[Marxism] Theory of Violence

[Haines Brown]

> Haines,
> 
> So far in this discussion you have outlawed deductive logic,
> indentified realism and materialism, trashed the work of Clausewitz,
> had a go at Trotsky, invented free-floating government with no
> connection to the class struggle and whilst accusing me of
> metaphysics kept going on about some mysterious notion of `force'
> which really is metaphysical.
> 

Well, yes, there are a lot of issues. It is difficult to frame a
debate when its boundaries remain uncertain (interestingly, debate
seems a closed system, which suggests it is not a learning
process). In any debate, some points may be obvious and so can be put
aside, while other points are contentious and so must be dealt
with. My mentioning these things was an effort to define the necessary
boundary within which debate might be constructive.

1. "outlawed deductive logic". Well, "outlawed" is not the right
   term. Deductive logic is unquestionably _useful_ (but
   non-explanatory) for closed systems. Human affairs are thought of
   as open systems. There's an overwhelming amount of literature on
   this point. One work among many from a Marxist viewpoint is Roy
   Bhaskar, Scientific Realism & Human Emancipation (London, 1986). 

2. Identification of realism and materialism. I hope I didn't do
   that. Scientific realism, it is safe to say, assumes that there's a
   world out there that is independent of our knowledge of it but
   which we can explain to some extent. It's contribution is to
   include in this world things that are "unobservables" and which
   empiricists either deny or about which they are agnostic. For
   example, quantum states, forces, fields, causal relations, wholes,
   black holes, and in particular (in my view), causal powers (such as
   labor power). Realism has nearly always been presumed by practicing
   natural scientists and only it is only an issue in the philosophy
   of science, where in recent years it has become part of the new
   consensus. I should mention that Marx is generally considered to be
   a scientific realist. 

. "Materialism" is an ambivalent word. If I turn to that great font of
   accurate information ;-}, Wikipedia, it suggests: "materialism is
   that form of physicalism which holds that the only thing that can
   truly be said to exist is matter; that fundamentally, all things
   are composed of material and all phenomena are the result of
   material interactions; that matter is the only substance. As a
   theory, materialism belongs to the class of monist ontology." I
   hope it is evident that scientific realism and materialism are not
   synonymous. Realists are materialists (although sometimes I wonder
   about is known as "critical realism"), but empiricist materialists
   would not see unobservables as being real objects of knowledge.

3. "trashed the works of Clausewitz" No, not at all. I meant only to
   suggest that his conclusions do not satisfy Marxist historiographic
   standards. More broadly and explicitly I suggested that while he
   may have been an astute observer of many aspects of the society in
   which he lived, that does not validate his conclusions about social
   dynamics in terms of the standards of today's social science. More
   specifically, truths about his society and time are unlikely to be
   true about our own society and time. Another way to put this,
   social science today is historicist. I think everyone, Marxist and
   non-Marxist alike, agree on this.

4. "had a go at Trotsky". Well, here I should apologize. I'm no expert
   on Trotsky, and my experiences of the Trostkyite movement might
   unfairly have reflected back on the man himself. Some of his
   positions I agree with; others I sharply disagree with. I see him
   as a real and important contributor to the Revolution, but who
   ended up as a destructive force. Although I forget why I might have
   brought his name up, if indeed I did trash him, I shouldn't have
   done it.

5. "invented free-floating government with no connection to the class
   struggle"? Gosh, I hope I didn't invent this, and I hope you are
   being judicious in your choice of the word "government". I said
   that the "state" is relevant to class struggle; "government" is
   not. I believe this is an entirely orthodox view that I did not
   have to invent. For example, in some hypothetical future communist
   society, there surely will be government (my apologies to any
   anarchists present), although the state need no longer exist.

6. "accusing me of metaphysics kept going on about some mysterious
   notion of `force' which really is metaphysical". Well this is not a
   general issue, but reflects our debate, and so doesn't belong in
   this list.

"Metaphysics" is a broad term that has a variety of meanings. If I
accused you of metaphysics, it could be a compliment or a
criticism. Unfortunately it was probably the latter (hypostatizing
concepts). As for some "mysterious" notion of force, see my point (1)
above. You are welcome to say that the force is mysterious, but since
that is not the scientific consensus, you must explain why it is
mysterious and offer some justification.

> Going back to the metaphysics point.  Violence is the continaution
> of politics by other means ...

I raised two objections to this if I recall correctly. First, you
shouldn't use the term "violence", but "force". To speak of state or
government action as "violent" runs some danger of being
self-contradictory, for the dictionary definition for violence
suggests it is unjust, and the action of the state or government is
almost by definition just, since it is government that
institutionalizes norms of justice. The force necessarily employed by
the state or contingently by government fails the definition also in
that violence implies impetuous action, is highly excited, vehement,
etc. That is, the force employed by government of the state is not
aways, and perhaps only exceptionally violent.

While this is a small point, what makes it significant is that you
simply ignore it, and I wonder why. You should have indicated why my
point is incorrect or adopted the phrase "force is the continuation
of politics". Is there something holy about Clausewitz's words?

Secondly, I mentioned the very conventional Marxist distinction
between "state" and "government". This is important, because
Clausewitz's view probably only refers to government, for _state_
action is almost by definition forceful and not simply a
"continuation".

Such picky clarifications as these seem needed in order for us to gain
a precise understanding of Clausewitz's point. Not having read him, I
can't be sure, but perhaps it is something like this: In the
fulfillment of its functions, governments may have to resort to
force. Wow! What happened? What sounded profound coming from
Clausewitz when inspected carefully turns out to be a truism that is
quite obvious to everyone.

> but there are many other ways of continuing politics from diplomacy
> to negotiation, to economic pressure, to incentivising, to sulking
> and so on and so forth so I'm not proposing violence as some kind of
> uber principle to life.

You make a comment that comes down to saying either that a)
governments have a variety of modes of action besides brute force (too
obvious to mention), or b) states have many modes of action besides
force (again, a truism, but one might argue that all state actions
necessarily involve "force" in some broad sense of the word). In
either case, your comment doesn't seem to add anything. 

> Finally you say `explanatory theories in history don't transcend
> time and cirumstance'. Where, I must ask, does this leave historical
> materialsm?

Historical materialism is a major contribution to historiography
because it does a better job at reconciling the categories of freedom
and determinism, particularity and universality, whole and part,
individual and society, etc. (which I believe is becase it seeks to
represent all things as processes). All (good) Marxist explanations
are both specific (a particular time, place and circumstance) and at
the same time general (these empirical specifics are placed in
relation to the causal structure that explains capitalist
dynamics). This causal structure (or in Marxist terms, "socio-economic
formation" or "mode of production"), persists in time (which is why we
have alterations between social evolution and revolution). So, indeed,
Marxist historical explanations don't transcent time, place and
circumstance, but take them fully into consideration as part of
(although I now prefer to use the notion "constraint") a greater
whole. I don't really think much of the book, but it happens to come
to mind and is of some use on this issue: Melvin Rader, Marx's
Interpretation of History (New York, 1979). 

I'm sorry to be so picky and to press you so on these matters, but I
found my objections to your project were simply being ignored rather
than debated. That kind of left me spinning my wheels without
traction.

Haines