[Marxism] Re: What will be effect of N Korea nuclear test?

[paul illich]

In case anyone hasn't got the message that proliferation of nuclear
technology is a covert goal of American imperialism, even whilst the
overt goal is nonproliferation....

(though I understand that the new gen reactors produce little
bomb grade side rpoducts?)

Paul

http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/61808.htm

Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)
http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/61808.htm
Clay Sell, Deputy Secretary of Energy; Robert Joseph, Under Secretary of 
State for Arms Control and International Security
Foreign Press Center Briefing
Washington, DC
February 16, 2006

1:00 P.M. EST Clay Sell at the Foreign Press Center

Real Audio of Briefing

DEPUTY SECRETARY SELL: Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to be here with 
each of you today and I look forward to being joined by Under Secretary 
Joseph. To begin, I would like to give a short presentation. It is a 
modification, or it is similar to the presentation that I gave to the United 
States press last week with the rollout of our budget.

The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership is a comprehensive strategy that the 
United States is proposing that will allow us to increase U.S. and global 
energy security, encourage clean development around the world while 
improving the environment and reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation.

It's important to start with the challenge and the challenge is a dramatic 
increase in global energy demand over the next 25 and 50 years. We project 
that global energy demand will increase by 50 percent in the next 25 years 
and will double in the next 50 years. We must find a way to meet this 
growing energy demand, to assist the emerging economies develop, to ensure 
against failed states; it's consistent with our President's democratization 
initiative. Energy is key to development and we need to find a safe and 
environmentally appropriate way to meet that growing energy demand. Clean 
coal will play a very significant role. Other technologies, renewable 
technologies will play a significant role, but nuclear power must -- and we 
believe will -- play a great role in meeting this increased energy demand. 
And in fact, we're already seeing that around the world today.

There are over 130 nuclear reactors under construction, planned or under 
consideration around the world today. The U.S. has not ordered a nuclear 
power plant in over 30 years and we have 103 nuclear power plants in this 
country. We have more than any other country, but we have not built one in 
about 30 years. And so we are anxious to get back into the nuclear 
generation business ourselves.

It is our goal from a U.S. public policy standpoint to be in a position to 
influence how the next generation of facilities will be designed from a 
safety, from a waste disposal and from a proliferation resistance viewpoint. 
So our goal is to really think about the next 25 and 50 years and how we can 
meet this dramatic expansion in nuclear power and what kind of technologies, 
what kinds of policies, what kinds of international regimes do we want to 
have in place so that we can meet the growing demand for electricity with 
nuclear power and do it in a way which enhances our nonproliferation 
concerns.

It's consistent with our long-held national energy policy to advance nuclear 
power and to develop advanced recycling technologies. We've proposed an 
additional -- a new $250 million in the budget this year for the United 
States to begin work on developing the advanced technologies that I'll go 
into in greater detail in a moment.

I would like to spend just a moment to elaborate just a little bit more on 
the benefits; why we need such a dramatic expansion of nuclear power. Here 
in the United States we are serious about reducing our dependence on fossil 
fuels, particularly coal and natural gas for electricity generation. We want 
to be able to meet this increasing energy demand in a way that does not 
significantly increase our carbon emissions. We want to develop technologies 
that allow us to recycle spent fuel. Here in the United States we do not 
recycle like other advanced nuclear states do, as a result, it makes the 
challenge of disposing of that waste a very significant challenge. And so we 
want to reduce the quantity, the radio toxicity and the heat load of the 
waste that we ultimately have to dispose of. And we also want to capture the 
energy value which is in spent fuel. And if we are able to do that, we can 
optimize and make our geologic repository in the United States at Yucca 
Mountain much more efficient.

If we keep our policy and we don't recycle in the United States, we will 
have to build nine Yucca Mountains over the course of the century, if we 
just keep Yucca Mountain at 20 percent of our -- if we just keep nuclear 
power at 20 percent of our electricity generation. If we recycle and can 
burn down those wastes in a way that we are proposing, we will be able to 
use -- that one Yucca Mountain will be able to last for the entirety of the 
century.

There are seven key elements of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership and I 
will quickly tick through each one of those and then we'll open it up to 
questions.

The first element is to expand dramatically the use of nuclear power here in 
the United States. We think -- today, we have 100 nuclear reactors; many of 
those are going to start phasing out in the coming decades. We think we 
really need to be, from a public policy standpoint we're shooting for 300 
reactors in 2050; that's a significant increase. That's what we think would 
be appropriate to meet our energy needs as well as to manage our greenhouse 
gas emissions and that's going to require significant advances in 
technology.

Again, the goal is to minimize nuclear waste; I mentioned that earlier. And 
the key effort in GNEP that allows us to do that is we want to join in 
partnership with the other advanced nuclear states to develop advanced 
recycling technologies. Now, let me just spend a moment on this.

In the 1970s the United States had commercial reprocessing of spent fuel 
based on an old technology that separates plutonium. President Carter made a 
decision to suspend commercial reprocessing in the United States because of 
the proliferation concerns about the separated plutonium. But many other 
nations around the world, France, the United Kingdom, Japan and Russia 
proceeded with those technologies and they still have commercial 
reprocessing based on the PUREX technology.

It is our goal to develop a technology that allows us to recycle in a way 
that is proliferation resistant. And when I say proliferation resistant, 
what I mean is pure plutonium is not separated as part of the recycling 
process; it is bound together with the other long-life actinides which makes 
the material of a sufficient quantity and of a sufficient heat load that 
concerns about diversion as a proliferation matter are greatly reduced, so 
that is a key technology that we seek to develop in partnership with our 
international partners -- advanced recycling.

We want to take the stream of material that comes out of the advanced 
recycling process and burn that, burn the actinides down in something called 
an advanced burner reactor, which is a modification of a fast spectrum 
reactor, many of which have been built around the world. France is quite 
advanced in their fast reactor technology, as is Russia, as is Japan and the 
United States has substantial experience with it. But if we can develop 
advanced recycling and then burn down the actinide streams in fast reactors, 
we get a tremendous amount of electricity generated in that process, we 
significantly reduce the volume of the waste that ultimately has to be 
disposed of and it is of a much lower radio toxicity. And it really allows 
us to envision a future in the coming decades, where we have the technology 
that can help us dispose of the over-200 metric tons of civil separated 
plutonium that had been produced and is stockpiled around the world today.

So there are really two significant -- or three significant nonproliferation 
benefits: the reduction of plutonium stockpiles, number one. Number two, we 
would hope as we develop these technologies we can accelerate the phase-in 
of these technologies in other countries that have commercial recycling so 
that we have a recycling infrastructure that is much more proliferation 
resistant in the future than it is today.

And finally, we think that would help us to envision a future where we can 
bring the benefits of nuclear power to the developing world. And our 
interest is in providing nuclear power to the developing world, and if you 
have an ability to take spent fuel, recycle it, burn it down and dispose of 
it in fast reactors, you can really envision a future of fuel leasing, where 
advanced fuel cycle states, with the full elements of the fuel cycle can 
lease fuel and then take it back for ultimate recycling and burn down in a 
fast reactor.

And in this slide we've tried to demonstrate graphically how that might 
work. With a fuel cycle state enriching the fuel, leasing it to a user 
nation, the user nation can send it back to the fuel cycle state where it 
would be recycled, burned down in fast reactors and then you have a much 
more benign waste product that has to be ultimately disposed of, either in 
the originating country or to be sent back possibly to a third ultimate 
disposition location elsewhere.

Another key aspect of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership is teaming 
together with a number of nations on advanced reactor technology. And a lot 
of the reactors that are on the market today are of great scale and they're 
appropriate for the most advanced electricity grids where there are huge 
load demands. And we would like to develop, in partnership with other 
nations, advanced reactors that are passively safe, that could have a 
lifetime of the reactor cores, that are possibly meltdown proof, that can be 
built on a modular basis, can perhaps even be factory built, shipped to a 
country and deployed. There are tremendous opportunities with advanced 
reactor technology that we think are critical and that can be developed in a 
way that will allow us to safely bring the benefits of nuclear power to the 
developing world. And working in partnership with other nations in 
developing these technologies is a key part of our initiative.

The seventh and final aspect of the initiative is enhanced nuclear 
safeguards. As we develop our advanced recycling technologies, we will build 
in the most advanced proliferation resistance technologies and technologies 
to monitor and control diversions. And it also allows us to build in and 
monitor and promote best practices as it relates to handling nuclear 
material worldwide.

The next steps here in the United States are we're going to press forward on 
our efforts, which really began with the energy bill that the President 
signed summer in expanding nuclear power. We hope to move out aggressively, 
starting with our budget of $250 million and we hope that will be matched in 
a very significant way by other international partners in developing these 
advanced technologies and to really build a consensus on a global vision as 
to how we're going to take the benefits and bring the benefits of nuclear 
power into the developing world.

A few weeks ago Under Secretary Joseph and I made an initial round of 
consultations. And I want to emphasize it was just an initial round of 
consultations in London, Paris, Moscow, Beijing and Tokyo. We also stopped 
to visit with Dr. ElBaradei at the International Atomic Energy Agency in 
Vienna. And we just talked about our interest in taking these ideas forward. 
And really, we focused on the key objectives: a world that needs a lot more 
nuclear power, a world that needs to develop recycling technologies that 
don't separate plutonium, a world that wants to -- that should facilitate 
fuel leasing concepts that will allow developing nations to enjoy the 
benefits of nuclear power and reduce the risk of the proliferation of the 
fuel cycle and that we should work in partnership to do this. And on all of 
those objectives, we found agreement with our potential partners and we look 
forward to advancing our cooperation.

So in conclusion, we really hope to envision a world with much more nuclear 
power, with much greater nuclear energy security which comes from energy 
diversity, a world that advances significantly our development goals, a 
world with much less carbon and pollution intensity, a world with much less 
nuclear waste and a world with less proliferation risks and less stocks of 
fissile material.

We're optimistic about what we can accomplish. The magnitude of what we are 
proposing is significant. We're really proposing ultimately to work in 
partnership with other nations to reorder the global nuclear enterprise. But 
we think with technology and with strong international participation it is 
possible.

With that, I know we'll take questions, but I want to introduce and turn the 
mike over to Bob Joseph, Under Secretary of State for Nonproliferation.

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Thank you. How are you doing?

DEPUTY SECRETARY SELL: Good to see you.

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Good afternoon. I will be very brief. I think 
Secretary Sell has done an excellent job in outlining the principle elements 
of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. I'll just explain why I'm here. 
I'm here because, first of all, the international dimension is absolutely 
essential to the success of the partnership. Secretary Sell has talked about 
the partnership that we seek to establish in the area of research and 
development to build on the expertise and the experience and to share the 
resources in terms of the investment for paving the way to this new 
comprehensive vision for nuclear energy.

And second, in terms of the international dimension, we want large buy-in by 
the international community in terms of sharing the benefits, the fruits of 
this initiative because in that way, it becomes truly a win-win for all of 
us in terms of energy security, in terms of our environmental objectives 
and, of course, in terms of our non and counter proliferation goals. And 
that's the second reason I'm here because the vision that has been laid out 
for you does, I think, go a far way in advancing for the future the type of 
world that we envision in terms of stopping the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons capabilities.

It does so, of course, in a number of ways. First, by ending the 
reprocessing that involves the separation of plutonium and the actual 
burning down of those plutonium stocks that have been accumulated. It does 
so by stopping the spread of very sensitive technologies associated with 
enrichment and reprocessing. It does this not by denying any state its 
rights under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but rather by providing 
incentives, financial incentives, as well as incentives dealing with the 
disposition of spent fuel. The Deputy Secretary mentioned the vision that we 
could provide fuel assurances that will give assurance to the consuming 
countries -- those that are consuming the fuel -- that they will have that 
fuel in a reliable and cost-effective way.

The third nonproliferation benefit is that the concept does deal with spent 
fuel, which is one of the key problems that we've faced both from an energy 
perspective and an environmental perspective and also from a proliferation 
perspective.

And finally, in terms of non and counter proliferation, as Secretary Sell 
said, we intend to build in to this future generation of capabilities -- 
whether it's the recycling or the advanced reactors or the small reactors -- 
the very latest, the most effective international safeguards that we can. 
And so it's essentially important that we work together with the IAEA. And 
in fact, one of the stops that we made when we did this initial set of 
consultations was with the IAEA and we had a very encouraging discussion 
along these lines with Dr. ElBaradei.

Let me stop there and we can take some questions.

MODERATOR: We can go to the third row there.

QUESTION: Thank you. Onur Sazak with Turkish Business Daily Referans. There 
are rumors that Turkey is buying nuclear energy -- nuclear reactors from the 
United States. Can you confirm that? And my second question is certain 
lawmakers in Turkey are accusing of the -- the United States of selling raw 
(inaudible) technology, first-generation nuclear reactors to the country. 
And if I can get your comments on this. Thank you.

DEPUTY SECRETARY SELL: I cannot confirm the rumor. But I can tell you that 
Turkey is a classic example in our judgment of a nation that we would like 
to work in partnership with, not to bring old technology, but to bring 
advanced technology and the benefits of nuclear power. So I would anticipate 
this is something that leaders in Turkey would -- I would welcome and it's 
something that I hope we could work with them on.

QUESTION: Thank you. Andrei Sitov from TASS from Russia. My understanding is 
that the coming G-8 Summit in St. Petersburg might be an ideal place to 
jumpstart the initiative, the partnership. So my question is what steps do 
you intend to take in the next few months before this time to make it 
happen, if any, obviously? And also on a specific Russian angle of this 
story, I understand both countries are working on the fourth generation 
nuclear reactors and the Russians have a number of times suggested that we 
pool our efforts in that direction. Why isn't it happening and what's the 
position of the Administration for its pooling of that effort -- those 
efforts? Thank you.

DEPUTY SECRETARY SELL: Why don't you take the last one first?

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Let me just say that with regard to the G-8 we, of 
course, did stop in Moscow. Moscow, of course, was quite receptive to a 
number of the ideas that we laid out. Russia, of course, is the President of 
the G-8 and it's, I think, going to advance an energy agenda for the term of 
its presidency and a nuclear power, we believe, should be an important 
element of that and I'm sure the Russian Government shares that. But it's 
really up to the Russian Government to lead the effort in the G-8. In terms 
of cooperation with Russia, Russia does, of course, have a great deal of 
experience and expertise in a number of the areas, particularly in advanced 
reactors. And we look forward to the day in which we can have more 
cooperation with Russia.

QUESTION: So nothing specific is planned at this time?

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Well, nothing specific. We're in the exploratory 
phase at this time regarding the global energy partnership.

DEPUTY SECRETARY SELL: And let me just say we've had initial consultations. 
A technical team will soon follow and go to Moscow and talk about the 
relative capabilities each of our countries could bring to the table as it 
relates to advance technology.

Certainly, there are issues that need to be resolved as to the level of 
cooperation. But the Energy Department would anticipate a day when our 
interests will come together on that and that we can cooperate more fully in 
developing these advanced technologies.

QUESTION: What about the GIF, the GIF in the fourth generation? What about 
the GIF?

DEPUTY SECRETARY SELL: Well, the Generation IV initiative, the GIF, is a 
existing ongoing effort to develop a series of fourth-generation 
technologies, fast reactors, high-temperature gas reactors, reactors 
optimized for hydrogen production and other things. The fast reactors that 
we contemplate using as an advance burner reactor that is a 
fourth-generation reactor and we would contemplate dramatically accelerating 
our work within the context of Generation IV and outside the context of 
Generation IV as an addition to Generation IV in developing these 
technologies.

MODERATOR: Do we have another question on Russia?

QUESTION: Can I go?

MODERATOR: Yeah, go ahead.

QUESTION: Thanks.

MODERATOR: And then we move on.

QUESTION: It's on a related subject, Secretary Joseph. Sir, I believe 
tomorrow you are meeting with the Arab-Russian counterpart Sergei Kuslatkin 
either in Vienna or Brussels. Will GNEP -- the part of the (inaudible) or 
what other issues (inaudible) even down to discussing -- what you intend to 
achieve as a result of this meeting? Thank you.

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: This issue very well may come up in the
context of the broad agenda that I have with my Russian counterpart. We do 
periodically meet and consult on a wide range of issues for which we are 
mutually responsible in our own governments. I wouldn't want to get into any 
of the specifics at this time.

QUESTION: My name is Wada. I'm with Japan's Mainichi Newspaper. I have some 
questions regarding the international consortium you are going to formulate 
for the development of technology for proliferation resistant fuel and 
recycling. What kind of timeframe are you thinking for the formation of this 
consortium? And also, could you also a bit elaborate on the definitions of, 
for example, nuclear supplier nations and also the conditions you are 
thinking for providing this fuel to developing nations that forego 
enrichment and recycling? Thank you.

DEPUTY SECRETARY SELL: On matters of timeline, that is a topic that we are 
discussing with our partners. The technologies that we are talking about, 
particularly the advance to recycling technologies have only been proven at 
a laboratory scale. And so, it will be important in the coming years, 
hopefully within the next five years, to demonstrate those technologies at 
an engineering scale. And we will work in partnership with other nations as 
to developing the appropriate place, the location, and exactly how that 
effort will be carried out.

And we would also hope that -- and expect that we could develop, on a pilot 
scale, an advanced burner reactor within the next 10 years. The key 
challenge on the burner reactor technology is fairly well understood. The 
key challenge is qualifying the fuel, the actinide-based fuel that comes out 
of the recycling stream. And that's going to require a significant amount of 
work, a significant amount of R&D, and that's something that we will hope to 
work in partnership with.

So, kind of five years on advanced recycling and 10 years as a goal on the 
advanced burner reactor to develop those technologies.

MODERATOR: We'll go to India in the back.

QUESTION: I'm Chida Rajghatta from the Times of India. How does the GNEP fit 
in with the bilateral nuclear deal which the Administration is trying to 
arrive at with India? And also, the President goes to India in less than a 
fortnight and the proposed deal is nowhere in sight. Is the safeguards issue 
over fast breeder reactors a deal breaker and if it is, how does one get 
around this?

DEPUTY SECRETARY SELL: Last year, the President and Prime Minister Singh 
jointly agreed to move out on nuclear cooperation, provided India met a 
number of nonproliferation commitments. And we would anticipate that once 
India has met its nonproliferation commitments, that in addition to expanded 
civil nuclear cooperation, which was originally talked about, we would also 
look forward to expanding our cooperation and our partnership with India on 
the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.) The fast breeder reactor and the deadlock over that, 
is that a deal breaker and how do you get around that?

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Well, I wouldn't want to get into any of the 
specifics and certainly, I wouldn't want to describe any of these particular 
issues as deal breakers. We are working very closely with our Indian 
colleagues to try to achieve the goals that were set in July by the 
President and the Prime Minister. A key element, of course, of that is the 
separation of the civilian and military facilities and that is an issue that 
we're working very hard, because both of our countries will benefit from 
success.

MODERATOR: We'll go to the middle. Yes, sir. Wait for the mike, please.

QUESTION: Manelisi Dubase from the SABC in South Africa. I was wondering if, 
in this very impressive plan of yours, particular of building a global 
partnership with other nation to develop this energy -- you talk about 
enlisting partners to limit the spread of sensitive nuclear. I was wondering 
if this is not the best opportunity of listening -- of listing partners such 
as Iran, for instance, whom you doubt if they can use this energy for -- I 
mean, this nuclear for energy purposes. I was wondering if you can enlist 
countries like that and Zimbabwe, which has also made a point that it needs 
to use this nuclear energy -- I mean, nuclear power for energy.

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: That's a very good question. I think that as you 
look at the timelines associated with this very comprehensive concept that's 
been laid out for you, you'll see that part of it, in terms of the 
nonproliferation benefits, is intended to prevent future Irans, future 
contingencies or circumstances in which a country may seek to acquire the 
sensitive technologies associated with enrichment and reprocessing, but 
really, for purposes other than nuclear energy.

That would be dealt with in the context of this comprehensive concept, but 
Iran is a problem for today and certain elements of the concept apply. We 
are working very hard, for example, to develop a set of assurances 
associated with the supply of fuel so that countries, even today, do not 
need to invest in these very expensive and sensitive technologies.

MODERATOR: Could we go to Italy right there?

QUESTION: Giampiero Gramaglia, the Italian News Agency.

As you know, there are in Europe countries as Italy, for instance, which 
have voted with the referendum against any new nuclear energy initiative. 
How do you deal with these countries and how could those countries impact 
the success of your initiative?

DEPUTY SECRETARY SELL: Our initiative is grounded in a few principles. One 
of them is that the partnership is voluntary. Secondly, it is based on -- or 
in the future would be based on commercial relationships and commercial 
incentives. And so the extent countries are interested in bringing the 
benefits of advanced nuclear power to their economies to help their 
economies grow, we hope to develop the technologies and the regimes that 
will allow them to do that in a way which serves the global nonproliferation 
interest. And if countries are not interested in doing that, then they will 
pursue their own sovereign choices.

MODERATOR: Front row here. Turkey.

QUESTION: Umit Enginsoy, NTV Turkey. A follow up on Turkey. Secretary Sell, 
what kind of cooperation are you proposing to Turkey regarding Turkey's 
newly announced nuclear program? And Secretary Joseph, your Ambassador to 
IAEA, George Schulte, is presently in Turkey for Iran talks. What's your 
message? What's happening there?

DEPUTY SECRETARY SELL: Well, in the near term, the immediate opportunity for 
Turkey is to -- or would conceivably be to acquire the latest technology, 
the -- what is referred to in the trade is a generation three and half-type 
lightwater reactor technology for deployment in their electricity grid. The 
President has made previous proposals that would help assure the fuel 
supply. GNEP, once it's fully developed and realized, would assist in our 
ability to assure an adequate fuel supply to countries acquiring nuclear 
technology and deploying nuclear reactors in their country. There are also 
possibilities for countries that do not currently have the fuel cycle, but 
who are interested in joining together in partnership to develop advanced 
generation reactors, to participate in the Global Nuclear Energy 
Partnership. That would be our hope and our expectation.

MODERATOR: There was a question on Ambassador Schulte.

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Ambassador Schulte is a very articulate spokesperson 
and is making a number of appearances in the context of our public diplomacy 
with regard to proliferations challenges more broadly, but specifically with 
regard to the challenge that Iran presents. He's playing a critical role in 
the IAEA context and in building international support, wide international 
support for taking those actions that are necessary to get Iran to change 
course and to resuspend its enrichment-related activities.

MODERATOR: I believe we have a question from New York, if you would go ahead 
New York.

QUESTION: Hi. My name is David Barroux from the French newspaper Les Echos. 
France, the UK and Japan have invested heavily already in other recycling 
technology. Would that make it -- how compatible would that be then for them 
to join your initiative? They would have to reinvest or can they use some of 
their investment that have already had in the past?

DEPUTY SECRETARY SELL: We do not seek, and it is not the goal of the 
initiative to render investments that other countries have made. And where 
they are operating those investments in a way that is safeguarded and 
secure, it is not our interest to render those investments uneconomic. But 
there is broad agreement in each of the countries that you mentioned and 
that we visited that we should join together in developing the next 
generation of recycling technologies that do not result in separated 
plutonium.

MODERATOR: Let's go to Venezuela here.

QUESTION: Thank you. Sonia Schott, Radio Valera, Venezuela. Yesterday, in 
Caracas, the President of the legislative body said -- offers his help to 
Venezuela -- from Iran to Venezuela in developing nuclear energy. I just 
want to know if you have some comments on that. Thank you.

DEPUTY SECRETARY SELL: I'm not aware of the offer and I don't have a comment 
on it.

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: I would just say that the vote at the IAEA Board of 
Governors meeting earlier this month speaks for itself, with 27 nations 
voting to report Iran to the Security Council and three nations voting 
against that with five abstentions.

MODERATOR: We go to the second row here.

QUESTION: Thank you. Masakatsu Ota from Kyodo News. My question is about the 
Japanese contribution. What kind of contribution do you expect, or at least 
hope, from Japan, number one, technically and number two, financially?

DEPUTY SECRETARY SELL: Expansive on both counts. (Laughter.) Japan has great 
capability in recycling technologies. They're about to open, or they will 
soon open, the world's newest commercial reprocessing facility. We're think 
there are potential opportunities there to test and demonstrate new 
technologies and they have at least two, I believe, operating fast spectrum 
reactors that could prove useful as a test bed in the near term. So we think 
there are many great opportunities for participation. And the commitment is 
one not just of -- it's not just an agreement on the objectives, but it is a 
commitment of each of our nation's talent and each of our nation's resources 
to develop these technologies as quickly as reasonably possible.

MODERATOR: I think we have time for one more. Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Just to follow up on that. Thank you. Eric Weiner, Tokyo 
Broadcasting System. Could you talk a little bit about the initial 
consultations? How did they go and were the Japanese responsive to your 
ideas and requests?

DEPUTY SECRETARY SELL: I'll leave it to others to characterize, but I did 
characterize it earlier, I found broad agreement on the goals and objectives 
that we laid out in each of the capitals that we visited.

MODERATOR: Yes, ma'am.

QUESTION: Phoenix Television of Hong Kong. Do you have consultation with the 
Chinese? I assume your counterparts asked how can China benefit from this 
initiative, since China already have the technology and capability to build 
and run nuclear power plants. I would assume they would focus more on the 
obligation this initiative would bring to them. For example, would this 
initiative require China to change its current conduct of its nuclear power 
plants or to require China to make public some of its nuclear activities it 
otherwise wouldn't do? Thank you.

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Well, China, of course, has the intention of 
expanding significantly its generation of nuclear power and this concept 
deals with the future and the establishment of a new nuclear enterprise. It 
would not require, as the Deputy Secretary said, any country to do anything 
-- these are sovereign choices that countries make. But I think that our 
reception in Beijing, like our reception in other capitals, was quite 
positive, because I think there are many elements, if not all elements, a 
division that we laid out that are shared in each of those capitals.

MODERATOR: Thank you all very much.