[Marxism] Speculation about a U.S. strike against Iran

[Joaquin Bustelo]

	It would be nice to know the political affiliations/connections of
the British analysts to try to figure out if this is one more move in a
campaign to pressure Iran or if it indeed represents the considered judgment
of these "experts."

	Because underlying the scenario presented are some implicit
assumptions that seem quite outlandish, plus a complete blindness to the
NATURE of war and the reality that winning a war is a POLITICAL rather than
simply MILITARY question.

	The scenario presented is that, thanks to new, smaller and even
smarter bombs than those the United States has employed in the past, it is
possible for the U.S. to simultaneously hit many thousands of Iranian
targets at the outset of a war, destroying entirely Iran's capacity for
retaliation and smashing the Iranian regime. WITHOUT putting an occupation
army on the ground.

	This assumes that the U.S. has 100% reliable intelligence covering
100% of Iran's relevant military assets and as close to 100% as makes no
difference of what the Iranian leadership would need to maintain some
minimal level of coherence as a government and mount a counterstrike,
organize the resistance of the population, etc.

	The idea that U.S. intelligence is anywhere near 100% reliable is
risible. The in-country sources are likely to be opportunist scoundrels who
will exaggerate/fabricate because that is the easy way to make a buck. And
there is simply no way to guarantee 100% coverage. That's never happened,
there's no reason to think it is even possible, and given the track record
of U.S. intelligence services, even if possible, there's every reason to
think the U.S. intelligence services would be the last ones to achieve it.

	Therefore, almost certainly Iran would emerge from a first wave with
some significant retaliatory capacity left and a target-rich environment
surrounding them. The obvious targets for IMMEDIATE political effects are
any significant concentrations of U.S. troops, such as ships and the
logistics and other bases the U.S. has in the region outside Iraq, and an
oil tanker or two. More long-terms political effects can be achieved by
damaging oil terminals and mining shipping lanes. It is hard to imagine a
circumstance where Iran would find sabotaging the regional oil industry to
at least some small degree beyond its reach. 

	But before then, one has to consider the possibility that Iran may
well employ a significant part of its retaliatory capacity as the U.S. air
strike is beginning. That is because it is doubtful that the U.S. could
achieve complete tactical surprise. 

	No matter how "stealthy" to radars, U.S. heavy bombers have to be
launched from certain bases which, even if some are unknown to us, they are
quite likely known to the Iranians or other intelligence services. If planes
takes off during the day, it can be observed, and if at night, heard and
possibly also observed. And at the very least both the Russians and the
Chinese are likely to want to see the U.S. get a bloody nose, even if Iran's
own intelligence assets are too limited to see what is going on. If the
Pentagon does not achieve tactical surprise, then the logic of "use it or
lose it" comes into play. It may be that U.S. warships are invulnerable to
the missiles Iranian planes can launch, but I suspect that is not true of
oil supertankers and the terminals where they take on their cargo. 

	Thus the question becomes, would the Iranians WANT to do that?
Partly, the answer would depend on the kind of war they think they are
facing. On that, it is as clear as can possibly be that a U.S. occupation of
Iran in the short term won't even be attempted; hence what is being deployed
is, in essence, a long-term siege. 

	Given that, the idea of giving the enemy's economy an "oil shock"
that might send it reeling into a recession and perhaps turn the
gasoline-addicted American population into a lynch mob against Bush is
almost certainly going to have a certain attraction. With worldwide
supply-demand balance already on a knife's edge, and markets drowning in a
sea of fictitious, speculative capital seeking to leverage any change in
price points, raising doubts about the reliability of oil supplies from the
region is going to lead to a speculative explosion in oil prices. And the
best way to say something is to DO it. Even if the ACTUAL disruption is
small, the speculative frenzy unleashed is likely to be quite spectacular.

	These sorts of possibilities are entirely unexplored by the British
analysts. In a sense, they are right, since it is probably true that the
U.S. has the military capacity to bomb Iran "back to the stone age," as Gen.
Curtis Le May promised to do to the Vietnamese in the 1960's. But the
assumption that this can be done in a matter of hours without Iran being
able to do anything in response is unwarranted, and the POLITICAL effects of
what Iran is able to do may well upset Washington's applecart before it is
able to achieve its military objective.

	Another aspect of things that is entirely unexamined by these
experts are political repercussions within Iran and in the region. I have no
doubt as to what the IMMEDIATE political impact within Iran will be -- the
entire nation will rally around the government in defense of their homeland.
Even in areas where strong separatist movements and sentiments exist, that
is likely to be the case, and the immediate effect will be a tremendous
setback for separatists. 

	It is true, after many months, but probably more like a few years, a
war-weary people may decide they have no choice but to capitulate. But
before that happens, it is quite like that millions of Iranians will
volunteer to take the war to the Americans next door.

	The British analysts discount a link up between the Iraqi
resistance, and more broadly the Iraqi people, and the Iranians, noting that
in the Iraq-Iran war, the Iraqi Shia's by and large didn't align with Iran
against the Sunni Iraqi leadership. But in this circumstance, BOTH
non-denominational patriotic sentiment AND religious allegiance would be on
the same side -- against the imperialist aggressor. They ALSO completely
discount the reaction throughout the Muslim and Arab world, saying things
like that Hezbollah can't really do much more than it already has. The risk
the analysts don't examine AT ALL is the possibility of a mass popular
upsurge or explosion in one or more countries or the entire region. 

	Also missing is any serious consideration of the reaction in the
rest of the world, although they admit it's an open question whether even
Britain would go along with the United States at the outset. Yet EVEN from
the point of view of the imperialist ruling classes in Europe and Japan, the
U.S. course must give pause for thought. 

	The reason for that is that the U.S. military doctrine is now to
become such a pre-eminent, overwhelming, qualitatively superior military
power that just the thought of challenging it is absurd (as these analysts
recognize).

	But what is the point of achieving such an unchallengeable world
monopoly in organized violence? The same as that of any other monopoly
--superprofits-- except that now, since this is a monopoly of the U.S.
ruling class as a whole, what's involved is not just the balance sheets of
the merchants of war, but exacting tribute from the whole world. Including,
at least in a certain sense, from Washington's imperialist "allies." 

	If the split on looting the third world right now is 60-40, soon the
U.S. will demand 66-33, then 75-25. It IS the United States that is bearing
just about ALL the cost of keeping the world "safe" for "democracy," and it
is entitled to compensation for its services. That will be the essential
argument. Some of the forms are already visible -- for example, the U.S.
stance that it is Europe that needs to offer more in opening agricultural
markets and cutting subsidies to bring Third World countries back to the
negotiating table in the Doha round of world trade talks.

	In other words, the U.S. increasingly faces the world, including
"allies," as a protection racket.

	This suggests Washington's isolation on a world scale will be quite
marked. And under THOSE circumstances, the U.S. will then pursue the
military strategy of massive bombardment of a defenseless civilian
population until some quisling faction somehow gains the upper hand in
Teheran. THAT is a scenario fraught with horrifying possibilities. For the
truth is that the United States does not have an unthinkable-to-challenge
military superiority. There is nothing a fleet of "strategic" and "stealthy"
long-range heavy bombers ten times the size of the American fleet can do
that can't be countered by an insignificant portion of the rest of the
world's nuclear arsenal, or even specifically of Russia's capabilities. 

	Thus the entire Washington drive for world military domination is
based on everyone agreeing it isn't worth the risk of nuclear destruction of
human civilization trying to stop Washington. But for a country like Iran,
that question doesn't really arise. They can be subjected "conventionally"
to nuclear-like levels of devastation by Washington; putting a Hiroshima
device over the U.S. military's camp Doha in Kuwait or sneaking one up the
Potomac on a barge or a container is a very different action than if the
Russians did it. 

	Hence the desperation in American imperialist circles on
guaranteeing "non-proliferation" of nuclear weapons. It may be possible to
blackmail Russia or China into military paralysis provided they are not
directly attacked, but if the U.S. government moves to bomb you back to the
stone age, and you've got the bomb, what have you got to lose?

	This, by the way, demonstrates the total hypocrisy of the liberals
and the wrong-headedness of countless "progressives," "radicals,"
"environmentalists," "peace activists," and well meaning people of every
sort who support "non-proliferation," i.e.,  the near monopoly on nuclear
weapons of the imperialist brigands. 

	Nuclear weapons are the great equalizer. The day Iran successfully
tests a nuclear device, U.S. plans for a war on Iran will go from "active"
to "archival" status. 

*  *  *

	I do not AT ALL rule out the Bush Administration adopting the sort
of outlook/reasoning these analysts present. But there are clearly problems
with the scenario, and an even more basic one than the complications coming
from Iran's response or the world's reaction that I point to. 

	The most basic problem is, even assuming everything the analysts
claim or assume is true, U.S. intelligence is 100% perfect, U.S. bombing is
100% perfect, Iran is to all intents and purposes 100% destroyed or as close
to as makes no difference in terms of being able to project force, wield
regional influence, aid the Iraqi insurgents, or even maintain a coherent
national government, does this mean the U.S. has won the war? 

	No. Victory in war is determined by political outcomes. The
political outcome that means victory for the U.S. in a war on Iran is the
installation of a stable puppet regime. The authors argue that Iran can be
reduced to "failed state" status almost immediately, and simply assume that
condition can be indefinitely maintained. As I've already explained, I think
the immediateness of the success is unlikely; I also discard that a nation
with Iran's history, tradition and resources can be prevented from rising
again, and in only a few years. 

	Sure, saturation bombing from American warplanes might be able to
prevent it, but how do you justify continuing a war against a country that
for all practical political purposes has ceased to exist? This is simply a
fantasy that military measures can be adopted quite arbitrarily regardless
of politics. The only possible meaning of victory in this war is the
installation of a client/puppet regime.

	But there is no mechanism for installing a puppet regime
contemplated in the war plan: that mechanism, all history shows, is
occupation, yet occupation is excluded.

	First, because the U.S. lacks the troops to even properly occupy
Iraq, never mind Iran, a country more than twice its population, and
especially not while most of Bush's ground forces are trapped in the Iraqi
quagmire. 

	And, second, because what happened in Iraq is that even in a smaller
country, already ground down by an earlier imperialist war and a decade of
sanctions and bombing, and with the plus of having an unpopular dictator you
could claim to be overthrowing as you invaded, the occupation could not be
successfully imposed. 

	The idea that you can achieve WITHOUT boots on the ground in Iran
what has thus far proved impossible to achieve EVEN WITH boots on the ground
in Iraq is far from an obvious one.

	Thus the military analysis presented by the two British writers is,
at bottom, unsound. They have sketched a splendid little war for the U.S. to
WAGE without properly analyzing what it would take to WIN. 

	Again, I do not discount unsound military moves by Bush; but I also
do not preclude that the glaring holes in the strategic design will cause it
to be rejected by those who make decisions on behalf of U.S. imperialism,
which is much more than the current occupant of the Oval Office.

Joaquín