From ilyenkova at gmail.com  Sun Jun  1 13:20:15 2008
From: ilyenkova at gmail.com (robert montgomery)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 2008 15:20:15 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] unsubscribe
Message-ID: <85cf56df0806011220s61181d6fge8fb5c56095399d5@mail.gmail.com>

please unsubscribe me from the Marxism-Thaxis list.
RMongomery


From ballistanc at yahoo.com  Sun Jun  1 18:22:26 2008
From: ballistanc at yahoo.com (juan De La Cruz)
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 2008 17:22:26 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Materialism, idealism, theory, practice, etc.
In-Reply-To: <483FD9FC.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
Message-ID: <561519.29675.qm@web35507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

...come on guys!  give a break! lets be serious about communism!  Stop bullshit about maoism and lets get into the real history of the class struggle on an international scale.  When was the CC created&#9786;  You see the whole history of the CCP is part of the counterrevolutionary practice of social democracy.  In fact, if there is going to be a social revolution in China, we need to plan and organize the communist revolution....

Charles Brown <Charles at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us> wrote:   On Materialism ( speaking of Mao), there are two levels of the
relationship between thought and being: "economics" and "physics". While
society remains in the Realm of Necessity , ruling classes control
masses by conditioning fulfillment of the _material_needs of the
exploited classes on the exploited classes ' producing surpluses for the
ruling , exploiting classes. The materialism (determinism by the
material) at this level derives from the coercive use of conditional
provision of material needs. In all societies, including those in the
Realm of Freedom ( socialist, communist future and ancient) , all people
must , of course, "obey" the laws of physics, chemistry, biology,
physiology, objective reality etc. "physics", in the general sense.

How do Foucault, Butler, and other Post-moderns differ with these
materialist principles ?

Charles




This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com

_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis


       

From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Tue Jun  3 13:55:09 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Tue, 03 Jun 2008 15:55:09 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Judith Butler
Message-ID: <4845695D020000BF0000BC6D@gwia.ci.detroit.mi.us>

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judith_Butler

Judith Butler

Western Philosophy
20th / 21st-century philosophy

NameJudith Butler
BirthFebruary 24, 1956 (1956-02-24) (age 52)
Cleveland, Ohio
School/traditionContinental Philosophy, Third-Wave Feminism, Critical Theory, Queer Theory, Postmodernism, Post-structuralism
Main interestsFeminist Theory, Political Philosophy, Ethics, Psychoanalysis, Discourse, Embodiment, Sexuality, Jewish Philosophy
Notable ideasSex and gender as social construction, performativity
Influenced byMichel Foucault, Theodor Adorno, J.L. Austin, Luce Irigaray, Gayle Rubin, Monique Wittig, Emmanuel L?vinas, Jacques Derrida, Louis Althusser, Jacques Lacan, Sigmund Freud, Friedrich Nietzsche, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Simone de Beauvoir, Claude Levi-Strauss
InfluencedEve Sedgwick, Michael Warner, Judith Halberstam, Jos? Mu?oz, Lauren Berlant, Kate Bornstein

Judith Butler (born February 24, 1956) is an American post-structuralist philosopher, who has contributed to the fields of feminism, queer theory, political philosophy, and ethics. She is the Maxine Elliot professor in the Departments of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Berkeley.
Butler received her Ph.D. in philosophy from Yale University in 1984, and her dissertation was subsequently published as Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France. In the late-1980s, between different teaching/research appointments (such as at the Humanities Center at Johns Hopkins University), she was involved in "post-structuralist" efforts within Western feminist theory to question the "presuppositional terms" of feminism. Her most recent work focuses on Jewish philosophy, engaging in particular with "pre-Zionist criticisms of state violence."[1][2]
Contents
[hide]
1 Major works 
1.1 Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990) 
1.2 Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" (1993) 
1.3 Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (1997) 
1.4 Undoing Gender (2004) 
1.5 Giving an Account of Oneself (2005) 
2 Politics 
3 Critical response 
4 Books 
5 Honors 
6 References 
7 See also 
8 Further reading 
9 External links 


[edit] Major works
[edit] Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990)
Main article: Gender Trouble
Gender Trouble was first published in 1990, selling over 100,000 copies internationally and in different languages[citation needed]. Alluding to the similarly named 1974 John Waters film Female Trouble starring the drag queen Divine,[3] Gender Trouble critically discusses the works of Simone de Beauvoir, Julia Kristeva, Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, Luce Irigaray, Monique Wittig, Jacques Derrida, and, most significantly, Michel Foucault. The book has also enjoyed widespread popularity outside of traditional academic circles, even inspiring an intellectual fanzine, Judy!.[4]
The crux of Butler's argument in Gender Trouble is that the coherence of the categories of sex, gender, and sexuality*the natural-seeming coherence, for example, of masculine gender and heterosexual desire in male bodies*is culturally constructed through the repetition of stylized acts in time. These stylized bodily acts, in their repetition, establish the appearance of an essential, ontological "core" gender. This is the sense in which Butler famously theorizes gender, along with sex and sexuality, as performative. The performance of gender, sex, and sexuality, however, is not a voluntary choice for Butler, who locates the construction of the gendered, sexed, desiring subject within what she calls, borrowing from Foucault?s Discipline and Punish, "regulative discourses." These, also called "frameworks of intelligibility" or "disciplinary regimes," decide in advance what possibilities of sex, gender, and sexuality are socially permitted to appear as coherent or "natural." Regulative discourse includes within it disciplinary techniques which, by coercing subjects to perform specific stylized actions, maintain the appearance in those subjects of the "core" gender, sex and sexuality the discourse itself produces.[5]
A significant yet sometimes overlooked part of Butler's argument concerns the role of sex in the construction of "natural" or coherent gender and sexuality. Butler explicitly challenges biological accounts of binary sex, reconceiving the sexed body as itself culturally constructed by regulative discourse.[6] The supposed obviousness of sex as a natural biological fact attests to how deeply its production in discourse is concealed. The sexed body, once established as a ?natural? and unquestioned ?fact,? is the alibi for constructions of gender and sexuality, unavoidably more cultural in their appearance, which can purport to be the just-as-natural expressions or consequences of a more fundamental sex. On Butler?s account, it is on the basis of the construction of natural binary sex that binary gender and heterosexuality are likewise constructed as natural.[7] In this way, Butler claims that without a critique of sex as produced by discourse, the sex/gender distinction as a feminist strategy for contesting constructions of binary asymmetric gender and compulsory heterosexuality will be ineffective.[8]
The concept of gender performativity is at the core of Butler's work. It extends beyond the doing of gender and can be understood as a full-fledged theory of subjectivity. Indeed, if her most recent books have shifted focus away from gender, they still treat performativity as theoretically central.
[edit] Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" (1993)
Bodies That Matter seeks to clear up readings and misreadings of performativity that view the enactment of sex/gender as a daily choice.[9] To do this, Butler emphasizes the role of repetition in performativity, making use of Derrida's theory of iterability, a form of citationality, to work out a theory of performativity in terms of iterability:
Performativity cannot be understood outside of a process of iterability, a regularized and constrained repetition of norms. And this repetition is not performed by a subject; this repetition is what enables a subject and constitutes the temporal condition for the subject. This iterability implies that 'performance' is not a singular 'act' or event, but a ritualized production, a ritual reiterated under and through constraint, under and through the force of prohibition and taboo, with the threat of ostracism and even death controlling and compelling the shape of the production, but not, I will insist, determining it fully in advance.[10]
Iterability, in its endless undeterminedness as to-be-determinedness, is thus precisely that aspect of performativity that makes the production of the "natural" sexed, gendered, heterosexual subject possible, while also and at the same time opening that subject up to the possibility of its incoherence and contestation.
[edit] Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (1997)
In Excitable Speech, Butler surveys the problems of hate speech and censorship. She argues that censorship is difficult to evaluate, and that in some cases it may be useful or even necessary, while in others it may be worse than tolerance. She develops a new conception of censorship?s complex workings, supplanting the myth of the independent subject who wields the power to censor with a theory of censorship as an effect of state power and, more primordially, as the condition of language and discourse itself.
Butler argues that hate speech exists retrospectively, only after being declared such by state authorities.[citation needed] In this way, the state reserves for itself the power to define hate speech and, conversely, the limits of acceptable discourse. In this connection, Butler criticizes feminist legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon's argument against pornography for its unquestioning acceptance of the state?s power to censor. Butler warns that such appeals to state power may backfire on those like MacKinnon who seek social change, in her case to end patriarchal oppression, through legal reforms. She cites for example the R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul 1992 Supreme Court case, which overturned the conviction of a teenager for burning a cross on the lawn of an African American family, in the name of the First Amendment.[citation needed]
Deploying Foucault?s argument from The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, Butler claims that any attempt at censorship, legal or otherwise, necessarily propagates the very language it seeks to forbid.[11] As Foucault argues, for example, the strict sexual mores of 19th century Western Europe did nothing but amplify the discourse of sexuality it sought to control.[12] Extending this argument using Derrida and Lacan, Butler claims that censorship is primitive to language, and that the linguistic ?I? is a mere effect of an originary censorship. In this way, Butler questions the possibility of any genuinely oppositional discourse; "If speech depends upon censorship, then the principle that one might seek to oppose is at once the formative principle of oppositional speech".[13]
Butler also questions the efficacy of censorship on the grounds that hate speech is context-dependent. Citing J.L. Austin's concept of the performative utterance, Butler notes that words? ability to ?do things? makes hate speech possible but also at the same time dependent on its specific embodied context.[citation needed] Austin?s claim that what a word ?does,? its illocutionary force, varies with the context in which it is uttered implies that it is impossible to adequately define the performative meanings of words, including hate, abstractly.[citation needed] On this basis, Butler rejects arguments like Richard Delgado?s which justify the censorship of certain specific words by claiming the use of those words constitutes hate speech in any context. In this way, Butler underlines the difficulty inherent in efforts to systematically identify hate speech.
[edit] Undoing Gender (2004)
Undoing Gender collects Butler's reflections on gender, sex, sexuality, psychoanalysis and the medical treatment of intersex for a more general readership than many of her other books. Butler revisits and refines her notion of performativity, which is the focus of Gender Trouble.
In her discussion of intersex, Butler addresses the case of David Reimer, a person whose sex was medically "reassigned" from male to female after a botched circumcision at eight months of age. Reimer was "made" female by doctors, but later in life identified as "really" male, and ultimately committed suicide.[14]
[edit] Giving an Account of Oneself (2005)
In Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler develops an ethics based on the opacity of the subject to itself, the limits of self-knowledge. Borrowing from Adorno, Foucault, Nietzsche, Laplanche and Levinas, among others, Butler develops a theory of the formation of the subject as a relation to the social * a community of others and their norms * which is beyond the control of the subject it forms, as precisely the very condition of that subject?s formation, the resources by which the subject becomes recognizably human, a grammatical "I", in the first place. The subject is therefore dispossessed of itself by another or others as the very condition of its being at all, and this process by which I become myself only in relation to others and therefore cannot own myself completely, this constitutive dispossession, is the opacity of the contemporary subject to itself, what I cannot know, possess, and master consciously about myself.
Butler then turns to the ethical question: If my narrative account of myself is necessarily incomplete, breaking down tellingly at the point precisely when "I" am called to elucidate the foundations of this "I", my genesis and ontology, what kind of ethical agent, or "I", am "I"?[citation needed] Butler accepts the claim that if the subject is opaque to itself the limitations of its free ethical responsibility and obligations are due to the limits of narrative, presuppositions of language and projection. "You may think that I am in fact telling a story about the prehistory of the subject, one that I have been arguing cannot be told. There are two responses to this objection. (1) That there is no final or adequate narrative reconstruction of the prehistory of the speaking "I" does not mean we cannot narrate it; it only means that at the moment when we narrate we become speculative philosophers or fiction writers. (2) This prehistory has never stopped happening and, as such, is not a prehistory in any chronological sense. It is not done with, over, relegated to a past, which then becomes part of a casual or narrative reconstruction of the self. On the contrary, that prehistory interrupts the story I have to give of myself, makes every account of myself partial and failed, and constitutes, in a way, my failure to be fully accountable for my actions, my final "irresponsibility," one for which I may be forgiven only because I could not do otherwise. This not being able to do otherwise is our common predicament" (page 78).
Instead she argues for an ethics based precisely on the limits of self-knowledge as the limits of responsibility itself.[citation needed] Any concept of responsibility which demands the full transparency of the self to itself, an entirely accountable self, necessarily does violence to the opacity which marks the constitution of the self it addresses. The scene of address by which responsibility is enabled is always already a relation between subjects who are variably opaque to themselves and to each other. The ethics that Butler envisions is therefore one in which the responsible self knows the limits of its knowing, recognizes the limits of its capacity to give an account of itself to others, and respects those limits as symptomatically human.[citation needed] To take seriously one's opacity to oneself in ethical deliberation means then to critically interrogate the social world in which one comes to be human in the first place and which remains precisely that which one cannot know about oneself. In this way, Butler locates social and political critique at the core of ethical practice.[citation needed]
[edit] Politics
In a London Review of Books article published in August 2003, Butler has identified herself as an anti-Zionist Jewish American who is concerned with the loss of academic freedom implicitly advocated by pro-Israeli groups.[15] She expounds upon her views on Zionism in a section of Precarious Life examining a debacle surrounding Harvard President Lawrence Summers. On September 7th, 2006, she partook in a faculty-organized teach-in at the University of California, Berkeley, scrutinizing the Israeli war on Lebanon during the summer.[16]
[edit] Critical response
While Butler?s work, especially the notion of ?gender performativity? is far from universally accepted as being an accurate or complete explanation of gender identity, it has been extremely influential in the field of gender studies, not to mention in cultural studies, philosophy, and literary criticism. The extent of Butler?s influence may be approximated by referring to the website for the University of California, Irvine?s Critical Theory Institute, which hosts a list of references to Butler?s work that includes hundreds of titles. Of course, the list is not even comprehensive, as new analyses of Butler?s work are still being written. [17]
Some theorists have built off Butler?s work and the idea of gender performativity in new directions. For example, Susan A. Speer and Jonathan Potter claim that it gives new insight in several areas, especially in the concept of heterosexism. However, although Speer and Potter find Butler?s work useful in this respect, they find her work too abstracted to be usefully applied to ?real-life situations.? For this reason, they pair a reading of Butler with Discursive Psychology in order to extend Butler?s ideas to real-world scenarios.[18]
Negative critical response to Butler?s work has generally fallen into two categories: criticisms of her writing style, and criticisms of the ideas she puts forth.
Martha Nussbaum wrote an article in The New Republic titled "The Professor of Parody" criticizing Butler's writing for obscurantism and for its merely "verbal and symbolic politics"; in contrast, Nussbaum mentions thinkers such as Catharine MacKinnon, Nancy Chodorow, and Andrea Dworkin as examples of effective feminist scholarship. According to Nussbaum, without a universally applicable notion of social justice or normative principles, Butler's projects constitute mere moral passivity. The thrust of Nussbaum's criticism lamented the retreat from legal and institutional concerns that contribute to material and practical gains for women, versus the isolated gestural movements that encourage defeatism and thus "collaborate with evil."[19]
Also in 1998, Philosophy and Literature admonished Butler with first prize in its Fourth Bad Writing Contest, for a sentence in the scholarly journal diacritics.[20] Following controversy, and perceptions of mean-spiritedness, over the "Bad Writing" award that Denis Dutton gave out under the auspices of his academic journal, Dutton discontinued the award in 1999.[21] Butler commented on the event in an interview,[22] and published a response entitled "A 'Bad Writer' Bites Back" in the pages of the New York Times.[23]
The criticism that Butler?s writing style is too dense or obfuscatory has itself been criticized. In Judith Butler: Live Theory, Vicki Kirby?s exploration of Butler?s contributions to gender theory, Kirby suggests that Butler?s critics are practicing anti-intellectualism, writing, ?Not surprisingly, the reception of Butler?s prolific contribution to theoretical and political life depends on the importance attributed to such concerns."[24]
Butler herself has also responded to criticism of her writing?s accessibility, writing in 2004:
"It?s not that I?m in favor of difficulty for difficulty?s sake; it?s that I think there is a lot in ordinary language and in received grammar that constrains our thinking * indeed, about what a person is, what a subject is, what sexuality is, what politics can be * and that I?m not sure we?re going to be able to struggle effectively against those constrains or work within them in a productive way unless we see the ways in which grammar is both producing and constraining our sense of what the world is."[25]
Butler further argues that attacks on her writing style from those in the humanities are symptomatic of these critics? doubts of their own importance or of the importance of the humanities in general to the academic world, writing:
"Those intellectuals who speak in a rarefied way are being scapegoated, are being purged, are being denounced precisely because they represent a certain anxiety about everyone?s effect * that is, what effect are any of us having, and what effect can we have?" [26]
Some critics, including Susan Bordo, have criticized Butler for reducing gender to language. Bordo, for example, argues that the body is a major part of gender, thus implicitly opposing Butler?s conception of gender as performed. [27]
Others, like Peter Digeser, have argued that Butler?s idea of performativity is too pure to account for identity. Like others before him, Digeser doubts that pure performativity is possible, and argues that in viewing the gendered individual as purely performed, Butler ignores the gendered body, which Bordo has argued is extremely important. Digeser argues that neither an essentialist nor a performative notion of gender should be used in the political sphere, as both simplify gender too much.[28]
One major critic of Butler?s work has been Nancy Fraser. The two writers, along with Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, participated in a discourse about each others?s work in 1995. Fraser has argued that Butler?s focus on performativity has distanced her from ?everyday ways of talking and thinking about ourselves * Why should we use such a self-distancing idiom??[29] Fraser argues that Butler needs to fully commit to her positions by way of justifying them and thus validating them, as this is the only way to achieve a political impact. Like Speer and Potter, Fraser also argues that Butler?s focus on language removes her from real-world issues and makes her work difficult to be applied to real-life situations. Fraser has also argued that homophobia is a result of cultural influences rather than economic, a position which Butler has argued directly against in an essay titled ?Merely Cultural.?
Although Butler clearly disagrees with Fraser, the two are old friends who have entered into direct discourse several times in the past[30], and Butler has stated that she views the difference of opinion between the two as ?productive disagreement.?[31]
[edit] Books


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Tue Jun  3 13:53:03 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Tue, 03 Jun 2008 15:53:03 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Open letter to Barack Obama
Message-ID: <484568DF020000BF0000BC69@gwia.ci.detroit.mi.us>

http://www.michigancitizen.com/default.asp?sourceid=&smenu=76&twindow=Default&mad=No&sdetail=6112&wpage=1&skeyword=&sidate=&ccat=&ccatm=&restate=&restatus=&reoption=&retype=&repmin=&repmax=&rebed=&rebath=&subname=&pform=&sc=1070&hn=michigancitizen&he=.com

Open letter to Barack Obama
By Ron Walters
NNPA Columnist

I write this ?open letter? to Barack Obama because I am concerned about one recently written by Harold Ford, Jr. That letter urged Obama to try harder to connect with white blue-collar voters by engaging them in states like Kentucky and Indiana in the Fall Elections. 

While I would not argue that he should ignore these states, I worry that the agenda he would use to attract conservative voters could weaken the force of change.

To begin with, worry about the blue collar vote is based on the perception of their strength as a part of the Democratic base, but this year will probably not reflect the 1980s when they went over to the Republican party en masse or in 1992 when they were a large part of the Ross Perot vote. This year, blue collar Whites are hurting more than any other time in recent memory and more than any other part of the political demographic with: Significant job losses, high prices for everything from milk to gas, the loss of their homes and disaffection with the war policies of the Bush administration. They have been let down by Republicans on both domestic and foreign policy and although about 20 percent in recent polls have said they would vote McCain if Obama were the choice in the Fall, the issue is what would happen to the rest. 

I think this year the blue collar constituency is likely to split. One group could go with McCain; another group may buy in to Obama?s promise of change to an agenda that favors lower income citizens; and still another group, frustrated by the choices, is likely to stay home. This means that while the split in their votes may be a threat to the Democratic base it could be neutralized by the dynamism created by the Obama campaign. 

There is the distinct possibility that a great deal of the loss of blue collar whites could be made up by the new coalition that Obama promises to bring into the fall election. Estimates by the Associated Press are that the new voters Democrats have attracted in the primaries thus far amount to 3.5 to 4 million. If this proportion holds up in the fall elections, one would have to triple the number of new voters to about 10-12 million. This substantial number of change voters should be the focus of the campaign rather than lavishing resources on voters in the conservative heartland of the nation that will most likely not vote for Barack Obama in any case.

The other path to increasing the change constituency is to focus on enhancing the turnout of those groups that have shown they are more likely to vote for a Democratic ticket, Blacks and Hispanics. 

To be sure, some of the increase in new primary election voters is reflected in the increase in Blacks and Hispanics, but more could be done in the general election to increase these numbers, especially among the youth who are trending away from the Republican party by astounding numbers. In 2004, 35 percent of Blacks and 66 percent of Hispanics were not registered and 44 percent of Blacks and 72 percent of Hispanics that were eligible did not vote. 

The addition of new voters to the Democratic base should put into perspective much of the speculation about Hillary Clinton?s strength in so-called swing states like Ohio, Michigan and Pennsylvania by considering the new states such voters might deliver.

Finally, some of Obama?s perceived weaknesses are based on head-to-head polls during the primary season, but the tradition is that these numbers do not necessarily hold up in the fall. For example, in 1998 Michael Dukakis was ahead of George H. W. Bush but Bush won; in 1992 Bill Clinton trailed him in the Primary elections but Clinton won; and in 2000 Al Gore was ahead of George Bush but Bush was given the election.

Therefore, the moderate wing of the Democratic party and the punditry that seems obsessed with blue collar voters should not dictate to the Obama campaign a strategy that both feeds into Obama?s weakness among blue collar whites, and challenges the strength of a change oriented campaign and administration if he wins the presidency. 

Such a strategy is disrespectful of Blacks by suggesting that they would stand still while Obama pursues conservative interests to their detriment, in effect, exchanging the progressive substance of change for race. 

I think this is a dangerous course the Obama campaign should avoid.

Ron Walters is Director of the African American Leadership Center and Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland College Park. 


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com

From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Thu Jun  5 09:04:57 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2008 11:04:57 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Marx on the dialectic in _Capital_
Message-ID: <4847C859.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

M. Block - ?Les Th?oriciens du Socialisme en Allemagne. Extrait du Journal des Economistes, Juillet et Ao?t 1872? - makes the discovery that my method is analytic and says: ?Par cet ouvrage M. Marx se classe parmi les esprits analytiques les plus eminents.? German reviews, of course, shriek out at ?Hegelian sophistics.? The European Messenger of St. Petersburg in an article dealing exclusively with the method of ?Das Kapital? (May number, 1872, pp. 427-436), finds my method of inquiry severely realistic, but my method of presentation, unfortunately, German-dialectical. It says:

?At first sight, if the judgment is based on the external form of the presentation of the subject, Marx is the most ideal of ideal philosophers, always in the German, i.e., the bad sense of the word. But in point of fact he is infinitely more realistic than all his forerunners in the work of economic criticism. He can in no sense be called an idealist.?

I cannot answer the writer better than by aid of a few extracts from his own criticism, which may interest some of my readers to whom the Russian original is inaccessible.

After a quotation from the preface to my ?Criticism of Political Economy,? Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on: 

?The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own. ... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx?s book has.? 

Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method? 



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Thu Jun  5 09:16:00 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2008 11:16:00 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Now-a-days atheism is culpa levis [a relatively
	slight sin, c.f. mortal sin],
	as compared with criticism of existing	property relations
Message-ID: <4847CAEF.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

In the domain of Political Economy, free scientific inquiry meets not merely the same enemies as in all other domains. The peculiar nature of the materials it deals with, summons as foes into the field of battle the most violent, mean and malignant passions of the human breast, the Furies of private interest. The English Established Church, e.g., will more readily pardon an attack on 38 of its 39 articles than on 1/39 of its income. Now-a-days atheism is culpa levis [a relatively slight sin, c.f. mortal sin], as compared with criticism of existing property relations. Nevertheless, there is an unmistakable advance. I refer, e.g., to the Blue book published within the last few weeks: ?Correspondence with Her Majesty's Missions Abroad, regarding Industrial Questions and Trades' Unions.? The representatives of the English Crown in foreign countries there declare in so many words that in Germany, in France,to be brief, in all the civilised states of the European Continent, radical change in the existing relations between capital and labour is as evident and inevitable as in England. At the same time, on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, Mr. Wade, vice-president of the United States, declared in public meetings that, after the abolition of slavery, a radical change of the relations of capital and of property in land is next upon the order of the day. These are signs of the times, not to be hidden by purple mantles or black cassocks. They do not signify that tomorrow a miracle will happen. They show that, within the ruling-classes themselves, a foreboding is dawning, that the present society is no solid crystal, but an organism capable of change, and is constantly changing. 

http://www.marx.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p1.htm





This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Thu Jun  5 09:23:19 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2008 11:23:19 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Uses and abuses of the culture or symbolic concept
Message-ID: <4847CCA6.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

To go with our critique of the use and abuse of biology, let us write on
the uses and abuses of the culture concept...Like Confederate culture,
American gun culture... righwing God culture and symbolic systems,
institutions and structures.. representations and cultural grammars. 

^^^^^^^
The Use and Abuse of Biology: An 
Anthropological Critique of Sociobiology (Paperback)

http://www.press.umich.edu/titleDetailDesc.do?id=20259


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Thu Jun  5 10:45:27 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2008 11:45:27 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Uses and abuses of the culture or symbolic
 concept
In-Reply-To: <4847CCA6.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
References: <4847CCA6.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
Message-ID: <E1K4Hiv-0004CE-P0@elasmtp-curtail.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

Ort a critique of anthropology as slumming.

At 10:23 AM 6/5/2008, Charles Brown wrote:
>To go with our critique of the use and abuse of biology, let us write on
>the uses and abuses of the culture concept...Like Confederate culture,
>American gun culture... righwing God culture and symbolic systems,
>institutions and structures.. representations and cultural grammars.
>
>^^^^^^^
>The Use and Abuse of Biology: An
>Anthropological Critique of Sociobiology (Paperback)
>
>http://www.press.umich.edu/titleDetailDesc.do?id=20259



From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Thu Jun  5 09:53:11 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2008 11:53:11 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Uses and abuses of the culture or	symbolic
	concept
In-Reply-To: <E1K4Hiv-0004CE-P0@elasmtp-curtail.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
References: <4847CCA6.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
	<E1K4Hiv-0004CE-P0@elasmtp-curtail.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <4847D3A6.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Skeletons in the Anthropological Closet, 

by Cousin William Willis ( student of Boas)


http://www.sas.upenn.edu/%7Epsanday/willis.html

Uses and abuses of anthropology.
Uses and abuses of philosophy

>>> Ralph Dumain <rdumain at autodidactproject.org> 06/05/2008 12:45 PM
>>>
Ort a critique of anthropology as slumming.

At 10:23 AM 6/5/2008, Charles Brown wrote:
>To go with our critique of the use and abuse of biology, let us write
on
>the uses and abuses of the culture concept...Like Confederate
culture,
>American gun culture... righwing God culture and symbolic systems,
>institutions and structures.. representations and cultural grammars.
>
>^^^^^^^
>The Use and Abuse of Biology: An
>Anthropological Critique of Sociobiology (Paperback)
>
>http://www.press.umich.edu/titleDetailDesc.do?id=20259 


_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis 


 


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Thu Jun  5 09:56:49 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2008 11:56:49 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] African-American pioneers in anthropology
Message-ID: <4847D480.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

African-American pioneers in anthropology / edited by Ira E. Harrison
and Faye V. Harrison. 
 
Subjects:  African American anthropologists 
Anthropology -- United States -- History. 
Ethnology -- United States -- History. 
 
Publisher:  Urbana : University of Illinois Press, c1999. 
 
ISBN:  0252024303 (cloth : acid-free paper) 
0252067363 (pbk. : acid-free paper) 
 
Description:  296 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. 
 
Contents:  Introduction: Anthropology, African Americans, and the
Emancipation of a Subjugated Knowledge / Faye V. Harrison and Ira E.
Harrison -- 1. Caroline Bond Day: Pioneer Black Physical Anthropologist
/ Hubert B. Ross, Amelia Marie Adams and Lynne Mallory Williams -- 2.
Feminism and Black Culture in the Ethnography of Zora Neale Hurston /
Gwendolyn Mikell -- 3. Louis Eugene King, the Anthropologist Who Never
Was / Ira E. Harrison -- 4. Laurence Foster: Anthropologist, Scholar,
and Social Advocate / Yolanda Moses -- 5. W. Montague Cobb: Physical
Anthropologist, Anatomist, and Activist / Lesley M. Rankin-Hill and
Michael L. Blakey -- 6. Katherine Dunham: Anthropologist, Artist,
Humanist / Joyce Aschenbrenner -- 7. Ellen Irene Diggs: Coming of Age in
Atlanta, Havana, and Baltimore / A. Lynn Bolles -- 8. Across Class and
Culture: Allison Davis and His Works / Dallas L. Browne -- 9. St. Clair
Drake: Scholar and Activist / Willie L. Baber -- 10. Arthur Huff Fauset,
Campaigner for Social Justice: A Symphony of Diversity / Carole H.
Carpenter -- 11. Skeletons in the Anthropological Closet: The Life and
Work of William S. Willis, Jr. / Peggy Reeves Sanday -- 12. Hubert B.
Ross, the Anthropologist Who Was / Ira E. Harrison -- 13. Continuing
Dialogue: The Life and Work of Elliot Skinner as Exemplar of the
African-American/African Dialectic / Cheryl Mwaria. 
 
Notes:  Includes bibliographical references. 
 
Contributors:  Harrison, Ira E. 
Harrison, Faye V. 
 
Control No.:  2062900 
ocm39051843 
 
LCCN:  98019724 
 
Bibliography:  Includes bibliographical references. 
 



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Thu Jun  5 10:48:57 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2008 12:48:57 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] History of American Womanism
Message-ID: <4847E0B9.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

See left aspects of WCTU ideology

CB

Woman's Christian Temperance Union
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
  (Redirected from Women's Christian Temperance Union)? Ten things you may not know about Wikipedia ?Jump to: navigation, search
"WCTU" redirects here. See WCTU Railway for the rail line in White City, Oregon. 
The Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) is the oldest continuing non-sectarian women's organization worldwide. Founded in Fredonia, New York in 1873, the group spearheaded the crusade for prohibition. Members advanced their cause by entering saloons, singing, praying, and urging saloonkeepers to stop selling alcohol. Subsequently, on December 22, 1873, they were the first local organization to adopt the name, Women's Christian Temperance Union.

Contents [hide]
1 History and purpose 
2 Current status 
3 See also 
4 External links 
5 References 
 


[edit] History and purpose
The purpose of the WCTU is to combat the influence of alcohol on families and society. Frances Willard, a noted feminist, was its second president. They were inspired by the Greek writer Xenophon who defined temperance as "moderation in all things healthful; total abstinence from all things harmful." In other words, should something be good, it should not be indulged in to excess. Should something be bad for you, it should be avoided altogether; thus their attempts to rid their surroundings of what they saw (and still see) as the dangers of alcohol. The WCTU perceived alcoholism as a consequence of larger social problems rather than as a personal weakness or failing. Thus the WCTU was very interested in a number of social reform issues including: labor, prostitution, public health, sanitation and international peace. As the movement grew in numbers and strength, members of the WCTU also focused on suffrage. The WCTU was instrumental in organizing women's suffrage leaders and in helping more women become involved in American politics. Willard pushed for the "Home Protection" ballot, arguing that women, being the superior sex morally, needed the vote in order to act as "citizen-mothers" and protect their homes and cure society's ills. At a time when suffragists still alienated most American women, who viewed them as radicals, the WCTU offered a more traditionally feminine and appropriate organization for women to join. Suffragists who emerged out of the WCTU used constitutional arguments to support their bid for enfranchisement and cited the Fourteenth Amendment. They claimed that American adult women had the right to vote because they were individuals and were thus entitled to enjoy all the rights of an American individual. By making this argument, suffragists were perceived as less threatening to social order, appealed to American pride and were successful in presenting their message of extending voting rights to all American adults.

The WCTU created a significant response throughout the United States. In 1878, Matilda Bradley Carse became the president of the Chicago branch. During her time as president, Carse founded many charities and managed to raise approximately $10,000 a year to support them. She started the Bethesda Day Nursery for working mothers, two kindergartens, the Anchorage Mission for erring girls, two dispensaries, two industrial schools, an employment bureau, Sunday schools, and temperance reading rooms. Carse also founded the Woman?s Temperance Publishing Association, a stock company which published written material ranging from books, to brochures and tracts on temperance regarding various social reforms, namely temperance.

The WCTU also formed in Canada in 1873, in Ontario. In 1885 Letitia Youmans founded a nationwide organization which was to become the leading women's society in Canada's temperance movement. An Australian arm commenced operation in 1882, it was important in both the temperance and women's suffrage movements.

In 1885, WCTU missionary Mary Greenleaf Clement Leavitt went on a tour of New Zealand and helped establish WCTU branches there. Having turned down the offer to become the first president of the WCTU, Leavitt went on to be named Honorary President in 1891 in Boston. Operating as a freelancer, Leavitt helped establish WCLU branches in the Hawaiian Islands, Australia, Madagascar, India, China, Madeira, Mauritius, Ceylon, Siam, the Straits Settlements, Korea, Japan and Europe.[1] A branch for children was formed, called the Loyal Temperance Legion.[2]

Led by Kate Sheppard from 1887, the New Zealand WCTU was a major force behind the campaign for women's suffrage. This resulted in New Zealand women being granted universal suffrage in 1893.[3] In April, 1887, WCTU member Susanna M. Salter of Argonia, Kansas became the first woman mayor elected in the United States.

In addition to campaigning against alcohol, the WCTU addressed social ills stemming from drunkenness and domestic violence. It also campaigned for reforms that would improve the status of women in society, such as the right to vote. The WCTU was a major force in Prohibition-and was also influential in creating laws banning prostitution and recreational drugs in the United States.

Although the WCTU had chapters throughout North America and had hundreds of thousands of members, it did not initially accept Catholic, Jewish, or African-American women, or women who had not been born in North America[citation needed]. Today that is no longer the case. In fact, today men may also join the organization as honorary members.

In contrast to the WCTU's stated aims, not all large-scale Christian groups and movements believe the consumption of alcohol to be inconsistent with practice of Christianity (see Christianity and alcohol).


[edit] Current status
The main requirements for joining the WCTU include signing a pledge of abstinence from alcohol and paying membership dues.

Current issues for the WCTU include alcohol, which the organization considers to be North America's number one drug problem, illegal drugs, abortion [1] and gay marriage [2]. The WCTU has warned against the dangers of tobacco since 1875. They continue to this day in their fight against those substances which they see as harmful to society. The WCTU strongly supports banning same-sex marriage, which it sees as a negative influence on families; in general, it is opposed to gay rights [3].

The WCTU publishes a quarterly journal entitled The Union Signal; the journal's main focus is as a digest of current research and information on drugs.[4]. The WCTU also attempts to encourage young people to avoid substance abuse through participation in three, age-divided suborganizations: White Ribbon Recruits for pre-schoolers; the Loyal Temperance Legion (LTL) for elementary school children; and, the Youth Temperance Council (YTC) for teenagers. http : / / michiganytc . freewebpage . org



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Thu Jun  5 10:56:27 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2008 12:56:27 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Xenophon
Message-ID: <4847E27A.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xenophon 


Xenophon

ary and a contemporary and admirer of Socrates. He is known for his
writings on the history of his own times, the sayings of Socrates, and
the life of Greece.

Contents [hide]
1 Life and writings 
2 List of works 
2.1 Xenophon in Pop Culture 
2.2 Historical and biographical works 
2.3 Socratic works and dialogues 
2.4 Short treatises 
3 Notes 
4 References and further reading 
5 External links 
5.1 Project Gutenberg e-texts 
 


[edit] Life and writings
Xenophon's birth date is uncertain, but most scholars agree that he was
born in 431 BC around Athens, Greece. Xenophon was born the son of an
Athenian knight, thus granting him access to certain privileges of the
aristocracy of Ancient Greece. While a young man, Xenophon participated
in the expedition led by Cyrus the Younger against his older brother,
the emperor Artaxerxes II of Persia, in 401 BC. Xenophon says that he
had asked the veteran Socrates for advice on whether to go with Cyrus,
and that Socrates referred him to the divinely inspired Delphic oracle.
Xenophon's query to the oracle, however, was not whether or not to
accept Cyrus' invitation, but "to which of the gods he must pray and do
sacrifice, so that he might best accomplish his intended journey and
return in safety, with good fortune." So the oracle told him which gods
to pray and sacrifice to. When Xenophon returned to Athens and told
Socrates of the oracle's advice, Socrates chastised him.

 
Route of Xenophon and the Ten ThousandUnder the pretext of fighting
Tissaphernes, Cyrus assembled a massive army composed of native Persian
soldiers, but also a large number of Greeks, whom he viewed as superior
fighters. Prior to waging war against the emperor, Cyrus proposed that
the enemy was the Pisidians, and so the Greeks were unaware that they
were to battle against the larger army of King Artaxerxes II. At Tarsus
the soldiers became aware of Cyrus' plans to dispose of the king, and as
a result refused to continue. Clearchus, however, convinced the Greeks
to continue with the expedition. The army of Cyrus met the army of
Artaxerxes II in the Battle of Cunaxa. Despite effective fighting by the
Greeks, Cyrus was killed in the battle. Shortly thereafter, the Greek
general Clearchus of Sparta was invited to a peace conference, where,
alongside four other generals and many captains, he was betrayed and
executed. The mercenaries, known as the Ten Thousand, found themselves
without leadership far from the sea, deep in hostile territory near the
heart of Mesopotamia. They elected new leaders, including Xenophon
himself, and fought their way north through hostile Persians, Armenians,
and Kurds to Trapezus on the coast of the Black Sea. They then sailed
westward back to Greece. On the way back, they helped Seuthes II make
himself king of Thrace. Xenophon's record of the entire expedition
against the Persians and the journey home was titled Anabasis ("The
Expedition" or "The March Up Country"). It is worth noting that the
Anabasis was used as a field guide by Alexander the Great during the
early phases of his expedition into Persia.

Xenophon was later exiled from Athens, most likely because he fought
under the Spartan king Agesilaus II against Athens at Coronea. (However,
there may have been contributory causes, such as his support for
Socrates, as well as the fact that he had taken service with the
Persians.) The Spartans gave him property at Scillus, near Olympia in
Elis, where he composed the Anabasis. However, because his son Gryllus
fought and died for Athens at the Battle of Mantinea while Xenophon was
still alive, Xenophon's banishment may have been revoked. Xenophon died
in either Corinth or Athens. His date of death is uncertain; historians
only know that he survived his patron Agesilaus II, for whom he wrote an
encomium.

Diogenes Laertius says Xenophon was sometimes known as the "Attic Muse"
for the sweetness of his diction; very few poets wrote in the Attic
dialect. Xenophon is often cited as being the original "horse
whisperer", having advocated sympathetic horsemanship in his "On
Horsemanship". He also reports that Xenophon had a young eromenos whom
he loved and of whom he said: "Now I look upon Clinias with more
pleasure than upon all the other beautiful things which are to be seen
among men; and I would rather be blind as to all the rest of the world,
than as to Clinias. And I am annoyed even with night and with sleep,
because then I do not see him; but I am very grateful to the sun and to
daylight, because they show Clinias to me."

Xenophon's standing as a political philosopher has been defended in
recent times by Leo Strauss, who devoted a considerable part of his
philosophic analysis to the works of Xenophon, returning to the high
judgment of Xenophon as a thinker expressed by Shaftesbury, Winckelmann,
and Machiavelli. Strauss's reading has been heavily criticized, notably
by classicist Myles Burnyeat, as attempting to force Socrates into the
mould of Strauss's own philosophical views.

Pointing (1991) cites Xenophon as one of the first thinkers to argue
that the ordered world must have been conceived by a God or gods.[1]
Xenophon's Memorabilia poses the argument that all animals are "only
produced and nourished for the sake of humans" (Pointing, 1991 p.142[1])
and Pointing argues that this reasoning is not undermined until the
emergence of scientific thought and Darwinian evolution in the
nineteenth century.[1]''Bold text'Media:Italic text#REDIRECT [[Insert
text

Block quote 

]] 

[edit] List of works
Xenophon's writings, especially the Anabasis, are often read by
beginning students of the Greek language. His Hellenica is a major
primary source for events in Greece from 411 to 362 BC, and his Socratic
writings, preserved complete, are the only surviving representatives of
the genre of Sokratikoi logoi other than the dialogues of Plato.


[edit] Xenophon in Pop Culture
The 1979 cult classic "The Warriors" seems loosely based on Xenophon's
Anabasis. In it a gang (The Warriors) has to fight their way home
through hostile territory after fleeing a meeting called by a prominent
gang leader, Cyrus, who's subsequent murder is blamed on them.


[edit] Historical and biographical works
Anabasis (or The Persian Expedition) 
Cyropaedia 
Hellenica 
Agesilaus 

[edit] Socratic works and dialogues
Memorabilia 
Oeconomicus 
Symposium 
Apology 
The so Called Hero 

[edit] Short treatises
On Horsemanship 
The Cavalry General 
Hunting with Dogs 
Ways and Means 
Constitution of Sparta 
In addition, a short treatise on the Constitution of Athens exists that
was once thought to be by Xenophon, but which was probably written when
Xenophon was about five years old. This is found in manuscripts among
the short works of Xenophon, as though he had written it also. The
author, often called in English the "Old Oligarch", detests the
democracy of Athens and the poorer classes, but he argues that the
Periclean institutions are well designed for their deplorable purposes.
Leo Strauss has argued that this work is in fact by Xenophon, whose
ironic posing he believes has been utterly missed by contemporary
scholarship.


[edit] Notes



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Thu Jun  5 09:54:44 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2008 11:54:44 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Fossils in the Anthropological Closet: Uses and
	abuses of the	culture or symbolic concept
In-Reply-To: <E1K4Hiv-0004CE-P0@elasmtp-curtail.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
References: <4847CCA6.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
	<E1K4Hiv-0004CE-P0@elasmtp-curtail.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <4847D403.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



>>> Ralph Dumain <rdumain at autodidactproject.org> 06/05/2008 12:45 PM
>>>
Ort a critique of anthropology as slumming.



AFRICAN-AMERICAN PIONEERS IN ANTHROPOLOGY
Ira E. Harrison and Faye V. Harrison
University of Illinois Press,1998

SKELETONS IN THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL CLOSET 
The Life Work of William S. Willis Jr.
by
Peggy Reeves Sanday 
We must...view anthropology from the perspectives of colored peoples,
from Richard Wright's 'frog perspectives' of looking upward from below.
When we do this, the importance of color erupts, and the world of E.B.
Tylor, Franz Boas, and A.R. Radcliffe-Brown becomes articulated with the
world of W.E.B. Du Bois, Richard Wright, and Frantz Fanon. The 'frog
perspectives' reveal surprising insights about anthropology, and these
insights are the skeletons in the anthropological closet.

---William S. Willis, Jr (l972:121) 
William S. Willis Jr. was passionately committed to anthropology as the
academic discipline that could help bring "the end of poverty and
powerlessness among colored peoples" through studying the exploitation
of these peoples for "the prosperity of white societies" (l972:149;125.)
Much of his scholarship served as a model for the anthropology he
envisioned. Willis provided particularistic descriptions of the
historical trends and socio-political processes that kept the dominated
peoples of the part of the world he chose to study, the American
southern colonial frontier, from achieving freedom and equality. In the
process he contributed significantly to our understanding of the
dynamics of inter-cultural contact, exchange, domination and subjugation
in multicultural contexts. 

In this Chapter I look at the life experiences and research interests
that led Willis to conclude that anthropology was not what it claimed to
be. It was not "the science of culture," he suggested, but the social
science that studied "dominated colored peoples--and their
ancestors--living outside the boundaries of modern white societies"
(l972:123). Willis exposed and analysed what he saw as the two faces of
anthropology: racism and antiracism. As a person and a professional he
was caught in the struggle between the two. He recognized that although
the racist part was never openly expressed, it was always there, hidden
behind the "apolitical masks" of nearly a century of anthropological
scholarship that ignored colonial domination abroad and racism at
home--the "skeletons in the anthropological closet." Willis experienced
the racist part of anthropology more personally in the difficulty he had
getting an academic job and in his treatment during his short tenure at
Southern Methodist University in Dallas. Despite the insensitivity and
sometimes demeaning attitudes he encountered in his professional life,
however, Willis did not give up on anthropology. This summary of
Willis's critique of anthropology would not be complete without
examining Willis's views of the "scientific antiracism" of Franz Boas
and the Boasian school. Willis expressed considerable ambivalence on
this topic because of the fact that antiracism was not conceived
primarily to defend "colored peoples" but "to attack racial
discrimination among white groups, especially Nordicism and
anti-Semitism" (l972:138). According to Willis, the fact that
"scientific antiracism was concerned only secondarily with colored
peoples" explained the detachment of Boasian anthropologists from the
civil rights movement (ibid., p. 139). While this angered Willis it did
not keep him from recognizing the significant contributions made by Boas
in extending the concept of cultural conditioning to blacks as well as
to whites. 

At the end of his life Willis was engaged in an extensive examination
of Boas's life work, which might have helped him resolved the paradox of
Boasian anthropology. It is clear from Willis's unpublished work and
letters on file at the American Philosophical Society that he felt a
close kinship with Boas because of the difficulties Boas encountered in
attempting to deal with the race issue in America and his research
efforts to collect and preserve black folklore. Willis saw parallels
between Boas's experience with anti-semitism and his own experience with
racism. Writing to his friend and colleague Morton Fried in l973, Willis
concluded that anti-semitism was as "inherent and pervasive in Christian
society" as "color prejudice" was in white society. The stereotype of
"cowardice of Jews" was as strong as the stereotype of "the shiftless
black," he suggested. Willis expressed admiration for the younger Boas
at the turn of the century because he was the "only Jew in anthropology
in this country and he was making daring innovations in the world of
white Protestant anthropology" (emphasis his, Willis l973 letter to
Fried.) I suggest that Willis's research on Boas became the means by
which he vented his frustration with racism and expressed his hope in
anthropology as the intellectual discipline that could offer a way out
despite the failure of the Boasians to participate in the American civil
rights struggle. 


**************
Throughout his life, Willis maintained an active correspondence with
anthropological colleagues and students. I was among his first students
and we stayed in contact throughout his lifetime. I met him in the
Spring of l958 at Columbia University. The course was Anthropology 6:
Indians of North America. He was the instructor, I was one of 25
undergraduate students. It was a first for both of us. It was his first
time teaching at Columbia as a new Ph.D. It was my first semester as an
undergraduate major in anthropology. That semester I also took courses
from Margaret Mead and Morton Fried. As teachers Mead was famous, Fried
was charismatic, Willis was thorough. To a lowly undergraduate female
who had just arrived from Catholic University in Washington, D.C.,
Willis was the least daunting and the most personable of the three. All
students were important to him, regardless of who they were, especially
if they shared his commitment to the field. He was a skilled,
hard-working teacher who came to class with piles of notes on lecture
cards, which he often read. His perfectionism would have been tedious
were it not accompanied by a fascination with anthropological theory and
the great respect and interest he showed for students. I was grateful
for his concern and encouragement. Willis was the first professor at
Columbia who made me feel that there might be a future for me in
anthropology. Although we lost touch for many years, we reestablished
contact when fate brought us by different paths to Philadelphia in the
l970s: He arrived in the years after resigning from SMU; I arrived to
start my tenure as an associate professor at the Dept. of Anthropology
of the University of Pennsylvania. We discovered that once again we had
in common the experience of being first, he as the first Black hired at
SMU, I as the first woman hired by Penn's anthropology department, one
of the oldest in the country. Although we never explicitly discussed the
indignities he suffered at SMU or those I encountered at Penn, I realize
through researching his life work that we had this in common also. But
that's another story. 


EARLY LIFE AND SCHOOL EXPERIENCES 
Willis was born into an affluent family, in Waco, Texas on July ll,
l921, the only son of college educated parents. In Waco, William S.
Willis Sr. was a school principal of a Negro highschool . In protest
against the subservience expected of him by the Waco school board, he
resigned his principalship and organized a construction company that
built houses for poor Blacks. Willis Sr. later became Grand Chancellor
of the "Colored Knights of Pythians" of Texas, a Negro fraternal
organization. Partly in response to an ultimatum from the Waco Ku Klux
Klan, Willis Sr. moved his family to Dallas in l923 into a stately
Federal-style home he had built in the early l920s. 

Willis's uncle, his mother's sister's husband, was also a wealthy
business man with a sense of community responsibility. He was one of the
founders of the "Negro Progressive Voters League of Dallas," and used
his own money to help register Negro votes and transport Negro voters to
the polls. Willis went to a segregated elementary school and then to a
segregated high school, Booker T. Washington in Dallas. The Willis
family entertained their friends in the Negro community, travelled, and
spent every summer in Chicago where they owned another home. As the
Grand Chancellor of a Negro fraternal organization, Willis Sr. was an
active participant in the Texas Negro community. His business brought
him into frequent, friendly contacts with the white business community
of Dallas. It was a unique relationship which few members of the Negro
community were able to establish given the restrictions imposed by
segregation. Tragically for his son, Willis Sr. died suddenly when
Willis was eight years old. Years later, he reflected on the emotional
trauma of his father's death in a letter to a student who had just
experienced a death in the family. In this letter he observed that
sudden death had taken many members of his own family. Sudden death also
claimed Willis. He died of a heart attack in August of l983 at the age
of 62. 

After his father's death, Willis accompanied his mother on a
round-the-world trip. Willis mentioned this trip a few days before he
died in his last conversation with his long-time friend and classmate,
Morton Fried. Fried felt that the trip had enormous significance for
Willis and may have been responsible for his turning to anthropology. 

After graduating from Booker T. Washington High School Willis attended
Howard University graduating from there in l942, cum laude. History was
his major and while at Howard Willis became very close to the historian,
Rayford Logan. Willis also studied under Sterling Brown, Ralph Bunche,
E. Franklin Frazier, Alain Locke and Charles Wesley. Through studying
history, Willis was able to continue his longstanding fascination with
"Negro" history and culture, which had been nurtured by the many books
in his family's home library. At Howard, this interest intensified and
would remain a lifelong preoccupation. 

In l942 World War II had already engulfed the United States and Willis
volunteered for service in the U.S. Coast Guard. After shore patrol duty
in Boston and combat duty in the North Atlantic, he was honorably
discharged in l944. It was a confusing time and Willis was torn between
a number of options for pursuing further study. His Howard mentor,
Rayford Logan, suggested that he try Harvard Law School. Willis,
however, was more interested in social science and Negro history and
culture. 


GRADUATE WORK IN ANTHROPOLOGY 
In l945 Willis began graduate study at Columbia University, first in
political science and then in anthropology. In two applications
submitted to the Guggenheim Foundation in the l970s, Willis explained in
the "Career Account" section of the application what led him into
anthropology. In the first account, he wrote that he "was led into
anthropology by the appeal of the scientific antiracism of the Boasian
tradition." In the second account he wrote as follows: 

In l945, I began graduate study at Columbia University, first in
political science and then in anthropology. I shifted to anthropology
because I assumed that this discipline was the vanguard in the attack
against racist thought. I tried to reconcile the concentration on North
American Indians that then prevailed in anthropology with my strong
interests in history and in the study of Black people by selecting
Black-Indian relations in Southeastern North America as the problem for
my dissertation. 

Despite the enormous influence of Boas and the Boasian tradition of
cultural as opposed to biological determinism in American anthropology,
Willis encountered discrimination immediately upon entering the field as
a graduate student. When he went to register in the Department of
Anthropology, which for many years had been Boas's academic home, a well
known professor advised him not to pursue graduate work because there
would be no place for him in the field. Nevertheless, he persisted and
received a Ph.D. at Columbia in l955. His classmates comprised a very
distinguished list: Eric Wolf, Sidney Mintz, Morton Fried, Robert
Murphy, Elliott P. Skinner, and Marvin Harris. 

Willis was not able to develop his interest in scientific antiracism
and Negro culture and history during his graduate years at Columbia. The
Boasian tradition was no longer prevalent in the Department and the
study of North American Indians dominated American anthropology, despite
Boas's efforts to turn attention to North American Blacks. The closest
Willis could get to studying dominated colored peoples in America was to
examine Indian-Negro relations in southeastern North America. He
selected this problem for his dissertation but soon discovered that it
could not be handled adequately without first gaining satisfactory
knowledge of socio-cultural change among l8th century Indians in this
region. Therefore, his dissertation became a study of economic,
military, and political patterns among the Cherokee. Research for the
dissertation was partly financed by a John Hay Whitney Opportunity
Fellowship awarded him in l949. In the same year he married Georgine E.
Upshur of Philadelphia who was studying for a M.S. degree at the New
York School of Social Work. 

Willis's dissertation was entitled Colonial Conflict and the Cherokee
Indians, 1710-1760. The dissertation dealt with the impact of the
Anglo-Spanish-French trade and political rivalry on Cherokee society and
culture, documenting the sociocultural change, assimilation and
adaptation of an Indian people in the colonial setting. The research
made him into an ethnohistorian and convinced him of the importance of
the historical approach in anthropology. 


EARLY WORK 
After receiving the Ph.D. in June of l955, Willis applied immediately
to the Ford Foundation for a Training Fellowship in West African culture
and history. At Columbia he had been able to take only one survey course
on Africa offered by Professor Gene Weltfish. His plan was to spend an
academic year beginning in Sept of l956 studying Africa at some
university before going to West Africa for field work. He wrote to
Melville Herskovits in November of l955 asking for sponsorship at
Northwestern. Herskovits responded by return mail welcoming him to
Northwestern and promising to do whatever was necessary to help Willis
receive training in the African field. 

In his proposal to Ford, Willis stressed his ethnohistorical background
and his desire to focus his project on the "study of the processes of
cultural change through time," noting that concern with historical depth
had been ignored by the structural- functional approach of British
anthropology. He wrote that he would be "especially concerned with the
ethnohistory of the emergent African political systems, particularly
with those in British West Africa." Specifically, he wanted to focus on
the Gold Coast and Nigeria. He described his long standing scientific
interest in things Negro and African, dating from his social science
studies as an undergraduate major in History at Howard. He said that his
maturation as a scholar would be facilitated by an intense concentration
upon an area as different in its history and ethnography as Africa
compared with his dissertation focus on the Indians of the Southeast.
Another reason he gave for his interest in Africa concerned the recent
political developments in West Africa, which he said were "especially
important and immensely fascinating." Such a concern with nationalist
politics and change over time was quite unusual in African studies at
the time. 

Also unusual at the time (this was the l950s) was his emphasis on the
importance of studying African women. In the application, he wrote that
his wife would accompany him throughout the program of study. He
explained that she would "be able to form contacts with African women"
which would not be available to him in the field. Accordingly he
included her "academic qualifications" in the application. These were
"an A.B. degree from the University of Pennsylvania where she was a
major in Sociology and a M.S. degree from the New York School of Social
Work." "Moreover," he concluded, "she has had six years' experience as a
social worker." 

Unfortunately, Ford turned him down. One can speculate that his
proposal was perceived as too political and naive given the academic
politics of the time. Including his wife in his plans for field
methodology came at a time when women were virtually ignored in
anthropological field methodology. In the l980s and 90s such a plan
would be routine. Looking at nationalist politics and history for
understanding contemporary social form was also politically incorrect in
the l950s, especially in light of the burgeoning local African political
movements for independence from colonial rule. 

Denied the chance to engage in ethnography abroad and the study of
Negro culture and history at home, Willis turned back to the
ethnohistory of southeastern Indian relations. In l957 he wrote a letter
to William N. Fenton at the State Museum in Albany, then the premiere
ethnohistorian of Northeastern Indians. Willis was careful not to
mention his interest in Indian-Negro relations in this letter. Compared
to his Ford proposal, he seemed very conservative when he wrote "my
belief is very strong that one of the most important needs in American
anthropology is for more historical research in the documentary
materials pertaining to the American Indians" (Willis l957 letter to
Fenton.) 

Willis asked Fenton's advice concerning possibilities for obtaining
employment or grants that could help him to continue his research.
Fenton's response must have been devastating to the young scholar.
Agreeing that anthropology needed more historical research, Fenton
stated that he knew of "no way" in which a young man of Willis's talents
and training could "find gainful employment at it." Several months later
after reading Willis' first published article "The Nation of Bread,"
Fenton wrote a congratulatory letter calling it "a sharp piece of
writing" (Fenton l957 letters to Willis.) 


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Thu Jun  5 09:59:29 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2008 11:59:29 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Anthropology and Womanist Theory
Message-ID: <4847D520.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Anthropology and Womanist Theory:
Claiming the Discourse on Gender, Race, and Culture  
   
http://www.uga.edu/~womanist/rodriguez2.1.htm

Search WTR
 by Cheryl Rodriguez   
   
  Anthropology is an ambitious science which, from its earliest origins, has sought to answer questions about the infinite complexities of the human experience.  While scholars often trace the origins of the discipline to the Greek philosopher, Herodotus (5th century B. C.), there is evidence that every group of people (including those who would become the "primitive" subjects of anthropological inquiry) has questioned the      human condition and sought to derive explanations for human behavior and human purpose.  Thinkers from every group of existing people have sought to understand the meaning of human constructs such as kinship, war, migration, social structure, and political organization.  Further, anthropological explanations of the human condition by nonliterate people have been expressed through art, mythology, religious practices, ceremonial displays, and, of course, through the oral tradition.   

The formalization of anthropology as a scientific discipline in the late nineteenth century meant that the observations, hypotheses, and theories of "the study of man" were generated from and based upon that which we now call empirical data.  Such data gained great respectability over so-called "superstitions" as people of the Western world became influenced by rationalist thinking during the eighteenth century's Age of Enlightenment.  As the discipline developed, a number of plausible -- if not problematic -- theories traversed the anthropological terrain, exerting various degrees of influence and inciting further theorizing from proponents and critics alike.  

Thus, anthropology has been shaped and influenced by such diverse theoretical perspectives as evolutionism, historical particularism, structural-functionalism, cultural materialism, and Marxism.  Additionally, there are the paradigms of psychological anthropology, symbolic anthropology, and structuralism.  This wealth of theories has led some scholars to label anthropologists as eclectics: that is, as scientists who are unable to commit to any particular epistemological or theoretical principles (Harris, 1979).  Murphy describes the lack of a dominant theory by defining anthropology as "a pluralistic discipline that loosely shelters a plethora of interest and which lacks a center" (Murphy, 1976, p. 19).  

Despite scholarly critiques of the state of anthropological theory, the anthropological project is a fundamentally discursive one whose task is the production of knowledge on every aspect of culture. Harrison (1995b) has referred to anthropology as the most interdisciplinary of all social sciences.  However, in both theory and application, anthropology continues to replicate the model of the (white) scholar venturing into Third World communities1 to observe, probe, interpret, and change.  Critiques of anthropology's colonialist and imperialist implications have been numerous (Asad, 1975; Drake, 1980; Harrison, 1991; Huizer and Mannheim, 1979; and Hymes, 1972, among others).  

Nevertheless, anthropologists who are members of oppressed groups are attracted to the discipline because of our "growing understanding that rigorous analysis and documentation of the cultures and histories of our peoples can be essential tools in the quest for progressive social change" (Gordon, 1991).  Feminist and womanist theorists also have critically examined the discipline's historical connections to hegemonic systems as well as its value in knowledge production and representation.  For example, Mohanty contends that anthropology "is an example of disciplinary knowledge which signifies the power of naming and the contests over meaning of definitions of the self and other" (Mohanty, 1991, p. 31). 

As such, anthropology has the potential of being a crucial tool for struggle and resistance.  Harrison argues for a reconsideration of anthropology's multiple knowledges (especially that knowledge created by anthropologists of color) and a recognition of the "silences and subjugations that influence the discipline's development" (Harrison, 1995a, p. 54).  In another scholarly essay, Harrison identifies the invisibility and silences of women of color in the anthropological canon and concludes: "In the process of redefining anthropology's critical project(s) and of reconstituting anthropological authority, we must offset the persistent pattern of relegating the work of women -- and that of women of color in particular -- to the discipline's periphery" (Harrison, 1995b, p. 242).  

In the tradition of those womanist scholars who have sought to broaden the meaning of feminism2 and of those anthropologists whose work examines the interlocking hierarchies of gender, race, and class as well as the subjugated knowledges and alternative methodologies of anthropology (Bolles, 1987; Harrison, 1995b; Mikell, 1982; Steady, 1981), I began exploring the implications and challenges of identifying and articulating a womanist voice in anthropology.  As a graduate student, my womanist perspective was subsumed by the discipline itself.  Recognizing the centrality and the authority of whiteness and maleness in the discipline, I struggled with my own questions about the roles of people of color as creators of knowledge in anthropology.  Further, Black women's presence in anthropology (as the focus of research or as researchers) was virtually unrecognized in my program of study.  Consequently, my development as a potential contributor to anthropological scholarship involved a conscious process of independently seeking out radical and alternative knowledge. 

Now, as a scholar with some intellectual freedom, I seek to participate in the paving of a path for myself and others who would define themselves as womanists.  This path is paved with womanist ideas on Black women as scholars, researchers, leaders, and active creators of culture and communities.  I define womanist ideas as those informed by the interaction of Afrocentric, multicultural, and feminist theoretical interpretations of political, economic, historical, social, and cultural phenomena.  According to Collins (1991), the foundation of womanist thought consists of specialized knowledge created by women of the African diaspora which clarifies a standpoint of and for Black women.  That standpoint consists of "the experiences and ideas shared by [Black] women that provide a unique angle of vision on self, community, and society" (Collins, 1991, p. 22).  Womanist thought is informed by the legacies of awareness, activism, intellectualism, struggle, and self-definition of women of Africa and its diaspora.  

Yet, what does it mean to be a womanist anthropologist?  How does one define, create, and operationalize womanist theory in anthropology?  In the following discussion, I will address these questions by describing some of the ways in which womanist theory can inform teaching and research in cultural anthropology.  I argue that womanist theory in anthropological pedagogy and research is congruent with a relevant, holistic, and humanistic anthropology.  As a womanist, I am professionally, politically, and personally concerned that the discipline of anthropology is one that embraces the multiple cultural interactions of all women of color, especially women of Africa and its diaspora.  

I will begin my womanist reflections with some brief historical perspectives on Black women's images in anthropology.  Not unimportantly or incidentally, Africa is the primary focus of this discussion.  Second, I will explore the meaning of womanist theory and its foundations in anthropology.  Third, I will describe the merging of theory and action by providing examples of my own teaching and research in cultural anthropology, which is informed by the work of other womanist anthropologists. 

Anthropological Images of Black Women 

Regardless of sexual affiliation, a researcher cannot really escape the ideological and cultural influences that are contributory factors in the formulation of concepts, values, orientations, and methodologies. 

   --Filomena Chioma Steady, The Black Woman Cross-Culturally 

Historically, Black women have been represented in anthropological and related social science research in a number of ways that appear to be authoritatively or empirically based.  These representations include: Black women as the exotic, primitively sexual Other; Black women as the dysfunctional or pathological Other; or Black women as the invisible, passive Other.  To emphasize the notion of Black women as the exotic, primitively sexual Other, Black women's bodies were examined and displayed in the name of science.  Giddings (1994) cites the degrading treatment of Sarah Bartmann (1790-1815), a South African woman, who in 1810 was publicly exhibited in London.  Fascinated with the size and structure of Bartmann's buttocks, European scientists displayed her for five years until she died in Paris at age twenty-five.  As the dysfunctional or pathological Other, Black women have been portrayed by sociologists as the domineering matriarch, solely responsible for the demise of the Black family (Giddings, 1988, pp. 325-35).  As the invisible, passive Other, Black women's creative and complex contributions to culture in Africa and the Americas were ignored.   

In more benign representations, Black women have been included among the oppressed without deep considerations of the interlocking hierarchies that affect Black women's lives.  It only has been in the mid-twentieth century that Black women in social science research have become active as scholars attempting to document liberatory and humanistic data on lives of women of Africa and its diaspora.   

In the following discussion, I will examine the scholarship of two very theoretical and historically diverse groups of anthropologists: the British structural-functionalists and American feminists.  The purpose of this discussion is to introduce some general observations on the ways in which Black women have been represented in the research of these two groups of anthropologists.  I examine the early works of the structural-functionalists and feminist anthropologists because these represent two periods in which anthropologists were generating new questions, exploring new theories, and feeling quite free in expressing their interpretations.  Second, these two groups were selected because of their anthropological foci: A significant body of anthropological literature on Africa came from the British structural-functionalists, and a significant body of work on women came from feminist anthropologists.  Black women are a part of both of these extensively examined populations.   

Finally, these groups were selected because of the distinctive historical and political time periods in which these anthropologists developed theories.  It is important to understand that in every historical period, scientific inquiry is influenced by the state of the larger world capitalist system (as well as by attempts to challenge the systems of Dower).  Historically, this capitalist ideology has depended upon the free or low wage labor of Black women and other people of color, while simultaneously denying and devaluing the contributions of these same people.  Since politics, economics, scientific inquiry, and knowledge are intricately interconnected, this devaluation of nonwhite people is sometimes reflected in social science research.  Anthropology has been no exception.   

Although misrepresented, Black women were a critical foundation of early anthropological inquiry.  Steady (1981) argues that long before the advent of a feminist focus on women, Black (African) women had been the undefined or unacknowledged Other:  "It can even be claimed that to some extent she was used, directly or indirectly, as a guinea pig for the development of a significant body of anthropological theory in Africa and sociological theory in the United States and in the Caribbean" (Steady, 1981, p. 1).   

The use of the Black woman indirectly is illustrated in early British anthropology.  Using structural-functionalism as a theoretical framework, British anthropologists attempted to make sense of living societies by adopting an organic analogy.  That is, institutions such as kinship, religion, politics, and economics interacted with each other in the same way that organs of the human body interact (Radcliffe-Brown, 1965).  These scientists believed that the components of a social system had specific purposes that maintained the integrity and stability of the entire system (Lett, 1987).  One edited text consisting of detailed descriptions of the social structures of eight African societies was produced by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940).  In the same paradigmatic tradition, Middleton and Tait (1958) produced a text that included six studies of "the reciprocal relations between descent groups and local political groups, between lineages and clans and local and political communities" (Evans-Pritchard, 1958, p. x).   

One example of African women's invisibility or misrepresentation is taken from Bohannan's chapter in the Middleton and Tait text.  Bohannan describes the social organization of the Tiv, a tribe in Northern Nigeria.  The chapter is an excellently detailed description of geography, language, housing compounds, genealogy, political structure, warfare, leadership patterns, and the maintenance of peace and order.  Based on Bohannan's narrative, men were her only informants and women were mentioned in passing only as the bearers of men's children (Bohannan, 1958, pp. 33-66).

African women's centrality to various forms of human organization (as maintainers of economic systems; as producers of food, social order, children, culture; as partners in leadership with men) is not apparent in the ethnographic descriptions of any of the fourteen studies of the aforementioned texts.  In their zeal to develop scholarship on so-called "primitive" or "simple" cultures in Africa and in their quest to be among the first to categorize these systems for the literate world, these anthropologists assumed that men were the key actors in the creation and maintenance of social structure.  Even when African women's presence was acknowledged, their contributions remained peripheral.  Further, these anthropologists worked assiduously to describe African political systems even as these systems were being destroyed by colonialism and imperialism.  

Yet, it would not have served the economic and political progress of their country for the structural-functionalists to acknowledge the destruction of African political institutions by European colonizers.  It would not have served the scientific aims of these anthropologists to determine how the colonial era was disrupting the lives of women as well as men.  It would later be determined that African women suffered tremendously from colonialist and imperialist changes, "for after having had a role in traditional forms of organization, under colonialism they discovered themselves systematically excluded from any participation in the new set-up" (Okonjo, 1981, p. 86).  

The success of early anthropological research in Africa owes much to the European expansionist ideology of the fifteenth century.  This forceful and violent expansion (which stimulated the practice and business of transatlantic slave trading), followed by white rule of various African countries, opened up the continent to the very curious eyes of those who wanted to compare European culture to that of primitive or simple societies.  Willis contends that anthropology's formalization in the latter nineteenth century "coincided with the shift from 'booty' colonialism to imperialism, which stressed profit from the control, exploitation, and preservation of cheap colored workers and consumers" (Willis, 1972, p. 122).  While these early European anthropologists were strongly influenced by the structural-functionalist paradigm, they also were influenced by an increasingly imperialistic ideology that was working to the advantage of European countries.  Further, these anthropologists set off on their adventurous explorations of Africa with the unchallenged assumption that universally, whether in complex or so-called simple societies, males were dominant, militaristic, necessarily oppressive, possessed of the most coveted positions in those tasks associated with the division of labor, and ascribed the rightful policymakers in their own particular hierarchies.  

Much later in social science history, the feminist anthropology of the 1970s emerged.  As di Leonardo explains, "The political source of feminist scholarship, early 1970s feminism, was not the first but the second major wave of women's rights thought and activism" (1991, p. 2).  As a relatively homogeneous group (white female scholars), Western feminist anthropologists of the 1970s sought to "expose sexism in public and private life, [and] to alter the male-biased presumptions of scholarly and popular culture" (di Leonardo, 1991, pp. 1-2).3  Similar to their non-feminist anthropological predecessors, these anthropologists believed that universal male domination did exist as a cultural phenomenon.  However, feminist anthropologists sought to identify this domination and explain its manifestations, as well as its political, economic, and social impacts on women.  Informed primarily by Western women's political, social, and economic issues, feminist anthropologists developed theories on universal sexual asymmetry (Rosaldo, 1974).  Some feminist anthropologists such as Ortner (1974) argued that women's subjugation by men was a universal phenomenon because of women's association with nature.  Rosaldo (1974) attributed universal male dominance to a dichotomy between the domestic sphere, which associated women with nurturing, homemaking, and related activities, and the public sphere, which has been viewed as the male domain in societies.  

Another similarity that feminist anthropologists shared with the British structural-functionalists was in their mutual fascination with nonwhite people as the subjects of their scientific curiosity.  Yet it is true that this fascination is anthropology's legacy: "To a considerable extent, anthropology has been the social science that studies dominated colored peoples -- and their ancestors -- living outside the boundaries of modern white society" (Willis, 1972, p. 123; emphasis in original).  Feminist anthropologists were strongly committed to the comparative method in order to prove universals or to explain common themes across cultures in women's lives.  In the anthropological tradition (inspired by evolutionist theory), feminist anthropologists compared the beliefs and practices of women who anthropologists felt represented simplified versions of Western culture.   

As just one example, in a 1974 essay, Tanner compared the roles of women in kinship systems among Indonesians, Africans, and African Americans (Tanner, 1974, pp. 129-56).  Focusing on the concept of matrifocality (the structural centrality of mother roles within a kinship system), Tanner concluded that there are social, economic, and cultural factors that determine this phenomenon.  She also concluded that women's centrality in kinship systems among the Javanese, the Atjehnese, the Minangkabau, the Igbo, and among African Americans is not an indicator of pathology or marginality.  However, do African-American women have to be compared with women of different cultures in order to refute the myth of a Black matriarchy?  How does one compare kinship systems of Black Americans across the United States with ethnic groups residing at the northern tip of Sumatra or even in eastern Nigeria?  

Similar questions surround the early feminist literature on women of color.  One problem was that feminist anthropologists were so consumed with asserting themselves (in a very sexist, male-dominated discipline) and with changing anthropology, that their universals became generalizations.  Black women and other women of color were no longer invisible; but, inadvertently, their lives were made to seem simplistic.  

While Western feminist theorists posed ideas that served to legitimize the study of gender and focus the blurred images of women in the anthropological picture, African women anthropologists developed scholarship in a womanist inspired tradition.  That scholarship was developed without exploitation or use of the comparative method.  African womanist anthropologists examined their own cultures for the inherent truths and realities that are evident to one who is both native and scientific observer.  Even today, African anthropologists are challenging Western feminist assumptions. 

First, African womanists have contributed to the anthropological literature by describing the communal structure of traditional African societies which assumed egalitarian interactions among African women and men.  They also have shown that in some traditional African societies, certain politico-religious roles are gender-determined (Okonjo, 1981).  Second, African womanists have shown that a close connection with nature served neither to subordinate nor to heighten women's status in traditional African societies, since the rhythms of African life were guided by nature.  Thus, the problematic nature/culture dichotomy did not manifest itself in traditional African life as it did (and still does) in Western culture.  Ultimately, colonialism, imperialism, and their legacies continue to be the primary oppressors of African women, argues Steady (1993).  Discussions of the experiences of the majority of African women must focus on multiple forms of oppression, not simply sexual asymmetry.  

This brief discussion of the early work of structural-functionalists and feminist anthropologists has been purposely narrow.  Indeed, there are many laudable insights from and enlightening dimensions to the research and theories of these scholars.  Moreover, anthropology has changed significantly since its formalization in the late nineteenth century, and it continues to evolve as the human experience changes.  Structural-functionalism outgrew its usefulness as a theoretical analysis because it did not address the inevitable impact of change on societies.  Western feminists are still firmly developing a place in anthropology as they reexamine their assumptions about the universality of the female experience.  Further, the anthropological literature on ethnicity, women, and gender has matured considerably.  Although not widely recognized, some of these changes can be attributed to womanist epistemology. 

  A Womanist Epistemological Framework in Anthropology   

We must act with deliberation and commitment in order to ensure that all women have a voice and an audience for the telling of their lives. 

   --Gwendolyn Etter-Lewis, Black Women's Life Stories  

A significant aspect of womanist epistemology is understanding the ways in which Black women's lives are affected by many complex interlocking hierarchies, including "slavery, imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, poverty, racism and apartheid" (Steady, 1993, p. 97).  Another aspect of womanist epistemology is the awareness and analysis of stereotypes and images of Black womanhood that justify and perpetuate these forms of oppression.  Womanist epistemology also is influenced by a need to elucidate the multiple roles that Black women play in the struggle for the survival of the Black community and in the struggle for institutional change (Collins, 1991).  Theorizing by womanist thinkers is a way of speaking out and shedding light on these hierarchies, stereotypes, and negative images, while simultaneously acknowledging Black women as capable contributors to humanity.  James contends that womanist theorizing emerges from Black women's experiences with racism, ethnocentrism, sexism, homophobia, and classism.  Moreover, womanist theorizing is transformative for Black women and their communities, even as Black women challenge their own communities to eliminate oppressive beliefs and practices (James, 1993).   

Yet, before addressing the significance of a womanist epistemological framework in anthropology, it is necessary to clarify terminology.  One of the problems with the term "feminism," as political identity, is that Black women generally associate feminist analyses and politics with white women, who, along with white men, are benefactors of systemic racism.4  In response to this term, "womanist," "Black feminist," "African feminist," and "Third World feminist" have been used in a number of contexts to denote the liberatory theories, perspectives, and actions of Black women who are particularly concerned with Black women's historical, cultural, social, economic, and political realities globally.  These terms are used to address a feminism that often has been characterized as "liberal, bourgeois, or reformist [with a] narrow conception of feminist terrain as an almost singularly antisexist struggle" (Johnson-Odim, 1991, p. 315).  For Black women activists and scholars, there is an ongoing challenge to develop a lexicon that describes an autonomous, relevant, humanistic, and community-focused epistemology.   

The development and use of unique and culturally grounded terminology does not distract from the larger issues involved in Black women's liberatory work.  Rather, the use of the term "womanist" clarifies our connection and commitment to understanding our own cultural realities as Black women.  Thus, Walker's (1983) spirited and succinct definition of the word is more than just a response to the narrowness of traditional feminist ideas.  The word derives from "womanish," a term used by Black women to describe the boldness of some Black girls.  Politically, a womanist is one who calls attention to the multiple oppression of Black women, but also is committed to the survival of all people.  A womanist understands that the well-being of her own folk is related to the larger struggle of the human community (Walker, 1983, pp. xi-xii).   

Womanist anthropologists are reconceptualizing feminist ideas and identifying the centrality of the feminine in African and African diasporan culture.  For example, as an anthropologist and native of Sierra Leone, Steady (1987) argues that there is an "African feminism" which she defines on two complementary levels.  On one level, African feminism is a traditional way of knowing that is embedded in African life.  Thus, in pre-colonial African societies, the dominant ideology of group survival dictated balance and egalitarianism: "Men and women in traditional African societies had spheres of autonomy -- in economic, social, ritual, and political terms -- ensured by various mechanisms of checks and balances" (Steady, 1987, p. 8).  Women's importance in all aspects of African life was understood. Steady's arguments are supported by Aidoo (1981), Okonjo (1981), and Sudarkasa (1987), each of whom provides detailed historic or ethnographic descriptions of women's roles in African societies.   

On another level, Steady defines African feminism as Black women's awareness of multiple oppression in post-colonial Africa.  Black women researchers, in particular, operationalize African feminist (or womanist) thinking by developing liberatory scholarship on Black women in Africa and its diaspora and by counteracting the destructive impact of research that has been used to dominate Black people (Steady, 1987, pp. 3-24).   

Collins (1991) argues that because knowledge has been defined by white male scholars, thinkers, and institutions, womanist ways of knowing have been suppressed, distorted, and silenced.  Thus, in intellectual domains, womanist knowledge is subjugated knowledge (Collins, 1991, p. 202).  While womanist knowledge has been subjugated in all of the social sciences, this subjugation particularly has been evident in anthropology.  In addressing anthropology's historical relationship with Black people, Drake contends that at the turn of the century, African-American intellectuals considered anthropology to be their enemy, "much as African intellectuals have tended to consider the discipline an adjunct to oppressive colonialism" (Drake, 1980, p. 2).  Thus, until the early 1920s, there were no Black scholars in anthropology.  Blacks everywhere were viewed not as creators of knowledge, but as subjects for the advancement of ethnographies and research careers.  Further, we know that Black women's lives were distorted, minimized, or rendered invisible by anthropology.   

How then, can one argue for the development of a womanist voice in anthropology?  First, I contend that there is a womanist intellectual tradition in anthropology.  This tradition was created by the first Black women who dared to claim anthropology as their discipline and whose work contributed to the idea that this discipline could be changed.  Second, I argue that there are contemporary scholars of anthropology who have legitimized the concept of native anthropology and whose work I implemented in a liberatory (i.e., womanist) tradition.  I will now expand upon each of these points.   

Although never attaching themselves to the descriptor "womanist," the first Black women anthropologists represent womanist ways of thinking and knowing in their research interests, methodologies, and interpretations.  When we seek out the work of the Black foremothers of anthropology, we reclaim a Black women's intellectual tradition which consists of expansive and explosive concepts and ideas on all aspects of humanity.  The reclaiming of this tradition means moving beyond what has been offered in traditional academic discourse and rediscovering the works of extraordinary Black women thinkers.   In anthropology, this rediscovery entails examining Black women's research and ethnographic work as well as exploring the thoughts of Black women not previously considered to be intellectuals (or even real anthropologists).   

Of great relevance to the professional development of womanist anthropologists is the exploration and examination of the works and lives of the women who began the foundation of a Black women's intellectual tradition in anthropology.  Drake (1980) cites Caroline Bond Day (1889-1948) as possibly the first African American to achieve a Ph.D. in anthropology.  During a time in which white citizens were consumed with fears about the evils of miscegenation, Day produced genealogical data on interracial families in America.  Working within the climate of a racially divided society that was driven by a need to categorize Blacks based on skin color, Day's research, entitled A Study of Some Negro-White Families in the United States (1932), revealed kinship ties between Blacks and prominent Southern white families.  Harrison (1995a) contends that Day's work contributed to the developing antiracist research in anthropology by refuting notions of the degenerative effects of interracial offspring.  

Little is known about the responses to her work during the time of its publication.   It would be fascinating to have access to any reactions to Day's research by Black leaders and thinkers such as Du Bois (1868-1963) and Garvey (1887-1940), who wrote and spoke about color issues in the Black community.  However, it is interesting to note that Day provided an intellectual perspective on a topic that continues to influence relationships in American society even into the latter part of the twentieth century.

The usefulness of Day's research in illuminating the culture of that anomalous minority known as free Blacks during the antebellum period probably has not been explored to its fullest extent.  It certainly has not been utilized in traditional anthropological pedagogy.  Yet, as recently as 1991, Day's 1932 research was cited in Ambiguous Lives: Free Women of Color in Rural Georgia, 1789-1879 (Alexander, 1991).  Despite her contributions to physical anthropology, very little is known about this scholar and her self-determined struggles to become an anthropologist during the Jim Crow era.  

Somewhat more is known about the struggles and self-determination of another Black woman who came to anthropology shortly after the publication of Day's research. What we know of this woman primarily occurs through the study of her novels, short stories, and folklore collections.  Of this woman, Drake writes:   

It was hard for those who knew her after she was a success to visualize Zora Neale Hurston submitting to the pedestrian humdrum grind involved in getting a Ph.D.  She didn't.  But she must have played the academic game to some extent because Langston Hughes once remarked that Zora was the only person on earth who could have gone up and down the streets of Harlem as she did, with her strange instruments, actually persuading people to let her measure their skulls and lips. . . . (1980, p. 17)

Despite her very successful resistance to the "humdrum" of academia, Hurston's vibrant creativity, her fascination with the humanity of poor southern Blacks, and her unconventional analysis and presentation of Black English, made unprecedented contributions to the cultural and linguistic anthropology of the Black South.  Emerging feminist scholars such as Visweswaran (1994) argue that Hurston's work is one of the ignored classics of the anthropological canon, and should be examined by anthropologists for its ethnographic value.   

However, Hurston's ethnography continues to be unrecognized in traditional anthropological pedagogy.  It is critical, however, that those seeking to create a womanist vision in anthropology know of Hurston's uses of anthropology.  Further, it is of consequence that womanist anthropologists become familiar with the impact of anthropological training on Black women like Day, Hurston (1891-1960), Katherine Dunham, Ellen Irene Diggs, and Vera Mae Green.5  Certainly, these women may not have called themselves Black feminist or womanist thinkers, yet they were indeed revolutionary in choosing nontraditional paths for their professional lives.  The choices made by these nontraditional scholars form the foundation of a Black women's intellectual tradition in anthropology.   

The work of contemporary Black women anthropologists also supports the idea of a womanist voice in this discipline.  Black women's work in anthropology is characterized by diversity in subject matter (including works that advance alternative methodologies and experimental writing, works that represent analyses of educational systems, and works that represent political economy and class analyses); by ongoing theoretical analyses of gender, race, and class issues; and by an understanding of the potential liberatory value of anthropology.6  More important, womanist anthropologists strive to transform the discipline by acknowledging a Black women's intellectual tradition and addressing the marginalization of Black women's scholarship in anthropology.  For example, in response to those who dismiss Hurston's anthropological endeavors, Mikell (1982, 1983) shows that Hurston's anthropological training influenced and enhanced her ability to portray the distinctive culture of rural Black people.   

Womanist anthropologists also explore the contributions of womanist interlocutors to anthropology. Thus, Harrison (1995b) analyzes Walker's connections to anthropology not only because of Walker's rediscovery of Hurston's work, but also because of Walker's novel, The Temple of My Familiar (1989), "which should be seen as an integral part of the broader literature on the politics of representing gender, race, and cultural history" (Harrison, 1995b, p. 237).   

The anthropological idea challenges the researcher to observe, ask questions, and document various realities from the perspectives of those who live those realities.  Womanist anthropology brings a unique and very necessary dimension to the discipline in several ways.  First, by exploring and recording the cultural interactions of Black women and the Black community, womanist anthropologists counter charges that one cannot effectively study one's own people.  In the tradition of Zora Neale Hurston, womanist anthropologists believe that "the best researcher [is] one who [has] an element of commonality with the people being studied" (Mikell, 1982, p. 218).  Second, while critiquing anthropology's colonialist history, womanist anthropologists move beyond the critique and seek to transform anthropology by introducing new subject matter, implementing alternative methodologies, and refusing to be relegated to a peripheral space in the discipline.  Third, through research, womanist anthropologists challenge the images of Black womanhood that have been created by social science in order to control Black women politically and economically.  This is done by asserting Black women as legitimate subjects of study, by identifying the multiple oppressive forces in Black women's lives, and by creating a space for the visible representation of Black women as active participants in the creation of culture, knowledge, and power. 

  Womanist Theory in Anthropological Pedagogy and Research 

This is the responsibility: to keep remembering that to be human, to say nothing of being scholarly, is to be constantly moving toward the light.

   --Vincent Harding, Responsibilities of the Black Scholar to the Community 

Collins (1991) has developed and articulated a womanist epistemological framework that defines some of the key elements of womanist theory.  These elements of womanist theory can serve as principles for the development of sound social science research, and have strengthened my development as an anthropologist.  Among the principles that compose the foundation of womanist theory is a "recurring humanist vision" (Collins, 1991, p. 37) which speaks to autonomy rather than separatism and a commitment to the survival and wholeness of all people.  The nineteenth-century Black feminist thinker Anna Julia Cooper (1859-1964) expressed this humanist vision in an 1893 speech in which she declared, "We take our stand on the solidarity of humanity, the oneness of life, and the unnaturalness and injustice of all special favoritism.  The colored woman feels that woman's cause is one and universal . . ." (Collins, 1991, p.37).   

This womanist principle can guide the womanist anthropologist in seeking an anthropology that is both humanist and whole.  As a womanist anthropologist, I believe that I must empower myself through knowledge of anthropological history and theory, knowledge of the political and historical contexts in which anthropology has developed, and knowledge of Black people's historical relationship to anthropological ideas, despite the apparent invisibility of people of the African diaspora in the founding of the discipline.  

Obviously, knowledge of anthropology's historical and theoretical roots is critical to the development of a contemporary anthropological scholar.  We must know the questions posed by our disciplinary predecessors, and we must have more than a passing familiarity with the written records of their observations and ideas.  We also must know of the passion with which the early anthropologists pursued their interests, and the forces that allowed them to follow their curious and brilliant minds.  However, does this knowledge provide a balanced historical perspective for all contemporary research interests?  As anthropology evolves, can traditional theories provide cogent theoretical foundations for contemporary anthropological analyses?  

The answers to both of these questions are "no" and "no."  One of the ways in which I have sought to address the issue of humanness and wholeness in anthropology is through pedagogy.  In the spring of 1993, I developed a course which focuses on African-American anthropology (Rodriguez, in press).  Because "Field Studies" is offered through the Africana Studies Department, the students who enroll in the course are typically Black and Africana Studies majors as well.  These undergraduates engage in action-oriented, ethnographic research in Black communities.

While the students are introduced to anthropological theory and methodology, they also explore the role of anthropology in race relations and the ways in which people of the African diaspora have participated in anthropology since the nineteenth century.  Equipped with this historical awareness (which is rarely presented in anthropological teaching, particularly at the undergraduate level), the students consider some of the issues facing Black anthropologists who choose to study people of the African diaspora.  Students also are challenged to consider some ways in which their research can provide some solutions to problems facing the communities they study.  

Upon completion of the class, students typically are intrigued by anthropological inquiry and often consider double majors in Africana Studies and anthropology.  As a result of their research experiences, several students have applied to graduate programs in anthropology.  More importantly, the womanist vision of wholeness and humanness has contributed to a class in which students are able to generate or regenerate interest in communities from which they themselves may have come.  Through this vision of wholeness and humanness, Black students may be more likely to consider their social and political responsibilities to their communities, rather than view education as a means of separating themselves from their communities.  

Another womanist principle that contributes to the creation of a womanist voice in anthropology is not only self-determination but self-definition.  Collins (1991) contends that having the power of self-definition is essential for Black women.  This concept supports the understanding that the womanist scholar must shape an anthropology that speaks to her interests despite others' concerns about "objectivity" in studying subjects so similar to herself.  The issue of the Black scholar's objectivity in studying people of the African diaspora is one with which early Black anthropologists grappled, and one which contemporary graduate students often discuss. 

As an example of the historical nature of this issue, Drake (1980) maintains that the few Blacks who practiced anthropology in the 1950s were discouraged from conducting fieldwork in Africa.  Black scholars received little support to study in Africa, because it was felt that their presence might offend the colonial powers who were highly visible on the continent during the imperialistic 1950s.  Further, it also was felt that anthropological inquiry by Blacks in Africa would not be valid because Black scholars could not be objective about Africa (Drake, 1980, p. 24).  In this case, both politics and science teamed up to prevent the study of Blacks by Blacks.  

With America's growing conservatism, and with the gradual but steady increase in Black conservatives who are rewarded with leadership positions, we as scientists once again may hear that our interest in people of color does not warrant fellowship or grant dollars.  It is very clear that current political forces are attempting to define our scholarly and intellectual boundaries even more stridently than ever, and to dictate what does and does not constitute scientific inquiry.  

Nevertheless, the womanist principle of self-definition informs womanist anthropologists that our intellectual interests in the lives of people of Africa and its diaspora are both scientifically legitimate and socially valuable.  This womanist principle by no means dictates that Black and/or womanist scholars only must study women and men of Africa and its diaspora.  Rather, the principle of self-definition in womanist thought encourages womanist scholars to study any aspect of any culture, with the knowledge that such research is legitimate and valid.  Further, regardless of her scholarly interests, the self-defined womanist anthropologist must be aware of the politics of her interactions with any group she chooses to study.  

In my quest to create and define womanist anthropology, I have designed a study that examines the lives, the work, and more important, the thoughts of Black women activists in Tampa, Florida.  History paints pictures of Black women who are forced into political action by extremely oppressive living and working conditions.  Yet, the notion that Black women become activists spontaneously in the drama of emotionally challenging events diminishes the intellectual aspects of their activism.  This self-defined womanist study seeks to listen to and determine the intellectual processes that shaped Black women's activism in Tampa. 

As I interview older women who worked during the Civil Rights era, I am nostalgic, stimulated, inspired, and awed by these women -- whose remarkable thoughts and stories never have been recorded.  As I interview younger women who are activists of the 1990s, I become aware of how the issues and strategies in the fight for human rights have evolved.  This is shared knowledge, created and recorded in a womanist tradition.  Studying these women's lives will contribute to the development of leadership skills by younger Black women when this research becomes a part of the schools, libraries, and local workshops in the larger community.  

Teaching activist community research and developing historical ethnographies on local Black women activists are two examples of anthropological work that is informed by a womanist epistemology.  Both of these projects speak to the merging of theory and action, which is indeed one of the most important goals of a transformed anthropology. 

Conclusion   

This article has presented some of the most salient aspects of womanist theory that can facilitate the creation of a womanist voice in anthropology.  Like other theoretical perspectives, womanist thinking continues to evolve, and the implications of its theoretical contributions to anthropology are not limited to the principles presented here.  While supporting our development as scholars and teachers, womanist anthropologists must continue to theorize individually and collectively.  As hooks (1992) asserts, theorizing is fundamental to self-recovery and collective liberation.  Womanist anthropologists must continue to claim the discourse on cultural analyses and develop theory that leads to action on domestic and international issues, particularly as those issues affect the lives of women, people of color, and other historically disenfranchised people.   

The fact that womanist theory is not a formalized and widely recognized part of traditional anthropological thought should not dissuade the theoretical development of womanist thinkers.  There is a place for womanist thinking in anthropology that must be nurtured and asserted.  Through the development of this self-defined womanist voice in anthropology, those who would be nontraditional scholars can contribute to anthropology from visible, unmarginalized positions.  More important, those who proudly would be nontraditional scholars can contribute to the continuing emergence of an empowering and liberatory anthropology. 

 

Notes   

1.  Like Mohanty (1991), I use the term "Third World" to emphasize hegemonic, hierarchical relationships between dominant political entities and oppressed people in both developing and developed countries.  

2.  See Guy-Sheftall (1995) for a substantive anthology of classic and contemporary writings by African-American feminists which attempts to document the development of womanist thought.  

3.  See di Leonardo (1991) for a discussion of the development of Western feminist anthropology.  

4.  See McIntosh (1992) for a discussion of "white privilege" as a phenomenon similar to male privilege.  

5.  For biographical and bibliographical data on these scholars, see Gacs, Khan, McIntyre, and Weinberg (Eds.) (1988).  

6.  A very limited list of examples of anthropological works in a womanist tradition include: Bolles, 1987; Fordham, 1993; Harrison, 1990; Henry, 1995; Mikell, 1990; Moses, 1981; Rodriguez, 1995; and Walker, 1990. 

 

References 

Aidoo, A. A.  (1981).  Asante queen mothers in government and politics in the nineteenth century. In F. C. Steady (Ed.), The Black woman cross-culturally (pp. 65-77).  Cambridge, MA: Schenkman. 

Alexander, A. L.  (1991).  Ambiguous lives: Free women of color in rural Georgia,1789-1879.  Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press. 

Asad, T. (Ed.).  (1975).  Anthropology and the colonial encounter.  London: Ithaca Press. 

Bohannan, L.  (1958).  Political aspects of Tiv social organization.  In J. Middleton & D. Tait (Eds.), Tribes without rulers (pp. 33-66).  London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 

Bolles, A.  (1987).  Anthropological research methods for the study of women in the Caribbean.  In R.Terborg-Penn, S. Harley, & A. Rushing (Eds.), Women in Africa and the African Diaspora (pp. 65-77).  Washington, D. C.: Howard University Press. 

Collins, P. H.  (1991).  Black feminist thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empowerment.(2nd ed.)  New York: Routledge. 

Day, C. B.  (1932).  Some Negro-White families in the United States.  Cambridge: Peabody Museum, Harvard African Studies Series. 

di Leonardo, M.  (1991).  Introduction: Gender, culture, and political economy: Feminist anthropology in historical perspective.  In M. di Leonardo (Ed.), Gender at the crossroads of knowledge: Feminist anthropology in the postmodern era (pp. 1-48).  Berkeley: University of California Press. 

Donovan, J.  (1987).  Feminist theory: The intellectual tradition of American feminism.  New York: Ungar. 

Drake, S. C.  (1980).  Anthropology and the Black experience. The Black Scholar, 11 (7), 2-31. 

Etter-Lewis, G.  (1991).  Black women's life stories: Reclaiming self in narrative texts.  In S. B. Gluck & D. Patai (Eds.), Women's words: The feminist practice of oral history (pp. 43-58).  New York: Routledge. 

Evans-Pritchard, E. E.  (1958).  Preface.  In J. Middleton & D. Tait (Eds.), Tribes without rulers (pp. ix-xi). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 

Fordham, S.  (1993).  "Those loud Black girls": (Black) women, silence, and gender "passing" in the academy. Anthropology and Education Quarterly, 24, 3-32. 

Fortes, M., & Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (Eds.).  (1940).  African political systems.  New York: Oxford University Press. 

Gacs, U., Khan, A., McIntyre, J., & Weinburg, R. (Eds.).  (1988).  Women anthropologists: A biographical dictionary.  New York: Greenwood Press. 

Giddings, P.  (1994).  The last taboo.  In V. L. Ruiz & E. C. DuBois (Eds.), Unequal sisters: A multicultural reader in women's history (pp. 560-70).  New York: Routledge. 

---.  (1988). When and where I enter: The impact of Black women on race and sex in America.  New York: Bantam. 

Gordon, E.  (1991).  Anthropology and liberation.  In F. V. Harrison (Ed.), Decolonizing anthropology: Moving further toward an anthropology for liberation (pp. 149-67).  Washington, D. C.: American Anthropological Association. 

Guy-Sheftall, B. (Ed.).  (1995).  Words of fire: An anthology of African-American feminist thought.  New York: The New Press. 

Harding, V.  (1986).  Responsibilities of the Black scholar to the community.  In D. C. Hine (Ed.), The state of Afro-American history: Past, present, and future.  (pp. 277-84).  Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 

Harris, M.  (1979).  Cultural materialism: The struggle for a science of culture.  New York: Random House. 

Harrison, F. V. (Ed.).  (1990).  Three women, one struggle: Anthropology, performance, and pedagogy. Transforming Anthropology, 1, 1-9. 

---.  (Ed.).  (1991).  Decolonizing anthropology: Moving further toward an anthropology for liberation. Washington, D.C.: American Anthropological Association. 

---.  (1995a).  The persistent power of "race" in the cultural and political economy of racism.  Annual Review of Anthropology, 24, 47-74. 

---.  (1995b).  Writing against the grain: Cultural politics of difference in the work of Alice Walker. In R. Behar & D. Gordon (Eds.), Women writing culture (pp. 233-45).  Berkeley: University of California Press. 

Henry, A.  (1995).  Growing up Black, female, and working class: A teacher's narrative.  Anthropology and Education Quarterly, 26, 279-305. 

hooks, b.  (1992).  Theory as liberatory practice.  Yale Journal of Law and Feminism, 4, 1-12. 

Huizer, G., & Mannheim, B. (Eds.).  (1979).  The politics of anthropology. The Hague: Mouton Publishers. 

Hymes, D. (Ed.).  (1972).  Reinventing anthropology.  New York: Pantheon. 

James, S. M.  (1993).  Introduction.  In S. M. James & A. P. A. Busia (Eds.), Theorizing Black feminisms: The visionary pragmatisim of Black women (pp. 1-9).  New York: Routledge. 

Johnson-Odim, C.  (1991).  Common themes, different contexts: Third world women and feminism.  In C. Mohanty, A. Russo, & L. Torres (Eds.), Third world women and the politics of feminism (pp. 314- 27).  Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 

Lett, J.  (1987).  The human enterprise: A critical introduction to anthropological theory.  Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 

McIntosh, P.  (1992).  White privilege and male privilege.  In M. L. Andersen & P. H. Collins (Eds.), Race, class, and gender (pp. 70-81).  Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 

Middleton, J., & Tait, D. (Eds.).  (1958).  Tribes without rulers.  London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 

Mikell, G.  (1982).  When horses talk: Reflections on Zora Neale Hurston's Haitian anthropology.  Phylon, 43, 218-30. 

---.  (1983).  The anthropological imagination of Zora Neale Hurston.  Western Journal of Black Studies, 7, 27-35. 

---.  (1990).  Women and economic development in Ghana: Fluctuating fortunes.  Sage, 7, 24-27. 

Mohanty, C.  (1991).  Introduction.  In Mohanty, A. Russo, & L. Torres (Eds.), Third world women and the politics of feminism (pp. 1-47). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 

Moses, Y.  (1981).  Female status, the family, and male dominance in the West Indian community.  In F. C. Steady (Ed.), The Black woman cross-culturally (pp. 499-513).  Cambridge: Schenkman. 

Murphy, R. F.  (1976).  A quarter century of American anthropology.  Introduction to selected papers from the American Anthropologist, 1946-1970 (p. 119).  Washington, D. C.: American Anthropological Association. 

Okonjo, K.  (1981).  Women's political participation in Nigeria.  In F. C. Steady (Ed.), The Black woman cross-culturally (pp. 79-106).  Cambridge: Schenkman. 

Ortner, S. B.  (1974).  Is female to male as nature is to culture?  In M. Z. Rosaldo & L. Lamphere (Eds.), Woman, culture and society (pp. 67-87).  Stanford: Stanford University Press. 

Radcliffe-Brown, A. R.  (1965).  Structure and function in primitive society.  New York: Free Press. 

Richardson, M.  (1987). Maria Stewart, America's first Black woman political writer.  Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 

Rodriguez, C.  (1995).  Women, microenterprise, and the politics of self-help.  New York: Garland Publishing. 

---.  (in press).  African-American anthropology and the pedagogy of activist community research. Anthropology and Education Quarterly. 

Rosaldo, M. Z.  (1974).  Woman, culture and society: A theoretical overview.  In M. Z. Rosaldo & L. Lamphere (Eds.), Woman, culture and society (pp. 17-42).  Stanford: Stanford University Press. 

Steady, F. C.  (1981).  Introduction.  In Steady (Ed.), The Black woman cross-culturally (pp. 1-5).  Cambridge: Schenkman. 

---.  (1987).  African feminism: A worldwide perspective.  In R. Terborg-Penn, S. Harley, & A. B. Rushing (Eds.), Women in Africa and the African diaspora (pp. 3-24).  Washington, D. C.: Howard University Press. 

---.  (1993).  Women and collective action: Female models in transition.  In S. M. James & A. P. A. Busia (Eds.), Theorizing Black feminisms (pp. 90-101).  New York: Routledge. 

Sudarkasa, N.  (1987).  Female employment and family organization in West Africa.  In F. C. Steady (Ed.), The Black woman cross-culturally (pp. 49-63).  Cambridge: Schenkman. 

Tanner, N.  (1974).  Matrifocality in Indonesia and Africa and among Black Americans.  In M. Z. Rosaldo & L. Lamphere (Eds.), Woman, culture and society (pp. 129-56).  Stanford: Stanford University Press. 

Visweswaran, K.  (1994).  Fictions of feminist ethnography.  Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 

Walker, A.  (1983).  In search of our mother's gardens: Womanist prose. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 

---.  (1989).  The temple of my familiar.  New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 

Walker, S.  (1990).  Walled women and women without walls among the Fulb? of northern Cameroon.  Sage, 7, 13-17. 

Willis, W. S.  (1972).  Skeletons in the anthropological closet. In D. Hymes (Ed.), Reinventing anthropology (pp. 12l- 152).  New York: Pantheon. 


An Assistant Professor of Anthropology and Africana Studies at the University of South Florida, Cheryl Rodriguez has done research on urban economic development, activism, gender, and race.  She has published Women, Microenterprise, and the Politics of Self-Help (Garland, 1995).  Her courses include: Field Studies and Research Issues, African-American History, and Black Women in America. 

Top 
   



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Thu Jun  5 11:50:04 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2008 13:50:04 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Critical race theory
Message-ID: <4847EF0B.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Critical race theory
 

Critical Race Theory (CRT) emphasizes the socially constructed nature of race, considers judicial conclusions to be the result of the workings of power, and opposes the continuation of all forms of subordination. This line of inquiry is the branch of critical legal studies concerned with issues of racism and racial subordination and discrimination. The notions of the social construction of race and discrimination are present in the writings of such established critical race theorists as Derrick Bell, Mari Matsuda, Richard Delgado, Kimberl? Williams Crenshaw, Gloria Ladson-Billings, Neil Gotanda, and William Tate; newly emerging CRT scholars Adrienne Dixson, Celia Rousseau, and Thandeka Chapman; and some pioneers in sociology, including W.E.B. DuBois and Max Weber.

Contents [hide]
1 Key theoretical elements 
2 Major contributors 
3 Applications 
4 Offshoot fields 
5 References 
5.1 Notes 
5.2 Bibliography 
 


[edit] Key theoretical elements
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic (1993) note the following major themes in critical race theory writings:

A critique of liberalism 
Storytelling/counterstorytelling and "naming one's own reality" 
Revisionist interpretations of American civil rights law and progress 
Applying insights from social science writing on race and racism to legal problems 
Structural determinism, how "the structure of legal thought or culture influences its content" 
The intersections of race, sex, and class 
Essentialism and anti-essentialism 
Cultural nationalism/separatism as well as encouraging black nationalism, power, or insurrection 
Legal institutions, Critical pedagogy, and minorities in the bar 
Criticism and self-criticism 
Critical race theory emerged in part from the milieu of Critical Legal Studies (CLS), a field of inquiry that argues that preserving the interests of power, rather than the demands of principle and precedent, is the guiding force behind legal judgments. CLS theorists suggest that the existing precedents are indeterminate, allowing the judiciary wide freedom to interpret them according to prevailing balance of power. Both CLS and Critical Race Theory writings engage in "trashing," extended arguments to demonstrate that precedents are not in fact based on a consistent application of principles. Critical Race Theory shares an overlapping literature with both Critical Legal Studies and Critical Theory, feminist jurisprudence, and postcolonial theory.


[edit] Major contributors
 
Derrick BellDerrick Bell is arguably the most influential critic of traditional civil rights discourse. Bell?s critique represented a challenge to the dominant liberal and conservative positions on civil rights, race, and the law. Bell employed three major arguments in his analyses of racial patterns in American law: constitutional contradiction, the interest convergence principle, and the price of racial remedies.

In The Constitutional Contradiction, Bell argues that the framers of the U.S. Constitution chose the rewards of property over justice. With regard to the interest convergence, he maintains that whites will promote racial advances for blacks only when they also promote white self-interest. Finally, in The Price of Racial Remedies, Bell argues that whites will not support civil rights policies that may threaten white social status. Each of his arguments sheds a different light on the traditional racial discourse.

Other significant contributors to the critical race theory discourse from the 1980s to the present include Richard Delgado and Kimberl? Williams Crenshaw. Delgado, in defense of Bell?s storytelling or narrative style, argues that people of color speak from an experience framed by racism. Delgado argues that the stories of people of color are born from a different frame of reference and therefore impart to them a voice that is different from the dominant culture of hegemonic whiteness and deserves to be heard. Critical race theorists believe that in order to appreciate the perspective of oppressed racial minorities, the voice of a particular contributor must be understood in terms of that individual's own narrative.

Crenshaw argues that little difference exists between conservative and liberal discourse on race-related law and policy. Crenshaw identifies two distinct properties in anti-discrimination law: expansive properties and restrictive properties. The former stresses equality as an outcome relying on the courts to eliminate effects of racism. The latter treats equality as a process. Its focus is to prevent any future wrongdoing. Crenshaw argues that expansive and restrictive properties coexist in anti-discrimination law. The implication of Crenshaw's argument is that the failure of the restrictive property to address or correct the racial injustices of the past simply perpetuates the status quo.

Critical race theory has been explored in education and sociology most notably by Ladson-Billings, Tate, Marvin Lynn, Laurence Parker, Tara Yosso, Daniel Sol?rzano, Dixson, Rousseau, and Chapman. Critical race scholarship in education has occurred in three waves. The first wave of studies emanated in the mid 1990s with the introduction of CRT to the field by Ladson-Billings and Tate. Parker and Solorzano's contributions followed soon thereafter. The second wave of scholarship occurred in the late 1990s and continued through about 2004. Younger scholars like Lynn, Garrett Albert Duncan, and Yosso have become key players. Dixson and Rousseau represent the third wave of new scholars who are attempting to re-introduce CRT to the field while creating stricter standards for how critical race theory in education is defined.


[edit] Applications
Critical Race Theory thought has been applied in a variety of contexts where socialized and institutionalized oppression of racial minorities has been litigated in courts (critical race theorists often present amicus curiae briefs, or critically examine the rulings of these cases).

One particular application has been to hate crime/speech legislation. In response to Justice Scalia's opinion in a paradigm hate speech case, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (which addressed cross burning as an act of hate speech), Mari Matsuda and Charles R. Lawrence III presented an argument informed by critical race theory against Scalia's opinion. While Scalia posits that speech is protected independent of content, Matsuda and Lawrence argue that historical and social context is paramount. When acts of speech are acts of intimidation and threaten violence, backed up by a historical force, then those words become a mechanism for social control and domination. The Supreme Court ruled unanimously with Justice Scalia 9-0, that the cross burning in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul was protected by the First Amendment.

Delgado also draws on CRT in calling for a tort action for racial insults, looking to the historical pattern of speech and the serious psychological harm inflicted on its victims as just measures for evaluating hate speech.

Angela P. Harris has done influential work examining critical race theory and feminist legal theory.[1]


[edit] Offshoot fields
No longer content with accepting whiteness as the norm, critical scholars have turned their attention to whiteness itself. In the field of Critical White Studies, numerous thinkers, including Toni Morrison, Eric Foner, Peggy McIntosh, Andrew Hacker, Ruth Frankenberg, John Howard Griffin, David Roediger, Kathleen Neal Cleaver, Noel Ignatiev, Cherr?e Moraga, Maurice Berger, and Reginald Horsman, attack such questions as:

How was whiteness invented, and why? 
How has the category of whiteness changed over time? 
Why did some immigrant groups, such as the Irish and Jews, start out as nonwhite and later become white? 
Can some individual people be both white and nonwhite at different times, and what does it mean to "pass for white"? 
At what point does pride in being white cross the line into white power or white supremacy? 
What can whites concerned over racial inequity or white privilege do about it? [2] 
Within Critical Race Theory, culturally specific subdivisions began to develop, including:

Latino Critical Race Studies or LatCrit. 
Asian American Critical Race Studies or AsiaCrit. 
American Indian Critical Race Studies or TribalCrit. 
Critical Race Realism. 



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Thu Jun  5 12:07:48 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2008 14:07:48 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Filomena Steady
Message-ID: <4847F334.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

 
 

Filomena Steady

Filomina Chioma Steady is Professor and Chair of Africana Studies at Wellesley College and is an expert on gender issues specializing in Africa, the African Diaspora and in Third World Development. She has been on the Wellesley faculty since 1997. She is an internationally recognized authority on Gender and international development. She has played a leading role in research and policy analyses for three International Plans of Action on the advancement of women and in mainstreaming gender in Agenda 21 as a Special Advisor, Director and Senior Consultant to the United Nations. 

She received a B.A. from Smith College, an M.A. in anthropology from Boston University and a D.Phil. (Ph.D.) degree in social anthropology from Oxford University, Oxford, England. She is the recipient of several awards including the Ioma Evans-Pritchard Research Award from Oxford University and the Otelia Cromwell Distinguished Alumna Award from Smith College. She also held a Social Science Post Doctoral Fellowship at the Harvard School of Public Health.

Steady has been a professor at several universities in the United States including Yale, Wesleyan, Boston University and California State University in Sacramento where she was also Chair of the Women's Studies Program. She was a lecturer at the University of Sierra Leone, and currently holds honorary positions as research fellow at the Institute of Environmental Studies, University of Wisconsin in Madison and the University of Sierra Leone. Her basic research interests are on gender systems in cross-cultural context; the environment and sustainable development; the intersectionality of race, class and gender; development theories and social transformation in Africa and the African Diaspora. 

She has authored or edited several books, monographs and articles including The Black Woman Cross-Culturally, 1981; African Women, Industrialization and Another Development, 1982; Women and Children First: Environment, Poverty and Sustainable Development, 1993. In commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, she chaired the Vienna Seminar dedicated to women and the United Nations and gender issues, and was co-editor of the resulting book entitled: Women and the United Nations: Reflections and New Horizons, 1995. In addition, she has been published widely in periodicals and journals such as American Anthropologist, Feminist Studies, Development Dialogue, Environmental Values, Nutritional Education, The Earth Times and Race and Class and Gender.Her most recent publications include Women and the Amistad Connection: Sierra Leone Krio Society, 2001 and Black Women, Globalization and Economic Justice: Studies from Africa and the African Diaspora, 2002. She is currently completing a study on women and social movements in Africa. 

Professor Steady was Special Advisor for Women, Environment and Development to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (The Earth Summit) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. In 1995 she was appointed Special Advisor on Women held in Beijing. From1984 to 1986 she was a Director of the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women responsible for the 1985 World Conference on Women held in Nairobi. In addition, she has served as a consultant to several international organizations within and outside the United Nations System, on Africa, gender issues, the environment and development. 

She is a founding member of the Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD). Steady is President of the Women's World Summit Foundation, an international non-governmental organization based in Geneva, Switzerland, dedicated to promoting the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The association also annually awards prizes for women?s creativity in rural life to thirty female laureates from rural areas all over the world. 

Professor Steady serves on several advisory boards including the Encyclopedia of Third World Women, the Steering Committee on Women in Least Developed Countries, the Committee for promoting African women in science and education and the Commission on the Anthropology of Women. 
http://www.wellesley.edu/PublicAffairs/Profile/sz/fsteady.html 

http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/BJS/pastVolumes/index483.htm 


http://www.ecu.edu/african/sersas/Papers/WilentzGayFall01.htm 

http://www.africanphilosophy.com/issue3/nzegwu.html


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Thu Jun  5 12:21:02 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2008 14:21:02 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Massive Raid at Kosher Meat Plant in Iowa -
	POSTVILLE USA
Message-ID: <4847F64D.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/a-list/2008w22/msg00015.htm


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Thu Jun  5 12:24:56 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2008 14:24:56 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Stalinism
Message-ID: <4847F737.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

http://links.org.au/node/439 


The Soviet Union: a no-party state?
Review by Alex Miller 


The Soviet Union: a no-party state?
Review by Alex Miller 

The Soviet Century
By Moshe Lewin
Verso 2005
416 pages

The standard view of the Soviet Union promulgated by the corporate media and capitalist intellectual elites traces a direct and continuous ideological line from the Bolshevism of the 1917 revolution, through the totalitarianism of the Stalinist period between the mid-1920s and 1953, and on to the post-Stalinist period from 1953 to the final collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991. This view is normally used to discredit Bolshevism and indeed any form of revolutionary Marxism: the stagnation and decline of the post-Stalinist period, and the massacres and purges of the Stalinist period, are used to construct a reductio ad absurdum of the original aspirations of the 1917 revolution. 

There are a number of pitfalls for contemporary socialists attempting to construct an alternative to this standard view. If the thesis that there is ideological continuity between Bolshevism and Stalinism is accepted, sympathy with the aspirations of 1917 can lead to a downplaying of the monstrous crimes committed in the name of socialism in the USSR. On the other hand, awareness of the yawning gulf between Stalinist society and that envisaged by the October Revolution can result in a denial of any sort of continuity between the earlier and later periods of Soviet history, resulting in an utterly and unjustifiably negative characterisation of the USSR (in some versions as embodying just another -- state-based -- form of capitalism). 

In this fascinating book, Moshe Lewin ? himself a former collective farm worker and Red Army soldier -- proposes an alternative to the standard view, one that seeks to avoid both of these pitfalls. In the same vein as his famous 1968 study Lenin?s Last Struggle, Lewin takes us through the various sharp ideological discontinuities existing between Bolshevism and Stalinism: the dispute between Lenin and Stalin concerning the relationship between Russia and the other republics of the USSR, the state monopoly on foreign trade, and the need to prevent the temporary restrictions on political debate within the Bolshevik Party (necessitated by the special and temporary circumstances of the New Economic Policy) from turning the party into a hollow shell of its previous vibrant self.

Lewin details the various factors in the period after the end of the civil war that led to the ascendancy of the bureaucratic strata that formed the social base for Stalin?s dictatorship. The survival of Stalin?s bureaucratically based dictatorship was incompatible with the survival of any vestiges of Bolshevism: hence the frenzy of the purges, the extent of which Lewin outlines in quite shocking detail: 3,778,000 arrests and 786,000 executions between 1930 and 1953, with arrests and executions often carried out to satisfy pre-ordained quotas.

There is absolutely no attempt to whitewash or excuse Stalin or his henchmen. Indeed, Lewin suggests that for the damage done to the USSR, Stalin himself deserved to be executed. Speaking of his having Tukhachevsky ? ``the best military mind of them all?? ? put to death on entirely fabricated charges of treason, Lewin writes: ``We are dealing here with a maniac who breaks a precious object to show that it can be broken. Preferring an incompetent but obsequious Voroshilov to Tukhachevsky and the rest, and destroying the military high command, were monumental blunders. This purge alone would warrant the death penalty.?? 

Lewin rejects the claim that the Soviet Union was an example of a one-party system. Instead, he suggests that it is best described as having been a ``no party system??: ``In the 1930s, the organization calling itself the ?party? had already lost its political character; it had been transformed into an administrative network, wherein a hierarchy ruled a rank and file?. Indeed, by the latter years of the regime, the party had literally become ?a corpse.??

Neither did the USSR exhibit a form of state capitalism, either before or after Stalin?s death. In fact, the USSR was neither socialist nor capitalist.



The Soviet Century
By Moshe Lewin
Verso 2005
416 pages




This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Fri Jun  6 09:07:47 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Fri, 06 Jun 2008 11:07:47 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] How does the structure change ?
Message-ID: <48491A83.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

The move from a structuralist account in which capital is understood to
structure social relations in relatively homologous ways to a view of 
hegemony
in which power relations are subject to repetition, convergence, and
rearticulation brought the question of temporality into the thinking of

structure,
and marked a shift from a form of Althusserian theory that takes
structural
totalities as theoretical objects to one in which the insights into the

contingent
possibility of structure inaugurate a renewed conception of hegemony as

bound
up with the contingent sites and strategies of the rearticulation of
power.
Now, Butler might have written: "Marxist accounts, focusing on capital

as the central force
structuring social relations, depicted the operations of that force as

everywhere uniform. By
contrast, Althusserian accounts, focusing on power, see the operations

of that force as
variegated and as shifting over time."

^^^^
The above is similar to what I say here:


How do Foucault, Butler, and other Post-moderns , Athusser grapple with
these
materialist principles ?


Third level of materialism

Let me suggest a third level of materialist determination, derived from
the struggle between the Marxists and the structuralists/post-moderns,
et. al.

The superstructure is _determined_ when it is changed.  It is changed
only rarely, in revolutions. Revolutions are rare, by definition; in
"punctuations". Most of the time of history, society is in convention or
"equilibrium", not revolution. In conventional times, it is the
superstructure of ideas that determines individual peoples' conduct.
There is determination by ideas, ideology. Thought determines the
actions by "beings".  

Only when practice of ideas comes into such crisis as to create a
system changing contradiction in the system of ideas ( the cultural
"grammar" in Levi-Straussian structural anthropology) does a revolution
arise. 

This system and convention changing crisis and contradiction between
practice and ideas is what Marx describes in his famous passage below.


"At a certain stage of their development, the material productive
forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of
production, or - what is but a legal expression for the same thing -
with the property relations within which they have been at work
hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these
relations turn into their fetters. 

Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the
economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less
rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction
should always be made between the material transformation of the
economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the
precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious,
aesthetic or philosophic - in short, ideological forms in which men
become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion
of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we
not judge  such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on
the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the
contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the
social productive forces and the relations of production. "

Preface of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy 


http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface-abs.htm








This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Fri Jun  6 11:21:03 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Fri, 06 Jun 2008 13:21:03 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Naturally organized sociality and symbolically
	organized	sociality
Message-ID: <484939C0.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Naturally organized sociality and symbolically organized sociality
Charles Brown 

As sexual instinct is an instinct that shapes a _social_ relationship
it
is different than some other instincts. Since culture or symbolic
systems or social structures or_social_ construction by symbol systems
constitute socialities or social relations,  the social feature of
biological sexuality impinges on that social structure in a way that
other instincts like thirst or hunger do not.  Thirst and hunger
relate
body and object. Sex relates body and body, i.e. is social.

This why sexual instinct impinges on _social _structure in a way that
other instincts do not. It is directly and immediately social. 

As humans are a uniquely social species, the social , and therefore
the
 cultural (which is essentially social; the symbolic is founded in
sociality) has much more pervasive importance in our lives than it
does
in other species.  This is the underlying truth of  the cultural
anthropology schools like Levi-Straussian structuralism.  It is this
principle that Butler is correctly championing. Ironically, the
exception to this principle in her area of emphasis, sexuality. 

On sex uniting the natural and the social, see quote from Marx from
Econ and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 previously posted.

Br'er Rabbit




This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Sat Jun  7 05:43:07 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Sat, 07 Jun 2008 07:43:07 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Obama speech on race from March ' 08
Message-ID: <484A3C0A.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

"We the people, in order to form a more perfect union ..." ? 221 years ago, in a hall that still stands across the street, a group of men gathered and, with these simple words, launched America's improbable experiment in democracy. Farmers and scholars, statesmen and patriots who had traveled across an ocean to escape tyranny and persecution finally made real their declaration of independence at a Philadelphia convention that lasted through the spring of 1787. 

The document they produced was eventually signed but ultimately unfinished. It was stained by this nation's original sin of slavery, a question that divided the colonies and brought the convention to a stalemate until the founders chose to allow the slave trade to continue for at least 20 more years, and to leave any final resolution to future generations. 

Of course, the answer to the slavery question was already embedded within our Constitution ? a Constitution that had at its very core the ideal of equal citizenship under the law; a Constitution that promised its people liberty and justice and a union that could be and should be perfected over time. 

And yet words on a parchment would not be enough to deliver slaves from bondage, or provide men and women of every color and creed their full rights and obligations as citizens of the United States. What would be needed were Americans in successive generations who were willing to do their part ? through protests and struggles, on the streets and in the courts, through a civil war and civil disobedience, and always at great risk ? to narrow that gap between the promise of our ideals and the reality of their time. 

This was one of the tasks we set forth at the beginning of this presidential campaign ? to continue the long march of those who came before us, a march for a more just, more equal, more free, more caring and more prosperous America. I chose to run for president at this moment in history because I believe deeply that we cannot solve the challenges of our time unless we solve them together, unless we perfect our union by understanding that we may have different stories, but we hold common hopes; that we may not look the same and we may not have come from the same place, but we all want to move in the same direction ? toward a better future for our children and our grandchildren. 

This belief comes from my unyielding faith in the decency and generosity of the American people. But it also comes from my own story. 

I am the son of a black man from Kenya and a white woman from Kansas. I was raised with the help of a white grandfather who survived a Depression to serve in Patton's Army during World War II and a white grandmother who worked on a bomber assembly line at Fort Leavenworth while he was overseas. I've gone to some of the best schools in America and lived in one of the world's poorest nations. I am married to a black American who carries within her the blood of slaves and slaveowners ? an inheritance we pass on to our two precious daughters. I have brothers, sisters, nieces, nephews, uncles and cousins of every race and every hue, scattered across three continents, and for as long as I live, I will never forget that in no other country on Earth is my story even possible. 

It's a story that hasn't made me the most conventional of candidates. But it is a story that has seared into my genetic makeup the idea that this nation is more than the sum of its parts ? that out of many, we are truly one. 

Throughout the first year of this campaign, against all predictions to the contrary, we saw how hungry the American people were for this message of unity. Despite the temptation to view my candidacy through a purely racial lens, we won commanding victories in states with some of the whitest populations in the country. In South Carolina, where the Confederate flag still flies, we built a powerful coalition of African-Americans and white Americans. 

This is not to say that race has not been an issue in this campaign. At various stages in the campaign, some commentators have deemed me either "too black" or "not black enough." We saw racial tensions bubble to the surface during the week before the South Carolina primary. The press has scoured every single exit poll for the latest evidence of racial polarization, not just in terms of white and black, but black and brown as well. 

And yet, it has only been in the last couple of weeks that the discussion of race in this campaign has taken a particularly divisive turn. 

On one end of the spectrum, we've heard the implication that my candidacy is somehow an exercise in affirmative action; that it's based solely on the desire of wide-eyed liberals to purchase racial reconciliation on the cheap. On the other end, we've heard my former pastor, Jeremiah Wright, use incendiary language to express views that have the potential not only to widen the racial divide, but views that denigrate both the greatness and the goodness of our nation, and that rightly offend white and black alike. 

I have already condemned, in unequivocal terms, the statements of Reverend Wright that have caused such controversy and, in some cases, pain. For some, nagging questions remain. Did I know him to be an occasionally fierce critic of American domestic and foreign policy? Of course. Did I ever hear him make remarks that could be considered controversial while I sat in the church? Yes. Did I strongly disagree with many of his political views? Absolutely ? just as I'm sure many of you have heard remarks from your pastors, priests, or rabbis with which you strongly disagreed. 

But the remarks that have caused this recent firestorm weren't simply controversial. They weren't simply a religious leader's efforts to speak out against perceived injustice. Instead, they expressed a profoundly distorted view of this country ? a view that sees white racism as endemic, and that elevates what is wrong with America above all that we know is right with America; a view that sees the conflicts in the Middle East as rooted primarily in the actions of stalwart allies like Israel, instead of emanating from the perverse and hateful ideologies of radical Islam. 

As such, Reverend Wright's comments were not only wrong but divisive, divisive at a time when we need unity; racially charged at a time when we need to come together to solve a set of monumental problems ? two wars, a terrorist threat, a falling economy, a chronic health care crisis and potentially devastating climate change ? problems that are neither black or white or Latino or Asian, but rather problems that confront us all. 

Given my background, my politics, and my professed values and ideals, there will no doubt be those for whom my statements of condemnation are not enough. Why associate myself with Reverend Wright in the first place, they may ask? Why not join another church? And I confess that if all that I knew of Reverend Wright were the snippets of those sermons that have run in an endless loop on the television sets and YouTube, or if Trinity United Church of Christ conformed to the caricatures being peddled by some commentators, there is no doubt that I would react in much the same way. 

But the truth is, that isn't all that I know of the man. The man I met more than 20 years ago is a man who helped introduce me to my Christian faith, a man who spoke to me about our obligations to love one another, to care for the sick and lift up the poor. He is a man who served his country as a United States Marine; who has studied and lectured at some of the finest universities and seminaries in the country, and who for over 30 years has led a church that serves the community by doing God's work here on Earth ? by housing the homeless, ministering to the needy, providing day care services and scholarships and prison ministries, and reaching out to those suffering from HIV/AIDS. 

In my first book, Dreams From My Father, I describe the experience of my first service at Trinity: 

"People began to shout, to rise from their seats and clap and cry out, a forceful wind carrying the reverend's voice up into the rafters. And in that single note ? hope! ? I heard something else: At the foot of that cross, inside the thousands of churches across the city, I imagined the stories of ordinary black people merging with the stories of David and Goliath, Moses and Pharaoh, the Christians in the lion's den, Ezekiel's field of dry bones. Those stories ? of survival and freedom and hope ? became our stories, my story. The blood that spilled was our blood, the tears our tears, until this black church, on this bright day, seemed once more a vessel carrying the story of a people into future generations and into a larger world. Our trials and triumphs became at once unique and universal, black and more than black. In chronicling our journey, the stories and songs gave us a meaning to reclaim memories that we didn't need to feel shame about ? memories that all people might study and cherish, and with which we could start to rebuild." 

That has been my experience at Trinity. Like other predominantly black churches across the country, Trinity embodies the black community in its entirety ? the doctor and the welfare mom, the model student and the former gang-banger. Like other black churches, Trinity's services are full of raucous laughter and sometimes bawdy humor. They are full of dancing and clapping and screaming and shouting that may seem jarring to the untrained ear. The church contains in full the kindness and cruelty, the fierce intelligence and the shocking ignorance, the struggles and successes, the love and, yes, the bitterness and biases that make up the black experience in America. 

And this helps explain, perhaps, my relationship with Reverend Wright. As imperfect as he may be, he has been like family to me. He strengthened my faith, officiated my wedding, and baptized my children. Not once in my conversations with him have I heard him talk about any ethnic group in derogatory terms, or treat whites with whom he interacted with anything but courtesy and respect. He contains within him the contradictions ? the good and the bad ? of the community that he has served diligently for so many years. 

I can no more disown him than I can disown the black community. I can no more disown him than I can disown my white grandmother ? a woman who helped raise me, a woman who sacrificed again and again for me, a woman who loves me as much as she loves anything in this world, but a woman who once confessed her fear of black men who passed her by on the street, and who on more than one occasion has uttered racial or ethnic stereotypes that made me cringe. 

These people are a part of me. And they are part of America, this country that I love. 

Some will see this as an attempt to justify or excuse comments that are simply inexcusable. I can assure you it is not. I suppose the politically safe thing to do would be to move on from this episode and just hope that it fades into the woodwork. We can dismiss Reverend Wright as a crank or a demagogue, just as some have dismissed Geraldine Ferraro, in the aftermath of her recent statements, as harboring some deep-seated bias. 

But race is an issue that I believe this nation cannot afford to ignore right now. We would be making the same mistake that Reverend Wright made in his offending sermons about America ? to simplify and stereotype and amplify the negative to the point that it distorts reality. 

The fact is that the comments that have been made and the issues that have surfaced over the last few weeks reflect the complexities of race in this country that we've never really worked through ? a part of our union that we have not yet made perfect. And if we walk away now, if we simply retreat into our respective corners, we will never be able to come together and solve challenges like health care or education or the need to find good jobs for every American. 

Understanding this reality requires a reminder of how we arrived at this point. As William Faulkner once wrote, "The past isn't dead and buried. In fact, it isn't even past." We do not need to recite here the history of racial injustice in this country. But we do need to remind ourselves that so many of the disparities that exist between the African-American community and the larger American community today can be traced directly to inequalities passed on from an earlier generation that suffered under the brutal legacy of slavery and Jim Crow. 

Segregated schools were and are inferior schools; we still haven't fixed them, 50 years after Brown v. Board of Education. And the inferior education they provided, then and now, helps explain the pervasive achievement gap between today's black and white students. 

Legalized discrimination ? where blacks were prevented, often through violence, from owning property, or loans were not granted to African-American business owners, or black homeowners could not access FHA mortgages, or blacks were excluded from unions or the police force or the fire department ? meant that black families could not amass any meaningful wealth to bequeath to future generations. That history helps explain the wealth and income gap between blacks and whites, and the concentrated pockets of poverty that persist in so many of today's urban and rural communities. 

A lack of economic opportunity among black men, and the shame and frustration that came from not being able to provide for one's family contributed to the erosion of black families ? a problem that welfare policies for many years may have worsened. And the lack of basic services in so many urban black neighborhoods ? parks for kids to play in, police walking the beat, regular garbage pickup, building code enforcement ? all helped create a cycle of violence, blight and neglect that continues to haunt us. 

This is the reality in which Reverend Wright and other African-Americans of his generation grew up. They came of age in the late '50s and early '60s, a time when segregation was still the law of the land and opportunity was systematically constricted. What's remarkable is not how many failed in the face of discrimination, but how many men and women overcame the odds; how many were able to make a way out of no way, for those like me who would come after them. 

For all those who scratched and clawed their way to get a piece of the American Dream, there were many who didn't make it ? those who were ultimately defeated, in one way or another, by discrimination. That legacy of defeat was passed on to future generations ? those young men and, increasingly, young women who we see standing on street corners or languishing in our prisons, without hope or prospects for the future. Even for those blacks who did make it, questions of race and racism continue to define their worldview in fundamental ways. For the men and women of Reverend Wright's generation, the memories of humiliation and doubt and fear have not gone away; nor has the anger and the bitterness of those years. That anger may not get expressed in public, in front of white co-workers or white friends. But it does find voice in the barbershop or the beauty shop or around the kitchen table. At times, that anger is exploited by politicians, to gin up votes along racial lines, or to make up for a politician's own failings. 

And occasionally it finds voice in the church on Sunday morning, in the pulpit and in the pews. The fact that so many people are surprised to hear that anger in some of Reverend Wright's sermons simply reminds us of the old truism that the most segregated hour of American life occurs on Sunday morning. That anger is not always productive; indeed, all too often it distracts attention from solving real problems; it keeps us from squarely facing our own complicity within the African-American community in our condition, and prevents the African-American community from forging the alliances it needs to bring about real change. But the anger is real; it is powerful. And to simply wish it away, to condemn it without understanding its roots, only serves to widen the chasm of misunderstanding that exists between the races. 

In fact, a similar anger exists within segments of the white community. Most working- and middle-class white Americans don't feel that they have been particularly privileged by their race. Their experience is the immigrant experience ? as far as they're concerned, no one handed them anything. They built it from scratch. They've worked hard all their lives, many times only to see their jobs shipped overseas or their pensions dumped after a lifetime of labor. They are anxious about their futures, and they feel their dreams slipping away. And in an era of stagnant wages and global competition, opportunity comes to be seen as a zero sum game, in which your dreams come at my expense. So when they are told to bus their children to a school across town; when they hear an African-American is getting an advantage in landing a good job or a spot in a good college because of an injustice that they themselves never committed; when they're told that their fears about crime in urban neighborhoods are somehow prejudiced, resentment builds over time. 

Like the anger within the black community, these resentments aren't always expressed in polite company. But they have helped shape the political landscape for at least a generation. Anger over welfare and affirmative action helped forge the Reagan Coalition. Politicians routinely exploited fears of crime for their own electoral ends. Talk show hosts and conservative commentators built entire careers unmasking bogus claims of racism while dismissing legitimate discussions of racial injustice and inequality as mere political correctness or reverse racism. 

Just as black anger often proved counterproductive, so have these white resentments distracted attention from the real culprits of the middle class squeeze ? a corporate culture rife with inside dealing, questionable accounting practices and short-term greed; a Washington dominated by lobbyists and special interests; economic policies that favor the few over the many. And yet, to wish away the resentments of white Americans, to label them as misguided or even racist, without recognizing they are grounded in legitimate concerns ? this too widens the racial divide and blocks the path to understanding. 

This is where we are right now. It's a racial stalemate we've been stuck in for years. Contrary to the claims of some of my critics, black and white, I have never been so na?ve as to believe that we can get beyond our racial divisions in a single election cycle, or with a single candidacy ? particularly a candidacy as imperfect as my own. 

But I have asserted a firm conviction ? a conviction rooted in my faith in God and my faith in the American people ? that, working together, we can move beyond some of our old racial wounds, and that in fact we have no choice if we are to continue on the path of a more perfect union. 

For the African-American community, that path means embracing the burdens of our past without becoming victims of our past. It means continuing to insist on a full measure of justice in every aspect of American life. But it also means binding our particular grievances ? for better health care and better schools and better jobs ? to the larger aspirations of all Americans: the white woman struggling to break the glass ceiling, the white man who has been laid off, the immigrant trying to feed his family. And it means taking full responsibility for our own lives ? by demanding more from our fathers, and spending more time with our children, and reading to them, and teaching them that while they may face challenges and discrimination in their own lives, they must never succumb to despair or cynicism; they must always believe that they can write their own destiny. 

Ironically, this quintessentially American ? and yes, conservative ? notion of self-help found frequent expression in Reverend Wright's sermons. But what my former pastor too often failed to understand is that embarking on a program of self-help also requires a belief that society can change. 

The profound mistake of Reverend Wright's sermons is not that he spoke about racism in our society. It's that he spoke as if our society was static; as if no progress had been made; as if this country ? a country that has made it possible for one of his own members to run for the highest office in the land and build a coalition of white and black, Latino and Asian, rich and poor, young and old ? is still irrevocably bound to a tragic past. But what we know ? what we have seen ? is that America can change. That is the true genius of this nation. What we have already achieved gives us hope ? the audacity to hope ? for what we can and must achieve tomorrow. 

In the white community, the path to a more perfect union means acknowledging that what ails the African-American community does not just exist in the minds of black people; that the legacy of discrimination ? and current incidents of discrimination, while less overt than in the past ? are real and must be addressed, not just with words, but with deeds, by investing in our schools and our communities; by enforcing our civil rights laws and ensuring fairness in our criminal justice system; by providing this generation with ladders of opportunity that were unavailable for previous generations. It requires all Americans to realize that your dreams do not have to come at the expense of my dreams; that investing in the health, welfare and education of black and brown and white children will ultimately help all of America prosper. 

In the end, then, what is called for is nothing more and nothing less than what all the world's great religions demand ? that we do unto others as we would have them do unto us. Let us be our brother's keeper, scripture tells us. Let us be our sister's keeper. Let us find that common stake we all have in one another, and let our politics reflect that spirit as well. 

For we have a choice in this country. We can accept a politics that breeds division and conflict and cynicism. We can tackle race only as spectacle ? as we did in the O.J. trial ? or in the wake of tragedy ? as we did in the aftermath of Katrina ? or as fodder for the nightly news. We can play Reverend Wright's sermons on every channel, every day and talk about them from now until the election, and make the only question in this campaign whether or not the American people think that I somehow believe or sympathize with his most offensive words. We can pounce on some gaffe by a Hillary supporter as evidence that she's playing the race card, or we can speculate on whether white men will all flock to John McCain in the general election regardless of his policies. 

We can do that. 

But if we do, I can tell you that in the next election, we'll be talking about some other distraction. And then another one. And then another one. And nothing will change. 

That is one option. Or, at this moment, in this election, we can come together and say, "Not this time." This time, we want to talk about the crumbling schools that are stealing the future of black children and white children and Asian children and Hispanic children and Native American children. This time, we want to reject the cynicism that tells us that these kids can't learn; that those kids who don't look like us are somebody else's problem. The children of America are not those kids, they are our kids, and we will not let them fall behind in a 21st century economy. Not this time. 

This time we want to talk about how the lines in the emergency room are filled with whites and blacks and Hispanics who do not have health care, who don't have the power on their own to overcome the special interests in Washington, but who can take them on if we do it together. 

This time, we want to talk about the shuttered mills that once provided a decent life for men and women of every race, and the homes for sale that once belonged to Americans from every religion, every region, every walk of life. This time, we want to talk about the fact that the real problem is not that someone who doesn't look like you might take your job; it's that the corporation you work for will ship it overseas for nothing more than a profit. 

This time, we want to talk about the men and women of every color and creed who serve together and fight together and bleed together under the same proud flag. We want to talk about how to bring them home from a war that should have never been authorized and should have never been waged. And we want to talk about how we'll show our patriotism by caring for them and their families, and giving them the benefits that they have earned. 

I would not be running for President if I didn't believe with all my heart that this is what the vast majority of Americans want for this country. This union may never be perfect, but generation after generation has shown that it can always be perfected. And today, whenever I find myself feeling doubtful or cynical about this possibility, what gives me the most hope is the next generation ? the young people whose attitudes and beliefs and openness to change have already made history in this election. 

There is one story in particularly that I'd like to leave you with today ? a story I told when I had the great honor of speaking on Dr. King's birthday at his home church, Ebenezer Baptist, in Atlanta. 

There is a young, 23-year-old white woman named Ashley Baia who organized for our campaign in Florence, S.C. She had been working to organize a mostly African-American community since the beginning of this campaign, and one day she was at a roundtable discussion where everyone went around telling their story and why they were there. 

And Ashley said that when she was 9 years old, her mother got cancer. And because she had to miss days of work, she was let go and lost her health care. They had to file for bankruptcy, and that's when Ashley decided that she had to do something to help her mom. 

She knew that food was one of their most expensive costs, and so Ashley convinced her mother that what she really liked and really wanted to eat more than anything else was mustard and relish sandwiches ? because that was the cheapest way to eat. That's the mind of a 9-year-old.

She did this for a year until her mom got better. So she told everyone at the roundtable that the reason she joined our campaign was so that she could help the millions of other children in the country who want and need to help their parents, too. 

Now, Ashley might have made a different choice. Perhaps somebody told her along the way that the source of her mother's problems were blacks who were on welfare and too lazy to work, or Hispanics who were coming into the country illegally. But she didn't. She sought out allies in her fight against injustice. 

Anyway, Ashley finishes her story and then goes around the room and asks everyone else why they're supporting the campaign. They all have different stories and different reasons. Many bring up a specific issue. And finally they come to this elderly black man who's been sitting there quietly the entire time. And Ashley asks him why he's there. And he does not bring up a specific issue. He does not say health care or the economy. He does not say education or the war. He does not say that he was there because of Barack Obama. He simply says to everyone in the room, "I am here because of Ashley." 

"I'm here because of Ashley." By itself, that single moment of recognition between that young white girl and that old black man is not enough. It is not enough to give health care to the sick, or jobs to the jobless, or education to our children. 

But it is where we start. It is where our union grows stronger. And as so many generations have come to realize over the course of the 221 years since a band of patriots signed that document right here in Philadelphia, that is where the perfection begins.




This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Sat Jun  7 07:21:54 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Sat, 07 Jun 2008 09:21:54 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Shemano on consumer behavior
Message-ID: <484A5331.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

I do not believe you are accurately characterizing my position, which I
believe is more sophisticated than you are interpreting.  I do NOT
believe consumption choices are inherently rational, independent,
internally-generated, etc.  People are absolutely affected by what
others do, etc.  My point is that not all choices are equal, that
certain behaviors are apparently more inherently preferable than others,
and such preferences reveal themselves across culture, economic system,
etc.  Yes, people keep up with the Joneses, which leads to several
thoughts -- (1) is keeping up with the Joneses an inherent part of the
human condition or something we can be socialized not to do, (2) if it
is not inherent, why is it so easy to socialize people to keep up with
the Joneses as opposed to socializing them to not keeping up with the
Joneses, and (3) why does keeping up with the Joneses so easily manifest
itself with certain consumption goods and behaviors and not others?

^^^^
CB: As far as cross-culturally and "the human condition",  have you
studied any anthropology, ethnology, anthropological economics ?

Humans are highly social animals. The unique human characteristic of
humans as compared with other species is that we are more social than
they are. Other species are more individualistic than we are.  So,
"individualism" moves us closer to other animals, and away from our
uniquely human nature, which is highly social.   

The human aspect of a human individual is her sociality , not her
individuality.

The critical unique quality of human productive activities is that they
are highly social, social labor or work.  The Robinson Crusoe model of
the isolated individual producing is a profound misrepresentation of the
human production model. 

  

And notice that social production is much more rational ( highly
rational) than isolated individual production.  This original human
rationality of socialized labor as opposed to individual, isolated labor
was our great adaptive advantage at the origin of our species. Culture
and language define our species because they are the special media and
means of socializing us.

However, capitalism perverts the fecundity which unsuspectingly lay in
the lap of social labor. Like the Sorcerer's Apprentice who releases
powers that he cannot keep under control,  Capital  must have an
ever-growing GDP and ever-growing types, variety , of goods and
services. Not for the ever better and efficient good and service of the
consumers of these goods and services, but for the ever increasing
accumulation of capital by Capital. 

To realize this accumulation in the form of money all the stuff must be
bought. The few capitalists, the tiny elite,  have no use for great
redundancies of _personal consumption_ goods and services.  What sense
would it be for a rich-man to buy 10,000 cars or go to a restaurant 50
times per day ? An individual can only consume so much.  The great  mass
of workers/producers are the only locus of enough individual demands to
buy all the personal/individual consumer goods so massively produced.

 So, the ruling idea from the ruling classes on this is ( and the
rulers control the socializing institutions) : Have a Jones for
commodities; shop, shop, shop until you drop; then come back and buy
again tomorrow. Otherwise, we'll start laying people off. 






This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Sat Jun  7 08:39:32 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Sat, 07 Jun 2008 10:39:32 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Elections and the Death Cult
Message-ID: <484A6563.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Elections and the Death Cult
http://www.feralscholar.org/blog/index.php/2008/06/06/elections-and-the-death-cult/#comment-193509

6th June 2008, 06:38 am by Stan 
I will venture a guess that, contrary to what many believe, Hillary Clinton?s biological status as a woman was as much an asset as a liability in the Democratic primaries. One can only speculate, but there was an understandable and fervent belief on the part of many highly mobilized (white) women voters that her achievement would be theirs. This is the contradiction of phenotype authenticity in an age where some women and some people of color can be the exception to the still standing hierarchies of social power that affect most women and most people of color.

What defeated Clinton, aside from Obama?s brilliant ?ground game? (as the pundits call it) of registering and turning out new voters and his superlative internet fundraising strategy, were two things: war and race.

Hillary Clinton?s shameless warmongering during the runup to the Iraq occupation led a small but significant sector of voters to declare early and often that she would never, ever receive their votes for anything (I am included in that number).

During the South Carolina primary campaign, then, Clinton made her first major gaff in suggesting that Lyndon Johnson was more pivotal in ending Jim Crow than the Black masses who had for years participated in the struggle against American Apartheid. That was the point at which Black voters, heretofore split between Clinton and Obama, walked away from her in disgust. This shift caused the Clinton campaign to recalculate its strategic emphasis away from African America, which they had just lost, to mobilizing white, working-class America?s stubborn negrophobia.

The irony is that now, with two men running against one another for the presidency, we will see the real gender war played out.

Phenotype authenticity (wherein a woman is automatically seen as representative of women, or an African American is automatically seen as representative of African America) is a superficial and tangential cultural reflex. It is not, however, insignificant. Too many Black parents believe that Obama?s presidency will give a sense of renewed confidence to their children. This is superficial; it is tangential; and it is important. The same could have been said about girls had Clinton secured the nomination.

But now that two men are running, we will see the essence of gender as a thoroughgoing system of male dominance ? and masculinity constructed as conquest, as McCain forces Obama to demonstrate his membership in the death cult called masculinity. Already pundits are saying that what Obama needs on his ticket is more ?testosterone? (I shit you not, that was said on television). What that means is the willingness to inflict and accept the deaths of human beings as proof of a ?protective? manhood. We call it militarism, because the fact that it is more deeply about gender is too sensitive a topic.

The challenge must be met in order to win, just as Obama had to throw his former pastor under the bus in order to win. Clinton knew he would have to; and McCain knows that Obama will have to step up and demonstrate his ?manhood? when the gauntlet is thrown.

This norm begins with gender policing at home and in the schoolyard, where the ?sissies? are weeded out for abuse. It is imbricated with what Carole Pateman called the ?sexual contract,? a deeply-rooted cultural notion that women have to exchange obedience to one man for protection from all other men. It is mythologized in our social imaginary as the line policed by men with guns (now with a few token women) that separates the Dark World of taint, horror, and chaos from the Safe World of our outlandishly over-built environment, our phony smiles, our incessant image-management, our terror of falling behind, and our inalienable right and duty to buy shit.

Masculinity is a death cult. It is proven by the willingness to accept, condone, and ultimately inflict death; and it is demonstrated in our affectations of disregard for our own deaths.

Watch this campaign from here out; and we will see McCain lose I believe, but in the process he will force Obama to present his masculine bona fides in an orgy of ritual, and superficially coded, gender-baiting. It will go unnoticed for what it is, because the power of gender as a social hierarchy is still so ubiquitous that we ignore it like the air.

This is gender in a far deeper cycle of social reality than phenotype authenticity.

Pay attention.

Category: General  |  Comment (RSS) 
5 Comments
Anne Ryan:
Thank you so much for the very astute and thoughtful article. I do so wish it were not true but it is.

6 June 2008, 8:44 am 
Winston Warfield:
Thank you for analysis and language to understand what is becoming a very confusing and chaotic image-game of race and gender coding in this election. Tools are necessary to understand what is going on, because even well-educated Americans have a hard time grappling with this stuff (being mis-educated as is the norm). This piece should be read more widely. Have you submitted it to Counterpunch, for example? Obama is already rushing full-tilt toward the embrace of Thanatos masked as ?toughness?, as he swears fealty to Zionism, denounces negotiations with Arab liberation movements (so McCain won?t call him ?weak?), and starts earning his Dr. Strangelove spurs by adding to the war fever being whipped up regarding Iran.

6 June 2008, 9:19 am 
Archer:
My wishful thinking leads me to hope that Obama is aware of this from a balanced place within himself and that he may be prepared to play a game on their end but not on his. 

Past that hope - superficial, tangential and important as it is - I am afraid you are right. That he either is, or is prepared to be, no different on matters such as these.

I continue to view Obama as a step in the right direction.

Your terminology ascribing masculinity as a ?death cult? - with no modifiers - disturbs my established thought process, and that causes me to delete what I just wrote on that issue in favor of more study and consideration. (the artist?s version, not the scholar?s version)

I have used the term ?Hyper Masculinity? to denote aggression beyond necessity. 

It?s possible I arrived at this sort of construction in order to neatly slip pass the aforementioned thought disturbances and I need to examine that, though the absolutist nature of your description also forces me to question the meaning behind the absent modifiers.

6 June 2008, 11:20 am 
Y.K.:
Stimulating post ? but why do you think that McCain will lose, especially if the contest emphasizes the virtues of violent masculinity? There are structural advantages for Republicans, not least of which include electronic voting machines and exit poll manipulations. Many are not anti-war per se, they simply don?t like to lose, and Bush is a loser. But McCain will present them a vision of victory. Also, many people deeply don?t want Obama as a war / security chief. There is still an atmosphere of paranoia, although it is weakening, but that can still turn to Republican advantage. 

Plus, they?ve effectively delayed the financial crisis, so the need for economic salvation has been somewhat mitigated and postponed to 2009, again to Republican advantage. There isn?t yet a serious decline in the dollar; in fact, the Chinese are acquiring more than ever, the Saudis have kept their peg, etc. etc.

So war (imperialism) might be bigger than economy (capitalism) in the balance by the election.

I do believe the contest will be close, but will Obama exceed the 3-5% that he?ll need to win, especially in crucial states, given these Republican advantages ? I?m not so sure.

YK

6 June 2008, 3:24 pm 
Curt:
I think we are all falling victim to Obama?s narrative that he is not just another politician, but a leader who will transcend race, politics and the clash of civilizations. However, Obama is first and foremost a politician. That means he will say whatever he has to win the election. If that includes pledging his allegiance to Israel in front of a zionist group as he did last week, then that is what he will say. If that includes bellicose language against Iran and Pakistan, then he will say that too. That doesn?t mean he will actually DO anything he says. Unfortunately, he probably won?t do what he says concerning social programs as well for many Americans who need them. He is just trying to get their vote, before he sells them down the river.

I am only voting for Obama because I believe he is more ?intelligent? than McCain. Not because I believe he will rule us any differently than McCain would, but I don?t look for US presidents to have my interests at heart. My only concern is to prevent America from starting anymore wars. Whereas I think McCain will start three or four new wars, I am under the impression that an ?intelligent? president will only start one or two new wars knowing that is all we can handle. That is how low my expectations have fallen for the presidency: who will start less wars?

7 June 2008, 8:45 am 
Charles:
Masculinity is a death cult.

^^^
fetishizing the death of _men_ especially, other men, and self-destructive behaviors, since the other men kill back? That?s why women have a longer life expectancy than men.

(Comment awaits moderation) 7 June 2008, 9:37 am 



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From dogangoecmen at aol.com  Sun Jun  8 12:45:09 2008
From: dogangoecmen at aol.com (=?utf-8?Q?Do=C4=9Fan_G=C3=B6=C3=A7men?=)
Date: Sun, 08 Jun 2008 14:45:09 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON GENDER AND
	DISASTERS
Message-ID: <8CA97AEE92EA5E7-113C-478D@MBLK-M10.sysops.aol.com>




PLEASE DISTRIBUTE WIDELY TO ALL RELEVANT LISTSERVERS



?



?



THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL
WORKSHOP ON GENDER AND DISASTERS: 



?CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE IN
RELIEF WORK: LEARNING FROM WOMEN?S EXPERIENCES IN CULTURALLY DIVERSE CONDITIONS



?



Date: 8-11
October 2008

Location: Derbent Hotel ? Kocaeli, Turkey

Workshop Host: Kocaeli University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative
Sciences, Turkey



Deadline:
July 15, 2008



?



Kocaeli
University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Turkey, seeks proposals for participating in an interdisciplinary international
workshop for the
victims of the recent disasters, emergency responders, relief workers, volunteers
of voluntary organizations, governmental representatives, as well as the
researchers who focus on gender related disaster topics. 



The event will cover topics that integrate the gender perspective into all natural
disaster related policies and decision-making processes with the consideration
of cultural differences. 



Lodging, breakfast and some
meals will be provided for all participants. Limited funds available for travel
support for the international participants coming from the non-Western world. 



The language of the meetings will be Turkish
and English. Simultaneous translation will be provided for all of the sessions.



Participants will be notified by August 10, 2008.



For more information please visit our website at? http://www.genderanddisaster2008.org



For any
queries, email to Ms. Derya Keskin Demirer at??
info at genderanddisaster2008.org 



?



Contact address:

Y?cel Demirer ve G?ven Bak?rezer 



Kocaeli
?niversitesi 



?ktisadi ve
?dari Bilimler Fak?ltesi 



Siyaset
Bilimi ve Kamu Y?netimi B?l?m?



Umuttepe
Yerle?kesi 41380 ?zmit/Kocaeli



?



Phone:
+90-262-303 16 05



Fax:???? +90-262-303 15 03



?



 


?----------------------
Do?an G??men
Author of The Adam Smith Problem:
Reconciling Human Nature and Society in
The Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations,
I. B. Tauris, London&New York 2007

________________________________________________________________________
AOL's new homepage has launched. Take a tour at http://info.aol.co.uk/homepage/ now.

From farmelantj at juno.com  Sun Jun  8 12:49:53 2008
From: farmelantj at juno.com (Jim Farmelant)
Date: Sun, 8 Jun 2008 14:49:53 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] [marxistphilosophy] Re: friendly fascism for
	the 21st century
Message-ID: <20080608.144957.5996.0.farmelantj@juno.com>


On Sun, 08 Jun 2008 17:06:17 -0000 "rtvinwfny" <rtvinwfny at yahoo.com>
writes:
> --- In marxistphilosophy at yahoogroups.com, Ralph Dumain <rdumain at ...>
> wrote:
> >
> >
>
<http://www.lsus.edu/la/journals/ideology/contents/vol29/vol1and2/towardf
riendlyfascismmilanzafirovsky.pdf>Toward
> 
> > Friendly Fascism? American Conservatism in the 21st Century
> > Milan Zafirovski
> > Quarterly Journal of Ideology, Volume 29, 2006, Numbers 1 & 2
> >
> 
>    As a marxist materialist, I find most philosophical discussions 
> of
> political subjects to be idealist (in the philosophical sense) and
> superficial. I miss the lack of discussion of material and economic
> factors in the rise of "friendly fascism".  E.g., one of the 
> reasons
> for the rise of the South in the U.S. was the fact that the labor 
> laws
> were very capitalist-friendly. Back in 1961, I was a scientist
> transferred down south to help build and run a specialty technical
> glass factory.  We were paying some of the highest wages in the 
> area,
> but they were abysmally low. The economy was largely agriculturally
> based, with textile sweatshops and tobacco factories.  To keep 
> wages
> low, the capitalists  (industrial and landowning) had to keep most 
> of
> the people ignorant and uneducated.  Religion was a very useful 
> tool
> for that.  However, it was not what I would call "religious 
> fascism";
> the capitalists, not the religious leaders, were clearly in control. 

We shouldn't also forget that a major part of the low-wage
strategy of economic development that has been followed
in the South since the early 20th century has been a
forthright antiunion policy.  Most of the Southern
states passed so-called "right to work" laws to
make it harder for unions to organize there.
And whenever unions attempted to organize
industries within a particular region, the
local economic and political elites would
quickly put together antiunion campaigns.
One of the most popular tactics used for
fending off unions was the deliberate
use of racism and racist appeals to
divide workers. 

> 
> Quite different from some fundamentalist religious state.
>    Another, historical factor, is the military defeat of the South 
> in
> the Civil War, and the longing of the capitalists and landowners to
> "correct" that "great wrong".  This led to a society that glorified
> the military.  Like Germany's reaction in the 1930's to their 
> defeat
> in the First World War.  So as we enter a period in the evolution 
> of
> capitalism in the U.S. where the military becomes very important, 
> the
> South can get greater influence because they enthusiastically 
> support
> the expansion of the military.  But the increase of military bases
> and, more important, the growth of military industries, is slowly
> opening up the society and thereby gradually liberalizing it.    

Also, I think we need to look at what happened
in the South during Reconstruction and why
Reconstruction was allowed to fail.  One of
the most notable achievements of the Reconstruction
era was the enfranchisement of the freedmen, and
the formation of populist-leaning state and
local governments under the auspices of
the Republican Party which were able to draw support
from both the freedmen and the poor whites.
These state and local governments tended to
pursue progressive policies like building
roads and hospitals and establishing
public schools.  Howevery, by 
the early 1870s, Northern capitalists
started to become disenchanted
with these political trends in the
South. They were now willing
to embrace the defeated planter
class as junior partners in the
governance of the country.
Events in Europe like the Paris
Commune of 1871, which received
great publicity in the US, contributed
to this unease.  The feeling in
US ruling circles was that it
was dangerous to permit
the freedmen and poor whites
to share in the governance
of the Southern states.  Calls
for and end to Reconstruction
soon became widespread,
not withstanding the fact that
in much of the South, Reconstruction
had never really been permitted to
get off the ground in the first place.
The Hayes-Tilden presidential
election of 1876 brought things
to a head,
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_election%2C_1876
)
with a deal being struck by which the
disputed votes in the Electoral College
were granted to the Republican
candidate, Samuel Hayes, in return
for the withdrawl of Federal troops
from the South, and thus the
ending of Rconstruction.  The
freedmen were soon disenfranchised
and white surpremacy was restored.
____________________________________________________________
Looking for insurance?  Click to compare and save big.
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL2141/fc/Ioyw6i3m276LxOWJgyvmAErpVzDgw87z5bedAlNqGqIYHH5IKCFq8Z/


From Waistline2 at aol.com  Sun Jun  8 13:18:17 2008
From: Waistline2 at aol.com (Waistline2 at aol.com)
Date: Sun, 8 Jun 2008 15:18:17 EDT
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] [marxistphilosophy] Re: friendly fascism for
	the 21st ce...
Message-ID: <c4f.2d45a446.357d8a79@aol.com>

Good stuff and right on the money. 
 
The political basis of reaction - fascism, has always been historically in  
the South. 
 
We tend to write as if we forget the right to work laws, Taft Hartley and  
how Hayes Tilden - 1876, altered our history.
 
Good stuff. 
 



**************Get trade secrets for amazing burgers. Watch "Cooking with 
Tyler Florence" on AOL Food.      
(http://food.aol.com/tyler-florence?video=4?&NCID=aolfod00030000000002)


From farmelantj at juno.com  Sun Jun  8 13:38:52 2008
From: farmelantj at juno.com (Jim Farmelant)
Date: Sun, 8 Jun 2008 15:38:52 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] [marxistphilosophy] Re: friendly fascism for
	the 21st ce...
Message-ID: <20080608.153853.5996.1.farmelantj@juno.com>

 
On Sun, 8 Jun 2008 15:18:17 EDT Waistline2 at aol.com writes:
> Good stuff and right on the money. 
>  
> The political basis of reaction - fascism, has always been 
> historically in  
> the South. 
>  
> We tend to write as if we forget the right to work laws, Taft 
> Hartley and  
> how Hayes Tilden - 1876, altered our history.
>  
> Good stuff. 
>  
> 
> 

We might also point out how
for many years the Southern
viewpoint dominated US historiography
concerning the Civil War, Reconstruction,
and the Grant Administration.  For
years, US history books portrayed
Reconstruction as a "terrible injustice"
done to the defeated South, despite
the benefits it brought to the freedmen
and for that matter to the poor whites.
Similarly, President Grant was long
villified too.  He was portrayed as
a drunkard and an incompetent
president who presided over
an extremely corrupt administration.
Actually, he was hated because
he sought to use Federal power
to enforce Reconstruction and
protect the rights of the freedmen.
Also, he was derided for his
Indian policy - Grant believing
in the radical proposition
that the US government should
abide by the terms of the treaties
that it had entered into with
the Indian nations.   All the various
economic interests that sought to
open up the Indian lands to
white settlement and "development"
would have none of this.
____________________________________________________________
Smart Girls Secret Weapon
Read Unbiased Beauty Product Reviews, Get Helpful Tips, Tricks and Sam
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL2141/fc/JKFkuJi7U3xS4nvQ6Sn2qC63JKXMRkmWp6zlyd0L9tnDf0B12hl285/


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Sun Jun  8 14:38:11 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Sun, 08 Jun 2008 15:38:11 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] [marxistphilosophy] Re: friendly fascism for
 the 21st ce...
In-Reply-To: <20080608.153853.5996.1.farmelantj@juno.com>
References: <20080608.153853.5996.1.farmelantj@juno.com>
Message-ID: <E1K5QnA-00065i-OM@elasmtp-mealy.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

I may have brought this up before, but I have long entertained the 
notion of the U.S. South as the first fascist state.

Incidentally, there's a new book out on the post-Reconstruction 
South, author was on Tavis Smiley.  The title might be WORSE THAN SLAVERY.

At 02:38 PM 6/8/2008, Jim Farmelant wrote:
>
>On Sun, 8 Jun 2008 15:18:17 EDT Waistline2 at aol.com writes:
> > Good stuff and right on the money.
> >
> > The political basis of reaction - fascism, has always been
> > historically in
> > the South.
> >
> > We tend to write as if we forget the right to work laws, Taft
> > Hartley and
> > how Hayes Tilden - 1876, altered our history.
> >
> > Good stuff.
> >
> >
> >
>
>We might also point out how
>for many years the Southern
>viewpoint dominated US historiography
>concerning the Civil War, Reconstruction,
>and the Grant Administration.  For
>years, US history books portrayed
>Reconstruction as a "terrible injustice"
>done to the defeated South, despite
>the benefits it brought to the freedmen
>and for that matter to the poor whites.
>Similarly, President Grant was long
>villified too.  He was portrayed as
>a drunkard and an incompetent
>president who presided over
>an extremely corrupt administration.
>Actually, he was hated because
>he sought to use Federal power
>to enforce Reconstruction and
>protect the rights of the freedmen.
>Also, he was derided for his
>Indian policy - Grant believing
>in the radical proposition
>that the US government should
>abide by the terms of the treaties
>that it had entered into with
>the Indian nations.   All the various
>economic interests that sought to
>open up the Indian lands to
>white settlement and "development"
>would have none of this.
>____________________________________________________________
>Smart Girls Secret Weapon
>Read Unbiased Beauty Product Reviews, Get Helpful Tips, Tricks and Sam
>http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL2141/fc/JKFkuJi7U3xS4nvQ6Sn2qC63JKXMRkmWp6zlyd0L9tnDf0B12hl285/
>
>_______________________________________________
>Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
>Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu
>To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
>http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
>
>
>--
>No virus found in this incoming message.
>Checked by AVG.
>Version: 7.5.524 / Virus Database: 270.0.0/1489 - Release Date: 
>6/7/2008 11:17 AM



From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Mon Jun  9 14:16:31 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2008 16:16:31 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Demand Diplomacy With Iran, Not War
Message-ID: <484D5762.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Please forward widely.

Dear Friend of United for Peace and Justice,

We know we've been asking you to make a lot of phone calls to Congress
lately. Tomorrow, as part of a "Time to Talk with Iran" event, UFPJ will
be asking members of Congress to come out of their offices to make a
phone call to Iran to talk directly with ordinary Iranian citizens.

But we need you to call too -- while we're on Capitol Hill talking to
members of Congress in person, we ask that you flood their offices with
phone calls demanding diplomacy.

National Call-In Day for Diplomacy With Iran
Tuesday, June 10

Call your congressional representative: 1-800-788-9372

Talking points:

   *     The U.S. must talk to Iran! Ask your rep to co-sponsor H.R.
5056 to appoint an envoy to Iran for the purpose of easing tensions and
normalizing relations with Iran.
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:H.R.5056: 
 
   *     The U.S. and Iran share common interests in a stable Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Middle East.

   *     The U.S. pursued negotiations with North Korea and Libya. It's
time to talk with Iran.

It is essential that we push back against the Bush administration's
push for bombing Iran. Your phone calls are an important part of the
pushback. Please call today!

The same people who called for attacking Iraq now are raising the
drumbeat for military action against Iran. The Bush administration is
labeling Iran as one of the greatest threats to U.S. security, despite
the November 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate which concluded
that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program.
Bombing Iran would bring disastrous consequences:

    * The entire Middle East likely would descend into further violence
putting the well-being of innumerable civilians at risk. 
    * U.S. standing in the world would plummet, and oil prices would
soar.
    * A U.S. attack would only strengthen hardliners in Iran.

Current U.S. policies are not working. Threats of military attacks and
regime change, while refusing to talk with Iran until they stop
enriching uranium, are only heightening tensions.

Tell your congressional leaders that you want dialogue not war!
1-800-788-9372

The call-in day is sponsored by the Campaign for a New American Policy
on Iran: www.newiranpolicy.org 

Yours, for peace and justice,


Judith Le Blanc
UFPJ National Organizing Coordinator

===============================================

Help us continue to do this critical work: Make a donation to UFPJ
today -- http://www.unitedforpeace.org/donate 

UNITED FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE
www.unitedforpeace.org | 212-868-5545
PO Box 607; Times Square Station; New York, NY 10108



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Mon Jun  9 15:22:04 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2008 17:22:04 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Keeping up with the Jones or a Jones for
	commodities
Message-ID: <484D66BF.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

I do not believe you are accurately characterizing my position, which I
believe is more sophisticated than you are interpreting.  I do NOT
believe consumption choices are inherently rational, independent,
internally-generated, etc.  People are absolutely affected by what
others do, etc.  My point is that not all choices are equal, that
certain behaviors are apparently more inherently preferable than
others,
and such preferences reveal themselves across culture, economic
system,
etc.  Yes, people keep up with the Joneses, which leads to several
thoughts -- (1) is keeping up with the Joneses an inherent part of the
human condition or something we can be socialized not to do, (2) if it
is not inherent, why is it so easy to socialize people to keep up with
the Joneses as opposed to socializing them to not keeping up with the
Joneses, and (3) why does keeping up with the Joneses so easily
manifest
itself with certain consumption goods and behaviors and not others?

^^^^
CB: As far as cross-culturally and "the human condition",  have you
studied any anthropology, ethnology, anthropological economics ?

Humans are highly social animals. The unique human characteristic of
humans as compared with other species is that we are more social than
they are. Other species are more individualistic than we are.  So,
"individualism" moves us closer to other animals, and away from our
uniquely human nature, which is highly social.   

The human aspect of a human individual is her sociality , not her
individuality.

The critical unique quality of human productive activities is that
they
are highly social, social labor or work.  The Robinson Crusoe model of
the isolated individual producing is a profound misrepresentation of
the
human production model. 

  

And notice that social production is much more rational ( highly
rational) than isolated individual production.  This original human
rationality of socialized labor as opposed to individual, isolated
labor
was our great adaptive advantage at the origin of our species. Culture
and language define our species because they are the special media and
means of socializing us.

However, capitalism perverts the fecundity which unsuspectingly lay in
the lap of social labor. Like the Sorcerer's Apprentice who releases
powers that he cannot keep under control,  Capital  must have an
ever-growing GDP and ever-growing types, variety , of goods and
services. Not for the ever better and efficient good and service of
the
consumers of these goods and services, but for the ever increasing
accumulation of capital by Capital. 

To realize this accumulation in the form of money all the stuff must
be
bought. The few capitalists, the tiny elite,  have no use for great
redundancies of _personal consumption_ goods and services.  What sense
would it be for a rich-man to buy 10,000 cars or go to a restaurant 50
times per day ? An individual can only consume so much.  The great 
mass
of workers/producers are the only locus of enough individual demands
to
buy all the personal/individual consumer goods so massively produced.

 So, the ruling idea from the ruling classes on this is ( and the
rulers control the socializing institutions) : Have a Jones for
commodities; shop, shop, shop until you drop; then come back and buy
again tomorrow. Otherwise, we'll start laying people off. 

John Henry






This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From Waistline2 at aol.com  Mon Jun  9 15:31:10 2008
From: Waistline2 at aol.com (Waistline2 at aol.com)
Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2008 17:31:10 EDT
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] [marxistphilosophy] Re: friendly fascism for
	the 21st ce...
Message-ID: <c02.3850c677.357efb1e@aol.com>

In a message dated 6/8/2008 12:43:43 P.M. Pacific Daylight Time,  
rdumain at autodidactproject.org writes:

> I may have brought this up before, but I have long entertained the  
notion of the U.S. South as the first fascist state.

Incidentally,  there's a new book out on the post-Reconstruction 
South, author was on Tavis  Smiley.  The title might be WORSE THAN  SLAVERY.<<

Comment

I always felt we had more in common than  our minor disputes Ralph. I am not 
familiar with this book by Tavis Smiley but  will check it out. 
 
America is strange or rather different. Financial-industrial imperialism,  in 
my opinion, arose on the basis of the Civil War in our country and as the  
result of the Civil War, a full 50 years before Lenin's "Imperialism." Had the  
industrial-financial sector of capital remained dominant, a different line of  
history would have emerge with a bourgeois class interest in expanding the 
basis  of the yeo-man farmers or small producers.  The possibility of 50 achers  
and a mule might have become possible. 
 
Wall Street imperialism would rule and it could not rule the South outside  
of a military dictatorship by the South over the South on its behalf. 
 
The South came to control the nation and Wall Street controlled the South. 
 
What took place in the core plantation South was no racial antagonism but  
fascist political rule with its ideological roots in the color factor. 
 
Jim is accurate in plainly stated how this meant disaster for the Indian  
peoples, their lands and the coming 100 years of treaty violations and "lets  
sweep the Indian under the carpet" treatment. 
 
Hey, the primaries are over and I am ready to talk about communism -  
economic communism, because there is nothing left for me in my heart. 
 
Yes, I supported Obama in the Democratic primaries, although I was not  
registered as a Democrat living in Florida. 
 
The primaries are over and I retain my right to vote for whoever I choose  in 
November. 
 
Or not vote at all. 
 
But the primaries was a distinct phase of political America. 
 
Peace and Revolution . 



**************Vote for your city's best dining and nightlife. City's Best 
2008.      (http://citysbest.aol.com?ncid=aolacg00050000000102)


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Mon Jun  9 15:44:39 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2008 17:44:39 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] [marxistphilosophy] Re: friendly fascism for the
	21st ce...
Message-ID: <484D6C0A.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Jim Farmelant 

 

> 
> 

We might also point out how
for many years the Southern
viewpoint dominated US historiography
concerning the Civil War, Reconstruction,
and the Grant Administration.  For
years, US history books portrayed
Reconstruction as a "terrible injustice"
done to the defeated South, despite
the benefits it brought to the freedmen
and for that matter to the poor whites.
Similarly, President Grant was long
villified too.  He was portrayed as
a drunkard and an incompetent
president who presided over
an extremely corrupt administration.
Actually, he was hated because
he sought to use Federal power
to enforce Reconstruction and
protect the rights of the freedmen.
Also, he was derided for his
Indian policy - Grant believing
in the radical proposition
that the US government should
abide by the terms of the treaties
that it had entered into with
the Indian nations.   All the various
economic interests that sought to
open up the Indian lands to
white settlement and "development"
would have none of this.

^^^^^
CB: When we throw in that Grant was the commanding general of the Union
army that physically overthrew slavery,  he is one of the three
"bestest" Americans who were Presidents.   Lincoln, Grant, FDR.




This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Mon Jun  9 15:50:40 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2008 17:50:40 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] [marxistphilosophy] Re: friendly fascism for the
	21st ce...
Message-ID: <484D6D74.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>


Ralph Dumain 


I may have brought this up before, but I have long entertained the 
notion of the U.S. South as the first fascist state.

^^^^
CB: Yea, me and Waistline take this line too. It was open terrorist
rule of the most reactionary section of finance capital in the US, well,
blooming finance capital in the US.   Nazi fascist terror was directed
especially at specially oppressed minorities too, not the majority of
the population.

And don't forget what was happening to the Indigenous Americans at the
same time. Reservations were like concentration camps, to some extent.
There was definitely a genocide perpetrated on the Native Americans. Of
course, it didn't start with Reconstruction. 

^^^^^^

Incidentally, there's a new book out on the post-Reconstruction 
South, author was on Tavis Smiley.  The title might be WORSE THAN
SLAVERY



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Mon Jun  9 20:25:08 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2008 21:25:08 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] [marxistphilosophy] Re: friendly fascism for
 the 21st ce...
In-Reply-To: <c02.3850c677.357efb1e@aol.com>
References: <c02.3850c677.357efb1e@aol.com>
Message-ID: <E1K5sgx-0001Am-Ri@elasmtp-spurfowl.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

For some reason, I can't access Tavis Smiley's PBS archive.  But the 
book was written by one of his guests; I think it was this:

Slavery by Another Name: The Re-Enslavement of Black Americans from 
the Civil War to World War II
by Douglas A. Blackmon

Hardcover: 480 pages Publisher: Doubleday (March 25, 2008)  ISBN-10: 
0385506252 ISBN-13: 978-0385506250

http://www.amazon.com/Slavery-Another-Name-Re-Enslavement-Americans/dp/0385506252/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213061190&sr=1-1

At 04:31 PM 6/9/2008, Waistline2 at aol.com wrote:
>In a message dated 6/8/2008 12:43:43 P.M. Pacific Daylight Time,
>rdumain at autodidactproject.org writes:
>
> > I may have brought this up before, but I have long entertained the
>notion of the U.S. South as the first fascist state.
>
>Incidentally,  there's a new book out on the post-Reconstruction
>South, author was on Tavis  Smiley.  The title might be WORSE THAN  SLAVERY.<<
>
>Comment
>
>I always felt we had more in common than  our minor disputes Ralph. I am not
>familiar with this book by Tavis Smiley but  will check it out.
>
>America is strange or rather different. Financial-industrial imperialism,  in
>my opinion, arose on the basis of the Civil War in our country and as the
>result of the Civil War, a full 50 years before Lenin's 
>"Imperialism." Had the
>industrial-financial sector of capital remained dominant, a 
>different line of
>history would have emerge with a bourgeois class interest in expanding the
>basis  of the yeo-man farmers or small producers.  The possibility 
>of 50 achers
>and a mule might have become possible.
>
>Wall Street imperialism would rule and it could not rule the South outside
>of a military dictatorship by the South over the South on its behalf.
>
>The South came to control the nation and Wall Street controlled the South.
>
>What took place in the core plantation South was no racial antagonism but
>fascist political rule with its ideological roots in the color factor.
>
>Jim is accurate in plainly stated how this meant disaster for the Indian
>peoples, their lands and the coming 100 years of treaty violations and "lets
>sweep the Indian under the carpet" treatment.
>
>Hey, the primaries are over and I am ready to talk about communism -
>economic communism, because there is nothing left for me in my heart.
>
>Yes, I supported Obama in the Democratic primaries, although I was not
>registered as a Democrat living in Florida.
>
>The primaries are over and I retain my right to vote for whoever I choose  in
>November.
>
>Or not vote at all.
>
>But the primaries was a distinct phase of political America.
>
>Peace and Revolution .

From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Mon Jun  9 20:31:22 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2008 21:31:22 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] friendly fascism for the 21st ce...
Message-ID: <E1K5smc-0005t0-O0@elasmtp-mealy.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

OK, I think this was the interview I saw on Tavis Smiley:

Douglas A. Blackmon
original airdate May 1, 2008
http://www.pbs.org/kcet/tavissmiley/archive/200805/20080501_blackmon.html


>Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2008 21:25:08 -0500
>To: marxism-thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu
>From: Ralph Dumain <rdumain at autodidactproject.org>
>Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] [marxistphilosophy] Re: friendly 
>fascism for the 21st ce...
>
>For some reason, I can't access Tavis Smiley's PBS archive.  But the 
>book was written by one of his guests; I think it was this:
>
>Slavery by Another Name: The Re-Enslavement of Black Americans from 
>the Civil War to World War II
>by Douglas A. Blackmon
>
>Hardcover: 480 pages Publisher: Doubleday (March 25, 2008)  ISBN-10: 
>0385506252 ISBN-13: 978-0385506250
>
>http://www.amazon.com/Slavery-Another-Name-Re-Enslavement-Americans/dp/0385506252/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213061190&sr=1-1

From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Mon Jun  9 20:58:59 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2008 21:58:59 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Jeff Nall's Perpetual Revolt
Message-ID: <E1K5tDO-0007o1-C2@elasmtp-scoter.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

I've just discovered Jeff Nall, an activist in progressive and 
secular humanist movements. His main web site is:

<http://www.jeffnall.com/writing.html>Jeff Nall: Writer, Speaker, Activist

Note his new book:

Perpetual Revolt: Essays on Peace & Justice and The Shared Values of 
Secular, Spiritual, and Religious Progressives
Publisher: Howling Dog Press, 250 pages.
Cost: $20.00 ($15.95 + $4.05 shipping and handling)
http://www.jeffnall.com/books.html

Jeff has some other web sites of interest. My point of entry was his 
site on French Enlightenment philosopher Concordet:

<http://www.condorcet.info/>Condorcet: Male Prophet of Feminism, by Jeff Nall





From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Mon Jun  9 22:03:32 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2008 23:03:32 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] [marxistphilosophy] Re: friendly fascism for
 the 21st ce...
In-Reply-To: <484D6D74.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
References: <484D6D74.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
Message-ID: <E1K5uDm-0000Jj-RD@elasmtp-banded.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

I try not to use the term "fascism" too loosely. 
It is not only genocide and terrorism, it is a 
product of modern capitalist and industrial 
conditions. I could be wrong about this, but much 
of what the Jim Crow, South instituted, with the 
participation of industrial capital in and out of 
the South, seems to me to qualify, and before the 
rise of fascism and corporatism in early 20th 
century Europe.  Note this description of the book in question:

"Wall Street Journal bureau chief Blackmon gives 
a groundbreaking and disturbing account of a 
sordid chapter in American history?the lease 
(essentially the sale) of convicts to commercial 
interests between the end of the 19th century and 
well into the 20th. Usually, the criminal offense 
was loosely defined vagrancy or even changing 
employers without permission. The initial 
sentence was brutal enough; the actual penalty, 
reserved almost exclusively for black men, was a 
form of slavery in one of hundreds of forced 
labor camps operated by state and county 
governments, large corporations, small time 
entrepreneurs and provincial farmers. Into this 
history, Blackmon weaves the story of Green 
Cottenham, who was charged with riding a freight 
train without a ticket, in 1908 and was sentenced 
to three months of hard labor for Tennessee Coal, 
Iron & Railroad, a subsidiary of U.S. Steel. 
Cottenham's sentence was extended an additional 
three months and six days because he was unable 
to pay fines then leveraged on criminals. 
Blackmon's book reveals in devastating detail the 
legal and commercial forces that created this 
neoslavery along with deeply moving and totally 
appalling personal testimonies of survivors. 
Every incident in this book is true, he writes; one wishes it were not so."

Note all the techniques of totalitarian, 
terrorist control of black labor, sans the 
obsolete institution of chattel slavery. The 
genocide of the Indians fits into this time 
period as well, but again what I have in mind 
here is thoroughly modern institutions of the 
control of populations.  Reservations perhaps 
fits into the category, but then there were 
ghettoes in Europe, though they were the product 
of different circumstances.  But the prototypes 
of concentration camps, forced labor without 
formal slavery or serfdom, surveillance of 
populations including their physical movements, 
arbitrary imprisonment, legal and extralegal mass 
murder, torture, and intimidation in the context 
of the modern state, etc.--I think all this taken 
together might make my case.  Of course it is no 
secret that the US provided models for the Nazis, 
and it is not so well known that the US provided 
a model for the institution of forced labor under 
industrial expansion in West Africa, thanks to 
the knowhow provided by Booker T. Washington and co.

I have long had it in mind to read Jack London's 
pioneering novel THE IRON HEEL. London was a 
white racist though a socialist, so I don't know 
if he ever had anything to say about Jim 
Crow.  But he and some other fellow whose name I 
can't recall invented the dystopian novel about 
the institution of a fascist state, and it would 
be useful to revisit how they saw it in their 
time. When the modern dystopian novel was 
initiated by Zamyatin's WE (banned in the USSR 
long before Stalin took control), prototype for 
Huxley and Orwell, already the totalitarian state 
rather than private capital became the villain. 
But we may learn something new if we move further 
back in time.  I'd like to know if any black 
writers had anything to say about London's novel.

At 04:50 PM 6/9/2008, Charles Brown wrote:

>Ralph Dumain
>
>
>I may have brought this up before, but I have long entertained the
>notion of the U.S. South as the first fascist state.
>
>^^^^
>CB: Yea, me and Waistline take this line too. It was open terrorist
>rule of the most reactionary section of finance capital in the US, well,
>blooming finance capital in the US.   Nazi fascist terror was directed
>especially at specially oppressed minorities too, not the majority of
>the population.
>
>And don't forget what was happening to the Indigenous Americans at the
>same time. Reservations were like concentration camps, to some extent.
>There was definitely a genocide perpetrated on the Native Americans. Of
>course, it didn't start with Reconstruction.
>
>^^^^^^
>
>Incidentally, there's a new book out on the post-Reconstruction
>South, author was on Tavis Smiley.  The title might be WORSE THAN
>SLAVERY

From Waistline2 at aol.com  Tue Jun 10 10:55:28 2008
From: Waistline2 at aol.com (Waistline2 at aol.com)
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 12:55:28 EDT
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] friendly fascism for the 21st ce...
Message-ID: <cda.30978e6b.35800c00@aol.com>

In a message dated 6/9/2008 7:24:34 P.M. Pacific  Daylight Time, 
rdumain at autodidactproject.org writes:
OK, I think this was the  interview I saw on Tavis Smiley:

Douglas A. Blackmon
original airdate  May 1,  2008
http://www.pbs.org/kcet/tavissmiley/archive/200805/20080501_blackmon.html

Comment   


Excellent interview. 
 
What is missing is Marxism or a Marxist approach, which is of course our  
jobs. Mr. Blackmon - an interesting name, speaks of the South being "addicted to  
forced labor." Really it was the shattered Slave Oligarchy "addicted to 
forced  labor," and the emergence of their political alliance with Wall Street 
financial  industrial imperialism that made the new slavery often more brutal than 
the old  slavery. Ever place else on earth such a political form of rule 
would be  called fascism in the classical communist definition: the open terrorist 
 dictatorship of the most reactionary, chauvinistic and imperialist sector of 
 finance capital.
 
This kind of discussion is more than academia and has an importance for  
today, given Bush W. outright fascist policies and his social and political  basis 
in the old South.   Real world communist approach to national  politics in 
America and presidential elections should always focus on  the core South as the 
social and political basis of reaction in  America. The Northern electorate 
cannot vote these fascists out of office.
 
I am not really sure exactly what is unfolding in political America today.  I 
am not even sure if Bush W. and Obama represent different sectors of capital. 
 I tend to say they do not. Rather, it seems both expressed different sectors 
of  the American political establishment, whose conflicting visions of the 
new world  is rooted in old class formations and peculiarities of the American 
political  establishment. The social base of the Republican Party and its 
ideology is  different then that of the Democratic Party, with the Republicans 
generally  being outright fascists for the past 40 - 50 years. That is to say, 
what  accounts for the outright fascism of Bush W. and his administration is the  
political establishment and its social basis that made it possible for him to 
 run for president in the first place, rather than Bush W. representing some  
distinct "sector" of capital as was the case of German fascism and early  
American fascism.    
 
Really. 
 
Much of my efforts for the past two years have been focusing on trying to  
understand the gravity of the new non-banking financial architecture. Part  of 
my problem is ignorance of real world financial architecture rather  than 
spouting general Marxists axioms. You heard all of them before . . .  
overproduction crisis, value, the price of labor ability, organic composition of  capital, 
poverty and polarity, etc. 
 
It seems we are in for a very rough ride.    
 
Any any rate thanks for the interview information. 
 
WL 



**************Vote for your city's best dining and nightlife. City's Best 
2008.      (http://citysbest.aol.com?ncid=aolacg00050000000102)


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Tue Jun 10 12:23:29 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 14:23:29 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] The original proletariat
Message-ID: <484E8E61.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Ancient laborer burial ground excavated near Rome

By FRANCES D'EMILIO, Associated Press Writer
Mon Jun 9, 8:41 PM ET

First-century burial grounds near Rome's main airport
are yielding a rare look into how ancient longshoremen
and other manual workers did backbreaking jobs,
archaeologists said Monday.

The necropolis near the town of Ponte Galeria came to
light last year when customs police noticed a
clandestine dig by grave robbers seeking valuable
ancient artifacts, Rome's archaeology office said.

Most of the 300 skeletons unearthed were male, and
many of them showed signs of years of heavy work:
joint and tendon inflammation, compressed vertebrae,
hernias and spinal problems, archaeologists said.
Sandy sediment helped preserve the remains well.

Judging by the condition of the skeletons,
archaeologists concluded that the men likely carried
loads on their backs at a nearby port during the early
years of Imperial Rome, said Gabriella Gatto, a
spokeswoman for the archaeology office.

Many ailments "seem to hark back to work as laborers,
in transport and carrying of heavy loads, in an
especially humid environment, circumstances that makes
one think of the burial of individuals who worked in
port areas of the city," the office said in a
statement.

Finding a necropolis near ancient Rome is not rare,
but most of them have been the burial grounds of the
privileged classes. So the Ponte Galeria find is
enlightening experts how the ancient lower class
lived.

Also excavated was a skeleton of a man whose lower jaw
was fused to his upper jaw.

Study indicated "how for all of his life this
individual was fed, likely through the care of his
family" with liquids or semisolids "introduced through
a hole made through his teeth," the archaeology
statement said.

The man lived into his 30s, a decent age at the time.
Experts took that as evidence that the lower classes
cared for the disabled.

Artifacts found in the necropolis were simple ones,
including lanterns to guide the dead to their next
life, Gatto said. One ceramic-and-glass lantern was
decorated with a grape harvest scene.

The dig yielded a glimpse into a working-class
community that was "humble and marked by strong ties
and solidarity among its members," the statement said.

The necropolis was one of the most extensive ones to
be excavated near Rome in recent years, archaeologists
said.






This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Tue Jun 10 14:46:08 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 16:46:08 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] McKinney congratulates Obama
Message-ID: <484EAFD0.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/marxism/2008-June/029586.html

Statement by Cynthia McKinney, Power to the People
Candidate for U.S. President,

on the nomination of Barack Obama as the Democratic Party's
Presidential Candidate in 2008

(statement issued June 9, 2008)

On Saturday, June 7, 2008, Hillary Clinton announced that
her 2008 presidential bid is over, making Barack Obama the
first-ever Black presidential nominee of a major party in
the history of the United States.

Congratulations to Senator Obama for achieving such a feat!

When I was growing up in the U.S. South in the racially
turbulent 1960s, it would have been impossible for a Black
politician to become a viable Presidential contender.
Nothing a Black candidate could have done or said would
have prevented him (or her) from being excluded on the
basis of skin color alone. Many of us never thought we
would see in our lifetime a Black person with a real
possibility of becoming President of the United States.

The fact that this is now possible is a sign of some racial
progress in this country, more than 40 years after the
Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts. But it is also a sign
of the deep discontent among the American people, and
particularly among African Americans, with the
corporate-dominated, business-as-usual politics that has
prevailed in Washington for too many years.

Coming from Barack Obama, the word "change" did not appear
as just another empty campaign slogan. It galvanized
millions of people --mostly young people--to register to
vote and to get active in the political system. The U.S.
political system needs the energy and vision of all is
citizens participating in the political process. Citizen
participation is always the answer.

Senator Obama called for healing the wounds inflicted on
working people and the poor in our country after eights
years of a corrupt and criminal Bush-Cheney Administration.
Just as in November 2006, people full of an expectation for
change, including those the system has purposefully left
out and left behind, flocked to the polls to vote for
Senator Obama. Across a broad swath of the people of this
country, and from those who are impacted by U.S. foreign
policy, there is a real expectation, a real desire, for
change.

While congratulating Senator Obama for a feat well done, 
I would also like to bring home the very real need for change
and a few of the issues that must be addressed for the
change needed in this country to be real. First of all, a
few of the more obvious facts:

United for a Fair Economy (UFE) produces studies each year
on the anniversary of the birth of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. entitled, State of the Dream reports. UFE has found
that on some indices the racial disparities that exist
today are worse than at the time of the murder of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. For example, infant mortality,
where the overall U.S. world ranking falls below Cuba,
Israel, and Canada. They also have found that, without a
public policy intervention, it would take over 5,000 years
to close the home ownership gap between blacks and whites
in this country, especially exacerbated because of the
foreclosure crisis disproportionately facing Blacks and
Latinos today. They have found that it would take 581
years, without a public policy intervention, to close the
racial gap in income in this country. UFE has found
unacceptable racial disparities extant on economic,
justice, and security issues. After analyzing the impact of
the Democratic Party's "First 100 Hours" agenda upon taking
the Congressional majority, UFE concluded in its 2007
report that Blacks vote in the Blue (meaning, they support
Democrats in the voting booth), but live in the Red (they
do not get the public policy results that those votes
merit). And UFE noted that Hurricane Katrina was not even
mentioned at all in the Congressional Democratic majority's
2007 First 100 hours agenda.

United for a Fair Economy is not the only organization to
find such dismal statistics, reflecting life for far too
many in this country. In a study not too long ago, Dr.
David Satcher found that over 83,000 blacks died
unnecessarily, due to racial disparities in access to
health care and because of the disparate treatment blacks
receive after access. A Hull House study found that the
racial disparity in the quality of life of black Chicagoans
and white Chicagoans would take 200 years to be eliminated
without a public policy intervention. The National Urban
League in its annual "State of Black America" publication
basically concludes that the United States has not done
enough to close long-existing and unacceptable racial
disparities. The United Nations Rapporteur for Special
Forms of Racism, Mr. Doudou Diene of Senegal, just left
this country in an unprecedented fact-finding mission to
monitor human rights violations in the United States. Dr.
Jared Ball submitted to Diene on my behalf, my statement
after the Sean Bell police verdict. The United Nations has
already cited its concern for the treatment of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita survivors and the extrajudicial killings
taking place across our country, that especially target
Black and Latino males, and especially at the hands of law
enforcement authorities.

I hope it is clear that the desire for change is so deeply
felt because it is deeply needed. Politics, through public
policy, can address all these issues and more in the favor
of the people. We do not have to accept or tolerate such
glaring disparities in our society. We do not have to
accept or tolerate bloated Pentagon spending, unfair tax
cuts, attacks on our civil liberties, and on workers'
rights to unionize. We don't have to accept or tolerate our
children dropping out of high school, college education
unreachable because tuition is so high, or our country
steeped in debt.

The 21st Century statistics for our country reflect a
country that can still be characterized as Dr. King did so
many years ago: the greatest purveyor of violence on the
planet.

It doesn't have to be that way. And the people know it.

I have accepted as the platform of the Power to the People
Campaign, the 10-Point Draft Manifesto of the
Reconstruction Movement, a grouping of Black activists who
came together in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita to advocate for public policy initiatives that address
the plight of Blacks and other oppressed peoples in this
country.

Among its many specific public policy planks, the Draft
Manifesto calls for:

* election integrity, if our vote is to mean anything at
all, all political parties must defend the integrity of the
votes cast by the American people, something neither of the
major parties has done effectively in the past two
Presidential elections;

* funding a massive infrastructure improvement program that
is also a jobs program that greens our economy and puts
people to work, and especially in New Orleans and the Gulf
Coast, Hurricane survivors, treated as internally displaced
persons whose right to vote and right of return are
protected, play a meaningful role in the rebuilding of
their communities;

* recognizing affordable housing as a fundamental human
right, and putting a halt to the senseless destruction of
public housing in New Orleans;

* enacting Reparations for African Americans, so that the
enduring racial disparities which reflect the U.S.
government's failure to address the reality and the
vestiges of slavery and unjust laws enacted can be ended
and recognition of the plight of Black Farmers whose issues
are still not being adequately addressed by USDA and
court-appointed mediators despite a US government admission
of guilt for systematic discrimination;

* acknowledging COINTELPRO and other government spying and
destabilization programs from the 1960s to today and
disclosing the role of the US government in the harassment
and false imprisonment of political activists in this
country, including Mumia Abu-Jamal, the San Francisco 8,
Leonard Peltier, including restitution to victims of
government abuse and their families for the suffering they
have long endured;

* ending prisons for profit and the "war on drugs," which
fuels the criminalization of Black and Latino youth at home
and provides cover for U.S. military intervention in
foreign countries, particularly to our south, which is used
to put down all social protest movements in countries like
Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and elsewhere;

* creating a universal access, single-payer, health care
system and enacting a livable wage, equal pay for equal
work, repealing the Bush tax cuts, and making corporations
and the rich pay their fair share of taxes;

* establishing public funding for higher education--no
student should graduate from college or university tens or
hundreds of thousands of dollars in debt;

* ensuring workers' rights by 1) repealing Taft-Hartley to
stop the unjust firing of union organizers, ban scabbing,
and enable workers to exercise their voices at work and 2)
enacting laws for U.S. corporations that keep labor
standards high at home and raise them abroad, which would
require the repeal of NAFTA, CAFTA, the Caribbean FTA, and
the U.S.-Peru FTA;

* justice for immigrant workers, including real immigration
reform that provides amnesty for all undocumented
immigrants;

* creating a Department of Peace that would put forward
projects for peace all over the world, deploying our
diplomats to help resolve conflicts through peaceful means
and overseeing the orderly withdrawal of U.S. troops from
the more than 100 countries around the world where they are
stationed, and an immediate end to all wars and occupations
by U.S. forces, beginning in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
slashing the budget for the Pentagon.

The Power to the People Campaign has visited 24 states and
I believe there is already broad support across our country
for these policy positions. The people deserve an open and
honest debate on these issues and more. I encourage the
Democratic Party and its new presumptive nominee, Senator
Obama, to embrace these important suggestions for policy
initiatives



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Tue Jun 10 15:16:09 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 17:16:09 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Revolutionary communications
Message-ID: <484EB6D9.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

GRANMA June 9, 2008

Cuban-Venezuelan Revolutionize Communications

JUAN ANTONIO BORREGO

CARACAS.? Venezuelan and Cuban specialists have finished mapping out a 
1,550 kilometer highway of underwater fiber-optics cable linking the two 
countries that will forever change the history of international 
communications in Cuba.

BESIDES THE MAIN LINE THERE WILL BE A RESTORATION LINE BETWEEN SANTIAGO 
DE CUBA AND JAMAICA.

Two pairs of fiber-optics cables will run from the Venezuelan state of 
Vargas to the province of Santiago de Cuba, potentially increasing the 
island?s international communications capacity by 3,000 times.

Wilfredo Morales, who heads the Gran Caribe Telecommunications Co. ?a 
joint venture created to manage the project?, said the cable will break 
down the wall constructed by the US blockade that forces the island to 
use more expensive and vulnerable satellite services for connections 
abroad. This little detail seems to have been forgotten by US President 
Bush when he pronounced his latest diatribe against Cuba and offered to 
send cell phones to the island.

WILFREDO MORALES SAID THE SYSTEM COULD BE OPERATING IN THE FIRST HALF OF 
2010.

Gran Caribe Telecommunications was created in early 2008 based on an 
agreement between Telecom Venezuela and the Cuban Telecommunication 
Signals Transport Co. (Transbit). Morales said it is currently designing 
the project and in the process of selecting the firm that will build the 
system. If the schedule is met, Morales said the selection of the 
supplier will conclude in August and the laying of the cables by the end 
of 2009 or early 2010. If things go according to plans, the system could 
be up and running in the first half of 2010.

TECHNICAL AND STRATEGIC CHALLENGES

The idea to connect Cuba and Venezuela by sea goes far beyond laying 
more than 1,500 kilometers of cable. In addition to the technical 
challenges of placing the cable that will lie in areas as deep as 5,400 
meters, the top coordinator for Venezuela, Lilian Rivas, spoke about the 
political elements involved: ?the issue of territorial waters, the 
blockade and the search for reliable suppliers.?

CARLOS ORFILA AND LILIANA RIVAS SAID THE PROJECT WILL GUARANTEE 
INDEPENDENCE AND MAXIMUM SECURITY FOR CUBA?S TELECOMMUNICATIONS.

Rivas emphasized that the project does not seek to develop an 
independent system. ?The communication we are seeking is not just 
between Venezuela and Cuba, but also with the world.? She said while the 
primary objective is to provide secure connectivity to both countries 
with lower costs and increased transmission capacity, there is a 
possible second phase, incorporating other countries in the region such 
as Nicaragua and Haiti. With that possibility in mind a junction unit is 
being designed to facilitate future expansion of the cable.

FIBER OPTIC CABLES SURROUND CUBA

If you look at the map of undersea cables that exist in the Caribbean, 
it would be difficult to understand the need for this project if it 
weren?t for the blockade imposed by the United States on Cuba.

Carlos Orfila, an engineer working as a project consultant to the 
Venezuelan Ministry of Telecommunications, said that one example is the 
Cancun-Miami cable that passes a mere 32 kilometers from the Havana seawall.

?If it weren?t for the blockade Cuba could connect for a cost of US 
$500,000. The companies can?t do it because they don?t have permission 
from the US Department of State and/or attempts by the State Department 
to impose unacceptable conditions on Cuba,? said Orfila. ?There have 
been several attempts, and I know because I was working for years on 
this, but the US government has always made connecting impossible for 
you Cubans.?

Another example given by Ofila illustrates the magnitude of the US siege 
against Cuba. The cable route between La Guaira and Santiago is being 
drawn almost entirely in international waters, due to both technical and 
cost aspects but also because of national borders and economic zones 
where the US imposes its conditions. As such, the cable has to be 
extended by 100 kilometers.

SHARK PROOF

With a total capacity of 640 Gigabytes, 320 for each pair of fibers, and 
state-of-the-art technology, the Cuban-Venezuelan cable will guarantee 
communications independence for both countries, something that is 
impossible with satellite communications.

Orfila explained that given the extreme depths of this project they are 
planning to use an ?arc technique;? employing a fine steel-rope covering 
in a curved shape to assure greater resistance on the sea bottom where 
extreme pressure could damage the cable.

A special covering will also be used in some parts to protect the cable, 
no thicker than a thumb in most parts, against attacks from sharks, 
which are attracted by the electromagnetic fields generated by the 
cables. Orfila also said it would be necessary to protect the undersea 
cables from maritime activities in coastal areas, such as anchors and 
fishing.

The project will have one pair of cables running directly between Cuba 
and Venezuela and a second pair that will allow connecting to other 
countries. The system will have two segments, one between Cuba and 
Venezuela and the other between Cuba and Jamaica, thus providing a point 
for repairs.

Orfila said the project will take advantage of Venezuelan 
telecommunications experience, especially in cellular telephone 
technology, fiber optics and its entering into satellite administration; 
and will employ Cuba?s Backbone system to extend the fiber optics 
network to most of the country.

Cable for Integration

ALBERTO NU?EZ alberto.enb at granma.cip.cu

Connecting Venezuela and Cuba by way of two pairs of fiber optic cables 
will be a significant advance in the integration of the Caribbean 
peoples, facilitating exchange in science and technology, in economics 
and several others areas, said Waldo Reboredo Arroyo, vice president of 
Gran Caribe Telecommunications S.A. It will also serve to confront the 
constant meddling of powers like the United States that want to impose 
their dominance, he added.

WALDO REBOREDO ARROYO

Reboredo spoke on the advantages of the undersea cable project between 
La Guaira, Venezuela and Siboney beach in Santiago de Cuba.

The executive said this is the first time that Latin American countries 
take on the administration and operations of a firm of this scope, 
without the participation of the transnationals that usually control 
such systems.

The joint collaboration between Cuban and Venezuelan professionals is 
not only limited to the carrying out of the project but also to its 
subsequent administration once operating.

Reboredo explained that from the very beginning the Cuban and Venezuelan 
engineers, economists, and attorneys took on this effort with great 
rigor and in close cooperation with international suppliers of this type 
of communications.

The project will be of use to Cuba and Venezuela as well as other 
nations of the region. With its completion, Cuba will be able to offer 
doctor?s consultations with images as well as educational 
videoconferences and other possibilities, all in real time.

?Therefore, we will all be gaining more political and security 
independence in telecommunications,? noted Reboredo.
Cable Submarino
========================================================

Una  autopista  entre Santiago y La Guaira

JUAN ANTONIO BORREGO

CARACAS.? Sobre el mapa del mar Caribe, especialistas venezolanos y 
cubanos han dibujado una ?autopista? de 1 550 kil?metros entre la zona 
de Camur?, cercana al puerto de La Guaira, en el estado de Vargas, y la 
playa Siboney, en las afueras de Santiago de Cuba, que seg?n afirman, 
contribuir? de manera perentoria a cambiar la historia de las 
comunicaciones internacionales de la mayor de las Antillas.

Foto: Calixto N. LLanes Como puede apreciarse, adem?s de su l?nea 
principal, la obra contar? con una v?a de restauraci?n entre Santiago de 
Cuba y Jamaica.

El proyecto, sin embargo, no pretende unir a los dos pa?ses por 
carretera, como pudiera sugerir el enunciado, sino conectarlos por el 
fondo del mar a trav?s de dos pares de fibras ?pticas, que a pesar de 
tener aproximadamente el grosor de un cabello pudieran multiplicar por 3 
000 la capacidad de que dispone Cuba hoy d?a para sus enlaces con el 
extranjero.

Para el ingeniero Wilfredo Morales, al frente de la Empresa de 
Telecomunicaciones Gran Caribe, asociaci?n mixta surgida con el 
prop?sito de dar vida a este sue?o, el empe?o es sumamente estrat?gico 
en tanto contribuye a fracturar el muro que durante medio siglo ha 
levantado EE.UU. contra nuestro pa?s, el cual lo obliga a depender de 
servicios satelitales para sus conexiones con el exterior ?m?s 
costosas y vulnerables?, realidad que al parecer olvid? el presidente 
George W. Bush cuando en su m?s reciente arenga anticubana, habl? del 
env?o de celulares a la ?nsula.

Foto: Calixto N. LLanesSeg?n Wilfredo Morales, el sistema pudiera 
comenzar a operar en el primer semestre del 2010.

Telecomunicaciones Gran Caribe, nacida a inicios del corriente a?o en 
virtud de un convenio de asociaci?n entre Telecom Venezuela y la cubana 
Empresa de Transporte de Se?ales de Telecomunicaciones (Transbit) avanza 
en los trabajos de proyectos para la obra y en el proceso de selecci?n 
de la entidad que asumir? la construcci?n del sistema.

De tal suerte y de acuerdo con el cronograma pactado ?estima Wilfredo?, 
la selecci?n del suministrador se ha previsto concluya en agosto pr?ximo 
y la colocaci?n del cable a finales del 2009 o principios del 2010, de 
manera tal que ya en el primer semestre de ese ?ltimo a?o el sistema 
pudiera iniciar operaciones.

IDEAL INTEGRADOR

La idea de conectar por v?a submarina a Cuba y Venezuela va m?s all? de 
la simple colocaci?n de un cable que surque las arenas de La Guaira, se 
zambulla en el Caribe, viaje por un costado del arco de Las Antillas y 
coquetee con la Fosa de Battle, en el sur del oriente cubano, a m?s de 5 
400 metros de profundidad, tal y como ya ha sido proyectado.

Foto: Calixto N. LLanesPara Carlos Orfila y Liliana Rivas, el proyecto 
garantiza independencia y m?xima seguridad a las telecomunicaciones de 
la Isla.

?Este es un trabajo muy complejo tanto por la especializaci?n y el nivel 
t?cnico que requiere, como por una serie de elementos de orden 
estrat?gico y pol?tico que confluyen en ?l, como el tema de las aguas 
territoriales, el bloqueo y la b?squeda de suministradores que cumplan?, 
ilustra Liliana Rivas, coordinadora por la parte venezolana y enamorada 
de la obra desde que hace m?s de un a?o asumi? la responsabilidad.

Es importante comprender ?explica ella? que no se trata de desarrollar 
un sistema independiente, la comunicaci?n que entre ambos buscamos no es 
solo entre Venezuela y Cuba, sino tambi?n con el mundo, y nosotros como 
empresa tenemos que asegurar una soluci?n para la cual trabajamos de 
manera conjunta en sesiones casi mensuales all? o ac?, imprimi?ndole 
todo el cari?o que lleva el prop?sito para que pueda cristalizar.

A ello habr?a que a?adir que si bien el objetivo primario del proyecto, 
hijo de la integraci?n propugnada por la Alternativa Bolivariana para 
las Am?ricas (ALBA), es dar conectividad segura a nuestros respectivos 
pa?ses ?abarata y aumenta la capacidad de transmisi?n de datos, voz y 
video?, los expertos consideran que no se descarta, en un segundo 
momento, la incorporaci?n al mismo de otros pa?ses de la regi?n como 
Nicaragua y Hait?, para lo cual ha sido dise?ada una unidad de 
bifurcaci?n en un punto intermedio que pudiera facilitar la pretendida 
expansi?n.

CABLES A LAS PUERTAS DE LA HABANA

Quien observe un gr?fico con la telara?a de cables submarinos que 
pululan por la regi?n del Caribe y no tenga razones del enfermizo 
bloqueo impuesto a Cuba por los Estados Unidos en el giro de las 
telecomunicaciones, dif?cilmente pueda comprender la necesidad de esta obra.

El ingeniero venezolano Carlos Orfila, asesor del Ministerio de las 
Telecomunicaciones y la Inform?tica para el proyecto, asegura por 
ejemplo que uno de estos cables (Canc?n-Miami) pasa a no m?s de 32 
kil?metros del malec?n habanero.

?Si no existiera el bloqueo, conectar a Cuba costar?a unos 500 000 
d?lares, pero las compa??as no pueden hacerlo porque nunca reciben el 
permiso del Departamento de Estado de EE.UU. por esta circunstancia, o 
este pretende imponer condiciones inaceptables para Cuba ?opina el 
experto?, ha habido varios intentos, los conozco porque he trabajado 
durante a?os en eso, pero los gringos siempre han estado detr?s para que 
ustedes no puedan conectarse.?

Orfila tiene a mano otro ejemplo, casi de connotaci?n novelesca, que 
retrata por s? mismo la magnitud del asedio norteamericano contra Cuba: 
el trazado inicial del cable entre la Guaira y Santiago, es casi todo 
por aguas internacionales, atendiendo no solo a aspectos t?cnicos y de 
costo de la inversi?n, sino adem?s a los de las fronteras nacionales y 
zonas econ?micas sobre los cuales los Estados Unidos pretenden imponer 
sus condiciones, lo cual ha significado el alargamiento del trazado del 
cable en alrededor de 100 kil?metros.

A PRUEBA DE TIBURONES

Con una capacidad total de 640 Gigabytes ?320 por cada par de fibras? y 
tecnolog?a de punta a nivel mundial, el cable Cuba-Venezuela garantizar? 
independencia a las telecomunicaciones de nuestros pa?ses, algo 
imposible cuando estas se encuentran a merced de servicios satelitales, 
y seg?n refiere el ingeniero Orfila, tambi?n ofrecer? seguridad ?a 
prueba de tiburones?.

Como estas profundidades no son comunes en tales proyectos ?explica el 
experto? se ha previsto usar la llamada ?t?cnica de arco?, que provee al 
sistema de un revestimiento especial con cuerdas de acero muy finas y de 
configuraci?n encorvada, el cual asegura mayor resistencia en el fondo 
del mar, donde la presi?n pudiera lastimar el cable que, contrario a lo 
que suele pensarse, en la mayor parte de su trayecto no supera el grosor 
del dedo pulgar.

La obra ha sido concebida con un par de fibras expresas entre Cuba y 
Venezuela y un segundo par dotado por una unidad de derivaci?n que 
permitir? conectar a otros pa?ses. Adicionalmente se ha previsto que el 
sistema posea restauraci?n, ya que contempla dos segmentos: uno entre 
Cuba y Venezuela y otro entre Cuba y Jamaica.

Entre sus fortalezas el sistema cuenta, asimismo, con la experiencia 
venezolana en materia de telecomunicaciones, con reconocido desarrollo 
en la telefon?a celular, la fibra ?ptica y su inminente debut en 
administraci?n de sat?lites, y con el Backbone (columna vertebral) 
desarrollado por Cuba para la expansi?n de la fibra a lo largo de buena 
parte de su territorio nacional.

A todo ello el ingeniero Orfila a?ade un elemento que, no por 
pintoresco, deja de ser sumamente comprometedor para la inversi?n: los 
especialistas que se ocupan en el sistema han determinado que varios 
tramos de la l?nea de 1 550 kil?metros entre Siboney y Camur? precisan 
de una cubierta especial que los proteja ante posibles arremetidas de 
los tiburones, que seg?n experiencias anteriores, atra?dos por los 
campos electromagn?ticos que genera el paso de la corriente por el 
cable, han provocado no pocos dolores de cabeza en otras latitudes.

Tambi?n es necesario proteger los cables submarinos de la actividades 
mar?timas en zonas cercanas a las costas como el anclaje de buques y 
labores pesqueras.
Cable para la integraci?n

Alberto N??ez alberto.enb at granma.cip.cu

La conexi?n por medio de dos pares de fibras ?pticas significa un paso 
trascendental en la integraci?n de nuestros pueblos del ?rea del Caribe, 
pues facilita el intercambio de conocimientos en materia 
cient?fico-t?cnica, econ?mica y de diversa ?ndole, y con ello enfrenta 
la constante intromisi?n cultural de potencias que como Estados Unidos 
pretenden imponer su hegemon?a.

Foto: Arnaldo SantosWaldo Reboredo Arroyo.

As? sostiene el ingeniero en Telecomunicaciones Waldo Reboredo Arroyo, 
vicepresidente de Telecomunicaciones Gran Caribe S.A., al valorar el 
proyecto de comunicaci?n v?a submarina entre Camur?, zona cercana al 
puerto de La Guaira, Venezuela, y la playa Siboney, en Santiago de Cuba.

El especialista apunta que esta es la primera vez que pa?ses de 
Latinoam?rica asumen la direcci?n y operaci?n de una empresa de tal 
envergadura, sin la participaci?n de las transnacionales que 
habitualmente controlan este sistema.

Porque la colaboraci?n conjunta entre profesionales cubanos y 
venezolanos no se limita solo a la ejecuci?n del proyecto, sino que 
incluye tambi?n la administraci?n de la Empresa una vez en funcionamiento.

Reboredo explica que el empe?o se ha asumido con mucho rigor desde el 
primer momento por parte de ingenieros, economistas y abogados de Cuba y 
Venezuela, en estrecha uni?n de suministradores internacionales 
especializados en este tipo de comunicaci?n.

La obra tendr? utilidad tanto para Cuba y Venezuela como para las 
naciones de la regi?n. Nuestro pa?s ofrecer? la posibilidad de 
transmitir consultas m?dicas con im?genes y teleconferencias a distancia 
de educaci?n y otros temas. Tambi?n podr? recibir materiales variados; 
todo ello en tiempo real.

As? todos estaremos ganando m?s independencia pol?tica y seguridad en 
las telecomunicaciones, concluye Reboredo


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From ballistanc at yahoo.com  Tue Jun 10 21:48:16 2008
From: ballistanc at yahoo.com (juan De La Cruz)
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2008 20:48:16 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Revolutionary communications
In-Reply-To: <484EB6D9.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
Message-ID: <397301.78628.qm@web35508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

...well, i didn't have the&nbsp;opportunity and the time to read all the bull shit about cuba and its bourgeois project in Latin America...that is to say the same project of the capitalist class worldwide....Don't you see the historical role played by the "socialist state" in Cuba since 1959@&nbsp; Do you still think, as some "communist structure" do, that socialism is possible in one country@&nbsp; That's the traditional stalinist conception which we need to go above and beyond in order to build a new society.&nbsp; keep up the good work!!!

--- On Tue, 6/10/08, Charles Brown &lt;charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us&gt; wrote:

From: Charles Brown &lt;charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us&gt;
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Revolutionary communications
To: marxism-thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu
Date: Tuesday, June 10, 2008, 5:16 PM

GRANMA June 9, 2008

Cuban-Venezuelan Revolutionize Communications

JUAN ANTONIO BORREGO

CARACAS.? Venezuelan and Cuban specialists have finished mapping out a 
1,550 kilometer highway of underwater fiber-optics cable linking the two 
countries that will forever change the history of international 
communications in Cuba.

BESIDES THE MAIN LINE THERE WILL BE A RESTORATION LINE BETWEEN SANTIAGO 
DE CUBA AND JAMAICA.

Two pairs of fiber-optics cables will run from the Venezuelan state of 
Vargas to the province of Santiago de Cuba, potentially increasing the 
island?s international communications capacity by 3,000 times.

Wilfredo Morales, who heads the Gran Caribe Telecommunications Co. ?a 
joint venture created to manage the project?, said the cable will break 
down the wall constructed by the US blockade that forces the island to 
use more expensive and vulnerable satellite services for connections 
abroad. This little detail seems to have been forgotten by US President 
Bush when he pronounced his latest diatribe against Cuba and offered to 
send cell phones to the island.

WILFREDO MORALES SAID THE SYSTEM COULD BE OPERATING IN THE FIRST HALF OF 
2010.

Gran Caribe Telecommunications was created in early 2008 based on an 
agreement between Telecom Venezuela and the Cuban Telecommunication 
Signals Transport Co. (Transbit). Morales said it is currently designing 
the project and in the process of selecting the firm that will build the 
system. If the schedule is met, Morales said the selection of the 
supplier will conclude in August and the laying of the cables by the end 
of 2009 or early 2010. If things go according to plans, the system could 
be up and running in the first half of 2010.

TECHNICAL AND STRATEGIC CHALLENGES

The idea to connect Cuba and Venezuela by sea goes far beyond laying 
more than 1,500 kilometers of cable. In addition to the technical 
challenges of placing the cable that will lie in areas as deep as 5,400 
meters, the top coordinator for Venezuela, Lilian Rivas, spoke about the 
political elements involved: ?the issue of territorial waters, the 
blockade and the search for reliable suppliers.?

CARLOS ORFILA AND LILIANA RIVAS SAID THE PROJECT WILL GUARANTEE 
INDEPENDENCE AND MAXIMUM SECURITY FOR CUBA?S TELECOMMUNICATIONS.

Rivas emphasized that the project does not seek to develop an 
independent system. ?The communication we are seeking is not just 
between Venezuela and Cuba, but also with the world.? She said while the 
primary objective is to provide secure connectivity to both countries 
with lower costs and increased transmission capacity, there is a 
possible second phase, incorporating other countries in the region such 
as Nicaragua and Haiti. With that possibility in mind a junction unit is 
being designed to facilitate future expansion of the cable.

FIBER OPTIC CABLES SURROUND CUBA

If you look at the map of undersea cables that exist in the Caribbean, 
it would be difficult to understand the need for this project if it 
weren?t for the blockade imposed by the United States on Cuba.

Carlos Orfila, an engineer working as a project consultant to the 
Venezuelan Ministry of Telecommunications, said that one example is the 
Cancun-Miami cable that passes a mere 32 kilometers from the Havana seawall.

?If it weren?t for the blockade Cuba could connect for a cost of US 
$500,000. The companies can?t do it because they don?t have permission 
from the US Department of State and/or attempts by the State Department 
to impose unacceptable conditions on Cuba,? said Orfila. ?There have 
been several attempts, and I know because I was working for years on 
this, but the US government has always made connecting impossible for 
you Cubans.?

Another example given by Ofila illustrates the magnitude of the US siege 
against Cuba. The cable route between La Guaira and Santiago is being 
drawn almost entirely in international waters, due to both technical and 
cost aspects but also because of national borders and economic zones 
where the US imposes its conditions. As such, the cable has to be 
extended by 100 kilometers.

SHARK PROOF

With a total capacity of 640 Gigabytes, 320 for each pair of fibers, and 
state-of-the-art technology, the Cuban-Venezuelan cable will guarantee 
communications independence for both countries, something that is 
impossible with satellite communications.

Orfila explained that given the extreme depths of this project they are 
planning to use an ?arc technique;? employing a fine steel-rope covering 
in a curved shape to assure greater resistance on the sea bottom where 
extreme pressure could damage the cable.

A special covering will also be used in some parts to protect the cable, 
no thicker than a thumb in most parts, against attacks from sharks, 
which are attracted by the electromagnetic fields generated by the 
cables. Orfila also said it would be necessary to protect the undersea 
cables from maritime activities in coastal areas, such as anchors and 
fishing.

The project will have one pair of cables running directly between Cuba 
and Venezuela and a second pair that will allow connecting to other 
countries. The system will have two segments, one between Cuba and 
Venezuela and the other between Cuba and Jamaica, thus providing a point 
for repairs.

Orfila said the project will take advantage of Venezuelan 
telecommunications experience, especially in cellular telephone 
technology, fiber optics and its entering into satellite administration; 
and will employ Cuba?s Backbone system to extend the fiber optics 
network to most of the country.

Cable for Integration

ALBERTO NU?EZ alberto.enb at granma.cip.cu

Connecting Venezuela and Cuba by way of two pairs of fiber optic cables 
will be a significant advance in the integration of the Caribbean 
peoples, facilitating exchange in science and technology, in economics 
and several others areas, said Waldo Reboredo Arroyo, vice president of 
Gran Caribe Telecommunications S.A. It will also serve to confront the 
constant meddling of powers like the United States that want to impose 
their dominance, he added.

WALDO REBOREDO ARROYO

Reboredo spoke on the advantages of the undersea cable project between 
La Guaira, Venezuela and Siboney beach in Santiago de Cuba.

The executive said this is the first time that Latin American countries 
take on the administration and operations of a firm of this scope, 
without the participation of the transnationals that usually control 
such systems.

The joint collaboration between Cuban and Venezuelan professionals is 
not only limited to the carrying out of the project but also to its 
subsequent administration once operating.

Reboredo explained that from the very beginning the Cuban and Venezuelan 
engineers, economists, and attorneys took on this effort with great 
rigor and in close cooperation with international suppliers of this type 
of communications.

The project will be of use to Cuba and Venezuela as well as other 
nations of the region. With its completion, Cuba will be able to offer 
doctor?s consultations with images as well as educational 
videoconferences and other possibilities, all in real time.

?Therefore, we will all be gaining more political and security 
independence in telecommunications,? noted Reboredo.
Cable Submarino
========================================================

Una  autopista  entre Santiago y La Guaira

JUAN ANTONIO BORREGO

CARACAS.? Sobre el mapa del mar Caribe, especialistas venezolanos y 
cubanos han dibujado una ?autopista? de 1 550 kil?metros entre la zona 
de Camur?, cercana al puerto de La Guaira, en el estado de Vargas, y la 
playa Siboney, en las afueras de Santiago de Cuba, que seg?n afirman, 
contribuir? de manera perentoria a cambiar la historia de las 
comunicaciones internacionales de la mayor de las Antillas.

Foto: Calixto N. LLanes Como puede apreciarse, adem?s de su l?nea 
principal, la obra contar? con una v?a de restauraci?n entre Santiago de 
Cuba y Jamaica.

El proyecto, sin embargo, no pretende unir a los dos pa?ses por 
carretera, como pudiera sugerir el enunciado, sino conectarlos por el 
fondo del mar a trav?s de dos pares de fibras ?pticas, que a pesar de 
tener aproximadamente el grosor de un cabello pudieran multiplicar por 3 
000 la capacidad de que dispone Cuba hoy d?a para sus enlaces con el 
extranjero.

Para el ingeniero Wilfredo Morales, al frente de la Empresa de 
Telecomunicaciones Gran Caribe, asociaci?n mixta surgida con el 
prop?sito de dar vida a este sue?o, el empe?o es sumamente estrat?gico 
en tanto contribuye a fracturar el muro que durante medio siglo ha 
levantado EE.UU. contra nuestro pa?s, el cual lo obliga a depender de 
servicios satelitales para sus conexiones con el exterior ?m?s 
costosas y vulnerables?, realidad que al parecer olvid? el presidente 
George W. Bush cuando en su m?s reciente arenga anticubana, habl? del 
env?o de celulares a la ?nsula.

Foto: Calixto N. LLanesSeg?n Wilfredo Morales, el sistema pudiera 
comenzar a operar en el primer semestre del 2010.

Telecomunicaciones Gran Caribe, nacida a inicios del corriente a?o en 
virtud de un convenio de asociaci?n entre Telecom Venezuela y la cubana 
Empresa de Transporte de Se?ales de Telecomunicaciones (Transbit) avanza 
en los trabajos de proyectos para la obra y en el proceso de selecci?n 
de la entidad que asumir? la construcci?n del sistema.

De tal suerte y de acuerdo con el cronograma pactado ?estima Wilfredo?, 
la selecci?n del suministrador se ha previsto concluya en agosto pr?ximo 
y la colocaci?n del cable a finales del 2009 o principios del 2010, de 
manera tal que ya en el primer semestre de ese ?ltimo a?o el sistema 
pudiera iniciar operaciones.

IDEAL INTEGRADOR

La idea de conectar por v?a submarina a Cuba y Venezuela va m?s all? de 
la simple colocaci?n de un cable que surque las arenas de La Guaira, se 
zambulla en el Caribe, viaje por un costado del arco de Las Antillas y 
coquetee con la Fosa de Battle, en el sur del oriente cubano, a m?s de 5 
400 metros de profundidad, tal y como ya ha sido proyectado.

Foto: Calixto N. LLanesPara Carlos Orfila y Liliana Rivas, el proyecto 
garantiza independencia y m?xima seguridad a las telecomunicaciones de 
la Isla.

?Este es un trabajo muy complejo tanto por la especializaci?n y el nivel 
t?cnico que requiere, como por una serie de elementos de orden 
estrat?gico y pol?tico que confluyen en ?l, como el tema de las aguas 
territoriales, el bloqueo y la b?squeda de suministradores que cumplan?, 
ilustra Liliana Rivas, coordinadora por la parte venezolana y enamorada 
de la obra desde que hace m?s de un a?o asumi? la responsabilidad.

Es importante comprender ?explica ella? que no se trata de desarrollar 
un sistema independiente, la comunicaci?n que entre ambos buscamos no es 
solo entre Venezuela y Cuba, sino tambi?n con el mundo, y nosotros como 
empresa tenemos que asegurar una soluci?n para la cual trabajamos de 
manera conjunta en sesiones casi mensuales all? o ac?, imprimi?ndole 
todo el cari?o que lleva el prop?sito para que pueda cristalizar.

A ello habr?a que a?adir que si bien el objetivo primario del proyecto, 
hijo de la integraci?n propugnada por la Alternativa Bolivariana para 
las Am?ricas (ALBA), es dar conectividad segura a nuestros respectivos 
pa?ses ?abarata y aumenta la capacidad de transmisi?n de datos, voz y 
video?, los expertos consideran que no se descarta, en un segundo 
momento, la incorporaci?n al mismo de otros pa?ses de la regi?n como 
Nicaragua y Hait?, para lo cual ha sido dise?ada una unidad de 
bifurcaci?n en un punto intermedio que pudiera facilitar la pretendida 
expansi?n.

CABLES A LAS PUERTAS DE LA HABANA

Quien observe un gr?fico con la telara?a de cables submarinos que 
pululan por la regi?n del Caribe y no tenga razones del enfermizo 
bloqueo impuesto a Cuba por los Estados Unidos en el giro de las 
telecomunicaciones, dif?cilmente pueda comprender la necesidad de esta obra.

El ingeniero venezolano Carlos Orfila, asesor del Ministerio de las 
Telecomunicaciones y la Inform?tica para el proyecto, asegura por 
ejemplo que uno de estos cables (Canc?n-Miami) pasa a no m?s de 32 
kil?metros del malec?n habanero.

?Si no existiera el bloqueo, conectar a Cuba costar?a unos 500 000 
d?lares, pero las compa??as no pueden hacerlo porque nunca reciben el 
permiso del Departamento de Estado de EE.UU. por esta circunstancia, o 
este pretende imponer condiciones inaceptables para Cuba ?opina el 
experto?, ha habido varios intentos, los conozco porque he trabajado 
durante a?os en eso, pero los gringos siempre han estado detr?s para que 
ustedes no puedan conectarse.?

Orfila tiene a mano otro ejemplo, casi de connotaci?n novelesca, que 
retrata por s? mismo la magnitud del asedio norteamericano contra Cuba: 
el trazado inicial del cable entre la Guaira y Santiago, es casi todo 
por aguas internacionales, atendiendo no solo a aspectos t?cnicos y de 
costo de la inversi?n, sino adem?s a los de las fronteras nacionales y 
zonas econ?micas sobre los cuales los Estados Unidos pretenden imponer 
sus condiciones, lo cual ha significado el alargamiento del trazado del 
cable en alrededor de 100 kil?metros.

A PRUEBA DE TIBURONES

Con una capacidad total de 640 Gigabytes ?320 por cada par de fibras? y 
tecnolog?a de punta a nivel mundial, el cable Cuba-Venezuela garantizar? 
independencia a las telecomunicaciones de nuestros pa?ses, algo 
imposible cuando estas se encuentran a merced de servicios satelitales, 
y seg?n refiere el ingeniero Orfila, tambi?n ofrecer? seguridad ?a 
prueba de tiburones?.

Como estas profundidades no son comunes en tales proyectos ?explica el 
experto? se ha previsto usar la llamada ?t?cnica de arco?, que provee al 
sistema de un revestimiento especial con cuerdas de acero muy finas y de 
configuraci?n encorvada, el cual asegura mayor resistencia en el fondo 
del mar, donde la presi?n pudiera lastimar el cable que, contrario a lo 
que suele pensarse, en la mayor parte de su trayecto no supera el grosor 
del dedo pulgar.

La obra ha sido concebida con un par de fibras expresas entre Cuba y 
Venezuela y un segundo par dotado por una unidad de derivaci?n que 
permitir? conectar a otros pa?ses. Adicionalmente se ha previsto que el 
sistema posea restauraci?n, ya que contempla dos segmentos: uno entre 
Cuba y Venezuela y otro entre Cuba y Jamaica.

Entre sus fortalezas el sistema cuenta, asimismo, con la experiencia 
venezolana en materia de telecomunicaciones, con reconocido desarrollo 
en la telefon?a celular, la fibra ?ptica y su inminente debut en 
administraci?n de sat?lites, y con el Backbone (columna vertebral) 
desarrollado por Cuba para la expansi?n de la fibra a lo largo de buena 
parte de su territorio nacional.

A todo ello el ingeniero Orfila a?ade un elemento que, no por 
pintoresco, deja de ser sumamente comprometedor para la inversi?n: los 
especialistas que se ocupan en el sistema han determinado que varios 
tramos de la l?nea de 1 550 kil?metros entre Siboney y Camur? precisan 
de una cubierta especial que los proteja ante posibles arremetidas de 
los tiburones, que seg?n experiencias anteriores, atra?dos por los 
campos electromagn?ticos que genera el paso de la corriente por el 
cable, han provocado no pocos dolores de cabeza en otras latitudes.

Tambi?n es necesario proteger los cables submarinos de la actividades 
mar?timas en zonas cercanas a las costas como el anclaje de buques y 
labores pesqueras.
Cable para la integraci?n

Alberto N??ez alberto.enb at granma.cip.cu

La conexi?n por medio de dos pares de fibras ?pticas significa un paso 
trascendental en la integraci?n de nuestros pueblos del ?rea del Caribe, 
pues facilita el intercambio de conocimientos en materia 
cient?fico-t?cnica, econ?mica y de diversa ?ndole, y con ello enfrenta 
la constante intromisi?n cultural de potencias que como Estados Unidos 
pretenden imponer su hegemon?a.

Foto: Arnaldo SantosWaldo Reboredo Arroyo.

As? sostiene el ingeniero en Telecomunicaciones Waldo Reboredo Arroyo, 
vicepresidente de Telecomunicaciones Gran Caribe S.A., al valorar el 
proyecto de comunicaci?n v?a submarina entre Camur?, zona cercana al 
puerto de La Guaira, Venezuela, y la playa Siboney, en Santiago de Cuba.

El especialista apunta que esta es la primera vez que pa?ses de 
Latinoam?rica asumen la direcci?n y operaci?n de una empresa de tal 
envergadura, sin la participaci?n de las transnacionales que 
habitualmente controlan este sistema.

Porque la colaboraci?n conjunta entre profesionales cubanos y 
venezolanos no se limita solo a la ejecuci?n del proyecto, sino que 
incluye tambi?n la administraci?n de la Empresa una vez en funcionamiento.

Reboredo explica que el empe?o se ha asumido con mucho rigor desde el 
primer momento por parte de ingenieros, economistas y abogados de Cuba y 
Venezuela, en estrecha uni?n de suministradores internacionales 
especializados en este tipo de comunicaci?n.

La obra tendr? utilidad tanto para Cuba y Venezuela como para las 
naciones de la regi?n. Nuestro pa?s ofrecer? la posibilidad de 
transmitir consultas m?dicas con im?genes y teleconferencias a distancia 
de educaci?n y otros temas. Tambi?n podr? recibir materiales variados; 
todo ello en tiempo real.

As? todos estaremos ganando m?s independencia pol?tica y seguridad en 
las telecomunicaciones, concluye Reboredo


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc.
www.surfcontrol.com

_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis


      

From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Wed Jun 11 12:45:37 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 14:45:37 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Revolutionary communications
Message-ID: <484FE512.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>


juan De La Cruz 

...well, i didn't have the&nbsp;opportunity and the time to read all
the bull shit about cuba and its bourgeois project in Latin
America...that is to say the same project of the capitalist class
worldwide....Don't you see the historical role played by the "socialist
state" in Cuba since 1959@&nbsp; Do you still think, as some "communist
structure" do, that socialism is possible in one country@&nbsp; That's
the traditional stalinist conception which we need to go above and
beyond in order to build a new society.&nbsp; keep up the good work!!!

^^^^

However, aren't you saying that nobody has built socialism in any
country ?




This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Wed Jun 11 15:05:07 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2008 17:05:07 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Jeff Nall's Perpetual Revolt
Message-ID: <485005C4.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Condorcet: Male Prophet of Feminism, by Jeff Nall

I thought the following was an interesting thought (from the end of the section on Condorcet's below):

"Today, this remains true. While women and men receive much of the same schooling, their cultural education, via media and marketing, is vastly different. "

^^
CB: I trying to think how media and market "education" is different .

^^^^

Condorcet?s Legacy Among the Philosophes 
and the Value of His Feminism for Today?s Man

Key Enlightenment minds are often juxtaposed with their iconic foes, religious conservatives. When discussing the subject of women?s rights, however, this comparison creates a false impression that Enlightenment male thinkers held ideas very much opposed to a dogmatic institution such as the Catholic Church. Ironically, and damaging to their legacy of prejudice-free rationalism, nearly all of the philosophes, many of which were ?freethinking? atheists, viewed woman?s intellectual nature and societal purpose through a prejudice-tainted glass, not unlike the most conservative establishments of their time. Indeed, when it came to the perception of women, the philosophes had less in common with a virulently secular feminist such as Condorcet, than they did with modern conservative Christians who believe women should be treated more fairly but still cling to gender stereotypes. 

Voltaire doubted that women were capable of invention. Montesquieu did not support woman?s enfranchisement, applauded rewarding warriors with the women of their choice; and failed to even consider woman?s right to govern her person when he asserted that abortion should be utilized as a means to control population. Diderot, like so many of his contemporaries, pitied women but did not respect them, in general. The only women he respected intellectually were those who have what he viewed as the fewest feminine characteristics. After all, intelligence was to Diderot a male characteristic. As Morley puts it, ?Diderot had deep pity for women. Their physical weaknesses moved him to compassion. To these are added the burden of their maternal function, and the burden of unequal laws.? 1 Despite Diderot?s iconoclastic atheism, his relationship with his family was dictated by a dogmatic devotion to the prevailing mores of the day: he chooses his daughter?s husband and instructed her to obey him as she had obeyed her father; he saw woman as fundamentally weaker and less intellectually capable than men; and he believed the home was woman?s sphere, leaving only men to operate society?s political apparatus. Ironically, even the great foe of organized Christianity, Thomas Paine perceived woman in much the same way the Church does. While supporting efforts by society to save her from her natural inequality, Paine identified woman with her role as a procreator and steward of the family. Still more, the avowed atheist, Holbach, too, believed that women were by nature intellectually weaker than men, not to mention more prone to sickness; and he agreed with the Church that woman?s most fundamental virtue is chastity. In fact, Diderot and Montesquieu held similar views about woman?s chastity. The anti-clericism of the philosophes stopped when it came to replacing natural law ideas about male-female relationships with scientific principles. 

Not even the supposed grandmother of feminism, Mary Wollstonecraft, makes as strong and concerted a case for feminism as Condorcet. Wollstonecraft tethers her contention that women deserve greater liberty to the point that in order to receive such liberties women must do their duties as not only good citizens but also good wives, mothers, and educators. Women, writes Wollstonecraft, will be rendered more useful and virtuous if they receive the protection of civil laws. The significance of the difference between these two thinkers is often lost on scholars, or at very least lost on their work: Brookes casually notes that Condorcet?s work was more potent than Wollstonecraft?s in realizing nothing short of structuring society could bequeath equality to women. Schapiro rightly accords Condorcet the title of the only feminist among the philosophes, but, again, places Wollstonecraft?s feminism in the same arena as he places Condorcet?s feminism. He writes that Condorcet?s surprisingly modern feminism was ?the forerunner of Mary Wollstonecraft and John Stuart Mill.? 2 Again, Wollstonecraft?s works are nowhere nearly as daring and pioneering as Condorcet?s revolutionary calls for expanding equality. 

While the philosophes mourned the unfortunate place in which women resided in society, most agreed, nonetheless, that women were naturally unequal to men. Those who rejected such a claim did little to nothing to actively and publicly support woman?s enfranchisement.  At best, some sought to uplift women, but none, except Condorcet, made a concerted effort to secure her participation in the political process. Meanwhile Condorcet rejected the obsession and unproven claim that women and men were fundamentally different. Instead he continuously pointed to education and socialization as having created these gender norms which were then, as they are now, perceived as universal truths. Condorcet not only rebuked the sentinels of conservativism, both the clergy and political conservatives, he also rebuked philosophers for seeking to secure the rights of man without so much as pondering whether or not they should seek the same for women, too. A signature of his work, Condorcet spent little to no time exalting the past. Instead, he bemoaned that a true democratic society had never yet existed, since all previous examples excluded the participation of women. Moreover, Condorcet?s ideas were not only high-minded ideals exchanged in the marketplace of philosophizing, he lived with a woman whom he treated as a perfect equal, even collaborating with, and urged his daughter to lead a life of self-sufficiency, without reliance on anyone, including a man.

For all of their exhortations of reason, empiricism, and free-thinking, nearly all elite male thinkers of the Enlightenment failed to escape the Promethean bondage which left them chained to the that irrational boulder of sexism, a monument to hypocrisy as well as, ironically, one of the greatest prejudices of the time. Condorcet?s ability to recognize any and all prejudices made him the Hercules among the philosophes who frees the Enlightenment from its imprisonment by hypocrisy, slaughtering the prejudice that stood pecking at the very cornerstone of the Age of Reason?s principles. In this way he became not only the first true male-feminist of his time, but also the first philosophe to make good on the principle to fall every unsubstantiated prejudice. For men and women in the twenty-first century, Condorcet is a monument to the possibilities of life freed of the bondage of stereotypes and prejudices. He reminds us that feminism does not belong to any one gender any more than human rights belong to any one gender; and he is a beckon, calling upon all human beings to embrace the totality of the human experience and to combat injustice and prejudice with the twin swords of reason inspired truth, and empathy driven passion.

In Condorcet we find the gray between the typological analyses of the eighteenth century. When all is said, Condorcet stood in the center of a bridge linking the age of passion and the age of reason, a bridge which also towered over apathetic concepts of gender which left men and women strained on separate islands, often to their own detriment. On this bridge, Condorcet realized a feminism none of his male counterparts had recognized; there he permitted himself to experience and embrace a full-range of human qualities, those associated with men and those associated with women, including rationalism and passion. In this way Condorcet is for men the key to unlocking the twin steeds of both reason, and passion and sensitivity. He stands out as irrefutable proof that a man can love as ardently as he can think rationally; that a man can feel and care as much as any woman, if only he allows himself to be freed of gender stereotypes, of the cultural pressures and prejudice that plague both sexes. Condorcet reminds us time and time again, education, not sex, is the fundamental difference between men and women. Today, this remains true. While women and men receive much of the same schooling, their cultural education, via media and marketing, is vastly different. 


1 Morley, Diderot and the Encyclopedists, 76. 
2 Schapiro, Rise of Liberalism, 188-89.





This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Thu Jun 12 11:45:15 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2008 13:45:15 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Feuerbach-International
Message-ID: <4851286B020000BF0000C204@gwia.ci.detroit.mi.us>

http://www.feuerbach-international.com/


Ludwig Feuerbach (1804 - 1872), maybe the most famous atheist of the
19th century, who never denied God in the sense of a construct of
human
imagination but as the creator, understood his criticism of religion
as
continuation of the enlightenment, which was disrupted in Germany
during
the restoration. 

Im Contrary to the French philosophy of enlightenment and the German
idealism Feuerbach unmasks religious, dependant consciousness and
theological dogmatism as instruments of established power, which can
keep up by permanent incapacitation of those, who fight for their
physical existence in the civil concurrence society. Incapacitated
consciousness is oppressed consciousness and is not dragged on
automatically with the world spirit or the process of enlightenment as
Hegel claims. So it should be set free from guardians and integrated
in
the political discourse of power as Marx demands. Feuerbach's
criticism
has not lost its actuality in times of religious fundamentalism and
calls for tolerance towards religions, cultures and different
perspectives of reflection. This tolerance must be learned in dialogue
and discourse. 

That's why the international society of Feuerbach researchers invites
this discourse and has established this forum of interested scientific
and exchange of philosophical thoughts serving the " matter of
mankind".


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Thu Jun 12 12:47:08 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2008 13:47:08 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Feuerbach-International
In-Reply-To: <4851286B020000BF0000C204@gwia.ci.detroit.mi.us>
References: <4851286B020000BF0000C204@gwia.ci.detroit.mi.us>
Message-ID: <E1K6qyE-0001vX-3k@elasmtp-dupuy.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

For a comprehensive guide to Feuerbach in English, see my:

<http://www.autodidactproject.org/bib/feuerbib.html>Ludwig Feuerbach: 
A Bibliography

Coincidentally, yesterday I received my copy of The Essence of 
Religion, completing my collection of Feuerbach translations in 
English. You can buy this in hard copy from Prometheus Books, or get 
the original edition on CD with a large collection of other 
freethought classics from the Bank of Wisdom.

At 12:45 PM 6/12/2008, Charles Brown wrote:
>http://www.feuerbach-international.com/

From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Thu Jun 12 13:52:34 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2008 15:52:34 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Transitional program
Message-ID: <48514642.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

 

Cuba to abandon salary equality 
Cuba is to abolish its system of equal pay for all and allow workers and  
managers to earn performance bonuses, a senior official has announced.  
Vice-Minister for Labour Carlos Mateu said the current system - in place  
since the communist revolution in 1959 - was no longer "convenient".  
He said wage differentiation should improve production and services.  
President Raul Castro has introduced a series of reforms since succeeding his 
 ailing brother Fidel in February.  
 
Writing in the communist party newspaper Granma Mr Mateu said workers would  
receive a minimum 5% bonus for meeting targets but with no ceiling on 
salaries.  
Managers could earn a 30% bonus if the team working under them increased  
production, he said.  
The minister pointed out that the current wage system sapped employees'  
incentives to excel since everyone earned the same regardless of performance.  
"It's harmful to give a worker less than he deserves, it's also harmful to  
give him what he doesn't deserve," the newspaper article said.  
Challenging Marxist orthodoxy  

^^^^
CB: The classical Marxist principle as described in the Critique of the Gotha Programme during the transitional phase , which Cuba is sort of in, is to  each according to work. So, this is moving to the classical Marxist position.

^^^^^^^

But the impact in terms of purchasing power will be limited, the BBC's  
Michael Voss in Havana says. 
 
The average wage in Cuba for everyone - from doctors to farm labourers - is  
about $20 (?10) a month.  
Even before the recent sharp rise in oil and food prices Cuba was spending  
billions of dollars on imports, and that bill is likely to rise sharply, our  
correspondent says.  
So far most of the reforms announced since Raul Castro took over the  
presidency have involved lifting restrictions such as the bans on mobile phones  and 
computers.  
The latest change is a more fundamental challenge to Marxist economic  
orthodoxy, our correspondent adds.  
Are you in Cuba? Will wage differentiation improve services and  production? 
How will this affect every day life for Cubans? You can send us your  views 
and experiences using the form below: 



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Thu Jun 12 14:31:14 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2008 16:31:14 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] The Feuerbach Internet Archive
Message-ID: <48514F52.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/index.htm 

The Feuerbach Internet Archive


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Fri Jun 13 14:33:25 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2008 16:33:25 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Marx on Feuerbach
Message-ID: <4852A157.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/hegel.htm

Feuerbach is the only one who has a serious, critical attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine discoveries in this field. He is in fact the true conqueror of the old philosophy. The extent of his achievement, and the unpretentious simplicity with which he, Feuerbach, gives it to the world, stand in striking contrast to the opposite attitude (of the others).

Feuerbach?s great achievement is:

(1) The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned;

(2) The establishment of true materialism and of real science, by making the social relationship of ?man to man? the basic principle of the theory; 

(3) His opposing of the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, teh self-supporting positive, positively based on itself. 

Feuerbach explains the Hegelian dialectic (and thereby justifies starting out from the positive facts which we know by the senses) as follows:

Hegel sets out from the estrangement of substance (in logic, from the infinite, abstractly universal) ? from the absolute and fixed abstraction; which means, put in a popular way, that he sets out from religion and theology.

Secondly, he annuls the infinite, and posits the actual, sensuous, real, finite, particular (philosophy, annulment of religion and theology).

Thirdly, he again annuls the positive and restores the abstraction, the infinite ? restoration of religion and theology. 

Feuerbach thus conceives the negation of the negation only as a contradiction of philosophy with itself ? as the philosophy which affirms theology (the transcendent, etc.) after having denied it, and which it therefore affirms in opposition to itself.

The positive position or self-affirmation and self-confirmation contained in the negation of the negation is taken to be a position which is not yet sure of itself, which is therefore burdened with its opposite, which is doubtful of itself and therefore in need of proof, and which, therefore, is not a position demonstrating itself by its existence ? not an acknowledged ||XIII| position; hence it is directly and immediately confronted by the position of sense-certainty based on itself. [Feuerbach also defines the negation of the negation, the definite concept, as thinking surpassing itself in thinking and as thinking wanting to be directly awareness, nature, reality. ? Note by Marx [44]]

But because Hegel has conceived the negation of the negation, from the point of view of the positive relation inherent in it, as the true and only positive, and from the point of view of the negative relation inherent in it as the only true act and spontaneous activity of all being, he has only found the abstract, logical, speculative expression for the movement of history, which is not yet the real history of man as a given subject, but only the act of creation, the history of the origin of man.

We shall explain both the abstract form of this process and the difference between this process as it is in Hegel in contrast to modern criticism, in contrast to the same process in Feuerbach?s Wesen des Christenthums, or rather the critical form of this in Hegel still uncritical process. 





This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Fri Jun 13 15:04:43 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2008 17:04:43 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Marx today
Message-ID: <4852A8AE.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>





--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

>Either as fodder or foil, hopefully a bit of both, I think you would 
>find the opening statements of Machiavelli and Marx in a 
>hypothetical debate about the Iraq War, U.S. militarism and the 
>current global economic crisis worth reading.  Machiavelli spoke 
>first, so the debate will make best sense if you scroll down and 
>read his argument before that of 
>Marx. 
><<http://truthandpolitics.wordpress.com>http://truthandpolitics.wordpress.com>
>Ted Keller, Emeritus Professor of International Relations, San 
>Francisco State Univ.



? Hello world!Machiavelli and Marx Debate Iraq
 


                     


                                            MARX?S OPENING STATEMENT

                                                 In Reply to Machiavelli

                                              Chronicled by Theosophus

 

The same men who establish their social relations in conformity with their material productivity, produce also principles, ideas and categories, in conformity with their social relations. Thus, these ideas, these categories, are as little eternal as the relations they express. They are historical and transitory products.?

?Ideas can never lead beyond an old world order but only beyond the ideas of the old world order. Ideas cannot carry out anything at all. In order to carry out ideas men are needed who can exert practical force.? 

Karl Marx


   

Judging by his facial expressions, Marx?s mood changed dramatically during Machiavelli?s opening argument: from bemused, to bewildered,  to irritated, to angry, and finally, to fierce determination.  Watching him, I recalled the remark of a Communist League friend who knew him well.  ?In everyday conversation,? the friend observed, ?Marx often rambles. But whenever the smallest part of his theory is questioned, his mind immediately acquires the clarity of a dagger.?  

Walking purposefully to the lectern, Marx took rumpled sheets of paper from the right pocket of his jacket.  Smoothing them out, he placed them, along with dog-eared copies of Grundrisse, The German Ideology, The Holy Family and The Poverty of Philosophy, next to a lined pad on which he had been scribbling notes. Throughout his presentation Marx referenced the notes and books with the seeming ease of a Horowitz using the keys of a piano.     

Clearing his throat, he began speaking.

Marx: ?Good evening. Like my opponent, I want to thank everyone involved in bringing this debate about; as well as all of you in the audience, for your open-minded interest and civility.?

?I also want to thank my adversary.?

?Mr. Machiavelli presented a truncated materialist logic, one diluted with non-material assumptions and assertions. But, given the plethora of idealist theories which describe human history as a product of ?lofty aspirations,? ?intelligent choices,? ?errors? and ?misunderstandings,? rather than people acting upon their hard-and-fast socio-economic interests, I found it refreshing.?

?Machiavelli called himself a scientist.  So, I?ll start by reminding him what science has established concerning our species? history.?

?We homo sapiens have been around between 200,000-250,000 years, and for all but the last 10,000 we lived in hunting and gathering tribes with 20 to 100 members, depending upon the available food.?

?It was only a short 10 millenia ago that we finally began to progress: from hunting and gathering to horticulture?planting various crops together; then, to agriculture?sowing and harvesting larger tracts of specific grains.?

?Over the course of that critical 10,000 years the populations of our communities grew continually larger. Hunting and gathering tribes had 20-100 members. Their semi-nomadic, horticultural/agricultural replacements had hundreds; and the latter, in turn, were succeeded by stationary feudal societies whose populations sometimes numbered in the millions.  Today?s capitalist communities 






This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Fri Jun 13 18:38:21 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2008 19:38:21 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Generation of Materialism, 1871-1900, revisited
Message-ID: <E1K7J78-00047n-Rh@elasmtp-masked.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

I finally acquired this book, which is a condensed historical summary 
of the political, social, technological, economic, and to some extent 
the corollary ideological, scientific, and artistic developments of 
the period in question.  Obviously, the ideational developments of 
society must ultimately be linked to the infrastructural and broader 
sociopolitical landscape, and general historical surveys can be an 
entry point into this dimension. I have scanned and uploaded the 
table of contents, some bibliographical references, and extracts from 
the book on science, its extrapolations and ideological ramifications 
and the tenor of the times.

A Generation of Materialism, 1871-1900 by Carlton J. H. Hayes
    * 
<http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/gen-materialism-0.html>Table 
of Contents, Maps, Illustrations. Bibliographical Essay (Jan. 1963) 
[fragment]
    * Chapter 3 (The Rapid Mechanizing of Work and Thought), sections 
6-9: 
<http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/gen-materialism-3-6.html>Mechanistic 
Natural Science, Deterministic Biological Science, Physiological 
Psychology, Positivism and the Social Sciences
    * Chapter 9: 
<http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/gen-materialism-9.html>The 
Climax of the Enlightenment

From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Mon Jun 16 14:41:39 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2008 15:41:39 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways (1)
Message-ID: <E1K8KbX-0004PL-BS@elasmtp-curtail.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

Friedman, Michael. A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and 
Heidegger. Chicago: Open Court, 2000.

The undivided world of German philosophy split into what we now know 
as analytical and continental philosophy. How did this happen? In the 
1920s philosophers of all camps wrestled with the problematic of 
Neo-Kantianism, itself split into the Marburg and Southwestern 
schools. In April 1929 a watershed debate took place between Ernst 
Cassirer, one of Germany's and the Marburg Schools leading 
philosophers, and Martin Heidegger. This conference was attended by 
Rudolf Carnap. Furthermore, Carnap closely followed Heidegger's work. 
Heidegger, in turn was to react to Carnap's criticism. The two found 
themselves in opposite camp with respect to both the role of science 
and logic, and politics.

Carnap judges Heidegger a metaphysician whose commitments are at odds 
with "logic and the scientific mode of thinking." Heidegger agrees. 
Heidegger accuses logic of tying down thinking to calculation and 
actuality. Carnap's animus against "metaphysics" is not a rejection 
of the entire tradition, but a rejection of philosophical systems 
that thumb their noses at empirical science, particularly at 
post-Kantian German idealism. He was quite relieved to be free of the 
stifling atmosphere of Europe in exile in the USA. (13-4) As can be 
seen especially in the case of Neurath, this specific 
anti-metaphysical attitude was closely connected to leftist politics. 
(15-6) Carnap himself makes this political connection in his 1928 
preface to the Aufbau (17). In 1932, Carnap stresses that the 
struggle against metaphysics is a secondary task, necessitated by the 
political situation. (19) Neurath, however, is a pit bull compared to 
Carnap. Neurath in 1932 condemns idealistic philosophy and Heidegger 
in particular as a tool of the ruling class and an enemy of the 
proletariat (20).

In a draft of his 1935 Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger 
condemns the Vienna Circle project and links it to Russian communism 
and Americanism. Heidegger sees logical positivism as the culmination 
of a project begun with Descartes, "a mode of thinking according to 
which truth is no longer disclosedness of what is and thus 
accommodation of grounding of Dasein in the disclosing being, but 
truth is rather diverted into certainty--to the mere securing of 
thought, and in fact the securing of mathematical thought against all 
that is not thinkable by it." (22)

From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Tue Jun 17 14:35:57 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2008 16:35:57 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Leslie White
Message-ID: <4857E7EE.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Leslie White



Leslie Alvin White (19 January 1900, Salida, Colorado ? 31 March 1975, Lone Pine, California) was an American anthropologist known for his advocacy of theories of cultural evolution, social evolutionism and especially neoevolutionism, and his role in creating the department of anthropology at the University of Michigan Ann Arbor. White was president of the American Anthropological Association (1964).

Contents [hide]
1 Biography 
2 White's anthropology 
3 Further reading 
4 Selected publications 
 


[edit] Biography
He was born to a peripatetic civil engineer. White lived first in Kansas and then Louisiana. He enrolled to fight in World War I, but saw only the tail end of it, spending a year in the US Navy before matriculating at Louisiana State University in 1919.

In 1921 he transferred to Columbia University where he studied psychology, taking a BA in 1923 and an MA in 1924. Although at the same university as Franz Boas, Leslie White's understanding of anthropology was decidedly anti-Boasian. However, his interests even at this stage of his career were diverse, and he took classes in several other disciplines and institutions, including philosophy at UCLA, and clinical psychiatry, before finally discovering anthropology via Alexander Goldenweiser's courses at the New School for Social Research. In 1925 White began studies for a Ph.D. in sociology/anthropology at the University of Chicago and had the opportunity of spending a few weeks with the Menominee and Winnebago in Wisconsin. After his initial thesis proposal ? a library thesis which foreshadowed his later theoretical work ? he conducted fieldwork at Acoma Pueblo, New Mexico. Ph.D. in hand, White began teaching at the University at Buffalo in 1927, where he began to rethink the anti-evolutionary views that his Boasian education had instilled in him. In 1930, he moved to Ann Arbor, where he would remain for the rest of his active career.

The three-year period at Buffalo marked a turning point in White's biography. It was during this time that he developed a worldview ? anthropological, political, and ethical ? that he would hold to and actively advocate until his death. The student response to the then-controversial Boasian anti-evolutionary and anti-racist doctrines that White espoused helped him formulate his own views regarding the evolution of human social life. In 1929 he visited Soviet Union and on his return joined the Socialist Labor Party, writing articles under the pseudonym ?John Steel' for their newspaper.

White came to Michigan when he was hired to replace Julian Steward who departed Ann Arbor in 1930. Although the university was home to a museum with a long history of involvement in matters anthropological, White was the only professor in the anthropology department itself. In 1932 he headed a fieldschool in the southwest which was attended by Fred Eggan and Mischa Titiev, among others.

It was Titiev that White brought to Michigan as a second professor in 1936. As a student of White ? and who knows, perhaps his status as a Russian immigrant was salient as well ? Titiev suited White perfectly. However, during the Second World War, Titiev took part in the war effort by studying Japan. Perhaps this upset the socialist White ? in any case by war's end White had broken with Titiev and the two were hardly even on speaking terms. More faculty were not hired until after the war, when the two-man department was expanded. This, compounded by the foundation by Titiev of the East Asian Studies Program and the import of scholars like Richard Beardsley into the department, created a split on which most professors fell one way or another.

As a professor in Ann Arbor White trained a generation of influential students. While authors such as Robert Carneiro, Beth Dillingham, and Gertrude Dole were to carry on White's program in its orthodox form, other scholars such as Eric Wolf, Arthur Jelinek, Elman Service, and Marshall Sahlins drew on their time with White to elaborate their own forms of anthropology.


[edit] White's anthropology
White's views were formulated specifically against the Boasians, with whom he was institutionally and intellectually at odds. This antagonism often took on an extremely personal form: White referred to Franz Boas's prose style as "corny" in no less a place than the American Journal of Sociology, while Robert Lowie referred to White's work as "a farrago of immature metaphysical notions" shaped by "the obsessive power of fanaticism [which] unconsciously warps one's vision."

One of the strongest deviations from Boasian orthodoxy was White's view of the nature of anthropology and its relation to other sciences present. White understood the world to be divided into cultural, biological, and physical levels of phenomenon. Such a division is a reflection of the composition of the universe and was not a heuristic device. Thus, contrary to Alfred L. Kroeber and Kluckhohn or Edward Sapir, White saw the delineation of the object of study not as a cognitive accomplishment of the anthropologist but a recognition of the actually existing and delineated phenomena which comprise the world. The distinction between 'natural' and 'social' sciences was thus not based on of method, but rather on the nature of the object of study ? physicists study physical phenomena, biologists biological phenomena and culturologists (White's term) cultural phenomena.

While the object of study was not delineated by the researcher's viewpoint or interest, the method by which he approached them could be. White believed that phenomena could be explored from three different points of view, the historical, the formal-functional, and the evolutionist (or formal-temporal). The historical view was essentially Boasian, dedicated to examining the particular diachronic cultural processes, "lovingly trying to penetrate into its secrets until every feature is plain and clear." The formal-functional is essentially the synchronic approach advocated by Alfred Radcliffe-Brown and Bronis?aw Malinowski, attempting to discern the formal structure of a society and the functional interrelations of its components. The evolutionist approach is, like the formal approach, generalizing. But it is also diachronic, seeing particular events as general instances of larger trends.

While Boas claimed his science promised complex and interdependent visions of culture, White thought that it would delegitimize anthropology if it became the dominant position, removing it from broader discourses on science. White viewed his own approach as a synthesis of historical and functional approach because it combined the diachronic scope of one with the generalizing eye for formal interrelations provided by the other. As such it could point out "the course of cultural development in the past and its probable course in the future" a task that was anthropology's "most valuable function."

As a result White frequently championed nineteenth century evolutionists in a search for intellectual predecessors unclaimed or ? preferably ? denounced by Boasians. This can be clearly seen in his views of evolution, which are firmly rooted in the writings of Herbert Spencer, Charles Darwin, and Lewis H. Morgan. While it can be argued that White's exposition of Morgan and Spencer's was tendentious, it can be safely said that White's concepts of science and evolution were firmly rooted in their work. Advances in population biology and evolutionary theory passed White by and, unlike Steward, his conception of evolution and progress remained firmly rooted in the nineteenth century.

For White, culture was a superorganic entity that was sui generis and could only be explained in terms of itself. It was composed of three levels, the technological, the social organizational, and the ideological. Each level rested on the previous one, and although they all interacted, ultimately the technological level was the determining one, what White calls "The hero of our piece" and "the leading character of our play". The most important factor in his theory is technology: "Social systems are determined by technological systems", wrote White in his book, echoing the earlier theory of Lewis Henry Morgan.

White spoke of culture as a general human phenomenon, and claimed not to speak of ?cultures' in the plural. His theory, published in 1959 in The Evolution of Culture: The Development of Civilization to the Fall of Rome, rekindled the interest in social evolutionism and is counted prominently among the neoevolutionists. He believed that culture ? meaning the sum total of all human cultural activity on the planet ? was evolving. White differentiated between three components of culture: technological, sociological and ideological, and argued that it was the technological component which plays a primary role or is the primary determining factor responsible for the cultural evolution. White's materialist approach is evident in the following quote: "man as an animal species, and consequently culture as a whole, is dependent upon the material, mechanical means of adjustment to the natural environment"[1]. This technological component can be described as material, mechanical, physical and chemical instruments, as well as the way people use these techniques. White's argument on the importance of technology goes as follows[2]:

Technology is an attempt to solve the problems of survival. 
This attempt ultimately means capturing enough energy and diverting it for human needs. 
Societies that capture more energy and use it more efficiently have an advantage over other societies. 
Therefore, these different societies are more advanced in an evolutionary sense. 
 
Composite image of the Earth at night, created by NASA and NOAA. The brightest areas of the Earth are the most urbanized, but not necessarily the most populated. Even more than 100 years after the invention of the electric light, some regions remain thinly populated and unlit.For White "the primary function of culture" and the one that determines its level of advancement is its ability to "harness and control energy". White's law states that the measure by which to judge the relative degree of evolvedness of culture was the amount of energy it could capture (energy consumption).

White differentiates between five stages of human development. In first, people use energy of their own muscles. In second, they use energy of domesticated animals. In third, they use the energy of plants (so White refers to agricultural revolution here). In fourth, they learn to use the energy of natural resources: coal, oil, gas. In fifth, they harness the nuclear energy. White introduced a formula

C= ET, 
where E is a measure of energy consumed per capita per year, T is the measure of efficiency of technical factors utilising the energy and C represents the degree of cultural development. In his own words: "the basic law of cultural evolution" was "culture evolves as the amount of energy harnessed per capita per year is increased, or as the efficiency of the instrumental means of putting the energy to work is increased"[3]. Therefore "we find that progress and development are effected by the improvement of the mechanical means with which energy is harnessed and put to work as well as by increasing the amounts of energy employed"[4]. Although White stops short of promising that technology is the panacea for all the problems that affect mankind, like technological utopians do, his theory treats the technological factor as the most important factor in the evolution of society and is similar to the later works of Gerhard Lenski, the theory of Kardashev scale of Russian astronomer, Nikolai Kardashev and to some notions of technological singularity.



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Tue Jun 17 15:27:49 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2008 17:27:49 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Is there humanist Americana ?
Message-ID: <4857F417.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

More of my search for humanist Americana, Ballad for Americans in
American songs

Charles
^^^^

Alexander's Ragtime Band

For the film of this name, see Alexander's Ragtime Band (film).
 
Cover, 1911 sheet music"Alexander's Ragtime Band" is the name of a song
by Irving Berlin. It was his first major hit, in 1911. There is some
evidence, although inconclusive, that Irving Berlin borrowed the melody
from a draft composition submitted by Scott Joplin that had been
submitted to a publisher.[1]


"Alexander's Ragtime Band" is not itself an example of the ragtime
musical idiom; apart from some mild syncopation, it has almost none of
ragtime's characteristic features. Nonetheless, the lyrics clearly refer
to the arrival of African-American musicians on the popular scene with
their then-new idea of playing standard songs in a more exciting
up-tempo style.

The first lines establish the African-American context:

Oh ma honey . . . ain't you goin' to the leaderman, the ragged meter
man 
References to "jazzing up" popular music include:

They can play a bugle call like you never heard before 
So natural that you want to go to war 
That's just the bestest band what am, honey lamb 
and:

If you care to hear the Swanee River played in ragtime 
The new style included new ways of playing traditional instruments as
well:

There's a fiddle with notes that screeches 
Like a chicken 
And the clarinet is a colored pet 
This song was played on the decks of the Titanic by the ship's band, as
the ship sank beneath the waters on April 15, 1912.

The song has been recorded by many artists, including Al Jolson, Billy
Murray, Louis Armstrong, George Formby, Bing Crosby, The Andrews
Sisters, Bessie Smith, Ella Fitzgerald, and Ray Charles.

A 1938 film of the same name was loosely based on the song.

A version of the song set to a disco beat was recorded by Ethel Merman
for her infamous Ethel Merman Disco Album in 1979.

The song was used in Tennessee politics by Lamar Alexander, a trained
pianist, Governor of Tennessee and U.S. Senator, who performed the song
for campaign events, including during his 1996 run for the Republican
presidential nomination.


[edit] Notes
^ King of Ragtime, E.A. Berlin, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 210.


[edit] External links
Alexander's Ragtime Band performed by Billy Murray (Cylinder
Preservation and Digitization Project) 
Original Sheet Music edition from Historic American Sheet Music:
1910-1920 - The Digital Scriptorium 
Retrieved from
"http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander%27s_Ragtime_Band"




This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Tue Jun 17 15:29:49 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2008 17:29:49 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Alexander's Ragtime Band (film)
Message-ID: <4857F48E.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Alexander's Ragtime Band (film)

Alexander's Ragtime Band 

Original film poster 
Directed by Henry King 
Produced by Darryl F. Zanuck 
Written by Irving Berlin
Richard Sherman 
Starring Tyrone Power
Alice Faye
Don Ameche
Ethel Merman 
Music by Irving Berlin
Alfred Newman 
Cinematography J. Peverell Marley 
Distributed by Twentieth Century Fox 
Release date(s) August 16, 1938 
Running time 106 min. 
IMDb profile 
Alexander's Ragtime Band (1938) is a film, released by Twentieth
Century Fox, that takes off from the 1911 Irving Berlin song
"Alexander's Ragtime Band", to tell a story of a society boy who
scandalizes his family by pursuing a career in ragtime instead of in
"serious" music. It stars Tyrone Power, Alice Faye, Don Ameche, Ethel
Merman, Jack Haley, and Jean Hersholt.

The story was written by Berlin himself, with Kathryn Scola, Richard
Sherman, and Lamar Trotti. It was directed by Henry King.

Contents [hide]
1 Songs 
2 Reception 
3 References 
4 External links 
 


[edit] Songs
The story strings together 28 Irving Berlin songs. Old songs were
combined with new ones written especially for the film, as Berlin was
also to do with the motion pictures Holiday Inn, Blue Skies, and White
Christmas. Alexander's Ragtime Band was released in 1938, but was set in
the World War I era (1914 - 1918). As a result, there were some
anomalies; for example, "Heat Wave", sung by Ethel Merman, and "Easter
Parade" were not written until 1933.


[edit] Reception
Alfred Newman won an Academy Award for Best Music, Scoring. The film
was also nominated for:

Best Picture 
Story - Irving Berlin 
Song - Irving Berlin for "Now It Can Be Told" 
Art Direction - Bernard Herzbrun and Boris Leven 
Film Editing - Barbara McLean 

[edit] References



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From jannuzi at gmail.com  Tue Jun 17 18:19:08 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 09:19:08 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806171719p3f600a90q3dd3e99f3dbf96a4@mail.gmail.com>

> Heidegger sees logical positivism as the culmination
> of a project begun with Descartes, "a mode of thinking according to
> which truth is no longer disclosedness of what is and thus
> accommodation of grounding of Dasein in the disclosing being, but
> truth is rather diverted into certainty--to the mere securing of
> thought, and in fact the securing of mathematical thought against all
> that is not thinkable by it." (22)

That was interesting because it explains the so-called analytic vs.
continental division in basically 'Germanic' terms. I would say,
though, Heidegger is reacting more to the attention that logical
positivism was getting among intellectuals. The breaks occur way
before. See, for example, the exchanges between Frege and Husserl. One
reason why Wittgenstein intrigues so many is he moved across the
analytic and the continental 'traditions', baffling the logical
positivists. Rorty seemed original to people in the analytic tradition
mostly because he didn't devalue continental philosophy and understood
it better than most of his peers.

Is it too much to say, though, that German-language analytics were
largely absorbed by the US and UK?

I find the distinction between analytic and continental traditions
rather useless for engaging philosophy seriously (much of Marxist
political philosophy never fit into either rough category), but it can
be used to help explain, for example, what happened in linguistics
after the structuralists. It doesn't mean that there are two schools
of linguistics, but the various schools can be traced back to these
two usually diverging streams of thought.

C


From jannuzi at gmail.com  Tue Jun 17 21:21:18 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 12:21:18 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806171719p3f600a90q3dd3e99f3dbf96a4@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806171719p3f600a90q3dd3e99f3dbf96a4@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806172021n67c207c8y368f724f59899dc3@mail.gmail.com>

Another way of looking at it might be to divide German-language
philosophy into German vs. Austrian, look at key positions in ontology
and epistemology, and go from there. Then Austrian philosophy divides
still further, but one being a division in 'phenomenology'. In which
case, I know I repeat myself, but Brentano, Husserl,  and Carnap are
the key figures.

I guess the question for people interested in the history of thought
would be: why given all the commonalities and interchanges, do little
fissures develop into gulfs? For one thing, you can't over-estimate
how influence is often based on social position, and the way people
react to others based on a defense of their status--or an attack on
that status. See the way Frege comes across as sarcastic and
dismissive, a stance he apparently adopted because he himself had such
low status and little recognition compared to the people he reviewed
and cited. It might have helped had he not alienated Husserl, who did
treat Frege as a serious thinker and one whose work-- and criticisms
of his own work --he did acknowledge and use.

Here is a book online that is also available in pdf download (but
can't find link right now).
It's a good secondary source as a way into the primary sources.

 http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/book/austrian_philosophy/

It's probably already been reviewed here or cited as reviewed
somewhere else but I don't have time to verify that. So sorry if I
hadn't noticed it before in previous discussions.

CJ


From farmelantj at juno.com  Wed Jun 18 05:43:43 2008
From: farmelantj at juno.com (farmelantj at juno.com)
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 11:43:43 GMT
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways
Message-ID: <20080618.074343.17621.0@webmail23.vgs.untd.com>


To some extent the analytic/continental divide was
reproduced within Marxism.  In eastern Europe
during the 1960s and 1970s sophisticated academic
Marxist philosophers tended to look towards either
continental philosophy or towards analytic philosophy.
For example in Poland, starting after 1956, there
emerged humanist interpretations of Marxism 
such as Leszek Kolakowski's which emphasized the
writings of the "young Marx" and which drew upon
phenomenology and existentialism in interpreting them.  
By the 1960s this approach to Marxist philosophy 
gained official status when Adam Schaff, who was 
the "house philosopher" of the Polish CP,
endorsed it.  

On the other hand,
there also emerged in the 1960s and 1970s the Poznan
School which drew upon the analytic philosophy of
the Lw?w-Warsaw School in the interpretation of
Marxism.  The Poznan School, among other things,
developed an adaptationist version of historical
materialism that was not unlike the one that
G.A. Cohen and his fellow Analytical Marxists
were developing at roughly the same time.

It is my understanding that parallel developments
in academic Marxist philosophy took place in
other eastern European countries during the
same time period too.

Jim F.

-- CeJ <jannuzi at gmail.com> wrote:
> Heidegger sees logical positivism as the culmination
> of a project begun with Descartes, "a mode of thinking according to
> which truth is no longer disclosedness of what is and thus
> accommodation of grounding of Dasein in the disclosing being, but
> truth is rather diverted into certainty--to the mere securing of
> thought, and in fact the securing of mathematical thought against all
> that is not thinkable by it." (22)

That was interesting because it explains the so-called analytic vs.
continental division in basically 'Germanic' terms. I would say,
though, Heidegger is reacting more to the attention that logical
positivism was getting among intellectuals. The breaks occur way
before. See, for example, the exchanges between Frege and Husserl. One
reason why Wittgenstein intrigues so many is he moved across the
analytic and the continental 'traditions', baffling the logical
positivists. Rorty seemed original to people in the analytic tradition
mostly because he didn't devalue continental philosophy and understood
it better than most of his peers.

Is it too much to say, though, that German-language analytics were
largely absorbed by the US and UK?

I find the distinction between analytic and continental traditions
rather useless for engaging philosophy seriously (much of Marxist
political philosophy never fit into either rough category), but it can
be used to help explain, for example, what happened in linguistics
after the structuralists. It doesn't mean that there are two schools
of linguistics, but the various schools can be traced back to these
two usually diverging streams of thought.

C

_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis


____________________________________________________________
Smart Girls Secret Weapon
Read Unbiased Beauty Product Reviews, Get Helpful Tips, Tricks and Sam
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL2141/fc/JKFkuJi7U3x0B0zlS2q9CrSprLvPY3Tmi9cMBhEm2YIgMDWQgo8AUJ/


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Wed Jun 18 06:27:12 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 08:27:12 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Poll: Many women get it
Message-ID: <4858C6E2.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

http://www.latimes.com/news/la-na-women16-2008jun16,0,7568615.story?track=ntothtml


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Wed Jun 18 07:11:35 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 09:11:35 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Barry's feminist record
Message-ID: <4858D149.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Wed Jun 18 12:11:38 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 13:11:38 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways
In-Reply-To: <20080618.074343.17621.0@webmail23.vgs.untd.com>
References: <20080618.074343.17621.0@webmail23.vgs.untd.com>
Message-ID: <E1K91DX-0000Sm-6C@elasmtp-mealy.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

Depending on how one defines the split, a split 
goes back at least as far as Lukacs, and probably 
farther, as documented (I don't remember much) in 
Russell Jacoby's THE DIALECTIC OF DEFEAT.

It can also be seen in the evolution of the 
Frankfurt School. It's obvious, for example, that 
Marcuse derived his scapegoating of positivism 
from Heidegger and his view of science from Husserl.

But I'm glad someone besides me knows about the Poznan School.

The notion of "continental" philosophy is an 
artifact of the historical amnesia induced by 
analytical philosophers.  The way that this split 
is now being addressed should be critically scrutinized.

Another factor, which goes back farther than an 
explicitly definable split, is the uneven 
diffusion of ideas across national/linguistic 
boundaries. While German philosophers always kept 
abreast of what was going on elsewhere, the 
reverse was not always the case. The 
catch-as-catch-can importation of German idealism 
into Britain is a case in point.

At 06:43 AM 6/18/2008, farmelantj at juno.com wrote:
>To some extent the analytic/continental divide 
>was reproduced within Marxism.  In eastern 
>Europe during the 1960s and 1970s sophisticated 
>academic Marxist philosophers tended to look 
>towards either continental philosophy or towards 
>analytic philosophy. For example in Poland, 
>starting after 1956, there emerged humanist 
>interpretations of Marxism such as Leszek 
>Kolakowski's which emphasized the writings of 
>the "young Marx" and which drew upon 
>phenomenology and existentialism in interpreting 
>them.  By the 1960s this approach to Marxist 
>philosophy gained official status when Adam 
>Schaff, who was the "house philosopher" of the 
>Polish CP, endorsed it.  On the other hand, 
>there also emerged in the 1960s and 1970s the 
>Poznan School which drew upon the analytic 
>philosophy of the Lw??w-Warsaw School in the 
>interpretation of Marxism.  The Poznan School, 
>among other things, developed an adaptationist 
>version of historical materialism that was not 
>unlike the one that G.A. Cohen and his fellow 
>Analytical Marxists were developing at roughly 
>the same time. It is my understanding that 
>parallel developments in academic Marxist 
>philosophy took place in other eastern European 
>countries during the same time period too. Jim 
>F. -- CeJ <jannuzi at gmail.com> wrote: > Heidegger 
>sees logical positivism as the culmination > of 
>a project begun with Descartes, "a mode of 
>thinking according to > which truth is no longer 
>disclosedness of what is and thus > 
>accommodation of grounding of Dasein in the 
>disclosing being, but > truth is rather diverted 
>into certainty--to the mere securing of > 
>thought, and in fact the securing of 
>mathematical thought against all > that is not 
>thinkable by it." (22) That was interesting 
>because it explains the so-called analytic vs. 
>continental division in basically 'Germanic' 
>terms. I would say, though, Heidegger is 
>reacting more to the attention that logical 
>positivism was getting among intellectuals. The 
>breaks occur way before. See, for example, the 
>exchanges between Frege and Husserl. One reason 
>why Wittgenstein intrigues so many is he moved 
>across the analytic and the continental 
>'traditions', baffling the logical positivists. 
>Rorty seemed original to people in the analytic 
>tradition mostly because he didn't devalue 
>continental philosophy and understood it better 
>than most of his peers. Is it too much to say, 
>though, that German-language analytics were 
>largely absorbed by the US and UK? I find the 
>distinction between analytic and continental 
>traditions rather useless for engaging 
>philosophy seriously (much of Marxist political 
>philosophy never fit into either rough 
>category), but it can be used to help explain, 
>for example, what happened in linguistics after 
>the structuralists. It doesn't mean that there 
>are two schools of linguistics, but the various 
>schools can be traced back to these two usually 
>diverging streams of thought. C



From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Wed Jun 18 12:13:53 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 13:13:53 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Barry's feminist record
In-Reply-To: <4858D149.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
References: <4858D149.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
Message-ID: <E1K91En-00081l-P9@elasmtp-spurfowl.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

We shall see how many white women are influenced by these arguments, 
or by organized feminism, for that matter. I'll have a hard time 
being moved from my sense that "white" comes before "women" for white women.

At 08:11 AM 6/18/2008, Charles Brown wrote:
> From Women for Barack Obama



From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Wed Jun 18 14:58:28 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2008 16:58:28 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Barry's feminist record
In-Reply-To: <E1K91En-00081l-P9@elasmtp-spurfowl.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
References: <4858D149.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
	<E1K91En-00081l-P9@elasmtp-spurfowl.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <48593EB8.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

A preliminary indication is in that poll I sent an article on earlier

>>> Ralph Dumain <rdumain at autodidactproject.org> 06/18/2008 2:13 PM
>>>
We shall see how many white women are influenced by these arguments, 
or by organized feminism, for that matter. I'll have a hard time 
being moved from my sense that "white" comes before "women" for white
women.

At 08:11 AM 6/18/2008, Charles Brown wrote:
> From Women for Barack Obama


_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From jannuzi at gmail.com  Wed Jun 18 19:36:18 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 10:36:18 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806172021n67c207c8y368f724f59899dc3@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806171719p3f600a90q3dd3e99f3dbf96a4@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806172021n67c207c8y368f724f59899dc3@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806181836v13184f5bmd8f8aa5be5c1ce6a@mail.gmail.com>

JF:
>>To some extent the analytic/continental divide was
reproduced within Marxism.  In eastern Europe
during the 1960s and 1970s sophisticated academic
Marxist philosophers tended to look towards either
continental philosophy or towards analytic philosophy.>>
and
>>The Poznan School, among other things,
developed an adaptationist version of historical
materialism that was not unlike the one that
G.A. Cohen and his fellow Analytical Marxists
were developing at roughly the same time.>>

That sort of inverts the discussion in an interesting way.  I've
always seen Marxism as peripheral to bourgeois academia in the US (and
post war, it is the US's university system that dominates the world,
if only because it can buy so much talent and can pay for it because
of huge financial positions in the current ongoing US financial
bubbles). That helps explain why an American university-educated
audience might find a book like 'Empire' by Hardt and Negri as
something NEW and DIFFERENT, while anyone who had already read
Lyotard, Baudrillard, Deleuze&Guattari etc  might find it TRITE.

But in Europe, bourgeois academia outside of science is more often
than not a form of Marxism (which is not to say that scientists could
not be Marxists). Especially after WW II with fascism, right wing
socialism and Catholic conservatism so discredited and unpopular
(though triumphant and bloody-minded in Spain). So little surprise
then that many types of philosophy, such as phenomenology,
existentialism, post-structuralism, even theology, attempts to
'recover Marx', 'correct Marx', 'add to Marx' or then 'reject the new
Marx'. And if one is a secular, academically trained bourgeois, to
think socially (not work in a narrow philosophical speciality) is
almost synonymous with to think as a type of Marxist.

On the other hand, American academia--which pays more people to be
philosophers than any other country I suspect--is largely impervious
to all this. I don't think it is too much to say that philosophy in
the Anglo-Analytic tradition does not usually integrate Marxism and
Marxism is , whether Marxists everywhere like it or not, seen as a
negative, dangerous, destructive type of continental philosophy
(though some basic thoughts of Marx also pervade popular thinking).

But speaking of continentals, perhaps more influential on thinking in
the US (the sort of thought that controls and runs politics, not just
thinks about politics) outside of philosophy departments, that would
be Hayek and Ayn Rand. Of course 'real philosophers' don't like Rand
because she wasn't a professional bourgeois philosopher.

And then those Analytical Marxists. Wow, that is so 1980s--like
listening to Duran Duran or something. It sort of did for Marxism what
Dogme filmmaking did for 'realism' in cinema.

Here is an interesting take on Marxism though (which I guess is
similar to what I was thinking), that if you think of Marxism as
political philosophy, as philosophers entrenched in academia tend to
do:

http://philosophyofbrains.com/2007/09/03/on-analytic-vs-continental-philosophy.aspx

>>Caveat 2:  What about Marxism and phenomenology, which surely originated before Heidegger and continued after him?  As far as I know, Marxism is mostly concerned with political philosophy, whereas phenomenology is mostly concerned with consciousness.  They are not general enough to challenge the analytic/continental distinction.  They are more analogous to empiricism or utilitarianism than to analytic vs. continental philosophy.  You can be a continental Marxist, an analytic Marxist, or just a good old-fashioned follower of Marx.  None of that invalidates the distinction between analytic and continental philosophy.>>

Finally, to get back to where the break in general philosophy comes. I
think it is important to remember that if you go back to the 19th
century and the first half of the 20th century, philosophy, or some
forms of it, were seen as foundational to sciences, including nascent
social sciences and emergent specialities and then sub-specialities.
So you can go back to a time when academically trained people of a
philosophical bent had to be prepared to move across an array of
thought, across Brentano, Husserl and Carnap etc in order to do
original work in philosophy or migrate into a new field (which I think
has a lot to do with the formation and burgeoning of the social and
formal sciences at universities). The other thing is where
'Anglo-analytic' types dominate, the 'continentals' tend to be the
self-proclaimed iconoclasts. And vice versa.

CJ


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Thu Jun 19 01:41:18 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 02:41:18 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806181836v13184f5bmd8f8aa5be5c1ce6a@mail.gmail.co
 m>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806171719p3f600a90q3dd3e99f3dbf96a4@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806172021n67c207c8y368f724f59899dc3@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806181836v13184f5bmd8f8aa5be5c1ce6a@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <E1K9DrB-0004GC-4l@elasmtp-spurfowl.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

I gave the once-over to the Brains blog debate and to the linked 
discussion on "styles of philosophy" on Brian Leiter's blog. l need 
to analyze this further, but something about all this makes me unhappy.

One note: I think the very creation of the artificial category of 
"continental philosophy" in order to selectively admit its contents 
into American philosophy (and into the British Commonwealth, I 
presume) is a way of adapting to the contemporary climate of 
globalization and irrationalism and is yet a subtler way of denying 
Marxism (which itself split philosophically into warring camps by the 
1920s, not to mention the divisions already present before 1900.) 
This postmodernist crap, however tokenistically it may still 
acknowledge Marx here and there, or social class, is yet another way 
of vitiating the potential influence of Marxism.  But then, what do I 
mean by Marxism, and how did it get to be an ism, and what about its 
assimilation of new knowledge and new theoretical perspectives? Hold 
those thoughts.

The bourgeois pluralist introduction of crap like feminist, black, 
Native American, queer, etc. philosophy into the revivified category 
of "American philosophy", including the irrationalist wing of 
pragmatism, is one sickening way in which the petty bourgeois 
humanistic academic star system makes room for the watered-down 
liberalism (akin to whoring for the neoliberal Democratic Party) of a 
segment of the intelligentsia letting off some steam for them while 
intensifying class inequality. It is all predicated on denying 
Marxism, and this can be perceived if one compares the climate of the 
'70s and very early '80s in which the effects of the new social 
movements as well as the contemporaneous class struggle bore their 
first fruits in the academy, to dominant trends now.

Of course I've begged the question of what I think Marxism is or 
should be, and how it should relate to other identifiable tendencies. 
I have written elsewhere that the notion of "Marxist philosophy" as 
it was codified was an erroneous conceptualization from the 
beginning. "Marxism" shouldn't mark itself off from the sum total of 
human knowledge; it should be a way of orienting oneself critically 
towards it, (in addition to supplying its own knowledge,) identifying 
the sources and consequences of ideological distortion, 
fragmentation, the division of labor, etc., and point the way towards 
the conceptual reconstitution of a demystified whole.

But now it's past my bedtime.

At 08:36 PM 6/18/2008, CeJ wrote:
>JF:
> >>To some extent the analytic/continental divide was
>reproduced within Marxism.  In eastern Europe
>during the 1960s and 1970s sophisticated academic
>Marxist philosophers tended to look towards either
>continental philosophy or towards analytic philosophy.>>
>and
> >>The Poznan School, among other things,
>developed an adaptationist version of historical
>materialism that was not unlike the one that
>G.A. Cohen and his fellow Analytical Marxists
>were developing at roughly the same time.>>
>
>That sort of inverts the discussion in an interesting way.  I've
>always seen Marxism as peripheral to bourgeois academia in the US (and
>post war, it is the US's university system that dominates the world,
>if only because it can buy so much talent and can pay for it because
>of huge financial positions in the current ongoing US financial
>bubbles). That helps explain why an American university-educated
>audience might find a book like 'Empire' by Hardt and Negri as
>something NEW and DIFFERENT, while anyone who had already read
>Lyotard, Baudrillard, Deleuze&Guattari etc  might find it TRITE.
>
>But in Europe, bourgeois academia outside of science is more often
>than not a form of Marxism (which is not to say that scientists could
>not be Marxists). Especially after WW II with fascism, right wing
>socialism and Catholic conservatism so discredited and unpopular
>(though triumphant and bloody-minded in Spain). So little surprise
>then that many types of philosophy, such as phenomenology,
>existentialism, post-structuralism, even theology, attempts to
>'recover Marx', 'correct Marx', 'add to Marx' or then 'reject the new
>Marx'. And if one is a secular, academically trained bourgeois, to
>think socially (not work in a narrow philosophical speciality) is
>almost synonymous with to think as a type of Marxist.
>
>On the other hand, American academia--which pays more people to be
>philosophers than any other country I suspect--is largely impervious
>to all this. I don't think it is too much to say that philosophy in
>the Anglo-Analytic tradition does not usually integrate Marxism and
>Marxism is , whether Marxists everywhere like it or not, seen as a
>negative, dangerous, destructive type of continental philosophy
>(though some basic thoughts of Marx also pervade popular thinking).
>
>But speaking of continentals, perhaps more influential on thinking in
>the US (the sort of thought that controls and runs politics, not just
>thinks about politics) outside of philosophy departments, that would
>be Hayek and Ayn Rand. Of course 'real philosophers' don't like Rand
>because she wasn't a professional bourgeois philosopher.
>
>And then those Analytical Marxists. Wow, that is so 1980s--like
>listening to Duran Duran or something. It sort of did for Marxism what
>Dogme filmmaking did for 'realism' in cinema.
>
>Here is an interesting take on Marxism though (which I guess is
>similar to what I was thinking), that if you think of Marxism as
>political philosophy, as philosophers entrenched in academia tend to
>do:
>
>http://philosophyofbrains.com/2007/09/03/on-analytic-vs-continental-philosophy.aspx
>
> >>Caveat 2:  What about Marxism and phenomenology, which surely 
> originated before Heidegger and continued after him?  As far as I 
> know, Marxism is mostly concerned with political philosophy, 
> whereas phenomenology is mostly concerned with consciousness.  They 
> are not general enough to challenge the analytic/continental 
> distinction.  They are more analogous to empiricism or 
> utilitarianism than to analytic vs. continental philosophy.  You 
> can be a continental Marxist, an analytic Marxist, or just a good 
> old-fashioned follower of Marx.  None of that invalidates the 
> distinction between analytic and continental philosophy.>>
>
>Finally, to get back to where the break in general philosophy comes. I
>think it is important to remember that if you go back to the 19th
>century and the first half of the 20th century, philosophy, or some
>forms of it, were seen as foundational to sciences, including nascent
>social sciences and emergent specialities and then sub-specialities.
>So you can go back to a time when academically trained people of a
>philosophical bent had to be prepared to move across an array of
>thought, across Brentano, Husserl and Carnap etc in order to do
>original work in philosophy or migrate into a new field (which I think
>has a lot to do with the formation and burgeoning of the social and
>formal sciences at universities). The other thing is where
>'Anglo-analytic' types dominate, the 'continentals' tend to be the
>self-proclaimed iconoclasts. And vice versa.
>
>CJ



From Waistline2 at aol.com  Thu Jun 19 02:51:26 2008
From: Waistline2 at aol.com (Waistline2 at aol.com)
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 04:51:26 EDT
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways
Message-ID: <bcc.2d294fdc.358b780e@aol.com>

In a message dated 6/18/2008 11:43:24 P.M. Pacific Daylight Time,  
rdumain at autodidactproject.org writes: .

>>  . .  But  then, what do I mean by Marxism, and how did it get to be an 
ism, and what about  its assimilation of new knowledge and new theoretical 
perspectives? Hold those  thoughts. . . . 


Of course I've begged the question of what I think  Marxism is or should be, 
and how it should relate to other identifiable  tendencies. I have written 
elsewhere that the notion of "Marxist philosophy" as  it was codified was an 
erroneous conceptualization from the beginning. "Marxism"  shouldn't mark itself 
off from the sum total of human knowledge; it should be a  way of orienting 
oneself critically towards it, (in addition to supplying its  own knowledge,) 
identifying the sources and consequences of ideological  distortion, 
fragmentation, the division of labor, etc., and point the way  towards the conceptual 
reconstitution of a demystified whole. 

But now  it's past my bedtime.<< 
 
 
Comment
 
The ultimate culprits are the Marxists.  
 
Engels get somewhat of a bad rap for "converting" Marx (method and  approach 
to unraveling the most general laws of society and commodity  production) into 
a "distinct philosophy," due to his efforts to popularize  Marx writings, on 
the basis of how the audience of their time thought  things out. 
 
All the various Marxists writers, with few exceptions - like you, are  partly 
to blame by defining Marxism as a philosophy. Nowhere can one find an  ounce 
of philosophy in Marx most famous statements like the passages from the  
"Preface to A Contribution to A Critique  . . ." where he speaks of the  mode of 
production and productive forces, etc, Or his Critique of the Gotha  Program or 
the Communist Manifesto. Or scores of other writings. 
 
Yet, Marxism is understood as a philosophy rather than a method and  approach 
to demystification - standpoint. 
 
Lenin of course followed Engels lead with his "Three Sources and Three  
Components" writing that Marxism - as a ism, was composed or founded on German  
Philosophy, French Socialism and English Political economy.  After the  victory 
and affirmation of Soviet Power, Stalin's little pamphlet on Dialectical  and 
Historical Materialism and then the Soviet Textbook On Marxist  Philosophy 
furthers perpetrate the historical error. A historical error is  precisely a 
historical error because it is unavoidable due to the complex  circumstances that 
produced the error. Marx sensed the error in making and all  of the old school 
Marxists know of him "thanking God" he was not a Marxist. 
 
This is of course no exhaustive list for there are thousands to have fallen  
into what I consider "the great philosophic trap." All one has to do is 
consult  any of the Marxist Libraries or Archives on line and can find scores of 
Marxist  Philosophers. 
 
The proletariat has no need for philosophy - any philosophy, only clarity  or 
demystification. As a philosophy, Marxism is simple one more commodity on the 
 philosophy shelf of bourgeois society.  
 
Then what do I know? I maintain that philosophy by definition is a form of  
insanity, mystification, that seeks to explain man and the world on the basis 
of  the idea of man, nature and the world.  
 
Marx did endlessly criticize the insane philosophic banter of the  German. 
 
The real world problem is that 99 of 100 Marxists believe Marx approach to  
society and demystification is in fact a philosophy rather than a powerful  
method and approach anti to philosophy. 
 
WL 






**************Gas prices getting you down? Search AOL Autos for 
fuel-efficient used cars.      (http://autos.aol.com/used?ncid=aolaut00050000000007)


From jannuzi at gmail.com  Thu Jun 19 07:47:03 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 22:47:03 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806181836v13184f5bmd8f8aa5be5c1ce6a@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806171719p3f600a90q3dd3e99f3dbf96a4@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806172021n67c207c8y368f724f59899dc3@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806181836v13184f5bmd8f8aa5be5c1ce6a@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806190647m712a80fct4519500b45e95059@mail.gmail.com>

WL writes:>>All the various Marxists writers, with few exceptions -
like you, are  partly
to blame by defining Marxism as a philosophy. Nowhere can one find an  ounce
of philosophy in Marx most famous statements like the passages from the
"Preface to A Contribution to A Critique  . . ." where he speaks of
the  mode of
production and productive forces, etc, Or his Critique of the Gotha  Program or
the Communist Manifesto. Or scores of other writings. Yet, Marxism is
understood as a philosophy rather than a method and  approach
to demystification - standpoint. >>

Well, maybe, but just who was Marx addressing when he wrote ponderous
academic and literary texts? He was a mostly unsuccessful bourgeois
intellectual who, in an era with more  political freedom and a mass
university system, might have got an academic post (and then never
sold a single journalistic piece).

Your critique of philosophy sounds a lot like Wittgenstein. I would
say that the only theory that is real is practice. People can tell you
they are this or that they are that, but what they actually do can
reveal a lot more than oratory or over-written texts.

Much of this treatment of Marx and Marxism as philosophy is by
default. If the study of political economy--and how many other
activities falling under 'social science'--never really emerged as a
rigorously scientific field, then what was it? Philosophy. Philosophy
of a science still in formation. The other side of the coin is that,
to the extent that Marxism is 'true' of the social realm, the less it
matters what anyone thinks or believes. That is until you find
yourself trying to lead a a real leftist opposition party capable of
taking power in a country or find yourself caught up in power during a
revolution.

I don't think socialism is altogether that difficult a concept. We are
all born socialists, and most of us die socialists. The problem is
getting people to accept living the life in between as socialists.

CJ


From rasherrs at eircom.net  Thu Jun 19 13:47:27 2008
From: rasherrs at eircom.net (rasherrs)
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 20:47:27 +0100
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways
References: <ffbe0f7e0806171719p3f600a90q3dd3e99f3dbf96a4@mail.gmail.com><ffbe0f7e0806172021n67c207c8y368f724f59899dc3@mail.gmail.com><ffbe0f7e0806181836v13184f5bmd8f8aa5be5c1ce6a@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806190647m712a80fct4519500b45e95059@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <001801c8d245$4ded41b0$0801a8c0@paddy>

If marxism contains a significant philosophical dimension then it should 
have attempted to establish the nature of knowledge and how certain that 
knowledge. Questions such as how we have knowledge of the world have not 
been adequately answered by marxism. Not even a serious attempt to answer 
these questions. This is just what Bertrand Russell sought the answers to.

Paddy Hackett
--
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "CeJ" <jannuzi at gmail.com>
To: <marxism-thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2008 2:47 PM
Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways


WL writes:>>All the various Marxists writers, with few exceptions -
like you, are  partly
to blame by defining Marxism as a philosophy. Nowhere can one find an  ounce
of philosophy in Marx most famous statements like the passages from the
"Preface to A Contribution to A Critique  . . ." where he speaks of
the  mode of



From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Thu Jun 19 14:49:02 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 16:49:02 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways
In-Reply-To: <bcc.2d294fdc.358b780e@aol.com>
References: <bcc.2d294fdc.358b780e@aol.com>
Message-ID: <485A8E03.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



>>> <Waistline2 at aol.com
 
 
Comment
 
The ultimate culprits are the Marxists.  
 
Engels get somewhat of a bad rap for "converting" Marx (method and 
approach 
to unraveling the most general laws of society and commodity 
production) into 
a "distinct philosophy," due to his efforts to popularize  Marx
writings, on 
the basis of how the audience of their time thought  things out. 

^^^^^
CB: You know actually Engels agrees with you. He says that philosophy
comes to an end with Marxism.  He says there is no longer philosophy as
a queen above all the other sciences,  but only dialectics , formal
logic and the positive sciences. So, Engels sort of explicitly agrees
with you and doesn't consider Marxism a "philosophy". 

^^^^^^^
 



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From phil at pwalden.fsnet.co.uk  Thu Jun 19 16:32:26 2008
From: phil at pwalden.fsnet.co.uk (Phil Walden)
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 23:32:26 +0100
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways
In-Reply-To: <001801c8d245$4ded41b0$0801a8c0@paddy>
Message-ID: <20080619223536.JGLX29365.aamtaout02-winn.ispmail.ntl.com@pwalden>

Epistemological questions and questions about how we have knowledge of the
world have been brilliantly confronted by Hegel.  Marxists who want to know
about epistemology must start with a serious study of Hegel.  Hegel tackled
the problem of scepticism - both Cartesian and Pyrrhonic - better than any
other philosopher to date.  Start with the Phenomenology of Spirit, then try
to wade through Science of Logic (only a proportion of which is currently
understood even by the best scholars), then read the Encyclopedia Logic,
then read Lukacs's 'The Young Hegel'.  A good simplified guide to the
Phenomenology of Spirit is Robert Stern's guide in the Routledge
Philosophers Guidebook series.

Phil Walden 

-----Original Message-----
From: marxism-thaxis-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:marxism-thaxis-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of rasherrs
Sent: 19 June 2008 20:47
To: Forum for the discussion of theoretical issues raised by Karl Marxand
the thinkers he inspired
Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways

If marxism contains a significant philosophical dimension then it should 
have attempted to establish the nature of knowledge and how certain that 
knowledge. Questions such as how we have knowledge of the world have not 
been adequately answered by marxism. Not even a serious attempt to answer 
these questions. This is just what Bertrand Russell sought the answers to.

Paddy Hackett
--
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "CeJ" <jannuzi at gmail.com>
To: <marxism-thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2008 2:47 PM
Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways


WL writes:>>All the various Marxists writers, with few exceptions -
like you, are  partly
to blame by defining Marxism as a philosophy. Nowhere can one find an  ounce
of philosophy in Marx most famous statements like the passages from the
"Preface to A Contribution to A Critique  . . ." where he speaks of
the  mode of


_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis



From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Thu Jun 19 21:25:34 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 22:25:34 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways
In-Reply-To: <20080619223536.JGLX29365.aamtaout02-winn.ispmail.ntl.com@p
	walden>
References: <001801c8d245$4ded41b0$0801a8c0@paddy>
	<20080619223536.JGLX29365.aamtaout02-winn.ispmail.ntl.com@pwalden>
Message-ID: <E1K9WKt-0007bm-CY@elasmtp-mealy.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

I am a few pages shy of finishing the book and will continue my 
installments as soon as I can squeeze in the time.

Skepticism is one of those issues in philosophy that in my view--John 
Searle agrees with me, too--is dead for the 21st century.  It's the 
flip side of the apriorism of traditional philosophy that is no 
longer an interesting question.

I did a quick read of Forster's book on Hegel and skepticism a few 
years back, and I've heard at least one talk on the subject, but I 
didn't absorb Forster's presentation properly the first time 
around.  Skepticism seems to me irrelevant to Marx as to Engels; they 
basically dismissed it.

As for epistemology and Marxism, well, Marxism contributes pieces of 
the puzzle to epistemology as do other trends. Marx's interest in the 
subject is invested in his struggle first against the Young Hegelians 
and then against the bourgeois political economists, with swipes at 
others along the line, like Proudhon and Comte.  As new challenges 
arose from various philosophical and quasi-scientific quarters, 
Engels tackled other questions, quite perceptively. Later on, in the 
German Social Democratic movement, Kautsky, Luxemburg and others 
tackled certain questions as best they knew how. In Russia, Plekhanov 
did likewise, and he proved to have a lasting influence. And one can 
go on with Lenin in 1908, and a new phase after the war beginning 
with Lukacs, and so on.  Many of these interventions had their up 
sides and their down sides. Note, however, that critiques have always 
been more productive than the codification and defense of total, 
finished systems.

Marxists have intersected other departments of knowledge and other 
philosophical claims from time to time, sometimes in the way of 
critique, others in attempts at synthesis. But the historical 
development of ideas is highly uneven.  For example, the issues which 
this book enters around have nothing to do with what marxism was up 
to.  If one were to throw a materialist into the mix, what basis of 
interaction would there even have been given the state of affairs in 
the 1920s?  Marcuse I suppose could have thrown his two cents in, 
from a quasi-Heideggerian view at least. Adorno was I think, a bit 
too young; he doesn't come on the scene until 1931.  But there were 
certain developments in Marxism, particularly in its philosophical 
wing--dialectical materialism--and other areas that as far as I can 
tell, did not intersect at the time.  And when it happened, the 
authority built up in the Soviet Union and its international 
influence was based on a partial and defective solidified tradition 
and set of habits.

I'll get back to the book as soon as I can. I'm also reading 
Macherey's IN A MATERIALIST WAY, which is frustrating, as most French crap is.

At 05:32 PM 6/19/2008, Phil Walden wrote:
>Epistemological questions and questions about how we have knowledge of the
>world have been brilliantly confronted by Hegel.  Marxists who want to know
>about epistemology must start with a serious study of Hegel.  Hegel tackled
>the problem of scepticism - both Cartesian and Pyrrhonic - better than any
>other philosopher to date.  Start with the Phenomenology of Spirit, then try
>to wade through Science of Logic (only a proportion of which is currently
>understood even by the best scholars), then read the Encyclopedia Logic,
>then read Lukacs's 'The Young Hegel'.  A good simplified guide to the
>Phenomenology of Spirit is Robert Stern's guide in the Routledge
>Philosophers Guidebook series.
>
>Phil Walden
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: marxism-thaxis-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
>[mailto:marxism-thaxis-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of rasherrs
>Sent: 19 June 2008 20:47
>To: Forum for the discussion of theoretical issues raised by Karl Marxand
>the thinkers he inspired
>Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways
>
>If marxism contains a significant philosophical dimension then it should
>have attempted to establish the nature of knowledge and how certain that
>knowledge. Questions such as how we have knowledge of the world have not
>been adequately answered by marxism. Not even a serious attempt to answer
>these questions. This is just what Bertrand Russell sought the answers to.
>
>Paddy Hackett
>--
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "CeJ" <jannuzi at gmail.com>
>To: <marxism-thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu>
>Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2008 2:47 PM
>Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways
>
>
>WL writes:>>All the various Marxists writers, with few exceptions -
>like you, are  partly
>to blame by defining Marxism as a philosophy. Nowhere can one find an  ounce
>of philosophy in Marx most famous statements like the passages from the
>"Preface to A Contribution to A Critique  . . ." where he speaks of
>the  mode of

From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Fri Jun 20 13:24:18 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2008 15:24:18 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways
In-Reply-To: <20080619223536.JGLX29365.aamtaout02-winn.ispmail.ntl.com@pwalden>
References: <001801c8d245$4ded41b0$0801a8c0@paddy>
	<20080619223536.JGLX29365.aamtaout02-winn.ispmail.ntl.com@pwalden>
Message-ID: <485BCBA2.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



>>> "Phil Walden" 
Epistemological questions and questions about how we have knowledge of
the
world have been brilliantly confronted by Hegel.  Marxists who want to
know
about epistemology must start with a serious study of Hegel.  Hegel
tackled
the problem of scepticism - both Cartesian and Pyrrhonic - better than
any
other philosopher to date.  Start with the Phenomenology of Spirit,
then try
to wade through Science of Logic (only a proportion of which is
currently
understood even by the best scholars), then read the Encyclopedia
Logic,
then read Lukacs's 'The Young Hegel'.  A good simplified guide to the
Phenomenology of Spirit is Robert Stern's guide in the Routledge
Philosophers Guidebook series.

Phil Walden 

^^^^
CB: Yes, as far as Marxists taking a lead from Hegel,  Engels and
Lenin, in their discussions of epistemology in _Anti-Duhring_ and
_Materialism and Empirio-Criticism_, explicitly mention Hegel's
analysis.  They mention that Hegel critiqued the Critical Philo of Kant
and it's skepticism about knowing; and their idea of the distinction
between the dialectic of absolute and relative truth comes from Hegel.

Engels and Marx were Young Hegelians, of course, so they was pretty
thoroughly versed in the Hegelian system.

-----Original Message-----
From: marxism-thaxis-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu 
[mailto:marxism-thaxis-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
rasherrs
Sent: 19 June 2008 20:47
To: Forum for the discussion of theoretical issues raised by Karl
Marxand
the thinkers he inspired
Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways

If marxism contains a significant philosophical dimension then it
should 
have attempted to establish the nature of knowledge and how certain
that 
knowledge. Questions such as how we have knowledge of the world have
not 
been adequately answered by marxism. Not even a serious attempt to
answer 
these questions. This is just what Bertrand Russell sought the answers
to.

Paddy Hackett
--
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "CeJ" <jannuzi at gmail.com>
To: <marxism-thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2008 2:47 PM
Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways


WL writes:>>All the various Marxists writers, with few exceptions -
like you, are  partly
to blame by defining Marxism as a philosophy. Nowhere can one find an 
ounce
of philosophy in Marx most famous statements like the passages from
the
"Preface to A Contribution to A Critique  . . ." where he speaks of
the  mode of


_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis 


_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Fri Jun 20 14:34:14 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2008 16:34:14 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] [lbo-talk] Chuck's Cassirer posts (origin of
	culture)
In-Reply-To: <485B954C020000690003594C@ngwway.uwc.ac.za>
References: <mailman.8322.1213894713.28040.lbo-talk@lbo-talk.org>
	<485B954C020000690003594C@ngwway.uwc.ac.za>
Message-ID: <485BDC06.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

 

BTW it is worth mentioning that the arbitrariness of the sign was the
one insight -- dodgy as it is -- that poststructuralism took from
linguistics. You take that away from them and the whole edifice
collapses, from Lacan to Derrida to Barthes to Althusser and the rest
(perhaps not Zizek), as well as a generation of French
semiotician-linguists from Benveniste to Greimas to Rastier and many
many more. I have a certain respect for members of this latter group
--
I had a very enlightening discussion with Rastier himself at a
conference in Italy last year, in which he explained to me how it was
that French structuralism had very little to do with the structuralist
movement in the US, which was mainly a phenomenon of the 1930s, that
rather "French 'structuralism' was in fact post-structuralism from the
very beginning". 

^^^^
CB: Yes, I  was going to say,  before there was post-structuralism ,
there was, of course, structuralism. As far as semiotic sociology mainly
the structural anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss, and as you say
modeled on structural linguistics.

See semiotics

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiotics

^^^

Now I don't mean to say that the arbitrariness of the sign is 'false'.

^^^
CB: The principle of the arbitrariness of the sign or in English, the
symbol, is not only from structuralism. Leslie White, a founder of a
main school of anthropology also articulated this principle. And symbols
in this sense are a main characteristic of culture ( that which socially
constructs , to put it in terms of a frequent refrain on this list.) as
well as language. Both culture and language are systems of symbols
(signs). And , importantly, the human species is defined by its
possession of culture or custom or tradition. No other species has
language or culture.  So, signing or symboling , in  the forms of both
language and culture, is our species defining activity.  And,
importantly , also, most of human _learning_ is through symbols,
culture, _not_ by imitating, like other species. Not by "monkey-see,
monkey do" imitation. Most of our learning ( as opposed to inborn or
genetically based knowledge) is through culture, not from experience.
And cultural learning is learning from the experience of other people,
including learning from people who are now dead. 

Just to further explain the concept of arbitrariness, it refers to the
relationship between the signifier and the signified.  So, if the sounds
d-o-g are used to refer to things that are dogs, we see that those
sounds do not "imitate" or are not naturally related to dogs. The
arbitrariness of a sign refers to the fact that in a sign something is
used to represent something that it is not.  Two _different_ things are
arbitrarily identified, treated as the _same_. Note that this is a unity
or identity of opposites of the dialectic.

So, culture or human social "constructivity" consists in an enormous
system of signs or symbols. 

I have theorized that the reason culture became our unique
characteristic is that once some homind discovered them way, way back
when, they were highly adaptive because they allowed past generations to
pass on their experience to future generations across the "death
barrier" . 

Why ? Because a symbol represents something by something it is not (
the arbitrary relation between signifier and signified) So, a living
generation can learn from a symbol about the experience of dead
generations, when it could not learn from imitating the dead, since the
dead aren't able to demonstrate things to be learned, obviously, because
they are dead.  But since a symbol uses something, a signifier, to
represent something that it is not, the signified, because of this
_arbitrary_ ( non-imitative) relation, the dead ancestor's
"demonstration" can be learned by the living descendent through the
signifier, through the thing (word or cultural object) that is _not_ the
dead ancestor.

Cultural learning allows us to learn from the experience of many,
many...many of our ancestors. This was its main adaptive advantage when
our species originated in founding culture. 
Culture also allowed learning more from other living members of the
species.  Human children could learn a lot more from their parents than
other species, who were restricted to teaching their young by
demonstration and imitation. Other species have to "give a picture" or
demonstration of what they are teaching. That a signifier is not what it
signifies means it communicates by a non-picture or non-imitation of
what it represents.

You heard it here first (smile)


I very much appreciate the rest of Tahir's discussion as a professional
linguist below and above.




This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Fri Jun 20 14:34:50 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2008 16:34:50 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Code pink
Message-ID: <485BDC2A.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>


Dear Friend,

While George Bush has been touring through Europe, beating the drums
for war with Iran, CODEPINK has been creating -- city by city -- a
groundswell of support for peace. Thanks to our initiative, the U.S.
Conference of Mayors (http://usmayors.org/), which is holding its annual
meeting from June 20-24 in Miami, Florida, will vote on a critical and
timely resolution urging the Bush Administration to pursue diplomatic
engagement with Iran. The resolution also asks Congress to prohibit the
use of funds to carry out military action against Iran without explicit
Congressional authorization. We are delighted to report that 20 mayors
(http://www.codepinkalert.org/article.php?id=4232) have cosponsored
the resolution so far. 

Click here (http://www.codepinkalert.org/article.php?id=4232) to see if
your mayor is a cosponsor. If so, please thank him/her. If not, please
ask your Mayor to sign on to the resolution. Click here to find your
mayor's name, telephone and email
(http://usmayors.org/meetmayors/mayorsatglance.asp), and scroll below
this page for a sample letter and the full text of the resolution. Ask
your mayor to send notice of his/her support to Nancy Mancias at Global
Exchange (nancy at globalexchange.org or 415-575-5543). Peace can begin in
your home town!

While we're working to stop the next war now, we must remember the
innocent victims of the war on Iraq, millions of whom have had to flee
their own home towns. The U.S. invasion of Iraq has led to the most
massive refugee crisis in the world today. We give our sincerest thanks
to those of you who, on Mothers and Fathers Day, paid tribute to Iraqi
parents by donating to our Refugee Fund. The tens of thousands of
dollars we've raised together have funded food rations for the hungry,
schooling for refugee children, and job training and business supplies
for displaced Iraqi women and men
(http://www.collateralrepairproject.org/MicroProj1-08.html). If you
would like to donate now, please click here
(https://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/424/shop/custom.jsp?donate_page_KEY=3683).


Dozens of important representatives from women's organizations have
signed our letter calling for the US and UN to allocate greater funds
for refugees
(http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/424/petition.jsp?petition_KEY=1209).
We will deliver this petition to the UN on Friday, June 20th, World
Refugee Day. Won't you add your name to the growing chorus of people
calling on the US and global community to show compassion for displaced
Iraqis?

Thank you for raising your voices for peace and justice,
Alicia, Dana, Deidra, Desiree, Farida, Gael, Gayle, Jodie, Liz, Lori,
Medea, Nancy, Rae, Sarah and Tighe

P.S. Get your CODEPINK ringtone now!
(http://act.credoaction.com/downloads/ringtone.html?tone=494038) You
can get Emma Revolution's CODEPINK song as your ringer and start putting
your cellphone where your progressive values are. CODEPINK encourages
you to switch to CREDO Mobile, a phone company that lets you voice your
beliefs with every call. By donating a portion of your bill to
progressive nonprofits, CREDO has raised a total of $60 million so far
for causes you care about-including CODEPINK! For more information on
how it works and the organizations they support, click here
(http://www.credomobile.com/)



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Fri Jun 20 15:50:10 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2008 16:50:10 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] [lbo-talk] Chuck's Cassirer posts (origin of
 culture)
In-Reply-To: <485BDC06.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
References: <mailman.8322.1213894713.28040.lbo-talk@lbo-talk.org>
	<485B954C020000690003594C@ngwway.uwc.ac.za>
	<485BDC06.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
Message-ID: <E1K9nZN-0004fP-VO@elasmtp-masked.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

Just to emphasize:

Structural linguistics, in the USA and elsewhere, was the real deal 
in linguistic science until Chomsky came along. It should not be 
confused with the nonsense extrapolated from the structuralist 
concept into anthropology and elsewhere by the French.

Arbitrariness of the sign is not just about any symbolism, but about 
spoken language: i.e. the sounds (phonemes) that comprise units of 
meaning (morphemes) have no relation to their referents.  For 
example, it's entirely arbitrary that Fido is termed a hund, chien, or dog.

As for other symbol systems, they are not as tightly organized as 
phonology, though any individual notion only takes on meaning by 
contrast with others, and all taken together have more or less 
systematic structure. A kinship system, for example, is entirely 
relational. There's no dad without a mom and a child.

These philosophical masturbators get a way with a lot, because, just 
like linguistics, they can refer back to Saussure, so they'd like to 
pass themselves off as linguists.

I'm getting some reviews of Friedman's book so I can compare them 
with my own take on it. Tom Rockmore has an entirely different view, it seems.

I should be taking my nap now.

At 03:34 PM 6/20/2008, Charles Brown wrote:
>
>
>BTW it is worth mentioning that the arbitrariness of the sign was the
>one insight -- dodgy as it is -- that poststructuralism took from
>linguistics. You take that away from them and the whole edifice
>collapses, from Lacan to Derrida to Barthes to Althusser and the rest
>(perhaps not Zizek), as well as a generation of French
>semiotician-linguists from Benveniste to Greimas to Rastier and many
>many more. I have a certain respect for members of this latter group
>--
>I had a very enlightening discussion with Rastier himself at a
>conference in Italy last year, in which he explained to me how it was
>that French structuralism had very little to do with the structuralist
>movement in the US, which was mainly a phenomenon of the 1930s, that
>rather "French 'structuralism' was in fact post-structuralism from the
>very beginning".
>
>^^^^
>CB: Yes, I  was going to say,  before there was post-structuralism ,
>there was, of course, structuralism. As far as semiotic sociology mainly
>the structural anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss, and as you say
>modeled on structural linguistics.
>
>See semiotics
>
>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiotics
>
>^^^
>
>Now I don't mean to say that the arbitrariness of the sign is 'false'.
>
>^^^
>CB: The principle of the arbitrariness of the sign or in English, the
>symbol, is not only from structuralism. Leslie White, a founder of a
>main school of anthropology also articulated this principle. And symbols
>in this sense are a main characteristic of culture ( that which socially
>constructs , to put it in terms of a frequent refrain on this list.) as
>well as language. Both culture and language are systems of symbols
>(signs). And , importantly, the human species is defined by its
>possession of culture or custom or tradition. No other species has
>language or culture.  So, signing or symboling , in  the forms of both
>language and culture, is our species defining activity.  And,
>importantly , also, most of human _learning_ is through symbols,
>culture, _not_ by imitating, like other species. Not by "monkey-see,
>monkey do" imitation. Most of our learning ( as opposed to inborn or
>genetically based knowledge) is through culture, not from experience.
>And cultural learning is learning from the experience of other people,
>including learning from people who are now dead.
>
>Just to further explain the concept of arbitrariness, it refers to the
>relationship between the signifier and the signified.  So, if the sounds
>d-o-g are used to refer to things that are dogs, we see that those
>sounds do not "imitate" or are not naturally related to dogs. The
>arbitrariness of a sign refers to the fact that in a sign something is
>used to represent something that it is not.  Two _different_ things are
>arbitrarily identified, treated as the _same_. Note that this is a unity
>or identity of opposites of the dialectic.
>
>So, culture or human social "constructivity" consists in an enormous
>system of signs or symbols.
>
>I have theorized that the reason culture became our unique
>characteristic is that once some homind discovered them way, way back
>when, they were highly adaptive because they allowed past generations to
>pass on their experience to future generations across the "death
>barrier" .
>
>Why ? Because a symbol represents something by something it is not (
>the arbitrary relation between signifier and signified) So, a living
>generation can learn from a symbol about the experience of dead
>generations, when it could not learn from imitating the dead, since the
>dead aren't able to demonstrate things to be learned, obviously, because
>they are dead.  But since a symbol uses something, a signifier, to
>represent something that it is not, the signified, because of this
>_arbitrary_ ( non-imitative) relation, the dead ancestor's
>"demonstration" can be learned by the living descendent through the
>signifier, through the thing (word or cultural object) that is _not_ the
>dead ancestor.
>
>Cultural learning allows us to learn from the experience of many,
>many...many of our ancestors. This was its main adaptive advantage when
>our species originated in founding culture.
>Culture also allowed learning more from other living members of the
>species.  Human children could learn a lot more from their parents than
>other species, who were restricted to teaching their young by
>demonstration and imitation. Other species have to "give a picture" or
>demonstration of what they are teaching. That a signifier is not what it
>signifies means it communicates by a non-picture or non-imitation of
>what it represents.
>
>You heard it here first (smile)
>
>
>I very much appreciate the rest of Tahir's discussion as a professional
>linguist below and above.



From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Fri Jun 20 15:03:04 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2008 17:03:04 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] [lbo-talk] Chuck's Cassirer posts (origin	of
	culture)
In-Reply-To: <E1K9nZN-0004fP-VO@elasmtp-masked.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
References: <mailman.8322.1213894713.28040.lbo-talk@lbo-talk.org>
	<485B954C020000690003594C@ngwway.uwc.ac.za>
	<485BDC06.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
	<E1K9nZN-0004fP-VO@elasmtp-masked.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <485BE2C8.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



>>> Ralph Dumain 
Just to emphasize:

Structural linguistics, in the USA and elsewhere, was the real deal 
in linguistic science until Chomsky came along. It should not be 
confused with the nonsense extrapolated from the structuralist 
concept into anthropology and elsewhere by the French.

Arbitrariness of the sign is not just about any symbolism,
^^^
CB: Well, in the Leslie White sense, the defining characteristic of the
symbol is the arbitrary relation between the representing token and what
it represents. There is no "natural" relation between the signifier and
the signified

^^^

 but about 
spoken language:
^^^^
CB: Yes, language. Written too. All language.

^^^

 i.e. the sounds (phonemes) that comprise units of 
meaning (morphemes) have no relation to their referents. 
^^^
CB: Exactly No prior relation to their being linked in the language.
^^^

 For 
example, it's entirely arbitrary that Fido is termed a hund, chien, or
dog.

^^^^^
CB; Yes, the sound sequence d-o-g-s has no natural relation to the
animal species dogs.

Eonimatapea ( spelling) is not symbolic. Because the sound sequence is
chosen to imitate the thing that it represents.  That is anti-symbolic
something is used to represent something that it is instead of what it
is not.

^^^^^^^


As for other symbol systems, they are not as tightly organized as 
phonology,
^^^^
CB: Well, structural anthropology disputes you on this. Levi-Strauss
claims to demonstrate very tightly organized cultural symbol systems,
like as tight as Group Theory algebra !  

^^^^

 though any individual notion only takes on meaning by 
contrast with others, and all taken together have more or less 
systematic structure. A kinship system, for example, is entirely 
relational. There's no dad without a mom and a child.

These philosophical masturbators get a way with a lot, because, just 
like linguistics, they can refer back to Saussure, so they'd like to 
pass themselves off as linguists.

I'm getting some reviews of Friedman's book so I can compare them 
with my own take on it. Tom Rockmore has an entirely different view, it
seems.

^^^
CB: You should take a look at Claude Levi-Strauss, _Structural
Anthropology_.

I should be taking my nap now.

At 03:34 PM 6/20/2008, Charles Brown wrote:
>
>
>BTW it is worth mentioning that the arbitrariness of the sign was the
>one insight -- dodgy as it is -- that poststructuralism took from
>linguistics. You take that away from them and the whole edifice
>collapses, from Lacan to Derrida to Barthes to Althusser and the rest
>(perhaps not Zizek), as well as a generation of French
>semiotician-linguists from Benveniste to Greimas to Rastier and many
>many more. I have a certain respect for members of this latter group
>--
>I had a very enlightening discussion with Rastier himself at a
>conference in Italy last year, in which he explained to me how it was
>that French structuralism had very little to do with the
structuralist
>movement in the US, which was mainly a phenomenon of the 1930s, that
>rather "French 'structuralism' was in fact post-structuralism from
the
>very beginning".
>
>^^^^
>CB: Yes, I  was going to say,  before there was post-structuralism ,
>there was, of course, structuralism. As far as semiotic sociology
mainly
>the structural anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss, and as you say
>modeled on structural linguistics.
>
>See semiotics
>
>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiotics 
>
>^^^
>
>Now I don't mean to say that the arbitrariness of the sign is
'false'.
>
>^^^
>CB: The principle of the arbitrariness of the sign or in English, the
>symbol, is not only from structuralism. Leslie White, a founder of a
>main school of anthropology also articulated this principle. And
symbols
>in this sense are a main characteristic of culture ( that which
socially
>constructs , to put it in terms of a frequent refrain on this list.)
as
>well as language. Both culture and language are systems of symbols
>(signs). And , importantly, the human species is defined by its
>possession of culture or custom or tradition. No other species has
>language or culture.  So, signing or symboling , in  the forms of
both
>language and culture, is our species defining activity.  And,
>importantly , also, most of human _learning_ is through symbols,
>culture, _not_ by imitating, like other species. Not by "monkey-see,
>monkey do" imitation. Most of our learning ( as opposed to inborn or
>genetically based knowledge) is through culture, not from experience.
>And cultural learning is learning from the experience of other
people,
>including learning from people who are now dead.
>
>Just to further explain the concept of arbitrariness, it refers to
the
>relationship between the signifier and the signified.  So, if the
sounds
>d-o-g are used to refer to things that are dogs, we see that those
>sounds do not "imitate" or are not naturally related to dogs. The
>arbitrariness of a sign refers to the fact that in a sign something
is
>used to represent something that it is not.  Two _different_ things
are
>arbitrarily identified, treated as the _same_. Note that this is a
unity
>or identity of opposites of the dialectic.
>
>So, culture or human social "constructivity" consists in an enormous
>system of signs or symbols.
>
>I have theorized that the reason culture became our unique
>characteristic is that once some homind discovered them way, way back
>when, they were highly adaptive because they allowed past generations
to
>pass on their experience to future generations across the "death
>barrier" .
>
>Why ? Because a symbol represents something by something it is not (
>the arbitrary relation between signifier and signified) So, a living
>generation can learn from a symbol about the experience of dead
>generations, when it could not learn from imitating the dead, since
the
>dead aren't able to demonstrate things to be learned, obviously,
because
>they are dead.  But since a symbol uses something, a signifier, to
>represent something that it is not, the signified, because of this
>_arbitrary_ ( non-imitative) relation, the dead ancestor's
>"demonstration" can be learned by the living descendent through the
>signifier, through the thing (word or cultural object) that is _not_
the
>dead ancestor.
>
>Cultural learning allows us to learn from the experience of many,
>many...many of our ancestors. This was its main adaptive advantage
when
>our species originated in founding culture.
>Culture also allowed learning more from other living members of the
>species.  Human children could learn a lot more from their parents
than
>other species, who were restricted to teaching their young by
>demonstration and imitation. Other species have to "give a picture"
or
>demonstration of what they are teaching. That a signifier is not what
it
>signifies means it communicates by a non-picture or non-imitation of
>what it represents.
>
>You heard it here first (smile)
>
>
>I very much appreciate the rest of Tahir's discussion as a
professional
>linguist below and above.


_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Sat Jun 21 07:58:07 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2008 08:58:07 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (1)
Message-ID: <E1KA2hZ-0000nO-BZ@elasmtp-scoter.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

I have several more installments to write on Friedman's book, but 
I've also begun to collect reviews, which compound my disquiet even 
when they criticize Friedman.

Roubach, Michael. Review: Friedman, Michael; A Parting of the Ways: 
Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger, Philosophical Review, Ja 02; 111(1): 119-122.

Gabriel, Gottfried. Review: Friedman, Michael; A Parting of the Ways: 
Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger, Erkenntnis: An International Journal 
of Analytic Philosophy, Jl 2003; 59(1): 125-128.

Hans Sluga, Review of Michael Friedman, "A Parting of the Ways", The 
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 98, 2001.

Rockmore, Tom. "On the Structure of Twentieth-Century Philosophy," 
Metaphilosophy, 35(4): 466-478, 2004.

         "It makes sense to ask from time to time where we are in the 
philosophical discussion. This article reviews the debate in the 
twentieth century. Michael Friedman has recently argued that the 
split between Continental and analytic philosophy is due to the 
inability, because of war, to carry forward a genuine debate begun by 
Heidegger and Carnap around the time of Heidegger's public 
controversy with Cassirer at Davos in 1929. I, however, argue that 
there was not even the beginning of a genuine debate between 
Heidegger and Carnap. I argue further that the split between analytic 
and Continental philosophy originated earlier, in the analytic attack 
on idealism at the beginning of the century. And finally, I argue 
that the differences among analytic philosophy, Continental 
philosophy, and pragmatism, the third main current of 
twentieth-century philosophy, can be traced to differing reactions to Kant."

------------

Roubach's review is the briefest. It is mostly a summary, with some 
comments added at the end.  It comes down to a historical division in 
which Canrap cleaves to the Naturwissensschaftern and Heidegger to 
the Geisteswissenschaften, with Cassirer the neglected towering 
figure who attempts to synthesize both intellectual worlds. But why 
not adopt both. Such putative "pluralism fails because the alleged 
'division of labor' is unsound." Roubach claims that Brouwer's and 
Weyl's foundations of mathematics fit better with Husserl and 
Heidegger than with Carnap. Also, that the characterization of 
Husserl's phenomenology as essentially non-mathematical, is 
wrong.  Also, the moral and the political division between the 
Heidegger and Carnap does not convince the reviewer that one should 
"choose" Carnap as opposed to choosing neither. I don't know what to 
make of this.

Gabriel's review is slightly more substantial. He is not convinced 
that the emigration forced by the Nazis is the definitive cause of 
the analytical-continental split. "However, this fact can only 
explain why it took so long for analytical philosophy to establish 
itself again on the continent, but not the split itself." 
"Continental" philosophers, esp. the left-leaning ones, also 
emigrated, including students of Heidegger.  After the war, the 
Heideggerians did not monopolize academic posts; there are also such 
people as Adorno and Bloch, who rejected analytical philosophy more 
vehemently than did Heidegger, and also rejected Heidegger.

Curiously, however entrenched the divide, there is another figure to 
consider, Nietzsche. Nietzsche and lebensphilosophie are 
fountainheads for the deconstructionists/postmodernists, but he is 
also the one figure in their camp admired by Carnap. Carnap's essay 
"The Elimination of Metaphysics" includes a section "Metaphysics as 
an Expression of an Attitude Towards Life". "Lebensgeful" is a term 
from Dilthey adopted by way of Carnap's teacher Herman Nohl. What can 
be gleaned from metaphysics are not meaningful statements but an 
emotive value. Art, not metaphysics, is the proper vehicle for such 
expressions. ("Metaphysicians are musicians without musical 
ability.") Carnap admires Nietzsche as that metaphysician with the 
greatest artist talent. So we are left with the dichotomy of science 
and poetry, thought and feeling, content and form. Carnap and 
Heidegger take off in opposite directions from a common point of 
departure.  Ultimately, a metaphilosophical position will have to be 
assumed "to determine the relation between science, philosophy and 
poetry." Logical and poetical thinking are complementary and both 
should be given their due.

I disagree with Gabriel's formulation of this alleged complementarity 
between Carnap and Heidegger and about the bridge that allegedly 
links them, partly because I disagree with Carnap's view of Nietzsche 
as emotivist, and I don't see Nietzsche as the common point of 
departure. Whatever complementarity there may be in general between 
science and poetry, I do not see it represented in these two, who 
individually and in mutual relation have misformulated any eventual 
complementarity. In this fin (et commence) de siecle rapproachement 
now proposed I see bourgeois philosophy at the end of its rope.

TO BE CONTINUED

From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Sat Jun 21 09:04:22 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2008 10:04:22 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (2)
Message-ID: <E1KA3iu-0004Fk-P8@elasmtp-spurfowl.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

Hans Sluga, Review of Michael Friedman, "A Parting of the Ways", The 
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 98, 2001.

Sluga qualifies Friedman's thesis that Neo-Kantianism lies at the 
root of it all. Kantianism (in general) indeed is pivotal for 
everyone, including Frege, Russell, Husserl, Mach, early 
Wittgenstein, but Sluga disagrees that everyone's response was based 
on the same issues or on Neo-Kantianism more narrowly. Carnap himself 
claims in his autobiography that Frege and Russell were the greatest 
influences on him.Heidegger was heavily involved with medieval 
philosophy, which he reevaluated in the light of phenomenology. But 
Friedman's account of the origins of the great divide is even 
dodgier, given Moore's and Russell's revolt against idealism at the 
turn of the century (to Collinngwood's dismay). And don't forget the 
strain of positivism going back to Mach.

In footnotes Sluga recommends two sources of interest:

(1) the most comprehensive account: Stadler, Friedrich. The Vienna 
Circle: Studies in the Origins, Development, and Influence of Logical 
Empiricism. New York: Springer, 2001.

(2) Sluga, Hans. "What has history to do with me? Wittgenstein and 
analytic philosophy," Inquiry, vol. 41, 1998, pp. 99-121.

While Friedman recognizes to some extent he is oversimplifying, he 
nevertheless overdoes it. "His account barely touches on the huge 
influence of empiricism, naturalism, positivism, and Darwinism on the 
development of nineteenth-century thought. These tendencies were 
important even in the formation in the formation of the Neo-Kantian 
tradition . . . " Footnote 11 continues with various examples.

Sluga denies that the 1929 Davos meeting between Cassirer and 
Heidegger can be characterized as a showdown between Enlightenment 
and Counter-Enlightenment, or that it was political in any way. The 
relation between philosophical and political commitments is far from 
one-to-one, given existentialists who opposed fascism, and 
positivists and Neo-Kantians who supported it.

Sluga is also doubtful of Friedman's contention that Cassirer is the 
key to bridging the analytical-continental divide. Can the next step 
in philosophy be a "neo-neo-Kantianism"? The prospect of a single 
philosophical framework to incorporate the concerns of both analytics 
and continentals may be no more desirable than realizable. Divergence 
and conflict might continue to be more productive. And "the terms 
'analytic' and 'continental' have by now become catch-alls for all 
kinds of movements and ideas and the disagreements within each 
tradition have proven conflictual and stimulating as well as 
resistant to reduction."

Recognizing neo-Kantianism as the once-dominant force helps not to 
chart the future of analytic philosophy but to understand its present 
character. Sluga concludes with a vague concern (it seems to be an 
objection) to the "apparently unstoppable encroachment of Kantian 
modes of thinking."  I'm too far out of the loop to know what this is about.

However, the previous point about catch-alls points up something 
about the delusive ideological nature of the current concern over the 
analytical-continental divide, esp. as I see no such thing as 
"continental philosophy", whereas I can see "phenomenology" and other 
nameable currents as developments to analyze.  "Continental 
philosophy" in the end is, inter alia, a new and subtler way of 
banishing Marxism, which also has a relation to what philosophy is 
and can and cannot accomplish.  There is a curious combination in 
these writings of technical acumen and short-sighted provincialism. 
The rapprochement approached in these contemporary writings is really 
a colonization of the Continent by analytical philosophers, hence the 
concentration on limited and provincial technical issues (which are 
legitimate up to a point) and a tacit censorship of some more 
fundamental questions. As we shall see, Rockmore admits as much, even 
though his perspective is fucked up, too. Even the recognition of the 
political dimension of "continental philosophy" is shallow. Sure, 
certain obvious historical facts about what happened in Europe have 
to be acknowledged. In the USA, current appropriations of older 
philosophies, either imported from Europe or indigenous (pragmatism), 
politically function as conduits for the petty bourgeois concerns of 
identity politics--feminism, African American philosophy, queer 
theory, etc. Not to say that these alleged constituencies are not 
worthy of inclusion, but the way they are being incorporated into the 
neoliberal order only serves to up the cultural capital of the Ivy 
League. (Shall I name names, departments, or Universities?)

TO BE CONTINUED

From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Sat Jun 21 11:52:56 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2008 12:52:56 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (3)
Message-ID: <E1KA6Lv-0007Wq-9B@elasmtp-mealy.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

Rockmore, Tom. "On the Structure of Twentieth-Century Philosophy," 
Metaphilosophy, 35(4): 466-478, 2004.

"It makes sense to ask from time to time where we are in the 
philosophical discussion. This article reviews the debate in the 
twentieth century. Michael Friedman has recently argued that the 
split between Continental and analytic philosophy is due to the 
inability, because of war, to carry forward a genuine debate begun by 
Heidegger and Carnap around the time of Heidegger's public 
controversy with Cassirer at Davos in 1929. I, however, argue that 
there was not even the beginning of a genuine debate between 
Heidegger and Carnap. I argue further that the split between analytic 
and Continental philosophy originated earlier, in the analytic attack 
on idealism at the beginning of the century. And finally, I argue 
that the differences among analytic philosophy, Continental 
philosophy, and pragmatism, the third main current of 
twentieth-century philosophy, can be traced to differing reactions to Kant."

------------

You would never know from this review that Rockmore ever studied 
Marxism, however ineptly. Some years ago I reviewed Rockmore's book 
IRRATIONALISM, on Lukacs, rather unfavorably. He also wrote a book on 
Marx and Marxism I haven't seen. Judging from the reviews I've been 
able to find online, it seems pretty stupid, but I guess I will have 
to forego judgment until I see for myself. Note that Rockmore, here 
adding pragmatism as the third main current of 20th century 
philosophy in addition to analytical philosophy and this 
pseudo-entity known as continental philosophy, banishes Marxism from 
this grand history.

Actually, he does mention Marxism once in passing: "Like Marxism, 
analytic philosophy tends to define itself through its opposition to 
idealism . . ."  (472).

But anyway, these three leading philosophical tendencies fought one 
another for dominance throughout the century. "Now, about a century 
after Frege, analytic philosophy seems to be in the process of 
abandoning a theoretical approach to reference, the very problem as 
originally understood, while turning to pragmatism and curiously to 
Hegel."  (467)

Re the continental, Rockmore shows the virtue of pointing to 
something specific, i.e. Husserlian phenomenology, and asserts that 
Heidegger effectively terminates rather than extends the Husserlian 
project. (467)

Pragmatism effectively died with Dewey and was revived in very 
different form by Rorty or by neo-analytic pragmatists.

But in attempting to come to grips with what has transpired, the 
analytic-continental divide becomes the focus of attention. Attempts 
to bridge the divide have come to the fore (e.g. Richard Bernstein, 
1971). Friedman has a track record in Kant studies and the 
vindication of Carnap (seen as the central figure of 20th century philosophy).

There is a fair amount of praise offered here, with some quibbles 
about Heidegger, and a complaint about the neglect of pragmatism.

Friedman avoids the pitfall of fussing over whether idealism denies 
the existence of the external world and thus the need to refute idealism.

Friedman touches on both the logical and political aspects of the 
schism in philosophy. The unresolved controversy about the role of 
logic was broken off for political reasons, i.e. the intrusion of 
fascism; otherwise, claims Friedman, that need not have happened. 
Carnap and Heidegger shared enough common ground for a debate to have 
continued. Rockmore does not believe any of this. He denies 
sufficient common ground for any sort of dialogue to continue. 
Heidegger did not engage, and could not engage, the views of Carnap 
or Cassirer. Carnap probably was not that conversant with Heidegger's 
philosophy. Admiration for Cassirer, however, is well deserved, and 
he probably was the only one who could have pulled off some synthesis.

Rockmore pans out from Friedman's focus on Davos to the wider 
rebellion against idealism by Russell and Moore, and by Frege (on the 
continent). Moore's objection to idealism doesn't really accomplish 
much. "Like Marxism, analytic philosophy tends to define itself 
through its opposition to idealism . . ." But other analytical 
philosophers have found Hegel a route to pursue towards their goals. 
(I'm not sure why this is.)

Note: "Though Hegel is a leading German idealist, analytical 
philosophers now turning to Hegel routinely draw a tacit distinction 
between Hegel and idealism. Everything happens as if it were possible 
to appropriate Hegel for analytic concerns while simply bracketing 
his idealism. Though they are starting to come to grips with Hegel, 
to the best of my knowledge none of them has yet found a way to come 
to grips with his idealist commitment or with idealism in general." (472)

I'm guessing that the nonsense about the "non-metaphysical Hegel" 
fits into this category.

Rockmore skeptically targets what he calls the Rorty-Brandom thesis. 
I won't get into the brief exposition of the notion that Wilfrid 
Sellars took analytical philosophy from a Humean to a Kantian phase. 
Rockmore doesn't believe this, so he doesn't believe that Brandom 
took it to a Hegelian phase.  Maybe others can explain to me what 
this is all about. Rockmore gives Rorty a few smacks. I'm out of this 
loop, so I don't know what's at stake for these people.

But then note: ". . . the political payoff of this thesis is that 
analytic philosophy can move without hesitation into any unoccupied 
or even into any occupied space, a little like the cowboys taking 
over from the Indians to secure the West. Stated in such terms, it 
should be clear that this is nothing more than another turf battle in 
the academy, a struggle for influence in which history is written 
retrospectively by the victors." (473)

Aha, just as I suspected!!

Skipping a paragraph and a half, we come to this noteworthy passage:

"Yet semantics and epistemology are not the same, since the problem 
of definite reference, or denotation, which concerns Frege, Russell, 
Kripke, and many others, is a doctrine that Hegel not only does not 
support but in fact opposes. The account of sense certainty in the 
opening arguments of Phenomenology of Spirit is intended to deny the 
very possibility of definite reference as it is discussed in analytic 
semantics (see Hegel 1967, 58-57). And there is no reason, other than 
the repeated analytic claim to conceptual rigor, to believe that 
analytic philosophy is genuinely scientific or even generally more 
rigorous than appropriate parts of Continental philosophy." (473-4)

Aha!

Rockmore adduces four points against Friedman's thesis (474):

(1) The divide is real and not obviously bridgeable;
(2) The distinctions between the two trends cannot be linked to the 
role of logic alone, since what counts as logic for Hegelians and for 
analytics are basically different;
(3) the analytic-continental divide is in effect political, meaning 
the divvying up of who gets to be published by which publishers, 
endowed chairs, receive big grants, sit on committees, get elected to 
posts, etc.;
(4) The Davos conference is only a symptom of an earlier and deeper 
philosophical divide.

Then there is a discussion of Kant, focusing on his Copernican 
revolution, upon which our historical philosophical understanding hinges.

But Rockmore says something weird about Copernicus himself that 
strikes me as bonkers. "Copernicus's astronomical revolution consists 
in making objective claims to know directly dependent on the subject 
[ . . . . ] This leads to an explanation of objective cognition in 
terms of the subject while abandoning any effort to know the 
mind-independent world as it is." (475)

Oh no, you di'int!

After proffering this piffle, Rockmore traces the fate of strong and 
weak realism, and constructivism, in post-Kantian philosophy. This 
goes for a page and a half. He concludes that the fundamental role of 
logic in a century of philosophy is nevertheless too narrow an object 
of focus. (476)

Skipping a half a paragraph, a paragraph, and another half, we come 
to the concluding assertion:

"The promise of the new century does not lie in continuing the 
fruitless effort, which stretches back in the Western discussion at 
least until Plato, to know the way the world is. As Kant suggests, it 
lies rather in further working out a constructivist approach to 
knowledge." (477)

Now, for all the good criticisms of Rockmore's peers to be mined 
here, to land in such trifling banality is tragic. It's a criticism 
of the small and provincial from a standpoint slightly less small and 
provincial, and this from someone who read Lukacs and Marx.  As with 
any in-group discourse, there is much tacitly assumed between 
Rockmore and his target audience that may elude many of us outside 
the loop.  But as useful as it may be to peek inside these people's 
world, there's something wrong at the base of this business.

Actually, the project of knowing the way the world is is not 
fruitless at all, it's only fruitless when pursued within the 
boundaries of philosophy. Philosophy is even more fruitless when a 
philosopher tells such a whopping lie about Copernicus. Rockmore 
exposes analytical philosophical and institutional imperialism only 
to offer his own slightly widened technocratic pettiness in its place.

I have as to put forward my view as to how Marxism did or did not or 
should relate to said century's worth of philosophical development. 
For the moment I would like to point out something that is 
fundamental to Hegel and Marx in different and incompatible 
formulations.  I need to find a statement by CLR James on Hegel that 
is far more elegant than what I am trying to say. Hegel offers an 
account of our history of our means of dealing with reality as part 
of his own perspective of grasping it now. It is not merely an 
historical/sociological perspective to the effect that only power 
relations and social prerogatives underlie ideas, nor is it a merely 
disembodied account of correct ideas. Rather, the socially 
conditioned, historically evolving ideological configuration of 
knowledge embodies objective content even while same is embedded 
within a socially conditioned framework which at a later date can be 
seen to be partial and inadequate from a changed and enlarged 
perspective. To put it another way, a system of ideas can be seen one 
level politically, but this is meaningless without understanding the 
technical, objective content and structure of this system; and, 
conversely, a merely technical exposition without an investigation of 
historical motivation, both on its own level and embedded with a 
larger framework of how society evolves, misses out on an important 
dimension of why these ideas are generated and what they say about 
the state of society as a whole and vice versa, even where the 
connection is highly indirect.

Obviously, some part of "continental" philosophy addresses this 
historical/social level in a way that analytical flatlanders do not, 
but simply to draw up a list of what these two artificially concocted 
categories do and do not encompass, is to perpetuate a mythology, 
which morphs now into an altered form, indirectly propelled by the 
forces of neoliberalism and "globalization". Actually, we need to 
fill in what Lukacs, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse left out or got 
wrong. (And maybe a few of the Frenchmen are worth engaging.) None of 
these people dealt with the objective content of science, 
mathematics, logic, and other central concerns of their rivals; 
instead, they opposed "positivism", which is worth doing, but 
"positivism" isn't just positivism, either.  But when you front 
"continental" philosophy, there is a fishier agenda on the make, and 
ultimately, going slumming with Nietzsche and Heidegger and their 
bootlickers doesn't make you a better person.

    

From jannuzi at gmail.com  Sun Jun 22 01:41:08 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2008 16:41:08 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] structuralist linguistics
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806220041k63caf23ax7feca8c100c2d1ab@mail.gmail.com>

Much of the early work in linguistics doesn't belong in the history of
thought to the French. For example, the 19th century conceptualization
of phoneme.

Saussure gets credit for a lot because of the impact and influence on
many Europeans.

To simplify and summarize, what sticks out about structuralist
analysis of language is:

1. the arbitrariness of the connection between the signifier and
signified under the sign (any link is not iconic, is not motivated)
2. a social (not psychological) differential theory of
meaning--meaning arises from differences/contrasts (such as
phonological, morpho-phonological, lexical, etc.)
3. language's ability to carry meaning is based on a conventional SYSTEM

Much of 1 is prefigured in Peirce and, for the purpose of modern
semiotics, perhaps worked out better there. Two became an obsession of
the French structuralists, and some have dubbed this the 'negative'
view of meaning. But then we can see why Lacan might latch onto not
just this idea but the ways in which Frege (and Husserl) worked out
how to argue 'what is a number'  to adduce 'what is the self',
post-Freud. As for the social as a SYSTEM and the need for analysis
that takes that into account, that is why 20th century figures insist
on making Marx a structuralist and even a post-structuralist.

Some analysis of language now argues that spoken human languages are
not anywhere near as arbitrary as originally thought. You can find
many striking examples of iconicity and motivation in both spoken and
written language. That worldwide so many languages have
similar-sounding words for babies to say 'mama'. There are NATURAL
reasons why babies everywhere say such similar things. Because their
physiological and phonological development limits what they can say to
syllables like the ones comprising 'ma-ma'.
There are many other striking aspects of language which can not be
said to be arbitrary.
But much of what you define as otherwise would depend on what of human
psychology, cognition, linguistic development etc. you accept as
'natural'.

To name a few linguistic phenomena worthy of consideration as
motivated (not arbitrary): sound symbolisms, like phonomimes,
phenomimes, pscyhomimes. I can tell you, for example, the words for
'knock knock' as in knocking on a door, in English are not that
different from Japanese (kan-kan). Why the repetition of a /k/ sound?
Phenomimes might use language to describe non-audible phenomena.
Greasy, gooey, gunk, grunge, gross, etc. English does something with
/g/ that is found in other languages as well, including Japanese.
Also, for example, if I wanted to say it rains softly, I might say Ame
ga shitoshito to furu. The term 'shito-shito' conveys the sense of a
hush. Before you dismiss the motivation, let me point out that the
English word 'hush' has a similar pronunciation and the sound /sh/.
And in both languages we might say be quiet by making the shhhh sound.

Humans can then incorporate this ability back into written language.
What, for example, about written English is motivated? Why did we
choose a letter <o> to stand for vowels sounds with lip rounding (just
say the name of the letter O)? Why do the letters <l> and <r> help to
differentiate two somewhat phonetically similar liquid consonants?
Think about what your tongue does when you say the sounds /l/ vs. /r/.
Korean Hangul systematically incorporates articulatory aspects, though
whether or not they are useful for reading Korean if you are a native
speaker of the language seems dubious.

I think motivation in language is a much more interesting phenomenon.
I think it can help account for the origins of human language. I also
think we overlook the incorporation of the entire body when we produce
speech, spoken language. Nowadays so much communication takes place
outside of face-to-face encounters, but it must be pointed out that
this is what human languages originally evolved and developed for. Not
literary texts, not scripted TV programs and movies recorded on film
and video, not e-mail, etc.However, bodily motivated aspects of
speech--many of them visual--are integral to language acquisition.
This is why a child does not just pick up a foreign language parked in
front of a TV with a foreign channel on. This is not to say that
arbitrariness hasn't helped extend our use of language. But it is easy
to overlook what is the core of acquiring a language and using it to
make meaning at the most personal levels.

CJ


From jannuzi at gmail.com  Sun Jun 22 02:21:21 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2008 17:21:21 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] structuralist linguistics plus follow up on phoneme
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806220121hbc698aej22a3e042163db168@mail.gmail.com>

I guess I should have been more complete. I wasn't trying to sound
authoritative but I should have pointed out that F. Saussure was
Swiss, and perhaps his most influential work, his lectures on General
Linguistics were near the end of his career and well after his years
in Paris. One source of inspiration, it would seem, for much
post-structuralist thought is due to the unworkability of basic
structuralist tenets when trying to do systematic analysis of social
phenomena. Just as with Marx and Marxism , first, a lot of energy and
time are taken up with textual exegesis and hermeneutics (and even
history, though we don't have to contend with the Russian Revolution,
the Spanish Civil War, or why or why not Trotsky deserved an ice axe
to the skull) . Second, even when a group of scholars agree to terms,
the terms turn out not to yield much in way of scientific power. As
problematic as the results were in phonology, for example, they were a
lot more convincing than work at 'higher' levels of language. That is
until Chomsky and Halle SPE (
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Sound_Pattern_of_English ).

The history of linguistics says that the coining of the term 'phoneme'
belongs to the French,
Dufriche-Desgenettes , for whom it is supposed to have meant a speech
sound (so I wonder what he used the term 'phone' for). But its more
modern meanings come from, de Courtenay, according to the Wiki article
(warning there, as Wiki articles on linguistics are collectively
written and edited but mostly truly awful),

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phoneme

>>The term phoneme as an abstraction was developed by the Polish linguist Jan Niecis?aw Baudouin de Courtenay and his student Miko?aj Kruszewski during 1875-1895. The term used by these two was fonema, the basic unit of what they called psychophonetics. The concept of the phoneme was elaborated in the works of Nikolai Trubetzkoi and other of the Prague School (during the years 1926-1935), as well as in that of structuralists like Ferdinand de Saussure, Edward Sapir, and Leonard Bloomfield. Later, it was also used in generative linguistics, most famously by Noam Chomsky and Morris Halle, and remains central to many accounts of the development of modern of phonology. As a theoretical concept or model, though, it has been supplemented and even replaced by others.  >>


----------------------------

As for phonological units that replace the phoneme, the one that
interests me the most is the phonological articulatory gesture. Much
of this work is done by people who have some association with the
Haskins Laboratory. If you want to describe and categorize dynamic
speech at a phonological level, you need a dynamic unit
(unfortunately, one that denies simple segmentation, since
co-articulation--even before actual phonation-- is the rule with real
speech, not the exception).

The segmental phoneme it most likely will turn out to be simply one
way you can analyze language into static units if you want to write it
for literacy instead of speaking it. Some languages are written
phonologically and/or phonetically (Korean in Hangul being a good
example, and in roman alphabet, Spanish and Serbian being often
cited). Some are written alphabetically but at a more morphological
level--that is quite a bit of English and probably no accident,
French. Some are written a unified morphemic level--that is Chinese.
Japanese mixes phono-syllabic with morpheme-level Chinese characters,
with a very limited use of roman alphabet (usually acronyms).

CJ

From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Sun Jun 22 02:47:35 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2008 03:47:35 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (5)
Message-ID: <E1KAKJo-0001Tk-87@elasmtp-banded.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

I have a couple more reviews of Friedman to review, plus a couple of 
related articles on history and historiography of analytical 
philosophy and the analytical-continental divide.  But I'll save that 
for next time. I happened to stumble onto this article:

Preston, Aaron. 
"<http://blogs.valpo.edu/apreston/files/2008/01/conformism-in-analytic-philosophy.doc>Conformism 
in Analytic Philosophy: On Shaping Philosophical Boundaries and 
Prejudices," The Monist, Volume 88, #2, April 2005, pp. 292-319.
URL: 
blogs.valpo.edu/apreston/files/2008/01/conformism-in-analytic-philosophy.doc

Now, this is just one piece of a larger puzzle, presumably assembled 
in Preston's book 
<http://www.amazon.com/Analytic-Philosophy-History-Illusion-Continuum/dp/0826490034/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1200974145&sr=1-1>Analytic 
Philosophy: The History of an Illusion, London and New York: 
<http://www.continuumbooks.com/Books/detail.aspx?ReturnURL=/Search/default.aspx&CountryID=2&ImprintID=2&BookID=124965>Continuum, 
2007.   Even so, there's a dimension to this article that strikes me 
as . . . well, idiotic.

Preston's greatest offense is to marshal the laughable "science of 
memes" to explain the sudden rise of "analytical philosophy", 
something that exists as a social formation but lacking the 
intellectual characteristics--common philosophemes--of a school, 
hence based on something other than a bona fide intellectual project. 
What motivates this alleged meme is not addressed in this 
article.  If this entityt is based on an illusion, then I suppose 
Kuhn's concept of paradigm would not apply. But the social causes 
adduced are the pettiest and most person; there's no conception of 
ideology here, no relation to other social trends, just a meme 
irrationally accumulating force in society.  This is one more reason 
to kick Richard Dawkins in the nuts, memetically speaking. For a 
sociology of knowledge, this is pretty idiotic.  For bourgeois 
philosophers gone sociologically buck wild, branding is all they 
know.  Culture is not only like natural selection, it's also only the 
advertising industry.

The notion of conformism, that analytical philosophy expresses social 
conformism, not a genuine school or common project-- I wonder how 
this really differs from the common human tendency to respond to 
conditioning and proceed upon unexamined assumptions.  And in any 
case, at what stage and by whom did this particular brand of 
conformism kick in, if it was not there at the creation?

With enemies like this, I could start to like analytical philosophers.

More of Preston's work:

Aaron Preston's Philosophy Page
http://blogs.valpo.edu/apreston/publications/

<http://blogs.valpo.edu/apreston/files/2008/01/prolegomena-to-any-future-history-of-analytic-philosophy.pdf> 
<http://blogs.valpo.edu/apreston/files/2008/01/prolegomena-to-any-future-history-of-analytic-philosophy.pdf>Prolegomena 
to Any Future History of Analytic Philosophy, Metaphilosophy, 35:4, 
July 2004, 445-465.

  <http://blogs.valpo.edu/apreston/files/2008/01/implications-of-current-work-on-the-history-of-analytic-philosophy.doc>Implications 
of Current Work on the History of Analytic Philosophy, Bertrand 
Russell Society Quarterly, no. 127, August 2005, 11-30.

From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Sun Jun 22 16:21:15 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2008 18:21:15 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Fear him !
Message-ID: <485E981A.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

exposeobama.com

Over at the FoRK list (geared toward tech/geeks), where a lot of
debates 
over religion take place, one of the subscribers inclined toward
atheism 
iirc forwarded some conservative claptrap about obama, his background,
etc. 
it's from human events. man, these folks are obsessed!

Subject: Was Barack Obama A Muslim? From:
HumanEvents at HumanEventsOnline.com 

Below please find a special message from one of our advertisers, Expose

Obama.com. From time to time, we receive opportunities we believe you
as a 
valued customer may want to know about. Please note that the following

message does not necessarily reflect the editorial positions of Human
Events.

Keep Reading For A Sneak Preview Of Our Latest Expose Obama Commercial

Which Poses the Question: "Was Barack Hussein Obama a Muslim. He says
'no,' 
but the Associated Press found records...."

But before we go any further... let's make one thing perfectly clear.
It 
doesn't really matter whether Barack Hussein Obama WAS a Muslim or
not!

What DOES matter is -- Can Barack Hussein Obama be trusted?

Is Barack Hussein Obama side-stepping questions about his Muslim
childhood?

And if so... WHY?

Pivotal questions come to mind:

is there more information -- as of yet undisclosed -- that Obama thinks
the 
American people would find repugnant?

if he is side-stepping questions, is it because he REALLY believes that
the 
patriotic people of America are all GUN-TOTIN', BIBLE-THUMPIN' bigots
and 
thus incapable of understanding the full-and-complete TRUTH?

and perhaps the most important question is, WHY DO the liberal media
and 
other assorted Obamaniacs, scramble about and circle the wagons around

Barack Hussein Obama EVERY SINGLE TIME QUESTIONS ABOUT HIM ARE RAISED?

That last question is already becoming the most important.

When we released this commercial to the media on Thursday morning, the

liberal 'blogosphere' went crazy. Within hours, liberals had already
put 
their smear-machine into overdrive. And within hours we received scores
of 
profane (and in some cases outright menacing) calls on our answering
machine.

What's the bottom line?

Simply put, LIBERALS DO NOT WANT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO SEE THIS
COMMERCIAL!

THEY KNOW THIS COMMERCIAL WILL DO MAJOR DAMAGE TO BARACK HUSSEIN
OBAMA!

Please understand, the fact that you are reading this letter is an 
indication that, as a conservative and a patriot, you already know that

BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA IS THE MOST DANGEROUS MAN IN AMERICA!

But the VAST MAJORITY of Americans are still spoon-fed news from the 
liberal media... a media which still holds a virtual monopoly on what
most 
Americans read, see and hear... a media which has already shown itself
to 
clearly be in Barack Hussein Obama's camp!

There is not a moment to lose. Obamaniacs in the media and at-large
know 
that when enough Americans see our newly release Expose Obama
commercial 
they will start asking the pivotal question: "Was Barack Hussein Obama
a 
Muslim?" They know that OBAMA CAN'T GIVE A CONSISTENT ANSWER TO THE 
QUESTION and the last thing they want is for people (particularly 
Independents and even some conservative Democrats) to start asking the

question!

Please use this hyperlink or the button to the right to view a sneak 
preview our newly released Expose Obama Commercial and if you agree
that 
EVERYONE must see this explosive commercial before liberals in the
media 
have the chance to spin it, then you can TAKE IMMEDIATE and DIRECT
ACTION. 
You can be an integral part of the movement to Expose Barack Hussein
Obama 
to the American people! Let's make it happen!


Is Obama Contradicting Himself When It Comes To His Upbringing?

At a January 15, 2008 debate, Obama said:

"In the Internet age, there are going to be lies that are spread all
over 
the place. I have been victimized by these lies. Fortunately, the
American 
people are, I think, smarter than folks give them credit for."

Of course lies have been around long before the Internet and
unfortunately 
for Barack Hussein Obama, the American people ARE a lot smarter than he
thinks!

On January 16, 2007, Insight Magazine published a story titled,
"Hillary's 
team has questions about Obama's Muslim background."

The thrust of the Insight Magazine article is summed up in the lead 
paragraph: "Are the American people ready for an elected president who
was 
educated in a Madrassa as a young boy and has not been forthcoming
about 
his Muslim heritage?"

In response, the Obama campaign issued the following denial on January
23, 
2007 which read:

"All of the claims about Senator Obama's faith and education raised in
the 
Insight Magazine story and repeated on Fox News are false. Senator
Obama 
was raised in a secular household in Indonesia by his stepfather and 
mother. Obama's stepfather worked for a U.S. oil company, and sent his

stepson to two years of Catholic school, as well as two years of public

school. " [Emphasis Mine]

But wait a minute! Twelve years earlier Obama stated in his book,
"Dreams 
of My Father:"

"In Indonesia, I had spent two years at a Muslim school, two years at a

Catholic school. In the Muslim school, the teacher wrote to tell my
mother 
that I made faces during Koranic studies." [Emphasis Mine]

While the word "Madrassa" has taken on some rather negative
connotations, 
it's simply the Arabic word for "school."

By his own admission, Obama did attend a "Muslim school" and as
required he 
engaged in "Koranic studies."

So why the need to parse his words?

Again, it doesn't really matter whether Barack Hussein Obama WAS a
Muslim 
or not. The important question is CAN WE TRUST HIM?

AND EVERY SINGLE TIME this commercial is seen, people of all political

persuasions will ask that very legitimate question: CAN WE TRUST HIM?

That's why the Obamaniacs DON'T WANT YOU -- or anyone else for that
matter 
-- TO SEE THIS COMMERCIAL! That's why they're circling the wagons and 
preparing for battle!

That's also why YOU MUST be a part of this effort to make sure EVERY 
American sees this commercial.

There is not a moment to lose. Obamaniacs in the media and at-large
know 
that when enough Americans see our newly release Expose Obama
commercial 
they will start asking the pivotal question: "Was Barack Hussein Obama
a 
Muslim?" They know that OBAMA CAN'T GIVE A CONSISTENT ANSWER TO THE 
QUESTION and the last thing they want is for people (particularly 
Independents and even some conservative Democrats) to start asking the

question!

Please use this hyperlink or the button to the right to view a sneak 
preview our newly released Expose Obama Commercial and if you agree
that 
EVERYONE must see this explosive commercial before liberals in the
media 
have the chance to spin it, then you can TAKE IMMEDIATE and DIRECT
ACTION. 
You can be an integral part of the movement to Expose Barack Hussein
Obama 
to the American people! Let's make it happen!



If At First You Don't Succeed, Parse, Parse Again.

Obama's campaign website very emphatically states: "OBAMA IS NOT AND
HAS 
NEVER BEEN A MUSLIM."

Moreover, the January 23, 2007 denial quoted earlier also states:

"To be clear, Senator Obama has never been a Muslim, was not raised a
Muslim."

Obama went even further while on the campaign trail at the Smoky Row
Coffee 
Shop in Oskaloosa, Iowa:

"My mother was a Christian from Kansas, and they married and then
divorced. 
I was raised by my mother. So, I've always been a Christian."

Of course, Obama's sister, Maya Soetoro, in a statement released by the

Obama campaign said that Obama did in fact attend the Mosque with his 
family, "for big communal events not every Friday."

As for Obama's mother Stanley Ann Dunham being a Christian, Tim Jones
of 
the Chicago Tribune attributes the following quote to Dunham's best
friend 
in High School, Maxine Box:

"She touted herself as an atheist, and it was something she'd read
about 
and could argue. She was always challenging and arguing and comparing.
She 
was already thinking about things that the rest of us hadn't."

As for the statement that he's always been a Christian, Obama recounts
in 
his book, "Dreams of my Father" that he was not baptized until 1988.

"I remained a reluctant skeptic, doubtful of my own motives, wary of 
expedient conversion, having too many quarrels with God to accept a 
salvation too easily won."

That leaves us with a lot of contradictory statements (or maybe that's
what 
he really means by "CHANGE");

1) The campaign says he was not raised Muslim but he attended Mosque
with 
his family -- how often we really don't know!

2) His mother was a Christian who, according to a close friend, touted

herself as an Atheist!

3) He was always a Christian but was not baptized until 1988?

Maybe Obama is just confused? But if so, the question still remains,
CAN WE 
TRUST HIM?

The media will continue to give Obama a free ride.

But you can ask the real questions and make a difference!

There is not a moment to lose. Obamaniacs in the media and at-large
know 
that when enough Americans see our newly release Expose Obama
commercial 
they will start asking the pivotal question: "Was Barack Hussein Obama
a 
Muslim?" They know that OBAMA CAN'T GIVE A CONSISTENT ANSWER TO THE 
QUESTION and the last thing they want is for people (particularly 
Independents and even some conservative Democrats) to start asking the

question!

Please use this hyperlink or the button to the right to view a sneak 
preview our newly released Expose Obama Commercial and if you agree
that 
EVERYONE must see this explosive commercial before liberals in the
media 
have the chance to spin it, then you can TAKE IMMEDIATE and DIRECT
ACTION. 
You can be an integral part of the movement to Expose Barack Hussein
Obama 
to the American people! Let's make it happen!



Is It A Media Conspiracy Or Just A Lot Of Sloppy Reporting?

Let's face facts. The liberal media rarely REPORTS anymore... mostly it

just DISTORTS!

And when it comes to Barack Hussein Obama, the liberal media only saves
the 
hard-nosed investigative reporting -- and editorializing -- for his
detractors!

Jonathan Alter of Newsweek attacked the Insight Magazine article
calling it 
a "Madrassa hoax," "grade-school innuendo" and "a pathetic little
saga."

The Chicago Tribune used the term "Anatomy of a False Story?"

The Washington Post wrote disparaging terms such as "juvenile," 
"scurrilous" and "contemptible."

Of course, a couple of minor items in the Insight article were
factually 
incorrect.

The amount of time Obama spent in a "Madrassa" was stated as four years

instead of two years and Insight referred to the "Madrassa" as a
"Muslim 
Seminary" (it would have been more accurate perhaps to simply refer to
it 
as a Muslim grade-school that provided two hours of daily Koranic
instruction).

The liberal media was quick to point out those minor discrepancies. 
Jonathan Alter, in particular, showed a sickening pro-Obama bias, 
editorializing and carelessly throwing out innuendos and outright
fabrications.

Just one example:

"The subtext of the story was that Obama was some kind of Muslim
Manchurian 
Candidate (or the Russian spy played by Kevin Costner in .No Way Out.)
-- 
trained in an Indonesian religious school to be a jihadist who would do
Al 
Qaeda's work from within."

One might wonder if Alter wasn't confused himself.

And in just about every single instance, the legitimate questions
regarding 
Obama that were addressed by the Insight article went untouched and 
unacknowledged.

The liberal media isn't going to do the job! We'll have to do it for
them!

The liberal media will only expose Obama's detractors. It's up to US to

EXPOSE OBAMA!

There is not a moment to lose. Obamaniacs in the media and at-large
know 
that when enough Americans see our newly release Expose Obama
commercial 
they will start asking the pivotal question: "Was Barack Hussein Obama
a 
Muslim?" They know that OBAMA CAN'T GIVE A CONSISTENT ANSWER TO THE 
QUESTION and the last thing they want is for people (particularly 
Independents and even some conservative Democrats) to start asking the

question!

Please use this hyperlink or the button to the right to view a sneak 
preview our newly released Expose Obama Commercial and if you agree
that 
EVERYONE must see this explosive commercial before liberals in the
media 
have the chance to spin it, then you can TAKE IMMEDIATE and DIRECT
ACTION. 
You can be an integral part of the movement to Expose Barack Hussein
Obama 
to the American people! Let's make it happen!



Bruce Hawkins Executive Director ExposeObama.com

P.S. Even if you can not join us in this effort right now, you can
still 
help us expose Barack Hussein Obama by sending this e-mail to at least
10 
of your friends.

Paid for by the National Campaign Fund and not authorized by any
candidate 
or candidate's committee. ExposeObama.com is a project of the National

Campaign Fund.

Contributions are not tax deductible for federal income tax purposes.

Contributions are only used in Federal elections. Contributions are
limited 
to $5000.00 per calendar year from an individual. Federal law requires

political committees to report the name, address, occupation and name
of 
employer for each individual whose contributions aggregate in excess of

$200 in a calendar year. Contributions may only be accepted from United

States citizens at least eighteen years of age. Contributions must be
made 
from an individual's personal funds and cannot be made from the general

treasury funds of a corporation, labor organization, national bank or
from 
the general treasury of an entity or person who is a federal
contractor. 
Funds cannot be provided to a contributor by another person or entity
for 
the purpose of making a contribution.



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Sun Jun 22 16:09:50 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2008 17:09:50 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (6)
Message-ID: <E1KAWrE-0002Id-Lr@elasmtp-dupuy.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

Houkes, Wybo. Review: Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways: 
Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger, Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, vol. 40, no. 4, October 2002: 554-555.

Concise summary with some praise, and a caveat:

"Yet it can only be part of the story, especially in Heidegger's 
case. Friedman suggests that Being and Time was still sensitive to 
developments in logic and science, but that Heidegger became more 
radical later, "under pressure of, among other things, his enounters 
with both Carnap and Cassirer" (151). But he does not support this 
claim. Even in the early 1920s, Heidegger's style and preferences 
were different from Carnap's or Cassirer's. Friedman's presentation 
of his work is sympathetic, but more distanced, as shown, for 
instance, by the number of quotation marks in the chapter on 
Heidegger. Furthermore, Friedman's assessment seems overly 
charitable: only one paragraph in Being and Time deals with 
relativity theory, biology, and the foundations of mathematics, and 
it does not discuss logic after Frege at all. And the anti-scientific 
spirit of Being and Time seems more vehement than warranted by 
Southwest Neokantianism alone." (555)

Next, a couple of articles on the history of analytical philosophy, 
beginning with this tease:

Sluga, Hans. "What Has History to Do With Me? Wittgenstein and 
Analytic Philosophy," Inquiry, vol. 41, 1998, pp. 99-121.

Review discussion centering on Peter Hacker's Wittgenstein's Place in 
Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). 
Critical of Hacker's British and Wittgensteinian bias in the 
historical evaluation of analytical philosophy. Also deals with 
general historiographical concerns in the history of ideas (cf. 
Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge ), the history of the category 
"analytical philosophy", and analytical philosophy's belated coming 
to grips with its ahistorical perspective (which might have actually 
been related to its international character) and its own history. 
(See also Nagel, "Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy 
in Europe," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 33, 1936.) (RD)

From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Sun Jun 22 18:03:39 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2008 20:03:39 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Materialist critique
Message-ID: <485EB01A.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

         For Women's Liberation: A  Comradely
          Critique of _The Manifesto_ and Historical 
                            Materialism

                 (For Angela Y. Davis)




 By Charles Brown


"Because exploited classes are coerced into producing surpluses for exploiting classes by making supply of the physiological necessities of life to the exploited classes conditional upon their producing those surpluses. Not only do exploited classes produce the physiological and derivative material necessities of life for society , but they are denied the fruits of their labor unless they supply the bosses, the ruling classes with super fruits."



           To me _The Manifesto of the Communist Party_ remains extraordinarily
persuasive of the historical epoch of which we are today still a part.  The argument
of the Manifesto is convincing in part because it is consistently courageous in
intelligently critiquing the order of the powers that be. Then, as now, the ruling
class ruins and murders those who so take them on. Famous examples in our country are
Nat Turner,  Marcus Garvey, Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, Fred Hampton, Paul Robeson and the Communist Party en masse.

           However, _The Manifesto_ shows  cowardice , and more bourgeois than communist
finesse in dealing with marriage, the family, patriarchy and monogamy. Marx and Engels
say the bourgeoisie accuse the communists of wanting to abolish the monogamous family
when the bourgeoisie have already in fact done so.  Then they cleverly, artfully,
correctly show how the bourgeois, male chauvinist practices of adultery, prostitution
and related activities have already in actual fact abolished the monogamous family,
although it hypocritically remains the law and custom.
          Marx and Engels dodge the dialectical requirement that they present an
affirmative, not just negative aspect, to their critique of bourgeois society's form
of the family. They defer to the taboo against even discussing sex positively,
affirmatively, fulfillingly.
           What is the Communist proposal for the next forms of the family ?  Given
Marx and Engels'' dialectical, evolutionary-revolutionary perspective on every other
institution, presumably for them, the mode of the family changes along with the mode
of production and the state. But they mention in the Manifesto no family equivalent in
reproduction to the formula "abolition of private property" in production or "working
class as the ruling class" in politics and the state. We would not expect them to
speculate a full utopian idea of the family, but at least give us a hint as they do in
political economy.
          To me this all demonstrates the European taboo on public (and much private),
revolutionary discussion and critique of reproductive institutions and practices ( the
mode of reproduction) is even stronger than that on revolutionary criticism of
productive institutions and practices, that is the mode of production. Freud's
breaking of this taboo has continuing value today, with all of his faults.
          Marx and Engels did creep up on telling the truth about the revolutionary
direction of the development of the family. Many years after the Manifesto, in  _The
Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State_ , Engels gained a lot of courage
that had been lacking.  Engels also published many years after they had been written
by Marx the "Theses on Feuerbach", the fourth of which says:

           "  Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-alienation, of the
             duplication of the world into a religious world and a secular one. His
              work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis.

              But that the secular basis detaches itself from itself and establishes

              itself as an independent realm in the clouds can only be exploited
              by the cleavages and self-contradictions within this secular basis.
              The latter
               therefore, in itself be both understood in its contradiction and
               revolutionised in practice. Thus, for instance, _after the
              earthly family
               is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must
              then itself be destroyed in theory and practice_" (emphasis added,
              C.B)


               So, Marx knew that monogamy would be revolutionised and "destroyed". He
just did not shout it, the way he did "expropriate the expropriators" and the like.

               Let us examine the issue a little more deeply.  By the Manifesto every
Marxist knows the A,B,C's of historical materialism or the materialist conception of
history. The history of  hitherto existing society, since the breaking up of the
ancient communes, is a history of class struggles between oppressor and oppressed.
Classes are groups that associate in a division of labor to produce their material
means of existence. Why are class struggles fundamental in determining the whole of society's laws and rules, it's history and culture, the "super-structure" ?

Because exploited classes are coerced into producing surpluses for exploiting classes by making supply of the physiological necessities of life to the exploited classes conditional upon their producing those surpluses. Not only do exploited classes produce the physiological and derivative material necessities of life for society , but they are denied the fruits of their labor unless they supply the bosses, the ruling classes with super fruits.

               In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels asserted an elementary
anthropological or "human nature" rationale for this conception of class relations determining substantially the shape of society as a whole. In a section titled
"History: Fundamental Conditions, they say:
               "*life involves before everything else eating and drinking,
               a habitation, clothing and many other things.  The first historical
               act is thus the production of material life itself.  And indeed this
               is an historical act, a fundamental condition of all history, which
               today, as thousands of years ago, must daily and hourly be
               fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life."

          Production and economic classes are the starting point of Marxist analysis
of  human society because human life, like all plant and animal life must fulfill
biological needs to exist as life at all. It is an appeal to biologic (which I
support, all of the anti-vulgar materialist critiques to the contrary notwithstanding,
but that's my other paper).  Whatever humans do that is "higher" than plants and
animals, we cannot do if we do not first fulfill or plant/animal like needs, physiological necessities.

Therefore, the "higher" (cultural, semiotic. super-structrual, social conditioning traditions, "super-natural, aesthetic, artistic etc.) human activities are limited or negatively determined ( See Marshall Sahlins' _Culture and Practical Reason_ on biological limits of culture) by the 
productive activities, the activities that produce biological necessities.  This means that historical materialism starts with human
nature, our human natural species qualities, Feuerbach's "species-being "

          Yet , it is fundamental in biology that the basic life sustaining processes
of a species are twofold. There is obtaining the material means of life and
subsistence or success of survival of the living generation, for existence
("production"). But just as fundamentally there is reproduction or success in creating
a next generation of the species that is fertile, and survives until it too reproduces
viable offspring.  Whoever heard of a one generation species ? In fact, one test of
two individual animals being of the same species is their ability to mate and produce
viable offspring.  We can imagine a group of living beings with the ultimate success
in eating and drinking, a habitation, sleeping, clothing, disposing of waste, cleanliness and healthy surroundings and many other things. But if they do
not also reproduce, they are either not a species or they are an extinct species (
unless the individuals are immortal).
          Thus, having premised their theory in part on human biology, our
"species-being",, Marx and Engels are logically obligated to develop historical
materialism based, not only on the logic of subsistence production, but also on the
logic of next generation reproduction.
          In  _The German Ideology_, they did recognize reproduction as a "fundamental
condition of history" along with production. However, they give reproduction  or , at
least, "the family" a subordinate "fundamental" status to production when they say,

         "The third circumstance which, from the very outset, enters into
          historical development, is that men, who daily remake their own life
          begin to make other men, to propagate their kind: the relation
          between
           man and woman, parents and children, the family.  The family, which
          to begin with is the only social relationship, becomes later, when
          increased needs create a new social relations and the increased
          population new  needs, a subordinate one*"

         My thesis in this essay is that the mode of reproduction (in the broad sense,
including, but not limited to social institutions called "the" family) of human beings
remains throughout human history equally fundamental with the mode of production in
shaping society, even with the "new social relations" that come with "increased
population".  For there to be history in the sense of many generations of women and
men, all of the way up to Marx, Engels and us today, men had to do more than "begin
to make other men." Women and men had to complete making next generations by sexually
uniting and rearing them for thousands of years. Otherwise history would have ended
long ago. We would be an extinct species. An essential characteristic of history is
its existence in the "medium" , the ":material substratum" of multiple generations.
Thus, with respect to historical materialism, reproduction is as necessary as
production.
         Not only that. In the above quoted passage, Marx and Engels give reproduction
a "subordinate" ,"fundamental" condition of history status by the following sleight of
hand: in part population increase or the success of reproduction somehow makes
reproduction less important in "entering into historical development" as a
"fundamental conditon". ( or  "primary historical relation" in another translation;
also "basic aspect of social activity"). This is quite a misogynist dialectic, given
that "men" are in the first premise and the third premise, but women only are
mentioned explicitly in the latter. It is also an idealist philosophical error,
because the theory now tends to abstract from the real social life of individuals in
reproduction.
        Another passage in The German Ideology demonstrates the same sort of magical
rather than scientific use of "dialectic" with respect to reproduction, and in this
case the impact on the materialist philosophical consistency of their argument is more
direct and explicit. They say,

        "Only now, after having considered four moments, four aspects of
        primary historical relations, do we find that man also possesses
"consciousness."But even from the outset this is not "pure" consciousness. The "mind"
is from the outset afflicted with the curse of being "burdened" with matter, which
here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of
language, Language is as old as consciousness* language like consciousness, only
arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men*Consciousness is,
therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men
exist at all.  Consciousness is at first of course, merely consciousness concerning
the immediate sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with
other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious*This
sheep-like or tribal consciousness receives its further development or extension
through increased productivity, the increase in needs, and , what is fundamental to both of these,the increase in population.  With these there develops the division of
labor, which     was originally nothing but the division of labor in the sexual act,
then the division of labor which develops spontaneously or "naturally" by virtue of
natural predisposition (e.g., physical strength, needs, accidents,etc., etc.) Division
of labor         becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and
mental labour appears.  From this moment onwards consciousness can really
flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that
it really represents something without representing something real; from now on
consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to
formation of "pure" theory, theology, philosophy, morality, etc."


            In this long paragraph (only partially quoted), we see Marx and Engels's
early formulation and explanation of the origin for what Engels later famously dubbed
the fundamental question of philosophy "*materialism or idealism ?"  is rooted in the
"second" original division of labor.  For some reason, the "first" original division
of labor, which gives women equivalent complementary status with men, just disappears
and is replaced by a productive division of labor, between "men's" minds and hands.
And to make it worse, once again, the "reason"   the reproductive division of labor
disappears as an ongoing fundamental  determinate  throughout history is it's own
success in creating a population explosion.  This seems to be an error of substituting
a negative and destructive dialectic in thought for what in being and becoming is the
most fundamentally positive and fruitful dialectic in human history. How is it that the reproduction of more and more people, "surpluses" of human population does not become a basis for coercion the way production of material surpluses at the origin of agriculture and animal husbandry did ? Engels  later claims that women were coerced to be monogamous, lost significant control of their bodies and children.
           Here is a key connecting point: then in their anthropological speculation in _The German Ideology_.  Marx and Engels (whom I love dearly)
substitute for the reproductive division of labor a productive division of labor as the
fundamentally determining contradiction of historical development.  This division of
labor, between predominantly mental and predominantly material labor, becomes the root
of development of classes, the importance of which is declared in the first sentence
of The Manifesto. Yet, Marx and Engels commit the same error of abstraction at one
level that they criticize at the next level - the error that mental labor makes, that idealist philosophy and religion make,  in abstracting and inverting, flipping upside down and onto the head,
from the concrete reality of physical laboring classes.  This is also seen from the fact that
they keep depending on "population increase", which is another name for reproduction
and "the sexual act,", childrearing and education, to explain the origin of increased "productivity" and "needs",
which seem to be the "premises" for the division between material and mental labor
(and are because of the role of material surpluses in making possible creation of the class of predominantly mental laborers, who are free from physical labor to concentrate on thinking, and developing their consciousnesses). Thus, we might
say that the original idealist philosophical inconsistency of Marxist materialism is
abstraction from  reproduction.

        In fact, by 1884, with the impact of anthropological studies, in the Preface
to the First Edition of _The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State_,
Engels shows an advance in his consciousness on this issue when he says:

        "According to the materialistic conception, the determining factor in
history is , in the final instance, the production and _reproduction_ of  immediate
life. (emphasis added -CB). This, again (again ?, C.B.), is of a twofold character : on the one side, the
production of the means of existence, of food, clothing and      shelter and the tools
necessary for that production; on the other side, the production of human beings
themselves, the propagation of the species.The social organization under which the
people of a particular historical epoch and a particular country live is determined by
both kinds of production: by the stage of development of labor on the one hand and of
the family on the other."

This word formulation giving coequal status to the family with labor, and the change in it from that in _The German Ideology_ support the
basic thesis of this essay: that reproduction is an equally fundamental, not a
subordinate, process with production in shaping human society from its origins through modern
times.  

But Engels's formulation in _The Origin_ is after Marx's death and late in their
heroic joint project in developing Marxism. Thus, the main classic writings of Marxism
and Marx and Engels's political activity focused in production and political economy
not equally on the evolution of forms of the family and the other institutions of reproduction.
        _The Origin's_ is the best scientific formulation of the materialistic
conception of history even after "the" family is surrounded by larger or more complex social
institutions in later stages of human history, as asserted in the passage from _The
German Ideology_, quoted above.  Even under capitalism, many of the social relations
and institutions that are quantitatively greater than those in the "nuclear" family
are part of reproduction, such as school and training, and  even medical services and
recreation.
        More importantly, reproduction and production have qualitatively different
functions, both fundamental in constituting our species existence, our species- being.
In other words, not only are reproductive relations not quantitatively less important
in determining history, but from the beginning, from the true original division of
labor as in the sexual act, reproduction has had a qualitatively, complementarily
necessary relation with production in creating history.  From the standpoint of our
uniquely human species character (our culture),it might be said that production makes
objects and reproduction creates subjects.
          Thus, problems in dealing with subjectivity in the history of Marxism ( see
my "Activist Materialism and the End of Philosophy") may in part be remedied by
rethinking Marxism based on equating and even privileging reproduction over production
in interpreting and acting to change the world. At the least, we must make another effort at integrating our analysis of labor with our analysis of caring labor.  This is seen as even more true when we
consider that there  now is for Marxism a scientific, materialist, truth-seeking need
for intellectual affirmative action in using empirical study of reproduction to
re-explain history to compensate for our focus on production in the narratives of Marxism. From a scientific and materialist standpoint, reproduction should have
always been coequal in our understanding of history. This is suggested by Marx and Engels's clipped comments and "admissions" quoted above. It follows from the fundamental physical and biological premises of their historical materialism. They never refute their own halting words, their glimpses of species-being's totality and the
importance that reproduction should have to historical materialist theory.  They just
uncharacteristically fail to develop one of their own stated fundamental materialist
premises. Living Marxists must creatively redevelop historical materialism based on a theoretical and practical compensation for this oversight and incompleteness.

        Dialectical materialism holds that the relationship between subject and object
is dialectical, of course. It is "vulgar" materialism that portrays the subject as
one-sidedly determined by the object. Reproduction and production are complementary
opposites, and their unity in struggle is the fundamental motive force of history
today as in ancient times.  Even more, in the orgasmic aspect of reproduction,
struggle itself turns into its opposite.
                However, when I say "reproduction creates subjects", I mean
"reproduction" in a broader sense than only sexual conception and birth.  Reproduction
includes all childbearing, from the home through all of school and any other type of
training. It is all "caring labor" as defined by Hilary Graham in "Caring: A Labour of
Love" (1983). Reproduction is all of those labors that have as a direct and main
purpose making and caring for a human subject or personality as contrasted with those
labors of production which have as a direct purpose making objects useful to humans.
Reproduction includes affirmative self-creation.


 Frederick Douglass said, "A man is worked on by what he works on."  But before a man works on things, he is made by his mother. 

        Under capitalism with alienation, production's impact in making  subjects is
primarily negative and indirect.  Conversely, reproduction indirectly makes objects,
in the sense that the subject, the human laborer, who is the direct and positive
purpose of reproduction, is the possessor of labor power, the active factor making
objects in production (directly).
        This conception of reproduction is consistent with Marx's basic reasoning in
_Capital_. In his famous development of the concept of the labor theory of value and
surplus value, he asserts that human labor is the only source of new value in the
production process.  The human laborer and the means of production (tools and raw
materials) all add exchange value to a commodity.   But the means of production add no
more value to the commodity than the values added to them by a previous human laborer
in the production of the means of production.  The human labor power is the only
element in the process that can add more value to a commodity than the values that
went into producing that labor power.  The labor of a worker in one-half day ( or nowadays ?
of a day) produces enough value to pay for the necessities creating the worker's labor
power for a full day's work.  The value produced by the worker in the second half of
the day is the surplus value exploited by the capitalist. The worker only receives the money to buy to meet her physiological necessities on the condition she produces the surpluses; she is coerced by this conditional supply of physical necessities, as was pointed out _supra_.

 The creation of the workers' labor power is done in reproduction, in the broad sense that I
have been using that concept in this essay. Thus, reproduction is the "only source" of
the only source of new value (that is not a typo). Subjectivity, psychological spirit or extra enthusiasm and motivation,  is the "source" of the
unique ability (over the non-human means of production) of the human component in the production
process to produce more value than went into producing it. Variable capital has subjectivity, will, and constant capital does not.
        Subjectivity is the source of a sort of Marxist "mind over matter",
Reproduction is the source of subjectivity.  Above I    claimed that there is
 co-primacy and co-determinancy of reproduction with production in the real original division of creation of human life. 
The division of material and mental labor is a secondary and later historical division of labor. We might deduce that it was (and is) within
reproduction that the mind and matter, mental and material, are non-antagonistically related as opposites
(when "men" , humans , are simultaneously theoreticians in their practice as mentioned in The
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844).
      Sociology and common experience teach that historically, women have been the
primary reproductive laborers *from pregnancy and child-rearing to housework, from
elementary and high school teaching to nursing.  Beyond pregnancy, women's
"assignment" to reproductive roles  is historically and ideologically caused and enforced by men, the ruling classes and state power, 
not biologically or genetically caused or necessary (see on this issue, for example _Not in Our
Genes_, by Lewontin ,Levins, et al.)  But as a result of this social and cultural coercion, women are to some extent a historically constituted,
exploited and oppressed reproductive class, whose defining labor is as fundamental to
our material life and species perpetuation as that of the productive laborers Marx and Engels focussed on.
Thus, the  presentation of the fundamentals of the  materialist conception of history in Communist Party educationals   and other popular forums  must be modified, and women's liberation
put on an equal footing with workers' liberation in the Marxist project; and  affirmative notions of  liberated families theorized and dreamt.





This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Sun Jun 22 18:05:27 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2008 20:05:27 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (6)
In-Reply-To: <E1KAWrE-0002Id-Lr@elasmtp-dupuy.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
References: <E1KAWrE-0002Id-Lr@elasmtp-dupuy.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <485EB086.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

What's Southwest Neo-Kantianism ?

>>> Ralph Dumain <rdumain at autodidactproject.org> 06/22/2008 6:09 PM
>>>
Houkes, Wybo. Review: Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways: 
Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger, Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, vol. 40, no. 4, October 2002: 554-555.

Concise summary with some praise, and a caveat:

"Yet it can only be part of the story, especially in Heidegger's 
case. Friedman suggests that Being and Time was still sensitive to 
developments in logic and science, but that Heidegger became more 
radical later, "under pressure of, among other things, his enounters 
with both Carnap and Cassirer" (151). But he does not support this 
claim. Even in the early 1920s, Heidegger's style and preferences 
were different from Carnap's or Cassirer's. Friedman's presentation 
of his work is sympathetic, but more distanced, as shown, for 
instance, by the number of quotation marks in the chapter on 
Heidegger. Furthermore, Friedman's assessment seems overly 
charitable: only one paragraph in Being and Time deals with 
relativity theory, biology, and the foundations of mathematics, and 
it does not discuss logic after Frege at all. And the anti-scientific 
spirit of Being and Time seems more vehement than warranted by 
Southwest Neokantianism alone." (555)

Next, a couple of articles on the history of analytical philosophy, 
beginning with this tease:

Sluga, Hans. "What Has History to Do With Me? Wittgenstein and 
Analytic Philosophy," Inquiry, vol. 41, 1998, pp. 99-121.

Review discussion centering on Peter Hacker's Wittgenstein's Place in 
Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). 
Critical of Hacker's British and Wittgensteinian bias in the 
historical evaluation of analytical philosophy. Also deals with 
general historiographical concerns in the history of ideas (cf. 
Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge ), the history of the category 
"analytical philosophy", and analytical philosophy's belated coming 
to grips with its ahistorical perspective (which might have actually 
been related to its international character) and its own history. 
(See also Nagel, "Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy 
in Europe," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 33, 1936.) (RD)
_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Sun Jun 22 18:12:26 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2008 20:12:26 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Binational indigenous front meets in Oaxaca
Message-ID: <485EB22A.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

SANTIAGO DE JUXTLAHUACA, OAXACA, MEXICO - 31MAY08 - The assembly of 
the Indigenous Front of Binational Organizations in the Mixteca 
region of Oaxaca, one of the poorest areas in Mexico.  A large 
percentage of the indigenous population of Oaxaca and other states 
has left to work in northern Mexico and in the United States. 

The FIOB is a political organization of indigenous communities and 
migrants, with chapters in Mexico and the U.S.  It advocates for the 
rights of migrants, and for the right not to migrate -- for economic 
development which would enable people to stay home. 

Delegates discuss FIOB's bylaws and political positions, vote to 
adopt them, and then elect new binational leadership in a democratic 
and open process.  Julio Sandoval, a delegate from Baja California, 
recounts his experience as a political prisoner in the penitentiary 
of Ensenaada, where he was held for three years after leading a fight 
for housing for indigenous migrants.  At the end of the assembly, 
Gaspar Rivera-Salgado, newly elected as FIOB's binational 
coordinator, addresses the delegates, and a group of Triqui women 
rise to their feet with a clenched-fist salute.


















For more articles and images on immigration, see 
http://dbacon.igc.org/Imgrants/imgrants.htm 

Coming in September, 2008, from Beacon Press:
Illegal People -- How Globalization Creates Migration and 
Criminalizes Immigrants
http://www.beacon.org/productdetails.cfm?PC=2002 

See also the photodocumentary on indigenous migration to the US
Communities Without Borders (Cornell University/ILR Press, 2006)
http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/cup_detail.taf?ti_id=4575 

See also The Children of NAFTA, Labor Wars on the U.S./Mexico Border 
(University of California, 2004)
http://www.ucpress.edu/books/pages/9989.html 
-- 
__________________________________

David Bacon, Photographs and Stories
http://dbacon.igc.org 





This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Sun Jun 22 18:22:22 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2008 20:22:22 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Food Is Gold, So Billions Invested in Farming
Message-ID: <485EB47E.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/05/business/05farm.html?_r=1&em&ex=1212984000&en=3920ed5de889ff2b&ei=5087%0A&oref=slogin

The Food Chain
Food Is Gold, So Billions Invested in Farming 
 Emergent Asset Management
A cattle farm in South Africa is among the holdings of Emergent Asset Management. 

               E-MailPrint Single Page Reprints Save Share
DiggFacebookMixxYahoo! BuzzPermalink
 
By DIANA B. HENRIQUES
Published: June 5, 2008
Huge investment funds have already poured hundreds of billions of dollars into booming financial markets for commodities like wheat, corn and soybeans.

Skip to next paragraph 
The Food Chain
Production and Motivation 
Articles in this series are examining growing demands on, and changes in, the world?s production of food.

Previous Articles in the Series ? 
Related
Leaders Speak of Their Own Issues at a Conference Addressing Food Shortages (June 5, 2008) 
Monsanto Seeks Big Increase in Crop Yields (June 5, 2008) 
Enlarge This Image
 
Ben Garvin for The New York Times
Andrew J. Redleaf, head of the hedge fund Whitebox Advisors, bought several grain elevators from ConAgra and Cargill. 
But a few big private investors are starting to make bolder and longer-term bets that the world?s need for food will greatly increase ? by buying farmland, fertilizer, grain elevators and shipping equipment.

One has bought several ethanol plants, Canadian farmland and enough storage space in the Midwest to hold millions of bushels of grain. 

Another is buying more than five dozen grain elevators, nearly that many fertilizer distribution outlets and a fleet of barges and ships. 

And three institutional investors, including the giant BlackRock fund group in New York, are separately planning to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in agriculture, chiefly farmland, from sub-Saharan Africa to the English countryside.

?It?s going on big time,? said Brad Cole, president of Cole Partners Asset Management in Chicago, which runs a fund of hedge funds focused on natural resources. ?There is considerable interest in what we call ?owning structure? ? like United States farmland, Argentine farmland, English farmland ? wherever the profit picture is improving.?

These new bets by big investors could bolster food production at a time when the world needs more of it.

The investors plan to consolidate small plots of land into more productive large ones, to introduce new technology and to provide capital to modernize and maintain grain elevators and fertilizer supply depots. 

But the long-term implications are less clear. Some traditional players in the farm economy, and others who study and shape agriculture policy, say they are concerned these newcomers will focus on profits above all else, and not share the industry?s commitment to farming through good times and bad.

?Farmland can be a bubble just like Florida real estate,? said Jeffrey Hainline, president of Advance Trading, a 28-year-old commodity brokerage firm and consulting service in Bloomington, Ill. ?The cycle of getting in and out would be very volatile and disruptive.?

By owning land and other parts of the agricultural business, these new investors are freed from rules aimed at curbing the number of speculative bets that they and other financial investors can make in commodity markets. ?I just wonder if they need some sheep?s clothing to put on,? Mr. Hainline said.

Mark Lapolla, an adviser to institutional investors, is also a bit wary of the potential disruption this new money could cause. ?It is important to ask whether these financial investors want to actually operate the means of production ? or simply want to have a direct link into the physical supply of commodities and thereby reduce the risk of their speculation,? he said.

Grain elevators, especially, could give these investors new ways to make money, because they can buy or sell the actual bushels of corn or soybeans, rather than buying and selling financial derivatives that are linked to those commodities. 

When crop prices are climbing, holding inventory for future sale can yield higher profits than selling to meet current demand, for example. Or if prices diverge in different parts of the world, inventory can be shipped to the more profitable market.

?It?s a huge disadvantage to not be able to trade the physical commodity,? said Andrew J. Redleaf, founder of Whitebox Advisors, a hedge fund management firm in Minneapolis. 

Mr. Redleaf bought several large grain elevator complexes from ConAgra and Cargill last year for a long-term stake in what he sees as a high-growth business. The elevators can store 36 million bushels of grain.

?We discovered that our lease customers, major food company types, are really happy to see us, because they are apt to see Cargill and ConAgra as competitors,? he said.

The executives making such bets say that fears about their new role are unfounded, and that their investments will be a plus for farming and, ultimately, for consumers. 

?The world is asking for more food, more energy. You see a huge demand,? said Axel Hinsch, chief executive of Calyx Agro, a division of the giant Louis Dreyfus Commodities, which is buying tens of thousands of acres of cropland in Brazil with the backing of big institutional investors, including AIG Investments.



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From farmelantj at juno.com  Sun Jun 22 18:34:35 2008
From: farmelantj at juno.com (Jim Farmelant)
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2008 20:34:35 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (6)
Message-ID: <20080622.203437.2888.1.farmelantj@juno.com>

 
On Sun, 22 Jun 2008 20:05:27 -0400 "Charles Brown"
<charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us> writes:
> What's Southwest Neo-Kantianism ?
> 

Wikipedia says the following at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neokantianism
-------------------------------------
One major thinker of importance in the first generation of the
Neo-Kantian movement was Hermann Cohen who became known as the leader of
the Marburg School, the other prominent representatives of which were
Paul Natorp, Nicolai Hartmann and Ernst Cassirer. Another important
group, the Southwest School (or Baden School, in Southwest Germany)
included Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert and Ernst Troeltsch. The
Marburg School emphasized epistemology and logic, whereas the Southwest
school emphasized issues of culture and value.
The Neo-Kantian schools tended to emphasize scientific readings of Kant,
often downplaying the role of intuition in favour of concepts. However
the ethical aspects of Neo-Kantian thought often drew them within the
orbit of socialism and they had an important influence on Austromarxism
and the revisionism of Edward Bernstein. Lange and Cohen in particular
were keen on this connection between Kantian thought and socialism
leading Ludwig Von Mises to view Kantian thought as pernicious. Another
aspect of the Neo-Kantian movement that was important was its attempt to
promote a revised notion of the Jewish religion particularly in Cohen's
seminal work, one of the few works of the movement available in English
translation.
--------------------------------------

Also see:  http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/articles/neokantianism.pdf
____________________________________________________________
Orlando Vacations - Click Here!
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL2141/fc/Ioyw6i3nK7u2maOSwD4973jVkxcuT2B4jDqMAohsRrFKd4i04c8XmR/

From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Sun Jun 22 18:45:18 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2008 20:45:18 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (6)
In-Reply-To: <20080622.203437.2888.1.farmelantj@juno.com>
References: <20080622.203437.2888.1.farmelantj@juno.com>
Message-ID: <485EB9DE.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Thanks.  Mach was another neo-Kantian as discussed  by Lenin in
_Materialism and Empirio-Criticism_.   

>>> Jim Farmelant <farmelantj at juno.com> 06/22/2008 8:34 PM >>>

On Sun, 22 Jun 2008 20:05:27 -0400 "Charles Brown"
<charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us> writes:
> What's Southwest Neo-Kantianism ?
> 

Wikipedia says the following at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neokantianism 
-------------------------------------
One major thinker of importance in the first generation of the
Neo-Kantian movement was Hermann Cohen who became known as the leader
of
the Marburg School, the other prominent representatives of which were
Paul Natorp, Nicolai Hartmann and Ernst Cassirer. Another important
group, the Southwest School (or Baden School, in Southwest Germany)
included Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert and Ernst Troeltsch. The
Marburg School emphasized epistemology and logic, whereas the
Southwest
school emphasized issues of culture and value.
The Neo-Kantian schools tended to emphasize scientific readings of
Kant,
often downplaying the role of intuition in favour of concepts. However
the ethical aspects of Neo-Kantian thought often drew them within the
orbit of socialism and they had an important influence on
Austromarxism
and the revisionism of Edward Bernstein. Lange and Cohen in particular
were keen on this connection between Kantian thought and socialism
leading Ludwig Von Mises to view Kantian thought as pernicious.
Another
aspect of the Neo-Kantian movement that was important was its attempt
to
promote a revised notion of the Jewish religion particularly in
Cohen's
seminal work, one of the few works of the movement available in
English
translation.
--------------------------------------

Also see:  http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/articles/neokantianism.pdf

____________________________________________________________
Orlando Vacations - Click Here!
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL2141/fc/Ioyw6i3nK7u2maOSwD4973jVkxcuT2B4jDqMAohsRrFKd4i04c8XmR/

_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Sun Jun 22 19:11:29 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2008 21:11:29 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Iowa Flooding Could Be An Act of Man, Experts Say
Message-ID: <485EC001.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Agriculture must respect the limits of nature" 
From: Louis Proyect <lnp3 at xxxxxxxxx> 
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 09:19:27 -0400 
Cc: 
User-agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.14 (Windows/20080421) 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Iowa Flooding Could Be An Act of Man, Experts Say


By Joel Achenbach
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, June 19, 2008; A01

As the Cedar River rose higher and higher, and as he stacked sandbags
along the levee protecting downtown Cedar Falls, Kamyar Enshayan, a
college professor and City Council member, kept asking himself the same
question: "What is going on?"

The river would eventually rise six feet higher than any flood on
record. Farther downstream, in Cedar Rapids, the river would break the
record by more than 11 feet.

Enshayan, director of an environmental center at the University of
Northern Iowa, suspects that this natural disaster wasn't really all
that natural. He points out that the heavy rains fell on a landscape
radically reengineered by humans. Plowed fields have replaced tallgrass
prairies. Fields have been meticulously drained with underground pipes.
Streams and creeks have been straightened. Most of the wetlands are
gone. Flood plains have been filled and developed.

"We've done numerous things to the landscape that took away these
water-absorbing functions," he said. "Agriculture must respect the
limits of nature."

Officials are still trying to understand all the factors that
contributed to Iowa's flooding, and not everyone has the same suspicions
as Enshayan. For them, the cause was obvious: It rained buckets and
buckets for days on end. They say the changes in land use were lesser
factors in what was really just a case of meteorological bad luck.

But some Iowans who study the environment suspect that changes in the
land, both recently and over the past century or so, have made Iowa's
terrain not only highly profitable but also highly vulnerable to
flooding. They know it's a hard case to prove, but they hope to get
Iowans thinking about how to reduce the chances of a repeat calamity.

"I sense that the flooding is not the result of a 500-year event," said
Jerry DeWitt, director of the Leopold Center for Sustainable Agriculture
at Iowa State University. "We're farming closer to creeks, farming
closer to rivers. Without adequate buffer strips, the water moves
rapidly from the field directly to the surface water."

Corn alone will cover more than a third of the state's land surface
this year. The ethanol boom that began two years ago encouraged still
more cultivation.

Between 2007 and 2008, farmers took 106,000 acres of Iowa land out of
the Conservation Reserve Program, which pays farmers to keep farmland
uncultivated, according to Lyle Asell, a special assistant for
agriculture and environment with the state's Department of Natural
Resources (DNR). That land, if left untouched, probably would have been
covered with perennial grasses with deep roots that help absorb water.

The basic hydrology of Iowa has been changed since the coming of the
plow. By the early 20th century, farmers had installed drainage pipes
under the surface to lower the water table and keep water from pooling
in what otherwise could be valuable farmland. More of this drainage
"tiling" has been added in recent years. The direct effect is that water
moves quickly from the farmland to the streams and rivers.

"We've lost 90 percent of our wetlands," said Mary Skopec, who monitors
water quality for the Iowa DNR.

Crop rotation may also play a subtle role in the flooding. Farmers who
may have once grown a number of crops are now likely to stick to just
corn and soybeans -- annual plants that don't put down deep roots.

Another potential factor: sediment. "We're actually seeing rivers
filling up with sediment, so the capacity of the rivers has changed,"
Asell said. He said that in the 1980s and 1990s, Iowa led the nation in
flood damage year after year.

This landscape wasn't ready for the kind of deluge that hit Iowa in May
and early June. Central and eastern portions of the state received 15
inches of rain. That came on top of previous rains that had left the
soil saturated. Worse, the rain came at the tail end of an unusually
cool spring. Farmers had delayed planting their crops. The deluge struck
a nearly naked landscape of small plants and black dirt.

"With that volume of rain, you're going to have flooding. There's just
no way around it," said Donna Dubberke, a meteorologist with the
National Weather Service in the Quad Cities. "This is not just because
someone put in a parking lot."

The rising Mississippi River is expected to peak this week, threatening
towns and farmland north of St. Louis as floodwaters continue to move
down the river. So far, flooding and severe weather have killed at least
24 people in three states and injured 106, forced the evacuations of
about 40,000, and driven corn prices to record highs.

Two levees burst just north of Quincy, Ill., yesterday morning, forcing
the evacuation of the small town of Meyer. Yesterday afternoon, Illinois
Gov. Rod Blagojevich (D) visited the town after viewing the nearby Sny
Island Levee, about 12 miles downstream from Quincy and, at 54 miles
long, the second-biggest levee on the Mississippi.

In Iowa, the National Weather Service has reported record flooding at
12 locations on four rivers, including the Cedar, the Iowa, the
Wapsipinicon and the Mississippi. The U.S. Geological Survey has
preliminary data showing 500-year floods on the Cedar, the Shell Rock,
the Upper Iowa and the Nodaway.

The Great Flood of 2008 has, for many inhabitants of sandbagged Iowa,
come awfully soon after the Great Flood of 1993. Or, as Elwynn Taylor, a
meteorologist at Iowa State University, put it: "Why should we have two
500-year floods within 15 years?"

Taylor attributes the flooding in recent years to cyclical climate
change: The entire Midwest, he says, has been in a wet cycle for the
past 30 years.


There has also been speculation that global warming could be a factor.

"Something in the system has changed," said Pete Kollasch, a
remote-sensing analyst with the Iowa DNR. "The only thing I can point my
finger at is global warming, but there's no proof of that."

Jeri Neal, a program leader for ecological systems and research at Iowa
State's Leopold Center, said all these things have a cumulative effect
on the landscape: "It doesn't have the resilience built into it that you
need to withstand disturbances in the system."

The idea of a 500-year flood can be confusing. Hydrologists use the
term to indicate a flooding event that they believe has a 0.2 percent
chance -- 1 in 500 -- of happening in any given year in a specific
location. A 100-year flood has a 1 in 100 chance of happening, and so
on. Such estimates are based on many years of data collection, in some
cases going back a century or more.

But the database can be spotty. Robert Holmes, national flood
coordinator with the U.S. Geological Survey, said a lack of funding
since 1999 has forced his agency to discontinue hundreds of stream
gauges across the country. "It's not sexy to fund stream flow gauges,"
he said.

What's certain is that a lot of water had nowhere to go when the sky
opened over Iowa this spring. Some rivers did things they'd never done
before. The flood stage at Cedar Rapids, for example, is 12 feet. The
previous record flood happened in 1929, when the Cedar hit 20 feet. This
year the Cedar hit 20 feet and kept rising. Experts predicted it would
crest at 22 feet, and then upped the estimate to 24 feet. The river had
other ideas. At mid-morning last Friday, it finally crested at 31.3
feet.

The entire downtown was flooded and a railroad bridge collapsed,
dumping rail cars filled with rock into the river.

"Cities routinely build in the flood plain," Enshayan said. "That's not
an act of God; that's an act of City Council."


Staff writer Kari Lydersen contributed to this report from Quincy,
Ill.
_______________________________________________




This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Sun Jun 22 19:49:56 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2008 21:49:56 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Obama Speech to Mayors
Message-ID: <485EC904.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

C-SPAN Video Library, Created by Cable. Offered as a Public Service.
Obama Speech to Mayors ... U.S. Mayors Conference

www.c-spanarchives.org/library/index.php?main_page=index 



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Sun Jun 22 20:18:42 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2008 21:18:42 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (6)
In-Reply-To: <20080622.203437.2888.1.farmelantj@juno.com>
References: <20080622.203437.2888.1.farmelantj@juno.com>
Message-ID: <E1KAaii-0005F8-Gg@elasmtp-masked.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

I didn't know about the Jewish angle, but does this explain why Felix 
Adler, creator of the Ethical Culture movement, was a 
(Neo-Kantian)?  Was this prominent among educated Reform Jews? Adler, 
from snippets I've read, was an idealist (categorical imperative?), 
opposed to materialism.  I find this quite irritating. The ethical 
culture movement, however, is not bound to Adler's ideas.

<http://aeu.org/library/display_article.php?article_id=10>Concept Map 
for Ethical Culture: Towards Philosophical Consensus.

Chapter 2 of THE PARTING OF THE WAYS (Ill return to that soon) is 
about the distinction between the Marburg and Southwestern Schools, 
but I must say I didn't fully grasp it. I think Carnap came out the 
Marburg School, Heidegger the Southwestern.

At 07:34 PM 6/22/2008, Jim Farmelant wrote:
>
>On Sun, 22 Jun 2008 20:05:27 -0400 "Charles Brown"
><charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us> writes:
> > What's Southwest Neo-Kantianism ?
> >
>
>Wikipedia says the following at:
>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neokantianism
>-------------------------------------
>One major thinker of importance in the first generation of the
>Neo-Kantian movement was Hermann Cohen who became known as the leader of
>the Marburg School, the other prominent representatives of which were
>Paul Natorp, Nicolai Hartmann and Ernst Cassirer. Another important
>group, the Southwest School (or Baden School, in Southwest Germany)
>included Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert and Ernst Troeltsch. The
>Marburg School emphasized epistemology and logic, whereas the Southwest
>school emphasized issues of culture and value.
>The Neo-Kantian schools tended to emphasize scientific readings of Kant,
>often downplaying the role of intuition in favour of concepts. However
>the ethical aspects of Neo-Kantian thought often drew them within the
>orbit of socialism and they had an important influence on Austromarxism
>and the revisionism of Edward Bernstein. Lange and Cohen in particular
>were keen on this connection between Kantian thought and socialism
>leading Ludwig Von Mises to view Kantian thought as pernicious. Another
>aspect of the Neo-Kantian movement that was important was its attempt to
>promote a revised notion of the Jewish religion particularly in Cohen's
>seminal work, one of the few works of the movement available in English
>translation.
>--------------------------------------
>
>Also see:  http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/articles/neokantianism.pdf

From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Sun Jun 22 20:21:53 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2008 22:21:53 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] World-historic shift
Message-ID: <485ED081.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

in Devine writes:


Marvin Gandall: 
That was then, this is now. There's faster growth in capital formation
and
wages in developing countries than in developed countries, suggesting
the
beginnings of a world-historic shift in the centre of gravity of the
global
economy from the old imperialist powers, including the US, to China,
India,
Brazil, and other former colonies and semi-colonies. This trend
departs
from
classical Marxist theories of imperialism, predicated on the export of
surplus capital from the more advanced to the less developed
countries,
rising working class standards in the advanced countries producing a
labour
aristocracy, and increased pauperization and the "development of
underdevelopment" on the periphery.

two comments:
first of all, it's a mistake to focus on the division between the
central capitalists (the US, etc.) and those in the periphery or what
used to be the periphery (China & India). Yes, new competitors are
rising, with an Indian company trying to buy Spielberg's film
corporation, etc. But they are joining the nascent world capitalist
class, not changing it significantly. The lust for profits persists as
the dominant principle.


MG: We're not in disageement. I drew attention to the division to
illustrate how
the classic relationship between the core and periphery has been turned
on
its head, particularly in relation to growth and the export of capital.
I
wasn't implying that the new economic powers are destined to come into
conflict with the old. In fact, as you suggest, their appearance has
given
global capitalism new markets and new life. Thanks to technological
advances
in transport and communciations and the spread of international
education
and managerial employment, the global economy is more integrated than
it was
during the periods of inter-imperialist rivalry before each of the
world
wars. Foreign governments, consumers, investors, and workers have
become as
essential to the profits of the transnationals as their home markets
and
nation states.


second, I agree that the era of the "aristocracy of labor" in the
center has come and gone. The classical era of imperialism (1870?? to
1980??) created a hierarchy of nation-states with the "core" (and
especially the US) at the top. That's because the accumulation process
was so "autocentric," oriented toward investment inside nation-states
or inside the rich countries themselves as a group. But since 1980 or
so, the raw material created by the classical era -- i.e., a reserve
army of newly-proletarianized labor-power in the periphery or
ex-periphery -- has been increasingly exploited. So the old
"aristocracy of labor" in the core finds itself increasingly in direct
competition with that of the (ex)periphery.


There still is a labor aristocracy in the core (and as a tenured
professor at a financially secure university, I can see it from the
inside). But it is my impression that there is also one in the
(ex)periphery. There's a movement toward equalization of the relative
role of the aristocracies in different areas of capitalism.


MG: We agree here also. I had in mind the more conventional notion of a
labour
aristocracy as comprising the organized industrial workers. Their
relatively
privileged position has declined markedly as production has shifted to
the
developing nations, where the industrial working class is growing
rather
than contracting and it's real wages are rising than falling. As these
countries move up the value chain, the "new working class" of
administrators, technicians, and professionals in the OECD countries is
also
becoming increasingly vulnerable to global labour arbitrage. While
outsourcing affects only a small percentage of jobs, the fear of
outsourcing
at all levels of the workforce in tradable sectors has a depressing
effect
on wages and benefits.


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Sun Jun 22 21:07:10 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2008 23:07:10 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Leftwing Republican
Message-ID: <485EDB1D.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Change may be coming faster than we think.

Charles

By JENNIFER McKEE - IR State Bureau - 06/05/08

Republican U.S. Senate nominee Bob Kelleher wants a "nonviolent
revolution" to overthrow the foundation of American government. He
favors enormous, FDR-style government work programs to reduce poverty;
he wants to nationalize the American oil and gas industries and
supports government-run, socialized medicine. He has little nice to
say about President Bush or former Montana Gov. Marc Racicot.

Political scientists and the head of the Montana Republican Party say
Kelleher, 85, isn't really a Republican, at all.

And yet, two days ago, Kelleher beat five other, mostly conservative
to mainstream GOP candidates to become the Republican who will take on
Sen. Max Baucus in the fall. He won fair and square.

How did this happen? And what does it mean?

"Honest to goodness, I see the hand of the Almighty in this," Kelleher
said Wednesday reached by telephone at his Butte law office.

For the last 44 years, Kelleher has run for office sixteen times and
lost fifteen. His only taste of victory came in 1971, when he was
elected a delegate to Montana's Constitutional Convention. There, he
helped replace the state's century-old territorial constitution with
one of the most progressive governing documents in the nation.
Kelleher's political passion then, as now, is unique - and largely
unpopular: He wants to replace the U.S. Senate, House and presidency
with a parliament.

Under a parliamentary system, citizens vote for parties, not
individual candidates. The party with the most votes selects a prime
minister, who serves as a kind of president, from the ranks of the
legislative branch. Under a parliament, Kelleher said Wednesday, you
can't have a president of one party playing the blame game with a
Congress controlled by the opposing party while the nation's real
problems and real people wait endlessly for real solutions.

"There's no more passing the buck," he said. "The party in power is
responsible for everything that goes wrong, as well as everything that
goes right. Now, nobody is responsible, really."

Such broad representation would free America to deal with the problems
that have literally been known to bring tears to Kelleher's eyes: He
is passionate about eradicating poverty. He believes health care is a
right of all citizens and the government should pay for it with tax
dollars. He believes bad trade policies have shipped American jobs
overseas, while bad tax policy has created a startling dichotomy
between rich and poor that threatens democracy itself. He believes
government exists to serve the common good, not necessarily private
interests, and that taxation, if spent wisely, is a solution to
America's problems, not the cause.

Kelleher said he intends to campaign on those very issues, along with
his long-held pro-life stance, in the general election against Baucus.

Fine. But almost none of that sounds like the stuff of a Republican,
said Craig Wilson, a political science professor at Montana State
University Billings.

"Absolutely, positively not," Wilson said when asked if Kelleher, who
has mostly run as a Democrat, with a few Green Party races thrown in,
could now be considered a Republican.

Erik Iverson, chairman of the Montana Republican Party and Republican
U.S. Rep. Denny Rehberg's chief of staff, agreed.

"No. Those positions don't reflect the platform of the Montana
Republican Party or the national Republican Party," he said. "Mr.
Kelleher is going to have to go out and make his case to Republicans
and all Montana."

So, why did 26,765 Montana Republicans vote for him Tuesday? Kelleher
didn't just squeak out a win. He got almost 10,000 more votes than his
closet competitor, Mike Lange, the GOP House majority leader in the
2007 session and a man whose Republican identity is hardly in
question.

"I don't know," Wilson said Tuesday with a laugh.

But there are many theories.

First, Wilson said, the vote in the GOP Senate primary was split among
six candidates, none of whom had raised much money or done much
campaigning to get their names out. The one possible exception, Wilson
said, was Lange, who gained fame - or at least infamy - in the end
days of the 2007 Legislature. That's when he let loose a mouthful of
obscenities broadcast on television around the state. Lange also
participated in the conciliatory, bipartisan meeting with Democrats
that brought an end to the stalemate over the state budget.

That little stunt got him removed from his leadership position.

So many Republicans who voted in the race either knew nothing about
the candidates, or they knew only that they didn't want to vote for
Lange.

There's also the matter of the paltry Republican turnout, Wilson said.
Almost two-thirds of the ballots cast Tuesday were for Democrats, a
startling turnaround.

So you've got a small number of Republicans splitting their vote
amongst a large selection of political nobodies - and one guy with a
spotty record.

There's also the matter of Ron Paul, a Republican/Libertarian
presidential maverick who got 22 percent of the Montana vote. Some of
those Kelleher votes could have come from Paul supporters registering
their general disapproval of the party, Wilson said.

What about the Irish name hypothesis? Is there something to the idea
that Kelleher is a nice Irish name and Montanans are comfortable with
a person with Irish heritage in politics?

Maybe, Wilson said. Maybe not.

"Bill Kennedy has tried it several times down here," he said,
referring to the Yellowstone County commissioner. "He's even got
little green signs and a shamrock and it didn't work."

Both Wilson and Jim Lopach, a political science professor at the
University of Montana, say the surprising victory likely boils down to
name identification: Kelleher has run a lot. Voters see his name over
and over. And when they are faced with a slate of names they don't
know, they gravitate toward the one that sounds familiar.

"The name just has a ring to it," Lopach said. "You remember those
names. They seem to call you out a bit."

Both men also agree on something else: The surprise victory does not
mean Montana Republicans want to shelve American democracy and replace
it with a parliament.

"I teach (political science) 101," Wilson said. "I know the vast
majority of Montanans have no idea how a parliamentary system
operates. They don't want to change their form of government. Ain't
gonna happen."

That mainstream Republicans couldn't field a candidate able to
dominate the race also says something else, they say.

It means that Baucus, who amassed $10 million in funding, successfully
scared off any credible GOP challenger, Lopach said. And it means the
GOP might be in some trouble if it couldn't rustle up somebody able to
knock off an eccentric like Kelleher, to say nothing of giving Baucus
a real run for his voluminous money.

Baucus said Monday he's going to concentrate on taking his message
directly to Montanans.

"I'm not running against anyone," Baucus said, reached by telephone in
Washington, D.C., where the Senate was in session. "I'm just running
for this job. I feel so lucky to be representing Montana."

Still, Kelleher's unusual candidacy does present some changes for both
Baucus and Montana Republicans.

For one thing, said Barrett Kaiser, a Baucus spokesman, there will be
no debates.

"Max plans on talking to Montanans across the state and they'll have
ample opportunity to ask him questions," he said. "But we don't want
to subject him to what will become a circus."

Iverson said the state party does not view the Kelleher-Baucus
match-up a high priority. Kelleher, who is hardly even a Republican
cannot possibly beat Baucus, Iverson said. The party is going to
deploy its resources where it can win: on state Sen. Roy Brown's bid
to pick off Gov. Brian Schweitzer and on Tim Fox's bid to win the open
attorney general's seat.

But Iverson does not dismiss Kelleher.

As the party's U.S. Senate nominee, he will have a vote at the
upcoming party convention in Missoula this month. Kelleher will have
space to set out his material; he'll be able to make proposals and
vote on the party platform.

Iverson said he didn't see a wellspring of support for a parliament or
nationalizing major industries or other tenants of Kelleher's
political philosophy. But he's entitled to his voice, Iverson said.

"I'm happy to have him in the mix," he said. "The Republican party is
a big enough tent to have a lot of different points of view."

http://www.helenair.com/articles/2008/06/05/top/55lo_080605_kelleher.txt





This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Sun Jun 22 21:08:15 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2008 23:08:15 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (6)
In-Reply-To: <E1KAaii-0005F8-Gg@elasmtp-masked.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
References: <20080622.203437.2888.1.farmelantj@juno.com>
	<E1KAaii-0005F8-Gg@elasmtp-masked.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <485EDB5F.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

So, Heidegger was a neo-Kantian ?

>>> Ralph Dumain <rdumain at autodidactproject.org> 06/22/2008 10:18 PM
>>>
I didn't know about the Jewish angle, but does this explain why Felix 
Adler, creator of the Ethical Culture movement, was a 
(Neo-Kantian)?  Was this prominent among educated Reform Jews? Adler, 
from snippets I've read, was an idealist (categorical imperative?), 
opposed to materialism.  I find this quite irritating. The ethical 
culture movement, however, is not bound to Adler's ideas.

<http://aeu.org/library/display_article.php?article_id=10>Concept Map 
for Ethical Culture: Towards Philosophical Consensus.

Chapter 2 of THE PARTING OF THE WAYS (Ill return to that soon) is 
about the distinction between the Marburg and Southwestern Schools, 
but I must say I didn't fully grasp it. I think Carnap came out the 
Marburg School, Heidegger the Southwestern.

At 07:34 PM 6/22/2008, Jim Farmelant wrote:
>
>On Sun, 22 Jun 2008 20:05:27 -0400 "Charles Brown"
><charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us> writes:
> > What's Southwest Neo-Kantianism ?
> >
>
>Wikipedia says the following at:
>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neokantianism 
>-------------------------------------
>One major thinker of importance in the first generation of the
>Neo-Kantian movement was Hermann Cohen who became known as the leader
of
>the Marburg School, the other prominent representatives of which were
>Paul Natorp, Nicolai Hartmann and Ernst Cassirer. Another important
>group, the Southwest School (or Baden School, in Southwest Germany)
>included Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert and Ernst Troeltsch.
The
>Marburg School emphasized epistemology and logic, whereas the
Southwest
>school emphasized issues of culture and value.
>The Neo-Kantian schools tended to emphasize scientific readings of
Kant,
>often downplaying the role of intuition in favour of concepts.
However
>the ethical aspects of Neo-Kantian thought often drew them within the
>orbit of socialism and they had an important influence on
Austromarxism
>and the revisionism of Edward Bernstein. Lange and Cohen in
particular
>were keen on this connection between Kantian thought and socialism
>leading Ludwig Von Mises to view Kantian thought as pernicious.
Another
>aspect of the Neo-Kantian movement that was important was its attempt
to
>promote a revised notion of the Jewish religion particularly in
Cohen's
>seminal work, one of the few works of the movement available in
English
>translation.
>--------------------------------------
>
>Also see: 
http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/articles/neokantianism.pdf 
_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Sun Jun 22 23:01:35 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 00:01:35 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (7)
Message-ID: <E1KAdHs-0007FG-Tf@elasmtp-banded.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

I'll get back to Sluga and Friedman,  but first:

May, Todd. "On the Very Idea of Continental (Or for that Matter 
Anglo-American) Philosophy," Metaphilosophy, vol. 33, no. 4, July 
2002, pp. 401-25.

The author delineates ten differences that characterize these 
allegedly different traditions and shows that at least nine of them 
don't fit the schema, so it's time to give up the perpetuation of 
their separateness. He begins with the assertion that the division 
between analytical--more precisely, Anglo-American--and Continental 
philosophy "marks the fundamental distinction in Western philosophy." 
But there is no interesting distinction between them.  But perhaps 
there once was, perhaps, in the first half of the 20th century, when 
analytical philosophy was indeed narrow in scope. Apparently this 
narrowness was abandoned due to Quine and Wittgenstein, as the 
deification of science and its definitive demarcation from nonscience 
could not be maintained.  We can thank Rawls for the revival of 
normative philosophy. So the scope has widened. The scope of 
continental philosophy has not widened so dramatically, but there are 
developments (introduction of empirical research, and reference to 
Anglo-American linguistic philosophy).

Here are the possible distinctions, grouped for convenience in 
categorical chunks:

postmodernist
   (1) loss of grand narratives
   (2) relativism
   (3) death of the subject
   (4) consumerism, media dominance, rise of transnational capitalism

nonpostmodernist (Continental vs Anglo-American)
   (5) rejection vs embrace of science
   (6) leftist vs liberal orientation
   (7) engagement vs rejection of history of philosophy
   (8) creating perspectives vs limning reality
   (9) obscurity vs clarity

the genuine distinction
   (10) Idiom and reference points

The distinction, though not necessarily formally maintained, is 
reflected institutionally--hiring, for example.

For each of these categories, examples are given to illustrate the 
principle, then exceptions to the illusory rule on either side of the 
divide. One recurrent exception is Habermas. The author can't think 
of major Anglo-American thinkers who take the analysis of advanced 
capitalism  as a framework for understanding our recent historical situation.

The most important piece of info new to me under category 5 is the 
recent revival of a naturalism which opposes positivism and advocates 
interaction with rather than logical clarification of the sciences 
and epistemological foundationalism. The relevant article, which I 
will try to get hold of, is:

Kitscher, Philip. "The Naturalists Return," Philosophical Review, 
101, no. 1, January 1992, pp. 53-114.

According to this perspective: "philosophy must answer to our 
empirical knowledge just as our empirical knowledge must answer to 
philosophy." I didn't realize this was new, since this is the way I 
always thought anyway.

Naturalism is also being pursued in ethics.

Perhaps a more viable distinction between the two traditions is the 
Anglo-American emphasis on the natural sciences. But again, 
counterexamples are cited. But maybe we could still maintain this 
distinction by reformulating the difference in terms of the ideal of 
science, particularly physics. (Exceptions on the continent are 
Canguilhem and Bachelard.)

(6): What are the exceptions to the rule that Anglo-Americans are 
liberals, Continentals are leftists? The popularity of liberalism now 
in Europe" Luc Ferry, Alain Renault, and late Habermas.  Lame!

(7): History of philosophy: Most continentals are indeed historically 
conscious. The loosening of positivism has improved the American 
situation. Wilfrid Sellars stands out, and now Robert Brandom. There 
are even more examples in ethics.

(9): Each tradition accuses the other of being obscure.

(10) At last we come to the genuine distinction, which should be 
overcome rather than maintained. Idiom is about style; reference 
points refers to particular philosophers and their perspectives. 
Anglo-Americans tend to actually work in an idiom (common stock of 
terms and comparable style), while Continentals do not (hence tending 
towards fostering monologue rather than dialogue).  While there are 
advantages to commonality, the continental way may have an advantage 
in fostering creativity. Each tradition should actually read and 
learn from the other, and overcome their mutual hostility. But also, 
there's no reason that the distinction should manifest itself along 
national lines. Reference points means that the two traditions should 
read one another's stuff, not just one's colleagues within one's own 
tradition.  Examples of fruitful cross-pollination achieved or 
desirable are Rawls and Habermas, Davidson and Gadamer, Sellars and 
Brandom with Foucault.  This won't work in some areas, where 
interests don't overlap.

Now, point 10 is of some interest to me, unlike the rest of this 
insufferable banality. The more I read material like this, the more I 
come to the conclusion how worthless this whole gambit is. Here are 
some observations:

(1) Ultimately, this is not about where we stand and what's worth 
doing in philosophy, based on consolidation of work achieved 
worldwide so far. It's really all about the marketplace (and of 
course the star system).  Should the analytical establishment forego 
protectionism and open up the market to free philosophical trade? 
Hence the seeming neutrality of perspective while shining a selective 
spotlight on the world market, as well as the lack of real 
integration based on some overarching perspective. The very argument 
for the erasure of the analytical-continental distinction actually 
preserves fragmentation while redrawing boundaries.

(2) Analytical vs continental is like the two-party system. I'm not 
sure which are the Democrats. OK, faulty analogy.  Europe is a small 
continent, but you'd think from all this literature that (the 
exceptionalist British Isles excepted) it consists entirely of France 
and Germany (including other nationals who have fallen under their 
spell).  There is no Italy or Finland; there was no 
Yugoslavia.  There never was a Soviet bloc, though maybe there were 
some enclaves of analytical philosophy in Poland. In Europe or in the 
Americas where Spanish or Portuguese is spoken, there is no 
autonomous philosophical activity. India, China, and Japan do not 
exist. And of course, while there is a continental high-fashion 
"left", there really is no Marxism.

Bourgeois thought really doesn't know where to go or what to do.













From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Mon Jun 23 07:16:44 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 09:16:44 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (7)
In-Reply-To: <E1KAdHs-0007FG-Tf@elasmtp-banded.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
References: <E1KAdHs-0007FG-Tf@elasmtp-banded.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <485F69FC.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Ralph D:

Now, point 10 is of some interest to me, unlike the rest of this 
insufferable banality. The more I read material like this, the more I 
come to the conclusion how worthless this whole gambit is. Here are 
some observations:

(1) Ultimately, this is not about where we stand and what's worth 
doing in philosophy, based on consolidation of work achieved 
worldwide so far. It's really all about the marketplace (and of 
course the star system).  Should the analytical establishment forego 
protectionism and open up the market to free philosophical trade? 
Hence the seeming neutrality of perspective while shining a selective 
spotlight on the world market, as well as the lack of real 
integration based on some overarching perspective. The very argument 
for the erasure of the analytical-continental distinction actually 
preserves fragmentation while redrawing boundaries.

(2) Analytical vs continental is like the two-party system. I'm not 
sure which are the Democrats. OK, faulty analogy.  Europe is a small 
continent, but you'd think from all this literature that (the 
exceptionalist British Isles excepted) it consists entirely of France 
and Germany (including other nationals who have fallen under their 
spell).  There is no Italy or Finland; there was no 
Yugoslavia.  There never was a Soviet bloc, though maybe there were 
some enclaves of analytical philosophy in Poland. In Europe or in the 
Americas where Spanish or Portuguese is spoken, there is no 
autonomous philosophical activity. India, China, and Japan do not 
exist. And of course, while there is a continental high-fashion 
"left", there really is no Marxism.

Bourgeois thought really doesn't know where to go or what to do.

^^^^^
CB: Yea, as Waistline suggested, philosophy in the old sense has been
preserved and overcome . like Engels said too.   There is still the task
of understanding the relationship between thought and being.  But by
ignoring capitalism, as Ralph says, these philosophers are covering up
reality rather than revealing it.  The topic of the history of
philosophy is probably worthwhile, although I bet they leave out Hegel,
who founded the study of the history of philosophy.  Hegel, Feuerbach ,
Marx and Engels are important figures in the history of philo.










_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From farmelantj at juno.com  Mon Jun 23 07:21:17 2008
From: farmelantj at juno.com (farmelantj at juno.com)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 13:21:17 GMT
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (7)
Message-ID: <20080623.092117.7808.0@webmail08.vgs.untd.com>


On the issue of differences in political orientation
between the analytic and continental traditions,
it should be kept in mind that most of the logical
positivists were socialists of one kind or another.
Otto Neurath was an Austro-Marxist, and Carnap and
Frank had similar political leanings too.  In the UK
both Bertrand Russell and A.J. Ayer were essentially
left social democrats in their politics.  However,
adhering to the austere conception of philosophy that
was rife among many of the analytics, they insisted that
when they wrote about politics, they were doing so
in their capacity as citizens rather than in their
capacity as professional philosophers.  Thus, although
Wilfrid Sellars was a leftist (and admirer of Engels),
as an analytic philosopher he was careful to keep his
politics out of his professional philosophical writings.
Quine, who was very much a right-winger, did much
the same too. George Reisch and other writers have
argued that the McCarthyism of the 1950s did much
to reinforce the tendency of analytic philosophers
to present their work as apolitical.

Of course since Rawls, analytic philosophers have 
been much less shy about addressing politics 
in their capacity as philosophers.

Many continentals have been liberals rather
than leftists in their political orientations.
Even Foucault, who had a long history of leftist
engagement, in his last years took an interest
in the work of Hayek and the liberal tradition
that he represented.

On other matters, it should be noted that
besides the US and UK (as well as Poland),
Scandinavia has long been a stronghold for
analytic philosophy, and philosophers in
other places have long been interested in
it too, including even in the Soviet Union.

-- Ralph Dumain <rdumain at autodidactproject.org> wrote:
I'll get back to Sluga and Friedman,  but first:

May, Todd. "On the Very Idea of Continental (Or for that Matter 
Anglo-American) Philosophy," Metaphilosophy, vol. 33, no. 4, July 
2002, pp. 401-25.

The author delineates ten differences that characterize these 
allegedly different traditions and shows that at least nine of them 
don't fit the schema, so it's time to give up the perpetuation of 
their separateness. He begins with the assertion that the division 
between analytical--more precisely, Anglo-American--and Continental 
philosophy "marks the fundamental distinction in Western philosophy." 
But there is no interesting distinction between them.  But perhaps 
there once was, perhaps, in the first half of the 20th century, when 
analytical philosophy was indeed narrow in scope. Apparently this 
narrowness was abandoned due to Quine and Wittgenstein, as the 
deification of science and its definitive demarcation from nonscience 
could not be maintained.  We can thank Rawls for the revival of 
normative philosophy. So the scope has widened. The scope of 
continental philosophy has not widened so dramatically, but there are 
developments (introduction of empirical research, and reference to 
Anglo-American linguistic philosophy).

Here are the possible distinctions, grouped for convenience in 
categorical chunks:

postmodernist
   (1) loss of grand narratives
   (2) relativism
   (3) death of the subject
   (4) consumerism, media dominance, rise of transnational capitalism

nonpostmodernist (Continental vs Anglo-American)
   (5) rejection vs embrace of science
   (6) leftist vs liberal orientation
   (7) engagement vs rejection of history of philosophy
   (8) creating perspectives vs limning reality
   (9) obscurity vs clarity

the genuine distinction
   (10) Idiom and reference points

The distinction, though not necessarily formally maintained, is 
reflected institutionally--hiring, for example.

For each of these categories, examples are given to illustrate the 
principle, then exceptions to the illusory rule on either side of the 
divide. One recurrent exception is Habermas. The author can't think 
of major Anglo-American thinkers who take the analysis of advanced 
capitalism  as a framework for understanding our recent historical situation.

The most important piece of info new to me under category 5 is the 
recent revival of a naturalism which opposes positivism and advocates 
interaction with rather than logical clarification of the sciences 
and epistemological foundationalism. The relevant article, which I 
will try to get hold of, is:

Kitscher, Philip. "The Naturalists Return," Philosophical Review, 
101, no. 1, January 1992, pp. 53-114.

According to this perspective: "philosophy must answer to our 
empirical knowledge just as our empirical knowledge must answer to 
philosophy." I didn't realize this was new, since this is the way I 
always thought anyway.

Naturalism is also being pursued in ethics.

Perhaps a more viable distinction between the two traditions is the 
Anglo-American emphasis on the natural sciences. But again, 
counterexamples are cited. But maybe we could still maintain this 
distinction by reformulating the difference in terms of the ideal of 
science, particularly physics. (Exceptions on the continent are 
Canguilhem and Bachelard.)

(6): What are the exceptions to the rule that Anglo-Americans are 
liberals, Continentals are leftists? The popularity of liberalism now 
in Europe" Luc Ferry, Alain Renault, and late Habermas.  Lame!

(7): History of philosophy: Most continentals are indeed historically 
conscious. The loosening of positivism has improved the American 
situation. Wilfrid Sellars stands out, and now Robert Brandom. There 
are even more examples in ethics.

(9): Each tradition accuses the other of being obscure.

(10) At last we come to the genuine distinction, which should be 
overcome rather than maintained. Idiom is about style; reference 
points refers to particular philosophers and their perspectives. 
Anglo-Americans tend to actually work in an idiom (common stock of 
terms and comparable style), while Continentals do not (hence tending 
towards fostering monologue rather than dialogue).  While there are 
advantages to commonality, the continental way may have an advantage 
in fostering creativity. Each tradition should actually read and 
learn from the other, and overcome their mutual hostility. But also, 
there's no reason that the distinction should manifest itself along 
national lines. Reference points means that the two traditions should 
read one another's stuff, not just one's colleagues within one's own 
tradition.  Examples of fruitful cross-pollination achieved or 
desirable are Rawls and Habermas, Davidson and Gadamer, Sellars and 
Brandom with Foucault.  This won't work in some areas, where 
interests don't overlap.

Now, point 10 is of some interest to me, unlike the rest of this 
insufferable banality. The more I read material like this, the more I 
come to the conclusion how worthless this whole gambit is. Here are 
some observations:

(1) Ultimately, this is not about where we stand and what's worth 
doing in philosophy, based on consolidation of work achieved 
worldwide so far. It's really all about the marketplace (and of 
course the star system).  Should the analytical establishment forego 
protectionism and open up the market to free philosophical trade? 
Hence the seeming neutrality of perspective while shining a selective 
spotlight on the world market, as well as the lack of real 
integration based on some overarching perspective. The very argument 
for the erasure of the analytical-continental distinction actually 
preserves fragmentation while redrawing boundaries.

(2) Analytical vs continental is like the two-party system. I'm not 
sure which are the Democrats. OK, faulty analogy.  Europe is a small 
continent, but you'd think from all this literature that (the 
exceptionalist British Isles excepted) it consists entirely of France 
and Germany (including other nationals who have fallen under their 
spell).  There is no Italy or Finland; there was no 
Yugoslavia.  There never was a Soviet bloc, though maybe there were 
some enclaves of analytical philosophy in Poland. In Europe or in the 
Americas where Spanish or Portuguese is spoken, there is no 
autonomous philosophical activity. India, China, and Japan do not 
exist. And of course, while there is a continental high-fashion 
"left", there really is no Marxism.

Bourgeois thought really doesn't know where to go or what to do.












_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis


____________________________________________________________
Bills adding up? Click here for free information on payday loans.
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL2141/fc/Ioyw6i3m3aOJ2MDZSxXguuO33IFWiB97y3moqNlDL4M0eF1wSQ4L09/


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Mon Jun 23 10:49:35 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 12:49:35 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (7)
In-Reply-To: <20080623.092117.7808.0@webmail08.vgs.untd.com>
References: <20080623.092117.7808.0@webmail08.vgs.untd.com>
Message-ID: <485F9BDF.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>


Aren't many of the analyticals anti-Hegelians,  find dialectic to be
nonsense ?  Frege, Russell don't deal with dialectic. Whitehead ?  Does
Wittgenstein ?

Without dialectic, they would tend to treat reality as static.

As to continentals, does Heidegger deal with dialectic ?

Charles


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Mon Jun 23 11:41:28 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 13:41:28 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Ballad for Americans
Message-ID: <485FA809.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Let America Be America Again 
by Langston Hughes 

! 
Let America be America again.
Let it be the dream it used to be.
Let it be the pioneer on the plain
Seeking a home where he himself is free.

(America never was America to me.)

Let America be the dream the dreamers dreamed--
Let it be that great strong land of love
Where never kings connive nor tyrants scheme
That any man be crushed by one above.

(It never was America to me.)

O, let my land be a land where Liberty
Is crowned with no false patriotic wreath,
But opportunity is real, and life is free,
Equality is in the air we breathe.

(There's never been equality for me,
Nor freedom in this "homeland of the free.")

Say, who are you that mumbles in the dark? 
And who are you that draws your veil across the stars?

I am the poor white, fooled and pushed apart,
I am the Negro bearing slavery's scars.
I am the red man driven from the land,
I am the immigrant clutching the hope I seek--
And finding only the same old stupid plan
Of dog eat dog, of mighty crush the weak.

I am the young man, full of strength and hope,
Tangled in that ancient endless chain
Of profit, power, gain, of grab the land!
Of grab the gold! Of grab the ways of satisfying need!
Of work the men! Of take the pay!
Of owning everything for one's own greed!

I am the farmer, bondsman to the soil.
I am the worker sold to the machine.
I am the Negro, servant to you all.
I am the people, humble, hungry, mean--
Hungry yet today despite the dream.
Beaten yet today--O, Pioneers!
I am the man who never got ahead,
The poorest worker bartered through the years.

Yet I'm the one who dreamt our basic dream
In the Old World while still a serf of kings,
Who dreamt a dream so strong, so brave, so true,
That even yet its mighty daring sings
In every brick and stone, in every furrow turned
That's made America the land it has become.
O, I'm the man who sailed those early seas
In search of what I meant to be my home--
For I'm the one who left dark Ireland's shore,
And Poland's plain, and England's grassy lea,
And torn from Black Africa's strand I came
To build a "homeland of the free."

The free?

Who said the free? Not me?
Surely not me? The millions on relief today?
The millions shot down when we strike?
The millions who have nothing for our pay?
For all the dreams we've dreamed
And all the songs we've sung
And all the hopes we've held
And all the flags we've hung,
The millions who have nothing for our pay--
Except the dream that's almost dead today.

O, let America be America again--
The land that never has been yet--
And yet must be--the land where every man is free.
The land that's mine--the poor man's, Indian's, Negro's, ME--
Who made America,
Whose sweat and blood, whose faith and pain,
Whose hand at the foundry, whose plow in the rain,
Must bring back our mighty dream again.

Sure, call me any ugly name you choose--
The steel of freedom does not stain.

From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Mon Jun 23 13:21:18 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 14:21:18 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Ballad for Americans
In-Reply-To: <485FA809.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
References: <485FA809.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
Message-ID: <E1KAqgK-00083Y-6W@elasmtp-curtail.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

I was thinking of this one too as a a specimen of Black Americanism, 
but couldn't remember the reference.

At 12:41 PM 6/23/2008, Charles Brown wrote:
>Let America Be America Again
>by Langston Hughes



From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Mon Jun 23 12:24:18 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 14:24:18 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] War danger
Message-ID: <485FB212.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Please forward widely.

Dear Friend of United for Peace and Justice,

The U.S. House of Representatives is considering a new resolution that
could effectively demand a blockade against Iran -- an act that would be
widely seen as an act of war and could invite Iranian retaliation,
possibly leading us into a shooting war.

Over the last three weeks, 77 House Democrats and 92 Republicans have
agreed to cosponsor this resolution, but we think many do not realize
its dangerous implications.

This resolution (H. Con. Res. 362) was introduced by Representative
Gary Ackerman. The most alarming provision "demands that the President
initiate an international effort to immediately and dramatically
increase the economic, political, and diplomatic pressure on Iran to
verifiably suspend its nuclear enrichment activities by, inter alia,
prohibiting the export to Iran of all refined petroleum products;
imposing stringent inspection requirements on all persons, vehicles,
ships, planes, trains, and cargo entering or departing Iran; and
prohibiting the international movement of all Iranian officials not
involved in negotiating the suspension of Iran's nuclear program."

Such a blockade imposed without United Nations authority (which the
resolution does not call for) would be seen as an act of war.
Congressional sources say the bill might first go to committee, which
gives us a little more time to pressure our representatives. But whether
or not it goes first to committee, or directly to the floor of the
House, action on H. Con. Res. 362 is needed now. We urge you to ask your
representative not to support this dangerous step toward war with Iran.
http://capwiz.com/justforeignpolicy/issues/alert/?alertid=11518951 

Congressional leaders seem to have assumed that there would be little
opposition to this punitive measure against Iran, and they have put it
on a fast track to passage. But due to the threat of war, many
organizations and reasonable members of Congress are working overtime to
stop this bill. Won't you join them?
http://capwiz.com/justforeignpolicy/issues/alert/?alertid=11518951 

Please take action now -- ask your representative to oppose this
dangerous path that could lead directly to war with Iran.
http://capwiz.com/justforeignpolicy/issues/alert/?alertid=11518951 

You can find the full text of the resolution and list of co-sponsors
here:
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:H.CON.RES.362: 

Yours,


Robert Naiman and Mike Lynn
Co-Conveners, UFPJ's Iran Working Group

===============================================

Help us continue to do this critical work: Make a donation to UFPJ
today -- http://www.unitedforpeace.org/donate 

UNITED FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE
www.unitedforpeace.org | 212-868-5545
PO Box 607; Times Square Station; New York, NY 10108



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Mon Jun 23 12:39:08 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 14:39:08 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Ballad for Americans
In-Reply-To: <E1KAqgK-00083Y-6W@elasmtp-curtail.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
References: <485FA809.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
	<E1KAqgK-00083Y-6W@elasmtp-curtail.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <485FB58C.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

In _Here I Stand_  (1958), Robeson says:

Yes , for well over 300 years my people have been a part of American
life and history. A half-century has passed since W.E.B. Dubois , in his
classic _The Souls of Black Folk_ challenged white Americans in these
words of poetry and truth:

"Your country ? How came it yours ? Before the Pilgrims landed we were
here. Here we have brought our three gifts and mingled them with yours:
a gift of story and song - soft, stirring melody in an ill-harmonized
and unmelodious land; the gift of sweat and brawn to beat back the
wilderness, conquer the soil, lay the foundations of the vast economic
empire two hundred years before your weak hands could have done it; the
third gift of the spirit...Our song, our toil our cheer...Would America
have been America without her Negro people ? "

Michelle Obama was on "The View" television show, and she was asked
about her statement that this is the first time that she has been proud
of her country ( the media has an obsession with her saying this). She
explained that she meant "politically".  That's a good idea. It is the
politics of America which have been bad. Perhaps we can be proud of
parts of American culture, art, music, parties, cabarets and labor.

Charles

>>> Ralph Dumain <rdumain at autodidactproject.org> 06/23/2008 3:21 PM
>>>
I was thinking of this one too as a a specimen of Black Americanism, 
but couldn't remember the reference.

At 12:41 PM 6/23/2008, Charles Brown wrote:
>Let America Be America Again
>by Langston Hughes


_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Mon Jun 23 13:45:53 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 14:45:53 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (7)
In-Reply-To: <20080623.092117.7808.0@webmail08.vgs.untd.com>
References: <20080623.092117.7808.0@webmail08.vgs.untd.com>
Message-ID: <E1KAr45-0006oq-7g@elasmtp-banded.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

I've been posting this rather arcane (from the point of view of 
Marxism as a social and political vantage point) material on 
marxism-thaxis, because a question on the politics of the Vienna 
Circle was recently raised and because this stuff comes up in 
discussion every now and then.

However, my argument does not concern the overt politics of any of 
these people, but rather the relationship between the structure and 
tendencies of society and the ideological skewing of its intellectual 
life, fragmentation and the integration of knowledge. The politics of 
this problem has a relationship to the overall political organization 
of society that goes deeper than the question of which philosophers 
were on the left or right, which itself at least raises the question 
of elective affinities.

I got into a conversation on this topic a few years back on my 
marxistphilosophy list. A cleaned-up version of the dialogue can be found at:

<http://www.autodidactproject.org/my/metaphil1.html>Metacritique, 
Philosophy, & the Logic of the Intellectual Marketplace

The main point I've been making here all along is not only that the 
analytical and continental categories are chimerical and the 
contrived relationship between them, which is now apparently being 
widely acknowledged, but that the attempt to bridge the divide is as 
ideological as the division and that it actually preserves the very 
problem it is purportedly designed to address.

The linkage to "politics" now has to do with the organization and 
ideological smorgasbord of the knowledge industry and the way it 
functions as a marketplace of ideas, allowing varying degrees of 
variety and concealing its mechanisms of social control, beyond the 
occasional admission of the existence of petty politics, turf wars, 
and personal ambition, i.e. the very personal dimension of academic 
politics which these people know affects their careers.

We can generalize this principle to the cross-fertilization of any 
pair of traditions that gets corrupted by questionable ideological 
agendas. For example, Chinese philosophy crossed with postmodernism 
or process philosophy (Whitehead):

http://autodidactproject.org/blog/culture/index.php/category/chinese-philosophy/

I've called this globalization gone bad.

At 08:21 AM 6/23/2008, farmelantj at juno.com wrote:

>On the issue of differences in political orientation
>between the analytic and continental traditions,
>it should be kept in mind that most of the logical
>positivists were socialists of one kind or another.
>Otto Neurath was an Austro-Marxist, and Carnap and
>Frank had similar political leanings too.  In the UK
>both Bertrand Russell and A.J. Ayer were essentially
>left social democrats in their politics.  However,
>adhering to the austere conception of philosophy that
>was rife among many of the analytics, they insisted that
>when they wrote about politics, they were doing so
>in their capacity as citizens rather than in their
>capacity as professional philosophers.  Thus, although
>Wilfrid Sellars was a leftist (and admirer of Engels),
>as an analytic philosopher he was careful to keep his
>politics out of his professional philosophical writings.
>Quine, who was very much a right-winger, did much
>the same too. George Reisch and other writers have
>argued that the McCarthyism of the 1950s did much
>to reinforce the tendency of analytic philosophers
>to present their work as apolitical.
>
>Of course since Rawls, analytic philosophers have
>been much less shy about addressing politics
>in their capacity as philosophers.
>
>Many continentals have been liberals rather
>than leftists in their political orientations.
>Even Foucault, who had a long history of leftist
>engagement, in his last years took an interest
>in the work of Hayek and the liberal tradition
>that he represented.
>
>On other matters, it should be noted that
>besides the US and UK (as well as Poland),
>Scandinavia has long been a stronghold for
>analytic philosophy, and philosophers in
>other places have long been interested in
>it too, including even in the Soviet Union.

From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Mon Jun 23 13:53:40 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 14:53:40 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (7)
In-Reply-To: <485F9BDF.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
References: <20080623.092117.7808.0@webmail08.vgs.untd.com>
	<485F9BDF.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
Message-ID: <E1KArBh-0007h9-Bk@elasmtp-curtail.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

Whitehead didn't deal with dialectic as far as I know, but as the 
initiator of "process philosophy", I guess he wasn't static:

<http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/wellshkp.html>Preface to 
Process and Unreality: A Criticism of Method in Whitehead's 
Philosophy<http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/wellshkp.html> by 
Harry K. Wells

Heidegger must have dealt with Hegel, though I'm not remembering 
where. His student Gadamer wrote a book on Hegelian dialectic.

Static, I think is another issue distinct from "dialectic".

At 11:49 AM 6/23/2008, Charles Brown wrote:

>Aren't many of the analyticals anti-Hegelians,  find dialectic to be
>nonsense ?  Frege, Russell don't deal with dialectic. Whitehead ?  Does
>Wittgenstein ?
>
>Without dialectic, they would tend to treat reality as static.
>
>As to continentals, does Heidegger deal with dialectic ?

From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Mon Jun 23 14:08:49 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 16:08:49 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Dialectics
Message-ID: <485FCA91.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Dialectical Philosophy ( uhhhh relationship between thought and being)
http://www.marxists.org/subject/dialectics/index.htm
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


General Overview 

Theses on Feurbach. In this essential work, Marx and Engels lay the
foundations for a philosophy of materialism that is practical. Practical
materialism is the chief difference between Marxist and Hegelian
dialectics. 
Afterward to the Second German Edition. A short and simplified
explaination of how Marxist and Hegelian dialectics differ, generally,
in the difference of being materialist as opposed to idealist. 


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dialectics Basics 

Anti-Duhring. This long series of abstracts covers the following
topics: (1) Marx & Engels task to relate dialectics to nature; (2)
Historical overview and basic concepts; (3) Critique of Idealism; (4)
Motion is the mode of existence of matter; (5) Eternal Truth; (6)
Freedom is the insight into necessity; (7) Mathematics & Chemistry
(example of quantity to quality); and (8) The historical process of
negation. 


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dialectics as a philosophical premise 

Preface of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. An
outline of the materialist conception of history, which is a result of
their philosophy of dialectics. 
Engel's Review of A Contribution to the Critique of Political economy.
Engels provides a brief history, and then an overview of political
economy. 
The Method of Political Economy. Marx describes his philosophy of
political economy. 


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Academic Resources 

The Holy Family. In this abstract, Marx first critiques speculative
philosophy using his dialetical method. In the second portion, he
provides a short history of French Materialism. 



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Further Resources 
Definitions and Examples of Dialectics 
Various critiques of Hegel, including critiques of Hegelian dialectics

Historical Materialism 



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Subject Archive



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Mon Jun 23 14:11:20 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 16:11:20 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Hegel's 'Absolute Idealism'
Message-ID: <485FCB29.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/txt/paulh01.htm

From: "Paul Healey" <Paul.Healey at logica.demon.co.uk> 

Hegel's 'Absolute Idealism'
After taking up Andy's suggestion, that I should look at Cyril Smith's
comments about Hisorshi Uchida's book: Marx's Grundisse and Hegel's
Logic, I reached the following conclusion: once the Marxist accepts
production can be measured in terms of Hegel's Logic, consistency means
equality can be measured in the same way. 

Hegel's dialectic is an inevitable part of his Logic. How is 'true
humanity', as Smith attributes Marx's edifice with, measured ? If Marx
new, I think the tune he was playing would of been quite different. 

Let me put this problem in the context in which I believe I have
resolved it; It was Errol E. Harris's book: Formal, Transcendental and
Dialectical Thinking: logic and reality (1978 ), that really got my
interest in Hegel going. Up until then I had followed Kant's Logic, but
I was never very happy with his unreserved use of the syllogism - as
part of a methodology for making decisions, it just doesn't work! At the
same time I was also reading E.V. Ilyenkov's book: Dialectical Logic
(1977). Like him I also accept that Formal Logic has no concept of
value. In fact it was his reading of Marx's value that helped me resolve
my concept of probability ( p331 ). 

It also appears that others eg. like Paul M. Churchland ( see A
Neurocomputational Perspective 1989 ) are aware of the logical tools, in
this case 'back propagation', that are far more effective then those
provided by formal logic. If I am right; that the dialectical concept of
chance, is itself categorically consistent, and can be demonstrated so
by complete induction the formal logician will have to accept his tools
cannot do the job. 

Hegel's concealment could therefore better be understood as a
methodological understanding of correct decision making. Assuming a set
of historical values, is quite different from providing the beginning of
a methodology upon which different measures of value can be tested. To
use a popular turn of phrase, if Hegel were alive, he would also be
accusing Marx of 'subjective idealism' albeit for different reasons: for
Marx nothing can be known outside that which is for-itself. Only in
terms of history and chance ( relative and absolute ) does 'true
humanity' have an identity. 




This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Mon Jun 23 15:23:21 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 16:23:21 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Hegel's 'Absolute Idealism'
In-Reply-To: <485FCB29.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
References: <485FCB29.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
Message-ID: <E1KAsaR-00079W-Pl@elasmtp-mealy.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

I always thought Paul Healey was a nut. Several of these people on 
the Hegel lists are insufferable.

At 03:11 PM 6/23/2008, Charles Brown wrote:
>http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/txt/paulh01.htm
>
>From: "Paul Healey" <Paul.Healey at logica.demon.co.uk>
>
>Hegel's 'Absolute Idealism'..........



From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Mon Jun 23 14:41:49 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 16:41:49 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (7)
Message-ID: <485FD24E.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>


Static, I think is another issue distinct from "dialectic".

^^^^
CB: Please elaborate.

What's your understanding of what Frege brings to logic ?  Your words



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Mon Jun 23 14:56:41 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 16:56:41 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] structuralist linguistics
Message-ID: <485FD5CA.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

structuralist linguistics
CeJ jannuzi at gmail.com 


That worldwide so many languages have
similar-sounding words for babies to say 'mama'. There are NATURAL
reasons why babies everywhere say such similar things. Because their
physiological and phonological development limits what they can say to
syllables like the ones comprising 'ma-ma'.

^^^^
CB: There's a  strange phenomenon right now where all these babies are
into to saying "Obama", sort of on their own when they hear it.



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Mon Jun 23 15:12:26 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 17:12:26 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Structural linguistics
Message-ID: <485FD97A.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Chomsky and Halle don't "overthrow" the basic concept of phoneme,
distinctive features, e.g. voiced and unvoiced as a binary opposition,
do they ? That makes too much obvious sense. provable by any human
speaker. Surely , in English  "big" is differentiated from "pig" by
voiced/unvoiced significant feature of the initial consonant , no ?

Charles

Charles

^^^^

As
problematic as the results were in phonology, for example, they were a
lot more convincing than work at 'higher' levels of language. That is
until Chomsky and Halle SPE (
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Sound_Pattern_of_English ).

The history of linguistics says that the coining of the term 'phoneme'
belongs to the French,
Dufriche-Desgenettes , for whom it is supposed to have meant a speech
sound (so I wonder what he used the term 'phone' for). But its more
modern meanings come from, de Courtenay, according to the Wiki article
(warning there, as Wiki articles on linguistics are collectively
written and edited but mostly truly awful),





This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Mon Jun 23 15:04:30 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 17:04:30 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] structural linguistics/ theory of origin of culture
Message-ID: <485FD79F.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

To name a few linguistic phenomena worthy of consideration as
motivated (not arbitrary): sound symbolisms, like phonomimes,
phenomimes, pscyhomimes. I can tell you, for example, the words for
'knock knock' as in knocking on a door, in English are not that
different from Japanese (kan-kan). Why the repetition of a /k/ sound?
Phenomimes might use language to describe non-audible phenomena.
Greasy, gooey, gunk, grunge, gross, etc. English does something with
/g/ that is found in other languages as well, including Japanese.
Also, for example, if I wanted to say it rains softly, I might say Ame
ga shitoshito to furu. The term 'shito-shito' conveys the sense of a
hush. Before you dismiss the motivation, let me point out that the
English word 'hush' has a similar pronunciation and the sound /sh/.
And in both languages we might say be quiet by making the shhhh sound

^^^^^
CB: But why is "shhh" non-arbitrarily connected to "quiet" ?

There is onemotapia , as well noted , non-arbitrary connection between
signifier and signified.

^^^

but it must be pointed out that
this is what human languages originally evolved and developed for

^^^
CB: My theory is the first words were names of people and the first
culture is kinship systems, dead ancestors' messages coming across the
"death barrier". Fuller discussion of my theory below, including why
arbitrariness of the symbol is critical dimension making it adaptive.



 

BTW it is worth mentioning that the arbitrariness of the sign was the
one insight -- dodgy as it is -- that poststructuralism took from
linguistics. You take that away from them and the whole edifice
collapses, from Lacan to Derrida to Barthes to Althusser and the rest
(perhaps not Zizek), as well as a generation of French
semiotician-linguists from Benveniste to Greimas to Rastier and many
many more. I have a certain respect for members of this latter group
--
I had a very enlightening discussion with Rastier himself at a
conference in Italy last year, in which he explained to me how it was
that French structuralism had very little to do with the structuralist
movement in the US, which was mainly a phenomenon of the 1930s, that
rather "French 'structuralism' was in fact post-structuralism from the
very beginning". 

^^^^
CB: Yes, I  was going to say,  before there was post-structuralism ,
there was, of course, structuralism. As far as semiotic sociology mainly
the structural anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss, and as you say
modeled on structural linguistics.

See semiotics

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiotics 

^^^

Now I don't mean to say that the arbitrariness of the sign is 'false'.

^^^
CB: The principle of the arbitrariness of the sign or in English, the
symbol, is not only from structuralism. Leslie White, a founder of a
main school of anthropology also articulated this principle. And symbols
in this sense are a main characteristic of culture ( that which socially
constructs , to put it in terms of a frequent refrain on this list.) as
well as language. Both culture and language are systems of symbols
(signs). And , importantly, the human species is defined by its
possession of culture or custom or tradition. No other species has
language or culture.  So, signing or symboling , in  the forms of both
language and culture, is our species defining activity.  And,
importantly , also, most of human _learning_ is through symbols,
culture, _not_ by imitating, like other species. Not by "monkey-see,
monkey do" imitation. Most of our learning ( as opposed to inborn or
genetically based knowledge) is through culture, not from experience.
And cultural learning is learning from the experience of other people,
including learning from people who are now dead. 

Just to further explain the concept of arbitrariness, it refers to the
relationship between the signifier and the signified.  So, if the sounds
d-o-g are used to refer to things that are dogs, we see that those
sounds do not "imitate" or are not naturally related to dogs. The
arbitrariness of a sign refers to the fact that in a sign something is
used to represent something that it is not.  Two _different_ things are
arbitrarily identified, treated as the _same_. Note that this is a unity
or identity of opposites of the dialectic.

So, culture or human social "constructivity" consists in an enormous
system of signs or symbols. 

I have theorized that the reason culture became our unique
characteristic is that once some homind discovered them way, way back
when, they were highly adaptive because they allowed past generations to
pass on their experience to future generations across the "death
barrier" . 

Why ? Because a symbol represents something by something it is not (
the arbitrary relation between signifier and signified) So, a living
generation can learn from a symbol about the experience of dead
generations, when it could not learn from imitating the dead, since the
dead aren't able to demonstrate things to be learned, obviously, because
they are dead.  But since a symbol uses something, a signifier, to
represent something that it is not, the signified, because of this
_arbitrary_ ( non-imitative) relation, the dead ancestor's
"demonstration" can be learned by the living descendent through the
signifier, through the thing (word or cultural object) that is _not_ the
dead ancestor.

Cultural learning allows us to learn from the experience of many,
many...many of our ancestors. This was its main adaptive advantage when
our species originated in founding culture. 
Culture also allowed learning more from other living members of the
species.  Human children could learn a lot more from their parents than
other species, who were restricted to teaching their young by
demonstration and imitation. Other species have to "give a picture" or
demonstration of what they are teaching. That a signifier is not what it
signifies means it communicates by a non-picture or non-imitation of
what it represents.

You heard it here first (smile)


I very much appreciate the rest of Tahir's discussion as a professional
linguist below and above.




This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Mon Jun 23 15:19:25 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 17:19:25 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (3)
Message-ID: <485FDB1E.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Note: "Though Hegel is a leading German idealist, analytical 
philosophers now turning to Hegel routinely draw a tacit distinction 
between Hegel and idealism. Everything happens as if it were possible 
to appropriate Hegel for analytic concerns while simply bracketing 
his idealism. Though they are starting to come to grips with Hegel, 
to the best of my knowledge none of them has yet found a way to come 
to grips with his idealist commitment or with idealism in general."
(472

^^^^
CB; There's a "well-known" statement by Lenin where he calls Hegel
"arch-brilliant" for coming very close to materialism. I've got it in
one of my books. Of course, all Marx and Engels did was flip him over on
his feet, off his head, a simple inversion.


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Mon Jun 23 15:31:22 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 17:31:22 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (3)
Message-ID: <485FDDEA.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

It'd be really fine if you took the time to elaborate and articulate the
below more precisely, and with historical specific examples

Charles
^^^^

For the moment I would like to point out something that is 
fundamental to Hegel and Marx in different and incompatible 
formulations.  I need to find a statement by CLR James on Hegel that 
is far more elegant than what I am trying to say. Hegel offers an 
account of our history of our means of dealing with reality as part 
of his own perspective of grasping it now. It is not merely an 
historical/sociological perspective to the effect that only power 
relations and social prerogatives underlie ideas, nor is it a merely 
disembodied account of correct ideas. Rather, the socially 
conditioned, historically evolving ideological configuration of 
knowledge embodies objective content even while same is embedded 
within a socially conditioned framework which at a later date can be 
seen to be partial and inadequate from a changed and enlarged 
perspective. ( maybe the socalled dialectic of absolute and relative
truth ? - CB)To put it another way, a system of ideas can be seen one 
level politically, but this is meaningless without understanding the 
technical, objective content and structure of this system; and, 
conversely, a merely technical exposition without an investigation of 
historical motivation, both on its own level and embedded with a 
larger framework of how society evolves, misses out on an important 
dimension of why these ideas are generated and what they say about 
the state of society as a whole and vice versa, even where the 
connection is highly indirect.



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Mon Jun 23 17:38:34 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 18:38:34 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Parting of the Ways: Reviews (3)
In-Reply-To: <485FDDEA.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
References: <485FDDEA.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
Message-ID: <E1KAuhl-0002uY-UM@elasmtp-scoter.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

I'm in a rush, so just a few comments for now.

Beyond the cataloging of various thinkers as politically left or 
right, there is the question of long-term trends, or elective 
affinities between philosophies and political orientations.

For example, See Stephen Eric Bronner's indispensable book Reclaiming 
the Enlightenment, showing the historical linkages between 
Enlightenment with progressive politics, and Counter-Enlightenment, 
intuitionism and irrationalism with political reaction.

And see my blog entry:

<http://autodidactproject.org/blog/culture/index.php/2007/10/stephen-eric-bronner-critical-theory-enlightenment-radical-politics-1/>Stephen 
Eric Bronner: Critical Theory, Enlightenment, radical politics (1)

But even where there are crossovers: left Heideggerians like Marcuse 
or Sartre, it's worth looking at what they have to do to make their 
philosophies work and then examine whether they really do work.

To a great extent, counterexamples notwithstanding, elective 
affinities can be seen in the material now engaged, i.e. Carnap vs 
Heidegger.  None of the philosophers under reviewed, however, engage 
in anything profounder than simply acknowledging the connection 
between philosophers and their politics.  Yet they recommend a 
philosophical rapprochement without understanding that there are more 
than technical philosophical issues at stake, when dealing with the 
likes of Heidegger, especially.  What are the intrinsic relationships 
between Heidegger's philosophical approach and his wider social 
orientation? Or conversely, might there be a linkage between the type 
of socialism implied in the politics of the neopositivists and the 
technocratic nature of their approach to philosophy?

I am venturing into waters where these elective affinities are not 
enough to gauge what is going on. But first: one can paint with broad 
brushes certain overall patterns into which positivist and 
irrationalist/Romantic tendencies fall. I would be more scrupulous 
about what one means by positivism than say members of the first 
generation Frankfurt School were, but I think on a broad level one 
can see certain patterns there. However, once one digs down into the 
technical specifics of a body of thought, the overall ideological 
contours may not directly show themselves in the subject matter to 
hand. Only on an extremely abstract level may it be possible to 
discern why certain assumptions are pushed in one direction and not 
in another.

How does one know, for example, the ultimate ideological implications 
of logicism, formalism, or intuitionism in foundations of 
mathematics? Just compare the ridiculous inference by the Stalinists 
and Maoists with their mathematicians and scientists based on the 
grossest ignorance.

(For one quite unusual take on this subject, see:
<http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/vardy2.html>"On the 
Dialectics of Metamathematics" (Excerpts) by Peter Vardy )

My verbose formulation of how to engage these questions unjustly 
tortures English syntax to the point of breakdown.  I wish I could 
remember where this elegant quote by CLR James on Hegel comes from: 
it could be a talk rather than an actual book or essay. My point here 
was that neither a strictly technical nor a strictly political 
approach would be adequate to engage the putative expanded reach of 
institutional Anglo-American philosophy to overcome the division 
which it itself inflicted. The Anglo-American colonization (which is 
really what it is) of this alleged continental philosophy is 
uncritical of the underlying dynamics of its own existence--and so 
negates one defining feature of what some of "continental" philosophy 
does, examining the preconditions of its own existence in addition to 
plunging into technical questions. Or, why should I give a shit that 
some analytical philosopher (I wonder who) now has a hard-on for 
Nietzsche? It's the continuation of one-dimensional philosophy by 
other means. And even philosophers who pretend to be progressive do 
nothing for me. The Democratic Party might as well own philosophy 
like it owns the black community, for all the good this does.

See, e.g. my report:

McCumber Marking Time
http://www.autodidactproject.org/my/diary0401a.html#mcc

It will take more explanation to unpack the tortured paragraph you 
cite, but I gotta go.

At 04:31 PM 6/23/2008, Charles Brown wrote:
>It'd be really fine if you took the time to elaborate and articulate the
>below more precisely, and with historical specific examples
>
>Charles
>^^^^
>
>For the moment I would like to point out something that is
>fundamental to Hegel and Marx in different and incompatible
>formulations.  I need to find a statement by CLR James on Hegel that
>is far more elegant than what I am trying to say. Hegel offers an
>account of our history of our means of dealing with reality as part
>of his own perspective of grasping it now. It is not merely an
>historical/sociological perspective to the effect that only power
>relations and social prerogatives underlie ideas, nor is it a merely
>disembodied account of correct ideas. Rather, the socially
>conditioned, historically evolving ideological configuration of
>knowledge embodies objective content even while same is embedded
>within a socially conditioned framework which at a later date can be
>seen to be partial and inadequate from a changed and enlarged
>perspective. ( maybe the socalled dialectic of absolute and relative
>truth ? - CB)To put it another way, a system of ideas can be seen one
>level politically, but this is meaningless without understanding the
>technical, objective content and structure of this system; and,
>conversely, a merely technical exposition without an investigation of
>historical motivation, both on its own level and embedded with a
>larger framework of how society evolves, misses out on an important
>dimension of why these ideas are generated and what they say about
>the state of society as a whole and vice versa, even where the
>connection is highly indirect.

From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Tue Jun 24 06:08:49 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2008 08:08:49 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Potential for rev greater in 3rd world,
	but need for 1st world	rev more
Message-ID: <4860AB91.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Matthijs  wrote:


I agree with this sentiment. I think that while support for Western
workers against Western capital, including their unions, is necessary,
we shouldn't conveniently lose sight of the fact that these unions
have
been very successful in negotiating with capital to share the spoils
of
the plunder of the Third World with their members. The corruption and
reformism of Western major unions is not a coincidence - they are a
labor aristocracy in many cases, if you look at it from a global
perspective.

I think it is disingenuous for us to focus on the increase in relative
immiseration in the First World, even though that is of itself true,
because the increases in absolute wealth among (white) workers in this
part of the world have been so enormous that they cannot be swept away
as irrelevant by pointing at relative difference. Instead, we should
recognize that the social-democratic movement has had success in
sharing
the profits gained from the real immiseration of the Third World, both
relative and absolute (although more so relatively), among First World
workers, sufficient to make the vast majority of them supportive of
the
current world system. Therefore, the real revolutionary kind of
immiseration, whether you conceive of it as relative or as absolute,
is
_for the greatest part_ going to be found in the Third World.


Matthijs Krul

^^^^
CB: I agree with your overall points.  However, the main revolution
that the whole world needs is in the US. Since, the US is the
imperialist center of this epoch, a revolution here would give
significant relief to the workers in the Third World.   The only ones
who can make a revolution in the US are the US masses. So, we US
activists have the responsibility of focusing on making a revolution
in
the US, even if the potential for revolution is greater in the Third
World.

To: <pen-l at xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> 
Subject: [Pen-l] Naomi Klein: Beware of Obama's Chicago School of
Economicsboys 
From: "Charles Brown" <charlesb at xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> 
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2008 14:25:56 -0400




This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From jannuzi at gmail.com  Tue Jun 24 09:41:31 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 00:41:31 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] structuralist linguistics plus follow up on
	phoneme
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806220121hbc698aej22a3e042163db168@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806220121hbc698aej22a3e042163db168@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806240841l4d8eb80dq2749c935261dc1b2@mail.gmail.com>

CB 1:

>>There's a  strange phenomenon right now where all these babies are
into to saying "Obama", sort of on their own when they hear it.>>

Are you sure the Teletubbies haven't endorsed Barack Obama?

CB 2>>But why is "shhh" non-arbitrarily connected to "quiet" ?

There is onemotapia , as well noted , non-arbitrary connection between
signifier and signified.>>

Actually, onomatopoeia is too general term, since the nomenclature of
phonomime, phenomime, and pscyhomime show that language doesn't just
imitate sounds, it imitates and reflects other phenomena, including
non-auditory physical phenomena and 'emotional states', etc. But about
'shhh', as I said, that would depend on what you consider natural and
motivated. Why do people with totally unrelated languages use such a
sibilant to mean 'silence'? It seems to go beyond totally arbitrary.

CB 3>>y theory is the first words were names of people and the first
culture is kinship systems, dead ancestors' messages coming across the
"death barrier". Fuller discussion of my theory below, including why
arbitrariness of the symbol is critical dimension making it adaptive.>>

In which case you might expect us to be able to recover now-extinct
Etruscan, since all that we have left are memorial inscriptions at
grave sites.

CB 4>>Yes, I  was going to say,  before there was post-structuralism ,
there was, of course, structuralism. As far as semiotic sociology mainly
the structural anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss, and as you say
modeled on structural linguistics.>>

Yet as some post-structuralists argue, there were post-structuralists
BEFORE there were structuralists. So when they say post, they don't
necessarily mean after in time. What they mean is something more like
the meta in metaphysics.

>>Chomsky and Halle don't "overthrow" the basic concept of phoneme,
distinctive features, e.g. voiced and unvoiced as a binary opposition,
do they ? That makes too much obvious sense. provable by any human
speaker. Surely , in English  "big" is differentiated from "pig" by
voiced/unvoiced significant feature of the initial consonant , no ?>>

They largely abandon the concept of phoneme as totally unnecessary for
the working out of phonology in grammar.

Speech perception research seems to indicate that 'big' and 'pig' are
NOT differentiated by a single feature of voicing. First, using such
static criteria, the initial [p] is often aspirated, so now we are
talking about two features being present or absent (that is , initial
p aspirates while initial b voices). Second, and more importantly, the
actual difference is more in the transition to and timing in the start
of the following vowel [i]. That is because phonetically speaking the
initial [p] of 'pig' when instantiated actually finishes as a voiced
sound that is more like a [b] before it becomes the following vowel
[i]. Finally, what research on articulation shows is that the theory
of a clean crisp sequence of segments -- like p-i-g -- is an illusion,
co-articulation rules.

The post- Chomsky tradition of linguistics tends to eliminate the
phoneme into a formalistic fog whereby 'phonology' is some sort of
method for describing and explaining language at a sub-syllabic level
that does not need phonetics. On the other hand, articulatory
phonology sheds the phoneme because a phonological unit that is lacks
reality in articulation, in speech transmission (acoustics), and in
speech perception has no usefulness as a model, as a unit of speech.

I also point out that it is viciously circular to say that we can
determine what the phonemes of a language are by specifying minimal
pairs of words (big vs. pig vs. fig etc.) and then to say that
existing phonemes create contrasts that determine meaning in words.
Besides, most words differentiate from each other in how they are
spoken or how they sound based on more than one or two sounds being
different. Moreover, there are words that sound sound the same that
mean something totally different--I vs. eye , two vs. to vs. too, etc.

The phoneme belongs with phlogiston.
CJ


From jannuzi at gmail.com  Tue Jun 24 10:00:57 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 01:00:57 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] structuralist linguistics plus follow up on
	phoneme
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806240841l4d8eb80dq2749c935261dc1b2@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806220121hbc698aej22a3e042163db168@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806240841l4d8eb80dq2749c935261dc1b2@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806240900h56c95599t54e6efbce88f4740@mail.gmail.com>

Sorry for all the typos in the last mail, but it's past midnight and
my eyes are too tired to read it in detail enough to correct. If
something is totally messed up, quote it and I'll try to clarify
tomorrow.

Meanwhile, to explain the voice-onset-timing thing, as with [p] vs. [b],
here is an example of standard explanation out of speech perception research:

>>The difference between voiced and unvoiced cognate consonants in the initial position appears to be highly dependent upon voice-onset-time (VOT). The VOT for voiced consonants appears to range from just before the burst of air is made to about 30 milliseconds afterwards. The VOT for unvoiced consonants ranges from 40 to 100 milliseconds after the burst of air. (Pages 128-129)

http://cnx.org/content/m11175/latest/

In effect, both the initial [b] of 'big' and [p] of 'pig' are voiced,
but the contrast is when the voicing starts (before phonation or at
the time you start to move air out and through your vocal tract or
milliseconds after this start of air movement). Another way of
accounting for this is simply this: you are voicing your [i] after [p]
in 'pig' before you finish saying the [p] sound. Linear sequence and
segmentation are but illusions--illusions of literacy perhaps.

CJ


From jannuzi at gmail.com  Tue Jun 24 10:04:49 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 01:04:49 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] On illusion of phoneme
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806240904v241fed09w317518a63cb8ae6e@mail.gmail.com>

http://www.psy.cmu.edu/~lholt/publications/PhonemeIllusion.pdf

Good paper. Very well thought out and reasoned--unlike most work in
the field where the reality and validity of a concept is assumed to be
true in order to 'prove' or at least support the position that the
concept is real and valid.

CJ


From jannuzi at gmail.com  Tue Jun 24 10:19:59 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 01:19:59 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Da da da da
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806240919w7bdf9313w4a664f5748e1d8f1@mail.gmail.com>

http://jp.youtube.com/watch?v=jtsfidRq2tw&feature=related

What you see and hear, what you hear, and what you see are THREE
different things. The McGurk Effect.

But also note that it can not be done with a single sound. It takes a
syllable. Which means perhaps the syllable--as we say it, as we
perceive it, and as we hear it acoustically--is the basic unit of
speech, not the phoneme.

CJ


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Tue Jun 24 11:29:17 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2008 13:29:17 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] structuralist linguistics plus follow up	on
	phoneme
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806240841l4d8eb80dq2749c935261dc1b2@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806220121hbc698aej22a3e042163db168@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806240841l4d8eb80dq2749c935261dc1b2@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4860F6AE.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



>>> CeJ 
CB 1:

>>There's a  strange phenomenon right now where all these babies are
into to saying "Obama", sort of on their own when they hear it.>>

Are you sure the Teletubbies haven't endorsed Barack Obama?

^^^
CB: I know this sounds strange, but , it's actual babies, not teletubbies. And it seems to be something inherent in the sounds of his name for which they have an uhhh natural affinity, like your point here.

Could be that "mmm" is the easiest thing to do with one's mouth , and so babies can master that first, before other phoneticals.

^^^^

CB 2>>But why is "shhh" non-arbitrarily connected to "quiet" ?

There is onemotapia , as well noted , non-arbitrary connection between
signifier and signified.>>

Actually, onomatopoeia is too general term, since the nomenclature of
phonomime, phenomime, and pscyhomime show that language doesn't just
imitate sounds, it imitates and reflects other phenomena, including
non-auditory physical phenomena and 'emotional states', etc.

^^^
CB: That's interesting. Could you give some examples of words imitating non-sounds ?

^^^

 But about
'shhh', as I said, that would depend on what you consider natural and
motivated. Why do people with totally unrelated languages use such a
sibilant to mean 'silence'? It seems to go beyond totally arbitrary.

^^^^
CB: Or it could be from way back when they had a common ancestor language or something.  In other words, maybe the languages are not totally unrelated.  

Aren't  "unhuh" for "yes" and  "unun" for no, along with head shakes up and down vs. side to side very widespread  ?

^^^

CB 3>>y theory is the first words were names of people and the first
culture is kinship systems, dead ancestors' messages coming across the
"death barrier". Fuller discussion of my theory below, including why
arbitrariness of the symbol is critical dimension making it adaptive.>>

In which case you might expect us to be able to recover now-extinct
Etruscan, since all that we have left are memorial inscriptions at
grave sites.

^^^^
CB: Maybe. But I'm not sure that follows from what I said above. What I'm talking about would have happened tens of thousands of years before the Etruscans.  I'm talking about from 200,000 to a million years ago.

^^^^^

CB 4>>Yes, I  was going to say,  before there was post-structuralism ,
there was, of course, structuralism. As far as semiotic sociology mainly
the structural anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss, and as you say
modeled on structural linguistics.>>

Yet as some post-structuralists argue, there were post-structuralists
BEFORE there were structuralists. So when they say post, they don't
necessarily mean after in time. What they mean is something more like
the meta in metaphysics.

^^^^^
CB: Sure. Just like them to put themselves above structuralists. But at any rate, I'm thinking structuralism is logically before post-structuralism Post-structuralism is a critique of structuralism, so they couldn't critique the concepts of structuralism without there first being structuralism.

^^^^^^^

>>Chomsky and Halle don't "overthrow" the basic concept of phoneme,
distinctive features, e.g. voiced and unvoiced as a binary opposition,
do they ? That makes too much obvious sense. provable by any human
speaker. Surely , in English  "big" is differentiated from "pig" by
voiced/unvoiced significant feature of the initial consonant , no ?>>

They largely abandon the concept of phoneme as totally unnecessary for
the working out of phonology in grammar.

Speech perception research seems to indicate that 'big' and 'pig' are
NOT differentiated by a single feature of voicing. First, using such
static criteria, the initial [p] is often aspirated, so now we are
talking about two features being present or absent (that is , initial
p aspirates while initial b voices). Second, and more importantly, the
actual difference is more in the transition to and timing in the start
of the following vowel [i]. That is because phonetically speaking the
initial [p] of 'pig' when instantiated actually finishes as a voiced
sound that is more like a [b] before it becomes the following vowel
^^^
CB: I don't know. You have to voice a vowel , don't you ? Otherwise, you can't hear it; or it becomes whispering. So, of course voicing has to come in after the "p" as you go into the vowel.

^^^

[i]. Finally, what research on articulation shows is that the theory
of a clean crisp sequence of segments -- like p-i-g -- is an illusion,
co-articulation rules.

^^^
CB: Could you elaborate what you mean here ? I know when I and most of the people I talk with say "pig" or "big" , there is some level of clean , crisp segments.

^^^

The post- Chomsky tradition of linguistics tends to eliminate the
phoneme into a formalistic fog whereby 'phonology' is some sort of
method for describing and explaining language at a sub-syllabic level
that does not need phonetics. On the other hand, articulatory
phonology sheds the phoneme because a phonological unit that is lacks
reality in articulation, in speech transmission (acoustics), and in
speech perception has no usefulness as a model, as a unit of speech.

^^^
CB: So speech has no relation to written language ?   Would you mind explaining a little more how they reach this conclusion ?

^^^^^

I also point out that it is viciously circular to say that we can
determine what the phonemes of a language are by specifying minimal
pairs of words (big vs. pig vs. fig etc.) and then to say that
existing phonemes create contrasts that determine meaning in words.
^^^
CB: I don't get the circularity.  It's based on sort of minimal empiricism, that any native speaker can perform. Like you just did.  Aren't the meanings of pig, big and fig differentiated by the first letter-sound in English ? Of course, p and b are differentiated by non-voiced/voiced. fig is differentiated from the other two by the difference between bilabial whatever vs whatever an "f" is.

^^^^


Besides, most words differentiate from each other in how they are
spoken or how they sound based on more than one or two sounds being
different.

^^^^
CB: Of course, but that doesn't contradict the basic logical point. The fact that they do differentiate themselves based on distinctive features of the sounds that make them up.  You have to narrow it down to words that have only one differentiating distinctive feature to show the idea. 

^^^^^^^

 Moreover, there are words that sound sound the same that
mean something totally different--I vs. eye , two vs. to vs. too, etc.

^^^
CB: But that doesn't contradict or refute the basic point on phonemes.   That's a different issue, homynyms

^^^

The phoneme belongs with phlogiston.
CJ

^^^^
CB: Your the expert, but I'd say you have to elaborate on what you say above a bit more to show that. Binary oppositions still seem to work on a lot of words and cultural categories, like up/down, left/right, male/female,  war/peace, wet/dry, on /off ...............


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phoneme 



Phoneme
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
This article is about the speech unit. For the JavaME library, see phoneME (software).
In human language, a phoneme is the smallest posited structural unit that distinguishes meaning. Phonemes are not the physical segments themselves, but, in theoretical terms, cognitive abstractions or categorizations of them.

An example of a phoneme is the /t/ sound in the words tip, stand, water, and cat. (In transcription, phonemes are placed between slashes, as here.) These instances of /t/ are considered to fall under the same sound category despite the fact that in each word they are pronounced somewhat differently. The difference may not even be audible to native speakers. That is, a phoneme may encompass several recognizably different speech sounds, called phones. In our example, the /t/ in tip is aspirated, [t?], while the /t/ in stand is not, [t]. (In transcription, speech sounds that are not phonemes are placed in brackets, as here.) In many languages, such as Korean and Spanish, these phones are different phonemes: For example, /tol/ is "stone" in Korean, whereas /t?ol/ is "grain of rice". In Spanish, there is no aspirated [t?], but the phone in American English writer is similar to the Spanish r /?/ and contrasts with Spanish /t/.

Phones that belong to the same phoneme, such as [t] and [t?] for English /t/, are called allophones. A common test to determine whether two phones are allophones or separate phonemes relies on finding minimal pairs: words that differ by only the phones in question. For example, the words tip and dip illustrate that [t] and [d] are separate phonemes, /t/ and /d/, in English, whereas the lack of such a contrast in Korean (/t?ata/ is pronounced [t?ada], for example) indicates that in this language they are allophones of a phoneme /t/.

In sign languages, the basic elements of gesture and location were formerly called cheremes (or cheiremes), but general usage changed to phoneme. Tonic phonemes are sometimes called tonemes, and timing phonemes chronemes.

Some linguists (such as Roman Jakobson) consider phonemes to be further decomposable into features, such features being the true minimal constituents of language. Features overlap each other in time, as do suprasegmental phonemes in oral language and many phonemes in sign languages.

Contents [hide]
1 Background and related ideas 
1.1 Notation 
1.2 Examples 
2 Restricted phonemes 
3 Biuniqueness 
4 Neutralization, archiphoneme, underspecification 
5 Phonological extremes 
6 See also 
7 External links 
 


[edit] Background and related ideas
In ancient India, the Sanskrit grammarian P??ini (c. 520-460 BC), in his text of Sanskrit grammar, the Shiva Sutras, originated the concepts of the phoneme, the morpheme and the root. The Shiva Sutras, traditionally prefaced to the A???dhy?y?, presents a system of phonemic notation in fourteen terse aphorisms. This notational system introduces different clusters of phonemes that serve special roles in the morphology of Sanskrit, and are referred to throughout the text.

Around the 1st century CE, the definitions of phoneme (oliyam) and alphabet (ezuththu) were discussed in the Tolk?ppiyam concerning the Tamil language.

The term phon?me was reportedly first used by Dufriche-Desgenettes in 1873, but it referred to only a sound of speech. The term phoneme as an abstraction was developed by the Polish linguist Jan Niecis?aw Baudouin de Courtenay and his student Miko?aj Kruszewski during 1875-1895. The term used by these two was fonema, the basic unit of what they called psychophonetics. The concept of the phoneme was elaborated in the works of Nikolai Trubetzkoi and other of the Prague School (during the years 1926-1935), as well as in that of structuralists like Ferdinand de Saussure, Edward Sapir, and Leonard Bloomfield. Later, it was also used in generative linguistics, most famously by Noam Chomsky and Morris Halle, and remains central to many accounts of the development of modern of phonology. As a theoretical concept or model, though, it has been supplemented and even replaced by others.

Some languages make use of pitch for phonemic distinction. In this case, the tones used are called tonemes. Some languages distinguish words made up of the same phonemes (and tonemes) by using different durations of some elements, which are called chronemes. However, not all scholars working on languages with distinctive duration use this term.

Usually, long vowels and consonants are represented either by a length indicator or doubling of the symbol in question.

In sign languages, phonemes may be classified as Tab (elements of location, from Latin tabula), Dez (the hand shape, from designator), Sig (the motion, from signation), and with some researchers, Ori (orientation). Facial expressions and mouthing are also phonemic.


[edit] Notation
A transcription that only indicates the different phonemes of a language is said to be phonemic. Such transcriptions are enclosed within virgules (slashes), / /; these show that each enclosed symbol is claimed to be phonemically meaningful. On the other hand, a transcription that indicates finer detail, including allophonic variation like the two English L's, is said to be phonetic, and is enclosed in square brackets, [ ].

The common notation used in linguistics employs virgules (slashes) (/ /) around the symbol that stands for the phoneme. For example, the phoneme for the initial consonant sound in the word "phoneme" would be written as /f/. In other words, the graphemes are <ph>, but this digraph represents one sound /f/. Allophones, more phonetically specific descriptions of how a given phoneme might be commonly instantiated, are often denoted in linguistics by the use of diacritical or other marks added to the phoneme symbols and then placed in square brackets ([ ]) to differentiate them from the phoneme in slant brackets (/ /). The conventions of orthography are then kept separate from both phonemes and allophones by the use of angle brackets < > to enclose the spelling.

The symbols of the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) and extended sets adapted to a particular language are often used by linguists to write phonemes of oral languages, with the principle being one symbol equals one categorical sound. Due to problems displaying some symbols in the early days of the Internet, systems such as X-SAMPA and Kirshenbaum were developed to represent IPA symbols in plain text. As of 2004, any modern web browser can display IPA symbols (as long as the operating system provides the appropriate fonts), and we use this system in this article.

There are 2 published set of phonemic symbols for sign language: SignWriting and Stokoe notation. SignWriting is capable of writing any sign language and is currently used in over 38 countries. People in these countries use SignWriting on a daily basis as a natural writing system for education and recreation. Stokoe notation is used for linguistic research and was originally developed for American Sign Language. Stokoe notation has since been applied to British Sign Language by Kyle and Woll, and to Australian Aboriginal sign languages by Adam Kendon.


[edit] Examples
Examples of phonemes in the English language would include sounds from the set of English consonants, like /p/ and /b/. These two are most often written consistently with one letter for each sound. However, phonemes might not be so apparent in written English, such as when they are typically represented with combined letters, called digraphs, like <sh> (pronounced /?/) or <ch> (pronounced /t?/).

To see a list of the phonemes in the English language, see IPA for English.

Two sounds that may be allophones (sound variants belonging to the same phoneme) in one language may belong to separate phonemes in another language or dialect. In English, for example, /p/ has aspirated and non-aspirated allophones:aspirated as in /p?n/, and non-aspirated as in /sp?n/. However, in many languages (e. g. Chinese), aspirated /p?/ is a phoneme distinct from unaspirated /p/. As another example, there is no distinction between [r] and [l] in Japanese; there is only one /r/ phoneme, though it has various allophones that can sound more like [l], [?], or [r] to English speakers. The sounds [z] and [s] are distinct phonemes in English, but allophones in Spanish. The sounds [n] (as in run) and [?] (as in rung) are phonemes in English, but allophones in Italian and Spanish.

An important phoneme is the chroneme, a phonemically-relevant extension of the duration a consonant or vowel. Some languages or dialects such as Finnish or Japanese allow chronemes after both consonants and vowels. Others, like Italian or Australian English use it after only one (in the case of Italian, consonants; in the case of Australian, vowels).


[edit] Restricted phonemes
A restricted phoneme is a phoneme that can only occur in a certain environment: There are restrictions as to where it can occur. English has several restricted phonemes:

/?/, as in sing, occurs only at the end of a syllable, never at the beginning (in many other languages, such as Swahili or Thai, /?/ can appear word-initially). 
/h/ occurs only before vowels and at the beginning of a syllable, never at the end (a few languages, such as Arabic, or Romanian allow /h/ syllable-finally). 
In many American dialects with the cot-caught merger, /?/ occurs only before /r/, /l/, and in the diphthong /??/. 
In non-rhotic dialects, /r/ can only occur before a vowel, never at the end of a word or before a consonant. 
Under most interpretations, /w/ and /j/ occur only before a vowel, never at the end of a syllable. However, many phonologists interpret a word like boy as either /b??/ or /b?j/. 

[edit] Biuniqueness
 Please help improve this section by expanding it.
Further information might be found on the talk page or at requests for expansion. 


Biuniqueness is a criterial definition of the phoneme in classic structuralist phonemics. The biuniqueness definition states that every phonetic allophone must unambiguously be assigned to one and only one phoneme. In other words, there is a one-to-one allophone-to-phoneme mapping instead of a one-to-many mapping.

The notion of biuniqueness was controversial among some pre-generative linguists and was prominently challenged by Morris Halle and Noam Chomsky in the late 1950s and early 1960s.


[edit] Neutralization, archiphoneme, underspecification
Main article: Underspecification
Phonemes that are contrastive in certain environments may not be contrastive in all environments. In the environments where they don't contrast, the contrast is said to be neutralized.

In English there are three nasal phonemes, /m, n, ?/, as shown by the minimal triplet,

/s?m/ sum 
/s?n/ sun 
/s??/ sung 

However, with rare exceptions, these sounds are not contrastive before plosives such as /p, t, k/ within the same morpheme. Although all three phones appear before plosives, for example in limp, lint, link, only one of these may appear before each of the plosives. That is, the /m, n, ?/ distinction is neutralized before each of the plosives /p, t, k/:

Only /m/ occurs before /p/, 
only /n/ before /t/, and 
only /?/ before /k/. 
Thus these phonemes are not contrastive in these environments, and according to some theorists, there is no evidence as to what the underlying representation might be. If we hypothesize that we are dealing with only a single underlying nasal, there is no reason to pick one of the three phonemes /m, n, ?/ over the other two.

(In some languages there is only one phonemic nasal anywhere, and due to obligatory assimilation, it surfaces as [m, n, ?] in just these environments, so this idea is not as far-fetched as it might seem at first glance.)

In certain schools of phonology, such a neutralized distinction is known as an archiphoneme (Nikolai Trubetzkoy of the Prague school is often associated with this analysis). Archiphonemes are often notated with a capital letter. Following this convention, the neutralization of /m, n, ?/ before /p, t, k/ could be notated as |N|, and limp, lint, link would be represented as |l?Np, l?Nt, l?Nk|. (The |pipes| indicate underlying representation.) Other ways this archiphoneme could be notated are |m-n-?|, {m, n, ?}, or |n*|.

Another example from American English is the neutralization of the plosives /t, d/ following a stressed syllable. Phonetically, both are realized in this position as [?], a voiced alveolar flap. This can be heard by comparing writer with rider (for the sake of simplicity, Canadian raising is not taken into account).

[?a??t] write 
[?a?d] ride 

with the suffix -er:

[??a???] writer 
[??a???] rider 

Thus, one cannot say whether the underlying representation of the intervocalic consonant in either word is /t/ or /d/ without looking at the unsuffixed form. This neutralization can be represented as an archiphoneme |D|, in which case the underlying representation of writer or rider would be |'?a?D?|.

Another way to talk about archiphonemes involves the concept of underspecification: phonemes can be considered fully specified segments while archiphonemes are underspecified segments. In Tuvan, phonemic vowels are specified with the features of tongue height, backness, and lip rounding. The archiphoneme |U| is an underspecified high vowel where only the tongue height is specified.

phoneme/
archiphoneme height backness roundedness 
/i/ high front unrounded 
/?/ high back unrounded 
/u/ high back rounded 
|U| high 

Whether |U| is pronounced as front or back and whether rounded or unrounded depends on vowel harmony. If |U| occurs following a front unrounded vowel, it will be pronounced as the phoneme /i/; if following a back unrounded vowel, it will be as an /?/; and if following a back rounded vowel, it will be an /u/. This can been seen in the following words:

-|Um|   'my' (the vowel of this suffix is underspecified) 
|idikUm| ? [idikim] 'my boot' (/i/ is front & unrounded) 
|xarUm| ? [xar?m] 'my snow' (/a/ is back & unrounded) 
|nomUm| ? [nomum] 'my book' (/o/ is back & rounded) 

Not all phonologists accept the concept of archiphonemes. Many doubt that it reflects how people process language or control speech, and some argue that archiphonemes add unnecessary complexity.


[edit] Phonological extremes
Of all the sounds that a human vocal tract can create, different languages vary considerably in the number of these sounds that are considered to be distinctive phonemes in the speech of that language. Ubyx and Arrernte have only two phonemic vowels, while at the other extreme, the Bantu language Ngwe has fourteen vowel qualities, twelve of which may occur long or short, for twenty-six oral vowels, plus six nasalized vowels, long and short, for thirty-eight vowels; while !X?? achieves thirty-one pure vowels-not counting vowel length, which it also has-by varying the phonation. Rotokas has only six consonants, while !X?? has somewhere in the neighborhood of seventy-seven, and Ubyx eighty-one. French has no phonemic tone or stress, while several of the Kam-Sui languages have nine tones, and one of the Kru languages, Wobe, has been claimed to have fourteen, though this is disputed. The total phonemic inventory in languages varies from as few as eleven in Rotokas to as many as 112 in !X?? (including four tones). These may range from familiar sounds like [t], [s], or [m] to very unusual ones produced in extraordinary ways (see: Click consonant, phonation, airstream mechanism). The English language itself uses a rather large set of thirteen to twenty-two vowels, including diphthongs, though its twenty-two to twenty-six consonants are close to average. (There are twenty-one consonant and five vowel letters in the English alphabet, but this does not correspond to the number of consonant and vowel sounds.)

The most common vowel system consists of the five vowels /i/, /e/, /a/, /o/, /u/. The most common consonants are /p/, /t/, /k/, /m/, /n/. Very few languages lack one of these: Arabic lacks /p/, standard Hawaiian lacks /t/, Mohawk and Tlingit lack /p/ and /m/, Hupa lacks both /p/ and a simple /k/, colloquial Samoan lacks /t/ and /n/, while Rotokas and Quileute lack /m/ and /n/. While most of languages missing sounds have very small inventories, Arabic, Quileute, and Hupa have quite complex consonant systems


_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis 


 


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Tue Jun 24 11:32:35 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2008 13:32:35 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] structuralist linguistics plus follow up	on
	phoneme
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806240841l4d8eb80dq2749c935261dc1b2@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806220121hbc698aej22a3e042163db168@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806240841l4d8eb80dq2749c935261dc1b2@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4860F773.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

This wikipedia article disagrees with you on Chomsky and Halle.

Charles

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phoneme

The term phon?me was reportedly first used by Dufriche-Desgenettes in 1873, but it referred to only a sound of speech. The term phoneme as an abstraction was developed by the Polish linguist Jan Niecis?aw Baudouin de Courtenay and his student Miko?aj Kruszewski during 1875-1895. The term used by these two was fonema, the basic unit of what they called psychophonetics. The concept of the phoneme was elaborated in the works of Nikolai Trubetzkoi and other of the Prague School (during the years 1926-1935), as well as in that of structuralists like Ferdinand de Saussure, Edward Sapir, and Leonard Bloomfield. Later, it was also used in generative linguistics, most famously by Noam Chomsky and Morris Halle, and remains central to many accounts of the development of modern of phonology. As a theoretical concept or model, though, it has been supplemented and even replaced by others

 



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Tue Jun 24 11:39:00 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2008 13:39:00 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] structuralist linguistics plus follow up	on
	phoneme
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806240900h56c95599t54e6efbce88f4740@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806220121hbc698aej22a3e042163db168@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806240841l4d8eb80dq2749c935261dc1b2@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806240900h56c95599t54e6efbce88f4740@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4860F8F4.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



>>> CeJ <jannuzi at gmail.com> 06/24/2008 12:00 PM >>>
Sorry for all the typos in the last mail, but it's past midnight and
my eyes are too tired to read it in detail enough to correct. If
something is totally messed up, quote it and I'll try to clarify
tomorrow.

Meanwhile, to explain the voice-onset-timing thing, as with [p] vs.
[b],
here is an example of standard explanation out of speech perception
research:

>>The difference between voiced and unvoiced cognate consonants in the
initial position appears to be highly dependent upon voice-onset-time
(VOT). The VOT for voiced consonants appears to range from just before
the burst of air is made to about 30 milliseconds afterwards. The VOT
for unvoiced consonants ranges from 40 to 100 milliseconds after the
burst of air. (Pages 128-129)

http://cnx.org/content/m11175/latest/ 

In effect, both the initial [b] of 'big' and [p] of 'pig' are voiced,
but the contrast is when the voicing starts
^^^^
CB: Well, that' the same principle, but just shifts the binary
oppostion differentiation from voiced/unvoiced to early voiced/late
voiced. The fundamental idea is the same.

^^^^^

 (before phonation or at
the time you start to move air out and through your vocal tract or
milliseconds after this start of air movement). Another way of
accounting for this is simply this: you are voicing your [i] after [p]
in 'pig' before you finish saying the [p] sound. 
^^^
CB: That's what I guessed two posts ago. The vowel must be voiced. So,
it slurs into the unvoiced consonant.

^^^^^

Linear sequence and
segmentation are but illusions--illusions of literacy perhaps.

^^^
CB: Come on .  There is some level of  distinction in linear sequence
between  "pig" and "gip" Say the two words. Clearly , your mouth
articulate the "g" sound before the "p" sound in the latter and vica
versa in the former.

^^^^

CJ

_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis 


 


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Tue Jun 24 11:42:36 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2008 13:42:36 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Da da da da
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806240919w7bdf9313w4a664f5748e1d8f1@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806240919w7bdf9313w4a664f5748e1d8f1@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4860F9CC.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



>>> CeJ <jannuzi at gmail.com> 06/24/2008 12:19 PM >>>
http://jp.youtube.com/watch?v=jtsfidRq2tw&feature=related 

What you see and hear, what you hear, and what you see are THREE
different things. The McGurk Effect.

But also note that it can not be done with a single sound. It takes a
syllable. Which means perhaps the syllable--as we say it, as we
perceive it, and as we hear it acoustically--is the basic unit of
speech, not the phoneme.

CJ

^^^^
CB; pig and big are both single syllables, differentiated by the
initial consonant, no ?

I'm not following you on " see and hear". Are you talking about reading
lips ?

_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis 


 


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Tue Jun 24 11:44:01 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2008 13:44:01 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Da da da da
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806240919w7bdf9313w4a664f5748e1d8f1@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806240919w7bdf9313w4a664f5748e1d8f1@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4860FA21.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



>>> CeJ <jannuzi at gmail.com> 06/24/2008 12:19 PM >>>
http://jp.youtube.com/watch?v=jtsfidRq2tw&feature=related 

What you see and hear, what you hear, and what you see are THREE
different things. The McGurk Effect.

^^^^^
CB: I thought he was saying "ah" "ah" "ah", not da, da , da

But also note that it can not be done with a single sound. It takes a
syllable. Which means perhaps the syllable--as we say it, as we
perceive it, and as we hear it acoustically--is the basic unit of
speech, not the phoneme.

CJ

_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis 


 


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Tue Jun 24 12:36:39 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2008 13:36:39 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Langston Hughes' Christian America
Message-ID: <E1KBCSj-0000GC-Fd@elasmtp-spurfowl.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

See my blog entry:


<http://reasonsociety.blogspot.com/2008/06/langston-hughes-goodbye-christ-hello.html>Langston 
Hughes: Goodbye Christ, Hello Persecution 

From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Tue Jun 24 12:04:34 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2008 14:04:34 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] On illusion of phoneme
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806240904v241fed09w317518a63cb8ae6e@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806240904v241fed09w317518a63cb8ae6e@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4860FEF2.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



>>> CeJ 
http://www.psy.cmu.edu/~lholt/publications/PhonemeIllusion.pdf 

Good paper. Very well thought out and reasoned--unlike most work in
the field where the reality and validity of a concept is assumed to be
true in order to 'prove' or at least support the position that the
concept is real and valid.

CJ

^^^^
CB: So most linguists think the phoneme is a valid concept ?

_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis 


 


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Tue Jun 24 12:09:55 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2008 14:09:55 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] The Illusion of the Phoneme
Message-ID: <48610033.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

The Illusion of the Phoneme
Andrew J. Lotto
Loyola University Chicago
Lori L. Holt
Carnegie Mellon University
0. Caveat
A caveat is warranted here. While our title is provocative, our ambitions are
much more prosaic. Obviously the debate on the ontological status of the
phoneme has a long and complicated history. We offer neither a summary of this
debate nor a last word on the question. We seek only to question the role of the
phoneme in the perception of speech and, in doing so, we hope to demonstrate
that the empirical evidence for the causal role of the phoneme in perception is
limited.
1. The Ontological Status of the Phoneme
Classifying speech in terms of discrete abstract labels has been an extremely
successful descriptive system for linguistics. While there are well-known
concerns about the ?shoe-horning? of different languages? phonetic systems into
universal phoneme sets, there is little doubt that this descriptive symbol system
has been instrumental in the progress of the speech sciences. Phonemes offer a
communication system for empirical results. In addition, standardized
descriptions of different linguistic sound systems have made the immense
variation in language manageable. But has this desire for simplicity and
generality blinded us to some of the realities of speech as a communication
system?
1.1 The ?Categorization Error?
The early Gestalt Psychologists (e.g. K?hler, 1930; Koffka, 1935) warned
against making the ?experience error? when theorizing about human perception.
This error arises when ?we mistake the result of organization for the cause of
organization? (Koffka, 1935). For the Gestalt theorists, structure and organization
in perception did not necessarily imply that this structure and organization must
be present in the input. We believe that this cautionary note applies beyond the
scope of ?illusory contours? and perceptual grouping rules. Structure and
organization in behavior need not imply that this structure and organization is
present in mental representation. It is easy enough in many areas of study to
mistake efficient descriptors of the structure of a system?s behavior as causal
entities responsible for that structure. For example, when subjects are asked to
rate members of a category for their typicality (e.g. ?birds? or ?furniture? or
?members of /i/?) there is a clear structure in their responses. In particular, there is
usually a prominence in the ratings across a subset of the members. This
prominence in responses is often described as a prototype. Similar prominences in
response structure can be observed for a variety of tasks and measures (e.g.
reaction time for identification). The prototype is a very useful descriptor of the
response structure for these types of tasks. After all, a prominence in responding
is a very salient attribute and it may have functional significance..
Beyond being an important descriptive entity, prototypes in the response
structure are often taken as evidence for mental prototypes internal to the subject
which are responsible for the structure of the output (e.g. Posner & Keele, 1970;
Rosch, 1975; 1978). This theoretical approach appears rather compelling: the
structure of mental representations is mirrored in the structure of responses.
However, we now have a variety of models of categorization that lead to response
structures that include a prominence or ?prototype?. Exemplar models and
connectionist net models deliver similar response structure with no explicit
representation of a mental or internal ?prototype? (see, e.g., Reed, 1972; Nelson,
1974; Brooks, 1978; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Knapp & Anderson, 1984;
Kluender, Lotto, Holt, & Bloedel, 1998). It is clear, then, that the presence of a
?prototype? in behavioral data does not necessitate a ?prototype? in the mental
representation of the stimuli. To make this sort of presumption about mental
representation structure from response structure is to commit something akin to
the ?experience error?.i Whereas, the Gestalt psychologists reprimanded the
presumption that subjective organization is determined by organization in the
stimulus, we are suggesting that it is wrong to presume that structure in response
follows in a straightforward manner from similar structure in mental
representations. The Gestalt version concerned the ?experience? of subjective
perception. We are discussing the ?experience? of objective data. This is
stretching the metaphor a bit and, thus, we prefer to refer to this as the
categorization error. That is, sometimes we mistake the description of response
structures (i.e. we categorize the structure for efficiency) as causes of response
structures (i.e. we presume the category to exist as a mental entity).
Another example of a ?categorization error? would result from confusing
?rule-described? behavior and ?rule-following? behavior (Heil, 1983; Ben-Zeev,
1987). The fact that behavior can be described efficiently by rules does not entail
that the behavior is the result of the following of explicit rules. This distinction
was made clear by Wittgenstein?s (1953) ?skeptical paradox?. A contemporary
example is the production of the past tense in English. The morphological
changes of regular verbs from present to past tense can be described quite
efficiently by a rule. This is certainly an example of rule-described behavior.
However, it would be an error to presume that this is equivalent to saying that the
behavior is a result of explicit rule following. Connectionist networks can map
the morphological change for regular verbs and even novel exemplars without the
representation of explicit rules (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). These networks
even appear to model the trajectory of acquisition of correct production of the past
tense by children, again without reference to explicit rules (though, see Pinker &
Prince, 1988 for a critical review of these results).ii
Are we committing the ?categorization error? when we suggest that the
phoneme is the fundamental representation or unit of speech? It is an efficient
unit for describing speech behavior, but does that give us license to infer that it is
a causal entity? And worse, could it be that because we give a prominent role to
the phoneme that we start to see more regularity in speech perception and
production than is actually there?
1.2 Phoneme as the Fundamental Unit of Speech
So, is the phoneme merely an efficient descriptor of language behavior or is it a
fundamental functional unit of speech perception (and production)? It appears
that across distinct theoretical divisions in speech research there is a pretheoretical
presumption that the phoneme is indeed the fundamental
representation of speech perception.iii For example, here is a quote from some of
the most respected researchers in the field:
?How is it that on hearing the sounds of speech a listener perceives
phonemes? Since the question is reasonable only if we assume
that phonemes are perceived?we accept it and go on to ask how
such perception might occur.? (Liberman, Cooper, Studdert-
Kennedy, Harris, & Shankweiler, 1966, as quoted in Walsh, 1989).
In the decades since this quote there have been some concerns raised about the
accepted role of phonemes (e.g., Studdert-Kennedy, 1976, 1980). The phoneme
representation has also had several explicit defenders (e.g., Nearey, 1990).
However, speech perception researchers (the current authors included) too often
simply proceed as if the issue has been resolved and conduct experiments to
uncover how ?a listener perceives phonemes?. Most of the disparate theories of
speech perception (excepting some forms of Direct Realism) simply presume that
the end product of perception is the assignment of a discrete phonemic symbol.
This presumption is codified in typical experimental paradigms that demonstrate
effects of acoustic parameter manipulation on the forced-choice phonemic
labeling of speech sounds. In order to avoid the categorization error, empirical
evidence concerning the role of the phoneme in perception has to be brought to
bear on the issue. To accomplish this we need to set down some defining
characteristics of the phoneme that will lead to testable predictions about
perceptual data.
1.3 Definition of Phoneme
It should be made clear that the ?phoneme? that we are discussing here is not the
orhographic unit for phonemic transcriptions of linguists, but a purported internal
mental representation that may be presumed to be a functional unit for the speech
perceiver-producer. This is the ?mentalistic? notion of the phoneme as described
by Jones (1967). It has its roots in phoneme theory back to its origins with de
Courtenay in the 1870s, who talked of ?psychophonetics?. The notion of the
phoneme as a psychological (as opposed) to linguistic entity is also explicit in the
work of Sapir (1925). Thus, this viewpoint is distinguishable from Trubetzkoy?s
functional view (1958) or Jones?s (1967) ?physicalist? notion.
Clearly, the concept of this mentalistic phoneme has gone through many
revisions since de Courtenay. We see three elements that are typical (though by
no means universal) of mentalistic notions of the phoneme. Phonemes are:
Discrete: Some continuous variation in speech sounds is quantized when a
phonemic label is assigned.
Abstract (Symbolic): The mental representation itself is a symbolic label similar
in conception (though not necessarily similar in structure) to the phonemic
transcription labels.
Language-specific: A phoneme is meaningful only in relation to a particular
language. It is a meaningful functional unit for the idiolect of the particular
speaker.iv
These properties are in direct contrast to the acoustic signal which carries the
phonemic message from speaker to listener. The speech signal is:
Continuous: Discrete markers for phoneme boundaries have been notoriously
difficult to find. The variation in the acoustic waveform is, for practical purposes,
continuous.
Physical: The waveform is not an abstract symbol, but a lawful product of the
movement and shape of articulators, the medium of sound travel and any
intervening objects or sources.v
Not Linguistically Marked: Obviously, the acoustic waveform is not explicitly
marked as characteristic of a particular language. In fact, it isn?t even explicitly
marked as language.
Because of this mismatch between the continuous signal and the discrete symbol,
speech perception research has been confronted with several contumacious
problems. The ?problems? of signal segmentation, perceptual compensation for
coarticulation, lack of invariance, and speaker normalization are all, to some
extent, created by the desire to map a continuously varying signal on phoneme
quanta. Could these long-standing problems be simply a consequence of our pretheoretical
assumptions?vi
To justify the large amount of work going into solving these
aforementioned difficulties, it seems incumbent upon us to empirically validate
the existence of phonemes or derive their necessity from first principles. We
understand that there have been efforts to provide empirical evidence about the
ontological status of the phoneme. Much of this previous work is based on
patterns of responses in production and perception data (e.g. speech errors,
Fromkin, 1971). These data can be quite compelling, but still we are left with the
possibility of a categorization error.

(continued)


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Tue Jun 24 12:18:07 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2008 14:18:07 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Dobson accuses Obama of 'distorting' Bible
Message-ID: <48610220.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

Dobson accuses Obama of 'distorting' Bible
Conservative is critical of Dem's stance on how the Bible should guide policy
  

 
Dobson questions Obama's stance on Bible
June 24: Evangelical leader James Dobson accuses Barack Obama of distorting the Bible. Journalists Brian Debose and Perry Bacon speak with MSNBC's Contessa Brewer about the Dobson claim, and a question about whether the Obama campaign is snubbing Muslim voters.
MSNBc

 
COLORADO SPRINGS, Colo. - As Barack Obama broadens his outreach to evangelical voters, one of the movement's biggest names, James Dobson, accuses the likely Democratic presidential nominee of distorting the Bible and pushing a "fruitcake interpretation" of the Constitution.

The criticism, to be aired Tuesday on Dobson's Focus on the Family radio program, comes shortly after an Obama aide suggested a meeting at the organization's headquarters here, said Tom Minnery, senior vice president for government and public policy at Focus on the Family.

The conservative Christian group provided The Associated Press with an advance copy of the pre-taped radio segment, which runs 18 minutes and highlights excerpts of a speech Obama gave in June 2006 to the liberal Christian group Call to Renewal. Obama mentions Dobson in the speech.

Story continues below ?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
advertisement

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

"Even if we did have only Christians in our midst, if we expelled every non-Christian from the United States of America, whose Christianity would we teach in the schools?" Obama said. "Would we go with James Dobson's or Al Sharpton's?" referring to the civil rights leader.

Dobson took aim at examples Obama cited in asking which Biblical passages should guide public policy ? passages like Leviticus, which Obama said suggests slavery is OK and eating shellfish is an abomination, or Jesus' Sermon on the Mount, "a passage that is so radical that it's doubtful that our own Defense Department would survive its application."

"Folks haven't been reading their Bibles," Obama said.

'Deliberately distorting'
Dobson and Minnery accused Obama of wrongly equating Old Testament texts and dietary codes that no longer apply to Jesus' teachings in the New Testament.

"I think he's deliberately distorting the traditional understanding of the Bible to fit his own worldview, his own confused theology," Dobson said.

"... He is dragging biblical understanding through the gutter."

Joshua DuBois, director of religious affairs for Obama's campaign, said in a statement that a full reading of Obama's speech shows he is committed to reaching out to people of faith and standing up for families. "Obama is proud to have the support of millions of Americans of faith and looks forward to working across religious lines to bring our country together," DuBois said.

 Video 

 Religious, but not dogmatic
June 23: A Pew poll found that while 92 percent of Americans believe in God, their beliefs are different than they were a generation ago. NBC's Rehema Ellis reports.
Nightly News
 
 
Dobson reserved some of his harshest criticism for Obama's argument that the religiously motivated must frame debates over issues like abortion not just in their own religion's terms but in arguments accessible to all people.

He said Obama, who supports abortion rights, is trying to govern by the "lowest common denominator of morality," labeling it "a fruitcake interpretation of the Constitution."

"Am I required in a democracy to conform my efforts in the political arena to his bloody notion of what is right with regard to the lives of tiny babies?" Dobson said. "What he's trying to say here is unless everybody agrees, we have no right to fight for what we believe."

The program was paid for by a Focus on the Family affiliate whose donations are taxed, Dobson said, so it's legal for that group to get more involved in politics.


  Click for related content 
NYT: Muslim voters sense snub from Obama
Newsweek: Will McCain choose Pawlenty as veep?
Obama tells women he supports equal pay
New Yorker: Obama ? What's the big idea? 
New York Times Politics
Newsvine Politics 


Possible visit
Last week, DuBois, a former Assemblies of God associate minister, called Minnery for what Minnery described as a cordial discussion. He would not go into detail, but said Dubois offered to visit the ministry in August when the Democratic National Convention is in Denver.

A possible Obama visit was not discussed, but Focus is open to one, Minnery said.

McCain also has not met with Dobson. A McCain campaign staffer offered Dobson a meeting with McCain recently in Denver, Minnery said. Dobson declined because he prefers that candidates visit the Focus on the Family campus to learn more about the organization, Minnery said.

Dobson has not backed off his statement that he could not in good conscience vote for McCain because of concerns over the Arizona senator's conservative credentials. Dobson has said he will vote in November but has suggested he might not vote for president.

Obama recently met in Chicago with religious leaders, including conservative evangelicals. His campaign also plans thousands of "American Values House Parties," where participants discuss Obama and religion, as well as a presence on Christian radio and blogs



This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Tue Jun 24 12:30:52 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2008 14:30:52 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Barack Obama: What's the big idea?
Message-ID: <4861051D.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>


Barry O is a big puzzle ( smile). Some people just can't figure him out. He's a mystery.

CB
^^^^^

Barack Obama: What's the big idea?
16 months and 26 debates later he remains a puzzle to many voters 

 
 
Malcolm Gladwell: Who says big ideas are rare?
 


  

  

The Talk of the Town
By Dorothy Wickenden 

updated 8:57 a.m. ET, Mon., June. 23, 2008
On October 7, 2002, in Cincinnati, Ohio, George W. Bush delivered the defining speech of his Presidency. In the face of ?clear evidence of peril? from a regime harboring terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, he declared, ?we cannot wait for the final proof?the smoking gun?that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.? 

Five days earlier, a forty-one-year-old Illinois state legislator had given a momentous speech of his own, although few recognized it as such at the time. ?I don?t oppose all wars,? Barack Obama told a few hundred Chicago protesters, adding:

I know that even a successful war against Iraq will require a U.S. occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined cost, with undetermined consequences. I know that an invasion of Iraq without a clear rationale and without strong international support will only fan the flames of the Middle East, and encourage the worst, rather than best, impulses of the Arab world, and strengthen the recruitment arm of Al Qaeda. I am not opposed to all wars. I?m opposed to dumb wars. 


------------------------------------------------------------

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Bush discovered a big idea for his Presidency. He would bring down a tyrant, crush terrorism, and impose democracy and peace on what his regent, Vice-President Dick Cheney, called ?freedom-loving peoples of the region.? As the world now knows, that idea was based on faulty intelligence reports and executed with a fatal disregard of political reality in the Middle East and at home. By the time of the 2008 Presidential campaign, Bush?s approval rating had shrunk from sixty-seven per cent to thirty-seven per cent, the Republican Party was coming apart, and Obama?s 2002 speech had proved a precondition for an astounding climb to victory this month as the Democratic Party?s presumptive nominee for President. 

Still, sixteen months after announcing his candidacy, and after twenty-six Presidential debates and thousands of public-speaking engagements, Obama remains a puzzle to many voters. Almost as dedicated a policy wonk as Hillary Clinton and arguably more centrist in his economic beliefs, he offers plenty of specifics about what needs to be done. But his captivating eloquence and his slogan??Change We Can Believe In??have seemed to lift him dangerously high above the concrete. He has proved his steadiness of purpose without clearly defining his priorities. What, above all, does he intend to accomplish if he is elected President?

Obama is said to have been dissatisfied with the slogan. If so, he has a point. The ?change? he advocates can be understood as a pragmatic correction to the radical policies and the ineptitude of the Bush brigade. His political departure is a kind of return. He has written two unusually revealing books?one describing how he came to be who he is, the other delineating how he proposes to reclaim the qualities that once made America so admired. He argues that the United States must relearn the fundamental lessons of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and its own long journey toward a more perfect union, and then apply them to the global upheavals of the twenty-first century.

In his books, Obama emerges not as the personification of cool projected onto him by his young adherents?or as the disdainful ?litist suggested by his offhand remark about a ?bitter? working class?but as something of a square: someone who doesn?t have to strain to talk about ?values,? God, and family. His eerily objective self-analysis is matched by his lawyerly ability to see things from the perspective of those on the other side. In January, after Obama uttered a few words of praise for Ronald Reagan in an interview with newspaper editors, Hillary Clinton and John Edwards rushed to condemn his apostasy. But he meant what he said. In 2006, in ?The Audacity of Hope,? he had written, ?Reagan spoke to America?s longing for order, our need to believe that we are not simply subject to blind, impersonal forces but that we can shape our individual and collective destinies, so long as we rediscover the traditional virtues of hard work, patriotism, personal responsibility, optimism, and faith.?

The general consistency of Obama?s policy views?with an occasional bald deviation, as on the public funding of his campaign?is a contrast to John McCain?s erratic shape-shifting. McCain opposed the Bush tax cuts as skewed toward the rich, and unsustainable; now he wants to extend them forever. He co-sponsored a relatively humane immigration bill; now he disowns it. He deplored the torture of detainees at Guant?namo; now he attacks the Supreme Court?s decision granting them the constitutional right to challenge in federal court their continued detention as ?one of the worst decisions in the history of this country.? 


Over the years, Obama has carefully calibrated his political message, and he has won a grudging respect among some conservatives. In The New Republic, Bruce Bartlett, a Treasury official in the Reagan and Bush p?re Administrations, writes that ?Obamacons??libertarians, disillusioned neoconservatives, even a few supply-siders?have been pushed ?into Obama?s arms.? In The American Conservative, Andrew J. Bacevich, a professor of international relations and history at Boston University, complains, ?To believe that President John McCain will reduce the scope and intrusiveness of federal authority, cut the imperial presidency down to size, and put the government on a pay-as-you-go basis is to succumb to a great delusion.?

Obama promises to tell voters what they need to know and not what they want to know. It?s a risky strategy, and one he doesn?t always follow, but when he put it into effect in April, by attacking McCain?s proposed summer gasoline-tax holiday, he helped his campaign more than he hurt it. Last week, he denounced McCain?s latest reversal, on offshore drilling. But he needs to go further. A year ago, he likened ?the tyranny of oil? to that of Fascism and Communism, saying, ?The very resource that has fueled our way of life over the last hundred years now threatens to destroy it if our generation does not act now and act boldly.? This is the kind of unequivocal message that Obama needs to develop. By telling just such inconvenient truths, Al Gore has inspired a worldwide movement to arrest climate change. The next President could be its most powerful leader. Obama will not rouse voters by getting lost in a tussle with McCain over the virtues of cellulosic ethanol. He can, however, make voters part of the solution by helping them understand that the greedy oil companies, the failing auto industry, and the craven Congress will not redeem themselves until consumers demand that they do so by making some inconvenient changes of their own. A little more audacity will yield a lot more hope.




This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Tue Jun 24 13:41:11 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2008 14:41:11 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Barack Obama: What's the big idea?
In-Reply-To: <4861051D.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
References: <4861051D.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
Message-ID: <E1KBDTA-0008Ma-EG@elasmtp-curtail.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

To make a long story short, Obama is an 
opportunist buppie.  Monsieur Pierrot and 
Sherlock Holmes together couldn't solve this big 
mystery.  If only George Carlin were still here 
to get us through this election year.

At 01:30 PM 6/24/2008, Charles Brown wrote:
>Barry O is a big puzzle ( smile). Some people 
>just can't figure him out. He's a mystery. CB 
>^^^^^ Barack Obama: What's the big idea? 16 
>months and 26 debates later he remains a puzzle 
>to many voters Malcolm Gladwell: Who says big 
>ideas are rare?     The Talk of the Town By 
>Dorothy Wickenden updated 8:57 a.m. ET, Mon., 
>June. 23, 2008 On October 7, 2002, in 
>Cincinnati, Ohio, George W. Bush delivered the 
>defining speech of his Presidency. In the face 
>of ???clear evidence of peril??? from a regime 
>harboring terrorists and weapons of mass 
>destruction, he declared, ???we cannot wait for 
>the final proof?thhe smoking gun?that could come 
>in the form of a mushroomm cloud.??? Five days 
>earlier, a forty-one-year-old Illinois state 
>legislator had given a momentous speech of his 
>own, although few recognized it as such at the 
>time. ???I don???t oppose all wars,??? Barack 
>Obama told a few hundred Chicago protesters, 
>adding: I know that even a successful war 
>against Iraq will require a U.S. occupation of 
>undetermined length, at undetermined cost, with 
>undetermined consequences. I know that an 
>invasion of Iraq without a clear rationale and 
>without strong international support will only 
>fan the flames of the Middle East, and encourage 
>the worst, rather than best, impulses of the 
>Arab world, and strengthen the recruitment arm 
>of Al Qaeda. I am not opposed to all wars. I???m 
>opposed to dumb wars. 
>------------------------------------------------------------ 
>After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Bush 
>discovered a big idea for his Presidency. He 
>would bring down a tyrant, crush terrorism, and 
>impose democracy and peace on what his regent, 
>Vice-President Dick Cheney, called 
>???freedom-loving peoples of the region.??? As 
>the world now knows, that idea was based on 
>faulty intelligence reports and executed with a 
>fatal disregard of political reality in the 
>Middle East and at home. By the time of the 2008 
>Presidential campaign, Bush???s approval rating 
>had shrunk from sixty-seven per cent to 
>thirty-seven per cent, the Republican Party was 
>coming apart, and Obama???s 2002 speech had 
>proved a precondition for an astounding climb to 
>victory this month as the Democratic Party???s 
>presumptive nominee for President. Still, 
>sixteen months after announcing his candidacy, 
>and after twenty-six Presidential debates and 
>thousands of public-speaking engagements, Obama 
>remains a puzzle to many voters. Almost as 
>dedicated a policy wonk as Hillary Clinton and 
>arguably more centrist in his economic beliefs, 
>he offers plenty of specifics about what needs 
>to be done. But his captivating eloquence and 
>his slogan????Change We Can Believe 
>In???????have seemed to lift him dangerously 
>high above the concrete. He has proved his 
>steadiness of purpose without clearly defining 
>his priorities. What, above all, does he intend 
>to accomplish if he is elected President? Obama 
>is said to have been dissatisfied with the 
>slogan. If so, he has a point. The ???change??? 
>he advocates can be understood as a pragmatic 
>correction to the radical policies and the 
>ineptitude of the Bush brigade. His political 
>departure is a kind of return. He has written 
>two unusually revealing books?one describing how 
>he came to be who he is,, the other delineating 
>how he proposes to reclaim the qualities that 
>once made America so admired. He argues that the 
>United States must relearn the fundamental 
>lessons of the Declaration of Independence, the 
>Constitution, and its own long journey toward a 
>more perfect union, and then apply them to the 
>global upheavals of the twenty-first century. In 
>his books, Obama emerges not as the 
>personification of cool projected onto him by 
>his young adherents???or as the disdainful 
>??litist suggested by his offhand remark about a 
>???bitter??? working class?but as somethhing of 
>a square: someone who doesn???t have to strain 
>to talk about ???values,??? God, and family. His 
>eerily objective self-analysis is matched by his 
>lawyerly ability to see things from the 
>perspective of those on the other side. In 
>January, after Obama uttered a few words of 
>praise for Ronald Reagan in an interview with 
>newspaper editors, Hillary Clinton and John 
>Edwards rushed to condemn his apostasy. But he 
>meant what he said. In 2006, in ???The Audacity 
>of Hope,??? he had written, ???Reagan spoke to 
>America???s longing for order, our need to 
>believe that we are not simply subject to blind, 
>impersonal forces but that we can shape our 
>individual and collective destinies, so long as 
>we rediscover the traditional virtues of hard 
>work, patriotism, personal responsibility, 
>optimism, and faith.??? The general consistency 
>of Obama???s policy views?with an occasional 
>bald deviation, as on the publicc funding of his 
>campaign?is a contrast to John McCain????s 
>erratic shape-shifting. McCain opposed the Bush 
>tax cuts as skewed toward the rich, and 
>unsustainable; now he wants to extend them 
>forever. He co-sponsored a relatively humane 
>immigration bill; now he disowns it. He deplored 
>the torture of detainees at Guant??namo; now he 
>attacks the Supreme Court???s decision granting 
>them the constitutional right to challenge in 
>federal court their continued detention as 
>???one of the worst decisions in the history of 
>this country.??? Over the years, Obama has 
>carefully calibrated his political message, and 
>he has won a grudging respect among some 
>conservatives. In The New Republic, Bruce 
>Bartlett, a Treasury official in the Reagan and 
>Bush p??re Administrations, writes that 
>???Obamacons????libertarians, disillusioned 
>neoconservatives, even a ffew supply-siders?have 
>been pushed ???into Obama???s armms.??? In The 
>American Conservative, Andrew J. Bacevich, a 
>professor of international relations and history 
>at Boston University, complains, ???To believe 
>that President John McCain will reduce the scope 
>and intrusiveness of federal authority, cut the 
>imperial presidency down to size, and put the 
>government on a pay-as-you-go basis is to 
>succumb to a great delusion.??? Obama promises 
>to tell voters what they need to know and not 
>what they want to know. It???s a risky strategy, 
>and one he doesn???t always follow, but when he 
>put it into effect in April, by attacking 
>McCain???s proposed summer gasoline-tax holiday, 
>he helped his campaign more than he hurt it. 
>Last week, he denounced McCain???s latest 
>reversal, on offshore drilling. But he needs to 
>go further. A year ago, he likened ???the 
>tyranny of oil??? to that of Fascism and 
>Communism, saying, ???The very resource that has 
>fueled our way of life over the last hundred 
>years now threatens to destroy it if our 
>generation does not act now and act boldly.??? 
>This is the kind of unequivocal message that 
>Obama needs to develop. By telling just such 
>inconvenient truths, Al Gore has inspired a 
>worldwide movement to arrest climate change. The 
>next President could be its most powerful 
>leader. Obama will not rouse voters by getting 
>lost in a tussle with McCain over the virtues of 
>cellulosic ethanol. He can, however, make voters 
>part of the solution by helping them understand 
>that the greedy oil companies, the failing auto 
>industry, and the craven Congress will not 
>redeem themselves until consumers demand that 
>they do so by making some inconvenient changes 
>of their own. A little more audacity will yield a lot more hope.



From Waistline2 at aol.com  Tue Jun 24 15:08:32 2008
From: Waistline2 at aol.com (Waistline2 at aol.com)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2008 17:08:32 EDT
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Potential for rev greater in 3rd world,
	but need for 1st...
Message-ID: <cb7.31ad95b4.3592bc50@aol.com>

>> CB: I agree with your overall points.  However, the main  revolution that 
the whole world needs is in the US. Since, the US is the  imperialist center 
of this epoch, a revolution here would give significant  relief to the workers 
in the Third World.   The only ones who can make  a revolution in the US are 
the US masses. So, we US activists have the  responsibility of focusing on 
making a revolution in the US, even if the  potential for revolution is greater in 
the Third World. <<
 
 
Comment
 
Having followed the thread on the labor aristocracy closely and portions  
imported to this list - (historic shift), has been cause to review my own  
thinking on this question and its numerous interactive issues. Over the course  of 
the better part of 40 years my thinking about the concrete applicability of  
Lenin concepts of the "labor aristocracy" to American history and current events 
 in our country has shifted repeatedly. The concept of an imperil bribery  
manifest amongst the mass of the oppressing people and sectors of the oppressed  
who live out their lives in the imperial centers has never shifted. 
 
This is most certainly a complex issue, which is why it is debated  endlessly 
as the world around us ceaselessly changes. 
 
I do not mean to be a pinprick but desire to contribute to the discussion. 
 
I am not sure if the potential for revolution is greater in the Third World  
in this era that is increasingly dominated by non-banking financial  
institutions. I note the word "potential" and not as an escape hatch but as a  serious 
comment on a world in flux - shift. 
 
Shift always hits the fan.  
 
Revolution today means some kind of economic communism and not just the  
political means to combat world bourgeois reaction. For instance I have been  
following events in Nepal and what is called the Maoist victory. Where does one  
go or what political and economic path is to be traveled after the overthrow of 
 their ancient Monarchal form of bourgeois production relations? Nepal is a t
hrow  back to the past that allows one to look at the future and present - 
again, with  fresh eyes. 
 
I am not sure if the potential for revolution is greater in the Third World  
in this era, although political upheaval is necessary and will take place if 
for  no other reason than to realign the national and multinational state 
structures  with the demands and polices of the debt driven economy or speculative 
capital  writing the agenda for the world total capital. 
 
No matter who wins the political struggle in Nepal, globalization means one  
must craft a set of economic and political relations within the world wide  
productivity infrastructure. 
 
Man . . . I just don't know. 
 
What I do deeply feel is that the mass of American proletarians are not  
going to allow themselves to be reduced to the economic and political level of  
the workers and peasants of imperialism historic colonies. Their consciousness  
will not allow for this and by this is meant how they think things out and 
look  at material relations in America rather than the former colonies. 
 
American workers have a consciousness of "rights" that evolved as our own  
history. This consciousness of "rights" and the "right" to economic stability is 
 not based on the history of material relations in the colonies of 
imperialism. 
 
While a vast sector of American society daily measures themselves against  
the world proletariat, and are extremely glad not to have to live their lives  
out in some poverty stricken former colony, and have no interest in sinking to  
this economic, social and political level, these same Americans also measure  
themselves against the wealth of American itself and the vast array of  
commodities seeking purchasers on the self of American society.  
 
The issue deepens because 30% of the American working class - the  workforce, 
is composed of temporary workers and are forced to live with their  parents, 
children and neighbors to pay the rent. From the standpoint of the  manual 
workers and peasants of Nepal, all of America is hopelessly bourgeois and  we are 
most certainly bourgeois, but not hopeless. 
 
We are proletarian with our own stories. We are not exactly who we were  
yesterday and most certainly will be different tomorrow. 
 
Are we bribed relative to the rest of the world? 
 
Yes, . . . . without question and this is the same kind of bribery that  
seemed to exist between free labor and slave labor in our past. Bribery - a very  
real and material thing one pays the house note and rent with and buy food 
under  the bourgeois order, did not mean that the free laborers of the mid  and 
late  1800's did not face the political and military attacks of  capital. 
 
My pension is more that what the average white workers in America makes  
working 40 hours a week. We must always describe stratification of the working  
class to make sense - more sense, to ourselves and others. 
 
Yes, the concept of the labor aristocracy is applicable to America. This  has 
never really been disputed by any sector of American communism. 
 
The dispute - as best as I understand it, has been "what constitutes the  
labor aristocracy" and how is this interactive with the historical colonies of  
imperialism? 
 
Interesting subject. 
 
 
WL 



**************Gas prices getting you down? Search AOL Autos for 
fuel-efficient used cars.      (http://autos.aol.com/used?ncid=aolaut00050000000007)

From jannuzi at gmail.com  Tue Jun 24 19:27:00 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 10:27:00 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] structuralist linguistics plus follow up on
	phoneme
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806240900h56c95599t54e6efbce88f4740@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806220121hbc698aej22a3e042163db168@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806240841l4d8eb80dq2749c935261dc1b2@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806240900h56c95599t54e6efbce88f4740@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806241827s4371e51er3039937661f66425@mail.gmail.com>

>>CB: That's interesting. Could you give some examples of words imitating non-sounds ?>>

In English, the /g/ of gooey, gunky, greasy, gross, goop, glob, glop
etc. seems to indicate that the /g/ sound is used to represent
something in common, so we could argue a shift away from purely
arbitrary. Also, note how repetition has one function (among others)
of representing endearment. The most basic motivated function of
repetition is perhaps to indicate more than one (which might get us
into a discussion of the ontology of number).
Arbitrary is certainly a term that captures an aspect of language that
allows us to extend its use, but human language is not completely
arbitrary, and, since use of language is so procedural and in real
time, we are not aware of just how motivated it can sometimes be. On a
spectrum of totally motivated to totally arbitrary, I would place the
x much nearer arbitrary, but not on the word itself.

CB>>Or it could be from way back when they had a common ancestor
language or something.  In other words, maybe the languages are not
totally unrelated. Aren't  "unhuh" for "yes" and  "unun" for no, along
with head shakes up and down vs. side to side very widespread  ?>>

I guess the mother of all protolanguages or something. But if totally
arbitrary, why would they have remained the same? One role of
arbitrariness would be random drift. And yet the patterns of language
change themselves can be used to argue for motivation, not
arbitrariness, in language change. The simple syllables above that you
see as arbitrary appear to me to be somewhat motivated. We didn't all
choose 'antidisestablishmentarianism' or
'supercalafrajalisticexpialadocious' to say 'yes' and 'no'.

CB>> Maybe. But I'm not sure that follows from what I said above. What
I'm talking about would have happened tens of thousands of years
before the Etruscans.  I'm talking about from 200,000 to a million
years ago.>>

I was just joking there CB. One theory of language development goes
along this schema: humans developed a recursive communication system
with physical gestures, which was then combined with human phonetic
abilities. Then human language shifted towards the phonetic. However,
I would point out that spoken language is still visible--as the McGurk
effect research shows. You could argue that the shift towards the
arbitrary was this use of phonetic symbols to stand for meanings that
previously had been worked out in a gestural language--but even then
the gestural language had already become to quite a degree
conventional and arbitrary.

CB>> I'm thinking structuralism is logically before post-structuralism
Post-structuralism is a critique of structuralism>>

Marx could be used to critique structuralism--see Althusser--but we
have to ignore the time sequence--which is more useful for analysis
along the lines of what author influenced what author, which gets a
more post-mo spin with the concept of 'intertextuality'.
But when post-structuralists say invert the structure and the
superstructure and make the superstructure the base, they are not
talking about intertextuality.

>>CB: I don't know. You have to voice a vowel , don't you ? Otherwise, you can't hear it; or it becomes whispering. So, of course voicing has to come in after the "p" as you go into the vowel.>>

Actually Japanese is marked by 'voiceless' vowels. Some languages
might have phonological /p/s  that are voiced, even though you, as a
non-speaker of that language, would still perceive some sort of [p].
My point was that the distinction between the words 'pig' and 'big' in
English is essentially a lexical contrast that could be analyzed at
the level of articulatory gesture, which would show that it does not
turn on a minimal contrast of two phonemes (/b/ vs. /p/) or one or two
features (aspiration plus or minus, voicing of consonant plus or
minus). Here is a phoneme-stumping example. Say the words 'latter' and
'ladder'. Is there a contrast in American and Canadian Englishes? Do
Americans really say a medial instantiation of English phoneme /t/ in
the word 'latter' while saying a parallel medial instantiation of
English phoneme /d/ in 'ladder'? I say there is a contrast, but if you
want to analyze it with segments, the most prominent difference is in
the preceding vowels.

CB>>Could you elaborate what you mean here ? I know when I and most of
the people I talk with say "pig" or "big" , there is some level of
clean , crisp segments.>>

An illusion of phonics. Co-articulation is the rule. With some
one-syllable words it is even possible to start articulating a medial
sound before you even start saying the first sound. Remember,
articulation is controlled and planned, and it is not the same thing
as phonation--the movement of air through the vocal tract (though in
actual speech they temporally overlap). Say the words 'low' and 'row'
in isolation. Although the overall gestural routine is somewhat
similar, notice how both start with prominent lip rounding. Yet the
English /l/ is often characterized as a 'lip flat' sound/phoneme. So
if you are rounding your lips before you start phonating [l ou ], you
are clearly articulating the vowel (which has lip-rounding) before you
actually say the initial [l-]. Also, it is very hard to describe,
discuss and explain speech because (1) much of it is interior -- in
the vocal tract and (2) dynamic and high speed, with co-articulated
and overlapping movements.



>>CB: So speech has no relation to written language ?   Would you mind explaining a little more how they reach this conclusion ?>>

I think the interior/cognitive decoding/encoding/recoding of spoken
language and written language is largely the same. But in terms of
phonological representation, spoken language is overdetermined and
redundant (we have redundant abilities to interpret the speech signal
of a language we have acquired). In terms of phonological
representation, written language is underdetermined and gives much
less information. This becomes all too obvious when you try to learn a
foreign language. French is a good example. It is alphabetic, but
phonological and phonetic information is combined with information
about lexical relationships. Want to pronounce, read out loud a French
text? It helps if you can speak French and have acquired a large
French vocabulary prior to reading.


CB>> I don't get the circularity.  It's based on sort of minimal
empiricism, that any native speaker can perform. Like you just did.
Aren't the meanings of pig, big and fig differentiated by the first
letter-sound in English ? Of course, p and b are differentiated by
non-voiced/voiced. fig is differentiated from the other two by the
difference between bilabial whatever vs whatever an "f" is.>>


Minimal empiricism. I like that term. That is what Chomsky has relied
on--he doesn't do linguistic or psycholinguistic experiments.

I think one point to keep in mind is that articulation is overlapping,
so not segmentally discrete. Also, the articulatory spectrum is no
where near as discrete as structuralists had hoped. It is amazing the
number of variations and gradations different languages can come up
with the use of basically the same active and passive articulators
(such as lips, tip of tongue, blade of tongue, alveolar ridge, hard
palate, velum, epi-glottis, glottis, etc.). Put these gradations into
co-articulated, dynamic, complex spoken syllables, and you don't get
anything like a view of language that can easily be analyzed into a
small set of phonemes or binary features.


CB>> Of course, but that doesn't contradict the basic logical point.
The fact that they do differentiate themselves based on distinctive
features of the sounds that make them up.  You have to narrow it down
to words that have only one differentiating distinctive feature to
show the idea.>>

Again, it is obviously circular. A linguist as minimal empiricist says
I will now determine and delimit all the phonemes of my language by
enumerating a sufficient number of 'minimal pairs'. These words will
show what sounds/sound groupings/sound-or-perceptual categories exist.
Next, I will use these lexically determined sound categories I call
phonemes to reveal how meanings at a lexical level are differentiated.
CIRCULAR. WEAK. BAD. Also, sociolinguistically, phonologically,
phonetically, psycholinguistically unreal. Of course one hope was a
minimal set of phonemes would reduce memory load on a computer and so
make machine recognition of human speech plausible. Billions of
dollars later most in that field have given up on the phoneme as a
realistic invariable speech unit. Memory on computers has got much
larger and processing power has increased. But no matter how much you
increase processing, a phonemic model is worthless for dealing with
the conunundrums of human speech: What units are invariable across all
that variability? How do humans keep up rather easily with a speech
signal that undergoes compression with a loss of amplitude in the
signal?

CB>> But that doesn't contradict or refute the basic point on
phonemes.   That's a different issue, homynyms>>

No, someone arguing for the phoneme says that these sounds or sound
categories do not carry meaning themselves, but they encode language
at a higher level to determine meaning differentially. So the question
is, how do they encode homophones to be different in meaning?
They don't. On the other hand, I can show what would be considered
phonemic contrasts NOT encoding differences in meaning. For example,
in Japanese, 'yahari' means nevertheless, or , well, it was just as I
was expecting. But if you say 'yappari', you have just said the same
thing, somewhat more emphatically. Japanese /h/ is a contrast with
Japanese /p/ in a classic phonemic account yet there is no contrast in
meaning. Also, it isn't really a contrast in two sounds /p/ vs. /h/
but rather a contrast of a glottal stop plus [p] (sometimes called a
geminate--but note English has geminate spellings but these are not
usually said as geminate sounds) vs. a medial [h]


CB>> Your the expert, but I'd say you have to elaborate on what you
say above a bit more to show that. Binary oppositions still seem to
work on a lot of words and cultural categories, like up/down,
left/right, male/female,  war/peace, wet/dry, on /off ...............
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phoneme>>

I would avoid wiki linguistics articles CB. They are awful. I've tried
to contribute to the article on phoneme, and some dipshit with a
couple undergrad courses in phonology, with a lot of time on his
hands, armed mostly with a total belief in phonemics, reverts it all
back to bad phonemics. Welcome to the world of wikiknowledge. Wiki is
good for somewhat current events and popular culture. Outside of that,
a lack of editorial principles means it is far too uneven to be a
useful encyclopedic resource. I go there mostly for bibliographies and
links to real resources that are online.

As for what it says about Chomsky and Halle, notice the difference
between accounts of the development of phonology and what phonology
now exists as. Those doing phonology as an academic profession, after
Chomsky, don't use the concept usually. Yes, the phoneme is important
in the history of phonology--in one American tradition, phonology was
comprised of phonetics plus phonemics (structuralist analysis of
languages or a language at a sub-syllabic level). It just isn't much
of a going concern in inquiry and scholarship now. It is OBSOLETE. It
isn't necessary or useful to highly formalized linuistics, hence
Chomsky's shedding it. And it can not be found in articulation,
acoustics or perception, so it isn't really important to phonology,
phonetics and speech perception studies in the Haskins Laboratory
tradition. It is mostly a relic. I would point out though that it is a
useful fiction if you have to discuss dynamic spoken language in
static linear text. And it might well have a psychological reality in
the reading of alphabetic texts.

CB:>>Well, that' the same principle, but just shifts the binary
oppostion differentiation from voiced/unvoiced to early voiced/late
voiced. The fundamental idea is the same. >>

Well how useful, for example, is it to teach ESL students that the
English /p/ phoneme is a bilabial stop that is unvoiced? It is
unvoiced and then voiced. The actual perceptual contrast between 'pig'
and 'big' comes not between the main point of articulation of the
initial consonant stop-plosives but in the transitions to the vowels,
and the beginning of the vowels overlap with the last half of the
consonants. Recordings of just the transitions (no initial consonants)
are sufficient for many people to hear the difference categorically
between 'ig' as in 'pig' and 'ig' as in 'big'. The transitions are
different as are the vowels (even though a phonemic account would
wrongly say the internal vowels are the same).


CB:>>Come on .  There is some level of  distinction in linear sequence
between  "pig" and "gip" Say the two words. Clearly , your mouth
articulate the "g" sound before the "p" sound in the latter and vica
versa in the former.>>

If you cut out the segments of 'pig' p plus i plus g and turned them
all around (I'm not sure what you would do with the vowel but leave it
in place), you would not get a word that sounded like 'gip'. Your
mind, your linguistic mind, would strain to perceive something, but if
it didn't know what you had done to make the new word, it would not
perceive?spoken syllable? 'gip'.
At any rate my point was there is no sequence of discrete segments,
and certainly no sequence of discrete invariable units called
phonemes. Language is planned and controlled in units that underlie
gestural routines which simply can not be captured at a phonemic or
featural level. A good metaphor would be more like sequences of
overlapping chords, not notes.

CJ


From jannuzi at gmail.com  Tue Jun 24 19:34:51 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 10:34:51 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] On illusion of phoneme
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806240904v241fed09w317518a63cb8ae6e@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806240904v241fed09w317518a63cb8ae6e@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806241834w3a12f7d6h9bc9c426f215cb7f@mail.gmail.com>

CB:>>CB: So most linguists think the phoneme is a valid concept ?>>

Most work in linguistics has become so specific and narrow that if a
linguist in lexical semantics says that the phoneme is a valid
concept, it is most likely because he or she hasn't read a paper in
phonology since their undergraduate days. Highly abstract formalized
phonology doesn't use the concept, other than as a concept to teach
students in order to get them ready for the abstractions they now use.
Articulatory phonology, while no where near as popular as formalistic
approaches (because you can't do it with simple empiricism but need to
master experimental techniques and possess expensive equipment),
replaces the phoneme with the articulatory gesture.

In linguistics, this lack of intra- and inter- disciplinary breadth
and depth characterizes a 'science' (you don't need to understand the
whole puzzle if you are laboratory technician or a scribe for a team
of authors) perhaps, but it makes for a lot of misunderstandings and
ignorance. The phoneme is largely accepted as the word of Truth in
applied linguistics (such as in academic ESL in anglophone countries),
but I would say that is largely because they haven't interacted with
phonology since the structuralist era's heyday (post-war US, just
before Chomsky).

CJ


From jannuzi at gmail.com  Tue Jun 24 19:51:54 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 10:51:54 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Da da da da
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806240919w7bdf9313w4a664f5748e1d8f1@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806240919w7bdf9313w4a664f5748e1d8f1@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806241851y11399831s1b2a2d8a11600f08@mail.gmail.com>

If the sound and visuals are too much out of synch, it doesn't work.
Perhaps something that is done in a highly controlled environment does
not translate too well to the still primitive av of the internet. I
saw it demonstrated on a large screen TV on a television program here
in Japan, and it did create the perceptual illusion for me.

The linguistic explanation from the guy is somewhat off though. It
would be hard to say you see a mouth making the viseme for /g/ since
that is palatal and interior to the mouth. Whatever the exact effect
in perception, the one thing clear watching it again on youtube is
that if you hear something that you might associate with a strong
visual (/p/ and /b/ have strong visual indicators, being bi-labial)
but see something different than that, your listening perception get
confused.

Hardly surprising if you consider what perception of face-to-face
speech involves. You see something at the speed of light, you hear
something at the speed of sound, your linguistic mind/brain buffers
it, decodes, re-encodes it as some sort of combined illusion of 3-D
stereophonic speech representing meaningful language, and you seem to
perceive this at the same time it is coming from your interlocutor.

On the other hand, if it is a foreign language and someone is coughing
in the background, you are likely to say, 'Huh?', 'What?' . Even if
you phonetically could hear what they said, you might not
linguistically perceive what they were trying to communicate.

 Another interesting phenomenon is , if you live in a country where
the language is foreign to you and you are not like a native speaker
(haven't acquired it from birth), when you walk into a noisy
environment with a lot of noises (both human and recorded human and
even non-human), you will think you sometimes hear your own language
being spoken (though you might not have any sense of where it came
from, since it didn't come from anyone). You are not crazy, just
having speech perception illusions. This happened to me in my first
three years in Japan. Now it would seem that when I am tired and
stressed my brain just shuts out the background Japanese, and I
understand difficult Japanese (like a news analysis program on
TV--lexically challenging, however jejune the thoughts) only when I
can focus and concentrate while at the same time not feeling
stressed--and interact, interaction makes it all mean something,
whereas eavesdropping on conversations is usually worse than a Harold
Pinter play .

C


From jannuzi at gmail.com  Tue Jun 24 20:00:58 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 11:00:58 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Da da da da
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806240919w7bdf9313w4a664f5748e1d8f1@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806240919w7bdf9313w4a664f5748e1d8f1@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806241900g137ce4e7j2dc43c39b7f12c30@mail.gmail.com>

I clearly got the effect--even on a tiny sub-note with a tinny
speaker--watching a recording of that very same Japanese TV program.

http://jp.youtube.com/watch?v=Fke7GWcT5ko&feature=related

The illusion was I perceived da da da da

When I closed my eyes, I could hear ba ba ba

And the visual was of a face saying ga ga ga ga (according to the explanation).

This illusion works out nicely for reasoning out because the spoken
syllable is a bilabial one. The visual is of a face saying a syllable
that initiates palatally or velarly. And the illusion appears to come
from a sound that is IN BETWEEN the two extremes (a da syllable would
be alveolar, in front of the hard palate but obviously behind the
lips).

Even if the listener/viewer doesn't hear the illusory da, they usually
do not hear a phonetic ba either.

C


From jannuzi at gmail.com  Tue Jun 24 20:33:53 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 11:33:53 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] On illusion of phoneme
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806241834w3a12f7d6h9bc9c426f215cb7f@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806240904v241fed09w317518a63cb8ae6e@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806241834w3a12f7d6h9bc9c426f215cb7f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806241933l4bfa6b0au193aedab966afe84@mail.gmail.com>

CJ >>Say the words 'low' and 'row' in isolation. Although the overall
gestural routine is somewhat
similar, notice how both start with prominent lip rounding. Yet the
English /l/ is often characterized as a 'lip flat' sound/phoneme. So
if you are rounding your lips before you start phonating [l ou ], you
are clearly articulating the vowel (which has lip-rounding) before you
actually say the initial [l-]. Also, it is very hard to describe,
discuss and explain speech because (1) much of it is interior -- in
the vocal tract and (2) dynamic and high speed, with co-articulated
and overlapping movements.>>

My explanation is somewhat lacking here. Compare the words 'low' and
'row' when you say them in isolation. Clearly, native speakers of
English pronounce and perceive a contrast between the two words, and
yet 'lip rounding', a feature of the /r/?shows up in the initial /l/,
and yet they are not the same. The lip-rounding of the initial /l/ is
the proceeding /ou/ vowel being articulated even before the /l/ has
been pronounced. You are mouthing your vowel before you say your
initial /l/--hence sequence here is more an illusion of the script in
terms of articulation.

An acoustic representation of these words would show that low and row
are very similar acoustically, but they wouldn't show a difference in
distinct phonemes.

If you put the [l]s and [r]s in initial cluster onsets, like gl as in
glass and gr as in grass, the [r] loses its lip-rounding feature, and
yet at a syllable and word level, there is still a distinction. What
is it? How could we isolate it? The overall visual signature would
appear different, even though the acoustic realization of the [l] and
of the [r] is so rapid that, for example, Japanese speakers would be
hard pressed to hear the difference [Japanese has one /r/ that in its
gestural routines, sounds, to English speakers, like English /r/, /l/
and /d/).

Here I am using the abstraction of a categorical sound (e.g., English
/r/) like the old phoneme to discuss phonology, but I also have to
emphasize that in actual English speech and in actual Japanese speech,
I do not believe there are phonemes. Again, the phoneme's existence is
not supported in articulatory evidence, acoustic evidence, or in
perceptual evidence. However, it is a nifty concept by which to pin
down spoken language in order to discuss it, since real speech is
complex, dynamic, multi-modal, far too difficult to pin down
otherwise.

But getting back to phonology, its main problematic would be, as I said,
how to >>describe, discuss and explain speech because (1) much of it
is interior -- in the vocal tract and (2) dynamic and high speed, with
co-articulated and overlapping movements.>>

How can we use articulatory, acoustic and perceptual data to account
for relatively unproblematic understanding of a rapidly spoken
language that one has acquired since birth? What unit as model will
show us the invariability we think subsists at the sub-syllabic level
of language? What are the phonological primitives of spoken languages?
My guess is that it is some sort of mastery of syllable types, not
phonemes. And those syllables types are mastered by the time a child
has acquired a core vocabulary of less than a thousand words. Not that
much of a phonological strain on memory for the human brain, however
much it might have stumped computers in the Wintel era (where most
computers are bogged down with loading and running their operating
systems).


CJ


From jannuzi at gmail.com  Tue Jun 24 20:42:26 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 11:42:26 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] On illusion of phoneme
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806241933l4bfa6b0au193aedab966afe84@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806240904v241fed09w317518a63cb8ae6e@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806241834w3a12f7d6h9bc9c426f215cb7f@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806241933l4bfa6b0au193aedab966afe84@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806241942q502de47fg8efc37d5f1984b1a@mail.gmail.com>

A couple more things to ponder before I head off to classes.

The idea of the phoneme is sometimes built on the house of cards that
is categorical perception (though minimal pairs and complementary
distribution have also been tried, as have featural matrices). Yet
categorical perception is not limited to language. Not limited to
human speech. It isn't even limited to human beings.

CJ


From jannuzi at gmail.com  Tue Jun 24 21:04:54 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 12:04:54 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] On illusion of phoneme
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806241942q502de47fg8efc37d5f1984b1a@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806240904v241fed09w317518a63cb8ae6e@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806241834w3a12f7d6h9bc9c426f215cb7f@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806241933l4bfa6b0au193aedab966afe84@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806241942q502de47fg8efc37d5f1984b1a@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806242004p1d1027ue21b3895521ab619@mail.gmail.com>

I had thought Chomsky had moved past featural matrices as phonological
units, but I could see where they might still appeal--they retain some
phonetic criteria and are easily formalized (he attacked phonemes from
the issue of how structuralists had used complementary distribution to
delimit what the phoneme set of a language are). For others in that
formalist tradition, matrices and frames have gone off into a
formalistic ether where phonetic considerations are irrelevant
(afterall, you don't need phonetics if you want to artificially break
up an artificially  formal language into a sub-lexical level).  But
Chomsky hasn't really done phonology since the late 60s (I think) and
he really isn't any longer in the thick of serious linguistics (if you
ask me).

Here is an interesting philosophical treatment of the issue. However,
note it still favors a static and formalist treatment of
phonology--moving towards fuzzy logics :

http://www.ifs.csic.es/sorites/lp/articles/gradual/phongdia.htm


PHONOLOGY
by Lorenzo Pe?a

An outstanding characteristic of human ?natural? language is the
linearity of its messages, which is nothing else but the fact that
contrasts, i.e. relationships among elements found together within one
message, are displayed along one dimension only. Even though such
linearity is far from complete, it has impressed many students of
language for centuries, characterizing as it does both the first and
second articulation, i.e. not only the relationship among meaningful
elements but also that among non-meaningful but distinctive ones. The
latter are the phonemes. For thousands of years students of language
have been aware of the existence of phonemes, i.e. minimal segments
within the spoken message whose presence is relevant for
distinguishing one message from a different one with another meaning
even though the phonemes themselves lack any meaning whatsoever. (An
anticipation of a modern phonological treatment is to be found in the
work of King Sejong of Korea (reigned 1418-50), the founder of the
Korean featural script Han'gl; see Sampson, pp. 120ff.)

The main difficulty concerning the existence and nature of phonemes is
that each of them underlies a great many different phonetic
realizations. Such a phonetic variation depends on a number of
factors. There are individual, free and contextually conditioned
variations, whether accountable for in terms of phonetic influence of
neighbouring sounds or not. Even though for thousands of years many
people have known about the existence of phonemes in-spite of such
variations, 19th century linguists focused on the phonetic
realizations themselves.

The Russian linguist Jan Baudoin de Courtenay (1845-1925) was one of
the first to anticipate the modern notion of phoneme, developed in the
structuralist movement initiated in 1916 with the publication of the
Cours de linguistique g?n?rale by Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913).
That book does not, however, reach the stage of a clear acknowledgment
of the phonemes. The main developments in the conception of the
phonemes were attained in the Prague school during the 1919-39 period
(esp. by Nikolai Sergeievich Trubetzkoy, 1890-1938), in the American
distributionalism initiated by Leonard Bloomfield (1887-1949), and in
the French functionalist school headed by Andr? Martinet (1908-), with
three non-mainstream tendencies represented by the British
structuralist linguist John R. Firth (1890-1960), the ?glossematics?
school of Copenhagen, started by Louis Hjelmslev (1899-1965), and the
generative phonology developed by Morris Halle (1923-) and Noam
Chomsky (1928-).

The American distributionalist school insists on a physicalist and
set-theoretic view of the phonemes, as mutually disjoint classes of
sounds. Glossematics regards phonemes as purely abstract entities
having nothing to do with phonetics; according to such a view there is
nothing to a phoneme but what serves to make it different from other
phonemes, regardless of whether they are realized phonetically,
graphically or through gestures. Martinet has a purely functionalist
view of phonemes, but one which does not dispose of phonetic
realization: he regards phonemes as entities whose reality is purely
relational -- distinctive (that is to say, such that a phoneme is
individuated by that which differentiates it from other phonemes) --
but which are characterized in phonetic terms; he rejects the
disjointness principle the distributionalists cleave to; he develops
Trubetzkoy's ideas on neutralization (the process by which in certain
environments the difference between two or more phonemes is lost, a
process consisting in the fact that in those contexts certain
distinctive features serving to differentiate those phonemes are no
longer relevant: for instance in word-final positions in German voiced
/d/ is pronounced like voiceless /t/, the feature voicedness lacking
relevance in that context) via the notion of the archiphoneme, which
would be a phonemic entity occurring in those contexts and comprising
all realizations of any of those phonemes; that is to say, in
word-final positions in German there would be neither /t/ not /d/, but
the archiphoneme /T/ instead; but of course such an analysis is by no
means the only possible one. Notice that a distinctive feature is any
phonetic property relevant for differentiating at least two phonemes
from one another. All those schools insist on positing for each
language one list of phonemes only, whereas Firth's polysystemic
approach maintains that for different phonological contexts there are
different lists of alternative phonemes -- which avoids resorting to
the notions of neutralization and archiphoneme. The polysystemic
approach, rigorous though it doubtless is, has been generally rejected
owing to its enormous complexity and perhaps also to some
arbitrariness in drawing the inventory of contexts which determine
respective phonemic systems.

While all the aforementioned schools take phonemes to be the basic
units, generative phonology bestows priority on the distinctive
features instead, and regards phonemes as mere classes of distinctive
features. Moreover generative phonologists, besides being about the
only ones to conceive of distinctive features as universal, generally
regard them as necessarily binary -- each feature being characterized
as a phonetic property, which is either downright absent or else fully
present. For instance, the English phoneme /i/ is characterized as: [+
syllabic], [- consonantal], [+ sonorant], [+ high], [- low], [+
voiced], [- tense], [- round], [+ front], [- back], [- nasal], [-
long], etc. -- although such a characterization contains a lot of
redundancy, since not all those specifications are independent.
(Defining any of those features goes beyond the scope of this paper.)
Another peculiarity of generative phonology is that it posits
different levels, with one deep level at which there may be phonemes
having features which are not manifested at all at the surface level
-- an ordered set of rules turning the deep input into the surface
output.

Generative phonology has gained widespread acceptance even outside the
English-speaking world. However, a great many linguists have qualms
about the existence of deep levels far away from surface realizations
and even more about the psychological reality of such a deep level or
the rules governing the generation of the surface output. (When once,
however, one takes issue with Chomsky's assertion of that
psychological reality, the whole nature of the generative process
becomes very dubious.) There is scarcity of empirical evidence in
support of such posited entities, and even abundance of indications
pointing to total lack of awareness of their existence on the part of
naive speakers. Moreover, the universalist view of distinctive
features can hardly be reconciled with many of the empirical data,
while the strictly transitionless binarist principle (the stipulation
that all phonological phenomena are to be accounted for in terms of
the presence or absence of different properties, with no property
being allowed to come in degrees) has been argued to run counter to
the continuous, gradual nature of the physiological and psychological
processes involved. Furthermore, distinctive features are likely to be
regarded as somehow less present than the phonemes themselves in the
consciousness of naive speakers. In fact what most commonly
differentiates two phonemes is not so much one or several definite
distinctive features as a fuzzy cluster thereof.

Thus, e.g., it can be argued that what sets English /p/ apart from /b/
is not just its voicelessness, or its aspiration, which is not
realized in certain contexts, but a fuzzy cluster of the fuzzy
features of being fortis (as against lenis), voiceless, aspirated, all
three of which vary in degree according to context and depending also
on individual or other parameters. /p, b/ are characterized in English
as being bilabial plosives, but in fact they are distinguished from
other phonemes by a fuzzy cluster of features, plosiveness and
bilabialness varying in degree, /p, b/ being sometimes realized as
either non-plosives or non-bilabial (e.g. in `hopeful' or
`subversive').

Furthermore, the choice of distinctive features in generative
phonology can be regarded as somehow ad hoc, with most features being
described in articulatory terms (i.e. terms applying to anatomic or
physiologic properties pertaining to the utterance of linguistic
messages) while others are acoustic. Sometimes a feature raises the
suspicion of having been invented in order to complete the binary
framework.

Some of those misgivings can probably be dispelled, although they
raise important methodological issues. However the study of phonemic
structures is likely to have much to gain from a gradualistic
approach. In fact there seem to be lots of borderline cases, such as
sounds which up to a point are allophones of (i.e. belong to) some
phoneme but to some extent are allophones of a different phoneme; or
sounds whose phonemehood is far from complete, whether in some
particular contexts or generally; or clusters of sounds which while to
some extent constituting one phoneme do not reach the same level of
unity as other sounds do (the English affricate pronunciation of `ch'
e.g., or diphthongs such as that in `how'). Through a gradualistic
treatment -- according to which so-called clear-cut situations would
be just limit cases -- synchronic phonology could tally with the
diachronic study in a simpler way than is customary. It is too early,
though, to assess the real merit of a gradualistic approach in
phonology. (In this connection, an obstacle to be overcome is a
widespread adherence to classical logic, which tends to reduce all
yes/no questions to alternatives between `completely' and `not at
all', whereas there are some non-classical logics which, while keeping
the excluded middle principle, ?p or not p?, and even the strong
version ?p or not-p at all", drop what can be termed the classical or
over-strong excluded middle, namely ?Either it is completely the case
that p, or else it is not the case that p at all"; classical logicians
are prone to view this schema as only stylistically different from ?p
or not p".)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

    * Bloomfield, L. 1933 Language. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
    * Chomsky, N. and M. Halle 1968 The Sound Pattern of English, New
York: Harper & Row.
    * Fudge, E.C. 1970 ?Phonology", in New Horizons in Linguistics,
ed. by John Lyons, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
    * Guti?rrez Ord??ez, S. 1983 ?La Fonolog?a", in Introducci?n a la
ling??stica, ed. by F. Abad and A. Garc?a Berrio, Madrid: Alhambra.
    * Martinet, A. 1960 ?l?ments de linguistique g?n?rale. Paris:
Armand Colin. English translation: Elements of General Linguistics,
London: Faber, 1964.
    * Mohrman, Ch., F. Norman and J. Sommerfelt 1963 Trends in Modern
Linguistics, Utrecht: Spectrum.
    * O'Connor, J.D. 1973 Phonetics, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
    * Sampson, G.R. 1985 Writing Systems, London: Hutchinson.
    * Sober, E. 1975 Simplicitty, Oxford: Clarendon.


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Wed Jun 25 08:10:45 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 10:10:45 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] structuralist linguistics plus follow up	on
	phoneme
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806241827s4371e51er3039937661f66425@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806220121hbc698aej22a3e042163db168@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806240841l4d8eb80dq2749c935261dc1b2@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806240900h56c95599t54e6efbce88f4740@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806241827s4371e51er3039937661f66425@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <486219A5.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



>>> CeJ <jannuzi at gmail.com> 06/24/2008 9:27 PM >>>
>>CB: That's interesting. Could you give some examples of words imitating non-sounds ?>>

In English, the /g/ of gooey, gunky, greasy, gross, goop, glob, glop
etc. seems to indicate that the /g/ sound is used to represent
something in common, so we could argue a shift away from purely
arbitrary. 
^^^^
CB: My thought is that there was an arbitrary connecting between "g" and the thing, and then other "g" words were built upon the first arbitrary "g word. There's no natural connection between the sound "g" and gooieness.

^^^^^^

Also, note how repetition has one function (among others)
of representing endearment. 
^^^
CB:  I don't have a feeling that repetition represents endearment.

^^^^

The most basic motivated function of
repetition is perhaps to indicate more than one (which might get us
into a discussion of the ontology of number).

^^^
CB:  I can see that.  I have another theory on the ontology of number based on Marx's early chapter's in _Capital_
^^^^^
Arbitrary is certainly a term that captures an aspect of language that
allows us to extend its use, but human language is not completely
arbitrary, and, since use of language is so procedural and in real
time, we are not aware of just how motivated it can sometimes be. On a
spectrum of totally motivated to totally arbitrary, I would place the
x much nearer arbitrary, but not on the word itself.

^^^^^
CB: I don't know. There are many representations that are not arbitrary, such as pictures, drawing. Think of picture writing. The point is that alphabetical writing is arbitrary and picture writing is not .

The arbitrary connection between a signifier and a signified allows language to do things that couldn't be done otherwise, I think, especially at the origin of culture.

^^^

CB>>Or it could be from way back when they had a common ancestor
language or something.  In other words, maybe the languages are not
totally unrelated. Aren't  "unhuh" for "yes" and  "unun" for no, along
with head shakes up and down vs. side to side very widespread  ?>>

I guess the mother of all protolanguages or something. But if totally
arbitrary, why would they have remained the same? One role of
arbitrariness would be random drift. And yet the patterns of language
change themselves can be used to argue for motivation, not
arbitrariness, in language change. The simple syllables above that you
see as arbitrary appear to me to be somewhat motivated. We didn't all
choose 'antidisestablishmentarianism' or
'supercalafrajalisticexpialadocious' to say 'yes' and 'no'.
^^^^^^^
CB:  I don't know that the change is random. It often has to do with groups differentiating themselves from other groups ( classes, national groups, ethnic groups) So, it is motivated in that sense , but the relation between the signifier and the signified remains arbitrary even in the changed word.

^^^^^

CB>> Maybe. But I'm not sure that follows from what I said above. What
I'm talking about would have happened tens of thousands of years
before the Etruscans.  I'm talking about from 200,000 to a million
years ago.>>

I was just joking there CB. One theory of language development goes
along this schema: humans developed a recursive communication system
with physical gestures, which was then combined with human phonetic
abilities. Then human language shifted towards the phonetic. However,
I would point out that spoken language is still visible--as the McGurk
effect research shows. You could argue that the shift towards the
arbitrary was this use of phonetic symbols to stand for meanings that
previously had been worked out in a gestural language--but even then
the gestural language had already become to quite a degree
conventional and arbitrary.

^^^^^
CB: OK, but the idea is that the arbitrariness was essential to language. That arbitrariness was a critical and defining characteristic of language. It's the difference between imitative learning and learning from language.   When one learns from imitating, the person you imitate has to be present, alive.  When you learn from words describing what you are learning , the person whose conduct you are learning, doesn't have to be present or alive. The words that describe the person's behavior do not "imitate" that behavior. Because they don't imitate that behavior, they allow learning that behavior when the person is not present, when they are dead even.  ( ask me a question ).

Put another way, the arbitrary relation between the signifier and the signified allows learning with a person present to demonstrate.  Words can teach without demonstrating what they are talking about. 

So, going back to the first humans, they could use language to tell stories about ancestors' experiences after the ancestors were dead and unable to demonstrate their experience.

Non-human species, like monkeys, are limited to demonstrating in order to teach.  This puts a big limitation on how much of their experiences they can teach to "young" monkeys. They are limited to "monkey-see;monkey do".   Humans have both learning by demonstration and learning through language.  The latter opens up learning from dead ancestors ( who can no longer demonstrate). It opens up an accumulation of experiences that other species don't have.  It becomes possible to accumulate the experiences of many, many generations.  It is the arbitrary relationship between the signifier and the signified of language that makes this accumulation of many generations of experience possible.

If the experience is with a predator, say a lion, how to avoid being killed by a lion , lets say. Then just the small sequence of sounds "l-i-o-n" can represent the actual lion. You don't have to have an actual lion present to "demonstrate" how to deal with a lion, avoid it, or kill it, or whatever.   Multiply this by the thousands of words that a language has, and language is an efficient way to demonstrate in a relatively small number of percepts ( sounds or hand gestures as you refer to above) much bigger percepts.

(Thanks Charles, I never spelled this out this much before)

CB>> I'm thinking structuralism is logically before post-structuralism
Post-structuralism is a critique of structuralism>>

Marx could be used to critique structuralism--see Althusser--but we
have to ignore the time sequence--which is more useful for analysis
along the lines of what author influenced what author, which gets a
more post-mo spin with the concept of 'intertextuality'.
But when post-structuralists say invert the structure and the
superstructure and make the superstructure the base, they are not
talking about intertextuality.

^^^^
CB: Indeed, structuralism is "superstructuralism" from Waistline's famous quote of Marx in the Introduction to a Contribution to the Critique of Poitical Economy

What does Althusser say on that ?  Give me a little more on intertexuality.

See my first post to Marxism-Thaxis back in 1998, where I give a simple "synthesis" of Marxism and structuralism. I'll post it here again. The idea came to me when I asked "how does the (super)structure change ?"  Why by Marx's idea , of course. Sure the structure or superstructure determines individuals conduct or events. The superstructure is a set of rules, a cultural "grammar", AS IN LINGUISTICS THE STRUCTURE OR GRAMMAR DETERMINES INDIVIDUAL SPEECH EVENTS. And as structuralists say " plus ca change, plus la meme chose", the more things change the more they stay the same.  But at certain revolutionary junctions , the _structure_ itself, the rules are changed.  This is Marx's era of social revolution, when the superstructure is changed by changes in the base. _This_ is the _determining_ of the superstructure, the structure, by the base. Something is determined when it is changed.

Also, the structure or superstructure is not self-changing.  Structures are formal logics, wherein the principle is identity.  "the more things change , the more they stay the same".   The structure changes based on dialectical logic, wherein the first principle is contradiction.  Structures change when in their practice contradictions arise . Practice is in the base. So, the contradictions that arise in the base from the practice guided by the rules of the structure/superstructure,  cause changes in the structure/superstructure. A period of social revolution, when a new superstructure is created and determined by the base.  This is the determining of the superstructure by the base.

So, necessity is the revolutionary mother of invention; formal logic-structure rules in convention.  You dig ?

>>CB: I don't know. You have to voice a vowel , don't you ? Otherwise, you can't hear it; or it becomes whispering. So, of course voicing has to come in after the "p" as you go into the vowel.>>

Actually Japanese is marked by 'voiceless' vowels. Some languages
might have phonological /p/s  that are voiced, even though you, as a
non-speaker of that language, would still perceive some sort of [p].
My point was that the distinction between the words 'pig' and 'big' in
English is essentially a lexical contrast that could be analyzed at
the level of articulatory gesture, which would show that it does not
turn on a minimal contrast of two phonemes (/b/ vs. /p/) or one or two
features (aspiration plus or minus, voicing of consonant plus or
minus). Here is a phoneme-stumping example. Say the words 'latter' and
'ladder'. Is there a contrast in American and Canadian Englishes? Do
Americans really say a medial instantiation of English phoneme /t/ in
the word 'latter' while saying a parallel medial instantiation of
English phoneme /d/ in 'ladder'? I say there is a contrast, but if you
want to analyze it with segments, the most prominent difference is in
the preceding vowels.

^^^
CB: Well, there's still a contrast , no ? The overall point is the binary contrasts, whether of consonants or vowels>  Although, this could just be an example like "two and too and to". wherein the exact same sound sequence has several different meanings, no ?

CB>>Could you elaborate what you mean here ? I know when I and most of
the people I talk with say "pig" or "big" , there is some level of
clean , crisp segments.>>

An illusion of phonics. Co-articulation is the rule. With some
one-syllable words it is even possible to start articulating a medial
sound before you even start saying the first sound. Remember,
articulation is controlled and planned, and it is not the same thing
as phonation--the movement of air through the vocal tract (though in
actual speech they temporally overlap). Say the words 'low' and 'row'
in isolation. Although the overall gestural routine is somewhat
similar, notice how both start with prominent lip rounding. Yet the
English /l/ is often characterized as a 'lip flat' sound/phoneme. So
if you are rounding your lips before you start phonating [l ou ], you
are clearly articulating the vowel (which has lip-rounding) before you
actually say the initial [l-]. Also, it is very hard to describe,
discuss and explain speech because (1) much of it is interior -- in
the vocal tract and (2) dynamic and high speed, with co-articulated
and overlapping movements.



>>CB: So speech has no relation to written language ?   Would you mind explaining a little more how they reach this conclusion ?>>

I think the interior/cognitive decoding/encoding/recoding of spoken
language and written language is largely the same. But in terms of
phonological representation, spoken language is overdetermined and
redundant (we have redundant abilities to interpret the speech signal
of a language we have acquired). In terms of phonological
representation, written language is underdetermined and gives much
less information. This becomes all too obvious when you try to learn a
foreign language. French is a good example. It is alphabetic, but
phonological and phonetic information is combined with information
about lexical relationships. Want to pronounce, read out loud a French
text? It helps if you can speak French and have acquired a large
French vocabulary prior to reading.


CB>> I don't get the circularity.  It's based on sort of minimal
empiricism, that any native speaker can perform. Like you just did.
Aren't the meanings of pig, big and fig differentiated by the first
letter-sound in English ? Of course, p and b are differentiated by
non-voiced/voiced. fig is differentiated from the other two by the
difference between bilabial whatever vs whatever an "f" is.>>


Minimal empiricism. I like that term. That is what Chomsky has relied
on--he doesn't do linguistic or psycholinguistic experiments.

I think one point to keep in mind is that articulation is overlapping,
so not segmentally discrete. Also, the articulatory spectrum is no
where near as discrete as structuralists had hoped. It is amazing the
number of variations and gradations different languages can come up
with the use of basically the same active and passive articulators
(such as lips, tip of tongue, blade of tongue, alveolar ridge, hard
palate, velum, epi-glottis, glottis, etc.). Put these gradations into
co-articulated, dynamic, complex spoken syllables, and you don't get
anything like a view of language that can easily be analyzed into a
small set of phonemes or binary features.


CB>> Of course, but that doesn't contradict the basic logical point.
The fact that they do differentiate themselves based on distinctive
features of the sounds that make them up.  You have to narrow it down
to words that have only one differentiating distinctive feature to
show the idea.>>

Again, it is obviously circular. A linguist as minimal empiricist says
I will now determine and delimit all the phonemes of my language by
enumerating a sufficient number of 'minimal pairs'. These words will
show what sounds/sound groupings/sound-or-perceptual categories exist.
Next, I will use these lexically determined sound categories I call
phonemes to reveal how meanings at a lexical level are differentiated.
CIRCULAR. WEAK. BAD. Also, sociolinguistically, phonologically,
phonetically, psycholinguistically unreal. Of course one hope was a
minimal set of phonemes would reduce memory load on a computer and so
make machine recognition of human speech plausible. Billions of
dollars later most in that field have given up on the phoneme as a
realistic invariable speech unit. Memory on computers has got much
larger and processing power has increased. But no matter how much you
increase processing, a phonemic model is worthless for dealing with
the conunundrums of human speech: What units are invariable across all
that variability? How do humans keep up rather easily with a speech
signal that undergoes compression with a loss of amplitude in the
signal?

CB>> But that doesn't contradict or refute the basic point on
phonemes.   That's a different issue, homynyms>>

No, someone arguing for the phoneme says that these sounds or sound
categories do not carry meaning themselves, but they encode language
at a higher level to determine meaning differentially. So the question
is, how do they encode homophones to be different in meaning?
They don't. On the other hand, I can show what would be considered
phonemic contrasts NOT encoding differences in meaning. For example,
in Japanese, 'yahari' means nevertheless, or , well, it was just as I
was expecting. But if you say 'yappari', you have just said the same
thing, somewhat more emphatically. Japanese /h/ is a contrast with
Japanese /p/ in a classic phonemic account yet there is no contrast in
meaning. Also, it isn't really a contrast in two sounds /p/ vs. /h/
but rather a contrast of a glottal stop plus [p] (sometimes called a
geminate--but note English has geminate spellings but these are not
usually said as geminate sounds) vs. a medial [h]


CB>> Your the expert, but I'd say you have to elaborate on what you
say above a bit more to show that. Binary oppositions still seem to
work on a lot of words and cultural categories, like up/down,
left/right, male/female,  war/peace, wet/dry, on /off ...............
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phoneme>>

I would avoid wiki linguistics articles CB. They are awful. I've tried
to contribute to the article on phoneme, and some dipshit with a
couple undergrad courses in phonology, with a lot of time on his
hands, armed mostly with a total belief in phonemics, reverts it all
back to bad phonemics. Welcome to the world of wikiknowledge. Wiki is
good for somewhat current events and popular culture. Outside of that,
a lack of editorial principles means it is far too uneven to be a
useful encyclopedic resource. I go there mostly for bibliographies and
links to real resources that are online.

As for what it says about Chomsky and Halle, notice the difference
between accounts of the development of phonology and what phonology
now exists as. Those doing phonology as an academic profession, after
Chomsky, don't use the concept usually. Yes, the phoneme is important
in the history of phonology--in one American tradition, phonology was
comprised of phonetics plus phonemics (structuralist analysis of
languages or a language at a sub-syllabic level). It just isn't much
of a going concern in inquiry and scholarship now. It is OBSOLETE. It
isn't necessary or useful to highly formalized linuistics, hence
Chomsky's shedding it. And it can not be found in articulation,
acoustics or perception, so it isn't really important to phonology,
phonetics and speech perception studies in the Haskins Laboratory
tradition. It is mostly a relic. I would point out though that it is a
useful fiction if you have to discuss dynamic spoken language in
static linear text. And it might well have a psychological reality in
the reading of alphabetic texts.

CB:>>Well, that' the same principle, but just shifts the binary
oppostion differentiation from voiced/unvoiced to early voiced/late
voiced. The fundamental idea is the same. >>

Well how useful, for example, is it to teach ESL students that the
English /p/ phoneme is a bilabial stop that is unvoiced? It is
unvoiced and then voiced. The actual perceptual contrast between 'pig'
and 'big' comes not between the main point of articulation of the
initial consonant stop-plosives but in the transitions to the vowels,
and the beginning of the vowels overlap with the last half of the
consonants. Recordings of just the transitions (no initial consonants)
are sufficient for many people to hear the difference categorically
between 'ig' as in 'pig' and 'ig' as in 'big'. The transitions are
different as are the vowels (even though a phonemic account would
wrongly say the internal vowels are the same).


CB:>>Come on .  There is some level of  distinction in linear sequence
between  "pig" and "gip" Say the two words. Clearly , your mouth
articulate the "g" sound before the "p" sound in the latter and vica
versa in the former.>>

If you cut out the segments of 'pig' p plus i plus g and turned them
all around (I'm not sure what you would do with the vowel but leave it
in place), you would not get a word that sounded like 'gip'. Your
mind, your linguistic mind, would strain to perceive something, but if
it didn't know what you had done to make the new word, it would not
perceive?spoken syllable? 'gip'.
At any rate my point was there is no sequence of discrete segments,
and certainly no sequence of discrete invariable units called
phonemes. Language is planned and controlled in units that underlie
gestural routines which simply can not be captured at a phonemic or
featural level. A good metaphor would be more like sequences of
overlapping chords, not notes.

CJ

_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis 


 


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Wed Jun 25 08:56:08 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 10:56:08 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] structuralist linguistics plus follow up	on
	phoneme
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806241827s4371e51er3039937661f66425@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806220121hbc698aej22a3e042163db168@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806240841l4d8eb80dq2749c935261dc1b2@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806240900h56c95599t54e6efbce88f4740@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806241827s4371e51er3039937661f66425@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <48622448.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



>>> CeJ

CB>>Could you elaborate what you mean here ? I know when I and most of
the people I talk with say "pig" or "big" , there is some level of
clean , crisp segments.>>

An illusion of phonics. Co-articulation is the rule. 

^^^
CB: But the p and g are not simultaneously articulated. They are in a
sequence.

^^
 


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Wed Jun 25 09:00:34 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 11:00:34 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] structuralist linguistics plus follow up	on
	phoneme
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806241827s4371e51er3039937661f66425@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806220121hbc698aej22a3e042163db168@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806240841l4d8eb80dq2749c935261dc1b2@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806240900h56c95599t54e6efbce88f4740@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806241827s4371e51er3039937661f66425@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <48622552.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



>>> CeJ <jannuzi at gmail.com> 06/24/2008 9:27 PM >>>


>>CB: I don't know. You have to voice a vowel , don't you ? Otherwise,
you can't hear it; or it becomes whispering. So, of course voicing has
to come in after the "p" as you go into the vowel.>>

Actually Japanese is marked by 'voiceless' vowels.
^^^^^
CB: Ok but here we are talking about English. There are no voiceless
vowels in English , are there ?  So, on the discussion of "pig" vs
"big", the voicing of the "i" in pig might slop over into the "p"
especially with the co-articulation you are talking about.

 
 


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Wed Jun 25 09:17:05 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 11:17:05 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] structuralist linguistics plus follow up	on
	phoneme
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806241827s4371e51er3039937661f66425@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806220121hbc698aej22a3e042163db168@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806240841l4d8eb80dq2749c935261dc1b2@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806240900h56c95599t54e6efbce88f4740@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806241827s4371e51er3039937661f66425@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <48622931.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



Actually Japanese is marked by 'voiceless' vowels. Some languages
might have phonological /p/s  that are voiced, even though you, as a
non-speaker of that language, would still perceive some sort of [p].
My point was that the distinction between the words 'pig' and 'big' in
English is essentially a lexical contrast that could be analyzed at
the level of articulatory gesture, which would show that it does not
turn on a minimal contrast of two phonemes (/b/ vs. /p/)
^^^
CB:  I'm not fully persuaded of this claim. To me, when I say the two
words, they are distinguished by the difference between "p" and "b". (
You dig ? smile)

^^^

 or one or two
features (aspiration plus or minus, voicing of consonant plus or
minus).
^^^
CB: If they are distinguished by two features, with one plus and the
other minus on both features, that doesn't contradict the fundamental
notion of phonemes.   It is still arbitrary to focus on the two features
as giving meaningful differences. That's the basic concept.  The
ccnvention , somewhat unconsciously "agreed" upon by all English
speakers, that these arbitrarily "chosen" aspects of sounds are imputed
with differentiating meanings. Or that differences in meaning are built
up based on discrete and arbitrarily chosen features of sounds.

^^^^^
 


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Wed Jun 25 09:26:29 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 11:26:29 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] On illusion of phoneme
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806241834w3a12f7d6h9bc9c426f215cb7f@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806240904v241fed09w317518a63cb8ae6e@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806241834w3a12f7d6h9bc9c426f215cb7f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <48622B65.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



>>> CeJ <jannuzi at gmail.com> 06/24/2008 9:34 PM >>>
CB:>>CB: So most linguists think the phoneme is a valid concept ?>>

Most work in linguistics has become so specific and narrow that if a
linguist in lexical semantics says that the phoneme is a valid
concept, it is most likely because he or she hasn't read a paper in
phonology since their undergraduate days. Highly abstract formalized
phonology doesn't use the concept, other than as a concept to teach
students in order to get them ready for the abstractions they now use.
Articulatory phonology, while no where near as popular as formalistic
approaches (because you can't do it with simple empiricism but need to
master experimental techniques and possess expensive equipment),
replaces the phoneme with the articulatory gesture.

^^^^
CB: Ok but articulatory gestures still differentiate meanings based on
distinctions made between arbitrarily "chosen" aspects of sounds, no ?
That's the basic concept. 

The articulatory gesture "pig"  is distinguished from the articulatory
gesture "big" how ?

^^^

In linguistics, this lack of intra- and inter- disciplinary breadth
and depth characterizes a 'science' (you don't need to understand the
whole puzzle if you are laboratory technician or a scribe for a team
of authors) perhaps, but it makes for a lot of misunderstandings and
ignorance. The phoneme is largely accepted as the word of Truth in
applied linguistics (such as in academic ESL in anglophone countries),
but I would say that is largely because they haven't interacted with
phonology since the structuralist era's heyday (post-war US, just
before Chomsky).

CJ

^^^^
CB: How are words distinguished based on the articulatory gesture
concept ?
_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis 


 


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Wed Jun 25 09:30:20 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 11:30:20 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Da da da da
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806241900g137ce4e7j2dc43c39b7f12c30@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806240919w7bdf9313w4a664f5748e1d8f1@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806241900g137ce4e7j2dc43c39b7f12c30@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <48622C4B.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



>>> CeJ <jannuzi at gmail.com> 06/24/2008 10:00 PM >>>
I clearly got the effect--even on a tiny sub-note with a tinny
speaker--watching a recording of that very same Japanese TV program.

http://jp.youtube.com/watch?v=Fke7GWcT5ko&feature=related 

The illusion was I perceived da da da da

When I closed my eyes, I could hear ba ba ba

And the visual was of a face saying ga ga ga ga (according to the
explanation).

This illusion works out nicely for reasoning out because the spoken
syllable is a bilabial one. The visual is of a face saying a syllable
that initiates palatally or velarly. And the illusion appears to come
from a sound that is IN BETWEEN the two extremes (a da syllable would
be alveolar, in front of the hard palate but obviously behind the
lips).

Even if the listener/viewer doesn't hear the illusory da, they usually
do not hear a phonetic ba either.

C

^^^^
 I heard " ah, ah, ah" , no consonant

_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis 


 


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Wed Jun 25 09:41:30 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 11:41:30 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] On illusion of phoneme
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806241942q502de47fg8efc37d5f1984b1a@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806240904v241fed09w317518a63cb8ae6e@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806241834w3a12f7d6h9bc9c426f215cb7f@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806241933l4bfa6b0au193aedab966afe84@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806241942q502de47fg8efc37d5f1984b1a@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <48622EEA.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



>>> CeJ 
A couple more things to ponder before I head off to classes.

The idea of the phoneme is sometimes built on the house of cards that
is categorical perception (though minimal pairs and complementary
distribution have also been tried, as have featural matrices). Yet
categorical perception is not limited to language. Not limited to
human speech. It isn't even limited to human beings.

CJ
^^^^^
CB:  Categorical perception is still fundamental to how language works,
and how symbolling and culture works.  In what sense is categorical
perception a house of cards ?  Categorical thinking is fundamental to
humans, and it is fundamentally social/communicative/communal, so that
it must use conventional or agreed upon uses of percepts.

_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis 


 


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Wed Jun 25 09:50:33 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 11:50:33 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] On illusion of phoneme
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806242004p1d1027ue21b3895521ab619@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806240904v241fed09w317518a63cb8ae6e@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806241834w3a12f7d6h9bc9c426f215cb7f@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806241933l4bfa6b0au193aedab966afe84@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806241942q502de47fg8efc37d5f1984b1a@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806242004p1d1027ue21b3895521ab619@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <48623108.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>

CB: This paragraph in the article you give us below, says that Chomsky and Halle do use phoneme.



The Russian linguist Jan Baudoin de Courtenay (1845-1925) was one of
the first to anticipate the modern notion of phoneme, developed in the
structuralist movement initiated in 1916 with the publication of the
Cours de linguistique g?n?rale by Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913).
That book does not, however, reach the stage of a clear acknowledgment
of the phonemes. The main developments in the conception of the
phonemes were attained in the Prague school during the 1919-39 period
(esp. by Nikolai Sergeievich Trubetzkoy, 1890-1938), in the American
distributionalism initiated by Leonard Bloomfield (1887-1949), and in
the French functionalist school headed by Andr? Martinet (1908-), with
three non-mainstream tendencies represented by the British
structuralist linguist John R. Firth (1890-1960), the ?glossematics?
school of Copenhagen, started by Louis Hjelmslev (1899-1965), and the
generative phonology developed by Morris Halle (1923-) and Noam
Chomsky (1928-).

>>> CeJ <jannuzi at gmail.com> 06/24/2008 11:04 PM >>>
I had thought Chomsky had moved past featural matrices as phonological
units, but I could see where they might still appeal--they retain some
phonetic criteria and are easily formalized (he attacked phonemes from
the issue of how structuralists had used complementary distribution to
delimit what the phoneme set of a language are). For others in that
formalist tradition, matrices and frames have gone off into a
formalistic ether where phonetic considerations are irrelevant
(afterall, you don't need phonetics if you want to artificially break
up an artificially  formal language into a sub-lexical level).  But
Chomsky hasn't really done phonology since the late 60s (I think) and
he really isn't any longer in the thick of serious linguistics (if you
ask me).

Here is an interesting philosophical treatment of the issue. However,
note it still favors a static and formalist treatment of
phonology--moving towards fuzzy logics :

http://www.ifs.csic.es/sorites/lp/articles/gradual/phongdia.htm 


PHONOLOGY
by Lorenzo Pe?a

An outstanding characteristic of human ?natural? language is the
linearity of its messages, which is nothing else but the fact that
contrasts, i.e. relationships among elements found together within one
message, are displayed along one dimension only. Even though such
linearity is far from complete, it has impressed many students of
language for centuries, characterizing as it does both the first and
second articulation, i.e. not only the relationship among meaningful
elements but also that among non-meaningful but distinctive ones. The
latter are the phonemes. For thousands of years students of language
have been aware of the existence of phonemes, i.e. minimal segments
within the spoken message whose presence is relevant for
distinguishing one message from a different one with another meaning
even though the phonemes themselves lack any meaning whatsoever. (An
anticipation of a modern phonological treatment is to be found in the
work of King Sejong of Korea (reigned 1418-50), the founder of the
Korean featural script Han'gl; see Sampson, pp. 120ff.)

The main difficulty concerning the existence and nature of phonemes is
that each of them underlies a great many different phonetic
realizations. Such a phonetic variation depends on a number of
factors. There are individual, free and contextually conditioned
variations, whether accountable for in terms of phonetic influence of
neighbouring sounds or not. Even though for thousands of years many
people have known about the existence of phonemes in-spite of such
variations, 19th century linguists focused on the phonetic
realizations themselves.

The Russian linguist Jan Baudoin de Courtenay (1845-1925) was one of
the first to anticipate the modern notion of phoneme, developed in the
structuralist movement initiated in 1916 with the publication of the
Cours de linguistique g?n?rale by Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913).
That book does not, however, reach the stage of a clear acknowledgment
of the phonemes. The main developments in the conception of the
phonemes were attained in the Prague school during the 1919-39 period
(esp. by Nikolai Sergeievich Trubetzkoy, 1890-1938), in the American
distributionalism initiated by Leonard Bloomfield (1887-1949), and in
the French functionalist school headed by Andr? Martinet (1908-), with
three non-mainstream tendencies represented by the British
structuralist linguist John R. Firth (1890-1960), the ?glossematics?
school of Copenhagen, started by Louis Hjelmslev (1899-1965), and the
generative phonology developed by Morris Halle (1923-) and Noam
Chomsky (1928-).

The American distributionalist school insists on a physicalist and
set-theoretic view of the phonemes, as mutually disjoint classes of
sounds. Glossematics regards phonemes as purely abstract entities
having nothing to do with phonetics; according to such a view there is
nothing to a phoneme but what serves to make it different from other
phonemes, regardless of whether they are realized phonetically,
graphically or through gestures. Martinet has a purely functionalist
view of phonemes, but one which does not dispose of phonetic
realization: he regards phonemes as entities whose reality is purely
relational -- distinctive (that is to say, such that a phoneme is
individuated by that which differentiates it from other phonemes) --
but which are characterized in phonetic terms; he rejects the
disjointness principle the distributionalists cleave to; he develops
Trubetzkoy's ideas on neutralization (the process by which in certain
environments the difference between two or more phonemes is lost, a
process consisting in the fact that in those contexts certain
distinctive features serving to differentiate those phonemes are no
longer relevant: for instance in word-final positions in German voiced
/d/ is pronounced like voiceless /t/, the feature voicedness lacking
relevance in that context) via the notion of the archiphoneme, which
would be a phonemic entity occurring in those contexts and comprising
all realizations of any of those phonemes; that is to say, in
word-final positions in German there would be neither /t/ not /d/, but
the archiphoneme /T/ instead; but of course such an analysis is by no
means the only possible one. Notice that a distinctive feature is any
phonetic property relevant for differentiating at least two phonemes
from one another. All those schools insist on positing for each
language one list of phonemes only, whereas Firth's polysystemic
approach maintains that for different phonological contexts there are
different lists of alternative phonemes -- which avoids resorting to
the notions of neutralization and archiphoneme. The polysystemic
approach, rigorous though it doubtless is, has been generally rejected
owing to its enormous complexity and perhaps also to some
arbitrariness in drawing the inventory of contexts which determine
respective phonemic systems.

While all the aforementioned schools take phonemes to be the basic
units, generative phonology bestows priority on the distinctive
features instead, and regards phonemes as mere classes of distinctive
features. Moreover generative phonologists, besides being about the
only ones to conceive of distinctive features as universal, generally
regard them as necessarily binary -- each feature being characterized
as a phonetic property, which is either downright absent or else fully
present. For instance, the English phoneme /i/ is characterized as: [+
syllabic], [- consonantal], [+ sonorant], [+ high], [- low], [+
voiced], [- tense], [- round], [+ front], [- back], [- nasal], [-
long], etc. -- although such a characterization contains a lot of
redundancy, since not all those specifications are independent.
(Defining any of those features goes beyond the scope of this paper.)
Another peculiarity of generative phonology is that it posits
different levels, with one deep level at which there may be phonemes
having features which are not manifested at all at the surface level
-- an ordered set of rules turning the deep input into the surface
output.

Generative phonology has gained widespread acceptance even outside the
English-speaking world. However, a great many linguists have qualms
about the existence of deep levels far away from surface realizations
and even more about the psychological reality of such a deep level or
the rules governing the generation of the surface output. (When once,
however, one takes issue with Chomsky's assertion of that
psychological reality, the whole nature of the generative process
becomes very dubious.) There is scarcity of empirical evidence in
support of such posited entities, and even abundance of indications
pointing to total lack of awareness of their existence on the part of
naive speakers. Moreover, the universalist view of distinctive
features can hardly be reconciled with many of the empirical data,
while the strictly transitionless binarist principle (the stipulation
that all phonological phenomena are to be accounted for in terms of
the presence or absence of different properties, with no property
being allowed to come in degrees) has been argued to run counter to
the continuous, gradual nature of the physiological and psychological
processes involved. Furthermore, distinctive features are likely to be
regarded as somehow less present than the phonemes themselves in the
consciousness of naive speakers. In fact what most commonly
differentiates two phonemes is not so much one or several definite
distinctive features as a fuzzy cluster thereof.

Thus, e.g., it can be argued that what sets English /p/ apart from /b/
is not just its voicelessness, or its aspiration, which is not
realized in certain contexts, but a fuzzy cluster of the fuzzy
features of being fortis (as against lenis), voiceless, aspirated, all
three of which vary in degree according to context and depending also
on individual or other parameters. /p, b/ are characterized in English
as being bilabial plosives, but in fact they are distinguished from
other phonemes by a fuzzy cluster of features, plosiveness and
bilabialness varying in degree, /p, b/ being sometimes realized as
either non-plosives or non-bilabial (e.g. in `hopeful' or
`subversive').

Furthermore, the choice of distinctive features in generative
phonology can be regarded as somehow ad hoc, with most features being
described in articulatory terms (i.e. terms applying to anatomic or
physiologic properties pertaining to the utterance of linguistic
messages) while others are acoustic. Sometimes a feature raises the
suspicion of having been invented in order to complete the binary
framework.

Some of those misgivings can probably be dispelled, although they
raise important methodological issues. However the study of phonemic
structures is likely to have much to gain from a gradualistic
approach. In fact there seem to be lots of borderline cases, such as
sounds which up to a point are allophones of (i.e. belong to) some
phoneme but to some extent are allophones of a different phoneme; or
sounds whose phonemehood is far from complete, whether in some
particular contexts or generally; or clusters of sounds which while to
some extent constituting one phoneme do not reach the same level of
unity as other sounds do (the English affricate pronunciation of `ch'
e.g., or diphthongs such as that in `how'). Through a gradualistic
treatment -- according to which so-called clear-cut situations would
be just limit cases -- synchronic phonology could tally with the
diachronic study in a simpler way than is customary. It is too early,
though, to assess the real merit of a gradualistic approach in
phonology. (In this connection, an obstacle to be overcome is a
widespread adherence to classical logic, which tends to reduce all
yes/no questions to alternatives between `completely' and `not at
all', whereas there are some non-classical logics which, while keeping
the excluded middle principle, ?p or not p?, and even the strong
version ?p or not-p at all", drop what can be termed the classical or
over-strong excluded middle, namely ?Either it is completely the case
that p, or else it is not the case that p at all"; classical logicians
are prone to view this schema as only stylistically different from ?p
or not p".)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

    * Bloomfield, L. 1933 Language. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
    * Chomsky, N. and M. Halle 1968 The Sound Pattern of English, New
York: Harper & Row.
    * Fudge, E.C. 1970 ?Phonology", in New Horizons in Linguistics,
ed. by John Lyons, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
    * Guti?rrez Ord??ez, S. 1983 ?La Fonolog?a", in Introducci?n a la
ling??stica, ed. by F. Abad and A. Garc?a Berrio, Madrid: Alhambra.
    * Martinet, A. 1960 ?l?ments de linguistique g?n?rale. Paris:
Armand Colin. English translation: Elements of General Linguistics,
London: Faber, 1964.
    * Mohrman, Ch., F. Norman and J. Sommerfelt 1963 Trends in Modern
Linguistics, Utrecht: Spectrum.
    * O'Connor, J.D. 1973 Phonetics, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
    * Sampson, G.R. 1985 Writing Systems, London: Hutchinson.
    * Sober, E. 1975 Simplicitty, Oxford: Clarendon.

_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis 


 


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From jannuzi at gmail.com  Wed Jun 25 18:38:28 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2008 09:38:28 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] structuralist linguistics plus follow up on
	phoneme (compendium response)
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806251738o14305185v42ccdf26be703406@mail.gmail.com>

>>CB: My thought is that there was an arbitrary connecting between "g" and the thing, <<

Certainly not iconic, but not entirely arbitrary, but rather
'motivated' by human psychology (hence the use of a velar for much of
the same purpose across cultures and languages).

>>CB:  I don't have a feeling that repetition represents endearment.<<

Well it most basically represents enhancement, extension, plurality.
There is no plural form in Japanese like the one in English (a cat,
two cats), but, for example, ki is tree, ki-gi is trees (repetition of
the ki morpheme, morphophonological voicing of the [k] to [g]).
As for what I called endearment, that would depend on us hearing you
interact with a baby or a beloved pet.

>>CB: The point is that alphabetical writing is arbitrary and picture writing is not .<<

Well alphabets are typically used for glottographic writing, pictures
are not--that is, they do not represent a written language derived
from a spoken one. However, the alphabets we know today descend from
writing systems that had pictographic elements in their development.
Moreover, you can still see motivated relics in alphabets (such as the
letter o, the shape of letter r vs. letter l pointing out an
articulatory difference). Korean hangul is not an entirely arbitrary
writing system because it represents a systematic working out of how
to pronounce Korean--it has phonological motivation.

>>CB: But the p and g are not simultaneously articulated. They are in a
sequence.>>

But the point is they are not discrete segments, which is one popular
view of the phoneme--that is what gives it its theoretical 'unicity'.
In speech, in acoustics and in auditory perception, however, that
unicity does not exist.

>>CB: How are words distinguished based on the articulatory gesture
concept ?<<

One difference is that if we use the articulatory gesture as an
abstract model of speech, it is hard to put into written discourse.
The beauty of the phoneme is that it helps you turn dynamic,
co-articulated speech into static linear segments for reading (though
research on reading processes show that a text is not 'bar code
scanned', that reading processes are not straight forward linear
either).  So once you grasp the dynamic nature of speech, you can find
it easier to embrace the articulatory gesture as a 'unit'.

I would say a second difference is that we can use the articulatory
gesture to move away from a negative differential view of meaning to a
positive differential view of meaning. Phonological encoding is
actually (I hope) an integral part of a language's grammar. And most
likely the basic unit is a psycholinguistic ability to control, store,
process, encode and decode the spoken syllable, not the phoneme.


>>CB: Categorical perception is still fundamental to how language works,
and how symbolling and culture works.  In what sense is categorical
perception a house of cards ?  Categorical thinking is fundamental to
humans, and it is fundamentally social/communicative/communal, so that
it must use conventional or agreed upon uses of percepts.<<

As it has been identified and researched, categorical perception is
not limited to human language or humans--even though it has been
argued before as something that separates human language and humans
from the rest of the animal kingdom. Most importantly though as it has
been identified and researched, it appears to be an epiphenomenon.

>>CB: This paragraph in the article you give us below, says that Chomsky and Halle do use phoneme.<<

Well the explanation there is largely schematic, and an uneven mix of
linguistics and philosophical ontology. But as I understand their
position, they reject the way phonemes were derived from
distributional methods (in structuralism), they embrace the use of
minimal pairs (which I reject--due to the circularity of using your
lexicon to delimit your phonological unit and then using your
phonological unit to delimit your lexicon ), and then they analyze
phonemes into features. In this version, the analysis is still static,
but the contrastive phoneme becomes unnecessary and the contrastive
feature is given prominence. However, the weaknesses of the approach
include it is still static, confuses articulatory aspects with
acoustic and perceptual ones, fails to produce an exhaustive agreed-to
list of features. It is also important to remember that in a static
analysis, the key thing to remember about the feature is that it is
not a discrete element in that it spreads across segments, syllables,
and whole words (like, for example, the feature of nasality in the
word 'can'--contrast 'can' with 'cap'--the vowel is different and the
nasality starts in the transition between the onset ([kj-] and the
nucleus vowel).

Since then the contrastive feature (which is really, I believe, what
the structuralist Jakobson called them) has morphed into extremely
abstract models like 'metrical frames'. One British linguist was so
certain that it was this sort of thing that underlay speech processing
that he got a patent on his version of the model and sold it as a
surefire way to program computers to process rapid human speech. He
got the patent, I'm sure he sold it to some programmer who didn't know
anything about linguistics and speech perception. Have no doubt this
was one of the 'holy grails' of programming in the 90s (successful
speech recognition). However, the subsequent software didn't work any
better than the ones flailing about with phonemic models programmed
into them. I think it didn't work at all actually.

If a computer can not be programmed to process complexly
co-articulated speech, it can not process spoken human language. And a
static model is not going to work. Most likely up to a point anyway
increasing memory and processing power combined with a syllabic and
word model will work better.
CJ


From jannuzi at gmail.com  Wed Jun 25 19:04:54 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2008 10:04:54 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Da da da da
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806241900g137ce4e7j2dc43c39b7f12c30@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806240919w7bdf9313w4a664f5748e1d8f1@mail.gmail.com>
	<ffbe0f7e0806241900g137ce4e7j2dc43c39b7f12c30@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806251804m68800772i916f88bfa466f0a8@mail.gmail.com>

CB:>>I heard " ah, ah, ah" , no consonant<<

But did you hear 'ba' when you closed your eyes? If not, you might
have a hearing problem or bad audio on your computer. I think hearing
'ah' (instead of da) is another observed percept for the McGurk effect
because the visuals of saying 'ga' and 'ah' are not that different.

CJ


From jannuzi at gmail.com  Wed Jun 25 19:11:14 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2008 10:11:14 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Categorical perception
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806251811y7bcb2ad3j22269c34713b9642@mail.gmail.com>

>>CB: Categorical perception is still fundamental to how language works,
and how symbolling and culture works.  In what sense is categorical
perception a house of cards ?  Categorical thinking is fundamental to
humans, and it is fundamentally social/communicative/communal, so that
it must use conventional or agreed upon uses of percepts.<<

>>CJ: As it has been identified and researched, categorical perception is
not limited to human language or humans--even though it has been
argued before as something that separates human language and humans
from the rest of the animal kingdom. Most importantly though as it has
been identified and researched, it appears to be an epiphenomenon.<<<<<<

I love these papers. The second includes a really good overview of
cutting edge developments in theories and models of speech perception
(whereas in mainstream linguistics, speech perception and the phoneme
had been largely begged questions).

http://www.psy.cmu.edu/~lholt/publications/JapaneseQuail.pdf

http://www.cs.indiana.edu/~port/HDphonol/Diehl.Lotto.Holt.speech.percptn.AnnlRevPsy2003.pdf

CJ


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Thu Jun 26 07:03:05 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2008 09:03:05 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] structuralist linguistics plus follow up	on
	phoneme (compendium response)
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806251738o14305185v42ccdf26be703406@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806251738o14305185v42ccdf26be703406@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <48635B4A.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



>>> CeJ <jannuzi at gmail.com> 06/25/2008 8:38 PM >>>
>>CB: My thought is that there was an arbitrary connecting between "g"
and the thing, <<

Certainly not iconic, but not entirely arbitrary, but rather
'motivated' by human psychology (hence the use of a velar for much of
the same purpose across cultures and languages).


^^^^^
CB: "Human psychology" is sort of a big wild card the way you use it
here. 
^^^^

>>CB:  I don't have a feeling that repetition represents endearment.<<

Well it most basically represents enhancement, extension, plurality.
There is no plural form in Japanese like the one in English (a cat,
two cats), but, for example, ki is tree, ki-gi is trees (repetition of
the ki morpheme, morphophonological voicing of the [k] to [g]).
As for what I called endearment, that would depend on us hearing you
interact with a baby or a beloved pet.

^^^^
CB: Babies might repeat sounds more than adults, as in babble.

Repetition could be in annoyance as much as endearment.
 
I can see a non-arbitrary representation of plurality.  

>>CB: The point is that alphabetical writing is arbitrary and picture
writing is not .<<

Well alphabets are typically used for glottographic writing, pictures
are not--that is, they do not represent a written language derived
from a spoken one. However, the alphabets we know today descend from
writing systems that had pictographic elements in their development.
^^^^
CB: But they changed qualitatively when they became alphabetic and no
longer pictographic.  There was a revolution in their "descent" when
they shifted to alphabetic. They qualitatively shifted from iconic to
arbitrary representation.

^^^^^

Moreover, you can still see motivated relics in alphabets (such as the
letter o, the shape of letter r vs. letter l pointing out an
articulatory difference). 

^^^^
CB: If you mean the shape of the mouth on the "o", that is not the
point of arbitrary representation. The arbitrary representation is not
of the sound by the letter, but by the words made up of the letters in
representing the things and concepts.

^^^^^

Korean hangul is not an entirely arbitrary
writing system because it represents a systematic working out of how
to pronounce Korean--it has phonological motivation.
^^^^^
CB: Again, if you mean the letters picture the shape of the mouth in
pronouncing them that is not the relevant representation. The arbitrary
representation is in the spoken word itself representing things and
concepts. So, that arbitrariness carries over to the alphabet of the
writing.  Whereas picture writing has come iconic, non-arbitrary
representation of what is being represented as in Mixtec or Aztec
codices.  The actual Mixtec "king" or "queen" is pictured in the
writing.

>>CB: But the p and g are not simultaneously articulated. They are in
a
sequence.>>

But the point is they are not discrete segments, which is one popular
view of the phoneme--that is what gives it its theoretical 'unicity'.
In speech, in acoustics and in auditory perception, however, that
unicity does not exist.

^^^
CB: How do you mean they are not discrete ? This is the crux of the
whole idea. We _think_ of them as discrete when we hear them.  Otherwise
, we wouldn't be able to understand the word. We wouldn't be able to
distinguish "pig" from "big", which we can.

^^^^^

^^^

>>CB: How are words distinguished based on the articulatory gesture
concept ?<<

One difference is that if we use the articulatory gesture as an
abstract model of speech, it is hard to put into written discourse.

^^^^
CB: No I mean how would we distinguish words in speech, not writing ?

^^^^

The beauty of the phoneme is that it helps you turn dynamic,
co-articulated speech into static linear segments for reading (though
research on reading processes show that a text is not 'bar code
scanned', that reading processes are not straight forward linear
either).  So once you grasp the dynamic nature of speech, you can find
it easier to embrace the articulatory gesture as a 'unit'.
^^^^^
CB: Ok, but how do you distinguish words ? I can distinguish words when
somebody speaks to me. I can isolate a word like "pig" or "big" from the
other part of the articulatory gestures toward me.

^^^

I would say a second difference is that we can use the articulatory
gesture to move away from a negative differential view of meaning to a
positive differential view of meaning. Phonological encoding is
actually (I hope) an integral part of a language's grammar. And most
likely the basic unit is a psycholinguistic ability to control, store,
process, encode and decode the spoken syllable, not the phoneme.

^^^^
CB: Aren't the syllables "pig" and "big" distinguished from each other
by the phoneme at the beginning ?

^^^


>>CB: Categorical perception is still fundamental to how language
works,
and how symbolling and culture works.  In what sense is categorical
perception a house of cards ?  Categorical thinking is fundamental to
humans, and it is fundamentally social/communicative/communal, so that
it must use conventional or agreed upon uses of percepts.<<

As it has been identified and researched, categorical perception is
not limited to human language or humans--even though it has been
argued before as something that separates human language and humans
from the rest of the animal kingdom. Most importantly though as it has
been identified and researched, it appears to be an epiphenomenon.

^^^^
CB: What do you mean by categorical perception ?

I thought you meant something like thinking of the sound "pig" as being
made up of categories of discrete elements, even though if a physics
test was done on each time it is said, there would be minute differences
between every utterance of it. In other words, when a person says "pig"
five times, we think of it as the same sound each time, even though at a
minute physical level there are differences each time it is said.

 The linguistic and anthropology professors I have don't agree that
animals have language.

>>CB: This paragraph in the article you give us below, says that
Chomsky and Halle do use phoneme.<<

Well the explanation there is largely schematic, and an uneven mix of
linguistics and philosophical ontology. But as I understand their
position, they reject the way phonemes were derived from
distributional methods (in structuralism), they embrace the use of
minimal pairs (which I reject--due to the circularity of using your
lexicon to delimit your phonological unit and then using your
phonological unit to delimit your lexicon ),

^^^^
CB: Ok but _Chomsky and Halle_ dpn't reject minimal pairs. Explain that
circularity to me a little more elaborately , please.

^^^

 and then they analyze
phonemes into features. In this version, the analysis is still static,
but the contrastive phoneme becomes unnecessary and the contrastive
feature is given prominence. However, the weaknesses of the approach
include it is still static, confuses articulatory aspects with
acoustic and perceptual ones, fails to produce an exhaustive agreed-to
list of features. It is also important to remember that in a static
analysis, the key thing to remember about the feature is that it is
not a discrete element in that it spreads across segments, syllables,
and whole words (like, for example, the feature of nasality in the
word 'can'--contrast 'can' with 'cap'--the vowel is different and the
nasality starts in the transition between the onset ([kj-] and the
nucleus vowel).

^^^
CB: But the vowel is physically different  everytime the same word is
said too ( if we were to do a physics test of it at a minute enough
level) but we just think of "can" ,"can" "can"  as identical to each
other.  So, even though the vowel in can is different from the vowel in
cap , we still think of them as identical sounds.

^^^^ 

Since then the contrastive feature (which is really, I believe, what
the structuralist Jakobson called them) has morphed into extremely
abstract models like 'metrical frames'. One British linguist was so
certain that it was this sort of thing that underlay speech processing
that he got a patent on his version of the model and sold it as a
surefire way to program computers to process rapid human speech. He
got the patent, I'm sure he sold it to some programmer who didn't know
anything about linguistics and speech perception. Have no doubt this
was one of the 'holy grails' of programming in the 90s (successful
speech recognition). However, the subsequent software didn't work any
better than the ones flailing about with phonemic models programmed
into them. I think it didn't work at all actually.

If a computer can not be programmed to process complexly
co-articulated speech, it can not process spoken human language. And a
static model is not going to work. Most likely up to a point anyway
increasing memory and processing power combined with a syllabic and
word model will work better.
CJ

^^^^
CB: Good point

_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis 


 


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Thu Jun 26 07:08:21 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2008 09:08:21 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Categorical perception
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806251811y7bcb2ad3j22269c34713b9642@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806251811y7bcb2ad3j22269c34713b9642@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <48635C85.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



>>> CeJ <jannuzi at gmail.com> 06/25/2008 9:11 PM >>>
>>CB: Categorical perception is still fundamental to how language
works,
and how symbolling and culture works.  In what sense is categorical
perception a house of cards ?  Categorical thinking is fundamental to
humans, and it is fundamentally social/communicative/communal, so that
it must use conventional or agreed upon uses of percepts.<<

>>CJ: As it has been identified and researched, categorical perception
is
not limited to human language or humans--even though it has been
argued before as something that separates human language and humans
from the rest of the animal kingdom. Most importantly though as it has
been identified and researched, it appears to be an
epiphenomenon.<<<<<<

^^^^
CB: What do you mean by epiphenomenon here ?

By speech perception, you mean what we hear when we listen to words ?

I love these papers. The second includes a really good overview of
cutting edge developments in theories and models of speech perception
(whereas in mainstream linguistics, speech perception and the phoneme
had been largely begged questions).

http://www.psy.cmu.edu/~lholt/publications/JapaneseQuail.pdf 

http://www.cs.indiana.edu/~port/HDphonol/Diehl.Lotto.Holt.speech.percptn.AnnlRevPsy2003.pdf


CJ

_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis 


 


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Fri Jun 27 01:26:44 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2008 02:26:44 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] formal logic not "static" [WAS: Parting of the
 Ways: Reviews (7)]
In-Reply-To: <485FD24E.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
References: <485FD24E.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
Message-ID: <E1KC7fl-0003z7-6t@elasmtp-curtail.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

I can't speak about Frege in relation to the question at hand.  But 
as to the nonsense about formal logic being static, here is an apt 
response from an otherwise insufferable Maoist asshole:

"The incapacity for concrete analysis which afflicted Trotsky 
throughout his militant life resulted from his failure to comprehend 
the materialist dialectic, an incomprehension even worse than 
Bukharin's, although less flagrant, for, prudently, he ventured only 
rarely into the higher spheres of Marxist philosophy. When he did so, 
particularly at the time of his polemic against Burnham, the results 
reach no more than an elementary level. He disparages formal logic 
but knows nothing of the developments in symbolic logic since 
Hilbert, Peano and Russell. He assumes that to acknowledge the 
dialectic implies rejecting the principle of identity or its 
restriction to elementary and subordinate tasks. For him, 'the 
dialectic and formal logic bear a relationship similar to that 
between higher and lower 
mathematics'.(<http://www.marx2mao.com/Other/OT73i.html#Cen1>1) 
Furthermore, formal logic is supposedly inapplicable, even 
approximately, to phenomena exhibiting appreciable quantitative 
changes. He would be at a loss to explain to us how mathematics 
(based on the principles of identity and non-contradiction) could be 
applied to nearly instantaneous physical transformations like those 
which occur at the moment of a nuclear explosion. In fact, Trotsky 
confused Aristotelian logic with the metaphysical inferences which 
are wrongly drawn from it by certain philosophers and which deny 
movement and change."  (p. 41)

SOURCE: Mavrakis, Kostas. On Trotskyism: Problems of Theory and 
History, translated by John McGreal. Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1976.
http://www.marx2mao.com/Other/OT73NB.html


At 03:41 PM 6/23/2008, Charles Brown wrote:

>Static, I think is another issue distinct from "dialectic".
>
>^^^^
>CB: Please elaborate.
>
>What's your understanding of what Frege brings to logic ?  Your words

From rasherrs at eircom.net  Fri Jun 27 06:18:05 2008
From: rasherrs at eircom.net (Paddy)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2008 13:18:05 +0100
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] formal logic not "static" [WAS: Parting of the
	Ways: Reviews (7)]
References: <485FD24E.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
	<E1KC7fl-0003z7-6t@elasmtp-curtail.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <001b01c8d84f$da699e30$0f01a8c0@Haceid>

Hi
Does anybody know of any good books in Symbolic Logic. Ones that have plenty 
of exercises and the answers+ 




From farmelantj at juno.com  Fri Jun 27 07:43:38 2008
From: farmelantj at juno.com (farmelantj at juno.com)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2008 13:43:38 GMT
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] formal logic not "static" [WAS: Parting of the
	Wa	ys: Reviews (7)]
Message-ID: <20080627.094338.26632.0@webmail22.vgs.untd.com>


Probably the most widely used ones are the books
Irving Copi's including his book,
"Introduction to Logic"
www.amazon.com/Introduction-Logic-Irving-M-Copi/dp/0130102024

and his, "Symbolic Logic"
www.amazon.com/Symbolic-Logic-Irving-M-Copi/dp/0023249803

I would get one of the earlier editions rather than
the latest editions which are way too expensive.

-- "Paddy" <rasherrs at eircom.net> wrote:
Hi
Does anybody know of any good books in Symbolic Logic. Ones that have plenty 
of exercises and the answers+ 



_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis


____________________________________________________________
Need cash? Click to get a cash advance.
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL2141/fc/Ioyw6i3mKetEFju3OCMhLoAuDxxVI2wa9r3R2RDlxNUGqAbY5fqYEp/


From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Fri Jun 27 08:09:48 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2008 10:09:48 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] formal logic not "static" [WAS: Parting	of the
	Wa	ys: Reviews (7)]
In-Reply-To: <20080627.094338.26632.0@webmail22.vgs.untd.com>
References: <20080627.094338.26632.0@webmail22.vgs.untd.com>
Message-ID: <4864BC6E.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



>>> "farmelantj at juno.com" <farmelantj at juno.com> 06/27/2008 9:43 AM >>>

Probably the most widely used ones are the books
Irving Copi's including his book,
"Introduction to Logic"
www.amazon.com/Introduction-Logic-Irving-M-Copi/dp/0130102024 

and his, "Symbolic Logic"
www.amazon.com/Symbolic-Logic-Irving-M-Copi/dp/0023249803 

^^^
CB: Wow ! That brings back memories. Copi was professor of logic at the
University of Michigan when I was a freshman in 1968. I used read his
into text, trying to teach myself logic

By static, I mean the principle of identity. A is A.

I would get one of the earlier editions rather than
the latest editions which are way too expensive.

-- "Paddy" <rasherrs at eircom.net> wrote:
Hi
Does anybody know of any good books in Symbolic Logic. Ones that have
plenty 
of exercises and the answers+ 



_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis 


____________________________________________________________
Need cash? Click to get a cash advance.
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL2141/fc/Ioyw6i3mKetEFju3OCMhLoAuDxxVI2wa9r3R2RDlxNUGqAbY5fqYEp/


_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Fri Jun 27 09:47:25 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2008 10:47:25 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] formal logic not "static" [WAS: Parting	of the
 Wa	ys: Reviews (7)]
In-Reply-To: <4864BC6E.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
References: <20080627.094338.26632.0@webmail22.vgs.untd.com>
	<4864BC6E.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
Message-ID: <E1KCFFs-0008RN-7X@elasmtp-mealy.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

A=A is not static.

BTW, as a Trotskyist, Copi was subject to McCarthyite persecution, 
but I think he squeezed through by sticking to logic.  Anyway, it's 
all in George Reisch's book.

At 09:09 AM 6/27/2008, Charles Brown wrote:


> >>> "farmelantj at juno.com" <farmelantj at juno.com> 06/27/2008 9:43 AM >>>
>
>Probably the most widely used ones are the books
>Irving Copi's including his book,
>"Introduction to Logic"
>www.amazon.com/Introduction-Logic-Irving-M-Copi/dp/0130102024
>
>and his, "Symbolic Logic"
>www.amazon.com/Symbolic-Logic-Irving-M-Copi/dp/0023249803
>
>^^^
>CB: Wow ! That brings back memories. Copi was professor of logic at the
>University of Michigan when I was a freshman in 1968. I used read his
>into text, trying to teach myself logic
>
>By static, I mean the principle of identity. A is A.
>
>I would get one of the earlier editions rather than
>the latest editions which are way too expensive.
>
>-- "Paddy" <rasherrs at eircom.net> wrote:
>Hi
>Does anybody know of any good books in Symbolic Logic. Ones that have
>plenty
>of exercises and the answers+



From charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us  Fri Jun 27 08:55:26 2008
From: charlesb at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2008 10:55:26 -0400
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] formal logic not "static" [WAS:	Parting	of the
	Wa	ys: Reviews (7)]
In-Reply-To: <E1KCFFs-0008RN-7X@elasmtp-mealy.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
References: <20080627.094338.26632.0@webmail22.vgs.untd.com>
	<4864BC6E.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
	<E1KCFFs-0008RN-7X@elasmtp-mealy.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <4864C720.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>



>>> Ralph Dumain <rdumain at autodidactproject.org> 06/27/2008 11:47 AM
>>>
A=A is not static.

^^^^^
A remains A. That's static. A turning into its opposite is change.

BTW, as a Trotskyist, Copi was subject to McCarthyite persecution, 
but I think he squeezed through by sticking to logic.  Anyway, it's 
all in George Reisch's book.

At 09:09 AM 6/27/2008, Charles Brown wrote:


> >>> "farmelantj at juno.com" <farmelantj at juno.com> 06/27/2008 9:43 AM
>>>
>
>Probably the most widely used ones are the books
>Irving Copi's including his book,
>"Introduction to Logic"
>www.amazon.com/Introduction-Logic-Irving-M-Copi/dp/0130102024 
>
>and his, "Symbolic Logic"
>www.amazon.com/Symbolic-Logic-Irving-M-Copi/dp/0023249803 
>
>^^^
>CB: Wow ! That brings back memories. Copi was professor of logic at
the
>University of Michigan when I was a freshman in 1968. I used read his
>into text, trying to teach myself logic
>
>By static, I mean the principle of identity. A is A.
>
>I would get one of the earlier editions rather than
>the latest editions which are way too expensive.
>
>-- "Paddy" <rasherrs at eircom.net> wrote:
>Hi
>Does anybody know of any good books in Symbolic Logic. Ones that have
>plenty
>of exercises and the answers+


_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu 
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis


This message has been scanned for malware by SurfControl plc. www.surfcontrol.com


From rdumain at autodidactproject.org  Fri Jun 27 10:20:49 2008
From: rdumain at autodidactproject.org (Ralph Dumain)
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2008 11:20:49 -0500
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] formal logic not "static" [WAS:	Parting	of the
 Wa	ys: Reviews (7)]
In-Reply-To: <4864C720.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
References: <20080627.094338.26632.0@webmail22.vgs.untd.com>
	<4864BC6E.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
	<E1KCFFs-0008RN-7X@elasmtp-mealy.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
	<4864C720.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
Message-ID: <E1KCFmH-00033f-Q5@elasmtp-masked.atl.sa.earthlink.net>

The law of identity is a property of statements, not things.

At 09:55 AM 6/27/2008, Charles Brown wrote:


> >>> Ralph Dumain <rdumain at autodidactproject.org> 06/27/2008 11:47 AM
> >>>
>A=A is not static.
>
>^^^^^
>A remains A. That's static. A turning into its opposite is change.



From rasherrs at eircom.net  Sat Jun 28 01:50:34 2008
From: rasherrs at eircom.net (Paddy)
Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2008 08:50:34 +0100
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Symbolic logic
References: <20080627.094338.26632.0@webmail22.vgs.untd.com><4864BC6E.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us><E1KCFFs-0008RN-7X@elasmtp-mealy.atl.sa.earthlink.net><4864C720.84C9.00BF.0@cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us>
	<E1KCFmH-00033f-Q5@elasmtp-masked.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
Message-ID: <000801c8d8f3$a58b6e10$0f01a8c0@Haceid>

Hi

While I am waiting to get a copy of another book on logic, I have Lemmon's 
one, can you recommend a web site where there are exercises, questions and 
solutions, for the student in logic?

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Ralph Dumain" <rdumain at autodidactproject.org>
To: <marxism-thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Friday, June 27, 2008 5:20 PM
Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] formal logic not "static" [WAS: Parting of the 
Wa ys: Reviews (7)]


The law of identity is a property of statements, not things.

At 09:55 AM 6/27/2008, Charles Brown wrote:


> >>> Ralph Dumain <rdumain at autodidactproject.org> 06/27/2008 11:47 AM
> >>>
>A=A is not static.
>
>^^^^^
>A remains A. That's static. A turning into its opposite is change.


_______________________________________________
Marxism-Thaxis mailing list
Marxism-Thaxis at lists.econ.utah.edu
To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis





From jannuzi at gmail.com  Sat Jun 28 21:48:09 2008
From: jannuzi at gmail.com (CeJ)
Date: Sun, 29 Jun 2008 12:48:09 +0900
Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] structuralist linguistics plus follow up on
	phoneme (compendium response)
In-Reply-To: <ffbe0f7e0806251738o14305185v42ccdf26be703406@mail.gmail.com>
References: <ffbe0f7e0806251738o14305185v42ccdf26be703406@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ffbe0f7e0806282048v18b4e192n28fb221ab9676a86@mail.gmail.com>

CB:>>But they changed qualitatively when they became alphabetic and no
longer pictographic.  There was a revolution in their "descent" when
they shifted to alphabetic. They qualitatively shifted from iconic to
arbitrary representation.<<

I doubt if they ever were truly iconic. In the shift to represent
glottographic speech, the arbitrary quickly intrudes itself. Chinese
characters are in effect as arbitrary as a syllabary or an alphabet.
That is not to say, though, that any of these are ENTIRELY arbitrary.
For example, quite unarbitrararily, English spelling points out word
length (and at least hints at syllables), word breaks, and most
importantly, word relationships. Not iconic, but linguistically
motivated. English spelling balances phonetic/phonological with
morphemic/lexical elements, making it look a lot like French. Or, if
you will, a Germanic language in terms of pronunciation, looking like
a Latin language.


CB*>>If you mean the shape of the mouth on the "o", that is not the
point of arbitrary representation. The arbitrary representation is not
of the sound by the letter, but by the words made up of the letters in
representing the things and concepts.<<

I was point out <o> as motivated, that is, not entirely arbitrary. It
is not by the arbitrary that letter <o> got chosen to represent sounds
that involve lip rounding in English. On the other hand, it most
likely represents the conscious choice of a Norman scribe or a Dutch
typesetter somewhere in the history of the development of modern
English spelling conventions.

CB:>>Again, if you mean the letters picture the shape of the mouth in
pronouncing them that is not the relevant representation. The arbitrary
representation is in the spoken word itself representing things and
concepts. So, that arbitrariness carries over to the alphabet of the
writing.  Whereas picture writing has come iconic, non-arbitrary
representation of what is being represented as in Mixtec or Aztec
codices.  The actual Mixtec "king" or "queen" is pictured in the
writing.<<

I was pointing out non-arbitrary aspects of the ways in which roman
alphabet has been adapted and/or evolved to represent
English--glottographically.

CB: >>How do you mean they are not discrete ? This is the crux of the
whole idea. We _think_ of them as discrete when we hear them.  Otherwise
, we wouldn't be able to understand the word. We wouldn't be able to
distinguish "pig" from "big", which we can.<<

Not discrete, not digital but analog. Human speech is complexly
analog. The pursuit of digital units has proven nice for formalization
but largely irrelevant to applied linguistics, which must concern
itself with things like language acquisition, use of languages across
language and cultural groups, how to program a computer to process
human speech, etc.


CB:>>Aren't the syllables "pig" and "big" distinguished from each other
by the phoneme at the beginning ?<<

In terms of what speech perception research shows, they are
differentiated by VOT--voice onset timing. If you still want to
believe in phonemes, explain how a North American differentiates, for
example, the pronunciation of 'ladder' from 'latter'. Also, remember,
it is philosophically weak in any discussion to assume the very issue
you are discussing to be true and existent--the phoneme exists, now
let me show you how it exists. Rather, start with, does the unit of
the phoneme (as defined by linguists) exist? Why is its existence not
supported by current speech perception and articulatory phonetics
research?

CB>>CJ: As it has been identified and researched, categorical perception
is not limited to human language or humans--even though it has been
argued before as something that separates human language and humans
from the rest of the animal kingdom. Most importantly though as it has
been identified and researched, it appears to be an
epiphenomenon.<<<<<<

^^^^
CB: What do you mean by epiphenomenon here ?<<

Let 's go back to differentiating words. First of all, how do you
differentiate, for example--to be quite arbitrary--pig from
antidisestablishmentarianism? Second, how do you differentiate
'latter' from 'ladder' or 'utter' from 'udder', phonologically
speaking. Third, if we can say we hear a [p-] at the beginning of
'pig' and ditto for a [b-] at the beginning of 'big', might such an
act of identification, isolation, segmentation, etc. actually be a
PRODUCT of successful word identification? In which case, the
segmentation of the words and differentiation of the two supposed
English phonemes, /p/ and /b/ are not causal to word identification
but rather dependent on it--epiphenomenal to speech perception.

To conclude with something different, here is a look at the
non-arbitrary (that is, motivated) aspects of reduplication, which I
had mentioned earlier. Some languages make considerably more use of
this process, but it seems to be very  basic to word creation in all
languages. So again, not entirely arbitrary.

http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/ftp/global/pub/techreports/1994/tr-94-019.ps.gz
Page 1
A Preliminary Study of the
Semantics of Reduplication
Terry Regier
TR-94-019
April 1994
Abstract
There is a universal component to the semantics of reduplication,
which can be ex-
pressed as a radial category of concepts. I present this radial
category, along with
supporting evidence from a range of languages, and motivations for the
links between
the various senses. The structure of the radial graph gives rise to a
number of pre-
dicted implicational universals. I also show that the radial category
for reduplication
shares an entire subsystem of concepts with the radial category for
the Russian verbal
prex
raz-
. This sharing of subsystems of concepts across separate radial categories
suggests that there is a single universal core conceptual network,
with individual
constructions covering dierent, possibly overlapping, regions.
The author may be reached by e-mail as
regier at icsi.berkeley.edu
.
Page 2
1 The Semantics of Reduplication
Reduplication expresses a wide and initially somewhat arbitrary-seeming array of
meanings cross-linguistically. There is, however, a core set of
meanings which recur so
frequently and in so many languages as to demand explanation. Consider
for example
the English words
higgledy-piggledy, helter-skelter, pell-mell,
and
willy-nilly
. These
reduplicatives share a semantic component of lack of control with
reduplicatives from
many other languages, e.g. Russian
tjap-ljap
(in a slipshod manner) and Bengali
ulat-palat
(helter-skelter).
Other senses which recur cross-linguistically include intensity,
increased quantity,
scattering, plurality, diversity, member of a class, repetition,
continuation, more than
appropriate, diminution,endearment,contempt, attenuation,
augmentation, similarity,
derogation, and habituality (Moravcsik 1978). In addition to these,
Nomura & Kiy-
omi (1993) note disorder, carelessness, pretense, reciprocity,
aimlessness, and attempt.
The apparent incoherence of the set of meanings she was examining led Moravcsik
(1978:325) to conclude:
Given that reduplication is neither the exclusive expression of any one
meaning category in language, nor are the meanings that it is an expres-
sion of all subsumable under general classes,
no explanatory or predictive
generalization about the meanings of reduplicative constructions can be
proposed
. [ Emphasis added ]
In this work I hope to demonstrate that despite this bewildering
diversity of mean-
ings, some tentative explanatory and predictive generalizations can be
made concern-
ing the semantics of reduplication. I shall cast the various meanings
expressed by
reduplication as a
radial category
of concepts (Lako 1987). This construct allows
one to express the relations between various senses of a linguistic
unit, without as-
suming that there exists a single abstract meaning which covers all
these senses and
no others. In general, the construction of a radial category involves
the identication
of a prototypical central sense and motivations for links radiating
out from that sense
to various other senses, and then possibly further links from those
senses on to yet
more peripheral senses. In using this construct to express universal
tendencies in
the semantics of reduplication, I adopt the notion of a
universal radial category
from
Pederson (1991) and Jurafsky (1993):
... all languages which share the common prototype will have a set of
extensions from that prototype which is a coherent subset of the universally-
sanctioned potential extensional structure. That is, while each language
may have a unique extensional structure, each language's extensional
structure will consist only of nodes and links which are adjacent in the
universal network. No language will have nodes which are non-adjacent in
1
Page 3
the universal network unless it also has (or has had) all the intermediate
nodes as well. (Pederson 1991:2)
Here the nodes represent individual senses or meanings, and the links
represent mo-
tivated conceptual relations between these meanings. The central prototype node
is taken to represent not only the semantically central sense of the
construction,
but also the origin from which a history of semantic extension eventually led to
the radial category as manifested synchronically (Pederson 1991;
Nikiforidou 1991;
Jurafsky 1993). This conception of a universal radial category lends
some explanatory
coherence to what might otherwise be a baingly heterogeneous set of
meanings, and
predicts implicational universals of the sort described above by Pederson.
The use of radial categories in explicating the semantics of
reduplication makes this
work very similar in spirit to the work of Nomura & Kiyomi (1993),
which uses radial
categories for similar purposes. However, this work does not restrict
its attention
to verbal reduplication, as theirs did, nor to instances of
reduplication in which the
unreduplicated stem is meaningful. On the other hand, their coverage
of the world's
language families is more thorough.
We shall see below that the radial category for reduplication shares an entire
subsystem of concepts with the radial category for the Russian verbal prex
raz-
. In
other words, many of the same extended senses are expressed both by
reduplication
and by
raz-
, although reduplication and
raz-
have dierent central senses. This sharing
of conceptual structure suggests the existence of a single
interconnected conceptual
network, with individual linguistic constructions rooted at dierent
nodes, covering
possibly overlapping subsets of nodes.
Figure 1 illustrates some of the various senses of reduplication, and
their inter-
connections. The senses shown in ellipses are shared with
raz-
, while those shown in
rectangles are not. The central sense, repetition, is shown in a
double rectangle. The
graph structure shown here divides quite cleanly into two halves: the
subgraph on the
left, which is not shared with
raz-
, and that on the right, almost all of which is. The
links between senses are directed, indicating the direction in which I
am proposing
semantic extension took place. Traugott (1982) has argued for the
unidirectionality
of semantic change, in general from a concept concerning some state or
object de-
scription to a concept concerning the speaker's attitude. As we shall
see, some of
the links shown here represent extensions of this sort, e.g. the link
from small to
contempt.
Evidence for the senses shown here, and motivation for the links between them,
are presented below. Whenever possible, independent motivation for the various
links is adduced. As this work is preliminary in nature, not all of
the senses found
by Moravcsik (1978) and Nomura & Kiyomi (1993) are covered here, although some
new ones are, e.g. insect and bird. In addition, it may be the case
that some of the
particulars of the graph structure presented here are incorrect or
incomplete. A more
accurate model will have to await the incorporation of more data,
hopefully including
2
Page 4
= a sense shared with
raz-
= a sense not shared with
raz-
non-uniformity
intensity
completion
bird
contempt
aection
incrementality
continuity
insect
lack of specicity
plurality
lack of control
repetition
scatter
spread out,
baby
small
Figure 1: Radial category for the semantics of reduplication.
3
Page 5
historical data indicating the course of semantic extension of reduplication.
Repetition
English
boogie-woogie
Mongolian
bayn bayn
often, constantly
Sundanese
guguyon
to jest repeatedly (guyon - to jest)
Tzeltal
-pikpik
to touch it lightly repeatedly (-pik - to touch it lightly)
I take repetition as the central sense of reduplication. In choosing this as the
central sense, I dier from Nomura & Kiyomi (1993), who take an abstract notion
of replication as the center, which then gives rise to repetition (and
continuation) as
\replication across time", and plurality as \replication across
participants". I have
chosen repetition as the center primarily because it, unlike either
plurality or the
more abstract replication, is directly iconically grounded in the
repetition of the stem
in the linguistic form.
Plurality
The use of reduplication to express plurality is widespread, appearing
in Dakota,
Agta (Niepokuj 1991), Comox (Sapir 1915), the Australian language Djaru (Nomura
& Kiyomi 1993), Papago, Samoan, and numerous other languages (Moravcsik 1978).
There are several variations on this general theme, reduplication
sometimesexpressing
simple nominal plurality, sometimes plurality of verbal subject,
sometimes plurality
of verbal object, etc.
Plurality is closely related to the central sense, repetition, in that
the repetition
of the stem in reduplication results directly in plurality of the
number of times the
stem has been uttered.
Incrementality
Farsi
kam kam
gradually
Mongolian
tus tus
each separately, each individually (tus - this, this same)
Pal. Arabic swaysway
little by little (sway - a little)
Tangale
dodok-dodok
one by one (dodok - one)
Incrementality is related to repetition through a PART FOR WHOLE metonymy,
a conceptual link used widely throughout language. An example of this is the En-
glish expression
fteen head
, e.g. of cattle, in which the word
head
, a part of the
individual cow, is used metonymically to refer to the cow as a whole.
This metonymy
is applicable here since incrementality, the notion of performing some
action bit by
bit, involves the
repeated
application of some subpart of the overall action, gradually
4
Page 6
completing the action as a whole. Repetition is therefore a part of
the semantics of
incrementality, so the use of a form meaning repetition to also mean
incrementality
is well motivated metonymically.
Continuity
The use of reduplication to express continuity has been noticed by
many researchers.
Reduplication expresses continuative aspect in Tagalog (French 1988)
and Javanese
(Niepokuj 1991). In addition, the continuative sense of reduplication
is evident in
Iraqi Arabic
t
.
ant
.
an
(to buzz or hum), Hindi
kit kit
(monotonous droning on), and
arguably English
dilly-dally
.
The use of reduplication in the sense of continuity is easily
motivated from repetition
using the well-established MULTIPLICITY TO MASS image schema transformation
(Lako 1987:428). This transformation appears in many other aspects of language,
such as the polysemy of English
over
: one can say, for example,
The guards were
posted all over the hill
, implicitly viewing the multiple guards as a mass which covers
the hill. While this transformation is often used in reference to
physical mass and
multiplicity, it is here analogously used in the temporal domain:
continuity is the
mass form of repetition.
Insect
Azeri
mig
.
mig
.
a
mosquito
Comox
xwaxwadjom
y
Syr. Neoaramaic
'ir'ra
wasp
A number of languages have reduplicative names for buzzing insects. An intu-
itively appealing motivation for this is simply that these insects
make continuous
sounds, and this association provides a conceptual link from
continuity to insect. We
shall see a number of links below which are similarly motivated.
Bird
Atsugewi
qasqasa
crow
Comox
xopxop
humming-bird
English
cuckoo
Spanish
caracara
Tamil
kaka
crow
It is quite common for birds to have reduplicative names. The
motivation for this
is entirely analogous to the motivation for insects: birds often make
repetitive sounds,
providing a simple conceptual link from repetition to bird.
5
Page 7
Baby
English
baby
French
bebe
baby
Tamil
papa
baby
A number of languages use reduplicative nouns for the concept baby. This is
presumably the case because babies, like birds, often make repetitive
sounds, yielding
an associational link from repetition to baby.
In addition to this, and related to it, reduplication can be used to mark \baby
register", that register used when addressing babies. Consider for
example English
teeny-weeny, Georgie-Porgie
, and Farsi
rizeh-mizeh
(teeny-weeny,
rizeh
- little). There
is also the related use of reduplication to express aection, noted by
Moravcsik (1978)
and exemplied by Palestinian Arabic
Dandun
, the hypocoristic form of the name
Dina. This extension from baby to aection is the sort of unidirectional semantic
spread for which Traugott argues, from concrete reference to an
expression of the
speaker's attitude.
Small
Comox
djidjidis
little tooth (djidis - tooth)
English
tidbit
English
nitty-gritty
Farsi
rizeh-mizeh
teeny-weeny (rizeh - little)
The use of reduplication to express diminution, i.e. the concept
small, is fairly
widespread, and is noted by both Moravcsik (1978) and Niepokuj (1991). The link
from baby to small is motivated by the perceptually very salient fact
that babies are
small, and may well be the most conceptually salient class of small
things. The use
of linguistic forms meaning baby to also mean small is illustrated in
such English
sentences as
Look, a baby airplane
, meaning a small airplane.
Contempt
Bengali
bhethor-shethor
in, but that is insignicant (bhethor - in)
Dutch
mik-mak
worthless collection
English
claptrap
English
hillbilly
German
Pille-palle
insignicant things
Yiddish
layfen-shmayfen
running is beside the point (layfen - to run)
A number of languages use reduplication to express contempt, insignicance, or
irrelevance. This can be motivated via the metaphorical conceptual link POWER
6
Page 8
AND IMPORTANCE IS SIZE, linking small to contempt (Jurafsky 1993). Jurafsky,
in his work on the semantics of the diminutive, points out that this
metaphor can be
seen in the semantics of the English
-y
sux: while often used for diminution (e.g.
doggy
),
-y
can also express derogation or contempt (e.g.
limey
, a derogatory term
for an Englishman). This extension, like the extension from baby to
aection, is an
instance of directed semantic spread from the concretely referential
to the attitudinal.
Lack of Control
Bengali
ulat-palat
helter-skelter
Danish
misk-mask
mess, disorganized jumble
Dutch
schelle-belle
overly independent young woman
English
helter-skelter
Farsi
g
.
=
ti-p
=
ti
pell-mell
German
Remmidemmi
noisy event, e.g. party
Pal. Arabic
harj w marj
confusion, hubbub
Russian
tjap-ljap
anyhow, in a slipshod manner
Lack of control and disorder are expressed by reduplication in a number of lan-
guages; in addition to the ones shown above, Nomura & Kiyomi (1993)
cite examples
from the Bantu languages Southern Sotho, Luba-Shaba, and Ndengese. A plausible
motivation for this phenomenon springs from the fact that babies are
often out of
control, doing things we wish they wouldn't. This gives us a simple
associative link
from baby to lack of control.
Spread Out / Scatter
Japanese
tokorodokoro
scattered
Mongolian
aravgar-saravgar
spread out
Tamil
inge-ange
here and there
Uzbek
alang-jalang
looking around
The notion of scattering or spreading out is also often expressed by
reduplication.
Motivation for this can be found in the fact that lack of control can
cause scattering
or spreading out. The image of an out-of-control child throwing food around may
be helpful in making this association concrete. This link is also
highlighted in the
colloquial American English sentence
He's a very together person
, which uses a word
whose central sense is the opposite of dispersion or distension to
express self-control,
i.e. the opposite of lack of control. The English word
scatterbrained
makes use of
the same mapping. In these English examples the extension operates in the other
direction, in that they use lexemes indicating scattering (or lack
thereof) to denote
control (or lack thereof), while in reduplication the directionality
is reversed. They
do provide independent motivation for the existence of the link, however.
7
Page 9
There is an interesting phenomenon in Palestinian Arabic related to
this sense of
reduplication: many small sprinklable and hence scatterable foods have
reduplicative
names, e.g. pepper (
ll
), sesame (
simsim
), mint (
na'na'
), and crumbs (
fataf
it
).
While apricot (
mismis
) does not seem to t the general pattern at rst, it may be
signicant that in the Levant apricot is often beaten out at into
sheets, dried, and
sold in that form. This gives us an obvious connection to the sense of
spreading.
Lack of Specicity
Farsi
hulu-mulu
peaches and such (hulu - peach)
Latin
quisquis
whoever (quis - who)
Pal. Arabic
kaza-kaza
whatchamacallit
Sundanese
sahasaha
whoever (saha - who)
Lack of specicity is expressed by reduplication in a range of
languages, including
those shown above, Khasi and Turkish (Moravcsik 1978), Hindi, and Uzbek. The
motivation for this comes from lack of control, in that these examples
can be seen as
denoting lack of control in referential specicity, a sort of sloppy
uncontrolled scatter-
ing motion in semantic space, picking out a cluster of closely related
meanings rather
than just a single one. There appears to be an interesting areal
phenomenon encom-
passing Turkish, Uzbek, Farsi, and Hindi, in which the use of partial
reduplication
with the initial consonant of the stem altered to a labial in the
second occurrence de-
notes lack of specicity. Consider for example Turkish
kitap-mitap
(books and such,
kitap
- book), Uzbek
n
=
n-p
=
n
(bread and such,
n
=
n
- bread), Farsi
hulu-mulu
(peaches
and such,
hulu
- peach), and Hindi
kitab-vitab
(books and such,
kitab
- book).
Non-Uniformity
English
hodge-podge
German
zick-zack
zig-zag
Kurd. Neoaramaic
range-range
in several colors (range - color)
Tamil
ippo-appo
now and then
Non-uniformity is sometimes expressed by reduplication, as shown by the exam-
ples above. The primary motivation for this is the metaphor STATES ARE LOCA-
TIONS, which transforms physical scatteredness, or non-uniformity of
location, to
non-uniformity of state, taking us from scatter to non-uniformity.
This widely-used
metaphor can also be seen in such expressions as
They're moving toward reconcilia-
tion
, in which progress toward the abstract social state of reconciliation
is expressed
in terms of physical motion towards a goal. In addition to this
motivation, one could
imagine a link from plurality to non-uniformity, in that
non-uniformity implies a
plurality of dierent states.
8
Page 10
It is interesting to note that the sense of non-uniformity is often expressed by
non-uniformity of form, i.e. by partial rather than complete reduplication. Many
English reduplicatives with this sense seem to exhibit variance in
form between the
rst and second instantiations of the stem e.g.
mish-mash, hodge-podge, knick-knacks,
bric-a-brac, zig-zag
. This need not be the case in all languages of course; Neoaramaic
range-range
is a counterexample.
Intensity
English
a whole whole lot
Hindi
lal-lal
very red (lal - red)
Mongolian
araycaray
just barely (aray - barely)
Mongolian
ocnoon tocnoon
a great deal
Reduplication is often used to express intensity. In addition to the
examples listed
above, this sense appears in Dakota, Turkish, Dagur, Perak Malay,
Tangale (Niepokuj
1991), Sundanese, and Thai (Moravcsik 1978). There are at least two
possible sources
of motivation for this use. One of these is a link from plurality,
highlighted by the
English expressions
many thanks
(Moravcsik 1978) and
a thousand pardons
, in which
quantity is used to express intensity. The other is a link from spread
out, or perhaps
more accurately from the result of spreading out, from enlargement.
For example, we
can see from the Russian expression
bol'shoe spasibo
(literally, big thank-you) that
size can also be used to express intensity.
Completion
Completion is also sometimes expressed by reduplication. An example of this from
the Bantu language Ewondo is
b
=
-b
==
(to make/do completely), where
b
=
means to
make or do (Nomura & Kiyomi 1993). In addition, Moravcsik (1978) notes that
reduplication marks the perfect in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and Gothic.
A plausible
motivation for the use of reduplication in this sense stems from
intensity: performing
an action intensely can lead to completion of the overall action. For
example, working
intensely on a research project will tend to result in completion of
the project.
Discussion
There are a number of senses of reduplication I have not incorporated
into the radial
category presented here. Some are extremely rare, and are probably
best viewed as
aberrations, e.g. the use of nominal reduplication to express third
person singular
possession in Tarok (Niepokuj 1991:10). Others, such as the concept game are ap-
parently fairly widespread: consider English
ping-pong, pall-mall, tic-tac-toe
, Basque
(and now Spanish and English)
jai-alai
, Hindi
holi-koli
, and
ses-bes
, a Levantine vari-
9
Page 11
ety of backgammon.
1
Senses such as this one, and the numerous others already noted
by other researchers, are common enough that their inclusion in the
radial category
would be required for a more complete account of the semantics of reduplication.
Another serious aw in the work as it currently stands is that its
coverage of the
world's languages is quite limited.
Despite these and no doubt a number of other shortcomings, I hope that this
analysis provides some explanatory insight into the polysemous
structure of redupli-
cation, and helps to make sense of an initially rather random-seeming
welter of data.
In many cases, the conceptual links between senses can be
independently motivated
by non-reduplicative data, and in some cases they are in keeping with
the previously
observed tendency of unidirectional semantic extension from the
concrete to the at-
titudinal. Perhaps the most satisfying aspect of a model of this sort,
however, is that
it makes concrete and falsiable predictions. Following Pederson
(1991), if we view
the universal radial category for reduplication as not only an
indication of universally
sanctioned synchronic structure, but also one of historical semantic
development, pre-
dictions arise from the structure of the graph itself. Specically, if
we view the graph
as a trace of semantic extension over time, we would predict that any
language in
which reduplication expresses some peripheral sense would also have,
or at some time
have had, reduplicative terms expressing the central sense of
repetition, along with all
intervening senses on a path from the center to the peripheral node in
question. For
example, we would predict that if a language uses reduplication to
express spread out,
it would also use, or have used, reduplication to express repetition,
baby (presumably
including baby register), and lack of control, as these concepts lie
on the only path
from the central sense repetition to spread out. While the work is
still somewhat
speculative in nature, the process of trying to falsify the
predictions generated by the
model as it stands should prove helpful in constructing a more accurate model.
2 The Semantics of the Russian Verbal Prex
raz-
The radial category for reduplication shares a number of interconnected concepts
with the radial category for the Russian verbal prex
raz-
. This can be seen from
Figure 2, which illustrates some of the more frequently attested senses of
raz-
, and
the links between them. We have already seen most of these from our look at the
semantics of reduplication. In particular, the senses shown in
ellipses are shared
with reduplication, while those shown in rectangles are not. Roughly
the same radial
1
This last example is particularly intriguing. After throwing the dice
it is customary to call out
the numbers that appear, and in the Arabophone Levant this is done in
Farsi for almost all pairs
of numbers. A notable exception is the pair six-ve. In this case, the
six is called out in Farsi
(
ses
) but the ve is called out in Turkish (
bes
), and the game is named after this combination. It is
at least possible that this departure from the use of Farsi alone is
the result of coercing the name
of the game into a reduplicative template, done presumably because of
some as-yet-undetermined
conceptual link indicating that games are appropriately named using
reduplication.
10
Page 12
intensity
completion
= a sense not shared with reduplication
= a sense shared with reduplication
non-uniformity
spread out,
scatter
lack of control
analysis
split
Figure 2: Radial category for the Russian verbal prex
raz-
.
11
Page 13
category of senses seems to hold for the use of
raz-
in some other Slavic languages.
Intriguingly, Atanasova
et al.
(1992) list \harum-scarum" as the meaning of Bulgarian
razvej-prax
, highlighting the semantic overlap between
raz-
and reduplication with
which we are concerned here.
This sharing of structure is signicant since it suggests that the
concepts and the
links between them are not peculiar to reduplication, or to
raz-
, but are rather part of a
universal core conceptual network, subsections of which may be
expressed by various
linguistic constructs. The idea then is that the radial categories for
reduplication
and
raz-
simply give us snapshots of subregions within a much larger conceptual
network, and the radial category overlap gives us an indication of how
the snapshots
t together.
I take the central sense of
raz-
to be spread out, scatter. From here, there are links
to the non-shared senses of split and analysis, as well as conceptual
links we have al-
ready discussed leading to intensity, completion, non-uniformity, and
lack of control.
In all cases except one, these links are of the same directionality as
the corresponding
links we saw in the radial category for reduplication. The exception
is the link from
spread out, scatter to lack of control. I take the fact that the same
link appears with
two directionalities in the two radial graphs as evidence of an underlying
bidirection-
ally sanctioned
link between the two concepts, that is, a link in the overall conceptual
network which will allow semantic extension to travel across it in
either direction. It
is critical to draw a distinction between the directionality of
semantic extension from
one concept to another
as posited for a particular linguistic form such as reduplica-
tion
, and the directionality which that link in the overall conceptual network may
assume in general. Traugott's work suggests that some links will be
unidirectional
not only from the point of view of radial categories for individual
linguistic forms,
but in the overall conceptual network generally. Others however, such
as the one in
question here, may be potentially bidirectional.
I present below a number of examples of the use of
raz-
in its various senses.
Since all links except the ones from spread out to split and from
split to analysis have
already been discussed, I shall motivate only these two.
Spread Out / Scatter
razgonjat'
to disperse
razmetat'
to scatter (s.t.); to spread (s.t.) out
raznosit'sja
to spread
raskidyvat'
to scatter; spread
rasprostranjat'
to spread, distribute
rasseivat'
to disperse, scatter
rassredotochivat'
to disperse
rasstilat'
to spread
12
Page 14
Lack of Control
razbushevat'sja
to rage, get violent, start lashing out
razvolnovat'
to upset (s.o.)
razlazhivat'sja
to go wrong
razmechtat'sja
to be lost in dreams
razozlit'sja
to get furious
razrydat'sja
to burst into sobs
raskapriznichat'sja
to become very naughty, act up
rasserdit'
to annoy, to make angry
Split
razgorazhivat'
to partition (s.t.)
razgryzat'
to bite (s.t.) in two
razdvaivat'
to divide (s.t.) into two, split in two
razdeljat'sja
to break up, split up
razluchat'
to separate
raznimat'
to part; to separate
Split can be motivated by viewing it as a special case of scatter:
when the number
of objects to be scattered is two, to scatter is to split or separate.
Analysis
razgljadyvat'
to examine
razdumyvat'
to think, ponder
razlichat'
to make out, discern; to distinguish between
rassledovat'
to investigate, inquire into
rassmatrivat'
to consider, examine
rassuzhdat'
to reason
rasschityvat'
to calculate
These words appear to have in common a semantic elementof analysis. This can be
motivated from split through the metaphor MENTAL OBJECTS ARE PHYSICAL
OBJECTS, evidenced in the English phrase
tossing a few ideas around
. To analyze,
then, is to separate and be able to distinguish between mental
objects, much as to
split is to separate physical objects.
13
Page 15
Non-Uniformity
razdumat'
to change one's mind
razlichat'sja
to dier, be distinguished
raznit'sja
to dier
raznoobrazit'
to diversify
raskhodit'sja
to disagree, dier
Intensity
razbalivat'sja
to be or become properly ill
razobidet'sja
to take great oense (obidet'sja - to be oended)
raskaljat'
to make scorching hot
rasshalit'sja
to get very playful
Completion
raskupat'
to buy up
raspivat'
to empty a bottle drinking
razgadyvat'
to solve; to get to the bottom of
razljubit'
to stop loving
razrjazhat'sja
to run down, be used up
razygryvat'
to bring to a conclusion
In addition to the examples of completion shown above,
raz-
can be used as a
perfective marker; e.g.
rasserdit'sja
is the perfective form of
serdit'sja
(to become
angry). It is presumably noncoincidental that this verb has a
semantics involving
lack of control, another sense of
raz-
. I have not yet determined whether all Russian
verbs which take
raz-
as a perfective marker have a base semantics implicating one of
the senses listed above.
3 Conclusions
The striking cross-linguistic regularities which appear in the
semantics of redupli-
cation can be explained through the construction of a universal radial
category of
concepts, following Pederson (1991). This radial category may be
interpreted as in-
dicating not only synchronic relations between the various senses of
reduplication,
but also a possible historical trace of semantic extension from the
central sense of
repetition out to senses whose motivation is less obvious.
Importantly, it is not the
case that each language must have each sense shown in the graph;
however, the graph
does predict which senses enable extension to which others. Thus, the
model will pre-
14
Page 16
dict that any language which uses reduplication to express a
peripheral sense will also
use reduplication (or have used it at some time in its past) to
express all senses on a
path from the central sense to the sense in question.
In general, this work will have been successful to the extent that it lends some
explanatory coherence to what would otherwise be a rather
haphazard-seeming set of
cross-linguistic regularities.
Interestingly, the semantics of reduplication and the semantics of the Russian
verbal prex
raz-
overlap to a surprising degree: an entire subsystem of concepts
and links is shared. The signicance of this shared conceptual
structure is that it
suggests the existence of a single unied conceptual network, such that
the the radial
categories for reduplication and
raz-
are simply overlapping subregions in this larger
network.
This study has been exploratory and preliminary in nature; much remains to be
done. To buttress claims of universality, more languages must be examined, from
dierent language families. Currently unattached senses of reduplication such as
game must be incorporated into the radial category. And perhaps most
importantly,
the predictions implicitly made by the graph structure of the
universal radial category
for reduplication must be empirically tested. I leave these tasks for
future research.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to my informants: Dina Aburous (Palestinian Arabic), Lone Hansen
(Danish), Dirk Geeraerts (Dutch), Nasir Kanbarov (Uzbek), Naghmeh Mirghafori
(Farsi), Srini Narayanan (Bengali, Hindi, Tamil), Michael Rehse
(German), Lokendra
Shastri (Hindi), Andreas Stolcke (German), and Len Talmy (Atsugewi, Yiddish).
Thanks also to Dan Jurafsky, Srini Narayanan, Clay Scott, Len Talmy, and Nancy
Urban for enjoyable and helpful conversations related to this work.
Tzeltal data from Berlin (1963), seen in (Moravcsik 1978); Tangale data from
Kidda (1985), seen in (Niepokuj 1991); Sundanese data from Robins (1959); Az-
eri data from Haneda & Ganjelu (1979); French data from Mansion (1991); Iraqi
Arabic data from Erwin (1963); Mongolian data from Bosson (1964); Japanese data
from Matsuda (1974); Kurdish Neoaramaic data from Krotko (1982); Latin data
from Glare (1983); Syrian Neoaramaic data from Spitaler (1938);
Turkish data from
Moravcsik (1978); Comox data from Sapir (1915); Russian data from Taube
et al.
(1987).
References
Atanasova, T.
,
M. Rankova
, &
V. Filipov
. 1992.
Bulgarian-English Dictionary
.
Soa: Izdatelska Kushta VEZNI-4.
15
Page 17
Berlin, Brent
. 1963. Some semantic features of reduplication in Tzeltal.
Interna-
tional Journal of American Linguistics
29.211{218.
Bosson, James E.
1964.
Modern Mongolian { A Primer and Reader
. Bloomington,
Indiana: Indiana University Publications. Uralic and Altaic Series, volume 38.
Erwin, Wallace M.
1963.
A Short Reference Grammar of Iraqi Arabic
. Washing-
ton DC: Georgetown University Press. Arabic Series, number 4.
French, Koleen Matsuda
. 1988.
Insights into Tagalog: Reduplication, Inxation,
and Stress from Nonlinear Phonology
. Arlington, Texas: Summer Institute for
Linguistics and University of Texas at Arlington.
Glare, P. G. W.
1983.
Oxford Latin Dictionary
. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Haneda, Koichi
, &
Ali Ganjelu
. 1979.
Tabrizi Vocabulary: An Azeri-Turkish
Dialect in Iran
. Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of
Asia and Africa.
Jurafsky, Daniel
. 1993. Universals in the semantics of the diminutive. In
Pro-
ceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society
.
University of California, Berkeley.
Kidda, M.
, 1985. Tangale phonology: a descriptive analysis. Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Illinois.
Krotkoff, Georg
. 1982.
A Neo-Aramaic Dialect of Kurdistan: Texts, Grammar,
and Vocabulary
. New Haven, Connecticut: American Oriental Society.
Lakoff, George
. 1987.
Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories
Reveal about the Mind
. University of Chicago Press.
Mansion, J. E.
1991.
Harrap's Standard French and English Dictionary
. London:
Harrap Books.
Matsuda, Koh
.
1974.
Kenkyusha's Japanese-English Dictionary
.
Tokyo:
Kenkyusha.
Moravcsik, Edith
. 1978. Reduplicative constructions. In
Universals of Human
Language
, ed. by Joseph H. Greenberg, 297{334. Stanford University Press, Stan-
ford, California.
Niepokuj, Mary Katherine
, 1991. The historical development of reduplication,
with special reference to Indo-European. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley.
16
Page 18
Nikiforidou, Kiki
. 1991. The meanings of the genitive: a case study in semantic
structure and semantic change.
Cognitive Linguistics
2.149{205.
Nomura, Masuhiro
, &
Setsuko Kiyomi
, 1993. How to motivate the meanings of
verbal reduplication: Cognitive and typological perspectives. Handout at Berke-
ley/UCSD cognitive linguistics workshop, University of California, San Diego.
Pederson, Eric William
, 1991. Subtle semantics: universals in the polysemy of
reexiveand causative constructions. Ph.D. dissertation, Universityof California,
Berkeley.
Robins, R. H.
1959. Nominal and verbal derivation in Sundanese.
Lingua
8.337{369.
Sapir, Edward
. 1915.
Noun Reduplication in Comox, a Salish Language of Vancou-
ver Island
. Ottowa, Canada: Government Printing Bureau. Canada Department
of Mines, Geological Survey, Anthropological Series, number 6, memoir 63.
Spitaler, Anton
. 1938.
Grammatik des Neuaramaischen Dialekts von Ma'lula
(Antilibanon)
. Leipzig: Deutsche Morgenlandische Gesellschaft.
Taube, A. M.
,
I. W. Litvinova
,
A. D. Miller
, &
R. C. Daglish
. 1987.
Russian-English Dictionary
. Moscow: Russky Yazyk Publishers.
Traugott, Elizabeth Closs
. 1982. From propositional to textual and expressive
meanings: some semantic-pragmatic aspects of grammaticalization. In
Perspec-
tives on Historical Linguistics
, ed. by Winfred P. Lehmann & Yakov Malkiel,
245{271, Amsterdam. Benjamins.
17