From leigh at totalpc.co.zw Thu Sep 3 05:15:23 2009 From: leigh at totalpc.co.zw (Leigh Price) Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 13:15:23 +0200 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS In-Reply-To: <4A93D2B7.3090303@gmx.net> References: <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> <4A93D2B7.3090303@gmx.net> Message-ID: <14D7108B324C4E0DB407347A3305FA25@leighlaptop> Hello again, and many thanks for everyone's contributions Sorry to take so long to reply but I live in Zimbabwe where email can be erratic and only yesterday managed to get back online. Echna was careful to say that he had not read all of Latour. His critique of Latour's earlier work is quite justifiable. However, Latour's more recent work was surprisingly unsympathetic towards the constructivist turn. For example, you may be interested to know that Latour gave a keynote address at Keele University in 1997 entitled "On Recalling ANT", in which he describes ANT as 'managerial, engineering, Machiavellian, demiurgic'. Basically, he felt that ANT, as it was being largely interpreted, was susceptible to the critique of being demiurgic on the one hand and resulting in the death of man on the other. By this I assume he means the oscillation between voluntarism (demiurgic tendency) and determinism (death of man tendency) that Bhaskar described in his lead up to giving his Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA). Latour was concerned that 'actor' was being given the role of agency and 'network' that of structure, magically turning one into the other like the social construction theory of Berger and Luckman. I agree that Bhaskar's TMSA conception is clearer and better justified that Latour's circulating actor network, but they do seem similar to me. As did Giddens and Bhaskar, Latour sees the actors and the networks (individuals and society?) as both being connected and influencing each other, but unlike Giddens and similar to Bhaskar, Latour insists on the historicity of the process. Also, Latour describes the way that the social can 'travel endlessly without encountering the micro-level' (individuals?), which seems similar to Bhaskar's TMSA diagram in which society and individuals are on parallel tracks. They are distinct, autonomously causally efficacious, yet closely related, transforming and reproducing each other. By definition, parallel lines can travel endlessly but never encounter each other. Diagrammatically, then, Bhaskar has used a similar metaphor to Latour's verbal metaphor of 'travelling endlessly without encountering each other' (but nevertheless aeffecting each other). Despite this similarity, what then throws the realist is Latour's statement that the social 'is turned from a province of reality to a circulation'. I understand why he says this, he wants to avoid social determinism, however, it is an undeniably uncritical realist statement. But this paper was written in 1997 and by 2004, Latour was to critique himself and his followers even further and to revindicate reality. He wrote a paper 'Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern' (Critical Inquiry 30, 2004). I hope the quote that follows is not too long, but I wanted to give you an idea of how worried Latour was by the way his work was being used...worried enough to admit he perhaps he 'did not mean what he said' (Bhaskar has also said of Derrida, that he probably 'did not mean what he said'). "While we spend years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind the appearance of objective statements, do we now have to reveal the real objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of prejudices? And yet entire Ph.D programs are still running to make sure that good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up (...) that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak from a standpoint and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very same argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could save our lives. Was I wrong to participate in this invention of this field known as science studies? Is it enough to say that we did not really mean what we said? Why does it burn my tongue to say that global warming is a fact whether you like it or not? Why can't I simply say that the argument is closed for good? Should I reassure myself by simply saying that the bad guys can use any weapon at hand, naturalized facts when it suits them and social construction when it suits them? Should we apologise for having been wrong all the time? (...) Or should we do a bit of soul-searching here: what were we really after when we were so intent on showing the scientific construction of facts?" Later Latour also writes: "My argument is that a certain form of critical spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the wrong enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong sort of allies because of a little mistake in the definition of its main target. The question was never to get away from facts, but closer to them, not fighting empiricism but renewing empiricism". Latour also argues that we need to "cultivate a stubbornly realist attitude". He says that "The mistake we made, the mistake I made, was to believe there was no efficient way to criticise matters of fact except by moving away from them and directing attention toward the conditions that made them possible". The reason I have gone to this trouble to show Latour's move from irrealism to realism (but not the na?ve realism of typical scientistic empiricism) is because I would like to encourage critical realists not to quickly throw out the baby with the bathwater, so to speak, when they decide to disregard Latour's work. The reason we might want to engage with the work of Latour or Donna Haraway (also a professed non realist) is because they have spent years trying to understand how language can be used in a Machiavellian way to oppress people. Bhaskar talks about oppressive demi-reality, and I suspect that it is this demi-reality that these thinkers are engaging with, albeit they say it is unreal. It is demi-reality which most needs our attention right now, if we are to facilitate a move towards the flourishing of humankind. There are other similarities between Latour and Critical Realism, such as his objection to polemical debate and his talk about the oscillation between naturalised facts and social construction (which reminds me of Sayer's concept of the pomo flips). I think his humility in being able to adjust his ideas in the face of contradictions, and his attempt to try and make his ideas more inclusive (of totality), is a brilliant model of Critical Realist praxis. We may not agree with everything Latour says, but we can learn a lot from his humble academic process which, in allowing for the possibility of mistake, gets him closer to an adequate conception. His ability to admit the inadequacy of his early writing also shows that Khun was wrong about how tightly academics cling to their theories... Mark Johnson was interested in the way that constructivism seems to be quite humane, as it seems to avoid strong arguments about rightness and wrongness. However, as Latour shows, even extremists/fundamentalists can now make use of constructivism (e.g. we have fundamentalist Capitalists arguing that global warming is just a construct). I have written too much already, but Latour offers a way to be critical without being polemical. As far as our efforts to bring credibility to CR goes, to have a main architect of the extreme social constructivist movement provide such critique of that discipline, and to have that critique include a revindication of realism, lends powerful support to our realist position. However, this is not to say that Latour's position is as complete as Bhaskar's (for example, as someone wrote earlier, it does not have a conception of the stratification of reality). Again, apologies that my contribution has taken so long to be returned. Best wishes, Leigh -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna Sent: 25 August 2009 14:02 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS Hi David, hi all, first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your mail when you state that Latour?s position can?t be reconciled - it is just contradictory. I don?t know all of Latour?s work, but for example in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn?s contradictory sentence that scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don?t do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an "ontological tension", as one can?t talk about ontology in purely epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in general. The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I don?t know all of Latour?s work (or I am misstaken about his theory - but one last thing: Latour?s very essayistic and loose style is not really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more confusion) best, e d.eldervass at ntlworld.com schrieb: > Hi Echna, and listers! > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a touch more coherently. > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empirical' (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observed by human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon known as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theorised by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it was observed, but we just didn't know about it. > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll suggest some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an authority on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructivism in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanities) has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on reflection. > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a very odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scientists observe and theorise them? > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on the categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We can never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filtered through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, but to the world-as-we-experience-it. > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social constructionists argue that these are social products, and although Latour rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be taken as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists employ rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical work, then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientists change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us of the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by science, therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence of this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our 'world'. > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for sure whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way of making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made within the constructivist tradition. > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excellent book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge') that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but they are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enable us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about our environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those in which our perceptual abilities developed). > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influence on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on our perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the world-in-itself. > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that the descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves strongly influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite of the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, I have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainly misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also some recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This is arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts to approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including inanimate objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other to produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about the phases of Venus. > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome views on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to make sense of Latour's ontology. > > Best, > > Dave > > > > ---- d.eldervass at ntlworld.com wrote: > >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. >> > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existing external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't have any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is difficult to make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. He seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinction is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps = 'the phenomenal world' thought interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as if the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no piont in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed to depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as our cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of the world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in that world. > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! > > best > > Dave > > > > ---- b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw wrote: > >> Hi Echna, >> > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may > be helpful too. > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency > in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): > 455-73. > > Best wishes, > Poe > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > Department of Sociology > National Taiwan University > > > ?? Matthew Smith : > > >> Hi Echna, >> >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: >> http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-theo.pdf). I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literature (here: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=981817881&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently don't have it online or accessible from where I currently >> am. >> >> >> Best, >> Matthew >> >> >> ----- Message initial ---- >> De : echna >> ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> >> Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS >> >> Hi all, >> >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whole >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the list). >> >> best wishes, >> e >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From Clive.Lawson at econ.cam.ac.uk Thu Sep 3 06:16:51 2009 From: Clive.Lawson at econ.cam.ac.uk (Clive.Lawson at econ.cam.ac.uk) Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 12:16:51 +0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS Message-ID: <3BEE2011430@econ.cam.ac.uk> I am now away until early September. I will try to read mail when I can, but many apologies for long delays in replying. Clive From rgroff at slu.edu Thu Sep 3 06:26:04 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 07:26:04 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS In-Reply-To: <14D7108B324C4E0DB407347A3305FA25@leighlaptop> References: <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> <4A93D2B7.3090303@gmx.net> <14D7108B324C4E0DB407347A3305FA25@leighlaptop> Message-ID: <6ad241360909030526q137430fdweb30fafafb0eb3f2@mail.gmail.com> Hi all, Leigh thanks for this latest thoughtful post. I have only a small thing to say, but I think it's important. It's something like this: Latour may or may not be an important intellectual resource, but even assuming that he is, it seems to me that more generally critical realists should be wary about equating thinkers too quickly, * merely* on the basis of being a fallibilist, say, or being a realist of some sort. I mean LOTS of people in the history of philosophy fit into those categories. They're too big, I think, those categories. I haven't read any Latour but I met him once when he came and gave a talk and then there was a little dinner for him after. He was talking about Aristotle and about rhetoric, and perhaps even friendship (as Aristotle does), and about forms of reason -- but not a word about *phronesis*, Aristotle's term for the kind of reason involved in making (non-apodeictic) moral judgments about what to do. It was such a curious thing, given what he was trying to say. He seemed intrigued, when I asked him why. Ok, back to lurking. r. On Thu, Sep 3, 2009 at 6:15 AM, Leigh Price wrote: > Hello again, and many thanks for everyone's contributions > > Sorry to take so long to reply but I live in Zimbabwe where email can be > erratic and only yesterday managed to get back online. > > Echna was careful to say that he had not read all of Latour. His critique > of Latour's earlier work is quite justifiable. However, Latour's more recent > work was surprisingly unsympathetic towards the constructivist turn. > > For example, you may be interested to know that Latour gave a keynote > address at Keele University in 1997 entitled "On Recalling ANT", in which he > describes ANT as 'managerial, engineering, Machiavellian, demiurgic'. > Basically, he felt that ANT, as it was being largely interpreted, was > susceptible to the critique of being demiurgic on the one hand and resulting > in the death of man on the other. By this I assume he means the oscillation > between voluntarism (demiurgic tendency) and determinism (death of man > tendency) that Bhaskar described in his lead up to giving his > Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA). Latour was concerned that > 'actor' was being given the role of agency and 'network' that of structure, > magically turning one into the other like the social construction theory of > Berger and Luckman. I agree that Bhaskar's TMSA conception is clearer and > better justified that Latour's circulating actor network, but they do seem > similar to me. As did Giddens and Bhaskar, Latour sees the actors and the > networks (individuals and society?) as both being connected and influencing > each other, but unlike Giddens and similar to Bhaskar, Latour insists on the > historicity of the process. Also, Latour describes the way that the social > can 'travel endlessly without encountering the micro-level' (individuals?), > which seems similar to Bhaskar's TMSA diagram in which society and > individuals are on parallel tracks. They are distinct, autonomously causally > efficacious, yet closely related, transforming and reproducing each other. > By definition, parallel lines can travel endlessly but never encounter each > other. Diagrammatically, then, Bhaskar has used a similar metaphor to > Latour's verbal metaphor of 'travelling endlessly without encountering each > other' (but nevertheless aeffecting each other). > > Despite this similarity, what then throws the realist is Latour's statement > that the social 'is turned from a province of reality to a circulation'. I > understand why he says this, he wants to avoid social determinism, however, > it is an undeniably uncritical realist statement. But this paper was written > in 1997 and by 2004, Latour was to critique himself and his followers even > further and to revindicate reality. He wrote a paper 'Why has critique run > out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern' (Critical Inquiry > 30, 2004). I hope the quote that follows is not too long, but I wanted to > give you an idea of how worried Latour was by the way his work was being > used...worried enough to admit he perhaps he 'did not mean what he said' > (Bhaskar has also said of Derrida, that he probably 'did not mean what he > said'). > > "While we spend years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind > the appearance of objective statements, do we now have to reveal the real > objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of > prejudices? And yet entire Ph.D programs are still running to make sure that > good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up (...) > that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak from a > standpoint and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very same > argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could save > our lives. Was I wrong to participate in this invention of this field known > as science studies? Is it enough to say that we did not really mean what we > said? Why does it burn my tongue to say that global warming is a fact > whether you like it or not? Why can't I simply say that the argument is > closed for good? > Should I reassure myself by simply saying that the bad guys can use any > weapon at hand, naturalized facts when it suits them and social construction > when it suits them? Should we apologise for having been wrong all the time? > (...) Or should we do a bit of soul-searching here: what were we really > after when we were so intent on showing the scientific construction of > facts?" > > Later Latour also writes: "My argument is that a certain form of critical > spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the wrong > enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong sort of > allies because of a little mistake in the definition of its main target. The > question was never to get away from facts, but closer to them, not fighting > empiricism but renewing empiricism". Latour also argues that we need to > "cultivate a stubbornly realist attitude". He says that "The mistake we > made, the mistake I made, was to believe there was no efficient way to > criticise matters of fact except by moving away from them and directing > attention toward the conditions that made them possible". > > The reason I have gone to this trouble to show Latour's move from irrealism > to realism (but not the na?ve realism of typical scientistic empiricism) is > because I would like to encourage critical realists not to quickly throw out > the baby with the bathwater, so to speak, when they decide to disregard > Latour's work. The reason we might want to engage with the work of Latour or > Donna Haraway (also a professed non realist) is because they have spent > years trying to understand how language can be used in a Machiavellian way > to oppress people. Bhaskar talks about oppressive demi-reality, and I > suspect that it is this demi-reality that these thinkers are engaging with, > albeit they say it is unreal. It is demi-reality which most needs our > attention right now, if we are to facilitate a move towards the flourishing > of humankind. > > There are other similarities between Latour and Critical Realism, such as > his objection to polemical debate and his talk about the oscillation between > naturalised facts and social construction (which reminds me of Sayer's > concept of the pomo flips). I think his humility in being able to adjust his > ideas in the face of contradictions, and his attempt to try and make his > ideas more inclusive (of totality), is a brilliant model of Critical Realist > praxis. We may not agree with everything Latour says, but we can learn a lot > from his humble academic process which, in allowing for the possibility of > mistake, gets him closer to an adequate conception. His ability to admit > the inadequacy of his early writing also shows that Khun was wrong about how > tightly academics cling to their theories... > > Mark Johnson was interested in the way that constructivism seems to be > quite humane, as it seems to avoid strong arguments about rightness and > wrongness. However, as Latour shows, even extremists/fundamentalists can now > make use of constructivism (e.g. we have fundamentalist Capitalists arguing > that global warming is just a construct). I have written too much already, > but Latour offers a way to be critical without being polemical. > > As far as our efforts to bring credibility to CR goes, to have a main > architect of the extreme social constructivist movement provide such > critique of that discipline, and to have that critique include a > revindication of realism, lends powerful support to our realist position. > However, this is not to say that Latour's position is as complete as > Bhaskar's (for example, as someone wrote earlier, it does not have a > conception of the stratification of reality). > > Again, apologies that my contribution has taken so long to be returned. > > Best wishes, > > Leigh > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto: > critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna > Sent: 25 August 2009 14:02 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > > Hi David, hi all, > > first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really > insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your > mail when you state that Latour?s position can?t be reconciled - it is > just contradictory. I don?t know all of Latour?s work, but for example > in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his > "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong > constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout > the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn?s contradictory sentence that > scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don?t > do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, > like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just > constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real > formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common > cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). > Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an > "ontological tension", as one can?t talk about ontology in purely > epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are > then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments > in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be > rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? > Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour > and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all > the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and > that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it > has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others > is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, > as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by > scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing > of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability > unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in > general. > The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as > Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. > When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not > much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes > structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then > suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be > contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I > don?t know all of Latour?s work (or I am misstaken about his theory - > but one last thing: Latour?s very essayistic and loose style is not > really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more > confusion) > > best, > e > > d.eldervass at ntlworld.com schrieb: > > Hi Echna, and listers! > > > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a > touch more coherently. > > > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say > here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour > acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empirical' > (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not > actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's > 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observed by > human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon known > as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theorised > by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and > common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it was > observed, but we just didn't know about it. > > > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this > contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm > offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered > explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong > constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll suggest > some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). > > > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how > accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an authority > on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructivism > in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour > takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of > constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanities) > has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in > philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on > reflection. > > > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a very > odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scientists > observe and theorise them? > > > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the > world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on the > categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, > space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We can > never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filtered > through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we can > know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the > world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, > when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not > referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, but > to the world-as-we-experience-it. > > > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience > depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on > concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) > positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social > constructionists argue that these are social products, and although Latour > rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of > constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be taken > as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists employ > rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. > > > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our > categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical work, > then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientists > change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of > Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world > about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong > constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us of > the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out > there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by science, > therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence of > this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our > 'world'. > > > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not > aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for sure > whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way of > making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made within > the constructivist tradition. > > > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the > contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excellent > book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge') > that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply > wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but they > are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have > enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our > categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the > actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enable > us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about our > environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those in > which our perceptual abilities developed). > > > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influence > on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on our > perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between > reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is > difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the > world-in-itself. > > > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that the > descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves strongly > influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite of > the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories > implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. > > > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, I > have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainly > misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his > account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the > inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to > behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view > that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' > theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is > motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also some > recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This is > arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the > undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their > perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts to > approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including inanimate > objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other to > produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. > > > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about > the phases of Venus. > > > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome views > on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to make > sense of Latour's ontology. > > > > Best, > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- d.eldervass at ntlworld.com wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. > >> > > > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different > sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different > from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existing > external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't have > any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that > science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other > hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe > did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is difficult to > make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. He > seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinction > is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the > world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps = 'the phenomenal world' thought > interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because > Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as if > the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they > only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no piont > in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed to > depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as our > cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at > the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of the > world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in > that world. > > > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that > (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! > > > > best > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > > > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may > > be helpful too. > > > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency > > in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): > > 455-73. > > > > Best wishes, > > Poe > > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > > Department of Sociology > > National Taiwan University > > > > > > ?? Matthew Smith : > > > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main > >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: > >> > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-theo.pdf). > I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which > touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the > perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literature > (here: > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=981817881&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). > If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently don't > have it online or accessible from where I currently > >> am. > >> > >> > >> Best, > >> Matthew > >> > >> > >> ----- Message initial ---- > >> De : echna > >> ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > >> > >> Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > >> > >> Hi all, > >> > >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from > >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) > >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can > >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological > >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the > >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology > >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik > >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno > >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even > >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of > >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whole > >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of > >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either > >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the > list). > >> > >> best wishes, > >> e > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > >> > >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel > >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk Thu Sep 3 06:27:12 2009 From: mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk (Mark Johnson) Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 13:27:12 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS In-Reply-To: <14D7108B324C4E0DB407347A3305FA25@leighlaptop> References: <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> <4A93D2B7.3090303@gmx.net> <14D7108B324C4E0DB407347A3305FA25@leighlaptop> Message-ID: Hi Leigh, Thanks very much for the Latour quote - personally I found it quite moving: it is a classic example of an 'inspection of conscience'. Such shifts of position are personally hard for people because it involves a shift in personal identity. You're right that constructivists are not immune from fundamentalism... I would only suggest that insistence on 'reality' can make one more susceptible to it (even, as is common in constructivism, it is the implicit ontology of the 'reality' of constructivism). Personally, I don't think we can escape the fact that our identities (critical realists, constructivists, jedi...) are tied to positions and assertions of what's real and what isn't. But how do we move forward? It strikes me that this must be a methodological development.. and more particularly one which takes account of diverse perspectives and diverse identities which are nonetheless 'real' (or at least part of a personal identity) to those who possess them (even the climate change deniers!). Establishing real mechanisms in it all must surely be a participative and appreciative exercise and not one where one set of distinctions (Roy's, Latour's or anyone else's) holds sway. If Roy is right and the reality behind individual perspectives can be revealed, the process of revealing it collaboratively can itself be transformative ("if you think climate change is not happening, what's your theory for what's going on when the ice-caps are melting?"... "what if you're wrong?"... etc.). But I think to make that work, an understanding of a real world must coexist with an understanding of ourselves as passionate, identity-seeking, distinction-making entities. Mark On Thu, Sep 3, 2009 at 12:15 PM, Leigh Price wrote: > Hello again, and many thanks for everyone's contributions > > Sorry to take so long to reply but I live in Zimbabwe where email can be > erratic and only yesterday managed to get back online. > > Echna was careful to say that he had not read all of Latour. His critique > of Latour's earlier work is quite justifiable. However, Latour's more recent > work was surprisingly unsympathetic towards the constructivist turn. > > For example, you may be interested to know that Latour gave a keynote > address at Keele University in 1997 entitled "On Recalling ANT", in which he > describes ANT as 'managerial, engineering, Machiavellian, demiurgic'. > Basically, he felt that ANT, as it was being largely interpreted, was > susceptible to the critique of being demiurgic on the one hand and resulting > in the death of man on the other. By this I assume he means the oscillation > between voluntarism (demiurgic tendency) and determinism (death of man > tendency) that Bhaskar described in his lead up to giving his > Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA). Latour was concerned that > 'actor' was being given the role of agency and 'network' that of structure, > magically turning one into the other like the social construction theory of > Berger and Luckman. I agree that Bhaskar's TMSA conception is clearer and > better justified that Latour's circulating actor network, but they do seem > similar to me. As did Giddens and Bhaskar, Latour sees the actors and the > networks (individuals and society?) as both being connected and influencing > each other, but unlike Giddens and similar to Bhaskar, Latour insists on the > historicity of the process. Also, Latour describes the way that the social > can 'travel endlessly without encountering the micro-level' (individuals?), > which seems similar to Bhaskar's TMSA diagram in which society and > individuals are on parallel tracks. They are distinct, autonomously causally > efficacious, yet closely related, transforming and reproducing each other. > By definition, parallel lines can travel endlessly but never encounter each > other. Diagrammatically, then, Bhaskar has used a similar metaphor to > Latour's verbal metaphor of 'travelling endlessly without encountering each > other' (but nevertheless aeffecting each other). > > Despite this similarity, what then throws the realist is Latour's statement > that the social 'is turned from a province of reality to a circulation'. I > understand why he says this, he wants to avoid social determinism, however, > it is an undeniably uncritical realist statement. But this paper was written > in 1997 and by 2004, Latour was to critique himself and his followers even > further and to revindicate reality. He wrote a paper 'Why has critique run > out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern' (Critical Inquiry > 30, 2004). I hope the quote that follows is not too long, but I wanted to > give you an idea of how worried Latour was by the way his work was being > used...worried enough to admit he perhaps he 'did not mean what he said' > (Bhaskar has also said of Derrida, that he probably 'did not mean what he > said'). > > "While we spend years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind > the appearance of objective statements, do we now have to reveal the real > objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of > prejudices? And yet entire Ph.D programs are still running to make sure that > good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up (...) > that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak from a > standpoint and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very same > argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could save > our lives. Was I wrong to participate in this invention of this field known > as science studies? Is it enough to say that we did not really mean what we > said? Why does it burn my tongue to say that global warming is a fact > whether you like it or not? Why can't I simply say that the argument is > closed for good? > Should I reassure myself by simply saying that the bad guys can use any > weapon at hand, naturalized facts when it suits them and social construction > when it suits them? Should we apologise for having been wrong all the time? > (...) Or should we do a bit of soul-searching here: what were we really > after when we were so intent on showing the scientific construction of > facts?" > > Later Latour also writes: "My argument is that a certain form of critical > spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the wrong > enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong sort of > allies because of a little mistake in the definition of its main target. The > question was never to get away from facts, but closer to them, not fighting > empiricism but renewing empiricism". Latour also argues that we need to > "cultivate a stubbornly realist attitude". He says that "The mistake we > made, the mistake I made, was to believe there was no efficient way to > criticise matters of fact except by moving away from them and directing > attention toward the conditions that made them possible". > > The reason I have gone to this trouble to show Latour's move from irrealism > to realism (but not the na?ve realism of typical scientistic empiricism) is > because I would like to encourage critical realists not to quickly throw out > the baby with the bathwater, so to speak, when they decide to disregard > Latour's work. The reason we might want to engage with the work of Latour or > Donna Haraway (also a professed non realist) is because they have spent > years trying to understand how language can be used in a Machiavellian way > to oppress people. Bhaskar talks about oppressive demi-reality, and I > suspect that it is this demi-reality that these thinkers are engaging with, > albeit they say it is unreal. It is demi-reality which most needs our > attention right now, if we are to facilitate a move towards the flourishing > of humankind. > > There are other similarities between Latour and Critical Realism, such as > his objection to polemical debate and his talk about the oscillation between > naturalised facts and social construction (which reminds me of Sayer's > concept of the pomo flips). I think his humility in being able to adjust his > ideas in the face of contradictions, and his attempt to try and make his > ideas more inclusive (of totality), is a brilliant model of Critical Realist > praxis. We may not agree with everything Latour says, but we can learn a lot > from his humble academic process which, in allowing for the possibility of > mistake, gets him closer to an adequate conception. His ability to admit > the inadequacy of his early writing also shows that Khun was wrong about how > tightly academics cling to their theories... > > Mark Johnson was interested in the way that constructivism seems to be > quite humane, as it seems to avoid strong arguments about rightness and > wrongness. However, as Latour shows, even extremists/fundamentalists can now > make use of constructivism (e.g. we have fundamentalist Capitalists arguing > that global warming is just a construct). I have written too much already, > but Latour offers a way to be critical without being polemical. > > As far as our efforts to bring credibility to CR goes, to have a main > architect of the extreme social constructivist movement provide such > critique of that discipline, and to have that critique include a > revindication of realism, lends powerful support to our realist position. > However, this is not to say that Latour's position is as complete as > Bhaskar's (for example, as someone wrote earlier, it does not have a > conception of the stratification of reality). > > Again, apologies that my contribution has taken so long to be returned. > > Best wishes, > > Leigh > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto: > critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna > Sent: 25 August 2009 14:02 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > > Hi David, hi all, > > first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really > insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your > mail when you state that Latour?s position can?t be reconciled - it is > just contradictory. I don?t know all of Latour?s work, but for example > in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his > "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong > constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout > the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn?s contradictory sentence that > scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don?t > do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, > like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just > constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real > formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common > cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). > Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an > "ontological tension", as one can?t talk about ontology in purely > epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are > then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments > in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be > rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? > Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour > and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all > the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and > that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it > has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others > is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, > as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by > scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing > of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability > unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in > general. > The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as > Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. > When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not > much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes > structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then > suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be > contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I > don?t know all of Latour?s work (or I am misstaken about his theory - > but one last thing: Latour?s very essayistic and loose style is not > really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more > confusion) > > best, > e > > d.eldervass at ntlworld.com schrieb: > > Hi Echna, and listers! > > > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a > touch more coherently. > > > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say > here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour > acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empirical' > (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not > actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's > 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observed by > human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon known > as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theorised > by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and > common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it was > observed, but we just didn't know about it. > > > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this > contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm > offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered > explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong > constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll suggest > some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). > > > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how > accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an authority > on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructivism > in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour > takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of > constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanities) > has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in > philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on > reflection. > > > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a very > odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scientists > observe and theorise them? > > > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the > world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on the > categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, > space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We can > never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filtered > through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we can > know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the > world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, > when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not > referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, but > to the world-as-we-experience-it. > > > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience > depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on > concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) > positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social > constructionists argue that these are social products, and although Latour > rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of > constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be taken > as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists employ > rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. > > > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our > categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical work, > then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientists > change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of > Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world > about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong > constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us of > the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out > there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by science, > therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence of > this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our > 'world'. > > > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not > aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for sure > whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way of > making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made within > the constructivist tradition. > > > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the > contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excellent > book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge') > that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply > wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but they > are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have > enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our > categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the > actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enable > us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about our > environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those in > which our perceptual abilities developed). > > > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influence > on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on our > perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between > reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is > difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the > world-in-itself. > > > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that the > descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves strongly > influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite of > the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories > implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. > > > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, I > have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainly > misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his > account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the > inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to > behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view > that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' > theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is > motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also some > recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This is > arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the > undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their > perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts to > approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including inanimate > objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other to > produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. > > > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about > the phases of Venus. > > > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome views > on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to make > sense of Latour's ontology. > > > > Best, > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- d.eldervass at ntlworld.com wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. > >> > > > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different > sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different > from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existing > external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't have > any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that > science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other > hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe > did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is difficult to > make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. He > seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinction > is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the > world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps = 'the phenomenal world' thought > interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because > Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as if > the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they > only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no piont > in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed to > depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as our > cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at > the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of the > world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in > that world. > > > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that > (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! > > > > best > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > > > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may > > be helpful too. > > > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency > > in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): > > 455-73. > > > > Best wishes, > > Poe > > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > > Department of Sociology > > National Taiwan University > > > > > > ?? Matthew Smith : > > > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main > >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: > >> > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-theo.pdf). > I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which > touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the > perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literature > (here: > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=981817881&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). > If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently don't > have it online or accessible from where I currently > >> am. > >> > >> > >> Best, > >> Matthew > >> > >> > >> ----- Message initial ---- > >> De : echna > >> ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > >> > >> Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > >> > >> Hi all, > >> > >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from > >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) > >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can > >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological > >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the > >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology > >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik > >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno > >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even > >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of > >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whole > >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of > >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either > >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the > list). > >> > >> best wishes, > >> e > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > >> > >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel > >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mark Johnson Institute for Educational Cybernetics University of Bolton BL3 5AB Tel. 01204 903567 Mob. 0778 6064505 From dpilgrim at uclan.ac.uk Thu Sep 3 13:01:01 2009 From: dpilgrim at uclan.ac.uk (David Pilgrim) Date: Thu, 03 Sep 2009 20:01:01 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 Message-ID: <4AA0207D020000EB000B3699@gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk> Thanks to Mark and Leigh for this illuminating exchange. Any references to the objections of RB and Latour to 'polemical debate' would be gratefully received. Dave David Pilgrim Professor of Mental Health Policy Department of Social Work Faculty of Health University of Central Lancashire Preston PR1 2HE Tel +44 (0)1772 893458 Fax +44 (0)1772 892974 Email DPilgrim at uclan.ac.uk >>> 03/09/09 7:00 PM >>> Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Re : CR and STS (Mark Johnson) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 13:27:12 +0100 From: Mark Johnson Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Hi Leigh, Thanks very much for the Latour quote - personally I found it quite moving: it is a classic example of an 'inspection of conscience'. Such shifts of position are personally hard for people because it involves a shift in personal identity. You're right that constructivists are not immune from fundamentalism... I would only suggest that insistence on 'reality' can make one more susceptible to it (even, as is common in constructivism, it is the implicit ontology of the 'reality' of constructivism). Personally, I don't think we can escape the fact that our identities (critical realists, constructivists, jedi...) are tied to positions and assertions of what's real and what isn't. But how do we move forward? It strikes me that this must be a methodological development.. and more particularly one which takes account of diverse perspectives and diverse identities which are nonetheless 'real' (or at least part of a personal identity) to those who possess them (even the climate change deniers!). Establishing real mechanisms in it all must surely be a participative and appreciative exercise and not one where one set of distinctions (Roy's, Latour's or anyone else's) holds sway. If Roy is right and the reality behind individual perspectives can be revealed, the process of revealing it collaboratively can itself be transformative ("if you think climate change is not happening, what's your theory for what's going on when the ice-caps are melting?"... "what if you're wrong?"... etc.). But I think to make that work, an understanding of a real world must coexist with an understanding of ourselves as passionate, identity-seeking, distinction-making entities. Mark On Thu, Sep 3, 2009 at 12:15 PM, Leigh Price wrote: > Hello again, and many thanks for everyone's contributions > > Sorry to take so long to reply but I live in Zimbabwe where email can be > erratic and only yesterday managed to get back online. > > Echna was careful to say that he had not read all of Latour. His critique > of Latour's earlier work is quite justifiable. However, Latour's more recent > work was surprisingly unsympathetic towards the constructivist turn. > > For example, you may be interested to know that Latour gave a keynote > address at Keele University in 1997 entitled "On Recalling ANT", in which he > describes ANT as 'managerial, engineering, Machiavellian, demiurgic'. > Basically, he felt that ANT, as it was being largely interpreted, was > susceptible to the critique of being demiurgic on the one hand and resulting > in the death of man on the other. By this I assume he means the oscillation > between voluntarism (demiurgic tendency) and determinism (death of man > tendency) that Bhaskar described in his lead up to giving his > Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA). Latour was concerned that > 'actor' was being given the role of agency and 'network' that of structure, > magically turning one into the other like the social construction theory of > Berger and Luckman. I agree that Bhaskar's TMSA conception is clearer and > better justified that Latour's circulating actor network, but they do seem > similar to me. As did Giddens and Bhaskar, Latour sees the actors and the > networks (individuals and society?) as both being connected and influencing > each other, but unlike Giddens and similar to Bhaskar, Latour insists on the > historicity of the process. Also, Latour describes the way that the social > can 'travel endlessly without encountering the micro-level' (individuals?), > which seems similar to Bhaskar's TMSA diagram in which society and > individuals are on parallel tracks. They are distinct, autonomously causally > efficacious, yet closely related, transforming and reproducing each other. > By definition, parallel lines can travel endlessly but never encounter each > other. Diagrammatically, then, Bhaskar has used a similar metaphor to > Latour's verbal metaphor of 'travelling endlessly without encountering each > other' (but nevertheless aeffecting each other). > > Despite this similarity, what then throws the realist is Latour's statement > that the social 'is turned from a province of reality to a circulation'. I > understand why he says this, he wants to avoid social determinism, however, > it is an undeniably uncritical realist statement. But this paper was written > in 1997 and by 2004, Latour was to critique himself and his followers even > further and to revindicate reality. He wrote a paper 'Why has critique run > out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern' (Critical Inquiry > 30, 2004). I hope the quote that follows is not too long, but I wanted to > give you an idea of how worried Latour was by the way his work was being > used...worried enough to admit he perhaps he 'did not mean what he said' > (Bhaskar has also said of Derrida, that he probably 'did not mean what he > said'). > > "While we spend years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind > the appearance of objective statements, do we now have to reveal the real > objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of > prejudices? And yet entire Ph.D programs are still running to make sure that > good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up (...) > that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak from a > standpoint and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very same > argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could save > our lives. Was I wrong to participate in this invention of this field known > as science studies? Is it enough to say that we did not really mean what we > said? Why does it burn my tongue to say that global warming is a fact > whether you like it or not? Why can't I simply say that the argument is > closed for good? > Should I reassure myself by simply saying that the bad guys can use any > weapon at hand, naturalized facts when it suits them and social construction > when it suits them? Should we apologise for having been wrong all the time? > (...) Or should we do a bit of soul-searching here: what were we really > after when we were so intent on showing the scientific construction of > facts?" > > Later Latour also writes: "My argument is that a certain form of critical > spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the wrong > enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong sort of > allies because of a little mistake in the definition of its main target. The > question was never to get away from facts, but closer to them, not fighting > empiricism but renewing empiricism". Latour also argues that we need to > "cultivate a stubbornly realist attitude". He says that "The mistake we > made, the mistake I made, was to believe there was no efficient way to > criticise matters of fact except by moving away from them and directing > attention toward the conditions that made them possible". > > The reason I have gone to this trouble to show Latour's move from irrealism > to realism (but not the na?ve realism of typical scientistic empiricism) is > because I would like to encourage critical realists not to quickly throw out > the baby with the bathwater, so to speak, when they decide to disregard > Latour's work. The reason we might want to engage with the work of Latour or > Donna Haraway (also a professed non realist) is because they have spent > years trying to understand how language can be used in a Machiavellian way > to oppress people. Bhaskar talks about oppressive demi-reality, and I > suspect that it is this demi-reality that these thinkers are engaging with, > albeit they say it is unreal. It is demi-reality which most needs our > attention right now, if we are to facilitate a move towards the flourishing > of humankind. > > There are other similarities between Latour and Critical Realism, such as > his objection to polemical debate and his talk about the oscillation between > naturalised facts and social construction (which reminds me of Sayer's > concept of the pomo flips). I think his humility in being able to adjust his > ideas in the face of contradictions, and his attempt to try and make his > ideas more inclusive (of totality), is a brilliant model of Critical Realist > praxis. We may not agree with everything Latour says, but we can learn a lot > from his humble academic process which, in allowing for the possibility of > mistake, gets him closer to an adequate conception. His ability to admit > the inadequacy of his early writing also shows that Khun was wrong about how > tightly academics cling to their theories... > > Mark Johnson was interested in the way that constructivism seems to be > quite humane, as it seems to avoid strong arguments about rightness and > wrongness. However, as Latour shows, even extremists/fundamentalists can now > make use of constructivism (e.g. we have fundamentalist Capitalists arguing > that global warming is just a construct). I have written too much already, > but Latour offers a way to be critical without being polemical. > > As far as our efforts to bring credibility to CR goes, to have a main > architect of the extreme social constructivist movement provide such > critique of that discipline, and to have that critique include a > revindication of realism, lends powerful support to our realist position. > However, this is not to say that Latour's position is as complete as > Bhaskar's (for example, as someone wrote earlier, it does not have a > conception of the stratification of reality). > > Again, apologies that my contribution has taken so long to be returned. > > Best wishes, > > Leigh > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto: > critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna > Sent: 25 August 2009 14:02 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > > Hi David, hi all, > > first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really > insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your > mail when you state that Latour?s position can?t be reconciled - it is > just contradictory. I don?t know all of Latour?s work, but for example > in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his > "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong > constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout > the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn?s contradictory sentence that > scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don?t > do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, > like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just > constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real > formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common > cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). > Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an > "ontological tension", as one can?t talk about ontology in purely > epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are > then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments > in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be > rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? > Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour > and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all > the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and > that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it > has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others > is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, > as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by > scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing > of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability > unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in > general. > The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as > Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. > When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not > much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes > structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then > suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be > contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I > don?t know all of Latour?s work (or I am misstaken about his theory - > but one last thing: Latour?s very essayistic and loose style is not > really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more > confusion) > > best, > e > > d.eldervass at ntlworld.com schrieb: > > Hi Echna, and listers! > > > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a > touch more coherently. > > > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say > here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour > acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empirical' > (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not > actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's > 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observed by > human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon known > as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theorised > by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and > common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it was > observed, but we just didn't know about it. > > > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this > contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm > offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered > explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong > constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll suggest > some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). > > > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how > accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an authority > on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructivism > in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour > takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of > constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanities) > has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in > philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on > reflection. > > > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a very > odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scientists > observe and theorise them? > > > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the > world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on the > categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, > space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We can > never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filtered > through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we can > know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the > world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, > when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not > referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, but > to the world-as-we-experience-it. > > > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience > depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on > concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) > positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social > constructionists argue that these are social products, and although Latour > rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of > constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be taken > as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists employ > rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. > > > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our > categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical work, > then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientists > change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of > Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world > about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong > constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us of > the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out > there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by science, > therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence of > this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our > 'world'. > > > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not > aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for sure > whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way of > making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made within > the constructivist tradition. > > > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the > contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excellent > book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge') > that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply > wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but they > are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have > enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our > categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the > actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enable > us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about our > environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those in > which our perceptual abilities developed). > > > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influence > on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on our > perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between > reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is > difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the > world-in-itself. > > > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that the > descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves strongly > influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite of > the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories > implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. > > > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, I > have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainly > misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his > account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the > inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to > behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view > that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' > theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is > motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also some > recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This is > arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the > undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their > perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts to > approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including inanimate > objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other to > produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. > > > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about > the phases of Venus. > > > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome views > on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to make > sense of Latour's ontology. > > > > Best, > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- d.eldervass at ntlworld.com wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. > >> > > > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different > sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different > from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existing > external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't have > any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that > science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other > hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe > did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is difficult to > make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. He > seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinction > is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the > world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps = 'the phenomenal world' thought > interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because > Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as if > the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they > only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no piont > in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed to > depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as our > cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at > the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of the > world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in > that world. > > > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that > (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! > > > > best > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > > > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may > > be helpful too. > > > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency > > in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): > > 455-73. > > > > Best wishes, > > Poe > > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > > Department of Sociology > > National Taiwan University > > > > > > ?? Matthew Smith : > > > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main > >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: > >> > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-theo.pdf). > I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which > touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the > perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literature > (here: > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=981817881&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). > If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently don't > have it online or accessible from where I currently > >> am. > >> > >> > >> Best, > >> Matthew > >> > >> > >> ----- Message initial ---- > >> De : echna > >> ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > >> > >> Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > >> > >> Hi all, > >> > >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from > >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) > >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can > >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological > >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the > >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology > >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik > >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno > >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even > >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of > >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whole > >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of > >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either > >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the > list). > >> > >> best wishes, > >> e > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > >> > >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel > >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mark Johnson Institute for Educational Cybernetics University of Bolton BL3 5AB Tel. 01204 903567 Mob. 0778 6064505 ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 *********************************************** From briandick51 at gmail.com Thu Sep 3 20:30:40 2009 From: briandick51 at gmail.com (Brian Dick) Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 19:30:40 -0700 Subject: [Critical-Realism] =?utf-8?b?UmUgOiBDUiBhbmQgU1RT4oCP?= Message-ID: <4a0badc00909031930vcad9bbejb5ead3cf0687e408@mail.gmail.com> Hi all, Thanks for the informative discussion of STS and CR. I know that Peter Manicas has discussed CR in relation to David Bloor's strong programme, but I haven't come across much else. Peter T. Manicas and Alan Rosenberg. 1985. "Naturalism, Epistemological Individualism and "The Strong Programme" in the Sociology of Knowledge." Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior. 15(1): 76-101. http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/120031188/abstract I haven't seen Bhaskar referenced in the STS literature, although its been a few years since I've explicitly looked, with the exception of a footnote in Harry Collins' book Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, 1985, p. 25 (footnote 11). Here is the entire footnote: "Bhaskar (1975) erects a whole philosophy upon the distinction between open and closed systems. Unfortunately he draws the dividing line in the wrong place. He accounts for the apparent success of science by its ability to develop theories which work within closed systems; these are experiments conducted within the walls of the laboratory. He believes that the environment of experiments can be controlled so that experimental situations are usefully thought of as closed. As the descriptions of experimental practice to be found in Chapters Three to Six will show, he is wrong in thinking of th experiemnt as a closed system. The internal workings of a developed computer are probably the nearest thing we have to a closed system in practical terms. This may be because it resembles a theoretical system as near can be, and these are the only really closed systems." For Collins, the problem of induction, like what he terms the "experimenter's regress," requires a sociological resolution. Best, Brian From ruth at ruthnaylor.com Sat Sep 5 06:43:16 2009 From: ruth at ruthnaylor.com (Ruth T Naylor) Date: Sat, 05 Sep 2009 13:43:16 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Weblink on this volume is reported as an attack site when I try to open it - In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4AA25CE4.6020607@ruthnaylor.com> Yes, I am behind in my reading! Do we have an updated, safe site to look at for this opportunity? Thanks, Ruth critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Interested in Research Projects (bwanika at yahoo.com) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2009 22:26:09 -0700 (PDT) > From: bwanika at yahoo.com > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Interested in Research Projects > To: Critical Realism > Message-ID: <198946.18163.qm at web58403.mail.re3.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 > > CR Listers! > > > You can > initiate and work on your own research with the support of?Kampala > University in Uganda. http://www.ku.ac.ug/Academic_Research_Projects.htm > > ? > > Just write > to the Vice Chancellor at vc at ku.ac.ug > > Copy to > director for planning and development at dpd at ku.ac.ug > and deputy vice chancellor academics dvc at ku.ac.ug > > > ? > > > > > Dan. > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 56, Issue 4 > *********************************************** > > From Clive.Lawson at econ.cam.ac.uk Sat Sep 5 07:43:41 2009 From: Clive.Lawson at econ.cam.ac.uk (Clive.Lawson at econ.cam.ac.uk) Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2009 13:43:41 +0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Weblink on this volume is reported as an attack site when I try to open it - Message-ID: <3F054CE7833@econ.cam.ac.uk> I am now away until early September. I will try to read mail when I can, but many apologies for long delays in replying. Clive From alperaslan79 at gmail.com Sat Sep 5 09:57:18 2009 From: alperaslan79 at gmail.com (Alper Aslan) Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2009 18:57:18 +0300 Subject: [Critical-Realism] epistemological relativism - subjectivism Message-ID: Hi all, I want to get some information about the difference between epistemological relativism vs epistemological subjectivism. Is there any article dealing with this issue. Regards. From rgroff at slu.edu Sat Sep 5 10:10:46 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2009 11:10:46 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] epistemological relativism - subjectivism In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <6ad241360909050910n44915d55hcd6f3551ceab0db5@mail.gmail.com> Within critical realism, the term "epistemological relativism" is used as a term of art in an idiosyncratic way (relative to how it is used in philosophy), to mean only that ideas are thought up by people, people living in particular times and places, and so are social products. Standardly, by contrast, the term refers to the view that there is no universal truth-maker(s) for any given claim about the world, no common standard in relation to which a claim is either well-founded or not. This (what is called by philosophers an) technically "epistemic" meaning of the term, having to do with justification, is not part of the meaning for those critical realists who follow Bhaskar's early use of the term. I'm not entirely sure what you mean by "epistemological subjectivism," but you should just do a search for it on Standford Encylopedia of Phil. If you want to read further, Chris Norris has a nice, no doubt cr-friendly book out just called Epistemology. May be useful. Ruth On Sat, Sep 5, 2009 at 10:57 AM, Alper Aslan wrote: > Hi all, > > I want to get some information about the difference between epistemological > relativism vs epistemological subjectivism. Is there any article dealing > with this issue. > Regards. > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From shivahemmati at gmail.com Sun Sep 6 01:31:45 2009 From: shivahemmati at gmail.com (shiva hemmati) Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2009 23:31:45 -0800 Subject: [Critical-Realism] (no subject) Message-ID: Hello I want to have Bhaskar's email if possible. Is there any body who tried to see what the impelications of critical realism are in education? -- best wishes Shiva Hemati From leigh at totalpc.co.zw Sun Sep 6 16:27:02 2009 From: leigh at totalpc.co.zw (Leigh Price) Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2009 00:27:02 +0200 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 In-Reply-To: <4AA0207D020000EB000B3699@gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk> References: <4AA0207D020000EB000B3699@gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk> Message-ID: <9004CD1FDD24450285528BF5449437DA@leighlaptop> Hi David Before we can engage in a discussion of critical realism's relationship to polemics, we first have to recognise that there can be two definitions of polemics. For example, according to the Merriam-Webster online dictionary, polemics is: a : an aggressive attack on or refutation of the opinions or principles of another b : the art or practice of disputation or controversy Etymology: French pol?mique, from Middle French, from polemique controversial, from Greek polemikos warlike, hostile, from polemos war Critical realism is polemical in that it engages in disputation and it is certainly controversial. Bhaskar frequently uses the word 'polemic' in this sense. However, CR is not, I believe, polemical in the sense of being aggressive or warlike in its manner of disputation. One of the reasons that I assume critical realism avoids aggressive polemics is its method of arguing that Bhaskar calls immanent critique. In this method, according to Bhaskar, you don?t argue against a position from your own position, but rather argue against a position from the point of view of the position itself. Therefore, if I believe X and you Y, to argue for my position, I have to show that something in totality is inconsistent with Y. I would say that aggressive polemics is fuelled by the dichotomy of setting one's self up against an opposite position. Hartwig (2009) has suggested that such academic attacks (polemics) that are "hostile and ungenerous, philistine and shrill" ...systematically breach the cardinal principle of immanent critique "that the critic operate on the terrain of the account being criticised to demonstrate that it is beset with problems that can be resolved on its own terms. And that it is at odds with the logic of the 'critical realist' embrace: the fundamental drive of the system to transcend and heal division and split...". For example, Bhaskar does not set himself up against Kant and Hume. Rather he tries to embrace their insights whilst nevertheless addressing the absences in their work. From my notes, that I took when attending a CR seminar last year, Bhaskar asked, "So, were Hume and Kant were completely wrong? No, because there is something that would imply that ontology should collapse into epistemology the 'natural attitude' when we talk about the world, actually we talk about our knowledge about the world. We only really need to disambiguate ontology and epistemology when there is conflict and when we are researching." Similarly, we should aim not to set ourselves up against Latour, but to embrace his insights whilst addressing the problems in his work. The quote I have found for Latour (2004:246) that refers, I think, to his being against polemics of the aggressive sort, is: "The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from under the feet of na?ve believers, but the one who offers the participants arenas in which to gather." Specifically, Latour is here referring to the critic as a reformed deconstructionist, but I think the quote is relevant. I would have to say that Latour's general tone in this paper is one against 'debunking'. He links this debunking attitude to those critics who alternate "haphazardly between antifetishism and positivism like the drunk iconoclast drawn by Goya". If you are interested in people's quotes against aggressive polemics, you might also like this one by Foucault (1984) - apologies for its length: "Questions and answers depend on a game?a game that is at once pleasant and difficult?in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of dialogue. The polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a just undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner in search for the truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is armful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat. For him, then the game consists not of recognizing this person as a subject having the right to speak but of abolishing him as interlocutor, from any possible dialogue; and his final objective will be not to come as close as possible to a difficult truth but to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has been manifestly upholding from the beginning. The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that his adversary is by definition denied. Perhaps, someday, a long history will have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic figure on discussion and an obstacle to the search for the truth." Best regards, Leigh References Foucault, M (1984). Polemics, Politics and Problematizations Interview conducted by Paul Rabinow. Translation by Lydia Davis, volume 1 ?Ethics? of ?Essential Works of Foucault?, The New Press 1997. http://foucault.info/foucault/interview.html Hartwig, M (2009). 'Orthodox' critical realism and the critical realist embrace. JCR, 8.2: 233-257. Latour,B (2004). Why has critique run out of steam/ From matters of fact to matters of concern. Critical Inquiry 30 (winter): 225-248. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of David Pilgrim Sent: 03 September 2009 21:01 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu; critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 Thanks to Mark and Leigh for this illuminating exchange. Any references to the objections of RB and Latour to 'polemical debate' would be gratefully received. Dave David Pilgrim Professor of Mental Health Policy Department of Social Work Faculty of Health University of Central Lancashire Preston PR1 2HE Tel +44 (0)1772 893458 Fax +44 (0)1772 892974 Email DPilgrim at uclan.ac.uk >>> 03/09/09 7:00 PM >>> Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Re : CR and STS (Mark Johnson) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 13:27:12 +0100 From: Mark Johnson Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Hi Leigh, Thanks very much for the Latour quote - personally I found it quite moving: it is a classic example of an 'inspection of conscience'. Such shifts of position are personally hard for people because it involves a shift in personal identity. You're right that constructivists are not immune from fundamentalism... I would only suggest that insistence on 'reality' can make one more susceptible to it (even, as is common in constructivism, it is the implicit ontology of the 'reality' of constructivism). Personally, I don't think we can escape the fact that our identities (critical realists, constructivists, jedi...) are tied to positions and assertions of what's real and what isn't. But how do we move forward? It strikes me that this must be a methodological development.. and more particularly one which takes account of diverse perspectives and diverse identities which are nonetheless 'real' (or at least part of a personal identity) to those who possess them (even the climate change deniers!). Establishing real mechanisms in it all must surely be a participative and appreciative exercise and not one where one set of distinctions (Roy's, Latour's or anyone else's) holds sway. If Roy is right and the reality behind individual perspectives can be revealed, the process of revealing it collaboratively can itself be transformative ("if you think climate change is not happening, what's your theory for what's going on when the ice-caps are melting?"... "what if you're wrong?"... etc.). But I think to make that work, an understanding of a real world must coexist with an understanding of ourselves as passionate, identity-seeking, distinction-making entities. Mark On Thu, Sep 3, 2009 at 12:15 PM, Leigh Price wrote: > Hello again, and many thanks for everyone's contributions > > Sorry to take so long to reply but I live in Zimbabwe where email can be > erratic and only yesterday managed to get back online. > > Echna was careful to say that he had not read all of Latour. His critique > of Latour's earlier work is quite justifiable. However, Latour's more recent > work was surprisingly unsympathetic towards the constructivist turn. > > For example, you may be interested to know that Latour gave a keynote > address at Keele University in 1997 entitled "On Recalling ANT", in which he > describes ANT as 'managerial, engineering, Machiavellian, demiurgic'. > Basically, he felt that ANT, as it was being largely interpreted, was > susceptible to the critique of being demiurgic on the one hand and resulting > in the death of man on the other. By this I assume he means the oscillation > between voluntarism (demiurgic tendency) and determinism (death of man > tendency) that Bhaskar described in his lead up to giving his > Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA). Latour was concerned that > 'actor' was being given the role of agency and 'network' that of structure, > magically turning one into the other like the social construction theory of > Berger and Luckman. I agree that Bhaskar's TMSA conception is clearer and > better justified that Latour's circulating actor network, but they do seem > similar to me. As did Giddens and Bhaskar, Latour sees the actors and the > networks (individuals and society?) as both being connected and influencing > each other, but unlike Giddens and similar to Bhaskar, Latour insists on the > historicity of the process. Also, Latour describes the way that the social > can 'travel endlessly without encountering the micro-level' (individuals?), > which seems similar to Bhaskar's TMSA diagram in which society and > individuals are on parallel tracks. They are distinct, autonomously causally > efficacious, yet closely related, transforming and reproducing each other. > By definition, parallel lines can travel endlessly but never encounter each > other. Diagrammatically, then, Bhaskar has used a similar metaphor to > Latour's verbal metaphor of 'travelling endlessly without encountering each > other' (but nevertheless aeffecting each other). > > Despite this similarity, what then throws the realist is Latour's statement > that the social 'is turned from a province of reality to a circulation'. I > understand why he says this, he wants to avoid social determinism, however, > it is an undeniably uncritical realist statement. But this paper was written > in 1997 and by 2004, Latour was to critique himself and his followers even > further and to revindicate reality. He wrote a paper 'Why has critique run > out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern' (Critical Inquiry > 30, 2004). I hope the quote that follows is not too long, but I wanted to > give you an idea of how worried Latour was by the way his work was being > used...worried enough to admit he perhaps he 'did not mean what he said' > (Bhaskar has also said of Derrida, that he probably 'did not mean what he > said'). > > "While we spend years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind > the appearance of objective statements, do we now have to reveal the real > objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of > prejudices? And yet entire Ph.D programs are still running to make sure that > good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up (...) > that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak from a > standpoint and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very same > argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could save > our lives. Was I wrong to participate in this invention of this field known > as science studies? Is it enough to say that we did not really mean what we > said? Why does it burn my tongue to say that global warming is a fact > whether you like it or not? Why can't I simply say that the argument is > closed for good? > Should I reassure myself by simply saying that the bad guys can use any > weapon at hand, naturalized facts when it suits them and social construction > when it suits them? Should we apologise for having been wrong all the time? > (...) Or should we do a bit of soul-searching here: what were we really > after when we were so intent on showing the scientific construction of > facts?" > > Later Latour also writes: "My argument is that a certain form of critical > spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the wrong > enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong sort of > allies because of a little mistake in the definition of its main target. The > question was never to get away from facts, but closer to them, not fighting > empiricism but renewing empiricism". Latour also argues that we need to > "cultivate a stubbornly realist attitude". He says that "The mistake we > made, the mistake I made, was to believe there was no efficient way to > criticise matters of fact except by moving away from them and directing > attention toward the conditions that made them possible". > > The reason I have gone to this trouble to show Latour's move from irrealism > to realism (but not the na?ve realism of typical scientistic empiricism) is > because I would like to encourage critical realists not to quickly throw out > the baby with the bathwater, so to speak, when they decide to disregard > Latour's work. The reason we might want to engage with the work of Latour or > Donna Haraway (also a professed non realist) is because they have spent > years trying to understand how language can be used in a Machiavellian way > to oppress people. Bhaskar talks about oppressive demi-reality, and I > suspect that it is this demi-reality that these thinkers are engaging with, > albeit they say it is unreal. It is demi-reality which most needs our > attention right now, if we are to facilitate a move towards the flourishing > of humankind. > > There are other similarities between Latour and Critical Realism, such as > his objection to polemical debate and his talk about the oscillation between > naturalised facts and social construction (which reminds me of Sayer's > concept of the pomo flips). I think his humility in being able to adjust his > ideas in the face of contradictions, and his attempt to try and make his > ideas more inclusive (of totality), is a brilliant model of Critical Realist > praxis. We may not agree with everything Latour says, but we can learn a lot > from his humble academic process which, in allowing for the possibility of > mistake, gets him closer to an adequate conception. His ability to admit > the inadequacy of his early writing also shows that Khun was wrong about how > tightly academics cling to their theories... > > Mark Johnson was interested in the way that constructivism seems to be > quite humane, as it seems to avoid strong arguments about rightness and > wrongness. However, as Latour shows, even extremists/fundamentalists can now > make use of constructivism (e.g. we have fundamentalist Capitalists arguing > that global warming is just a construct). I have written too much already, > but Latour offers a way to be critical without being polemical. > > As far as our efforts to bring credibility to CR goes, to have a main > architect of the extreme social constructivist movement provide such > critique of that discipline, and to have that critique include a > revindication of realism, lends powerful support to our realist position. > However, this is not to say that Latour's position is as complete as > Bhaskar's (for example, as someone wrote earlier, it does not have a > conception of the stratification of reality). > > Again, apologies that my contribution has taken so long to be returned. > > Best wishes, > > Leigh > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto: > critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna > Sent: 25 August 2009 14:02 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > > Hi David, hi all, > > first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really > insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your > mail when you state that Latour?s position can?t be reconciled - it is > just contradictory. I don?t know all of Latour?s work, but for example > in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his > "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong > constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout > the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn?s contradictory sentence that > scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don?t > do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, > like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just > constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real > formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common > cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). > Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an > "ontological tension", as one can?t talk about ontology in purely > epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are > then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments > in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be > rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? > Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour > and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all > the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and > that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it > has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others > is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, > as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by > scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing > of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability > unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in > general. > The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as > Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. > When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not > much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes > structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then > suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be > contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I > don?t know all of Latour?s work (or I am misstaken about his theory - > but one last thing: Latour?s very essayistic and loose style is not > really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more > confusion) > > best, > e > > d.eldervass at ntlworld.com schrieb: > > Hi Echna, and listers! > > > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a > touch more coherently. > > > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say > here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour > acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empirical' > (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not > actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's > 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observed by > human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon known > as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theorised > by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and > common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it was > observed, but we just didn't know about it. > > > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this > contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm > offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered > explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong > constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll suggest > some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). > > > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how > accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an authority > on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructivism > in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour > takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of > constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanities) > has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in > philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on > reflection. > > > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a very > odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scientists > observe and theorise them? > > > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the > world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on the > categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, > space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We can > never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filtered > through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we can > know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the > world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, > when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not > referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, but > to the world-as-we-experience-it. > > > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience > depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on > concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) > positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social > constructionists argue that these are social products, and although Latour > rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of > constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be taken > as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists employ > rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. > > > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our > categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical work, > then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientists > change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of > Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world > about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong > constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us of > the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out > there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by science, > therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence of > this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our > 'world'. > > > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not > aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for sure > whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way of > making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made within > the constructivist tradition. > > > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the > contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excellent > book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge') > that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply > wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but they > are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have > enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our > categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the > actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enable > us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about our > environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those in > which our perceptual abilities developed). > > > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influence > on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on our > perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between > reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is > difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the > world-in-itself. > > > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that the > descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves strongly > influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite of > the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories > implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. > > > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, I > have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainly > misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his > account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the > inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to > behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view > that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' > theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is > motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also some > recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This is > arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the > undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their > perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts to > approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including inanimate > objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other to > produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. > > > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about > the phases of Venus. > > > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome views > on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to make > sense of Latour's ontology. > > > > Best, > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- d.eldervass at ntlworld.com wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. > >> > > > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different > sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different > from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existing > external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't have > any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that > science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other > hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe > did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is difficult to > make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. He > seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinction > is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the > world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps = 'the phenomenal world' thought > interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because > Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as if > the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they > only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no piont > in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed to > depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as our > cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at > the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of the > world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in > that world. > > > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that > (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! > > > > best > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > > > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may > > be helpful too. > > > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency > > in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): > > 455-73. > > > > Best wishes, > > Poe > > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > > Department of Sociology > > National Taiwan University > > > > > > ?? Matthew Smith : > > > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main > >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: > >> > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-th eo.pdf). > I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which > touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the > perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literature > (here: > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_us er=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=981 817881&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0 &_userid=10&md5=67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). > If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently don't > have it online or accessible from where I currently > >> am. > >> > >> > >> Best, > >> Matthew > >> > >> > >> ----- Message initial ---- > >> De : echna > >> ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > >> > >> Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > >> > >> Hi all, > >> > >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from > >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) > >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can > >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological > >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the > >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology > >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik > >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno > >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even > >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of > >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whole > >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of > >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either > >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the > list). > >> > >> best wishes, > >> e > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > >> > >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel > >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- Mark Johnson Institute for Educational Cybernetics University of Bolton BL3 5AB Tel. 01204 903567 Mob. 0778 6064505 ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From rgroff at slu.edu Sun Sep 6 17:29:03 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Sun, 6 Sep 2009 18:29:03 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 In-Reply-To: <9004CD1FDD24450285528BF5449437DA@leighlaptop> References: <4AA0207D020000EB000B3699@gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk> <9004CD1FDD24450285528BF5449437DA@leighlaptop> Message-ID: <6ad241360909061629p62622acfhb4ea03adebf48c5e@mail.gmail.com> Hi Leigh, all, This is a small but important point I think: immanent critique is not really well-defined as when you say "You're a little bit right" or even "That's wrong, but I can see why you might have thought it." Nor is it a matter of being generous, necessarily -- though one's position is always made stronger by being so, it seems to me. And plus it's good for the soul. Rather, immanent (versus external) critique is when you say "If you really think (this one part of) what you say you think, then you can't actually think (this other part of) what you say you think." Thus the critique of Hume and Kant is immanent in a different, and more precise, sense than that which you suggest: viz., RTS is an argument directed to Humean and Kantian philosophers of science, to the effect that if they want to hold to what they - and everyone else - understands experiments to be, which they do want to do, then they have to give up their Humeanism and/or Kantianism, because it can't account for experimentation so conceived. (Whether the argument is successful or not is a different question. Indeed, one might even want to say that it really only shows up as a genuinely internal, or immanent, critique to the extent that it is.) I think you're intuition is a reasonable one, though -- that someone who is interested in arguing via internal critique is perhaps especially likely to be interested in actually making an argument. I think of a polemic as the rhetorical expression of dogmatism as a (non)argument-form; it's when there is no actual argument, only tone and effect. Warmly, r. On Sun, Sep 6, 2009 at 5:27 PM, Leigh Price wrote: > Hi David > > Before we can engage in a discussion of critical realism's relationship to > polemics, we first have to recognise that there can be two definitions of > polemics. For example, according to the Merriam-Webster online dictionary, > polemics is: > a : an aggressive attack on or refutation of the opinions or principles of > another > b : the art or practice of disputation or controversy > Etymology: French pol?mique, from Middle French, from polemique > controversial, from Greek polemikos warlike, hostile, from polemos war > > Critical realism is polemical in that it engages in disputation and it is > certainly controversial. Bhaskar frequently uses the word 'polemic' in this > sense. However, CR is not, I believe, polemical in the sense of being > aggressive or warlike in its manner of disputation. One of the reasons that > I assume critical realism avoids aggressive polemics is its method of > arguing that Bhaskar calls immanent critique. In this method, according to > Bhaskar, you don?t argue against a position from your own position, but > rather argue against a position from the point of view of the position > itself. Therefore, if I believe X and you Y, to argue for my position, I > have to show that something in totality is inconsistent with Y. I would say > that aggressive polemics is fuelled by the dichotomy of setting one's self > up against an opposite position. Hartwig (2009) has suggested that such > academic attacks (polemics) that are "hostile and ungenerous, philistine > and > shrill" ...systematically breach the cardinal principle of immanent > critique > "that the critic operate on the terrain of the account being criticised to > demonstrate that it is beset with problems that can be resolved on its own > terms. And that it is at odds with the logic of the 'critical realist' > embrace: the fundamental drive of the system to transcend and heal division > and split...". > > For example, Bhaskar does not set himself up against Kant and Hume. Rather > he tries to embrace their insights whilst nevertheless addressing the > absences in their work. From my notes, that I took when attending a CR > seminar last year, Bhaskar asked, "So, were Hume and Kant were completely > wrong? No, because there is something that would imply that ontology should > collapse into epistemology?the 'natural attitude'?when we talk about the > world, actually we talk about our knowledge about the world. We only really > need to disambiguate ontology and epistemology when there is conflict and > when we are researching." Similarly, we should aim not to set ourselves up > against Latour, but to embrace his insights whilst addressing the problems > in his work. > > The quote I have found for Latour (2004:246) that refers, I think, to his > being against polemics of the aggressive sort, is: > > "The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The > critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from under the feet of na?ve > believers, but the one who offers the participants arenas in which to > gather." Specifically, Latour is here referring to the critic as a reformed > deconstructionist, but I think the quote is relevant. I would have to say > that Latour's general tone in this paper is one against 'debunking'. He > links this debunking attitude to those critics who alternate "haphazardly > between antifetishism and positivism like the drunk iconoclast drawn by > Goya". > > If you are interested in people's quotes against aggressive polemics, you > might also like this one by Foucault (1984) - apologies for its length: > > "Questions and answers depend on a game?a game that is at once pleasant and > difficult?in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the > rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of dialogue. The > polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he > possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he > possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a > just > undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner in search for the > truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is armful, and whose > very > existence constitutes a threat. For him, then the game consists not of > recognizing this person as a subject having the right to speak but of > abolishing him as interlocutor, from any possible dialogue; and his final > objective will be not to come as close as possible to a difficult truth but > to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has been manifestly > upholding from the beginning. The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that > his > adversary is by definition denied. Perhaps, someday, a long history will > have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic figure on > discussion > and an obstacle to the search for the truth." > > > Best regards, > > Leigh > > > References > > Foucault, M (1984). Polemics, Politics and Problematizations > Interview conducted by Paul Rabinow. Translation by Lydia Davis, volume 1 > ?Ethics? of ?Essential Works of Foucault?, The New Press 1997. > http://foucault.info/foucault/interview.html > > Hartwig, M (2009). 'Orthodox' critical realism and the critical realist > embrace. JCR, 8.2: 233-257. > > Latour,B (2004). Why has critique run out of steam/ From matters of fact to > matters of concern. Critical Inquiry 30 (winter): 225-248. > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of David > Pilgrim > Sent: 03 September 2009 21:01 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu; > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 > > Thanks to Mark and Leigh for this illuminating exchange. Any references to > the objections of RB and Latour to 'polemical debate' would be gratefully > received. Dave > > David Pilgrim > Professor of Mental Health Policy > > Department of Social Work > Faculty of Health > University of Central Lancashire > Preston > PR1 2HE > > Tel +44 (0)1772 893458 > Fax +44 (0)1772 892974 > Email DPilgrim at uclan.ac.uk > >>> 03/09/09 7:00 PM >>> > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Re : CR and STS (Mark Johnson) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 13:27:12 +0100 > From: Mark Johnson > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Hi Leigh, > Thanks very much for the Latour quote - personally I found it quite moving: > it is a classic example of an 'inspection of conscience'. Such shifts of > position are personally hard for people because it involves a shift in > personal identity. You're right that constructivists are not immune from > fundamentalism... I would only suggest that insistence on 'reality' can > make > one more susceptible to it (even, as is common in constructivism, it is the > implicit ontology of the 'reality' of constructivism). Personally, I don't > think we can escape the fact that our identities (critical realists, > constructivists, jedi...) are tied to positions and assertions of what's > real and what isn't. > > But how do we move forward? It strikes me that this must be a > methodological > development.. and more particularly one which takes account of diverse > perspectives and diverse identities which are nonetheless 'real' (or at > least part of a personal identity) to those who possess them (even the > climate change deniers!). Establishing real mechanisms in it all must > surely > be a participative and appreciative exercise and not one where one set of > distinctions (Roy's, Latour's or anyone else's) holds sway. If Roy is right > and the reality behind individual perspectives can be revealed, the process > of revealing it collaboratively can itself be transformative ("if you think > climate change is not happening, what's your theory for what's going on > when > the ice-caps are melting?"... "what if you're wrong?"... etc.). But I think > to make that work, an understanding of a real world must coexist with an > understanding of ourselves > as passionate, identity-seeking, distinction-making entities. > > Mark > > On Thu, Sep 3, 2009 at 12:15 PM, Leigh Price wrote: > > > Hello again, and many thanks for everyone's contributions > > > > Sorry to take so long to reply but I live in Zimbabwe where email can be > > erratic and only yesterday managed to get back online. > > > > Echna was careful to say that he had not read all of Latour. His critique > > of Latour's earlier work is quite justifiable. However, Latour's more > recent > > work was surprisingly unsympathetic towards the constructivist turn. > > > > For example, you may be interested to know that Latour gave a keynote > > address at Keele University in 1997 entitled "On Recalling ANT", in which > he > > describes ANT as 'managerial, engineering, Machiavellian, demiurgic'. > > Basically, he felt that ANT, as it was being largely interpreted, was > > susceptible to the critique of being demiurgic on the one hand and > resulting > > in the death of man on the other. By this I assume he means the > oscillation > > between voluntarism (demiurgic tendency) and determinism (death of man > > tendency) that Bhaskar described in his lead up to giving his > > Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA). Latour was concerned > that > > 'actor' was being given the role of agency and 'network' that of > structure, > > magically turning one into the other like the social construction theory > of > > Berger and Luckman. I agree that Bhaskar's TMSA conception is clearer and > > better justified that Latour's circulating actor network, but they do > seem > > similar to me. As did Giddens and Bhaskar, Latour sees the actors and the > > networks (individuals and society?) as both being connected and > influencing > > each other, but unlike Giddens and similar to Bhaskar, Latour insists on > the > > historicity of the process. Also, Latour describes the way that the > social > > can 'travel endlessly without encountering the micro-level' > (individuals?), > > which seems similar to Bhaskar's TMSA diagram in which society and > > individuals are on parallel tracks. They are distinct, autonomously > causally > > efficacious, yet closely related, transforming and reproducing each > other. > > By definition, parallel lines can travel endlessly but never encounter > each > > other. Diagrammatically, then, Bhaskar has used a similar metaphor to > > Latour's verbal metaphor of 'travelling endlessly without encountering > each > > other' (but nevertheless aeffecting each other). > > > > Despite this similarity, what then throws the realist is Latour's > statement > > that the social 'is turned from a province of reality to a circulation'. > I > > understand why he says this, he wants to avoid social determinism, > however, > > it is an undeniably uncritical realist statement. But this paper was > written > > in 1997 and by 2004, Latour was to critique himself and his followers > even > > further and to revindicate reality. He wrote a paper 'Why has critique > run > > out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern' (Critical > Inquiry > > 30, 2004). I hope the quote that follows is not too long, but I wanted to > > give you an idea of how worried Latour was by the way his work was being > > used...worried enough to admit he perhaps he 'did not mean what he said' > > (Bhaskar has also said of Derrida, that he probably 'did not mean what he > > said'). > > > > "While we spend years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind > > the appearance of objective statements, do we now have to reveal the real > > objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of > > prejudices? And yet entire Ph.D programs are still running to make sure > that > > good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up (...) > > that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak from a > > standpoint and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very same > > argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could > save > > our lives. Was I wrong to participate in this invention of this field > known > > as science studies? Is it enough to say that we did not really mean what > we > > said? Why does it burn my tongue to say that global warming is a fact > > whether you like it or not? Why can't I simply say that the argument is > > closed for good? > > Should I reassure myself by simply saying that the bad guys can use any > > weapon at hand, naturalized facts when it suits them and social > construction > > when it suits them? Should we apologise for having been wrong all the > time? > > (...) Or should we do a bit of soul-searching here: what were we really > > after when we were so intent on showing the scientific construction of > > facts?" > > > > Later Latour also writes: "My argument is that a certain form of critical > > spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the wrong > > enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong sort > of > > allies because of a little mistake in the definition of its main target. > The > > question was never to get away from facts, but closer to them, not > fighting > > empiricism but renewing empiricism". Latour also argues that we need to > > "cultivate a stubbornly realist attitude". He says that "The mistake we > > made, the mistake I made, was to believe there was no efficient way to > > criticise matters of fact except by moving away from them and directing > > attention toward the conditions that made them possible". > > > > The reason I have gone to this trouble to show Latour's move from > irrealism > > to realism (but not the na?ve realism of typical scientistic empiricism) > is > > because I would like to encourage critical realists not to quickly throw > out > > the baby with the bathwater, so to speak, when they decide to disregard > > Latour's work. The reason we might want to engage with the work of Latour > or > > Donna Haraway (also a professed non realist) is because they have spent > > years trying to understand how language can be used in a Machiavellian > way > > to oppress people. Bhaskar talks about oppressive demi-reality, and I > > suspect that it is this demi-reality that these thinkers are engaging > with, > > albeit they say it is unreal. It is demi-reality which most needs our > > attention right now, if we are to facilitate a move towards the > flourishing > > of humankind. > > > > There are other similarities between Latour and Critical Realism, such as > > his objection to polemical debate and his talk about the oscillation > between > > naturalised facts and social construction (which reminds me of Sayer's > > concept of the pomo flips). I think his humility in being able to adjust > his > > ideas in the face of contradictions, and his attempt to try and make his > > ideas more inclusive (of totality), is a brilliant model of Critical > Realist > > praxis. We may not agree with everything Latour says, but we can learn a > lot > > from his humble academic process which, in allowing for the possibility > of > > mistake, gets him closer to an adequate conception. His ability to admit > > the inadequacy of his early writing also shows that Khun was wrong about > how > > tightly academics cling to their theories... > > > > Mark Johnson was interested in the way that constructivism seems to be > > quite humane, as it seems to avoid strong arguments about rightness and > > wrongness. However, as Latour shows, even extremists/fundamentalists can > now > > make use of constructivism (e.g. we have fundamentalist Capitalists > arguing > > that global warming is just a construct). I have written too much > already, > > but Latour offers a way to be critical without being polemical. > > > > As far as our efforts to bring credibility to CR goes, to have a main > > architect of the extreme social constructivist movement provide such > > critique of that discipline, and to have that critique include a > > revindication of realism, lends powerful support to our realist position. > > However, this is not to say that Latour's position is as complete as > > Bhaskar's (for example, as someone wrote earlier, it does not have a > > conception of the stratification of reality). > > > > Again, apologies that my contribution has taken so long to be returned. > > > > Best wishes, > > > > Leigh > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto: > > critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna > > Sent: 25 August 2009 14:02 > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > > > > Hi David, hi all, > > > > first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really > > insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your > > mail when you state that Latour?s position can?t be reconciled - it is > > just contradictory. I don?t know all of Latour?s work, but for example > > in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his > > "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong > > constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout > > the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn?s contradictory sentence that > > scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don?t > > do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, > > like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just > > constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real > > formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common > > cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). > > Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an > > "ontological tension", as one can?t talk about ontology in purely > > epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are > > then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments > > in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be > > rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? > > Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour > > and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all > > the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and > > that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it > > has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others > > is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, > > as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by > > scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing > > of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability > > unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in > > general. > > The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as > > Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. > > When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not > > much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes > > structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then > > suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be > > contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I > > don?t know all of Latour?s work (or I am misstaken about his theory - > > but one last thing: Latour?s very essayistic and loose style is not > > really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more > > confusion) > > > > best, > > e > > > > d.eldervass at ntlworld.com schrieb: > > > Hi Echna, and listers! > > > > > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a > > touch more coherently. > > > > > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say > > here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour > > acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the > empirical' > > (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not > > actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's > > 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observed > by > > human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon > known > > as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and > theorised > > by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and > > common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it > was > > observed, but we just didn't know about it. > > > > > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this > > contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm > > offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered > > explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong > > constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll > suggest > > some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). > > > > > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how > > accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an > authority > > on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian > constructivism > > in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour > > takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of > > constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other > humanities) > > has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in > > philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on > > reflection. > > > > > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a > very > > odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until > scientists > > observe and theorise them? > > > > > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the > > world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on > the > > categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, > > space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We > can > > never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always > filtered > > through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we > can > > know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the > > world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, > > when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not > > referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, > but > > to the world-as-we-experience-it. > > > > > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience > > depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on > > concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) > > positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social > > constructionists argue that these are social products, and although > Latour > > rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of > > constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be > taken > > as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists employ > > rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. > > > > > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our > > categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical > work, > > then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when > scientists > > change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of > > Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world > > about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong > > constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us > of > > the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out > > there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by > science, > > therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence > of > > this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our > > 'world'. > > > > > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not > > aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for > sure > > whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way > of > > making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made > within > > the constructivist tradition. > > > > > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the > > contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her > excellent > > book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of > knowledge') > > that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply > > wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but they > > are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have > > enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our > > categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the > > actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that > enable > > us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about > our > > environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those > in > > which our perceptual abilities developed). > > > > > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an > influence > > on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on > our > > perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between > > reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is > > difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the > > world-in-itself. > > > > > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that > the > > descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves > strongly > > influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite > of > > the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories > > implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. > > > > > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, > I > > have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainly > > misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his > > account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the > > inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to > > behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view > > that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' > > theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is > > motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also > some > > recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This > is > > arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the > > undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their > > perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts > to > > approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including > inanimate > > objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other > to > > produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. > > > > > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about > > the phases of Venus. > > > > > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome > views > > on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to > make > > sense of Latour's ontology. > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > > > > > ---- d.eldervass at ntlworld.com wrote: > > > > > >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. > > >> > > > > > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different > > sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different > > from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a > pre-existing > > external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't > have > > any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that > > science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other > > hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe > > did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is difficult > to > > make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. > He > > seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a > distinction > > is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the > > world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps = 'the phenomenal world' thought > > interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because > > Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as > if > > the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they > > only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no > piont > > in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed > to > > depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as > our > > cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at > > the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of > the > > world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in > > that world. > > > > > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that > > (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! > > > > > > best > > > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > > > > > ---- b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw wrote: > > > > > >> Hi Echna, > > >> > > > > > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may > > > be helpful too. > > > > > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency > > > in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): > > > 455-73. > > > > > > Best wishes, > > > Poe > > > > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > > > Department of Sociology > > > National Taiwan University > > > > > > > > > ?? Matthew Smith : > > > > > > > > >> Hi Echna, > > >> > > >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main > > >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: > > >> > > > > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-th > eo.pdf > ). > > I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which > > touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the > > perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems > literature > > (here: > > > > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_us > > er=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=981 > > 817881&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0 > &_userid=10&md5=67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d > ). > > If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently > don't > > have it online or accessible from where I currently > > >> am. > > >> > > >> > > >> Best, > > >> Matthew > > >> > > >> > > >> ----- Message initial ---- > > >> De : echna > > >> ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > >> > > >> Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > > >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > > >> > > >> Hi all, > > >> > > >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from > > >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" > (STS) > > >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can > > >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > > >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in > epistemological > > >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the > > >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of > ontology > > >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik > > >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno > > >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law > even > > >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description > of > > >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the > whole > > >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind > of > > >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by > either > > >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the > > list). > > >> > > >> best wishes, > > >> e > > >> > > >> _______________________________________________ > > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel > > >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > > >> > > >> _______________________________________________ > > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > -- > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > ----- > Mark Johnson > Institute for Educational Cybernetics > University of Bolton > BL3 5AB > Tel. 01204 903567 > Mob. 0778 6064505 > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 > *********************************************** > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From rgroff at slu.edu Sun Sep 6 17:31:02 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Sun, 6 Sep 2009 18:31:02 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] You're? Message-ID: <6ad241360909061631n4cec617ej3d88dc027b043b03@mail.gmail.com> Sorry -- I mean "your." I'm blind from line editing all day. On Sun, Sep 6, 2009 at 6:29 PM, Ruth Groff wrote: > Hi Leigh, all, > > This is a small but important point I think: immanent critique is not > really well-defined as when you say "You're a little bit right" or even > "That's wrong, but I can see why you might have thought it." Nor is it a > matter of being generous, necessarily -- though one's position is always > made stronger by being so, it seems to me. And plus it's good for the > soul. Rather, immanent (versus external) critique is when you say "If you > really think (this one part of) what you say you think, then you can't > actually think (this other part of) what you say you think." Thus the > critique of Hume and Kant is immanent in a different, and more precise, > sense than that which you suggest: viz., RTS is an argument directed to > Humean and Kantian philosophers of science, to the effect that if they want > to hold to what they - and everyone else - understands experiments to be, > which they do want to do, then they have to give up their Humeanism and/or > Kantianism, because it can't account for experimentation so conceived. > (Whether the argument is successful or not is a different question. Indeed, > one might even want to say that it really only shows up as a genuinely > internal, or immanent, critique to the extent that it is.) > > I think you're intuition is a reasonable one, though -- that someone who is > interested in arguing via internal critique is perhaps especially likely to > be interested in actually making an argument. I think of a polemic as the > rhetorical expression of dogmatism as a (non)argument-form; it's when there > is no actual argument, only tone and effect. > > Warmly, > r. > > > > > > > On Sun, Sep 6, 2009 at 5:27 PM, Leigh Price wrote: > >> Hi David >> >> Before we can engage in a discussion of critical realism's relationship to >> polemics, we first have to recognise that there can be two definitions of >> polemics. For example, according to the Merriam-Webster online dictionary, >> polemics is: >> a : an aggressive attack on or refutation of the opinions or principles of >> another >> b : the art or practice of disputation or controversy >> Etymology: French pol?mique, from Middle French, from polemique >> controversial, from Greek polemikos warlike, hostile, from polemos war >> >> Critical realism is polemical in that it engages in disputation and it is >> certainly controversial. Bhaskar frequently uses the word 'polemic' in >> this >> sense. However, CR is not, I believe, polemical in the sense of being >> aggressive or warlike in its manner of disputation. One of the reasons >> that >> I assume critical realism avoids aggressive polemics is its method of >> arguing that Bhaskar calls immanent critique. In this method, according to >> Bhaskar, you don?t argue against a position from your own position, but >> rather argue against a position from the point of view of the position >> itself. Therefore, if I believe X and you Y, to argue for my position, I >> have to show that something in totality is inconsistent with Y. I would >> say >> that aggressive polemics is fuelled by the dichotomy of setting one's self >> up against an opposite position. Hartwig (2009) has suggested that such >> academic attacks (polemics) that are "hostile and ungenerous, philistine >> and >> shrill" ...systematically breach the cardinal principle of immanent >> critique >> "that the critic operate on the terrain of the account being criticised to >> demonstrate that it is beset with problems that can be resolved on its own >> terms. And that it is at odds with the logic of the 'critical realist' >> embrace: the fundamental drive of the system to transcend and heal >> division >> and split...". >> >> For example, Bhaskar does not set himself up against Kant and Hume. Rather >> he tries to embrace their insights whilst nevertheless addressing the >> absences in their work. From my notes, that I took when attending a CR >> seminar last year, Bhaskar asked, "So, were Hume and Kant were completely >> wrong? No, because there is something that would imply that ontology >> should >> collapse into epistemology?the 'natural attitude'?when we talk about the >> world, actually we talk about our knowledge about the world. We only >> really >> need to disambiguate ontology and epistemology when there is conflict and >> when we are researching." Similarly, we should aim not to set ourselves up >> against Latour, but to embrace his insights whilst addressing the problems >> in his work. >> >> The quote I have found for Latour (2004:246) that refers, I think, to his >> being against polemics of the aggressive sort, is: >> >> "The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The >> critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from under the feet of na?ve >> believers, but the one who offers the participants arenas in which to >> gather." Specifically, Latour is here referring to the critic as a >> reformed >> deconstructionist, but I think the quote is relevant. I would have to say >> that Latour's general tone in this paper is one against 'debunking'. He >> links this debunking attitude to those critics who alternate "haphazardly >> between antifetishism and positivism like the drunk iconoclast drawn by >> Goya". >> >> If you are interested in people's quotes against aggressive polemics, you >> might also like this one by Foucault (1984) - apologies for its length: >> >> "Questions and answers depend on a game?a game that is at once pleasant >> and >> difficult?in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the >> rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of dialogue. The >> polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he >> possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he >> possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a >> just >> undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner in search for the >> truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is armful, and whose >> very >> existence constitutes a threat. For him, then the game consists not of >> recognizing this person as a subject having the right to speak but of >> abolishing him as interlocutor, from any possible dialogue; and his final >> objective will be not to come as close as possible to a difficult truth >> but >> to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has been manifestly >> upholding from the beginning. The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that >> his >> adversary is by definition denied. Perhaps, someday, a long history will >> have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic figure on >> discussion >> and an obstacle to the search for the truth." >> >> >> Best regards, >> >> Leigh >> >> >> References >> >> Foucault, M (1984). Polemics, Politics and Problematizations >> Interview conducted by Paul Rabinow. Translation by Lydia Davis, volume 1 >> ?Ethics? of ?Essential Works of Foucault?, The New Press 1997. >> http://foucault.info/foucault/interview.html >> >> Hartwig, M (2009). 'Orthodox' critical realism and the critical realist >> embrace. JCR, 8.2: 233-257. >> >> Latour,B (2004). Why has critique run out of steam/ From matters of fact >> to >> matters of concern. Critical Inquiry 30 (winter): 225-248. >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of David >> Pilgrim >> Sent: 03 September 2009 21:01 >> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu; >> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 >> >> Thanks to Mark and Leigh for this illuminating exchange. Any references to >> the objections of RB and Latour to 'polemical debate' would be gratefully >> received. Dave >> >> David Pilgrim >> Professor of Mental Health Policy >> >> Department of Social Work >> Faculty of Health >> University of Central Lancashire >> Preston >> PR1 2HE >> >> Tel +44 (0)1772 893458 >> Fax +44 (0)1772 892974 >> Email DPilgrim at uclan.ac.uk >> >>> 03/09/09 7:00 PM >>> >> Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to >> critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> >> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu >> >> You can reach the person managing the list at >> critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu >> >> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >> than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." >> >> >> Today's Topics: >> >> 1. Re: Re : CR and STS (Mark Johnson) >> >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >> Message: 1 >> Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 13:27:12 +0100 >> From: Mark Johnson >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> >> Message-ID: >> >> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 >> >> Hi Leigh, >> Thanks very much for the Latour quote - personally I found it quite >> moving: >> it is a classic example of an 'inspection of conscience'. Such shifts of >> position are personally hard for people because it involves a shift in >> personal identity. You're right that constructivists are not immune from >> fundamentalism... I would only suggest that insistence on 'reality' can >> make >> one more susceptible to it (even, as is common in constructivism, it is >> the >> implicit ontology of the 'reality' of constructivism). Personally, I don't >> think we can escape the fact that our identities (critical realists, >> constructivists, jedi...) are tied to positions and assertions of what's >> real and what isn't. >> >> But how do we move forward? It strikes me that this must be a >> methodological >> development.. and more particularly one which takes account of diverse >> perspectives and diverse identities which are nonetheless 'real' (or at >> least part of a personal identity) to those who possess them (even the >> climate change deniers!). Establishing real mechanisms in it all must >> surely >> be a participative and appreciative exercise and not one where one set of >> distinctions (Roy's, Latour's or anyone else's) holds sway. If Roy is >> right >> and the reality behind individual perspectives can be revealed, the >> process >> of revealing it collaboratively can itself be transformative ("if you >> think >> climate change is not happening, what's your theory for what's going on >> when >> the ice-caps are melting?"... "what if you're wrong?"... etc.). But I >> think >> to make that work, an understanding of a real world must coexist with an >> understanding of ourselves >> as passionate, identity-seeking, distinction-making entities. >> >> Mark >> >> On Thu, Sep 3, 2009 at 12:15 PM, Leigh Price wrote: >> >> > Hello again, and many thanks for everyone's contributions >> > >> > Sorry to take so long to reply but I live in Zimbabwe where email can be >> > erratic and only yesterday managed to get back online. >> > >> > Echna was careful to say that he had not read all of Latour. His >> critique >> > of Latour's earlier work is quite justifiable. However, Latour's more >> recent >> > work was surprisingly unsympathetic towards the constructivist turn. >> > >> > For example, you may be interested to know that Latour gave a keynote >> > address at Keele University in 1997 entitled "On Recalling ANT", in >> which >> he >> > describes ANT as 'managerial, engineering, Machiavellian, demiurgic'. >> > Basically, he felt that ANT, as it was being largely interpreted, was >> > susceptible to the critique of being demiurgic on the one hand and >> resulting >> > in the death of man on the other. By this I assume he means the >> oscillation >> > between voluntarism (demiurgic tendency) and determinism (death of man >> > tendency) that Bhaskar described in his lead up to giving his >> > Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA). Latour was concerned >> that >> > 'actor' was being given the role of agency and 'network' that of >> structure, >> > magically turning one into the other like the social construction theory >> of >> > Berger and Luckman. I agree that Bhaskar's TMSA conception is clearer >> and >> > better justified that Latour's circulating actor network, but they do >> seem >> > similar to me. As did Giddens and Bhaskar, Latour sees the actors and >> the >> > networks (individuals and society?) as both being connected and >> influencing >> > each other, but unlike Giddens and similar to Bhaskar, Latour insists on >> the >> > historicity of the process. Also, Latour describes the way that the >> social >> > can 'travel endlessly without encountering the micro-level' >> (individuals?), >> > which seems similar to Bhaskar's TMSA diagram in which society and >> > individuals are on parallel tracks. They are distinct, autonomously >> causally >> > efficacious, yet closely related, transforming and reproducing each >> other. >> > By definition, parallel lines can travel endlessly but never encounter >> each >> > other. Diagrammatically, then, Bhaskar has used a similar metaphor to >> > Latour's verbal metaphor of 'travelling endlessly without encountering >> each >> > other' (but nevertheless aeffecting each other). >> > >> > Despite this similarity, what then throws the realist is Latour's >> statement >> > that the social 'is turned from a province of reality to a circulation'. >> I >> > understand why he says this, he wants to avoid social determinism, >> however, >> > it is an undeniably uncritical realist statement. But this paper was >> written >> > in 1997 and by 2004, Latour was to critique himself and his followers >> even >> > further and to revindicate reality. He wrote a paper 'Why has critique >> run >> > out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern' (Critical >> Inquiry >> > 30, 2004). I hope the quote that follows is not too long, but I wanted >> to >> > give you an idea of how worried Latour was by the way his work was being >> > used...worried enough to admit he perhaps he 'did not mean what he said' >> > (Bhaskar has also said of Derrida, that he probably 'did not mean what >> he >> > said'). >> > >> > "While we spend years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind >> > the appearance of objective statements, do we now have to reveal the >> real >> > objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of >> > prejudices? And yet entire Ph.D programs are still running to make sure >> that >> > good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up >> (...) >> > that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak from a >> > standpoint and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very same >> > argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could >> save >> > our lives. Was I wrong to participate in this invention of this field >> known >> > as science studies? Is it enough to say that we did not really mean what >> we >> > said? Why does it burn my tongue to say that global warming is a fact >> > whether you like it or not? Why can't I simply say that the argument is >> > closed for good? >> > Should I reassure myself by simply saying that the bad guys can use any >> > weapon at hand, naturalized facts when it suits them and social >> construction >> > when it suits them? Should we apologise for having been wrong all the >> time? >> > (...) Or should we do a bit of soul-searching here: what were we really >> > after when we were so intent on showing the scientific construction of >> > facts?" >> > >> > Later Latour also writes: "My argument is that a certain form of >> critical >> > spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the >> wrong >> > enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong sort >> of >> > allies because of a little mistake in the definition of its main target. >> The >> > question was never to get away from facts, but closer to them, not >> fighting >> > empiricism but renewing empiricism". Latour also argues that we need to >> > "cultivate a stubbornly realist attitude". He says that "The mistake we >> > made, the mistake I made, was to believe there was no efficient way to >> > criticise matters of fact except by moving away from them and directing >> > attention toward the conditions that made them possible". >> > >> > The reason I have gone to this trouble to show Latour's move from >> irrealism >> > to realism (but not the na?ve realism of typical scientistic empiricism) >> is >> > because I would like to encourage critical realists not to quickly throw >> out >> > the baby with the bathwater, so to speak, when they decide to disregard >> > Latour's work. The reason we might want to engage with the work of >> Latour >> or >> > Donna Haraway (also a professed non realist) is because they have spent >> > years trying to understand how language can be used in a Machiavellian >> way >> > to oppress people. Bhaskar talks about oppressive demi-reality, and I >> > suspect that it is this demi-reality that these thinkers are engaging >> with, >> > albeit they say it is unreal. It is demi-reality which most needs our >> > attention right now, if we are to facilitate a move towards the >> flourishing >> > of humankind. >> > >> > There are other similarities between Latour and Critical Realism, such >> as >> > his objection to polemical debate and his talk about the oscillation >> between >> > naturalised facts and social construction (which reminds me of Sayer's >> > concept of the pomo flips). I think his humility in being able to adjust >> his >> > ideas in the face of contradictions, and his attempt to try and make his >> > ideas more inclusive (of totality), is a brilliant model of Critical >> Realist >> > praxis. We may not agree with everything Latour says, but we can learn a >> lot >> > from his humble academic process which, in allowing for the possibility >> of >> > mistake, gets him closer to an adequate conception. His ability to >> admit >> > the inadequacy of his early writing also shows that Khun was wrong about >> how >> > tightly academics cling to their theories... >> > >> > Mark Johnson was interested in the way that constructivism seems to be >> > quite humane, as it seems to avoid strong arguments about rightness and >> > wrongness. However, as Latour shows, even extremists/fundamentalists can >> now >> > make use of constructivism (e.g. we have fundamentalist Capitalists >> arguing >> > that global warming is just a construct). I have written too much >> already, >> > but Latour offers a way to be critical without being polemical. >> > >> > As far as our efforts to bring credibility to CR goes, to have a main >> > architect of the extreme social constructivist movement provide such >> > critique of that discipline, and to have that critique include a >> > revindication of realism, lends powerful support to our realist >> position. >> > However, this is not to say that Latour's position is as complete as >> > Bhaskar's (for example, as someone wrote earlier, it does not have a >> > conception of the stratification of reality). >> > >> > Again, apologies that my contribution has taken so long to be returned. >> > >> > Best wishes, >> > >> > Leigh >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto: >> > critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna >> > Sent: 25 August 2009 14:02 >> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS >> > >> > Hi David, hi all, >> > >> > first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really >> > insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your >> > mail when you state that Latour?s position can?t be reconciled - it is >> > just contradictory. I don?t know all of Latour?s work, but for example >> > in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his >> > "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong >> > constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout >> > the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn?s contradictory sentence that >> > scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don?t >> > do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, >> > like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just >> > constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real >> > formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common >> > cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). >> > Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an >> > "ontological tension", as one can?t talk about ontology in purely >> > epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are >> > then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments >> > in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be >> > rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? >> > Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour >> > and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all >> > the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and >> > that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it >> > has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others >> > is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, >> > as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by >> > scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing >> > of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability >> > unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in >> > general. >> > The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as >> > Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. >> > When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not >> > much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes >> > structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then >> > suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be >> > contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I >> > don?t know all of Latour?s work (or I am misstaken about his theory - >> > but one last thing: Latour?s very essayistic and loose style is not >> > really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more >> > confusion) >> > >> > best, >> > e >> > >> > d.eldervass at ntlworld.com schrieb: >> > > Hi Echna, and listers! >> > > >> > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this >> a >> > touch more coherently. >> > > >> > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to >> say >> > here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour >> > acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the >> empirical' >> > (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not >> > actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's >> > 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not >> observed >> by >> > human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon >> known >> > as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and >> theorised >> > by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and >> > common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it >> was >> > observed, but we just didn't know about it. >> > > >> > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this >> > contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm >> > offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered >> > explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong >> > constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll >> suggest >> > some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). >> > > >> > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious >> how >> > accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an >> authority >> > on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian >> constructivism >> > in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour >> > takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of >> > constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other >> humanities) >> > has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in >> > philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on >> > reflection. >> > > >> > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a >> very >> > odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until >> scientists >> > observe and theorise them? >> > > >> > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the >> > world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on >> the >> > categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of >> time, >> > space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We >> can >> > never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always >> filtered >> > through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we >> can >> > know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the >> > world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. >> So, >> > when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not >> > referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, >> but >> > to the world-as-we-experience-it. >> > > >> > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience >> > depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on >> > concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) >> > positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social >> > constructionists argue that these are social products, and although >> Latour >> > rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of >> > constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be >> taken >> > as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists employ >> > rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. >> > > >> > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our >> > categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical >> work, >> > then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when >> scientists >> > change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of >> > Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world >> > about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong >> > constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us >> of >> > the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out >> > there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by >> science, >> > therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence >> of >> > this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our >> > 'world'. >> > > >> > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not >> > aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for >> sure >> > whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way >> of >> > making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made >> within >> > the constructivist tradition. >> > > >> > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the >> > contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her >> excellent >> > book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of >> knowledge') >> > that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply >> > wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but >> they >> > are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have >> > enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our >> > categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of >> the >> > actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that >> enable >> > us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about >> our >> > environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those >> in >> > which our perceptual abilities developed). >> > > >> > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an >> influence >> > on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on >> our >> > perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between >> > reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is >> > difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the >> > world-in-itself. >> > > >> > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that >> the >> > descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves >> strongly >> > influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite >> of >> > the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories >> > implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. >> > > >> > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, >> I >> > have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost >> certainly >> > misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his >> > account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the >> > inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to >> > behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view >> > that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' >> > theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is >> > motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also >> some >> > recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This >> is >> > arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the >> > undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their >> > perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts >> to >> > approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including >> inanimate >> > objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other >> to >> > produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. >> > > >> > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim >> about >> > the phases of Venus. >> > > >> > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome >> views >> > on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to >> make >> > sense of Latour's ontology. >> > > >> > > Best, >> > > >> > > Dave >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > ---- d.eldervass at ntlworld.com wrote: >> > > >> > >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. >> > >> >> > > >> > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different >> > sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different >> > from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a >> pre-existing >> > external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't >> have >> > any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that >> > science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other >> > hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists >> describe >> > did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is >> difficult >> to >> > make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. >> He >> > seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a >> distinction >> > is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the >> > world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps = 'the phenomenal world' thought >> > interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' >> because >> > Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as >> if >> > the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they >> > only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no >> piont >> > in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is >> deemed >> to >> > depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as >> our >> > cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking >> at >> > the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of >> the >> > world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in >> > that world. >> > > >> > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that >> > (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! >> > > >> > > best >> > > >> > > Dave >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > ---- b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw wrote: >> > > >> > >> Hi Echna, >> > >> >> > > >> > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may >> > > be helpful too. >> > > >> > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency >> > > in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): >> > > 455-73. >> > > >> > > Best wishes, >> > > Poe >> > > >> > > Poe Yu-ze Wan >> > > Department of Sociology >> > > National Taiwan University >> > > >> > > >> > > ?? Matthew Smith : >> > > >> > > >> > >> Hi Echna, >> > >> >> > >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main >> > >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: >> > >> >> > >> >> http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-th >> eo.pdf >> ). >> > I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which >> > touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the >> > perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems >> literature >> > (here: >> > >> >> http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_us >> >> er=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=981 >> >> 817881&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0 >> &_userid=10&md5=67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d >> ). >> > If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently >> don't >> > have it online or accessible from where I currently >> > >> am. >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> Best, >> > >> Matthew >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> ----- Message initial ---- >> > >> De : echna >> > >> ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> > >> >> > >> Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s >> > >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS >> > >> >> > >> Hi all, >> > >> >> > >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from >> > >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" >> (STS) >> > >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can >> > >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and >> > >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in >> epistemological >> > >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by >> the >> > >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of >> ontology >> > >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik >> > >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno >> > >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law >> even >> > >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description >> of >> > >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the >> whole >> > >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind >> of >> > >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by >> either >> > >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the >> > list). >> > >> >> > >> best wishes, >> > >> e >> > >> >> > >> _______________________________________________ >> > >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel >> > >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ >> > >> >> > >> _______________________________________________ >> > >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> >> > >> >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > _______________________________________________ >> > > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > _______________________________________________ >> > > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > _______________________________________________ >> > > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> >> >> >> -- >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> ----- >> Mark Johnson >> Institute for Educational Cybernetics >> University of Bolton >> BL3 5AB >> Tel. 01204 903567 >> Mob. 0778 6064505 >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 >> *********************************************** >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > From gbrown at uow.edu.au Sun Sep 6 19:17:48 2009 From: gbrown at uow.edu.au (Gordon Brown) Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2009 11:17:48 +1000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] (no subject) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <324738CE-89E0-4CA6-80F8-2AAF2159C9C2@uow.edu.au> Hello Shiva, The Journal Of Critical Realism Vol 8.1 (2009) pp.5-34 has an article I have written making a case for a CR understanding of ontology as the basis for considering the learning environment as a starting point in education. In the article I mention a range of papers, chapters and books that have tackled education issues from a CR framework. This would be a good start for you. CR in education is starting to take off, and strangely a number of them are in Australia (I say strangely because of all the critical realists in Australia, a good many of them are working in education). Regards, Gordon On Sep 6, 2009, at 5:31 PM, shiva hemmati wrote: > Hello > I want to have Bhaskar's email if possible. > Is there any body who tried to see what the impelications of critical > realism are in education? > -- > best wishes > Shiva Hemati > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism Dr Gordon Brown Senior Lecturer, Curriculum and Teacher Education Director, BMathsEd and BScienceEd, Loftus Campus Coordinator, Curriculum and Pedagogy Faculty of Education University of Wollongong Wollongong NSW 2522 Australia Phone (work) 61 2 4221 3792 Fax (work) 61 2 4221 3892 From dpilgrim at uclan.ac.uk Mon Sep 7 01:27:11 2009 From: dpilgrim at uclan.ac.uk (David Pilgrim) Date: Mon, 07 Sep 2009 08:27:11 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Bhaskar, Latour and polemics Message-ID: <4AA4C3DF020000EB000B3E98@gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk> Dear Leigh, This is very clear and very helpful (about both Bhaskar and Latour). With regard to the immanent critique, there is much intellectual and ethical sense in this. Pursued properly it gets the best out of the critique and the attempt to empathise with the target of the critique. It also increases the chances of an open and respectful debate with those defending that target. However, in practice, given that viewpoints are often if, not invariably, bound up with interests and thus the passions these arouse, is it not common for an aggressive version of polemics to define the tone of most disputes? Those encouraging rhetorical inquiry (like Toulmin and Adler) maybe simply accept this as being inevitable to some degree and therefore suggest that we analyse disputes in relation to how the parties disagree in relation to conceptual, normative and ontological assumptions. (I find Toulmin's distinction in rhetorical inquiry between codified-law and common-law forms of argumentation useful, with the latter dominating 'hot' disputes.) As an onlooker to disputes and when I have been party to them at times, it strikes me that the worthy aspiration of Bhaskar and Latour has already failed most of the time. The only protection we usually have (in academic circles at least but not in politics) is the taboo on ad hominem ways of reasoning. Other than that (even in academic circles) commuinities of interest often simply talk past each other in a spirit of failed mutual empathy and Bhaskar's and Latour's aspiration is stillborn. Does this sound cynical? Have I had an atypically bad experience in the academy? Thanks for your thoughts on this. Dave When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 (Leigh Price) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2009 00:27:02 +0200 From: "Leigh Price" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Message-ID: <9004CD1FDD24450285528BF5449437DA at leighlaptop> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi David Before we can engage in a discussion of critical realism's relationship to polemics, we first have to recognise that there can be two definitions of polemics. For example, according to the Merriam-Webster online dictionary, polemics is: a : an aggressive attack on or refutation of the opinions or principles of another b : the art or practice of disputation or controversy Etymology: French pol?mique, from Middle French, from polemique controversial, from Greek polemikos warlike, hostile, from polemos war Critical realism is polemical in that it engages in disputation and it is certainly controversial. Bhaskar frequently uses the word 'polemic' in this sense. However, CR is not, I believe, polemical in the sense of being aggressive or warlike in its manner of disputation. One of the reasons that I assume critical realism avoids aggressive polemics is its method of arguing that Bhaskar calls immanent critique. In this method, according to Bhaskar, you don?t argue against a position from your own position, but rather argue against a position from the point of view of the position itself. Therefore, if I believe X and you Y, to argue for my position, I have to show that something in totality is inconsistent with Y. I would say that aggressive polemics is fuelled by the dichotomy of setting one's self up against an opposite position. Hartwig (2009) has suggested that such academic attacks (polemics) that are "hostile and ungenerous, philistine and shrill" ...systematically breach the cardinal principle of immanent critique "that the critic operate on the terrain of the account being criticised to demonstrate that it is beset with problems that can be resolved on its own terms. And that it is at odds with the logic of the 'critical realist' embrace: the fundamental drive of the system to transcend and heal division and split...". For example, Bhaskar does not set himself up against Kant and Hume. Rather he tries to embrace their insights whilst nevertheless addressing the absences in their work. From my notes, that I took when attending a CR seminar last year, Bhaskar asked, "So, were Hume and Kant were completely wrong? No, because there is something that would imply that ontology should collapse into epistemology?the 'natural attitude'?when we talk about the world, actually we talk about our knowledge about the world. We only really need to disambiguate ontology and epistemology when there is conflict and when we are researching." Similarly, we should aim not to set ourselves up against Latour, but to embrace his insights whilst addressing the problems in his work. The quote I have found for Latour (2004:246) that refers, I think, to his being against polemics of the aggressive sort, is: "The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from under the feet of na?ve believers, but the one who offers the participants arenas in which to gather." Specifically, Latour is here referring to the critic as a reformed deconstructionist, but I think the quote is relevant. I would have to say that Latour's general tone in this paper is one against 'debunking'. He links this debunking attitude to those critics who alternate "haphazardly between antifetishism and positivism like the drunk iconoclast drawn by Goya". If you are interested in people's quotes against aggressive polemics, you might also like this one by Foucault (1984) - apologies for its length: "Questions and answers depend on a game?a game that is at once pleasant and difficult?in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of dialogue. The polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a just undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner in search for the truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is armful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat. For him, then the game consists not of recognizing this person as a subject having the right to speak but of abolishing him as interlocutor, from any possible dialogue; and his final objective will be not to come as close as possible to a difficult truth but to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has been manifestly upholding from the beginning. The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that his adversary is by definition denied. Perhaps, someday, a long history will have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic figure on discussion and an obstacle to the search for the truth." Best regards, Leigh References Foucault, M (1984). Polemics, Politics and Problematizations Interview conducted by Paul Rabinow. Translation by Lydia Davis, volume 1 ?Ethics? of ?Essential Works of Foucault?, The New Press 1997. http://foucault.info/foucault/interview.html Hartwig, M (2009). 'Orthodox' critical realism and the critical realist embrace. JCR, 8.2: 233-257. Latour,B (2004). Why has critique run out of steam/ From matters of fact to matters of concern. Critical Inquiry 30 (winter): 225-248. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of David Pilgrim Sent: 03 September 2009 21:01 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu; critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 Thanks to Mark and Leigh for this illuminating exchange. Any references to the objections of RB and Latour to 'polemical debate' would be gratefully received. Dave David Pilgrim Professor of Mental Health Policy Department of Social Work Faculty of Health University of Central Lancashire Preston PR1 2HE Tel +44 (0)1772 893458 Fax +44 (0)1772 892974 Email DPilgrim at uclan.ac.uk David Pilgrim Professor of Mental Health Policy Department of Social Work Faculty of Health University of Central Lancashire Preston PR1 2HE Tel +44 (0)1772 893458 Fax +44 (0)1772 892974 Email DPilgrim at uclan.ac.uk >>> 03/09/09 7:00 PM >>> Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu From ruth at ruthnaylor.com Mon Sep 7 15:17:58 2009 From: ruth at ruthnaylor.com (Ruth T Naylor) Date: Mon, 07 Sep 2009 22:17:58 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 10 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4AA57886.3060109@ruthnaylor.com> Hello, I'm new to this forum and am returning briefly to philosophy (undergrad minor subject) after an extended absence (44 years) as I am now attempting to do PhD in Applied Psychology. I was recently told at a 'Post Human' conference point blank that CR and SC are incompatible. Please would some of you respond to this by outlining the incompatibilities and compatibilities between critical realism (any form) and social constructionism? If you could also see your way clear to discussing briefly any overlaps between CR and Buddhist Phenomenology (Lusthaus, for example), this would also be very helpful. Putting CR into context of Post Humanism would also be appreciated... Thank you, Ruth Naylor CCCU, Canterbury, Kent From rgroff at slu.edu Mon Sep 7 15:40:32 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2009 16:40:32 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 10 In-Reply-To: <4AA57886.3060109@ruthnaylor.com> References: <4AA57886.3060109@ruthnaylor.com> Message-ID: <6ad241360909071440u1d72fb74n5afcb9852d7245e@mail.gmail.com> Hi Ruth, A very good introduction to cr is Andrew Collier's CRITICAL REALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ROY BHASKAR'S PHILOSOPHY. It's back in print now, too. It might be an idea to read at least that, for yourself, so as to really be able to respond. I don't think I've ever actually said this on the list before, and I feel self-conscious doing it, but I wrote a book that might be of interest too, called CRITICAL REALISM, POST-POSITIVISM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE. It's in paper now. I follow the debates in question more from the perspective of philosophy than social theory, so I'm sure that others will have things to say that will be more pointed by way of response, but I will say this: everybody agrees that knowledge-claims (things people say, write, etc, about how they believe the world to be) are "socially constructed." People think things, say things, write things down; people do that, and they do it in given times and places. And pretty much everybody, I think, agrees that lots of other social/cultural artifacts besides knowledge-claims are "socially constructed" too. So what is the fuss about? What are the things that someone might thing are NOT socially constructed? One key thing that is not "constructed," from a cr perspective, is causality per se. Most people never actually think about causality per se, even most cr-ers, but it is in fact at the core of the metaphysics of the position, this point. Also, even setting aside the concept of "alethic truth," implicit in the idea of "rationality at the level of judgment" is the idea that what makes true beliefs true, when they are, is not that anyone agreed that they are. That is to say, cr involves what is called in philosophy a "non-epistemic" account of the meaning of the concept of truth. Beyond this, even in relation to those things that everyone agrees are socially constructed, from a cr perspective things are not voluntaristically constructed willy-nilly, let alone by individuals. There are always already existent social structures, for example, and social forms, in place, prior to anybody's "constructing" anything. These are just a few thoughts. I'm sure others will have more to say. Warmly, (also) Ruth On Mon, Sep 7, 2009 at 4:17 PM, Ruth T Naylor wrote: > Hello, > I'm new to this forum and am returning briefly to philosophy (undergrad > minor subject) after an extended absence (44 years) as I am now > attempting to do PhD in Applied Psychology. > I was recently told at a 'Post Human' conference point blank that CR and > SC are incompatible. > Please would some of you respond to this by outlining the > incompatibilities and compatibilities between critical realism (any > form) and social constructionism? > If you could also see your way clear to discussing briefly any overlaps > between CR and Buddhist Phenomenology (Lusthaus, for example), this > would also be very helpful. > Putting CR into context of Post Humanism would also be appreciated... > Thank you, > Ruth Naylor > CCCU, Canterbury, Kent > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From rgroff at slu.edu Mon Sep 7 15:42:29 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2009 16:42:29 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 10 In-Reply-To: <6ad241360909071440u1d72fb74n5afcb9852d7245e@mail.gmail.com> References: <4AA57886.3060109@ruthnaylor.com> <6ad241360909071440u1d72fb74n5afcb9852d7245e@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <6ad241360909071442p10342c9btd221df9374e86b02@mail.gmail.com> That's "... that someone might THINK ..." On Mon, Sep 7, 2009 at 4:40 PM, Ruth Groff wrote: > Hi Ruth, > > A very good introduction to cr is Andrew Collier's CRITICAL REALISM: AN > INTRODUCTION TO ROY BHASKAR'S PHILOSOPHY. It's back in print now, too. It > might be an idea to read at least that, for yourself, so as to really be > able to respond. I don't think I've ever actually said this on the list > before, and I feel self-conscious doing it, but I wrote a book that might be > of interest too, called CRITICAL REALISM, POST-POSITIVISM AND THE > POSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE. It's in paper now. > > I follow the debates in question more from the perspective of philosophy > than social theory, so I'm sure that others will have things to say that > will be more pointed by way of response, but I will say this: everybody > agrees that knowledge-claims (things people say, write, etc, about how they > believe the world to be) are "socially constructed." People think things, > say things, write things down; people do that, and they do it in given times > and places. And pretty much everybody, I think, agrees that lots of other > social/cultural artifacts besides knowledge-claims are "socially > constructed" too. > > So what is the fuss about? What are the things that someone might thing > are NOT socially constructed? > > One key thing that is not "constructed," from a cr perspective, is > causality per se. Most people never actually think about causality per se, > even most cr-ers, but it is in fact at the core of the metaphysics of the > position, this point. > > Also, even setting aside the concept of "alethic truth," implicit in the > idea of "rationality at the level of judgment" is the idea that what makes > true beliefs true, when they are, is not that anyone agreed that they are. > That is to say, cr involves what is called in philosophy a "non-epistemic" > account of the meaning of the concept of truth. > > Beyond this, even in relation to those things that everyone agrees are > socially constructed, from a cr perspective things are not voluntaristically > constructed willy-nilly, let alone by individuals. There are always already > existent social structures, for example, and social forms, in place, prior > to anybody's "constructing" anything. > > These are just a few thoughts. I'm sure others will have more to say. > > Warmly, > (also) Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Sep 7, 2009 at 4:17 PM, Ruth T Naylor wrote: > >> Hello, >> I'm new to this forum and am returning briefly to philosophy (undergrad >> minor subject) after an extended absence (44 years) as I am now >> attempting to do PhD in Applied Psychology. >> I was recently told at a 'Post Human' conference point blank that CR and >> SC are incompatible. >> Please would some of you respond to this by outlining the >> incompatibilities and compatibilities between critical realism (any >> form) and social constructionism? >> If you could also see your way clear to discussing briefly any overlaps >> between CR and Buddhist Phenomenology (Lusthaus, for example), this >> would also be very helpful. >> Putting CR into context of Post Humanism would also be appreciated... >> Thank you, >> Ruth Naylor >> CCCU, Canterbury, Kent >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > From F.Rab at gmx.net Mon Sep 7 15:52:05 2009 From: F.Rab at gmx.net (Florian Rabitz) Date: Mon, 07 Sep 2009 23:52:05 +0200 Subject: [Critical-Realism] material existence of abstractions and CR In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20090907215205.256590@gmx.net> Hello folks! I am really sorry if I am posing a stupid question, but I am very unclear about the following. Some days ago, I was in a discussion with somebody tending towards anarcho-capitalism, and his stance was that something called a "society" does not exist. Well this is somewhat of an old argument, really, but I asked myself, what is the CR position on this? I mean, would it be possible to say that a "society" (or, e.g., a "state", a "market economy" etc.) exists in a material kind of way? The last days, I have been thinking about wether talk of "society" is merely an abstraction for allowing a more macroscopic level of analysis. I have been thinking that abstraction per se is nothing more than an instrument for answering certain questions, but that the abstraction does not exist in any "real" way. But then I recalled Robert Cox talking about classes, and that classes are not merely abstractions. Instead, he says, "Class is to be understood as a real historical relationship and not as merely an analytical category". So now I am kind of in the dark, and this is really driving me up the wall. So if someone could offer me some clarification, I would be really grateful. Thanks a lot and good night, Florian -- Jetzt kostenlos herunterladen: Internet Explorer 8 und Mozilla Firefox 3 - sicherer, schneller und einfacher! http://portal.gmx.net/de/go/atbrowser From christian.fuchs at sbg.ac.at Mon Sep 7 16:43:04 2009 From: christian.fuchs at sbg.ac.at (Christian Fuchs) Date: Tue, 08 Sep 2009 00:43:04 +0200 Subject: [Critical-Realism] CfP: Call for Chapter Abstracts for the Book "The Internet & Surveillance" Message-ID: <4AA58C78.9020601@sbg.ac.at> CfP: Call for Chapter Abstracts for the Book "The Internet & Surveillance" PDF version of CfP: http://fuchs.uti.at/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/CfP_Internet_Surveillance.pdf Editors: Christian Fuchs, Kees Boersma, Anders Albrechtslund, Marisol Sandoval Supported by COST: European Cooperation in Science and Technology, COST Action Living in Surveillance Societies (LiSS, IS0807), Working Group 2: Surveillance Technologies in Practice Abstract submissions until October 15, 2009 (deadline) to christian.fuchs at sbg.ac.at The overall aim of this collected volume is to bring together contributions that show how surveillance works on the Internet and which risks are connected to Internet surveillance in general and surveillance connected to "web 2.0" and "social software" in particular. The publication and publishing process is part of the COST Action "Living in Surveillance Societies" (LiSS) that is funded by the European Science Foundation (2009-2012, see http://w3.cost.esf.org/index.php?id=233&action_number=IS0807 for further information and details) and is a project by the LiSS working group "Surveillance Technologies in Practice". The editors are members of this working group. Routledge has expressed interest in publishing this volume. The collection of data for organizing bureaucratic and economic life is inherent in modern society. At the same time that privacy has been postulated as important value of modern society, privacy-threatening surveillance mechanisms have been structurally implemented and institutionalized in modern society. This collected volume explores perspectives on privacy, surveillance, and the privacy-surveillance-paradox in relation to the Internet. Background Many observers claim that the Internet has been transformed in the past years from a system that is primarily oriented on information provision into a system that is more oriented on communication and community building. The notions of "web 2.0", "social Software", and "social network(ing) sites" have emerged in this context. Web platforms such as Wikipedia, MySpace, Facebook, YouTube, Google, Blogger, Rapidshare, Wordpress, Hi5, Flickr, Photobucket, Orkut, Skyrock, Twitter, YouPorn, PornHub, Youku, Orkut, Redtube, Friendster, Adultfriendfinder, Megavideo, Tagged, Tube8, Mediafire, Megaupload, Mixi, Livejournal, LinkedIn, Netlog, ThePirateBay, Orkut, XVideos, Metacafe, Digg, StudiVZ, etc are said to be typical for this transformation of the Internet. No matter if we agree that important transformations of the Internet have taken place or not, it is clear that a principle that underlies such platforms is the massive provision and storage of personal data that are systematically evaluated, marketed, and used for targeting users with advertising. In a world of global economic competition, economic crisis, and fear of terrorism after 9/11, especially two kinds of actors are interested in accessing such personal data: corporations on the one hand and state institutions on the other hand. Will the Internet under the current societal conditions advance the intensification and extension of surveillance so that a coercive and totalitarian surveillance society that George Orwell would have only thought about in his worst dreams will emerge or not? Are there counter-tendencies? The contributions in this book deal with these topics by elaborating theoretical concepts and presenting the results of empirical case studies. We are especially interested in papers that do not primarily discuss single examples, but attempt to discuss Internet surveillance from a broad perspective that takes into account societal contexts or that embed examples or case studies into the discussion of societal contexts. Research Questions Chapters could for example relate to one or more of the following questions: * What is electronic surveillance? What are specific qualities of electronic surveillance on the Internet? How does Internet surveillance differ from other forms of surveillance? * Which theories do we need for thinking about Internet & surveillance? How important (or how outdated) are the thoughts by Michel Foucault and George Orwell for studying surveillance on the Internet? How suitable are the theories of thinkers like Max Weber, Karl Marx, Anthony Giddens, and others for the analysis and conceptualization of Internet surveillance? * What is the relationship of privacy and surveillance in respect to the Internet? * What is privacy, how should it be defined, and how does it change in the age of the Internet? * Is Internet surveillance a form of "new surveillance" (Gary Marx)? What are the differences and commonalities between Internet surveillance and concepts such as computer surveillance, dataveillance (Roger Clarke), the electronic panopticon (Mark Poster), electronic surveillance (David Lyon), the panoptic sort (Oscar H. Gandy), social Taylorism of surveillance (Frank Webster, Kevin Robins), or the synopticon (Thomas Mathiesen)? * What are the normative and ethical implications of Internet & surveillance? * What is a surveillance society and what is the role of the Internet in surveillance society? Should the notions of surveillance and surveillance society be used as general, neutral terms or as negative terms? What are the implications of certain definitions of surveillance and surveillance society for studying the Internet? * What does it mean to study Internet & surveillance critically? What is a critical theory of Internet surveillance, what are critical studies of Internet & surveillance? What are the ontological, epistemological, methodological, and axiological dimensions of such studies? * What are central aspects of the political economy of surveillance on the Internet? * What is the role of surveillance for "web 2.0" and "social software"? How is surveillance connected with mass self-communication and communication power/counter-power (Manuel Castells) in web 2.0? * What is the role of surveillance on social networking sites such as MySpace and Facebook? * How is surveillance used in the Internet economy? What problems are connected to surveillance in the Internet economy? What is the role of surveillance for Internet business models? * How does targeted advertising work as economic mechanism for generating profit? What are the problems that are connected to it? * Presentation and generalization of case studies about how specific Internet platforms (Google, Facebook, MySpace, YouTube, etc) or applications use surveillance and about the connected problems and threats. * How are terms of use and privacy terms designed by Internet corporations in order to enable surveillance? What are the problems and societal implications connected to such practices? * How has surveillance on the Internet changed after 9/11? * Which different legal frameworks for surveillance on the Internet are there (international comparison) and how have they changed after 9/11? * What are the major threats and problems of surveillance on the Internet? * What is to be done in order to solve the problems that are connected to surveillance on the Internet? What is the role of information policies, data protection, governments, governance, civil society, and social movements in this respect? * How do social movements and groups that struggle against the establishment of a "maximum surveillance society" (Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong) make use of the Internet for cyberprotest and cyberactivism? * How do Internet & society have to be designed in order to avoid the emergence of a total surveillance society? Which alternative design principles for Internet & society are needed in this context? What is the role of privacy-enhancing Internet technologies in this context? * Which Internet surveillance technologies are there and how can they be systematically classified? * What is the role of surveillance and surveillance technologies in Internet-based eGovernment and eGovernance? Submission of Structured Abstracts: Please submit structured abstracts for chapter proposals, short author biography/biographies, and your contact details (in a word document) until October 15th, 2009 to Christian Fuchs by email: christian.fuchs at sbg.ac.at. The editors are interested in abstracts for original, unpublished contributions that have not been submitted for consideration in journals or other publications. The abstracts should adhere to the following structured format and should have approximately 650-900 words. (1) Purpose What are the reasons for writing this chapter? Why is the topic important? What are the aims of research? What are the research questions? (2) Approach/Theoretical framework/Design/Methodology How are the objectives achieved? Include the main method(s) used for the research [theory construction is also considered as a method in this context]. What is the approach to the topic and what is the theoretical or subject scope of the paper? (3) Findings What was found in the course of the work? What are the main results presented in the chapter? This will refer to analysis, discussion, or results. (4) Research limitations/implications (if applicable) Suggestions for future research and any identified limitations in the research process. Implications for academic fields, disciplines, state of the art. (4) Practical and societal implications (if applicable) What outcomes and implications for practice, applications and consequences are identified? How will the research impact upon society? How will it influence public attitudes? How could it inform civil society or public or industry policy? What changes to human practices should be made as a result of this research? How might it affect quality of life? Not all chapters must necessarily have practical and societal implications. (5) Originality/value What is new in the paper? How does it differ from and go beyond the state of the art in respective research fields? State the value of the paper and for whom it is relevant. Author short biographies should be approximately 200-300 words and contain information on academic position, institutional affiliation, research interests and topics, major publications, projects, networks, affiliations, roles, etc. Time Schedule October 15, 2009: deadline for the submission of structured abstracts of chapter proposals End of October 2009: notification of authors on acceptance/decline of proposals; submission of the overall proposal, abstracts, author data to Routledge End of November 2009: decision on publication by the publisher End of September 2010: deadline for the submission of full chapters (further details will be announced) End of November 2010: feedback of review comments to the authors End of December 2010: submission of final versions of chapters January 2011: submission of final manuscript to the publisher About the Editors Christian Fuchs is associate professor for ICTs and society at the University of Salzburg, Austria. He is management committee member of the ESF COST Action "Living in Surveillance Society" (LiSS) and member of the LiSS working group "Surveillance Technologies in Practice". Kees Boersma is associate professor for science and technology studies at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands. He is leader of the working group "Surveillance Technologies in Practice" and management committee member of the ESF Cost Action "Living in Surveillance Societies". Anders Albrechtslund is assistant professor for surveillance and ethics at Aalborg University, Denmark. He is management committee member of the ESF Cost Action "Living in Surveillance Societies" and member of the LiSS working group "Surveillance Technologies in Practice". Marisol Sandoval is research associate at the University of Salzburg, Austria. She is member of the working group "Surveillance Technologies in Practice" of the ESF Cost Action "Living in Surveillance Societies". - - - Priv.-Doz. Dr. Christian Fuchs Associate Professor Unified Theory of Information Research Group ICT&S Center University of Salzburg Sigmund Haffner Gasse 18 5020 Salzburg Austria christian.fuchs at sbg.ac.at Phone +43 662 8044 4823 Personal Website: http://fuchs.uti.at Research Group: http;//www.uti.at Editor of tripleC - Cognition, Communication, Co-Operation | Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society http://www.triple-c.at Fuchs, Christian. 2008. Internet and Society: Social Theory in the Information Age. New York: Routledge. http://fuchs.uti.at/?page_id=40 From rgroff at slu.edu Mon Sep 7 17:13:58 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2009 18:13:58 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] material existence of abstractions and CR In-Reply-To: <20090907215205.256590@gmx.net> References: <20090907215205.256590@gmx.net> Message-ID: <6ad241360909071613r68bad5d1t9c16261502cae4c4@mail.gmail.com> Hi Florian, Yes, an old argument. The view that it is only individuals and aggregates thereof who exist is called atomism. The view that properly sociological entities exist is called holism. Most cr-ers are holists. But there are cr-friendly people who are atomists, e.g., Harre. One way to argue for the existence of a "society" from a cr perspective (or other sociological entities) is on the grounds that it has causal properties that individuals do not. Cox (and you) are right, though: the ontological question of what exists is different from the epistemic one of which question it suits you to ask. r. On Mon, Sep 7, 2009 at 4:52 PM, Florian Rabitz wrote: > Hello folks! > > I am really sorry if I am posing a stupid question, but I am very unclear > about the following. Some days ago, I was in a discussion with somebody > tending towards anarcho-capitalism, and his stance was that something called > a "society" does not exist. Well this is somewhat of an old argument, > really, but I asked myself, what is the CR position on this? I mean, would > it be possible to say that a "society" (or, e.g., a "state", a "market > economy" etc.) exists in a material kind of way? > > The last days, I have been thinking about wether talk of "society" is > merely an abstraction for allowing a more macroscopic level of analysis. I > have been thinking that abstraction per se is nothing more than an > instrument for answering certain questions, but that the abstraction does > not exist in any "real" way. But then I recalled Robert Cox talking about > classes, and that classes are not merely abstractions. Instead, he says, > "Class is to be understood as a real historical relationship and not as > merely an analytical category". So now I am kind of in the dark, and this is > really driving me up the wall. So if someone could offer me some > clarification, I would be really grateful. > > Thanks a lot and good night, > > Florian > -- > Jetzt kostenlos herunterladen: Internet Explorer 8 und Mozilla Firefox 3 - > sicherer, schneller und einfacher! http://portal.gmx.net/de/go/atbrowser > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From chanzo.osei at gmail.com Tue Sep 8 03:17:50 2009 From: chanzo.osei at gmail.com (Chanzo Greenidge) Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2009 12:17:50 +0300 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Politics of Truth Message-ID: Hello, I'm in the middle of preparing a submission to the upcoming JCR issue on CR and Postcolonial theory, so I'm thinking out loud and hoping for feedback. I have two questions: one was on the continued use of the terms social, hard and natural science in Critical Realism. Is it worth fighting to change/replace these terms altogether or simply focus on clarifying their historical origins? The other is on the politics of truth. CR seems to be a powerful means of interrogating what is truth. I find CR attractive in part because of its fundamental concerned with interrogation of the scientific method, and also its allowance (in my view) for the coexistence of multiple problematiques in the field of international relations. However, it appears to me that the problematiques undertaken by countries and political leaders in the Global South are as much about the versions of the story which are pleasing to funders, more powerful or influential state actors and their own internal political support bases as they are about developing a clear understanding of the situations they face. How does CR respond when self-delusion and misrepresentation are such profitable endeavours? Or simply less painful. Does CR offer the same prescriptions as Peripheral Realism (i.e. keep your head down and focus on your 'own business') or is there more? All the best, CG -- Chanzo Greenidge Co-ordinator BRAVO Language Services Ltd. Tel:(868)375-8707 Fax:(270)588-1110 E-mail:chanzo7 at bravocom.net Web: www.bravocom.net From pip.boucher at gmail.com Tue Sep 8 03:41:13 2009 From: pip.boucher at gmail.com (Philip Boucher) Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2009 10:41:13 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] material existence of abstractions and CR Message-ID: Hiya, CR would say that society and social objects do exist, because social objects (e.g. values, aspirations, interest rates) possess causal power. In terms of how they might have a material existence (which is a different question to their having a bona fide existence) you could use emergence- a social reality emerges from biological and other material realities, they are constituted by them. The following might be good for this: ELDER-VASS, D. (2005) Emergence and the Realist Account of Cause. Journal of Critical Realism, 4, 315-338. COLLIER, A. (1989) Scientific Realism and Socialist Thought, Hertfordshire, Harvester Wheatsheaf. Another way in which the socially real might be considered materially real is in artifacts (this is related to emergence- it might just be a more specific example of it). Artifacts have material and social (Fleetwood would say 'ideally real') dimensions, see here- FLEETWOOD, S. (2005) Ontology in Organization and Management Studies: A Critical Realist Perspective. Organization, 12, 197-222. Lawson has discussed these in the context of technological artifacts whereby, for instance, a design process includes a materialisation of social values, aspirations, desires etc, which adds a durability to their concept-time-space dependency. This is laid out here: LAWSON, C. (2008) An Ontology of Technology. Techn?, 12, 48-64. Thanks everyone for your interesting discussion! Cheers, Philip -- http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/generate/staffprint/staff-view.php?id=4153 From rgroff at slu.edu Tue Sep 8 07:22:00 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2009 08:22:00 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Politics of Truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <6ad241360909080622s7c5569c0ob3e68e32568de304@mail.gmail.com> Hi Chanzo, Philosophically speaking, the issue in question is that of verification: how do you know if the theory you or someone else is advancing is true or not? At least in his earlier work, Bhaskar's position (and so: one cr position, anyway) was that there are no trans-theoretical justification criteria, other than something like "Go with the theory that explains the most the best"; the case just has to be made at the level of content, i.e., "Look, theory x falls apart in this way here." This said, the cr concepts of "rationality at the level of judgment" and of "explanatory critique," for example, illustrate the sense in which the idea is indeed to engage with competing accounts, to try to show them to be flawed or false, if they are. r. On Tue, Sep 8, 2009 at 4:17 AM, Chanzo Greenidge wrote: > Hello, > > I'm in the middle of preparing a submission to the upcoming JCR issue on CR > and Postcolonial theory, so I'm thinking out loud and hoping for feedback. > > I have two questions: one was on the continued use of the terms social, > hard > and natural science in Critical Realism. Is it worth fighting to > change/replace these terms altogether or simply focus on clarifying their > historical origins? > > The other is on the politics of truth. CR seems to be a powerful means of > interrogating what is truth. > > I find CR attractive in part because of its fundamental concerned with > interrogation of the scientific method, and also its allowance (in my view) > for the coexistence of multiple problematiques in the field of > international > relations. > > However, it appears to me that the problematiques undertaken by countries > and political leaders in the Global South are as much about the versions of > the story which are pleasing to funders, more powerful or influential state > actors and their own internal political support bases as they are about > developing a clear understanding of the situations they face. > > How does CR respond when self-delusion and misrepresentation are > such profitable endeavours? Or simply less painful. Does CR offer the same > prescriptions as Peripheral Realism (i.e. keep your head down and focus on > your 'own business') or is there more? > > > All the best, > CG > > -- > Chanzo Greenidge > Co-ordinator > BRAVO Language Services Ltd. > > Tel:(868)375-8707 > Fax:(270)588-1110 > E-mail:chanzo7 at bravocom.net < > E-mail%3Achanzo7 at bravocom.net > > Web: www.bravocom.net > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From lefouque at gmail.com Tue Sep 8 09:14:01 2009 From: lefouque at gmail.com (Ng Foo Keong) Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2009 23:14:01 +0800 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 11 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <14a6419f0909080814k7f069c9te759f3ffde5a3664@mail.gmail.com> Ruth Groff said "One key thing that is not 'constructed,' from a cr perspective, is causality per se. Most people never actually think about causality per se, even most cr-ers, but it is in fact at the core of the metaphysics of the position, this point." don't Einstein's Theories of Relativity call to question the notion of "simultaneity", and hence "causality"? and if i remember correctly, there is also a critique of the idea of "causality" by Lincoln and Guba's <>. regardless of the social constructedness of scientific theories like Einstein's, it may well be true that "causality" is something our human minds impose on reality, rather than reality itself (whatever it is). thus i am open to the possibility that our intuitions about 'casuality' could be misplaced. could we be self-deluded regarding "causality"? why / why not? any comments on this? Sophus F K Ng From rgroff at slu.edu Tue Sep 8 10:44:05 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2009 11:44:05 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 11 In-Reply-To: <14a6419f0909080814k7f069c9te759f3ffde5a3664@mail.gmail.com> References: <14a6419f0909080814k7f069c9te759f3ffde5a3664@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <6ad241360909080944t26bdd2f7ufede3f99b1c163c5@mail.gmail.com> Yes, the view that causality is a construct imported into experience (a priori, via the synthetic operation of reason) is Kant's. Kant called the view "transcendental idealism," contrasting it with the view that he dismissed, which he called transcendental realism. Bhaskar's first book, A REALIST THEORY OF SCIENCE was an argument against Kant and Hume alike, on this issue (though Bhaskar focused more on the Humean version of anti-realism about causality than on Kant's version). Bhaskar called his own, essentially Aristotelian position (pun fitting, if not intended) "transcendental realism." What is sometimes called "dispositional realism" is becoming an increasingly influential position within analytic metaphysics. This does not mean that Kant is wrong, of course, and/or that there are genuinely dispositional properties (or powers) the display of which is what causality is. But for better or for worse the claim that there are such things, and that causality is grounded in them, is the metaphysical core of critical realism. So it's the thing to come to terms with, when one is evaluating cr on philosophical grounds. It's interesting to ask how the view relates to the latest scientific thinking. Chris Norris recently wrote a book on this issue, about quantum theory, though I haven't read it. A REALIST THEORY OF SCIENCE is a very good book. Anyone attracted to critical realism really should read it -- I mean just to see what the position is. Warmly, Ruth On Tue, Sep 8, 2009 at 10:14 AM, Ng Foo Keong wrote: > Ruth Groff said "One key thing that is not 'constructed,' from a cr > perspective, > is causality per se. Most people never actually think about causality per > se, > even most cr-ers, but it is in fact at the core of the metaphysics of the > position, this point." > > don't Einstein's Theories of Relativity call to question the notion of > "simultaneity", and hence "causality"? and if i remember correctly, there > is > also a critique of the idea of "causality" by Lincoln and Guba's > < Inquiry>>. > > regardless of the social constructedness of scientific theories like > Einstein's, > it may well be true that "causality" is something our human minds impose > on reality, rather than reality itself (whatever it is). thus i am open to > the > possibility that our intuitions about 'casuality' could be misplaced. > could we > be self-deluded regarding "causality"? why / why not? > > any comments on this? > > Sophus F K Ng > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From R.Dsouza1 at westminster.ac.uk Wed Sep 9 04:34:37 2009 From: R.Dsouza1 at westminster.ac.uk (Radha D'Souza) Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2009 11:34:37 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Politics of Truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <999A7C2B264EA640B183B790D772DE76A4411E@isls-exch-be-1.intranet.wmin.ac.uk> Dear Chanzo, I am not sure if I have understood your questions correctly. Do you mean should you use terms such as 'social' in their philosophical sense or sociological sense? If that is the case I guess it would depend on your objectives for the piece. For me the difficulty in relation to Southern societies is that if we use the terms in their philosophical sense, we end up with concepts, categories etc developed through processes of abstraction and requirements of logical consistency and then we are often left with the problem of the usefulness of the concepts and categories to explain the differences in history and sociology of Southern societies in particular their subordinate status since the rise of capitalism. If we start with historical/sociological accounts we are left with the problem of developing philosophical categories, concepts that are adequate to accommodate the historical and sociological differences. In practice, our positions remain trapped between the old problem of dependency/world systems theories and postcolonialism/postmodernism. What I am saying is If we extend the use of the term 'social' etc unproblematically, in the same sort of way for dominant and subordinated societies the language of social theory will be at variance with the experience of reality - i.e. a tension between the philosophical and sociological content of the of the terms - and if you focus on historical origins then you don't have the vocabulary to articulate the differences in the historical experiences of subordinate/dominant societies in theoretically consistent ways. This is the challenge. Personally I feel CR raises more questions than answers when applied to problems of the South. As to your second question on the politics of truth, I guess again, it will depend on whether the question is a philosophical one or a sociological one. As a sociological question I think there are many who have answered it in terms of conventional Marxist ideas such as 'crony capitalism' camprador bourgeoisie, social structures and the place of agents within it, power, class interests etc. As a philosophical question I guess the politics of truth operates at different levels: at the level of the empirical, in political economy, politics of aid whatever, at another level -the actual - it is the politics of half-truths, or partial truths or false perceptions of reality, what CR-ists would call demi-reality - where a Southern leader for example may believe that by signing up to World Bank conditions their societies stand to gain more than they stand to lose. At a higher level it could be a politics of ignorance - ignorance of the nature of the world, or emergent possibilities, ignorance of Reality, what is entailed in master-slave type relations- understanding reality in terms of what we say about it-what CR-ists would call irrealism. Personally I believe our desire to critique Eurocentrism, and transcend it remains just that - a desire, an aspiration, something we wish we could do, but do not know how to. What I find fascinating about CR is while at the analytic/philosophical level it offers so much, at the level of applied social theory, it can be used to support practically any brand of politics - from conservative charity/social service variety to radical/revolutionary movements - and to many in the South this is troublesome. I look forward to reading your piece. Best wishes, Radha -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Chanzo Greenidge Sent: 08 September 2009 10:18 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [Critical-Realism] Politics of Truth Hello, I'm in the middle of preparing a submission to the upcoming JCR issue on CR and Postcolonial theory, so I'm thinking out loud and hoping for feedback. I have two questions: one was on the continued use of the terms social, hard and natural science in Critical Realism. Is it worth fighting to change/replace these terms altogether or simply focus on clarifying their historical origins? The other is on the politics of truth. CR seems to be a powerful means of interrogating what is truth. I find CR attractive in part because of its fundamental concerned with interrogation of the scientific method, and also its allowance (in my view) for the coexistence of multiple problematiques in the field of international relations. However, it appears to me that the problematiques undertaken by countries and political leaders in the Global South are as much about the versions of the story which are pleasing to funders, more powerful or influential state actors and their own internal political support bases as they are about developing a clear understanding of the situations they face. How does CR respond when self-delusion and misrepresentation are such profitable endeavours? Or simply less painful. Does CR offer the same prescriptions as Peripheral Realism (i.e. keep your head down and focus on your 'own business') or is there more? All the best, CG -- Chanzo Greenidge Co-ordinator BRAVO Language Services Ltd. Tel:(868)375-8707 Fax:(270)588-1110 E-mail:chanzo7 at bravocom.net Web: www.bravocom.net _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism -- The University of Westminster is a charity and a company limited by guarantee. Registration number: 977818 England. Registered Office: 309 Regent Street, London W1B 2UW, UK. From alperaslan79 at gmail.com Thu Sep 10 05:07:45 2009 From: alperaslan79 at gmail.com (Alper Aslan) Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2009 14:07:45 +0300 Subject: [Critical-Realism] judgemental rationality Message-ID: Hi all, my question is about judgemental rationality. Is there any criteria for comparing two different theories? How can we evaluate their truthlikeness? Best Alper From rgroff at slu.edu Thu Sep 10 08:03:30 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2009 09:03:30 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] judgemental rationality In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <6ad241360909100703j2a6020b3td8008028370bb2a3@mail.gmail.com> There was a protracted discussion about this on the list about 10 or 12 years ago ... don't know if those threads are archived, but if so they might be of interest. Certainly in Bhaskar's older work, the view was - as I said - that there are not criteria other than "greater explanatory power." There is one unfortunate spot where this is cashed out in some sort of straight-forwardly quantitative way, in terms of accounting for "more" facts, but I don't think one has to worry unduly about this. I remember arguing that I sort of thought that we might NEED some criteria, that the treatment of justification was unsatisfying. I remember Doug Porpora being in on the discussion, though not for sure what his position was. I don't know that I think what I thought then any more. I might; I'm just not sure. Anyway, just because this was RB's view, doesn't mean it's right or that it's everyone's who thinks of themselves as friendly to cr. But it makes it something like the "default" cr view. There's a little bit of discussion of it at the very end of RTS. There it's got a kind of Althusserian flavor. It's also in Reclaiming Reality. r. On Thu, Sep 10, 2009 at 6:07 AM, Alper Aslan wrote: > Hi all, my question is about judgemental rationality. Is there any criteria > for comparing two different theories? How can we evaluate their > truthlikeness? > Best > > Alper > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk Thu Sep 10 20:14:30 2009 From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2009 03:14:30 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] concrete utopia Message-ID: Dear List if anybody has a copy of Dictionary of Critical Realism to hand could you be so kind as to give me the page reference for the following line taken from the entry on "concrete utopianism" "Concrete *utopianism* is grounded in, among other things, a keen sense of he reality and ontological primacy of unactualized possibility" thanks phil From rgroff at slu.edu Thu Sep 10 20:43:52 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2009 21:43:52 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] concrete utopia In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <6ad241360909101943r1c4b10e5kdfa3e4acfd62e5cc@mail.gmail.com> p. 75 in my copy. On Thu, Sep 10, 2009 at 9:14 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon < pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote: > Dear List > > if anybody has a copy of Dictionary of Critical Realism to hand could you > be so kind as to give me the page reference for the following line taken > from the entry on "concrete utopianism" > > "Concrete *utopianism* is grounded in, among other things, a keen sense of > he reality and ontological primacy of unactualized possibility" > > thanks > phil > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk Fri Sep 11 23:14:00 2009 From: matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk (Karl Maton) Date: Sat, 12 Sep 2009 15:14:00 +1000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] New Critical Realism Seminar Message-ID: <4AAB2E18.3090902@yahoo.co.uk> Getting Real: AACR Seminars and Discussions The Australasian Association for Critical Realism (AACR)is pleased to announce the latest in a new series of seminars, to be held at the University of Sydney. Wednesday 30th September 6.30pm Room 148 (downstairs) R.C. Mills Building University of Sydney No one said this was going to be easy! Journeying from underlabouring to debates in meta-theory and education Alison Gable, School of Education, University of Queensland In an effort to explore why inclusive forms of education still elude certain cohorts of school student, her research has focused on the collaborative, adult working relationships supporting students with disabilities who are perceived to have challenging behaviour. However her study has also focused on the process of research and the implications of applying a critical realist framework to a complex phenomenon. While this has resulted in some questions about the limitations of critical realist research, it has also positioned the research problem within much larger and significant debates concerning theory, school reform and the philosophy of inclusion. We adjourn to the pub afterwards as well. PLEASE send this on to anyone in your Dept or Faculty you think might be interested! Thanks. -- With best wishes, Karl ---- Dr Karl Maton Department of Sociology & Social Policy Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney http://www.KarlMaton.com Editorial Board, Journal of Critical Realism President, Australasian Association for Critical Realism From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk Sat Sep 12 19:09:08 2009 From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2009 02:09:08 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] concrete utopia Message-ID: Thanks Ruth. Re, concrete utopia, this is paralleled with Eric Olin Wright's "Real Utopias" project: http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/RealUtopias.htm phil From nellhaus at mail.com Sun Sep 13 13:35:29 2009 From: nellhaus at mail.com (Tobin Nellhaus) Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2009 15:35:29 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Historiographical definition help? Message-ID: <40BA67D2C32C4B57921451B99EC691AD@Godiva> Hi folks, Pardon an off-topic question but I figured some of you could help, since I'm struggling for the right phrase to define a historical period that many of you know something about. There is (at least to my mind) a certain continuity of the period ranging from the late 17th century through the early 20th. This is the period in which empiricism and positivism developed and dominated philosophically -- which is not to say they're dead yet, but clearly those ideas started taking a beating during the inter-war years and still more with postmodernism. The "modern era" (or "modernity") doesn't seem right since from many perspectives, that began around 1600. Would the "bourgeois era" fit? Is there a better term? (Please don't argue with my periodization or I'll shoot myself!) Thanks, T. --- Tobin Nellhaus nellhaus at mail.com "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce From rgroff at slu.edu Sun Sep 13 14:39:55 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2009 15:39:55 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Historiographical definition help? In-Reply-To: <40BA67D2C32C4B57921451B99EC691AD@Godiva> References: <40BA67D2C32C4B57921451B99EC691AD@Godiva> Message-ID: <6ad241360909131339i65ab569eh8844fcfa29e8d4ac@mail.gmail.com> If you're talking philosophy, I think it's fine to call it "modern." On Sun, Sep 13, 2009 at 2:35 PM, Tobin Nellhaus wrote: > Hi folks, > > Pardon an off-topic question but I figured some of you could help, since > I'm > struggling for the right phrase to define a historical period that many of > you know something about. There is (at least to my mind) a certain > continuity of the period ranging from the late 17th century through the > early 20th. This is the period in which empiricism and positivism > developed > and dominated philosophically -- which is not to say they're dead yet, but > clearly those ideas started taking a beating during the inter-war years and > still more with postmodernism. The "modern era" (or "modernity") doesn't > seem right since from many perspectives, that began around 1600. Would the > "bourgeois era" fit? Is there a better term? > > (Please don't argue with my periodization or I'll shoot myself!) > > Thanks, > > T. > > --- > Tobin Nellhaus > nellhaus at mail.com > "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw Sun Sep 13 14:46:54 2009 From: b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw (Poe Yu-ze Wan) Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2009 04:46:54 +0800 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Historiographical definition help? In-Reply-To: <40BA67D2C32C4B57921451B99EC691AD@Godiva> References: <40BA67D2C32C4B57921451B99EC691AD@Godiva> Message-ID: <4eb733d00909131346y67427a09ifb50d03cbc2d2797@mail.gmail.com> Hi Tobin, How about "from the Enlightenment to the early 20th century"? The Enlightenment is often (though not always) regarded as beginning from the late 17th century. (Newton's Principia Mathematica, for example, was published in 1687.) As for the term "bourgeois era," it seems to refer to a later period beginning from, say, the mid-18th century (though it began much earlier in England, of course). Best, Poe Poe Yu-ze Wan Department of Sociology National Taiwan University 2009/9/14 Tobin Nellhaus > Hi folks, > > Pardon an off-topic question but I figured some of you could help, since > I'm > struggling for the right phrase to define a historical period that many of > you know something about. There is (at least to my mind) a certain > continuity of the period ranging from the late 17th century through the > early 20th. This is the period in which empiricism and positivism > developed > and dominated philosophically -- which is not to say they're dead yet, but > clearly those ideas started taking a beating during the inter-war years and > still more with postmodernism. The "modern era" (or "modernity") doesn't > seem right since from many perspectives, that began around 1600. Would the > "bourgeois era" fit? Is there a better term? > > (Please don't argue with my periodization or I'll shoot myself!) > > Thanks, > > T. > > --- > Tobin Nellhaus > nellhaus at mail.com > "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From nellhaus at mail.com Sun Sep 13 20:04:21 2009 From: nellhaus at mail.com (Tobin Nellhaus) Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2009 22:04:21 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Historiographical definition help? In-Reply-To: <4eb733d00909131346y67427a09ifb50d03cbc2d2797@mail.gmail.com> References: <40BA67D2C32C4B57921451B99EC691AD@Godiva> <4eb733d00909131346y67427a09ifb50d03cbc2d2797@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <9C8ACB81027B4A24A887552BDC0AE89B@Godiva> Hi-- To answer Ruth, yes I'm speaking of philosophy, but to an audience that knows fairly little about it: theater scholars, most of whom are mainly interested in theater from 1870 on, which is what they mean by "modern drama" -- which makes the word "modern" *very* confusing! And to answer Poe, yes I'm discussing England, at least for the start of the period (the formation of civil society etc). Unfortunately the phrase "from the Enlightenment to the early 20th century" simply demarcates a time period: I want to characterize its continuity. So maybe "bouregois era" is it, though I'm still wary. Keep 'em coming! Thanks, T. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Poe Yu-ze Wan" To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Sent: Sunday, September 13, 2009 4:46 PM Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Historiographical definition help? > Hi Tobin, > > How about "from the Enlightenment to the early 20th century"? The > Enlightenment is often (though not always) regarded as beginning from the > late 17th century. (Newton's Principia Mathematica, for example, was > published in 1687.) As for the term "bourgeois era," it seems to refer to > a > later period beginning from, say, the mid-18th century (though it began > much > earlier in England, of course). > > Best, > > Poe > Poe Yu-ze Wan > Department of Sociology > National Taiwan University > 2009/9/14 Tobin Nellhaus > >> Hi folks, >> >> Pardon an off-topic question but I figured some of you could help, since >> I'm >> struggling for the right phrase to define a historical period that many >> of >> you know something about. There is (at least to my mind) a certain >> continuity of the period ranging from the late 17th century through the >> early 20th. This is the period in which empiricism and positivism >> developed >> and dominated philosophically -- which is not to say they're dead yet, >> but >> clearly those ideas started taking a beating during the inter-war years >> and >> still more with postmodernism. The "modern era" (or "modernity") doesn't >> seem right since from many perspectives, that began around 1600. Would >> the >> "bourgeois era" fit? Is there a better term? >> >> (Please don't argue with my periodization or I'll shoot myself!) >> >> Thanks, >> >> T. >> >> --- >> Tobin Nellhaus >> nellhaus at mail.com >> "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From rgroff at slu.edu Sun Sep 13 20:29:06 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2009 21:29:06 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Historiographical definition help? In-Reply-To: <9C8ACB81027B4A24A887552BDC0AE89B@Godiva> References: <40BA67D2C32C4B57921451B99EC691AD@Godiva> <4eb733d00909131346y67427a09ifb50d03cbc2d2797@mail.gmail.com> <9C8ACB81027B4A24A887552BDC0AE89B@Godiva> Message-ID: <6ad241360909131929y1da0444bo6af923f9e05ed320@mail.gmail.com> What about either just naming the actual positions in question? Or saying something like "the period during which empiricism comes to the fore"" Or saying "modern, by which I mean blank-to-blank"? Keep us posted. On Sun, Sep 13, 2009 at 9:04 PM, Tobin Nellhaus wrote: > Hi-- > > To answer Ruth, yes I'm speaking of philosophy, but to an audience that > knows fairly little about it: theater scholars, most of whom are mainly > interested in theater from 1870 on, which is what they mean by "modern > drama" -- which makes the word "modern" *very* confusing! And to answer > Poe, yes I'm discussing England, at least for the start of the period (the > formation of civil society etc). Unfortunately the phrase "from the > Enlightenment to the early 20th century" simply demarcates a time period: I > want to characterize its continuity. So maybe "bouregois era" is it, > though > I'm still wary. > > Keep 'em coming! > > Thanks, > > T. > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Poe Yu-ze Wan" > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Sent: Sunday, September 13, 2009 4:46 PM > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Historiographical definition help? > > > > Hi Tobin, > > > > How about "from the Enlightenment to the early 20th century"? The > > Enlightenment is often (though not always) regarded as beginning from the > > late 17th century. (Newton's Principia Mathematica, for example, was > > published in 1687.) As for the term "bourgeois era," it seems to refer to > > a > > later period beginning from, say, the mid-18th century (though it began > > much > > earlier in England, of course). > > > > Best, > > > > Poe > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > > Department of Sociology > > National Taiwan University > > 2009/9/14 Tobin Nellhaus > > > >> Hi folks, > >> > >> Pardon an off-topic question but I figured some of you could help, since > >> I'm > >> struggling for the right phrase to define a historical period that many > >> of > >> you know something about. There is (at least to my mind) a certain > >> continuity of the period ranging from the late 17th century through the > >> early 20th. This is the period in which empiricism and positivism > >> developed > >> and dominated philosophically -- which is not to say they're dead yet, > >> but > >> clearly those ideas started taking a beating during the inter-war years > >> and > >> still more with postmodernism. The "modern era" (or "modernity") > doesn't > >> seem right since from many perspectives, that began around 1600. Would > >> the > >> "bourgeois era" fit? Is there a better term? > >> > >> (Please don't argue with my periodization or I'll shoot myself!) > >> > >> Thanks, > >> > >> T. > >> > >> --- > >> Tobin Nellhaus > >> nellhaus at mail.com > >> "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From bwanika at yahoo.com Sun Sep 13 23:51:31 2009 From: bwanika at yahoo.com (BD_wanika) Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2009 22:51:31 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Critical-Realism] Research Projects at Kampala University Message-ID: <523840.77467.qm@web58405.mail.re3.yahoo.com> CR Listers! You can initiate and work on your own research project with the support of?Kampala University in Uganda. Just write to the Vice Chancellor Professor Kateregga at vc at ku.ac.ug or to the Vice Chancellor Professor Emeritus A.B.T. Akiiki deputy vice chancellor academics dvc at ku.ac.ug Daniel From marie.moran at ucd.ie Mon Sep 14 02:42:55 2009 From: marie.moran at ucd.ie (Marie Moran) Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2009 09:42:55 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Historiographical definition help? In-Reply-To: <9C8ACB81027B4A24A887552BDC0AE89B@Godiva> References: <40BA67D2C32C4B57921451B99EC691AD@Godiva> <4eb733d00909131346y67427a09ifb50d03cbc2d2797@mail.gmail.com> <9C8ACB81027B4A24A887552BDC0AE89B@Godiva> Message-ID: Hello, I've had a similar query before, and I settled on 'the age of reason' to cover the period in question, and to indicate the faith in positivism and scientific progress characterizing the period more generally. Maybe this would work? I also understand the predicament with the use of the term 'modern' - As an English literature undergraduate, I found the term was most commonly used to discuss 'modern literature' from about 1870, something which initially confused me when I later began to study philosophy. So I can see how use of that term might wrongfoot your audience, even if you do stipulate what you mean by it. All the best Marie Marie Moran Equality Studies School of Social Justice Room 538 Library Building UCD, Belfield Dublin 4 Tel: 00353-1-7167333 www.ucd.ie/esc ----- Original Message ----- From: Tobin Nellhaus Date: Monday, September 14, 2009 3:04 am Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Historiographical definition help? To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Hi-- > > To answer Ruth, yes I'm speaking of philosophy, but to an > audience that > knows fairly little about it: theater scholars, most of whom are > mainly > interested in theater from 1870 on, which is what they mean by > "modern > drama" -- which makes the word "modern" *very* confusing!? > And to answer > Poe, yes I'm discussing England, at least for the start of the > period (the > formation of civil society etc).? Unfortunately the phrase > "from the > Enlightenment to the early 20th century" simply demarcates a > time period: I > want to characterize its continuity.? So maybe "bouregois > era" is it, though > I'm still wary. > > Keep 'em coming! > > Thanks, > > T. > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Poe Yu-ze Wan" > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Sent: Sunday, September 13, 2009 4:46 PM > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Historiographical definition help? > > > > Hi Tobin, > > > >? How about "from the Enlightenment to the early 20th > century"? The > > Enlightenment is often (though not always) regarded as > beginning from the > > late 17th century. (Newton's Principia Mathematica, for > example, was > > published in 1687.) As for the term "bourgeois era," it seems > to refer to > > a > > later period beginning from, say, the mid-18th century (though > it began > > much > > earlier in England, of course). > > > > Best, > > > > Poe > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > > Department of Sociology > > National Taiwan University > > 2009/9/14 Tobin Nellhaus > > > >> Hi folks, > >> > >> Pardon an off-topic question but I figured some of you could > help, since > >> I'm > >> struggling for the right phrase to define a historical period > that many > >> of > >> you know something about.? There is (at least to my > mind) a certain > >> continuity of the period ranging from the late 17th century > through the > >> early 20th.? This is the period in which empiricism and > positivism>> developed > >> and dominated philosophically -- which is not to say they're > dead yet, > >> but > >> clearly those ideas started taking a beating during the inter- > war years > >> and > >> still more with postmodernism.? The "modern era" (or > "modernity") doesn't > >> seem right since from many perspectives, that began around > 1600.? Would > >> the > >> "bourgeois era" fit?? Is there a better term? > >> > >> (Please don't argue with my periodization or I'll shoot myself!) > >> > >> Thanks, > >> > >> T. > >> > >> --- > >> Tobin Nellhaus > >> nellhaus at mail.com > >> "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": > C.S. Peirce > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism Marie Moran Equality Studies School of Social Justice Room 538 Library Building UCD, Belfield Dublin 4 Tel: 00353-1-7167333 www.ucd.ie/esc From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Mon Sep 14 06:23:50 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2009 13:23:50 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Historiographical definition help? In-Reply-To: <9C8ACB81027B4A24A887552BDC0AE89B@Godiva> Message-ID: Hi Tobin I don't think 'modernity' is confusing in the way that 'modern' is, and I don't see any insuperable problem in dating it from the early 17th C -- even in philosophy you have e.g. Baconian empiricism, and the philosophers always lag behind anyway; great scientists and artists tend to be ahead of their times... Charles Tayor's concept of the 'modern social imaginary' (or, if you don't like that, the 'social imaginary of modernity') (see his The Secular Age) as a unitary shift in Weltanschauung involving changes in (or in perception of) time, space, rationality, the self, society, the body, science, the economy, etc etc, of which philosophical change was but one element, is I think useful in thinking this through, especially perhaps if you see it with him as the culminating phase of the Axial Revolution that began in the first millennium BCE, which broadly coincides with the advent of what Bhaskar calls master-slave-type society... It seems to me there's only a 'problem' if you tie things too tightly to bourgeois economic and political transformation. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Tobin Nellhaus Sent: 14 September 2009 03:04 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Historiographical definition help? Hi-- To answer Ruth, yes I'm speaking of philosophy, but to an audience that knows fairly little about it: theater scholars, most of whom are mainly interested in theater from 1870 on, which is what they mean by "modern drama" -- which makes the word "modern" *very* confusing! And to answer Poe, yes I'm discussing England, at least for the start of the period (the formation of civil society etc). Unfortunately the phrase "from the Enlightenment to the early 20th century" simply demarcates a time period: I want to characterize its continuity. So maybe "bouregois era" is it, though I'm still wary. Keep 'em coming! Thanks, T. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Poe Yu-ze Wan" To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Sent: Sunday, September 13, 2009 4:46 PM Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Historiographical definition help? > Hi Tobin, > > How about "from the Enlightenment to the early 20th century"? The > Enlightenment is often (though not always) regarded as beginning from the > late 17th century. (Newton's Principia Mathematica, for example, was > published in 1687.) As for the term "bourgeois era," it seems to refer to > a > later period beginning from, say, the mid-18th century (though it began > much > earlier in England, of course). > > Best, > > Poe > Poe Yu-ze Wan > Department of Sociology > National Taiwan University > 2009/9/14 Tobin Nellhaus > >> Hi folks, >> >> Pardon an off-topic question but I figured some of you could help, since >> I'm >> struggling for the right phrase to define a historical period that many >> of >> you know something about. There is (at least to my mind) a certain >> continuity of the period ranging from the late 17th century through the >> early 20th. This is the period in which empiricism and positivism >> developed >> and dominated philosophically -- which is not to say they're dead yet, >> but >> clearly those ideas started taking a beating during the inter-war years >> and >> still more with postmodernism. The "modern era" (or "modernity") doesn't >> seem right since from many perspectives, that began around 1600. Would >> the >> "bourgeois era" fit? Is there a better term? >> >> (Please don't argue with my periodization or I'll shoot myself!) >> >> Thanks, >> >> T. >> >> --- >> Tobin Nellhaus >> nellhaus at mail.com >> "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 4423 (20090914) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From nellhaus at mail.com Mon Sep 14 15:26:30 2009 From: nellhaus at mail.com (Tobin Nellhaus) Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2009 17:26:30 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Historiographical definition help? In-Reply-To: References: <40BA67D2C32C4B57921451B99EC691AD@Godiva><4eb733d00909131346y67427a09ifb50d03cbc2d2797@mail.gmail.com><9C8ACB81027B4A24A887552BDC0AE89B@Godiva> Message-ID: <36C0F89C868842D99F5A312353AFA4F5@Godiva> Hi Marie -- "Age of Reason" is an interesting suggestion, particularly for the way it'll make my largely pomo audience bristle -- possibly good preparation for my discussion On the other hand it has a weird archaic feel which might rub off on how the reader thinks of me. (Though perhaps I *am* archaic!) Hi Ruth -- I suppose I could call it the empiricist/positivist era, as you suggest. "Modern, by which I mean blank-to-blank" is viable in principle, but as Marie suggests, my audience may forget what I mean, plus my ending point is roughly the starting point of what they consider "modern." Yeah I know, it sounds like I'm being twitchy, but it's a problem of how periodization varies by discipline. Thanks, T. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Marie Moran" To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Sent: Monday, September 14, 2009 4:42 AM Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Historiographical definition help? Hello, I've had a similar query before, and I settled on 'the age of reason' to cover the period in question, and to indicate the faith in positivism and scientific progress characterizing the period more generally. Maybe this would work? I also understand the predicament with the use of the term 'modern' - As an English literature undergraduate, I found the term was most commonly used to discuss 'modern literature' from about 1870, something which initially confused me when I later began to study philosophy. So I can see how use of that term might wrongfoot your audience, even if you do stipulate what you mean by it. All the best Marie Marie Moran Equality Studies School of Social Justice Room 538 Library Building UCD, Belfield Dublin 4 Tel: 00353-1-7167333 www.ucd.ie/esc ----- Original Message ----- From: Tobin Nellhaus Date: Monday, September 14, 2009 3:04 am Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Historiographical definition help? To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Hi-- > > To answer Ruth, yes I'm speaking of philosophy, but to an > audience that > knows fairly little about it: theater scholars, most of whom are > mainly > interested in theater from 1870 on, which is what they mean by > "modern > drama" -- which makes the word "modern" *very* confusing! > And to answer > Poe, yes I'm discussing England, at least for the start of the > period (the > formation of civil society etc). Unfortunately the phrase > "from the > Enlightenment to the early 20th century" simply demarcates a > time period: I > want to characterize its continuity. So maybe "bouregois > era" is it, though > I'm still wary. > > Keep 'em coming! > > Thanks, > > T. > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Poe Yu-ze Wan" > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Sent: Sunday, September 13, 2009 4:46 PM > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Historiographical definition help? > > > > Hi Tobin, > > > > How about "from the Enlightenment to the early 20th > century"? The > > Enlightenment is often (though not always) regarded as > beginning from the > > late 17th century. (Newton's Principia Mathematica, for > example, was > > published in 1687.) As for the term "bourgeois era," it seems > to refer to > > a > > later period beginning from, say, the mid-18th century (though > it began > > much > > earlier in England, of course). > > > > Best, > > > > Poe > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > > Department of Sociology > > National Taiwan University > > 2009/9/14 Tobin Nellhaus > > > >> Hi folks, > >> > >> Pardon an off-topic question but I figured some of you could > help, since > >> I'm > >> struggling for the right phrase to define a historical period > that many > >> of > >> you know something about. There is (at least to my > mind) a certain > >> continuity of the period ranging from the late 17th century > through the > >> early 20th. This is the period in which empiricism and > positivism>> developed > >> and dominated philosophically -- which is not to say they're > dead yet, > >> but > >> clearly those ideas started taking a beating during the inter- > war years > >> and > >> still more with postmodernism. The "modern era" (or > "modernity") doesn't > >> seem right since from many perspectives, that began around > 1600. Would > >> the > >> "bourgeois era" fit? Is there a better term? > >> > >> (Please don't argue with my periodization or I'll shoot myself!) > >> > >> Thanks, > >> > >> T. > >> > >> --- > >> Tobin Nellhaus > >> nellhaus at mail.com > >> "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": > C.S. Peirce > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism Marie Moran Equality Studies School of Social Justice Room 538 Library Building UCD, Belfield Dublin 4 Tel: 00353-1-7167333 www.ucd.ie/esc _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From janstr at wirehub.nl Mon Sep 14 16:15:29 2009 From: janstr at wirehub.nl (Jan Straathof) Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2009 23:15:29 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Historiographical definition help? In-Reply-To: <36C0F89C868842D99F5A312353AFA4F5@Godiva> References: <40BA67D2C32C4B57921451B99EC691AD@Godiva><4eb733d00909131346y67427a09ifb50 d03cbc2d2797@mail.gmail.com><9C8ACB81027B4A24A887552BDC0AE89B@Godiva> Message-ID: Hi Tobin, Why not stick to your initial terms, but give them a neologistic twist and call the period, say: "The Empirico-Positivist Era". yours, Jan From michael.betancourt at gmail.com Mon Sep 14 16:17:45 2009 From: michael.betancourt at gmail.com (Michael Betancourt) Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2009 18:17:45 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Introduction by way of a link Message-ID: This post is a kind of de-lurking. An article of mine that may be of interest was just published on CTheory: "The State of Information" which can be found at http://ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=611 Comments and thoughts greatly welcomed Michael michaelbetancourt.com twitter.com/cinegraphic From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Tue Sep 15 05:38:56 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2009 12:38:56 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Postmarxism, critique of Message-ID: Hi all, Here's a great free book for anyone interested in cutting a path (without destroying the good timber, such as it is) through the jungle of the postmarxist region of poststructuralism: Boucher, Geoff The Charmed Circle of Ideology: A Critique of Laclau and Mouffe, Butler and ?i?ek (Melbourne: Re.Press, 2008; Open Access: http://www.re-press.org/book-files/OA_Version_9780980544046_Charmed_Circle_o f_Ideology.pdf). Boucher develops a trenchant immanent and (in effect) explanatory critique of postmarxism from a perspective -- Structural (Althusserian) Marxism -- that arguably has strong affinites with CR, and indeed invokes the support of CR and DCR in a number of places (Bhaskar, Benton, Collier, Jessop, Norris), without however developing this in much detail or elucidating the differences that undoubtedly exist (along with affinities) beween structural Marxism and CR. Congratulations to Re.Press for experimenting with Open Access! Users are of course encouraged to ask their Libraries to purchase a hard copy and to do so themselves if they can afford. Mervyn From sjjtas at yahoo.com Tue Sep 15 21:06:52 2009 From: sjjtas at yahoo.com (Sebastian Job) Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2009 20:06:52 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Critical-Realism] Postmarxism, critique of In-Reply-To: <7o7ghn$5tc7t9@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> References: <7o7ghn$5tc7t9@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: <882811.35303.qm@web36203.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Thanks for?posting that Mervyn. Looks worthwhile. The link as posted doesn't work, because of the bracket and full stop at the end I think. Here is the link again: http://www.re-press.org/book-files/OA_Version_9780980544046_Charmed_Circle_of_Ideology.pdf Sebastian Sebastian Job, PhD Lecturer Department of Anthropology University of Sydney R.C. Mills Building, Room 235 tel: (02) 9351 6678 ________________________________ From: Mervyn Hartwig To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Sent: Tuesday, September 15, 2009 9:38:56 PM Subject: [Critical-Realism] Postmarxism, critique of Hi all, Here's a great free book for anyone interested in cutting a path (without destroying the good timber, such as it is) through the jungle of the postmarxist region of poststructuralism: Boucher, Geoff The Charmed Circle of Ideology: A Critique of Laclau and Mouffe, Butler and ?i?ek (Melbourne: Re.Press, 2008; Open Access: http://www.re-press.org/book-files/OA_Version_9780980544046_Charmed_Circle_o f_Ideology.pdf). Boucher develops a trenchant immanent and (in effect) explanatory critique of postmarxism from a perspective -- Structural (Althusserian) Marxism -- that arguably has strong affinites with CR, and indeed invokes the support of CR and DCR in a number of places (Bhaskar, Benton, Collier, Jessop, Norris), without however developing this in much detail or elucidating the differences that undoubtedly exist (along with affinities) beween structural Marxism and CR. Congratulations to Re.Press for experimenting with Open Access! Users are of course encouraged to ask their Libraries to purchase a hard copy and to do so themselves if they can afford. Mervyn _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Wed Sep 16 03:39:52 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2009 10:39:52 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Anniversary of the Financial Crisis: A Dangerous Taste for Unreality Message-ID: Rowan Williams on the financial crisis, Newsnight, BBC TV 2009-09-16 (special edition on the anniversary of the fall of Lehman Brothers) What follows is (1) part of a report in The Telegraph 16 Sept 2009-09-16 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/religion/6195694/Archbishop-of-Ca nterbury-No-repentance-in-the-City.html (2) My recollection of comments that were not reported. (3) A comment by me. (1) Archbishop of Canterbury: 'No repentance in the City' Dr Rowan Williams, the Archbishop of Canterbury, said he feared that the City was returning to business as usual with no ''repentance'' for the excesses which led to the economic collapse. Dr Williams said the Government should have acted to cap bonuses and warned that the gap between rich and poor would lead to an increasingly ''dysfunctional'' society. There was a feeling of ''diffused resentment'' that bankers had failed to accept their responsibility for the crisis. Dr Williams told BBC 2's Newsnight: ''There hasn't been a feeling of closure about what happened last year. ''There hasn't been what I would, as a Christian, call repentance. We haven't heard people saying 'well actually, no, we got it wrong and the whole fundamental principle on which we worked was unreal, was empty'.'' Asked whether he thought the City was returning to ''business as usual'' Dr Williams said: ''I worry. I feel that's precisely what I call the 'lack of closure' coming home to roost. ''It's a failure to name what was wrong. To name that, what I called last year 'idolatry', that projecting (of) reality and substance onto things that don't have them.'' (2) Jeremy Paxman (the presenter): Why do you think that is? Why are we getting a return to all the old hocus pocus? Williams: I think it's original sin. Paxman: You surely don't believe in original sin? Williams: I do. I think that built into human nature is a dangerous taste for unreality. Paxman: That's sounds profound. We can go into it in detail some other time. (3) If we think of the Fall/diremption as now, a contemporaneously existing social fact, and not at some remote temporal remove, and human nature as geo-historically changing, not some fixed essence, CR can agree with the Archbishop. 'A dangerous taste for unreality' or 'the projection of substance and reality onto things that don't have them' is indeed at the heart of human nature as constituted in capitalist society understood as a giant Tina formation or demi-reality, with which irrealist philosophy resonates. Hang onto your hats as the next phase of the crisis approaches. Mervyn From shivahemmati at gmail.com Thu Sep 17 13:34:43 2009 From: shivahemmati at gmail.com (shiva hemmati) Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2009 11:34:43 -0800 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 10 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Gordon I checked that the Journal Of Critical Realism Vol 8.1 (2009) pp.5-34 has an article you have written. according to its abstract it was realy what I wanted. But according to technical difficulties I coulden't download it no matter how much I tried. Other articles were available but it wasn't. How could I have a copy of it? many thanks shiva Hemmati On Mon, Sep 7, 2009 at 10:00 AM, < critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: (no subject) (Gordon Brown) > 2. Re: Bhaskar, Latour and polemics (David Pilgrim) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2009 11:17:48 +1000 > From: Gordon Brown > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] (no subject) > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: <324738CE-89E0-4CA6-80F8-2AAF2159C9C2 at uow.edu.au> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed; delsp=yes > > Hello Shiva, > > The Journal Of Critical Realism Vol 8.1 (2009) pp.5-34 has an article > I have written making a case for a CR understanding of ontology as the > basis for considering the learning environment as a starting point in > education. In the article I mention a range of papers, chapters and > books that have tackled education issues from a CR framework. This > would be a good start for you. CR in education is starting to take > off, and strangely a number of them are in Australia (I say strangely > because of all the critical realists in Australia, a good many of them > are working in education). > > Regards, > > Gordon > > On Sep 6, 2009, at 5:31 PM, shiva hemmati wrote: > > > Hello > > I want to have Bhaskar's email if possible. > > Is there any body who tried to see what the impelications of critical > > realism are in education? > > -- > > best wishes > > Shiva Hemati > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > Dr Gordon Brown > Senior Lecturer, Curriculum and Teacher Education > Director, BMathsEd and BScienceEd, Loftus Campus > Coordinator, Curriculum and Pedagogy > Faculty of Education > University of Wollongong > Wollongong NSW 2522 Australia > Phone (work) 61 2 4221 3792 > Fax (work) 61 2 4221 3892 > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Mon, 07 Sep 2009 08:27:11 +0100 > From: "David Pilgrim" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Bhaskar, Latour and polemics > To: , > > Message-ID: <4AA4C3DF020000EB000B3E98 at gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII > > Dear Leigh, This is very clear and very helpful (about both Bhaskar and > Latour). With regard to the immanent critique, there is much intellectual > and ethical sense in this. Pursued properly it gets the best out of the > critique and the attempt to empathise with the target of the critique. It > also increases the chances of an open and respectful debate with those > defending that target. However, in practice, given that viewpoints are often > if, not invariably, bound up with interests and thus the passions these > arouse, is it not common for an aggressive version of polemics to define the > tone of most disputes? Those encouraging rhetorical inquiry (like Toulmin > and Adler) maybe simply accept this as being inevitable to some degree and > therefore suggest that we analyse disputes in relation to how the parties > disagree in relation to conceptual, normative and ontological assumptions. > (I find Toulmin's distinction in rhetorical inquiry between codified-law and > common-law forms of argumentation useful, with the latter dominating 'hot' > disputes.) As an onlooker to disputes and when I have been party to them at > times, it strikes me that the worthy aspiration of Bhaskar and Latour has > already failed most of the time. The only protection we usually have (in > academic circles at least but not in politics) is the taboo on ad hominem > ways of reasoning. Other than that (even in academic circles) commuinities > of interest often simply talk past each other in a spirit of failed mutual > empathy and Bhaskar's and Latour's aspiration is stillborn. Does this sound > cynical? Have I had an atypically bad experience in the academy? Thanks for > your thoughts on this. Dave > > > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 (Leigh Price) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2009 00:27:02 +0200 > From: "Leigh Price" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue > 2 > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Message-ID: <9004CD1FDD24450285528BF5449437DA at leighlaptop> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Hi David > > Before we can engage in a discussion of critical realism's relationship to > polemics, we first have to recognise that there can be two definitions of > polemics. For example, according to the Merriam-Webster online dictionary, > polemics is: > a : an aggressive attack on or refutation of the opinions or principles of > another > b : the art or practice of disputation or controversy > Etymology: French pol?mique, from Middle French, from polemique > controversial, from Greek polemikos warlike, hostile, from polemos war > > Critical realism is polemical in that it engages in disputation and it is > certainly controversial. Bhaskar frequently uses the word 'polemic' in this > sense. However, CR is not, I believe, polemical in the sense of being > aggressive or warlike in its manner of disputation. One of the reasons that > I assume critical realism avoids aggressive polemics is its method of > arguing that Bhaskar calls immanent critique. In this method, according to > Bhaskar, you don?t argue against a position from your own position, but > rather argue against a position from the point of view of the position > itself. Therefore, if I believe X and you Y, to argue for my position, I > have to show that something in totality is inconsistent with Y. I would say > that aggressive polemics is fuelled by the dichotomy of setting one's self > up against an opposite position. Hartwig (2009) has suggested that such > academic attacks (polemics) that are "hostile and ungenerous, philistine > and > shrill" ...systematically breach the cardinal principle of immanent > critique > "that the critic operate on the terrain of the account being criticised to > demonstrate that it is beset with problems that can be resolved on its own > terms. And that it is at odds with the logic of the 'critical realist' > embrace: the fundamental drive of the system to transcend and heal division > and split...". > > For example, Bhaskar does not set himself up against Kant and Hume. Rather > he tries to embrace their insights whilst nevertheless addressing the > absences in their work. From my notes, that I took when attending a CR > seminar last year, Bhaskar asked, "So, were Hume and Kant were completely > wrong? No, because there is something that would imply that ontology should > collapse into epistemology?the 'natural attitude'?when we talk about the > world, actually we talk about our knowledge about the world. We only really > need to disambiguate ontology and epistemology when there is conflict and > when we are researching." Similarly, we should aim not to set ourselves up > against Latour, but to embrace his insights whilst addressing the problems > in his work. > > The quote I have found for Latour (2004:246) that refers, I think, to his > being against polemics of the aggressive sort, is: > > "The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The > critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from under the feet of na?ve > believers, but the one who offers the participants arenas in which to > gather." Specifically, Latour is here referring to the critic as a reformed > deconstructionist, but I think the quote is relevant. I would have to say > that Latour's general tone in this paper is one against 'debunking'. He > links this debunking attitude to those critics who alternate "haphazardly > between antifetishism and positivism like the drunk iconoclast drawn by > Goya". > > If you are interested in people's quotes against aggressive polemics, you > might also like this one by Foucault (1984) - apologies for its length: > > "Questions and answers depend on a game?a game that is at once pleasant and > difficult?in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the > rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of dialogue. The > polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he > possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he > possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a > just > undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner in search for the > truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is armful, and whose > very > existence constitutes a threat. For him, then the game consists not of > recognizing this person as a subject having the right to speak but of > abolishing him as interlocutor, from any possible dialogue; and his final > objective will be not to come as close as possible to a difficult truth but > to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has been manifestly > upholding from the beginning. The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that > his > adversary is by definition denied. Perhaps, someday, a long history will > have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic figure on > discussion > and an obstacle to the search for the truth." > > > Best regards, > > Leigh > > > References > > Foucault, M (1984). Polemics, Politics and Problematizations > Interview conducted by Paul Rabinow. Translation by Lydia Davis, volume 1 > ?Ethics? of ?Essential Works of Foucault?, The New Press 1997. > http://foucault.info/foucault/interview.html > > Hartwig, M (2009). 'Orthodox' critical realism and the critical realist > embrace. JCR, 8.2: 233-257. > > Latour,B (2004). Why has critique run out of steam/ From matters of fact to > matters of concern. Critical Inquiry 30 (winter): 225-248. > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of David > Pilgrim > Sent: 03 September 2009 21:01 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu; > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 > > Thanks to Mark and Leigh for this illuminating exchange. Any references to > the objections of RB and Latour to 'polemical debate' would be gratefully > received. Dave > > David Pilgrim > Professor of Mental Health Policy > > Department of Social Work > Faculty of Health > University of Central Lancashire > Preston > PR1 2HE > > Tel +44 (0)1772 893458 > Fax +44 (0)1772 892974 > Email DPilgrim at uclan.ac.uk > David Pilgrim > Professor of Mental Health Policy > > Department of Social Work > Faculty of Health > University of Central Lancashire > Preston > PR1 2HE > > Tel +44 (0)1772 893458 > Fax +44 (0)1772 892974 > Email DPilgrim at uclan.ac.uk > >>> 03/09/09 7:00 PM >>> > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 10 > ************************************************ > -- best wishes Shiva Hemati From kaboubf at gmail.com Tue Sep 22 10:30:12 2009 From: kaboubf at gmail.com (Fadhel Kaboub) Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2009 12:30:12 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Job Ad - Denison University Message-ID: <4AB8FB94.4000202@gmail.com> Dear Colleagues, The Department of Economics at Denison University invites applications for a tenure track position at the assistant professor level beginning in Fall 2010. Applicants must have superior teaching skills and the ability to teach a variety of courses. The department is especially interested in finding someone to teach Economic History, Introductory and Intermediate Microeconomics and other applied courses on a rotating basis with other members of the department. We are looking for a versatile colleague -- one who appreciates the interdisciplinary nature of a small residential, undergraduate, liberal arts institution. Denison values faculty who are successful and effective teachers, who develop active and productive research programs, and who are involved in the life of the college. The Economics Department has eleven faculty members and is one of the largest majors on campus. Denison has a 3/2 teaching load. Denison University is an equal opportunity-affirmative action employer. Women and minorities are encouraged to apply. We will begin reviewing applications on December 7, 2009, and will continue to accept applications until the position is filled. We will interview prospective candidates at the ASSA meetings in Atlanta, January 3-5, 2010. We expect candidates to have their PhD in hand by August 2010. *Applicants should submit electronic application materials on-line at employment.denison.edu: a letter of application, vitae, a statement of teaching philosophy, three letters of recommendation, and other supportive documents. * -- Fadhel Kaboub -- Fadhel Kaboub, Ph.D. Assistant Professor of Economics Denison University 227 Higley Hall 100 W. College Street Granville, OH 43023 ________________________ Tel: 740-587-6315 Fax: 740-587-6348 Email: kaboubf at denison.edu website: www.kaboub.com ________________________ From christian.fuchs at sbg.ac.at Thu Sep 24 15:35:25 2009 From: christian.fuchs at sbg.ac.at (Christian Fuchs) Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2009 23:35:25 +0200 Subject: [Critical-Realism] CfP: Information and Communication Technologies and the Current Crisis Message-ID: <4ABBE61D.8030705@sbg.ac.at> Please direct questions about potential contributions directly to the issue editors Marcus Breen m.breen at neu.edu and David Hakken dhakken at indiana.edu. Christian Fuchs Editor of tripleC * * * * * * * * Call For Papers - Special Issue of tripleC (http://www.triple-c.at): Information and Communication Technologies and the Current Crisis: How Are They Connected? The Crisis that began in 2007 continues to convulse the world. Labelled by some as merely a recession, yet it is associated with dramatic changes in national and global power. Others frame the Crisis as merely a consequence of over-promoting a narrow range of financial transactions associated with subprime mortgage instruments. These were indeed overly aggressively oversold by deregulated bankers, but this was likely only an important trigger of the Crisis, not the primary cause. In this special issue, we will explore the notion that much of the basis of the Crisis should be assigned to financial transactions not just made possible but also strongly afforded by use of computer technologies. Thus, those operating at the highest levels of algorithmic capacity bear substantial responsibility for the Crisis. For students of technological innovation and diffusion, many questions emerge about the connection between the Crisis in general and computerization. Some of the questions involve the tight relationship between cultures of technological empowerment and financial elites. Others questions, while appearing initially to be purely economic, turn out on examination to articulate strongly with the public interest, civil society, policymaking, and public discourse more generally. These in turn lead to further, perhaps quite new critical questions about the emerging relationships between capitalism, democracy and the data-information-knowledge-technology nexus. Thus, equally important for responsibility is specification of what is known within computer science about the technological dimensions of the Crisis of this crisis. Ultimately, a rethinking of the very notion of "crisis" itself may be needed. Some specific questions authors may choose to address include: * What kind of crisis is this, how is it different from previous ones, how are these differences related to automated ICTs and the changed practices they have afforded? * What role do computer professionals have in the crisis? * Does this crisis suggest a dystopian post-human future? * What media theories best explain the crisis, or has the time arrived for newly radical approaches in this area? * How does public policy fit in the private world of computerization? * What historical guides are available as tools to foster better analyses of technological crisis? * Will the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China) be the "winners" of this crisis? * Are there artistic innovations that help refine political and policy responses to this crisis? * What new knowledge innovations are needed to understand the forces at work in this crisis and its implications for democracy? * What new questions need to be addressed to orientate research about the crisis? * How are the computing-, information-, and media-industries affected by this crisis? How will they develop in the future? This special issue of tripleC is intended to feature research from both theoretical and practical perspectives. We seek contributions from any theoretical, professional, or disciplinary perspective that offers innovative analysis that promotes debate about technology and the Crisis. Submission deadline: Full papers should be submitted until February 1st, 2010. All papers will be peer reviewed. The special issue will be published in 2010. tripleC -- Cognition, Communication, Co-operation: Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society (http://www.triple-c.at) promotes contributions within an emerging science of the information age with a special interest in critical studies following the highest standards of peer review. Submissions must be formatted according to tripleC's guidelines (http://triplec.at/index.php/tripleC/about/submissions#authorGuidelines), make use of APA style, and use the style template (http://triplec.at/files/journals/1/template-0.dot). Papers should be submitted online by making use of the electronic submission system (http://triplec.at/index.php/tripleC/user/register, http://triplec.at/index.php/tripleC/login). When submitting to the electronic system, please select "Special issue on crisis & communication" as the journal's section. ISSUE CO-EDITORS: David Hakken (dhakken at indiana.edu) and Marcus Breen (m.breen at neu.edu) David Hakken is professor of informatics at Indiana University. Marcus Breen is associate professor of communication studies at Northeastern University.