No subject

Brian M Ganter bmganter at acsu.buffalo.edu
Tue Apr 22 01:55:13 MDT 1997




************************************
The Revolutionary Marxist Collective





                        Critique as Radical Praxis, Pt. 2
        
                                Bob Nowlan




************************************

RED NET TEXTS


************************************

In the RED NET TEXTS, we start a series that will introduce issues we
think are at the moment missing from the net-left discussions: issues that
are part of any serious Marxist understanding of the social -- questions
of sexism, postcolonialism, homophobia... and we begin our series by
discussing the mode of our discourse: critique.  We make a distinction
between CRITIQUE and CRITICISM and argue for a materialist critique as a
mode of social analysis.  At the end of each set of texts we will hold a
CYBERFORUM for critique of our texts by all interested persons and the
writers of these texts will engage the critiques. Our first CYBERFORUM
will be on questions related to sexism and sexual harassment and will be
held after publication of Jennifer Cotter's text on "Sexual Harassment
as/and Invention".

*******************************************************************************



(Continued from RED-NET: TEXT TWO)



        In addition to non-critical criticism, I think it is useful also
to distinguish another mode of evaluative praxis from genuinely "critical
criticism," and this is what I call anti-critical criticism. 
Anti-critical criticism does provide an explanation for the judgement it
makes, and yet this is an explanation which is not only so abstract but
also so partial and limited as to provide little real explanation at all:
anti-critical criticism typically marshals sweepingly simplistic and
reductive -- and usually transhistorically essentialist -- kinds of
reasoning and evidence to support its claims.  A common anti-critical
argument against socialism is that socialism is impossible because it runs
contrary to human nature: human beings are, supposedly, by nature
hopelessly and inevitably, always (already and forever) essentially
uncooperatively competitive, selfishly greedy, and cruelly and callously
corrupt.  This argument usually involves citing the entirety of hitherto
recorded human history as proof without realizing that this history has
not been so monolithically anti-socialistic, and, furthermore, that even
if this were the case, what is and what has been is not necessarily what
will or must be. 


        A critique attempts to judge its object on the basis of an
accurate interpretation of what this object really is and does.  This
means that a critique aims to be scientific: it seeks to determine
precisely what the object is and does, how so, and for what.  Such a
determination enables the critic not only to recognize the problems and
the limitations inherent in the object forwhat and for how serious they
really are, but also to recognize the contradictions inherent within the
object that provide the source both of these problems and limitations and
of a possible solution to these problems and an overcoming of these
limitations by means of a development and transformation of possibilities
inherent within the object of critique itself.  A critique of capitalism,
for example, will look to the principal contradictions of capitalism
(especially the fundamental contradiction of capitalism, the contradiction
between socialization of the forces of production and privatization of
relations of production) to explain both the problems and limitations of
capitalism (especially the determinate relation, within and across global
capitalism, between a very few who enjoy sumptuous wealth and a great many
who suffer miserable poverty) and the basis upon which these problems can
be solved and these limitations overcome through a resolution of these
contradictions, and thereby a transformation and supersession of
capitalism (especially through the expropriation and redistribution of
private wealth as the wealth of the collective whole). 
  

        A critique should be both objective and interested.  It should be
objective insofar as it seeks to determine what is true and what is not
about its object.  It should be interested insofar as its aim is not
simply to explain what is and is not, but rather to point the way towards
the most radically progressive possible resolution of the contradictions
(and thereby the most radically progressive possible solution of the
problems and overcoming of the limitations) inherent in this object. 
Critique is motivated by a concern to intervene in, effect, and (re)direct
the course of change -- change both in and of the object, and change in
what the object effects as it changes.  A critique, therefore, not only
seeks the truth about its object, but also seeks to make use of this
discernment of what is and is not true as a foundation upon which to
advance a radical political agenda in relation to what should be done with
or about its object so as to enable radical political ends and interests,
and the ultimate end and interest of radical praxis is to enable
transformation of the structural foundations of the existing social system
so as to enable an exponential leap forward in the realization of human
emancipation, collective equality, social justice, and ecological harmony.


        The first stage of critique involves determination of the meaning
of the object of critique.  The meaning of an object refers to what that
object is and does.  The meaning of an object is a unity of its content
(what it is about), its form (how it goes about this), and its purpose or
function (why it goes about this, and why in this way).  As an object can
be and do many different things in many different ways for many different
ends as part of many different relations and processes, it can mean many
different things, and yet it is important to understand that meaning
refers to what an object truly is and does -- meaning refers to what is
objectively real about an object.  The different meanings that adhere to a
single object always refer to what are different aspects or dimensions of
its objectively real existence within different relations and as part of
different processes.  Meaning is, therefore, different from signification: 
>from what an object is understood to mean, what the object "signifies." 
What people think and feel about an object, even about its relation to
themselves, may or may not be true. Meaning refers to what is objectively
real and signification to what is subjectively imagined to be real.  For
example, many workers for capitalist corporations do not think they are
exploited and do not feel alienated and yet they are both.  What working
for capital signifies to these workers is therefore not what it actually
means.


        Interpretation of meaning is much more complex than merely
discerning what is objectively real from what is subjectively imagined to
be real.  Meaning must be understood concretely.  This means that it is
necessary to study the meaning of an object in context.  In other words,
because an object "is"  something, moreover, ultimately only in and
through the various real relations and processes in which it really "does"
something, an object is only meaningful, therefore, in context, and a
critique should always seek to determine the meaning of an object by
inquiring into what the object does in the context of its precise, real
location(s) within an historically concrete society. 


        Recognition of the multiplicity of meaning should not, however, be
misunderstood in a relativist fashion: it is necessary to recognize the
meaning of an object refers not only to the concrete forms of appearance
of the object, its concrete manifestations in particular concrete
situations, but also to its abstract essence (which unites in common, and
more preciselygoverns, the ways, and the range of ways, in which the
object manifests itself concretely), and to the mediations (connections
and transformations) which link the essence of the object with its various
concrete forms of appearance.  The meaning of capitalism, for example,
involves reference not only to what capitalism looks like at very
particular places and times, but also to what are the fundamental laws of
motion of capitalism in general, and to the ways these laws of motion are
mediated through the uneven development of these laws of motion within and
between various nations and regions, branches and sectors, and industries
and firms.


        It is, in fact, useful to inquire into the meaning of an object as
it exists on -- and across -- multiple, different levels of natural and
social reality. I suggest investigating the meaning of an object as it
exists on seven general levels of meaning, inquiring into what are its
specific locations, and what are its specific functions and significances,
within and as a part of what specific relations and processes on each of
these levels of meaning. Allow me to illustrate with the example of
"capitalism" once more:

LEVEL OF MEANING 1: What does capitalism mean -- what are its specific
forms and effects -- at the level of what is uniquely particular about the
present conjuncture, the immediately here and now, i.e. in late capitalist
america today? 

LEVEL OF MEANING 2: What does capitalism mean -- what are its specific
forms and effects -- at the level of what is uniquely particular to the
present stage in its historical development and transformation, i.e. in
late capitalism? 

LEVEL OF MEANING 3: What does capitalism mean at the level of what is
uniquely particular to capitalism in general as a dominant mode of social
organization, as a dominant mode of articulation of the forces and
relations of social production?

LEVEL OF MEANING 4: What does capitalism mean at the level of its place
within the history of class society in general? 

LEVEL OF MEANING 5: What does capitalism mean at the level of its place
within the history of human society in general? 

LEVEL OF MEANING 6: What does capitalism mean at the level of its place
within the (history of the) animal world in general? 

LEVEL OF MEANING 7: What does capitalism mean at the level of its place
within (the history of) nature in general? 


        Of course, both within and between each of these levels of
meaning, many other "sub-levels" are possible as well.  What is important
is that the critic indicate clearly at what level(s) of generality and
particularity (and of abstractness and concreteness) she is working in
explaining what an object means.  Moreover, it is also important that she
indicate what particular aspects or dimensions of reality she is concerned
with at these levels and sublevels and from what particular vantage
point(s) or perspective(s) she is focussing upon what her object of
critique means in relation to these aspects and dimensions of reality at
these levels and sublevels of meaning.  The importance of working at (or
across) different levels and sublevels of meaning, focussing upon
different aspects and dimensions of reality at these different levels and
sublevels, and working from (and moving between)  different vantage points
will vary both from one kind of object of critique to another kind of
object of critique, and according to what objective the critic seeks to
accomplish in and through her critique.  A critique of how and why
"capitalism sucks," for instance, will probably want to explain how and
why capitalism is dependent upon the perpetuation of exploitation and
alienation of working class productive and reproductive activity.  This
kind of critique will probably want to work not only at level one, but
also level two and level three; it will probably want to focus not only
upon economic relations but also upon forms of consciousness and the
relations -- and mediations -- between the two; and it will probably want
to examine capitalist alienation and exploitation from the vantage points
of both "subject" (under capitalism) and "structure" (of capitalism), of
both capitalist and proletarian, of both capitalist ideology and
anti-capitalist ideology, and of both capitalist subjectivity and
anti-capitalist subjectivity. 


        In all cases, it is always important to realize that what an
object is and does within and as a part of any particular relation or
process -- and therefore also what it means on any level and sublevel, in
relation to any aspect or dimension of reality, and from any vantage point
or perspective -- is always, in actuality, not only multiple but also
contradictory.  It is particularly important, for instance, in critiquing
capitalism to be able to assess what contribution capitalism has made to
the "universal" development of humanity -- to progress in the development
of human culture and civilization -- versus what is "independent" of this
universal development and, as such, functions to maintain and reproduce
capitalism rather than to push forward through and beyond capitalism:
here, of course, the tendency of capitalism to support socialization of
the process of (social) production is "universal" while the tendency of
capitalism to maintain and even greatly expand the privatization of
ownership in the means and ends of (social)  production is "independent." 


        The actual evaluation -- the judgement -- of the object of
critique develops immediately out of the interpretation of what the object
means: critical evaluation involves assessing the object's problems and
limitations in relation to the contradictions inherent within the object
which both give rise to these and to the possibility of their
supersession.  Interpretation should have already prepared the way for the
first step in this second stage of critique: determination of what are the
principal -- and the most serious -- problems and limitations in what the
object of critique is and in what it does.  What is necessary here is for
the critic to account for what she seizes upon as (the most serious)
problems and limitations by explaining from what vantage point, according
to what standards for evaluation (of importance and seriousness), and in
relation to the advancement of what ends and the service of what interests
these problems are (such important and serious)  problems and these
limitations are (such important and serious) limitations.  In the case of
capitalism, of course, she would explain her commitment towards finding
the way past the exploitation and alienation of labor -- and the resulting
destruction and dehumanization of life -- which she has already shown is
intrinsically indispensable to the normal workings of capitalism itself.


    Because critical evaluation is not interested in merely stopping with
determination of what is "bad" about or "wrong" with its object, it is
necessary to move from this point to investigate the real possibilities --
in the real struggle of real forces and tendencies -- for resolution of
the principal contradictions inherent within the object that provide the
source of its problems and limitations.  This requires a very precisely
concrete analysis of what are and are not possible and useful sites of
prospective intervention in this struggle so as to push these
contradictions towards crisis and to strengthen the forces and tendencies
representative of the most radically progressive resolution of these
contradictions at -- and beyond -- their development to the point of
crisis (the point in which a fundamental change in the balance or
configuration of opposing forces must occur because the possibility of a
continuation of the status quo has been exhausted). Upon the basis of such
a concrete analysis, then, it is the final aim of the critique to
intervene exactly as possible and as useful, where possible and where
useful, both to push forward the contradictions in its object further
towards crisis and to push forward the most radically progressive
tendencies for resolution of these contradictions at and beyond this point
of crisis. The critic pushes the most radically progressive tendencies
more strongly to the fore(front), and pushes these over and against
competing counter-tendencies which she at the same time attempts to push
back, disrupt, and subvert.  In the case of late capitalist american
politics today, it is, in particular, necessary for the radical critic of
capitalism to push forward, expand, enrich, and work towards the full
realization of the tendencies already inherent within late capitalist
america towards collectivization -- and these are tendencies towards
collectivization not only of relations within production but also towards
collectivization of relations which precede and follow from production and
which extend out of and beyond production, including tendencies towards
the supersession of predominantly private with predominantly collective
modes of subjectivity. 

        In general, it is important for the radical critic to support
collectivization against privatization and to push towards the
(proto)socialist democratization of collective relations begun under
capitalism.  In the concrete reality of late capitalist america today,
this also means sharply opposing tendencies supportive of the currently
ongoing post-collectivist re-privatization of social welfare
("post-collectivist"  re-privatization in the sense of movement towards
re-privatization both "after" and "against" the establishment of a minimal
welfare state as a "norm" within "modern" and "advanced" capitalist
society).




(Forthcoming: Critique as Radical Praxis, Pt. 3)



     --- from list marxism-thaxis at lists.village.virginia.edu ---




More information about the Marxism-Thaxis mailing list