner had workers at GM, Chrysler, and Ford each voted to
accept the new contract than their respective employers announced new plant
shutdowns and layoffs!

So, if it was not to save jobs, why did autoworkers vote ³yes²? The
beginning of the answer to this question is as plain as the nose on
Gettelfinger¹s face. It was the treasonous role played by the UAW
leadership, without which a vote in favor of the biggest-ever giveback
contract in labor history would have been impossible. More precisely, it was
the last several decades of setbacks and givebacks that have led most
autoworkers to the conclusion that either strikes don¹t work anymore or,
with the likes of Gettelfinger in control of the union apparatus, a strike
would be lost before it began.

Thus, it becomes perfectly understandable‹however wrongheaded‹why many of
the most experienced and class-conscious trade unionists decided to just
take the money and run.

Also contributing significantly to the ³yes² vote was the ³buyout²‹an offer
of as much as $140,000 to all UAW members with at least 10 years of
continuous service; and $70,000 for those with less than 10 years ifthey
give up their healthcare coverage. In addition to increasing the vote for
the contract, the most damaging effect of the buyout was the fact that it
took many of the most experienced, union-conscious trade union activists out
of the picture‹seriously weakening the growing opposition by rank-and-file
militants to the union-busting contract foisted on autoworkers by bosses and
bureaucrats. 
Being determines consciousness
The philosophers who study the question of why people do what they do, have
summed it up in the three words: ³Being determines consciousness.²

This is a key to understanding why the poorest and hungriest workers are
often among the first to take the risks involved in strikes and other forms
of class confrontation. But it¹s far from the only factor determining how
masses of people consciously respond to the ups and downs of the class
struggle. A no less important factor is the matter of which direction living
standards are moving‹especially when it changes suddenly.

Thus, because demand for jobs far exceeded demand for workers there were no
successful strikes for the first three-and-a-half years after the
stock-market crash of 1929. In fact, in strict accord with the
aforementioned relation between being and consciousness, the greatest-ever
worker uprising in American history was set in motion by a modest revival of
the stagnant economy. Thus, the three big citywide strike victories of 1934
were triggered by the greater demand for workers, which in turn set in
motion the labor upsurge of the 1930s.

Although objective conditions had not changed qualitatively, the modest
increase in hiring that had begun put a little wind in the sails of the
class-struggle left-wing leaders of the labor movement and their coworkers.
By the beginning of 1934, militant trade-union activists and their leaders
in three American cities led three victorious citywide strikes, which in
turn detonated the explosion of class struggle of the 1930s. 1

But workers who are not hungry are no less likely to struggle to defend and
advance their class interests. Thus, immediately after the end of the Second
World War the biggest and longest wave of strikes in American history began
on November 21, 1945, when some 225,000 autoworkers poured out of General
Motors¹s 92 plants in 50 cities and conducted a success ful 113-day strike.

Labor historian Art Preis, the author of Labor¹s Giant Step: Twenty Years of
the CIO, presents a graphic account of that historical period. We get the
flavor of that experience from the following short description of the
potential power to change the world in the hands of working people. Preis
writes: 

³In the 12 months following V-J Day more than 5,000,000 workers engaged in
strikes. For the number of strikers, their weight in industry and the
duration of the struggle, the 1945­46 strike wave in the U.S. surpassed
anything of its kind in any capitalist county, including the British General
Strike of 1926. Before its ebb it was to include the whole coal, railroad,
maritime and communications industries, although not simultaneously.

³It is clear, in retrospect, that the American monopolies stood helpless
before this awesome display of labor power. The corporations used their
usual devices of trying to break picket lines with force and violence,
police terror and injunctions. In Philadelphia, Chicago, Los Angeles, even
Detroit, the cops beat up strikers, and workers were sentenced to jail terms
for ³contempt² of injunctions. But the forces of corporate power and
political reaction were met by stiff mass resistance.

³The American industrial workers had learned a thing or two since their
first great awakening in the Thirties. In 1946 there were few would-be
scabs‹and very few of them got through picket lines.²
Background to the postwar strike wave
A little background will help put this event in its proper context. This
biggest-ever strike wave, which is a long story in itself, was the result of
the wartime policy of wage and price controls‹capitalist-style. That is,
wages were strictly frozen during the war, but while prices, for the most
part, remained nominally unchanged, commodities like 5-cent candy bars,
breakfast foods, and most other packaged and canned goods and the weight of
their contents got progressively smaller and lighter. A similar, but readily
apparent violation of price controls took place in the black market for meat
kept in a back room to be sold to the highest bidder.

Thus, by the time the war ended, the purchasing power of wages had fallen
significantly, but prices had risen just as fast and as far. That¹s what
triggered the massive outpouring of a fighting working class in the
year-long series of strikes beginning within weeks of the end of the Second
World War. 

So, it can be seen that both the impact of mass unemployment and full
employment, as well as both falling and rising living standards, can
qualitatively alter the course of the class struggle. But in the end, it¹s
the struggle for a better life and a better world by the great majority of
the exploited and oppressed that can and will change the world.

The most important lesson of those days is simply that none of it could have
happened without a mass upsurge led on the ground by militant rank-and-file
activists, who always serve as the labor movement¹s driving force.

This takes us to the only fully positive consequence of the 2007-11 UAW
contract‹otherwise the biggest blow suffered by autoworkers and their union
at the hands of bosses and bureaucrats.
Sometimes, the darkest clouds do have silver linings
Starting immediately after the Big Three¹s campaign to cut autoworkers¹
wages and benefits by more than half, a rank-and-file leadership movement
erupted, made up of groups with names like Soldiers of Solidarity, Future of
the Union,and Factory Rats Unite!

These groupings are in many ways like the union caucuses that have always
competed with each other in union elections‹much like political parties in
electoral politics.But in this case they are not in competition with each
other with rival programs of action. Rather, all three are united against
Gettelfinger¹s leadership caucus, which they have all dubbed the
³concessions caucus.² Thus, it would be more accurate to say they are really
the local websites of a movement known as Soldiers of Solidarity (SOS).
Their interrelationship is much more like the relation between local unions
in the UAW, which are in principle all united in their common need to defend
and advance their class interests,than it is to rival caucuses.

Such websites and blogs are a welcome product of the Internet revolution.
The proliferation of computers in the U.S.A. and the other advanced
industrial countries has opened the door to a major new medium of
communication between workers and, by the same token, an expansion of union
democracy and rank-and-file activism. That is, it provides a way for
rank-and-filers, so inclined, to play a far greater role in the internal
life of their union.
How mass union consciousness was changed for the worse
 This is where an understanding of the gradual undermining of union
democracy comes into the picture. A substantial portion of the American
working class today don¹t know what unions were like in the 1930s and ¹40s.
Unions throughout American history had met weekly‹not monthly as is the case
today. The change from weekly to monthly meetings was introduced shortly
after the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act‹more popularly known in 1947 in
all sections of the labor movement by leaders and members alike, as the
³slave-labor² law. 

Another innovation introduced around the same time was the extension of the
time between the elections of union officers, from one year to three years.
These changes, which put greater distance between rank-and-file workers and
control over their unions, were an integral part of transforming the
American unions from highly democratic institutions into bureaucratically
deformed caricatures of genuine worker¹s democracy.

The erosion of union democracy, however, didn¹t come from below. It was
engineered from the top by the most conservative wing of the labor
bureaucracy, who would much rather play golf with the big shots of corporate
America than go bowling with the rank-and-file of their union.

The question arises: Given the high level of union and class-consciousness
of the labor movement in 1946, how could the labor bureaucracy get away with
this crippling of union democracy?

There¹s the rub. The American working class and their unions up until the
end of1946 and most of1947 were one thing. But Taft-Hartley not only changed
the rules of class war, it also radically changed mass consciousness as well
from what it was at the beginning of1947 to what it became at the end.
Here¹s how it was done.
The true story behind the Taft-Hartley Œslave-labor¹ law
The key provision in the slave-labor Taft-Hartley Act was the one requiring
all elected union officers to sign a ³Loyalty Oath,² that read, ³I am not
now, nor have I ever been a member of a subversive communist-controlled
organization.² After all, when class-consciousness was at its height,as it
was throughout the period between 1934 and the end of 1947 there were
literally millions of workers who were at least tolerant, if not necessarily
supporters of socialist and communist ideas.

 This was simply the result of the fact that it was often socialist-minded
rank-and-filers and leaders who tended to spark and lead many of the biggest
and most militant strike victories of the 1930s and ¹40s. Thus, it was
because of what they did that they tended to have the respect and at least
the fraternal support of most trade unionists. Moreover, while most worker
militants in the unions in those days might have disagreed with socialists
over political questions, what proved to be more important was the fact that
they more often than not tended to agree with them on tactics and strategy
in the unions. 

But it was the endorsement of the Loyalty Oath‹the key ingredient of the
slave-labor law‹by the dominant wing of the labor bureaucracy that helped
the bosses and their bipartisan capitalist government divide the labor
movement on the purely diversionary and false question: are you for
communism or for your country. One¹s country, and one¹s government are,
after all, two entirely different things‹at least according to Thomas
Jefferson and other leaders of the first American Revolution‹ 1776-1783.

The loyalty oath was the bait the ruling class put on the hook that the
dominant wing of the labor bureaucracy greedily swallowed along with line
and sinker. Knowing that such an oath was not directed at them but rather at
militants in the unions, the most reactionary wing of the labor bureaucracy
saw it as an opportunity for them to deal a blow to militant union activists
who tended to form union caucuses to fight for democratic control over their
union. In fact, by subordinating union solidarity to advance their own
self-serving interests they violated the labor principle of union
solidarity‹³an injury to one is an injury to all.² That destruction of this
time-honored labor principle and Taft-Hartley¹s restrictions on the right to
strike is why it was called, a slave-labor law, by both workers and
bureaucrats. 

Taft-Hartley served another purpose for capitalist America. It also divided
the labor movement on the question of how to fight the slave labor law. The
militant wing of the union officialdom headed by United Mine Workers¹
President John L. Lewis wanted to fight the slave-labor law in the streets
and factories of the nation where workers¹ power is greatest‹beginning with
a refusal to sign the Loyalty Oath.

But the supporters of the Loyalty Oath were opposed to that kind of fight.
That is, they were opposed to the kind of fight that built American unions
into the world¹s most powerful despite essentially the same kind of laws in
effect before and during the great labor upsurge that began in 1934.
Instead, the class-collaborationist bureaucrats put their faith in the
Democratic Party. 

However, while President Truman had vetoed Taft-Hartley, as it turned out it
was only an unprincipled political maneuver. In the first place, he had
twice tried to push such a law through Congress and failed. And in the
second place, while Republicans held only the slimmest majority in both
Houses of Congress, they did not have enough votes to override Truman¹s
veto. That¹s where Truman and his Democrats revealed the cynical hypocrisy
of his veto by providing more than enough votes to help their Republican
confederates override their president¹s veto.

And if that¹s not enough, the proof of the pudding came after Truman was
reelected based on his having vetoed and then promised to repeal
Taft-Hartley. In the four more years he served as president he did what
capitalist politicians always do, especially when decisive issues vital to
capitalist interests are at stake. He simply failed to keep his promise to
the American workers.

Even so, and despite a trailer-truck-load of un-kept promises ever since,
bureaucrats continue lining up votes for Democrats and from time to time,
equally anti-labor Republicans as well.

However, there was another force at work that helped shift the relation of
class forces to the right. This, too, is a manifestation of the three words
outlining what makes people think what they think and do what they do‹being
determining consciousness.

Thus, it¹s both ironical and paradoxical that the militant strike victories
led by the class-conscious militants of the 1930s so improved the living
standards of some of the best of them, that they began spending more of
their spare time after a hard day¹s work enjoying the better things of life
that their well-deserved, higher-than-average wages made possible.

In other words, they relied much more than before on their leaders¹ guarding
the chicken coop, but the guardians of their union were also enjoying an
even better and far richer lifestyle by raising their pay from union wages
to the level of salaries capitalists pay their CEOs and other corporate
foxes. Thus, as many autoworkers now know, their official leaders had
learned to become more concerned with the welfare of the foxes, who must eat
chickens in order to live, than with the welfare of those who pay them to
guard the chicken coop.
What makes Soldiers of Solidarity different?
Let¹s take a closer look at what makes the leading activists of the Soldiers
of Solidarity movement different. They not only ³talk the talk and walk the
walk² of class-struggle strategy and tactics, no less importantly they have
shown they have a pretty good idea of what must be done next at each stage
of the struggle‹and they have done it. That¹s something we have seen only
rarely in the trade-union movement since the 1930s and ¹40s.

Consequently, even though their attempt to stop the biggest bureaucratic
giveback in American labor history did not succeed, a substantial nucleus of
a new fighting union leadership in the UAW has been born.

Moreover, based on their performance thus far, there¹s good reason to expect
that they will also know how to survive, grow, and turn their defensive
struggle into an offensive campaign when the opportunity arises.

In other words, the principal leaders and organizers of Soldiers of
Solidarity have shown a deep understanding of the art and science of class
struggle. Such understanding can only come from their years of experience on
factory assembly lines and workbenches, as well as from the lessons and
other conclusion drawn from their study of the history of class struggle in
America and the world.

One of the most important lessons of this history is the need to carefully
judge the relation of forces among workers, capitalists, and the bureaucrats
who interpose themselves between workers and bosses‹as mediators, not as
leaders of workers under attack. That is, just as it¹s not a good idea for
anyone to bite off more than he or she can chew, it¹s an even bigger mistake
for the most well-intentioned workers¹ leaders to target goals beyond what
is possible given the existing relation of forces between workers and
bosses, even if every iffy factor in the equation of class struggle turns
out as planned. 

One of the principal leaders of this emerging rank-and file movement is an
autoworker and long-time UAW activist named Gregg Shotwell. The reason we
have tended to focus on his role in building this movement is because of his
unusual ability to figure out what needs to be done next, explain why it¹s
the best way to go and thereby help pass on what he has learned to his
coworkers. 

This, it seems to us, is because Shotwell and other leaders of this movement
have shown a deep understanding of labor history and its lessons, which
evidently serve as their guide to effective mass working-class action.

By setting their sights on practical in-plant action, rather than proposing
or discussing strike action in the period leading up to the vote on the
contract and explaining why and how it served the interests of the bosses,
they posed the immediate task as being the defeat of this extremely
pro-employer contract. At the same time they laid the basis for effective
strike action if it was defeated.

Unfortunately, as we had noted earlier, the decades of bureaucratic
misleadership and the absurdity of strikes that were supposedly victories
for both workers and bosses, had convinced most workers that the strike is
no longer the most decisive weapon in the hands of workers and their unions.
Thus, SOS leaders understood that it was necessary to reeducate their
coworkers in the real meaning of union solidarity. That¹s the meaning of the
slogan ³Workers will rule when they work to rule!²

We focus our analysis on the contribution made by Brother Shotwell, because
he appears to be as good with his pen as he is with his sword. Here is a
sample of what Shotwell had to say and how thoughtfully he said it. It¹s an
extract from one of the first of his reports to autoworkers, reprinted in
the January/February 2006 edition of this magazine, and titled,³Workers Will
Rule When They Work to Rule.²

³The slogan Œwork to rule¹ has a double meaning.Work to rule is a method of
slowing production by following every rule to the letter. The aim is to
leverage negotiations. Work to rule is also an invocation for workers to
govern collectively, to control the conditions of their labor. Work to rule
means power to the people.

³Work to rule is an in-plant strategy, a method of influencing negotiations
without going on strike. Workers follow the boss¹s orders but do nothing on
their own initiative.

They keep their knowledge and experience to themselves, defer all decisions
to the straw boss, and let the pieces fall where they may....

³In the 1930s union members occupied factories. The sit-down strikes were
illegal, but there is a higher authority than the bossing class. When
workers work to rule, human rights take precedence over property rights. In
the 1930s workers claimed ownership of their jobs and stared down the barrel
ofa gun to win union recognition....

³Management thinks they control the plant with their clipboards,portable
phones,and panties twisted in a knot. But when workers work to rule the
bosses find out who really runs the plant, who keeps machines humming,
production flowing,and the money coming in....

³Workers are not saboteurs. Workers want to build, not destroy. Work to rule
simply means: to rigorously adhere to Process Control Instructions and
strive to meet the stated goals of high quality, lean inventory, and
just-in-time delivery in order to compel Œcooperation¹ from the boss.
Working to rule is like keeping kosher a strict code of law.¹²

The reader will see how real leaders lead. This includes a heavy dose
ofexplaining the laws that determine the outcome ofstrikes and other
confrontations between labor and capital. But no less important, it shows a
deep understanding of the transitional methodthat has been applied by some
of the best class-struggle leaders in labor history.

SOS building a new movement ŒOn the Ashes of the old¹ Even though SOS¹s
attempt to stop the biggest bureaucratic giveback in American labor history
did not succeed, a substantial nucleus of a new fighting union leadership in
the UAW has been born.

Moreover, rather than having been demoralized by their unsuccessful campaign
against the biggest giveback contract in labor history engineered by Big
Three bosses and UAW bureaucrats, they have set about the task of building a
broader movement of militant trade-union activists.

That is, SOS and its component formations Future of the Union, Factory Rats
Unite, in conjunction with ³Labor Notes and numerous rank and-file
committees of resistance will sponsor a one-day meeting for all autoworker
activists on the recent concessionary Big Three Auto Contracts. The session
will be an opportunity to analyze the economic and structural impact of the
negotiations, to share experiences from the effort to mobilize opposition,
and explore strategies and tactics for reclaiming unionism¹s direction and
rebuilding rank & file solidarity.²

Though it is directed exclusively at autoworkers, the inclusion of a number
of sponsors of this one-day affair beginning with Labor Notes, which is an
existing movement of trade-union activists from many unions, gives the
upcoming conference an all-union character.(See the leaflet announcing
³Autoworker Activists Gathering²on page 10.)

We look forward in the spirit of revolutionary working-class optimism to a
successful outcome to this important gathering in Flint, Michigan on
Saturday, January 26, 2008.