[Marxism] Administration response indicates that NIE report does not register US-Iranian alliance against Iraq insurgency

[Fred Feldman]

Louis Proyect wrote, in response to his bete noire Walter Lippmann, who
suggested that the NIE estimate clearly aimed at stalling war against Iran
was a positive development:

I was referring to Iran cutting deals with the US. Only 6 
months ago I was stressing the underlying commonality of interest 
between the US and Iran over defeating the Iraqi insurgency. It appears 
that I was right. No matter how much the US hates the Iranian 
government, it hates the Iraqi insurgency more.

So, as I understand it, Louis insists that the NIE report registers not a
setback for the war drive against Iran, but a firm alliance between Iran and
the US to defeat the Sunni insurgency at all costs.  That is, Iran is at war
in Iraq, but not on the side of the insurgents as Washington preferred to
claim but on the side of the occupation.

Frankly, the evidence for this is sketchy at best, and seems to include the
assumption that the Iranians aim to ultimately conquer all of Iraq, not just
increase their influence in the Shia areas as much as possible -- or do they
just think that US control and bases in Sunni Iraq represent no problem for
the defense of Iran.  To prove that they do not care about this, he cites
Samir Amin's brilliant observation that Islamists do not think in class
terms.  Of course, there would not be an Islamist, or liberal, or whatever
in the world if everybody thought in class terms.  What a banal cliché.

How has the Sunni insurgency in Iraq affected Iran. Overwhelmingly
positively.  Are they incapable of noticing this because they don't think in
cl;ass  terms. Here elementary empiricism can come to the rescue of those
who fail to think in  "class terms". Not to mention the ways that those who
think in "class terms" can obstruct thinking about Iran's continuing fight
for independence as a bourgeois state, and the basically bourgeois
resistance to US occupation of Iraq.

Iraq has stakes in both the Shia-led government of Iran and its Shia
opposition.  This means its interests are not at all the same, indeed PARTLY
antagonistic, to the Sunni insurgency, to the extent that it insists on
Sunni domination of the whole country as a matter of right (and not everyone
in the Sunni resistance is so irreconcilable toward the Shia). But that is
so far from the whole picture as to be absurd/

Remember that when Iraq seemed to have collapsed before the US invasion,
there was great enthusiasm for the idea that Iran was next. What slowed this
down radically was not just the relative strength politically and socially
of Iran, but the emergence of the Sunni resistance in Iraq, along with the
Mahdi army and related expressions among the Shia.  Does Louis thin the
Iranian bourgeois leaders could not notice this because, not being Marxists,
they did not " think in class terms.

This situation still exists. I think Iran's role in Iraq, while hardly
principled from a Marxist or even revolutionary nationalist point of view,
is hardly as simplistically pro-US as Louis presents it, on the profound
ground that Islamists do not think in class terms.  The fact that they do
not think in class terms does not prove that they cannot think at all, which
his analysis would seem to imply.

In that case, what does the NIE mean if it does not mean a firm Iranian
commitment to US victory over the Irnqi  insurgency?

I suggest the current NIE means simply that there is no basis for a US
attack on Iran on Bush's watch. Under Hilary Clinton, a new NIE can be
constructed that will get the whole drive going again under what the rulers
imagine will be more competent and therefore more successful leadership. B
ut the rulers seem to be convinced not that there should not be a war with
Iran, but that the Bush presidency is incapable of carrying  it out
successfully. And since the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services seem to
be on this line, the chances that Bush can launch a war against Iran, while
not impossible, seems like quite an uphill battle.

But under the incoming Clinton administration, all bets are off.  And she is
incoming, regardless or what happens in Iowa.  She is almost, to all intents
and purposes, the incumbent.
Fred Feldman

NEWS & COMMENTARY: Hawks are calling new NIE on Iran an act of 'anti-Bush
sabotage'

[In the aftermath of the extaordinary and unexpected U.S. intelligence
report (http://www.ufppc.org/content/view/6894/) declaring that Iran has no
nuclear weapons program, AP described as "frenzied" the Bush
administration's current diplomatic efforts "to keep the world on board with
its hard line against Tehran."[1]  --  

The White House deputy press secretary actually contradicted the report
saying:  "Anyone who thinks that the threat from Iran has receded or
diminished is naive and is not paying attention to the facts."  -- 

 A parallel campaign to discredit the report is underway in the media.  --
Although AP reported that the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) "is
consistent with the U.N. atomic watchdog agency's own findings and "should
help to defuse the current crisis,"

[2] the *New York Times* worked to undermine the report, publishing one
article on Israel's refusal to accept the report and another insinuating
that what it called the IAEA's "public stance" was not what "the agency"
really thinks.[3]  --  

In one particularly disingenuous paragraph, Elaine Sciolino wrote:  "'To be
frank, we are more skeptical,' a senior official close to the agency said.
'We don’t buy the American analysis 100 percent.  We are not that generous
with Iran.'"  --  But the "frankness" of a "senior official" who will not
give his or her name is worthless.  --  

And why does the *Times* claim that this individual speaks in the IAEA's
name, when he or she is merely "close to the agency"?  (What does "close to
the agency" mean?  That the "official" lives in Vienna?  It is not entirely
clear what is "official" or "senior" about this so-called "senior official";
even his or her nationality is a mystery.)  --  

It is impossible to take such reporting seriously, but its existence shows
that a strong determination exists to continue a propaganda campaign in
favor of a military strike against Iran.  --  A column published in
Thursday's *Washington Post* was an indication that Iran superhawk John
Bolton is still on board in that campaign; his piece transforms the
individual mentioned above into "an unnamed International Atomic Energy
Agency official."[4]  --  

Rush Limbaugh, meanwhile, broadcast to his 20 million listeners Bolton's
view that the NIE might turn out to be "catastrophic"
because "it will make it virtually imossible for President Bush to stop the
Iranians by launching a military attack on their nuclear facilities or by
working covertly to overthrow the regime itself."[5]  --  

Limbaugh also quoted "a piece by Ed Lasky entitled:  'The Suspect Provenance
of the NIE Report.'  For those of you in Rio Linda, provenance is
essentially credibility.  'The *Wall Street Journal* editorial that ran this
morning echoes and expands upon suspicions first articulated by the *New
York Sun* that the National Intelligence Estimate was cooked up by
bureaucrats eager to embarrass George Bush and transform US policy towards
Iran.'"  -- 

Limbaugh is conveying, then, the venomous message that treasonous leftists
in the State Department are responsible for a policy coup designed to
sabotage U.S. interests, and he named their names:  Tom Fingar, Vann Van
Diepen, and Kenneth Brill.  --  "You have some disgruntled State Department
people, one of them actively pursuing a program of allowing the Iranians to
enrich uranium, sabotage, unhappy with the Bush administration," said
Limbaugh.  --Mark {Jensen of the invaluable Snow-News list and website]

http://www.ufppc.org/content/view/6895/
[Pay attention to this URL.  The articles that I have omitted are available
on this INVALUABLE Iraq war website. Plus occasionally French politics --
Jensen is a professor of French and provides valuable translations from many
French publications.

[Every political person needs analysts, and he -- a political person,
himself -- is one of my all-time favorites. -- FF]

1.

BUSH CALLS ON IRAN TO 'COME CLEAN'
By Ben Feller

Associated Press
December 5, 2007

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071205/ap_on_go_pr_wh/bush

OMAHA, Neb. -- President Bush, trying to keep pressure on Iran, called on
Tehran Wednesday to "come clean" about the scope of its nuclear activities
or else face diplomatic isolation.

Two days after a new intelligence report said that Iran had halted its
nuclear weapons program four years ago, Bush demanded that Tehran detail its
previous program to develop nuclear weapons "which the Iranian regime has
yet to acknowledge."

"The Iranians have a strategic choice to make," he said.  "They can come
clean with the international community about the scope of their nuclear
activities, and fully accept the long-standing offer to suspend their
enrichment program and come to the table and negotiate, or they can continue
on a path of isolation."

The administration is worried that the new National Intelligence Estimate
-- representing a consensus of all U.S. spy agencies -- weakens its leverage
over Iran and its ability to build global pressure on Tehran to stop its
uranium enrichment program.

Bush, arriving here on a campaign fundraising trip, said he had consulted
with members of his national security team, who gave him a report about what
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and National Security Adviser Stephen
Hadley have learned in talks during the past several days with their
counterparts in Britain, Germany, France, and Russia.

"These countries understand that the Iranian nuclear issue is a problem, and
continues to be a problem and must be addressed," Bush said.

Backing the U.S. intelligence community, Bush said he appreciated its work
in helping people to understand past and present activities in Iran and
helping the administration develop a sound policy.

"It is clear from the latest NIE that the Iranian government has more to
explain about its nuclear intentions and past actions," Bush said.

His statement Wednesday came a day after a news conference called in part to
react to the new information on Iran's nuclear activities.  Bush's public
remarks, coupled with frenzied contacts with world leaders by Bush, Rice,
and Hadley, show a White House trying to keep the world on board with its
hard line against Tehran -- an uphill effort now, according to most
analysts.

Also Wednesday, the White House said the United States will continue
"actively pushing" for a third, tougher round of United Nations sanctions
against Iran.  Deputy press secretary Tony Fratto said Iran continues to
hide information, remains in violation of two U.N. Security Council
resolutions, tests ballistic missiles, and is enriching uranium.

"Anyone who thinks that the threat from Iran has receded or diminished is
naive and is not paying attention to the facts," Fratto told reporters
flying aboard Air Force One with Bush en route to Nebraska.

Fratto disputed Iran's claim that the intelligence estimate was a
vindication for Tehran.  "I think that's absolutely absurd, and Iran should
take no comfort or vindication from the NIE," he said.

He rejected calls, since the new report, for the administration to enter
into unconditional talks with Iran, something the White House has said it
would only do once Tehran stops enriching uranium.

Tehran says its nuclear program is only for civilian energy purposes.  It
says it is allowed to enrich uranium for that reason.

Rice, traveling in Africa Wednesday, questioned the openness of the Iranian
government after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said the new U.S.
intelligence review amounted to "a final shot" against Tehran's critics.

Rice declined to respond to Ahmadinejad's remark, but told reporters in the
Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa that the public release of the NIE showed
the administration was committed to transparent democracy, while Iran was
not.

"I am not going to comment on that comment except to say that what the
National Intelligence Estimate shows, and the transparency with which the
administration released it, is what it means to live in a democracy and I
hope one day that the people of Iran will live in a democracy too," she
said.

Rice said that the latest U.S. intelligence estimate did not mean that
Washington no longer considered Tehran a threat and urged the international
community not to back down at the U.N. Security Council on pressuring Iran
to halt its activities that could produce the ingredients for an atomic
weapon.

"It is the very strong view of the administration that the Iranian regime
remains a problematic and dangerous regime and that the international
community must continue to unite around the Security Council resolutions
that have passed," she said.

"Iran needs to stop enrichment and reprocessing activities because those
enriching and reprocessing activities permit, if they are perfected, a state
to acquire fissile material for a nuclear weapon," Rice said.

2.

IAEA: U.S. IRAN REPORT MATCHES U.N. AGENCY By William J. Kole

Associated Press
December 4, 2007

http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-7126061,00.html

VIENNA -- A new U.S. intelligence review that concludes Iran stopped
developing a nuclear weapons program in 2003 is consistent with the U.N.
atomic watchdog agency's own findings and "should help to defuse the current
crisis," the organization's chief said Tuesday.

"Although Iran still needs to clarify some important aspects of its past and
present nuclear activities, the agency has no concrete evidence of an
ongoing nuclear weapons program or undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran,"
International Atomic Energy Agency director-general Mohamed ElBaradei said
in a statement.

ElBaradei said he viewed "with great interest" Monday's release of a U.S.
National Intelligence Estimate that said Tehran halted nuclear weapons
development in late 2003 under international pressure.

The chief U.S. envoy to the IAEA, Gregory L. Schulte, said the U.S.
assessment contained "some positive news" and raised hopes of a peaceful and
diplomatic end to the standoff.

"It does make us more hopeful that diplomacy can succeed, but for diplomacy
to succeed, we still need to keep the pressure on while giving Iran a
negotiated way out," Schulte told reporters in Vienna.

But "Iran's nuclear file is not closed," he said, adding that the U.S.
report "shows we were right to be concerned."

The U.S. report noted that Iran continues to enrich uranium, and senior
officials in Washington said that means it still may be able to develop a
weapon between 2010 and 2015.

Monday's finding was a shift from two years ago, when U.S. intelligence
agencies said they believed Tehran was determined to develop a nuclear
capability and was continuing its weapons development program.  It suggests
that Iran is susceptible to diplomatic pressure, the officials said.

ElBaradei, who was traveling in South America on Tuesday, said the new
assessment "should help to defuse the current crisis" over Iran's suspect
nuclear program and growing fears that Washington may be gearing up for a
possible conflict with the Islamic Republic.

"At the same time, it should prompt Iran to work actively with the IAEA to
clarify specific aspects of its past and present nuclear program," he said.
"This would allow the agency to provide the required assurances regarding
the nature of the program."

In his statement, ElBaradei called on Iran to "accelerate" its cooperation
with the IAEA and for all parties "to enter without delay into
negotiations."

"Such negotiations are needed to build confidence about the future direction
of Iran's nuclear program -- concern about which has been repeatedly
expressed by the Security Council," he said.

"They are also needed to bring about a comprehensive and durable solution
that would normalize the relationship between Iran and the international
community," ElBaradei said.

--Associated Press Writer Veronika Oleksyn in Vienna contributed to this
report.

3.

THE FLAWS IN THE IRAN REPORT
By John R. Bolton

Washington Post
December 6, 2007
Page A29

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/05/AR2007120502
234.html?hpid=opinionsbox1

Rarely has a document from the supposedly hidden world of intelligence had
such an impact as the National Intelligence Estimate released this week. 
Rarely has an administration been so unprepared for such an event.  And
rarely have vehement critics of the "intelligence community" on issues such
as Iraq's weapons of mass destruction reversed themselves so quickly.

All this shows that we not only have a problem interpreting what the mullahs
in Tehran are up to, but also a more fundamental problem:  Too much of the
intelligence community is engaging in policy formulation rather than
"intelligence" analysis, and too many in Congress and the media are happy
about it.  President Bush may not be able to repair his Iran policy (which
was not rigorous enough to begin with) in his last year, but he would leave
a lasting legacy by returning the intelligence world to its proper function.

Consider these flaws in the NIE's "key judgments," which were made public
even though approximately 140 pages of analysis, and reams of underlying
intelligence, remain classified.

First, the headline finding -- that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program
in 2003 -- is written in a way that guarantees the totality of the
conclusions will be misread.  In fact, there is little substantive
difference between the conclusions of the 2005 NIE on Iran's nuclear
capabilities and the 2007 NIE.  Moreover, the distinction between "military"
and "civilian" programs is highly artificial, since the enrichment of
uranium, which all agree Iran is continuing, is critical to civilian and
military uses.  Indeed, it has always been Iran's "civilian"
program that posed the main risk of a nuclear "breakout."

The real differences between the NIEs are not in the hard data but in the
psychological assessment of the mullahs' motives and objectives.  The
current NIE freely admits to having only moderate confidence that the
suspension continues and says that there are significant gaps in our
intelligence and that our analysts dissent from their initial judgment on
suspension.  This alone should give us considerable pause.

Second, the NIE is internally contradictory and insufficiently supported. 
It implies that Iran is susceptible to diplomatic persuasion and pressure,
yet the only event in 2003 that might have affected Iran was our invasion of
Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, not exactly a diplomatic pas de
deux.  As undersecretary of state for arms control in 2003, I know we were
nowhere near exerting any significant diplomatic pressure on Iran. 
Nowhere does the NIE explain its logic on this critical point.  Moreover,
the risks and returns of pursuing a diplomatic strategy are policy
calculations, not intelligence judgments.  The very public rollout in the
NIE of a diplomatic strategy exposes the biases at work behind the Potemkin
village of "intelligence."

Third, the risks of disinformation by Iran are real.  We have lost many
fruitful sources inside Iraq in recent years because of increased security
and intelligence tradecraft by Iran.  The sudden appearance of new sources
should be taken with more than a little skepticism.  In a background
briefing, intelligence officials said they had concluded it was "possible"
but not "likely" that the new information they were relying on was
deception.  These are hardly hard scientific conclusions.  One contrary
opinion came from -- of all places -- an unnamed International Atomic Energy
Agency official, quoted in the *New York Times*, saying that "we are more
skeptical. We don't buy the American analysis 100 percent.  We are not that
generous with Iran."  When the IAEA is tougher than our analysts, you can
bet the farm that someone is pursuing a policy agenda.

Fourth, the NIE suffers from a common problem in government:  the
overvaluation of the most recent piece of data.  In the bureaucracy, where
access to information is a source of rank and prestige, ramming home policy
changes with the latest hot tidbit is commonplace, and very deleterious.  It
is a rare piece of intelligence that is so important it can conclusively or
even significantly alter the body of already known information.  Yet the
bias toward the new appears to have exerted a disproportionate effect on
intelligence analysis.

Fifth, many involved in drafting and approving the NIE were not intelligence
professionals but refugees from the State Department, brought into the new
central bureaucracy of the director of national intelligence.
 These officials had relatively benign views of Iran's nuclear intentions
five and six years ago; now they are writing those views as if they were
received wisdom from on high.  In fact, these are precisely the policy
biases they had before, recycled as "intelligence judgments."

That such a flawed product could emerge after a drawn-out bureaucratic
struggle is extremely troubling.  While the president and others argue that
we need to maintain pressure on Iran, this "intelligence" torpedo has all
but sunk those efforts, inadequate as they were.  Ironically, the NIE opens
the way for Iran to achieve its military nuclear ambitions in an essentially
unmolested fashion, to the detriment of us all.

--John R. Bolton, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, is the
author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United
Nations and Abroad." He is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise
Institute.