From Joanne.Pyke at vu.edu.au  Mon Jun  1 22:06:48 2009
From: Joanne.Pyke at vu.edu.au (Joanne Pyke)
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2009 14:06:48 +1000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 55, Issue 1
References: <mailman.1.1243879202.16156.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID: <DA6C36945B55CC4F972FE2F9ACC6C629041C9FDD@VUCLEX01-EVS2.ad.vu.edu.au>

Was wondering whether there is a Sydney seminar planned in July?  
 
Joanne Pyke
Senior Research Fellow
Victoria University

________________________________

From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu
Sent: Tue 6/2/2009 4:00 AM
To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 55, Issue 1



Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
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Today's Topics:

   1. Seminar, Weds 3rd June, Sydney University (Karl Maton)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2009 02:41:09 +0000 (GMT)
From: Karl Maton <matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk>
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Seminar, Weds 3rd June, Sydney University
To: Bourdieu at googlegroups.com, critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
Message-ID: <613494.65408.qm at web23604.mail.ird.yahoo.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8


Seminar, Weds 3rd June, Sydney University

Getting Real: AACR Seminars and Discussions

The Australasian Association for Critical Realism (AACR)is pleased to announce the latest in a new series of seminars, to be held at the University of Sydney.

Wednesday 3rd june, 6.30pm
Room 148 (downstairs)
R.C. Mills Building, University of Sydney

Margaret Moussa
University of Western Sydney

J.S. Mill and Empiricism

Getting Real is a new series of seminars and discussions of readings organised by the AACR.  They are open to anyone interested in coming and engaging with realist ideas.  Neither speakers nor other participants need be 'critical realists' - the aim is to open up and encourage debate and discussion.

We adjourn to the pub afterwards as well.

PLEASE send this on to anyone in your Dept or Faculty you think might be interested!  Thanks.





     



------------------------------

_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism


End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 55, Issue 1
***********************************************



From shivahemmati at gmail.com  Tue Jun  2 02:33:08 2009
From: shivahemmati at gmail.com (shiva hemmati)
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2009 01:33:08 -0700
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 53, Issue 8
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1239732002.13475.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>
References: <mailman.1.1239732002.13475.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID: <adf9704b0906020133i3e0afa56s83003160094a3a43@mail.gmail.com>

Dear Mervyn

 I haven't got access to your Dictionary of CR to see the entries on
Critique and
Consistency and follow up the cross-references to take me to places in
the CR literature where the approach is outlined.I've got access to UT
& Modarres databases to e-journals but I couldn't find it . Will you
please tell me how I can access it-at least the entry you mentioned-?
ps: Is there any body who works on education & multiculturalism
according to Bhaskar's point of view?




On 4/14/09, critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu
<critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote:
> Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
> 	critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> 	http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> 	critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu
>
> You can reach the person managing the list at
> 	critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu
>
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>    1. Re: New Critical Realism Seminars (Karl Maton)
>    2. question (shiva hemmati)
>    3. Re: question (Mervyn Hartwig)
>    4. Re: question (Mark Johnson)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2009 10:35:30 +1000
> From: Karl Maton <matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] New Critical Realism Seminars
> To: Bernstein Listserv <B_Bernstein at yahoogroups.com>,
> 	Bourdieu at googlegroups.com, Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> 	<critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <49E3DA52.8010201 at yahoo.co.uk>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
>
> Cunningly, I got the day of the week wrong.  This year is Wednesday night!
>
>
> Getting Real
>
> AACR Seminars and Discussions
>
>
> The Australasian Association for Critical Realism is pleased to announce
> a new series of seminars and discussions, to be held at the University
> of Sydney.
>
>
> Wednesday, 6th May
> Mervyn Hartwig, the editor-in-chief of the Journal of Critical Realism
> will kick off this year's seminars with a journey through the different
> dimensions of critical realist philosophy: "First wave, second wave,
> third wave: the moments of critical realism and the critical realist
> embrace"
>
> Wednesday, 3rd June
> Dr Margaret Moussa, UWS, on J.S. Mill and empiricism
>
> Wednesday, 5th August
> Assoc Prof Brian Pinkstone, UWS, on historical materialism
>
> Wednesday, 2nd September
> Alison Gable, University of Queensland on 'underlabouring'
>
> Wednesday, 7th October
> Sandra Wallace of University of Sydney: Critical realism and
> archaeology: an ontology of the material
>
> Wednesday, 4th Nov
> Karl Maton, USyd, co-editor of Social Realism, Knowledge and the
> Sociology of Education, published by Continuum this month, will discuss
> the growing approach called 'social realism', which builds on critical
> realist philosophy and the sociologies of Basil Bernstein and Pierre
> Bourdieu.
>
> Wednesday, 2nd Dec
> Melanie McDonald, who recently published in Journal of Critical Realism
> and is currently writing a chapter for a book on critical realism, will
> discuss 'meta-reality'.
>
> Seminars are held on the first Wednesday of every month, at 6.30pm, in
> the R.C. Mills Building (room 148).
>
>
> --
> With best wishes,
>
> Karl
>
> ----
>
> Dr Karl Maton
> Department of Sociology & Social Policy
> Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney
>
> http://www.KarlMaton.com
>
> Editorial Board, Journal of Critical Realism
> President, Australasian Association for Critical Realism
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2009 13:17:52 +0330
> From: shiva hemmati <shivahemmati at gmail.com>
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] question
> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> Message-ID:
> 	<adf9704b0904140247o3ac91336s397452cc194b0839 at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
>
> Dear Sirs
> What is the criteria for criticizing a school of philosophy in Bhaskar's
> point of view?
> PHD student of Philosophy of education/ intrested in social constructivism
> (esp science teaching)
> Any recomandation makes me happy
> --
> best wishes
> Shiva Hemati
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2009 13:53:28 +0100
> From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] question
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
> 	<critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<mailman.2.1239732003.13475.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Content-Type: text/plain;	charset="us-ascii"
>
> Hi Shiva
>
> Basically, consistency.
>
> 1. Is the approach consistent with the possibility of some well attested
> human practice, e.g. science or human intentional practice as such? The
> procedure here is transcendental argument.
>
> 2. Is it theory-practice consistent? The classical philosophical discourse
> of modernity, e.g.,  arguably is not: it pronounces ontology to be
> impossible yet in practice generates an implicit ontology itself. This is
> immanent critique. Note that it asks whether an approach is consistent in
> its own terms, it does not introduce arbitrary external criteria.
>
> 3. You can then go further and explain the inconsistency or the approach as
> such. This is explanatory critique.
>
> 1 and 2 combined is 'transcendental critique', which is Bhaskar's
> characteristic procedure.
>
> If you've got access to my Dictionary of CR see the entries on Critique and
> Consistency and follow up the cross-references and above all the references,
> which take you to places in the CR literature where the approach is
> outlined.
>
> Mervyn
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of shiva
> hemmati
> Sent: 14 April 2009 10:48
> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] question
>
> Dear Sirs
> What is the criteria for criticizing a school of philosophy in Bhaskar's
> point of view?
> PHD student of Philosophy of education/ intrested in social constructivism
> (esp science teaching) Any recomandation makes me happy
> --
> best wishes
> Shiva Hemati
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
> __________ NOD32 4002 (20090411) Information __________
>
> This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system.
> http://www.eset.com
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2009 16:19:39 +0100
> From: Mark Johnson <mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] question
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> 	<critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<d4aa99eb0904140819o479f81d1wef77e63f48f02e2e at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> In matters of education these throw up some subtle distinctions...
>
> Regarding 1) - A typical 'educational' transcendental question might
> be: "given that children appear to learn science in such-and-such a
> way, what must the world be like?" .. which is where a lot of
> educational constructivists (starting with Piaget, Vygotsky, etc)
> start.
>
> Regarding 2) Sometimes theories and interventions with apparently
> suspect ontologies are nevertheless 'successful' as educational
> interventions. 'Half truths' seem to play an important role in
> succesful teaching (most school science is typical of it!)
>
> Education is about changing people, and people change in all sorts of
> ways for all sorts of reasons. I wonder if the ancient arguments
> between philosophy and rhetoric might be relevant here?
>
> Mark
>
> On 4/14/09, Mervyn Hartwig <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>> Hi Shiva
>>
>> Basically, consistency.
>>
>> 1. Is the approach consistent with the possibility of some well attested
>> human practice, e.g. science or human intentional practice as such? The
>> procedure here is transcendental argument.
>>
>> 2. Is it theory-practice consistent? The classical philosophical discourse
>> of modernity, e.g.,  arguably is not: it pronounces ontology to be
>> impossible yet in practice generates an implicit ontology itself. This is
>> immanent critique. Note that it asks whether an approach is consistent in
>> its own terms, it does not introduce arbitrary external criteria.
>>
>> 3. You can then go further and explain the inconsistency or the approach
>> as
>> such. This is explanatory critique.
>>
>> 1 and 2 combined is 'transcendental critique', which is Bhaskar's
>> characteristic procedure.
>>
>> If you've got access to my Dictionary of CR see the entries on Critique
>> and
>> Consistency and follow up the cross-references and above all the
>> references,
>> which take you to places in the CR literature where the approach is
>> outlined.
>>
>> Mervyn
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of shiva
>> hemmati
>> Sent: 14 April 2009 10:48
>> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> Subject: [Critical-Realism] question
>>
>> Dear Sirs
>> What is the criteria for criticizing a school of philosophy in Bhaskar's
>> point of view?
>> PHD student of Philosophy of education/ intrested in social constructivism
>> (esp science teaching) Any recomandation makes me happy
>> --
>> best wishes
>> Shiva Hemati
>> _______________________________________________
>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>
>> __________ NOD32 4002 (20090411) Information __________
>>
>> This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system.
>> http://www.eset.com
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>
>
>
> --
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Mark Johnson
> Institute for Educational Cybernetics
> University of Bolton
> BL3 5AB
> Tel. 01204 903567
> Mob. 0778 6064505
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 53, Issue 8
> ***********************************************
>


-- 
best wishes
Shiva Hemati


From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk  Tue Jun  2 02:53:01 2009
From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig)
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2009 09:53:01 +0100
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 53, Issue 8
In-Reply-To: <adf9704b0906020133i3e0afa56s83003160094a3a43@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <mailman.115.1243932788.17122.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>

I'll contact you off-list. M 


 

-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of shiva
hemmati
Sent: 02 June 2009 09:33
To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 53, Issue 8

Dear Mervyn

 I haven't got access to your Dictionary of CR to see the entries on
Critique and Consistency and follow up the cross-references to take me to
places in the CR literature where the approach is outlined.I've got access
to UT & Modarres databases to e-journals but I couldn't find it . Will you
please tell me how I can access it-at least the entry you mentioned-?
ps: Is there any body who works on education & multiculturalism according to
Bhaskar's point of view?




On 4/14/09, critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu
<critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote:
> Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
> 	critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> 	http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> 	critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu
>
> You can reach the person managing the list at
> 	critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu
>
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific 
> than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>    1. Re: New Critical Realism Seminars (Karl Maton)
>    2. question (shiva hemmati)
>    3. Re: question (Mervyn Hartwig)
>    4. Re: question (Mark Johnson)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2009 10:35:30 +1000
> From: Karl Maton <matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] New Critical Realism Seminars
> To: Bernstein Listserv <B_Bernstein at yahoogroups.com>,
> 	Bourdieu at googlegroups.com, Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> 	<critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <49E3DA52.8010201 at yahoo.co.uk>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
>
> Cunningly, I got the day of the week wrong.  This year is Wednesday night!
>
>
> Getting Real
>
> AACR Seminars and Discussions
>
>
> The Australasian Association for Critical Realism is pleased to 
> announce a new series of seminars and discussions, to be held at the 
> University of Sydney.
>
>
> Wednesday, 6th May
> Mervyn Hartwig, the editor-in-chief of the Journal of Critical Realism 
> will kick off this year's seminars with a journey through the 
> different dimensions of critical realist philosophy: "First wave, 
> second wave, third wave: the moments of critical realism and the 
> critical realist embrace"
>
> Wednesday, 3rd June
> Dr Margaret Moussa, UWS, on J.S. Mill and empiricism
>
> Wednesday, 5th August
> Assoc Prof Brian Pinkstone, UWS, on historical materialism
>
> Wednesday, 2nd September
> Alison Gable, University of Queensland on 'underlabouring'
>
> Wednesday, 7th October
> Sandra Wallace of University of Sydney: Critical realism and
> archaeology: an ontology of the material
>
> Wednesday, 4th Nov
> Karl Maton, USyd, co-editor of Social Realism, Knowledge and the 
> Sociology of Education, published by Continuum this month, will 
> discuss the growing approach called 'social realism', which builds on 
> critical realist philosophy and the sociologies of Basil Bernstein and 
> Pierre Bourdieu.
>
> Wednesday, 2nd Dec
> Melanie McDonald, who recently published in Journal of Critical 
> Realism and is currently writing a chapter for a book on critical 
> realism, will discuss 'meta-reality'.
>
> Seminars are held on the first Wednesday of every month, at 6.30pm, in 
> the R.C. Mills Building (room 148).
>
>
> --
> With best wishes,
>
> Karl
>
> ----
>
> Dr Karl Maton
> Department of Sociology & Social Policy Faculty of Arts, University of 
> Sydney
>
> http://www.KarlMaton.com
>
> Editorial Board, Journal of Critical Realism President, Australasian 
> Association for Critical Realism
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2009 13:17:52 +0330
> From: shiva hemmati <shivahemmati at gmail.com>
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] question
> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> Message-ID:
> 	<adf9704b0904140247o3ac91336s397452cc194b0839 at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
>
> Dear Sirs
> What is the criteria for criticizing a school of philosophy in 
> Bhaskar's point of view?
> PHD student of Philosophy of education/ intrested in social 
> constructivism (esp science teaching) Any recomandation makes me happy
> --
> best wishes
> Shiva Hemati
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2009 13:53:28 +0100
> From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] question
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
> 	<critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<mailman.2.1239732003.13475.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Content-Type: text/plain;	charset="us-ascii"
>
> Hi Shiva
>
> Basically, consistency.
>
> 1. Is the approach consistent with the possibility of some well 
> attested human practice, e.g. science or human intentional practice as 
> such? The procedure here is transcendental argument.
>
> 2. Is it theory-practice consistent? The classical philosophical 
> discourse of modernity, e.g.,  arguably is not: it pronounces ontology 
> to be impossible yet in practice generates an implicit ontology 
> itself. This is immanent critique. Note that it asks whether an 
> approach is consistent in its own terms, it does not introduce arbitrary
external criteria.
>
> 3. You can then go further and explain the inconsistency or the 
> approach as such. This is explanatory critique.
>
> 1 and 2 combined is 'transcendental critique', which is Bhaskar's 
> characteristic procedure.
>
> If you've got access to my Dictionary of CR see the entries on 
> Critique and Consistency and follow up the cross-references and above 
> all the references, which take you to places in the CR literature 
> where the approach is outlined.
>
> Mervyn
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of 
> shiva hemmati
> Sent: 14 April 2009 10:48
> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] question
>
> Dear Sirs
> What is the criteria for criticizing a school of philosophy in 
> Bhaskar's point of view?
> PHD student of Philosophy of education/ intrested in social 
> constructivism (esp science teaching) Any recomandation makes me happy
> --
> best wishes
> Shiva Hemati
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
> __________ NOD32 4002 (20090411) Information __________
>
> This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system.
> http://www.eset.com
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2009 16:19:39 +0100
> From: Mark Johnson <mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] question
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> 	<critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
> 	<d4aa99eb0904140819o479f81d1wef77e63f48f02e2e at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> In matters of education these throw up some subtle distinctions...
>
> Regarding 1) - A typical 'educational' transcendental question might
> be: "given that children appear to learn science in such-and-such a 
> way, what must the world be like?" .. which is where a lot of 
> educational constructivists (starting with Piaget, Vygotsky, etc) 
> start.
>
> Regarding 2) Sometimes theories and interventions with apparently 
> suspect ontologies are nevertheless 'successful' as educational 
> interventions. 'Half truths' seem to play an important role in 
> succesful teaching (most school science is typical of it!)
>
> Education is about changing people, and people change in all sorts of 
> ways for all sorts of reasons. I wonder if the ancient arguments 
> between philosophy and rhetoric might be relevant here?
>
> Mark
>
> On 4/14/09, Mervyn Hartwig <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>> Hi Shiva
>>
>> Basically, consistency.
>>
>> 1. Is the approach consistent with the possibility of some well 
>> attested human practice, e.g. science or human intentional practice 
>> as such? The procedure here is transcendental argument.
>>
>> 2. Is it theory-practice consistent? The classical philosophical 
>> discourse of modernity, e.g.,  arguably is not: it pronounces 
>> ontology to be impossible yet in practice generates an implicit 
>> ontology itself. This is immanent critique. Note that it asks whether 
>> an approach is consistent in its own terms, it does not introduce
arbitrary external criteria.
>>
>> 3. You can then go further and explain the inconsistency or the 
>> approach as such. This is explanatory critique.
>>
>> 1 and 2 combined is 'transcendental critique', which is Bhaskar's 
>> characteristic procedure.
>>
>> If you've got access to my Dictionary of CR see the entries on 
>> Critique and Consistency and follow up the cross-references and above 
>> all the references, which take you to places in the CR literature 
>> where the approach is outlined.
>>
>> Mervyn
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of 
>> shiva hemmati
>> Sent: 14 April 2009 10:48
>> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> Subject: [Critical-Realism] question
>>
>> Dear Sirs
>> What is the criteria for criticizing a school of philosophy in 
>> Bhaskar's point of view?
>> PHD student of Philosophy of education/ intrested in social 
>> constructivism (esp science teaching) Any recomandation makes me 
>> happy
>> --
>> best wishes
>> Shiva Hemati
>> _______________________________________________
>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>
>> __________ NOD32 4002 (20090411) Information __________
>>
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best wishes
Shiva Hemati

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From agent.redstone at yahoo.com  Tue Jun  2 10:12:23 2009
From: agent.redstone at yahoo.com (Fred Zaman)
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2009 09:12:23 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Bhaskar and Machiavelli
Message-ID: <442662.49098.qm@web63601.mail.re1.yahoo.com>



Emancipatory Critique (CR Dictionary, p. 105) touted as being 
oriented to demystification and thus (arguably) emancipation, is 
grounded in the human capacity to reflexively accept or reject 
received socio-cultural traditions; which are objective systems 
of constraints historically produced, reproduced, and potentially 
transformable; and which critical explanatory theory may show to 
be false or systematically misleading. This posting suggests a 
possible basis in critical realist theory an explanatory critique 
of the ?class politics? of diverse social structures, which would 
increase the capacity to objectively reflect on the received 
socio-cultural traditions of these structures, regarding their 
historically false and systematically misleading but potentially 
transformable constraints. It may be that such an approach in 
critical realism can demystify the origin and progression of 
class politics in the diverse social structures of synchronic 
emergent powers arising out of a universal ?will to power.?
-
This approach certainly can demystify (and concerning myself has 
since its inception shortly after the 911 attack), systematic 
constraints historically imposed (circa 1650 to today) on the 
class politics of elites and populists in the United States, by 
the nation?s socio-cultural traditions of conservatism, 
communitarianism, liberalism, and libertarianism. It can be 
argued that no other critique that might be undertaken will yield 
the results obtainable by demystifying today?s class politics in 
the United States. Indeed, through this approach one can see with 
clarity, today in the turmoil of U.S. politics, that which is 
false and misleading in the socio-cultural traditions of both 
conservatives and liberals.
-
Critical realists perhaps could engage in no other ?emancipatory 
critique? that would be as productive socially and politically. 
Bhaskar to his credit has provided the necessary philosophical 
backdrop for this effort, but critical realists IMO must now 
bravely carry the ?emancipatory critique? forward politically in 
fundamental socio-cultural terms. The only question may be--do 
critical realists have the courage and political will to do this? 
That is, are they up to abandoning the current ?fireside chats? 
of this list on CR philosophy and join the political fray as 
academic activists. This is what the upcoming conference in Rio 
could initiate, as a CR program and agenda in political science.
-
-
An Emancipatory Critique of U.S. Class Politics:
-
As the term is sometimes used in the U.S., ?realpolitik? refers 
to the Machiavellian view that politics is fundamentally the 
pursuit, possession, and application of power--in essence a 
political ?will to power? not rigidly constrained by principles, 
doctrines, ethics, or morals. Can a critical realist 
?emancipatory critique? of class-differentiated realpolitik--in 
the U.S. and elsewhere--be formulated; wherein the political will 
to power of an oppressive, elitist upper class is countered by 
the ?pulse of freedom? of an egalitarian, populist under class? 
Emancipatory critiques of class realpolitik thus formulated are, 
in short, ?classpolitik.?
-
Classpolitik, as a critical realist emancipatory critique of the 
will to power of class in diverse social structures, is 
realpolitik in which the collective ?will to power? of an upper 
class is an elite system of governance whose lower class populist 
opposition is ?the pulse of freedom.? The emancipatory critique 
of ?classpolitik,? potentially, would provide a critical realist 
framework for illuminating the class politics, qua class-
differentiated realpolitik, of diverse institutions and 
organizations. The classpolitik suggested here a triad of 
political powers, suggestively labeled in quasi-Nietzschean terms 
the ?berpolitik, unterpolitik and nebenpolitik, constitute the 
trilateral power structure of an elitist upper class, populist 
lower class, and elitist-allied middle class:
-
1. ?berpolitik: the coercive, elitist will to power of an 
oppressive ruling class aka power elite. ?berpolitik in critical 
realism is the ?synchronic emergent power? of a master class qua 
collective overman manifesting its will to power behind the 
scenes. The ?berpolitik of this elitist ??berklasse? is never 
seen in public, but conducted behind the scenes, beyond public 
view, conspiratorially.
-
2. Unterpolitik: the egalitarian, populist ?pulse of freedom? of 
an oppressed lower class or ?unterklasse,? which is the will to 
power of the oppressed. Unterpolitik in critical realism is the 
?synchronic emergent power? (will to power) of egalitarian 
democratic movements (whether they are explicitly manifested or 
exist unconsciously as political undercurrents). The unterklasse 
pulse of freedom, in critical realist terms, is here in its 
essence a political dialectic that absents the ?constraints on 
the absenting of absences? in the following reference:
-
?Dialectic as the Pulse of Freedom...Dialectic is the absenting 
of constraints on the absenting of absences (ills, and causally 
lower-order constraints) and, since constraints, negatively 
generalized, are just the absence of freedom, dialectic is 
equally the axiology of freedom, the implications of the positive 
generalization of which I have only just begun to tap. Dialectic 
is the yearning for freedom and the transformative negation of 
constraints on it...The strength of its presence is the measure 
of the pulse of freedom -- of its health, or transformative 
power.? (Bhaskar, in Dialectic 1993: 378)
-
3. Nebenpolitik: the political will to power of a elitist-allied 
middle class; a governing ?nebenklasse? grounded on prevailing 
?popular wisdom.? Nebenpolitik is an Aristotelian phronesis that 
collectively is the tacit wisdom of middle class realpolitik: the 
elitist-allied ?practical action? of nebenklasse executives, 
managers, supervisors, etc. Nebenpolitik in critical realism is 
the ?synchronic emergent? will to power of an elitist-allied 
nebenklasse underlaboring in support of the ?berklasse; which 
thus at the same time opposes behind the scenes, in the dark 
politically to the extent possible, the unterklasse?s egalitarian 
pulse of freedom.
-
Politically linked through the middle class nebenpolitik, the 
upper class ?berpolitik and lower class unterpolitik collectively 
form a combined ?diachronic emergent powers? classpolitik or will 
to power, in which the ?berklasse (elitist upper class) endeavors 
behind the scenes to position the polity toward the political 
right while the unterklasse (populist lower class) endeavors to 
shift it politically to the left.
-
Bhaskar in his dialectic as the pulse of freedom admittedly seeks 
freedom from precisely the kinds of dichotomies (left-right, 
liberal-conservative, communitarian-libertarian, paternalism-
humanism, etc) that have always bedeviled humankind, I agree. But 
as he has defined it above, the pulse of freedom clearly is more 
general than critical realists apparently prefer to understand 
it; because Bhaskar?s ?dialectic,? as the pulse of freedom, can 
be employed by anyone to absent the constraints experienced, 
including anyone endeavoring to promote whatever ideology 
including the political left and political right. The pulse of 
freedom, as Bhaskar defined it above, is that of anyone 
endeavoring to absent whatever constraints on whatever absences. 
The pulse of freedom of one social class (or other entity) thus, 
of course, can be--and often is--experienced by others outside 
that social class (or other entity) as the former?s will to 
power. History in general clearly (IMO) shows this to be true. In 
an emancipatory critique of classpolitik there appears to be no 
psychic absolute ?ground state? of the kind seemingly advanced by 
Bhaskar. It is basic to human nature that politically there will 
be no such ground state, of the classes in which elites and 
populists finally see eye to eye politically. There instead will 
be a never ending, class-differentiated elitist-populist, 
political dialectic that endeavors to maximize freedom.
-
A political precursor to Bhaskar?s philosophy of dialectic as the 
pulse of freedom is found in Machiavelli?s works (Machiavelli 
1965, ?The Chief Works and Others?: 202-203): ?To me those who 
condemn the tumults between the Nobles [?berklasse] and Plebs 
[unterklasse] seem to be caviling at the very thing that was the 
primary cause of Rome?s retention of liberty? And they do not 
realize that in every republic there are two different 
dispositions, that of the people and that of the great men, and 
that all legislation favoring liberty is brought about? by the 
dissention [dialectic].?
-
In the emancipatory critique of class realpolitik provided by 
?classpolitik? here, the will to power and pulse of freedom are 
the yin-yang (darkness-light) of humanity?s political meta-
reality: one simply cannot be viewed objectively and 
independently of the other (i.e. without ideological pretensions, 
liberal or conservative). The two together, the dark (will to 
power) and light (pulse of freedom) of humanity?s political meta-
reality, make up a whole that is both darkness and light 
intertwined--one does not exist without the other. Bhaskar?s 
apparent intention that humanity?s yang (its pulse of freedom) 
ultimately overcome its yin (the will to power) may be humanly 
impossible in principle--the light of the former may never 
extinguish the darkness of the latter. The only real human 
possibility may be the achievement of a more egalitarian balance 
of the powers of light and darkness, intertwined in an ultimate 
political meta-reality that is both. This may be the only 
objective that an emancipatory critique of class realpolitik can 
actually obtain, realistically in both theory and practice.
-
Much of what critical realism offers, in the way of a 
philosophical base for ?emancipatory critiques,? can underpin 
emancipatory critiques of class realpolitik and political power 
in general; but the concepts thereof must be reformulated in 
terms more clearly relevant to today?s political realities--of 
which Nietzsche?s will to power certainly is one, and 
Machiavellian political concepts are as well. And key to such 
critiques (IMO) will be the ability to parse the realpolitik of 
power structures into an upper class ?berpolitik, lower class 
unterpolitik and middle class (elitist-allied) nebenpolitik. In 
realpolitik Machiavelli and Nietzsche indeed are relevant--Kant 
and Hume are far less relevant. Critical realism?s arcane 
discourses on Kant, Hume and other philosophers arguably must be 
shelved here, if real world applications of critical realism?s 
emancipatory critique to class politics are to become a 
possibility. Otherwise, political scientists and social 
scientists generally may be unable to understand the relevance of 
such critiques, and thus reject them as a valid explanatory 
framework within which to work.
-
Critical realists should be greatly concerned with developing 
important applications of their principles in the social 
sciences. And what could be more important in this endeavor than 
emancipatory critiques of political science, to particularly 
include critiques of class realpolitik in the U.S. and elsewhere? 
Or are critical realists on this list simply too comfortable with 
the current routine of endlessly counting critical realism?s 
Bhaskarian-Kantian-Humean ?angels on a pinhead??
-
Fred
?


      

From jycostel at ucalgary.ca  Mon Jun  8 18:16:58 2009
From: jycostel at ucalgary.ca (Joanne Costello)
Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2009 18:16:58 -0600
Subject: [Critical-Realism] seeking article from Journal of Critical Realism
Message-ID: <FFAC5BECE35A4D58A50C4F9D798E1E2B@JoannePC>

Hello,

I only have access to the Journal of Critical Realism from 2004 onwards through my university. Mervyn, I was wondering if you might have a PDF copy of your interview/article:

http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/article/view/3698

Best wishes,

Joanne

From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk  Tue Jun  9 06:44:51 2009
From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig)
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2009 13:44:51 +0100
Subject: [Critical-Realism] seeking article from Journal of Critical
	Realism
In-Reply-To: <FFAC5BECE35A4D58A50C4F9D798E1E2B@JoannePC>
Message-ID: <mailman.133.1244551507.17122.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>

Dear Joanne

Attached. It's reprinted  in Bhaskar, From Science to Emanicaption, ch. 10.

What are you working on? Are you a potential contributor/reviewer in
relation to JCR?

Best wishes 

Mervyn Hartwig
General Editor
Journal of Critical Realism
 ISSN: 1476-7430 (print)
ISSN: 1572-5138 (online) 
http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR
 

-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Joanne
Costello
Sent: 09 June 2009 01:17
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: [Critical-Realism] seeking article from Journal of Critical Realism

Hello,

I only have access to the Journal of Critical Realism from 2004 onwards
through my university. Mervyn, I was wondering if you might have a PDF copy
of your interview/article:

http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/article/view/3698

Best wishes,

Joanne
_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism

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From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk  Tue Jun  9 06:55:07 2009
From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig)
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2009 13:55:07 +0100
Subject: [Critical-Realism] seeking article from Journal of
	CriticalRealism
In-Reply-To: <7o4dbq$4o69nv@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu>
Message-ID: <mailman.134.1244552109.17122.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>

Oops, sorry - this should have been sent off-list. Mervyn 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn
Hartwig
Sent: 09 June 2009 13:45
To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] seeking article from Journal of
CriticalRealism

Dear Joanne

Attached. It's reprinted  in Bhaskar, From Science to Emanicaption, ch. 10.

What are you working on? Are you a potential contributor/reviewer in
relation to JCR?

Best wishes 

Mervyn Hartwig
General Editor
Journal of Critical Realism
 ISSN: 1476-7430 (print)
ISSN: 1572-5138 (online)
http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR
 

-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Joanne
Costello
Sent: 09 June 2009 01:17
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: [Critical-Realism] seeking article from Journal of Critical Realism

Hello,

I only have access to the Journal of Critical Realism from 2004 onwards
through my university. Mervyn, I was wondering if you might have a PDF copy
of your interview/article:

http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/article/view/3698

Best wishes,

Joanne
_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism

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From rakesh7biswas at gmail.com  Tue Jun  9 12:12:18 2009
From: rakesh7biswas at gmail.com (Rakesh Biswas)
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2009 23:42:18 +0530
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Call for chapters: A book on user driven health
	care and narrative medicine from a critical realist perspective
Message-ID: <4d785e270906091112j2600650j1e3dd9dae6d00d91@mail.gmail.com>

We welcome a critical realist perspective on medicine.

More at this web link: http://www.igi-global.com/requests/details.asp?ID=657

Hope to hear from you.

rakesh

From ksd08 at aber.ac.uk  Wed Jun 10 03:43:54 2009
From: ksd08 at aber.ac.uk (ksd08 at aber.ac.uk)
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2009 10:43:54 +0100 (BST)
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Application of Critical Realism (and Palestine)
Message-ID: <25a7642a02fe510b539ed6cb8497c47e.squirrel@webmail.aber.ac.uk>

Hello,

I wonder if anyone has come across any books or articles using critical
realism in explaining the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

Also, would anyone be able to recommend any books/articles on how to apply
critical realism to specific research projects, or on what implications CR
might have on practical research especially within international
relations? If anyone has any thoughts on possible difficulties involved in
"applying" CR that would also be most appreciated!

Thank you,
Katja Daniels






From matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk  Wed Jun 10 07:12:04 2009
From: matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk (Karl Maton)
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2009 23:12:04 +1000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 55, Issue 1
In-Reply-To: <DA6C36945B55CC4F972FE2F9ACC6C629041C9FDD@VUCLEX01-EVS2.ad.vu.edu.au>
References: <mailman.1.1243879202.16156.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>
	<DA6C36945B55CC4F972FE2F9ACC6C629041C9FDD@VUCLEX01-EVS2.ad.vu.edu.au>
Message-ID: <4A2FB124.50707@yahoo.co.uk>

Hi Joanne,

As yet, there is no July seminar planned because many people will be 
away during July, including myself.  The next one is planned for August.
Cheers
Karl

Joanne Pyke wrote:

>Was wondering whether there is a Sydney seminar planned in July?  
> 
>Joanne Pyke
>Senior Research Fellow
>Victoria University
>
>________________________________
>
>From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu
>Sent: Tue 6/2/2009 4:00 AM
>To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 55, Issue 1
>
>
>
>Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
>        critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>
>To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>        http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>        critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu
>
>You can reach the person managing the list at
>        critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu
>
>When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..."
>
>
>Today's Topics:
>
>   1. Seminar, Weds 3rd June, Sydney University (Karl Maton)
>
>
>----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>Message: 1
>Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2009 02:41:09 +0000 (GMT)
>From: Karl Maton <matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk>
>Subject: [Critical-Realism] Seminar, Weds 3rd June, Sydney University
>To: Bourdieu at googlegroups.com, critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>Message-ID: <613494.65408.qm at web23604.mail.ird.yahoo.com>
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
>
>
>Seminar, Weds 3rd June, Sydney University
>
>Getting Real: AACR Seminars and Discussions
>
>The Australasian Association for Critical Realism (AACR)is pleased to announce the latest in a new series of seminars, to be held at the University of Sydney.
>
>Wednesday 3rd june, 6.30pm
>Room 148 (downstairs)
>R.C. Mills Building, University of Sydney
>
>Margaret Moussa
>University of Western Sydney
>
>J.S. Mill and Empiricism
>
>Getting Real is a new series of seminars and discussions of readings organised by the AACR.  They are open to anyone interested in coming and engaging with realist ideas.  Neither speakers nor other participants need be 'critical realists' - the aim is to open up and encourage debate and discussion.
>
>We adjourn to the pub afterwards as well.
>
>PLEASE send this on to anyone in your Dept or Faculty you think might be interested!  Thanks.
>
>
>
>
>
>     
>
>
>
>------------------------------
>
>_______________________________________________
>Critical-Realism mailing list
>Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
>End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 55, Issue 1
>***********************************************
>
>
>  
>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>_______________________________________________
>Critical-Realism mailing list
>Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>  
>

-- 
With best wishes,

Karl

----

Dr Karl Maton
Department of Sociology & Social Policy
Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney

http://www.KarlMaton.com

President, Australasian Association for Critical Realism
Editorial Board, Journal of Critical Realism

'This is your life, and it's ending one minute at a time'

'The greatest pleasure in life is doing what people say you cannot do'

What teachers make:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RxsOVK4syxU


From Joanne.Pyke at vu.edu.au  Wed Jun 10 18:52:53 2009
From: Joanne.Pyke at vu.edu.au (Joanne Pyke)
Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2009 10:52:53 +1000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 55, Issue 5
References: <mailman.1.1244656802.9063.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID: <DA6C36945B55CC4F972FE2F9ACC6C629041C9FEE@VUCLEX01-EVS2.ad.vu.edu.au>

Hi Katja, 
While not directly in your area of interest, through a PhD, have  applied CR to looking at women's sluggish career progression in Australian academe relying particularly on Lawson's theory of gender relations.  The thesis will be examined soon - but can make that available after I get feedback.  I found it a particularly fruitful approach, particular in relation to explaining enduring patterns of gender relations in the context of change.  The CR conceptualisation of agency and structure as being inseperable, but not reducible to either, was the idea that was most useful in exploring women's career aspirations and gendered character of 'choice'.
 
Joanne Pyke

________________________________

From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu
Sent: Thu 6/11/2009 4:00 AM
To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 55, Issue 5



Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
        critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
        http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
        critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu

You can reach the person managing the list at
        critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..."


Today's Topics:

   1. Call for chapters: A book on user driven health   care and
      narrative medicine from a critical realist perspective (Rakesh Biswas)
   2. Application of Critical Realism (and Palestine) (ksd08 at aber.ac.uk)
   3. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 55, Issue 1 (Karl Maton)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2009 23:42:18 +0530
From: Rakesh Biswas <rakesh7biswas at gmail.com>
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Call for chapters: A book on user driven
        health  care and narrative medicine from a critical realist perspective
To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
Message-ID:
        <4d785e270906091112j2600650j1e3dd9dae6d00d91 at mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

We welcome a critical realist perspective on medicine.

More at this web link: http://www.igi-global.com/requests/details.asp?ID=657

Hope to hear from you.

rakesh


------------------------------

Message: 2
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2009 10:43:54 +0100 (BST)
From: ksd08 at aber.ac.uk
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Application of Critical Realism (and
        Palestine)
To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
Message-ID:
        <25a7642a02fe510b539ed6cb8497c47e.squirrel at webmail.aber.ac.uk>
Content-Type: text/plain;charset=iso-8859-15

Hello,

I wonder if anyone has come across any books or articles using critical
realism in explaining the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

Also, would anyone be able to recommend any books/articles on how to apply
critical realism to specific research projects, or on what implications CR
might have on practical research especially within international
relations? If anyone has any thoughts on possible difficulties involved in
"applying" CR that would also be most appreciated!

Thank you,
Katja Daniels







------------------------------

Message: 3
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2009 23:12:04 +1000
From: Karl Maton <matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk>
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 55, Issue
        1
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID: <4A2FB124.50707 at yahoo.co.uk>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed

Hi Joanne,

As yet, there is no July seminar planned because many people will be
away during July, including myself.  The next one is planned for August.
Cheers
Karl

Joanne Pyke wrote:

>Was wondering whether there is a Sydney seminar planned in July? 
>
>Joanne Pyke
>Senior Research Fellow
>Victoria University
>
>________________________________
>
>From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu
>Sent: Tue 6/2/2009 4:00 AM
>To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 55, Issue 1
>
>
>
>Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
>        critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
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>Today's Topics:
>
>   1. Seminar, Weds 3rd June, Sydney University (Karl Maton)
>
>
>----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>Message: 1
>Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2009 02:41:09 +0000 (GMT)
>From: Karl Maton <matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk>
>Subject: [Critical-Realism] Seminar, Weds 3rd June, Sydney University
>To: Bourdieu at googlegroups.com, critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>Message-ID: <613494.65408.qm at web23604.mail.ird.yahoo.com>
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
>
>
>Seminar, Weds 3rd June, Sydney University
>
>Getting Real: AACR Seminars and Discussions
>
>The Australasian Association for Critical Realism (AACR)is pleased to announce the latest in a new series of seminars, to be held at the University of Sydney.
>
>Wednesday 3rd june, 6.30pm
>Room 148 (downstairs)
>R.C. Mills Building, University of Sydney
>
>Margaret Moussa
>University of Western Sydney
>
>J.S. Mill and Empiricism
>
>Getting Real is a new series of seminars and discussions of readings organised by the AACR.  They are open to anyone interested in coming and engaging with realist ideas.  Neither speakers nor other participants need be 'critical realists' - the aim is to open up and encourage debate and discussion.
>
>We adjourn to the pub afterwards as well.
>
>PLEASE send this on to anyone in your Dept or Faculty you think might be interested!  Thanks.
>
>
>
>
>
>    
>
>
>
>------------------------------
>
>_______________________________________________
>Critical-Realism mailing list
>Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
>End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 55, Issue 1
>***********************************************
>
>
> 
>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>_______________________________________________
>Critical-Realism mailing list
>Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> 
>

--
With best wishes,

Karl

----

Dr Karl Maton
Department of Sociology & Social Policy
Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney

http://www.KarlMaton.com <http://www.karlmaton.com/> 

President, Australasian Association for Critical Realism
Editorial Board, Journal of Critical Realism

'This is your life, and it's ending one minute at a time'

'The greatest pleasure in life is doing what people say you cannot do'

What teachers make:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RxsOVK4syxU



------------------------------

_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism


End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 55, Issue 5
***********************************************



From d.eldervass at ntlworld.com  Mon Jun 15 04:57:23 2009
From: d.eldervass at ntlworld.com (Dave Elder-Vass)
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2009 11:57:23 +0100
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
References: <E524A5DAD5EE8F44A83C14CC5649844319FB8FEDF8@QUTEXMBX01.qut.edu.au>
	<6ad241360905102156x6d0dd8d7t95030c3f990001e@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <43828EFCB30A472DA5462EF1DD565CF4@Presario>

Dear listers,

I seem to recall that somewhere in one of his early works Bhaskar writes 
something along the lines of "It cannot be an error to reify a thing" but I 
can't find the quote at the moment. Could anyone point me to the right 
place? Or am I just getting confused?

Best,

Dave



From rgroff at slu.edu  Mon Jun 15 08:09:08 2009
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2009 09:09:08 -0500
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
In-Reply-To: <43828EFCB30A472DA5462EF1DD565CF4@Presario>
References: <E524A5DAD5EE8F44A83C14CC5649844319FB8FEDF8@QUTEXMBX01.qut.edu.au>
	<6ad241360905102156x6d0dd8d7t95030c3f990001e@mail.gmail.com>
	<43828EFCB30A472DA5462EF1DD565CF4@Presario>
Message-ID: <6ad241360906150709p25f903d9x3f69dc80897f8a57@mail.gmail.com>

Dunno -- but let me know if you find it!   There is a transcript of a debate
with Rom Harre, in Potter and Lopez's collection, where Harre is charging
him w/reifying things (as it were).  But that's the only reference I can
think of .  Which tells us only that that's all I can think of, not anything
about what's there or not.

Ruth



On Mon, Jun 15, 2009 at 5:57 AM, Dave Elder-Vass
<d.eldervass at ntlworld.com>wrote:

> Dear listers,
>
> I seem to recall that somewhere in one of his early works Bhaskar writes
> something along the lines of "It cannot be an error to reify a thing" but I
> can't find the quote at the moment. Could anyone point me to the right
> place? Or am I just getting confused?
>
> Best,
>
> Dave
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>

From b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw  Mon Jun 15 08:53:08 2009
From: b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw (Wan Yu-ze)
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2009 22:53:08 +0800
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
References: <E524A5DAD5EE8F44A83C14CC5649844319FB8FEDF8@QUTEXMBX01.qut.edu.au><6ad241360905102156x6d0dd8d7t95030c3f990001e@mail.gmail.com>
	<43828EFCB30A472DA5462EF1DD565CF4@Presario>
Message-ID: <000a01c9edc9$00820460$4c9c708c@linuxjc2tfhe8z>

Hi Dave,

I think you're refering to the following passage:

"On this interpretation then the generative mechanisms of nature exist as
the causal powers of things.
We now have a perfectly acceptable ontological basis for causal laws. For if
it is wrong to reify
causal laws, and it is wrong to reify generative mechanisms, it cannot be
wrong to reify things!"
 (A Realist Theory of Science, p. 50)


Poe Yu-ze Wan
Department of Sociology
National Taiwan University

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Dave Elder-Vass" <d.eldervass at ntlworld.com>
To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
<critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Monday, June 15, 2009 6:57 PM
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!


> Dear listers,
>
> I seem to recall that somewhere in one of his early works Bhaskar writes
> something along the lines of "It cannot be an error to reify a thing" but
I
> can't find the quote at the moment. Could anyone point me to the right
> place? Or am I just getting confused?
>
> Best,
>
> Dave
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism



From rgroff at slu.edu  Mon Jun 15 09:06:30 2009
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2009 10:06:30 -0500
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
In-Reply-To: <000a01c9edc9$00820460$4c9c708c@linuxjc2tfhe8z>
References: <E524A5DAD5EE8F44A83C14CC5649844319FB8FEDF8@QUTEXMBX01.qut.edu.au>
	<6ad241360905102156x6d0dd8d7t95030c3f990001e@mail.gmail.com>
	<43828EFCB30A472DA5462EF1DD565CF4@Presario>
	<000a01c9edc9$00820460$4c9c708c@linuxjc2tfhe8z>
Message-ID: <6ad241360906150806y6726269aoe6c4bf369b3ff924@mail.gmail.com>

Interesting -- this pushes RB much closer to H & Madden's "powerful
particulars" view than RB's general commitment to "powers" leaves him.




On Mon, Jun 15, 2009 at 9:53 AM, Wan Yu-ze <b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw> wrote:

> Hi Dave,
>
> I think you're refering to the following passage:
>
> "On this interpretation then the generative mechanisms of nature exist as
> the causal powers of things.
> We now have a perfectly acceptable ontological basis for causal laws. For
> if
> it is wrong to reify
> causal laws, and it is wrong to reify generative mechanisms, it cannot be
> wrong to reify things!"
>  (A Realist Theory of Science, p. 50)
>
>
> Poe Yu-ze Wan
> Department of Sociology
> National Taiwan University
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Dave Elder-Vass" <d.eldervass at ntlworld.com>
> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Sent: Monday, June 15, 2009 6:57 PM
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
>
>
> > Dear listers,
> >
> > I seem to recall that somewhere in one of his early works Bhaskar writes
> > something along the lines of "It cannot be an error to reify a thing" but
> I
> > can't find the quote at the moment. Could anyone point me to the right
> > place? Or am I just getting confused?
> >
> > Best,
> >
> > Dave
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>

From hbar12 at yahoo.com  Mon Jun 15 09:13:18 2009
From: hbar12 at yahoo.com (hbar12yahoo.com)
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2009 08:13:18 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
Message-ID: <2190.66843.qm@web34508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

Here is some more on that.
?
http://books.google.com/books?id=lrK5m8NThWYC&pg=PA37&lpg=PA37&dq=Bhaskar+reify&source=bl&ots=AzGzsKWnIB&sig=uiPE4h6t96TGbqNUsDbjZ9gIUSE&hl=en&ei=aWQ2SonBM42OMu-Q9YgK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1


hbar12 at yahoo.com
http://hbar12.bravehost.com
Washington, DC USA

--- On Mon, 6/15/09, Wan Yu-ze <b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw> wrote:


From: Wan Yu-ze <b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw>
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Date: Monday, June 15, 2009, 10:53 AM


Hi Dave,

I think you're refering to the following passage:

"On this interpretation then the generative mechanisms of nature exist as
the causal powers of things.
We now have a perfectly acceptable ontological basis for causal laws. For if
it is wrong to reify
causal laws, and it is wrong to reify generative mechanisms, it cannot be
wrong to reify things!"
(A Realist Theory of Science, p. 50)


Poe Yu-ze Wan
Department of Sociology
National Taiwan University

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Dave Elder-Vass" <d.eldervass at ntlworld.com>
To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
<critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Monday, June 15, 2009 6:57 PM
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!


> Dear listers,
>
> I seem to recall that somewhere in one of his early works Bhaskar writes
> something along the lines of "It cannot be an error to reify a thing" but
I
> can't find the quote at the moment. Could anyone point me to the right
> place? Or am I just getting confused?
>
> Best,
>
> Dave
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism


_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism



      

From d.eldervass at ntlworld.com  Mon Jun 15 15:41:25 2009
From: d.eldervass at ntlworld.com (Dave Elder-Vass)
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2009 22:41:25 +0100
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
References: <2190.66843.qm@web34508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <F5957380DB1C406D9284216DB34EC7B3@Presario>

Excellent - and thank you both. I've often cited the early part of that 
quote but I'd forgotten the two quotes fitted together.

Incidentally, in response to Ruth, I think RB is very close to the 'powerful 
particulars' view, certainly in RTS, but without the odd qualification that 
Harre later makes, restricting powerful particulars to persons and fields.

Best,

Dave

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "hbar12yahoo.com" <hbar12 at yahoo.com>
To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" 
<critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: 15 June 2009 16:13
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!


Here is some more on that.

http://books.google.com/books?id=lrK5m8NThWYC&pg=PA37&lpg=PA37&dq=Bhaskar+reify&source=bl&ots=AzGzsKWnIB&sig=uiPE4h6t96TGbqNUsDbjZ9gIUSE&hl=en&ei=aWQ2SonBM42OMu-Q9YgK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1


hbar12 at yahoo.com
http://hbar12.bravehost.com
Washington, DC USA

--- On Mon, 6/15/09, Wan Yu-ze <b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw> wrote:


From: Wan Yu-ze <b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw>
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" 
<critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Date: Monday, June 15, 2009, 10:53 AM


Hi Dave,

I think you're refering to the following passage:

"On this interpretation then the generative mechanisms of nature exist as
the causal powers of things.
We now have a perfectly acceptable ontological basis for causal laws. For if
it is wrong to reify
causal laws, and it is wrong to reify generative mechanisms, it cannot be
wrong to reify things!"
(A Realist Theory of Science, p. 50)


Poe Yu-ze Wan
Department of Sociology
National Taiwan University

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Dave Elder-Vass" <d.eldervass at ntlworld.com>
To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
<critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Monday, June 15, 2009 6:57 PM
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!


> Dear listers,
>
> I seem to recall that somewhere in one of his early works Bhaskar writes
> something along the lines of "It cannot be an error to reify a thing" but
I
> can't find the quote at the moment. Could anyone point me to the right
> place? Or am I just getting confused?
>
> Best,
>
> Dave
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism


_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism




_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism



From rgroff at slu.edu  Mon Jun 15 16:34:30 2009
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2009 17:34:30 -0500
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
In-Reply-To: <F5957380DB1C406D9284216DB34EC7B3@Presario>
References: <2190.66843.qm@web34508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<F5957380DB1C406D9284216DB34EC7B3@Presario>
Message-ID: <6ad241360906151534m247d0d15w9108d770153d0905@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Dave,

I sort of think it's hard to know for sure how to make all the parts add up
exactly, in the earlier work anyway.  Yes on powerful particulars, but then
it turns out that there are some "things" that are just powers.  Not
restricted to persons, but then in PON it seems that it is, actually, only
persons, who do things.  Even though he can't possibly think that.  But he
says it -- such that Ted Benton then criticizes him for it -- and says also
in PON that structures are only material causes.  Etc.

r.



On Mon, Jun 15, 2009 at 4:41 PM, Dave Elder-Vass
<d.eldervass at ntlworld.com>wrote:

> Excellent - and thank you both. I've often cited the early part of that
> quote but I'd forgotten the two quotes fitted together.
>
> Incidentally, in response to Ruth, I think RB is very close to the
> 'powerful
> particulars' view, certainly in RTS, but without the odd qualification that
> Harre later makes, restricting powerful particulars to persons and fields.
>
> Best,
>
> Dave
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "hbar12yahoo.com" <hbar12 at yahoo.com>
> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Sent: 15 June 2009 16:13
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
>
>
> Here is some more on that.
>
>
> http://books.google.com/books?id=lrK5m8NThWYC&pg=PA37&lpg=PA37&dq=Bhaskar+reify&source=bl&ots=AzGzsKWnIB&sig=uiPE4h6t96TGbqNUsDbjZ9gIUSE&hl=en&ei=aWQ2SonBM42OMu-Q9YgK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1
>
>
> hbar12 at yahoo.com
> http://hbar12.bravehost.com
> Washington, DC USA
>
> --- On Mon, 6/15/09, Wan Yu-ze <b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw> wrote:
>
>
> From: Wan Yu-ze <b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Date: Monday, June 15, 2009, 10:53 AM
>
>
> Hi Dave,
>
> I think you're refering to the following passage:
>
> "On this interpretation then the generative mechanisms of nature exist as
> the causal powers of things.
> We now have a perfectly acceptable ontological basis for causal laws. For
> if
> it is wrong to reify
> causal laws, and it is wrong to reify generative mechanisms, it cannot be
> wrong to reify things!"
> (A Realist Theory of Science, p. 50)
>
>
> Poe Yu-ze Wan
> Department of Sociology
> National Taiwan University
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Dave Elder-Vass" <d.eldervass at ntlworld.com>
> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Sent: Monday, June 15, 2009 6:57 PM
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
>
>
> > Dear listers,
> >
> > I seem to recall that somewhere in one of his early works Bhaskar writes
> > something along the lines of "It cannot be an error to reify a thing" but
> I
> > can't find the quote at the moment. Could anyone point me to the right
> > place? Or am I just getting confused?
> >
> > Best,
> >
> > Dave
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>

From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk  Tue Jun 16 06:08:28 2009
From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig)
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2009 13:08:28 +0100
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
In-Reply-To: <6ad241360906151534m247d0d15w9108d770153d0905@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <mailman.9.1245154112.2550.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>

Hi Ruth, Dave

Ruth wrote: "Not restricted to persons, but then in PON it seems that it is,
actually, only persons, who do things."

 Surely this needs a qualifier added: "in the social sphere". In other
spheres it of course remains the case that causality is "not restricted to
persons", and there is arguably no inconsistency. This is why I insist on
the implicitly dialectical character of the early work: it thinks the
coincidence of distinctions and connections.

I don't think Bhaskar actually says in so many words in PON that social
structures are 'only' material causes. The way I read him is that they are
also 'formal' causes in Aristotelian terms (cf pervasive deployment of the
concept 'social form'), and they provide the indispensable context for the
efficient/final causation of people-in-society. The 'causal power' of the
social (p. 26) is an integral aspect of people's efficient and final causal
powers.

Mervyn


 

-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth
Groff
Sent: 15 June 2009 23:35
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!

Hi Dave,

I sort of think it's hard to know for sure how to make all the parts add up
exactly, in the earlier work anyway.  Yes on powerful particulars, but then
it turns out that there are some "things" that are just powers.  Not
restricted to persons, but then in PON it seems that it is, actually, only
persons, who do things.  Even though he can't possibly think that.  But he
says it -- such that Ted Benton then criticizes him for it -- and says also
in PON that structures are only material causes.  Etc.

r.



On Mon, Jun 15, 2009 at 4:41 PM, Dave Elder-Vass
<d.eldervass at ntlworld.com>wrote:

> Excellent - and thank you both. I've often cited the early part of 
> that quote but I'd forgotten the two quotes fitted together.
>
> Incidentally, in response to Ruth, I think RB is very close to the 
> 'powerful particulars' view, certainly in RTS, but without the odd 
> qualification that Harre later makes, restricting powerful particulars 
> to persons and fields.
>
> Best,
>
> Dave
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "hbar12yahoo.com" <hbar12 at yahoo.com>
> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Sent: 15 June 2009 16:13
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
>
>
> Here is some more on that.
>
>
> http://books.google.com/books?id=lrK5m8NThWYC&pg=PA37&lpg=PA37&dq=Bhas
> kar+reify&source=bl&ots=AzGzsKWnIB&sig=uiPE4h6t96TGbqNUsDbjZ9gIUSE&hl=
> en&ei=aWQ2SonBM42OMu-Q9YgK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1
>
>
> hbar12 at yahoo.com
> http://hbar12.bravehost.com
> Washington, DC USA
>
> --- On Mon, 6/15/09, Wan Yu-ze <b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw> wrote:
>
>
> From: Wan Yu-ze <b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Date: Monday, June 15, 2009, 10:53 AM
>
>
> Hi Dave,
>
> I think you're refering to the following passage:
>
> "On this interpretation then the generative mechanisms of nature exist 
> as the causal powers of things.
> We now have a perfectly acceptable ontological basis for causal laws. 
> For if it is wrong to reify causal laws, and it is wrong to reify 
> generative mechanisms, it cannot be wrong to reify things!"
> (A Realist Theory of Science, p. 50)
>
>
> Poe Yu-ze Wan
> Department of Sociology
> National Taiwan University
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Dave Elder-Vass" <d.eldervass at ntlworld.com>
> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Sent: Monday, June 15, 2009 6:57 PM
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
>
>
> > Dear listers,
> >
> > I seem to recall that somewhere in one of his early works Bhaskar 
> > writes something along the lines of "It cannot be an error to reify 
> > a thing" but
> I
> > can't find the quote at the moment. Could anyone point me to the 
> > right place? Or am I just getting confused?
> >
> > Best,
> >
> > Dave
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism

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This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system.
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From rgroff at slu.edu  Tue Jun 16 07:13:48 2009
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2009 08:13:48 -0500
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
In-Reply-To: <7u5804$6ngh7i@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu>
References: <6ad241360906151534m247d0d15w9108d770153d0905@mail.gmail.com>
	<7u5804$6ngh7i@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu>
Message-ID: <6ad241360906160613kebe5773k126ff38befa9adeb@mail.gmail.com>

Yes, in the social sphere.  I've argued that they are formal causes (too),
as you know.  I can't imagine how RB couldn't think so; it's just that it's
not actually what he says there, where he says what kind of Aristotelian
cause they are.  Hey maybe you could get him to say it when you interview
him!



On Tue, Jun 16, 2009 at 7:08 AM, Mervyn Hartwig <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>wrote:

> Hi Ruth, Dave
>
> Ruth wrote: "Not restricted to persons, but then in PON it seems that it
> is,
> actually, only persons, who do things."
>
>  Surely this needs a qualifier added: "in the social sphere". In other
> spheres it of course remains the case that causality is "not restricted to
> persons", and there is arguably no inconsistency. This is why I insist on
> the implicitly dialectical character of the early work: it thinks the
> coincidence of distinctions and connections.
>
> I don't think Bhaskar actually says in so many words in PON that social
> structures are 'only' material causes. The way I read him is that they are
> also 'formal' causes in Aristotelian terms (cf pervasive deployment of the
> concept 'social form'), and they provide the indispensable context for the
> efficient/final causation of people-in-society. The 'causal power' of the
> social (p. 26) is an integral aspect of people's efficient and final causal
> powers.
>
> Mervyn
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth
> Groff
> Sent: 15 June 2009 23:35
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
>
> Hi Dave,
>
> I sort of think it's hard to know for sure how to make all the parts add up
> exactly, in the earlier work anyway.  Yes on powerful particulars, but then
> it turns out that there are some "things" that are just powers.  Not
> restricted to persons, but then in PON it seems that it is, actually, only
> persons, who do things.  Even though he can't possibly think that.  But he
> says it -- such that Ted Benton then criticizes him for it -- and says also
> in PON that structures are only material causes.  Etc.
>
> r.
>
>
>
> On Mon, Jun 15, 2009 at 4:41 PM, Dave Elder-Vass
> <d.eldervass at ntlworld.com>wrote:
>
> > Excellent - and thank you both. I've often cited the early part of
> > that quote but I'd forgotten the two quotes fitted together.
> >
> > Incidentally, in response to Ruth, I think RB is very close to the
> > 'powerful particulars' view, certainly in RTS, but without the odd
> > qualification that Harre later makes, restricting powerful particulars
> > to persons and fields.
> >
> > Best,
> >
> > Dave
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "hbar12yahoo.com" <hbar12 at yahoo.com>
> > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Sent: 15 June 2009 16:13
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> >
> >
> > Here is some more on that.
> >
> >
> > http://books.google.com/books?id=lrK5m8NThWYC&pg=PA37&lpg=PA37&dq=Bhas
> > kar+reify&source=bl&ots=AzGzsKWnIB&sig=uiPE4h6t96TGbqNUsDbjZ9gIUSE&hl=
> > en&ei=aWQ2SonBM42OMu-Q9YgK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1
> >
> >
> > hbar12 at yahoo.com
> > http://hbar12.bravehost.com
> > Washington, DC USA
> >
> > --- On Mon, 6/15/09, Wan Yu-ze <b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw> wrote:
> >
> >
> > From: Wan Yu-ze <b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw>
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Date: Monday, June 15, 2009, 10:53 AM
> >
> >
> > Hi Dave,
> >
> > I think you're refering to the following passage:
> >
> > "On this interpretation then the generative mechanisms of nature exist
> > as the causal powers of things.
> > We now have a perfectly acceptable ontological basis for causal laws.
> > For if it is wrong to reify causal laws, and it is wrong to reify
> > generative mechanisms, it cannot be wrong to reify things!"
> > (A Realist Theory of Science, p. 50)
> >
> >
> > Poe Yu-ze Wan
> > Department of Sociology
> > National Taiwan University
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Dave Elder-Vass" <d.eldervass at ntlworld.com>
> > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Sent: Monday, June 15, 2009 6:57 PM
> > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> >
> >
> > > Dear listers,
> > >
> > > I seem to recall that somewhere in one of his early works Bhaskar
> > > writes something along the lines of "It cannot be an error to reify
> > > a thing" but
> > I
> > > can't find the quote at the moment. Could anyone point me to the
> > > right place? Or am I just getting confused?
> > >
> > > Best,
> > >
> > > Dave
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
> __________ NOD32 4156 (20090615) Information __________
>
> This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system.
> http://www.eset.com
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>

From echna at gmx.net  Tue Jun 16 11:11:19 2009
From: echna at gmx.net (echna)
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2009 19:11:19 +0200
Subject: [Critical-Realism] bookshops in London
Message-ID: <4A37D237.2060705@gmx.net>

Hi all,

as I will be  in London soon for a couple of days I was wondering, if 
anybody here on the list could give me some tipps on (academic) 
bookshops, which have a wide range of CR-literature (so that I can 
browse through their assortment and buy one or two things ;-) ).  
Besides I am interested in shops, even second hand ones, with a variety 
of books on marxist theory. Thanks in advance for any help.

best regards,
e


From phil at pwalden.fsnet.co.uk  Tue Jun 16 14:46:15 2009
From: phil at pwalden.fsnet.co.uk (Phil Walden)
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2009 21:46:15 +0100
Subject: [Critical-Realism] bookshops in London
In-Reply-To: <4A37D237.2060705@gmx.net>
Message-ID: <20090616204617.RNJD13254.aamtaout01-winn.ispmail.ntl.com@pwalden>

The best bookshops for philosophy in London are:
Foyles in Charing Cross Road
Blackwells in Charing Cross Road
Waterstones near ULU (round the corner from Malet Street - and it has a
second-hand section too)

All of these will carry some CR books, but perhaps only the most recent
ones.

You can buy most of the CR books on Amazon.com or on abebooks.com

For Marxist theory try Housmans bookshop in Caledonian Road near King's
Cross Station.  Or there is Judd Books in Marchmont Street (again near
King's Cross) which is a second-hand bookshop that has a specific section on
Marxism in the basement.  You could also try Bookmarks in Bloomsbury Street
(in fact Foyles, Blackwells, and Bookmarks are all very close to Tottenham
Court Road tube station - for Bookmarks you just go up New Oxford Street and
turn right into Bloomsbury Street).

Phil Walden

 

-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna
Sent: 16 June 2009 18:11
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: [Critical-Realism] bookshops in London


Hi all,

as I will be  in London soon for a couple of days I was wondering, if 
anybody here on the list could give me some tipps on (academic) 
bookshops, which have a wide range of CR-literature (so that I can 
browse through their assortment and buy one or two things ;-) ).  
Besides I am interested in shops, even second hand ones, with a variety 
of books on marxist theory. Thanks in advance for any help.

best regards,
e

_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism



From echna at gmx.net  Wed Jun 17 00:57:34 2009
From: echna at gmx.net (echna)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2009 08:57:34 +0200
Subject: [Critical-Realism] bookshops in London
In-Reply-To: <20090616204617.RNJD13254.aamtaout01-winn.ispmail.ntl.com@pwalden>
References: <20090616204617.RNJD13254.aamtaout01-winn.ispmail.ntl.com@pwalden>
Message-ID: <4A3893DE.8020005@gmx.net>

Thanks, Phil! I?ll try to find all the mentioned shops - wish me luck :-) .

best wishes,
e

Phil Walden schrieb:
> The best bookshops for philosophy in London are:
> Foyles in Charing Cross Road
> Blackwells in Charing Cross Road
> Waterstones near ULU (round the corner from Malet Street - and it has a
> second-hand section too)
>
> All of these will carry some CR books, but perhaps only the most recent
> ones.
>
> You can buy most of the CR books on Amazon.com or on abebooks.com
>
> For Marxist theory try Housmans bookshop in Caledonian Road near King's
> Cross Station.  Or there is Judd Books in Marchmont Street (again near
> King's Cross) which is a second-hand bookshop that has a specific section on
> Marxism in the basement.  You could also try Bookmarks in Bloomsbury Street
> (in fact Foyles, Blackwells, and Bookmarks are all very close to Tottenham
> Court Road tube station - for Bookmarks you just go up New Oxford Street and
> turn right into Bloomsbury Street).
>
> Phil Walden
>
>  
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna
> Sent: 16 June 2009 18:11
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] bookshops in London
>
>
> Hi all,
>
> as I will be  in London soon for a couple of days I was wondering, if 
> anybody here on the list could give me some tipps on (academic) 
> bookshops, which have a wide range of CR-literature (so that I can 
> browse through their assortment and buy one or two things ;-) ).  
> Besides I am interested in shops, even second hand ones, with a variety 
> of books on marxist theory. Thanks in advance for any help.
>
> best regards,
> e
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>   



From phil at pwalden.fsnet.co.uk  Wed Jun 17 03:28:23 2009
From: phil at pwalden.fsnet.co.uk (Phil Walden)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2009 10:28:23 +0100
Subject: [Critical-Realism] bookshops in London
In-Reply-To: <4A3893DE.8020005@gmx.net>
Message-ID: <20090617092826.YUHD13254.aamtaout01-winn.ispmail.ntl.com@pwalden>

No problem.
By the way, at the end of my post that should have been "turn left into
Bloomsbury Street".
Phil


-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna
Sent: 17 June 2009 07:58
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] bookshops in London


Thanks, Phil! I?ll try to find all the mentioned shops - wish me luck :-) .

best wishes,
e

Phil Walden schrieb:
> The best bookshops for philosophy in London are:
> Foyles in Charing Cross Road
> Blackwells in Charing Cross Road
> Waterstones near ULU (round the corner from Malet Street - and it has a
> second-hand section too)
>
> All of these will carry some CR books, but perhaps only the most recent
> ones.
>
> You can buy most of the CR books on Amazon.com or on abebooks.com
>
> For Marxist theory try Housmans bookshop in Caledonian Road near King's
> Cross Station.  Or there is Judd Books in Marchmont Street (again near
> King's Cross) which is a second-hand bookshop that has a specific section
on
> Marxism in the basement.  You could also try Bookmarks in Bloomsbury
Street
> (in fact Foyles, Blackwells, and Bookmarks are all very close to Tottenham
> Court Road tube station - for Bookmarks you just go up New Oxford Street
and
> turn right into Bloomsbury Street).
>
> Phil Walden
>
>  
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna
> Sent: 16 June 2009 18:11
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] bookshops in London
>
>
> Hi all,
>
> as I will be  in London soon for a couple of days I was wondering, if 
> anybody here on the list could give me some tipps on (academic) 
> bookshops, which have a wide range of CR-literature (so that I can 
> browse through their assortment and buy one or two things ;-) ).  
> Besides I am interested in shops, even second hand ones, with a variety 
> of books on marxist theory. Thanks in advance for any help.
>
> best regards,
> e
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>   


_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism



From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk  Wed Jun 17 03:57:39 2009
From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2009 10:57:39 +0100
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
In-Reply-To: <6ad241360906160613kebe5773k126ff38befa9adeb@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <mailman.10.1245232663.2550.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>

It's probably too late, as we're in the final draft stage, but I'll see. 


-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth
Groff
Sent: 16 June 2009 14:14
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!

Yes, in the social sphere.  I've argued that they are formal causes (too),
as you know.  I can't imagine how RB couldn't think so; it's just that it's
not actually what he says there, where he says what kind of Aristotelian
cause they are.  Hey maybe you could get him to say it when you interview
him!



On Tue, Jun 16, 2009 at 7:08 AM, Mervyn Hartwig
<mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>wrote:

> Hi Ruth, Dave
>
> Ruth wrote: "Not restricted to persons, but then in PON it seems that 
> it is, actually, only persons, who do things."
>
>  Surely this needs a qualifier added: "in the social sphere". In other 
> spheres it of course remains the case that causality is "not 
> restricted to persons", and there is arguably no inconsistency. This 
> is why I insist on the implicitly dialectical character of the early 
> work: it thinks the coincidence of distinctions and connections.
>
> I don't think Bhaskar actually says in so many words in PON that 
> social structures are 'only' material causes. The way I read him is 
> that they are also 'formal' causes in Aristotelian terms (cf pervasive 
> deployment of the concept 'social form'), and they provide the 
> indispensable context for the efficient/final causation of 
> people-in-society. The 'causal power' of the social (p. 26) is an 
> integral aspect of people's efficient and final causal powers.
>
> Mervyn
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of 
> Ruth Groff
> Sent: 15 June 2009 23:35
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
>
> Hi Dave,
>
> I sort of think it's hard to know for sure how to make all the parts 
> add up exactly, in the earlier work anyway.  Yes on powerful 
> particulars, but then it turns out that there are some "things" that 
> are just powers.  Not restricted to persons, but then in PON it seems 
> that it is, actually, only persons, who do things.  Even though he 
> can't possibly think that.  But he says it -- such that Ted Benton 
> then criticizes him for it -- and says also in PON that structures are
only material causes.  Etc.
>
> r.
>
>
>
> On Mon, Jun 15, 2009 at 4:41 PM, Dave Elder-Vass
> <d.eldervass at ntlworld.com>wrote:
>
> > Excellent - and thank you both. I've often cited the early part of 
> > that quote but I'd forgotten the two quotes fitted together.
> >
> > Incidentally, in response to Ruth, I think RB is very close to the 
> > 'powerful particulars' view, certainly in RTS, but without the odd 
> > qualification that Harre later makes, restricting powerful 
> > particulars to persons and fields.
> >
> > Best,
> >
> > Dave
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "hbar12yahoo.com" <hbar12 at yahoo.com>
> > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Sent: 15 June 2009 16:13
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> >
> >
> > Here is some more on that.
> >
> >
> > http://books.google.com/books?id=lrK5m8NThWYC&pg=PA37&lpg=PA37&dq=Bh
> > as
> > kar+reify&source=bl&ots=AzGzsKWnIB&sig=uiPE4h6t96TGbqNUsDbjZ9gIUSE&h
> > kar+l=
> > en&ei=aWQ2SonBM42OMu-Q9YgK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1
> >
> >
> > hbar12 at yahoo.com
> > http://hbar12.bravehost.com
> > Washington, DC USA
> >
> > --- On Mon, 6/15/09, Wan Yu-ze <b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw> wrote:
> >
> >
> > From: Wan Yu-ze <b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw>
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Date: Monday, June 15, 2009, 10:53 AM
> >
> >
> > Hi Dave,
> >
> > I think you're refering to the following passage:
> >
> > "On this interpretation then the generative mechanisms of nature 
> > exist as the causal powers of things.
> > We now have a perfectly acceptable ontological basis for causal laws.
> > For if it is wrong to reify causal laws, and it is wrong to reify 
> > generative mechanisms, it cannot be wrong to reify things!"
> > (A Realist Theory of Science, p. 50)
> >
> >
> > Poe Yu-ze Wan
> > Department of Sociology
> > National Taiwan University
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Dave Elder-Vass" <d.eldervass at ntlworld.com>
> > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Sent: Monday, June 15, 2009 6:57 PM
> > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> >
> >
> > > Dear listers,
> > >
> > > I seem to recall that somewhere in one of his early works Bhaskar 
> > > writes something along the lines of "It cannot be an error to 
> > > reify a thing" but
> > I
> > > can't find the quote at the moment. Could anyone point me to the 
> > > right place? Or am I just getting confused?
> > >
> > > Best,
> > >
> > > Dave
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
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>
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From johnsheldon at live.co.uk  Wed Jun 17 04:01:34 2009
From: johnsheldon at live.co.uk (John Sheldon)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2009 10:01:34 +0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] bookshops in London
In-Reply-To: <4A37D237.2060705@gmx.net>
References: <4A37D237.2060705@gmx.net>
Message-ID: <SNT102-W1275FB79F911B7795FD3C58A3C0@phx.gbl>


Good second hand bookshop in London is Skoob:

 

                www.skoob.com

 

They'll part exchange too!

 

Good luck 

J


 
> Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2009 19:11:19 +0200
> From: echna at gmx.net
> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] bookshops in London
> 
> Hi all,
> 
> as I will be in London soon for a couple of days I was wondering, if 
> anybody here on the list could give me some tipps on (academic) 
> bookshops, which have a wide range of CR-literature (so that I can 
> browse through their assortment and buy one or two things ;-) ). 
> Besides I am interested in shops, even second hand ones, with a variety 
> of books on marxist theory. Thanks in advance for any help.
> 
> best regards,
> e
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism

_________________________________________________________________
With Windows Live, you can organise, edit, and share your photos.
http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/134665338/direct/01/

From rgroff at slu.edu  Wed Jun 17 06:16:17 2009
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2009 07:16:17 -0500
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
In-Reply-To: <7u5804$6nse3g@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu>
References: <6ad241360906160613kebe5773k126ff38befa9adeb@mail.gmail.com>
	<7u5804$6nse3g@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu>
Message-ID: <6ad241360906170516l5cc594fjadae14d9d202ab3f@mail.gmail.com>

That would be great!  I'd love to know if he agrees on them being formal
causes.



On Wed, Jun 17, 2009 at 4:57 AM, Mervyn Hartwig <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>wrote:

> It's probably too late, as we're in the final draft stage, but I'll see.
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth
> Groff
> Sent: 16 June 2009 14:14
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
>
> Yes, in the social sphere.  I've argued that they are formal causes (too),
> as you know.  I can't imagine how RB couldn't think so; it's just that it's
> not actually what he says there, where he says what kind of Aristotelian
> cause they are.  Hey maybe you could get him to say it when you interview
> him!
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 16, 2009 at 7:08 AM, Mervyn Hartwig
> <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>wrote:
>
> > Hi Ruth, Dave
> >
> > Ruth wrote: "Not restricted to persons, but then in PON it seems that
> > it is, actually, only persons, who do things."
> >
> >  Surely this needs a qualifier added: "in the social sphere". In other
> > spheres it of course remains the case that causality is "not
> > restricted to persons", and there is arguably no inconsistency. This
> > is why I insist on the implicitly dialectical character of the early
> > work: it thinks the coincidence of distinctions and connections.
> >
> > I don't think Bhaskar actually says in so many words in PON that
> > social structures are 'only' material causes. The way I read him is
> > that they are also 'formal' causes in Aristotelian terms (cf pervasive
> > deployment of the concept 'social form'), and they provide the
> > indispensable context for the efficient/final causation of
> > people-in-society. The 'causal power' of the social (p. 26) is an
> > integral aspect of people's efficient and final causal powers.
> >
> > Mervyn
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> > Ruth Groff
> > Sent: 15 June 2009 23:35
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> >
> > Hi Dave,
> >
> > I sort of think it's hard to know for sure how to make all the parts
> > add up exactly, in the earlier work anyway.  Yes on powerful
> > particulars, but then it turns out that there are some "things" that
> > are just powers.  Not restricted to persons, but then in PON it seems
> > that it is, actually, only persons, who do things.  Even though he
> > can't possibly think that.  But he says it -- such that Ted Benton
> > then criticizes him for it -- and says also in PON that structures are
> only material causes.  Etc.
> >
> > r.
> >
> >
> >
> > On Mon, Jun 15, 2009 at 4:41 PM, Dave Elder-Vass
> > <d.eldervass at ntlworld.com>wrote:
> >
> > > Excellent - and thank you both. I've often cited the early part of
> > > that quote but I'd forgotten the two quotes fitted together.
> > >
> > > Incidentally, in response to Ruth, I think RB is very close to the
> > > 'powerful particulars' view, certainly in RTS, but without the odd
> > > qualification that Harre later makes, restricting powerful
> > > particulars to persons and fields.
> > >
> > > Best,
> > >
> > > Dave
> > >
> > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > From: "hbar12yahoo.com" <hbar12 at yahoo.com>
> > > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > > <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > Sent: 15 June 2009 16:13
> > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> > >
> > >
> > > Here is some more on that.
> > >
> > >
> > > http://books.google.com/books?id=lrK5m8NThWYC&pg=PA37&lpg=PA37&dq=Bh
> > > as
> > > kar+reify&source=bl&ots=AzGzsKWnIB&sig=uiPE4h6t96TGbqNUsDbjZ9gIUSE&h
> > > kar+l=
> > > en&ei=aWQ2SonBM42OMu-Q9YgK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1
> > >
> > >
> > > hbar12 at yahoo.com
> > > http://hbar12.bravehost.com
> > > Washington, DC USA
> > >
> > > --- On Mon, 6/15/09, Wan Yu-ze <b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > From: Wan Yu-ze <b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw>
> > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> > > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > > <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > Date: Monday, June 15, 2009, 10:53 AM
> > >
> > >
> > > Hi Dave,
> > >
> > > I think you're refering to the following passage:
> > >
> > > "On this interpretation then the generative mechanisms of nature
> > > exist as the causal powers of things.
> > > We now have a perfectly acceptable ontological basis for causal laws.
> > > For if it is wrong to reify causal laws, and it is wrong to reify
> > > generative mechanisms, it cannot be wrong to reify things!"
> > > (A Realist Theory of Science, p. 50)
> > >
> > >
> > > Poe Yu-ze Wan
> > > Department of Sociology
> > > National Taiwan University
> > >
> > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > From: "Dave Elder-Vass" <d.eldervass at ntlworld.com>
> > > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > > <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > Sent: Monday, June 15, 2009 6:57 PM
> > > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> > >
> > >
> > > > Dear listers,
> > > >
> > > > I seem to recall that somewhere in one of his early works Bhaskar
> > > > writes something along the lines of "It cannot be an error to
> > > > reify a thing" but
> > > I
> > > > can't find the quote at the moment. Could anyone point me to the
> > > > right place? Or am I just getting confused?
> > > >
> > > > Best,
> > > >
> > > > Dave
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> > __________ NOD32 4156 (20090615) Information __________
> >
> > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system.
> > http://www.eset.com
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
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> This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system.
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>
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>

From howarde at iastate.edu  Wed Jun 17 09:23:10 2009
From: howarde at iastate.edu (howarde at iastate.edu)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2009 10:23:10 -0500 (CDT)
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
Message-ID: <10231017510931671@webmail.iastate.edu>


Hi Ruth,

Doesn't the confusion turn on an ambiguity, and isn't the ambiguity really
unnecessary?

"only persons do things" can mean that in the social sphere only individuals
have causal efficacy.  A methodological individualist would assert this.

Or "only persons do things" can mean that individual persons are the moving part
in any causal complex of the social.

If the second point is what is meant, then there is no problem in accepting that
only persons do things while simultaneously affirming that different social
arrangements have different causal consequences.  If you pass buckets of water
along a line, you will get more water to a fire than if each individual carries
a bucket individually.  But in either case only individuals do anything.

Or take the furniture in a room.  Only the material pieces do anything, but you
can arrange them so people can walk through or arrange them so they can't.

Another way of stating the point would be this:  only if there is an efficient
or moving cause is a causal complex of any sort causally efficacious.

howard






> That would be great!  I'd love to know if he agrees on them being formal
> causes.
> 
> 
> 
> On Wed, Jun 17, 2009 at 4:57 AM, Mervyn Hartwig <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>wrote:
> 
> > It's probably too late, as we're in the final draft stage, but I'll see.
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth
> > Groff
> > Sent: 16 June 2009 14:14
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> >
> > Yes, in the social sphere.  I've argued that they are formal causes (too),
> > as you know.  I can't imagine how RB couldn't think so; it's just that it's
> > not actually what he says there, where he says what kind of Aristotelian
> > cause they are.  Hey maybe you could get him to say it when you interview
> > him!
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Jun 16, 2009 at 7:08 AM, Mervyn Hartwig
> > <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>wrote:
> >
> > > Hi Ruth, Dave
> > >
> > > Ruth wrote: "Not restricted to persons, but then in PON it seems that
> > > it is, actually, only persons, who do things."
> > >
> > >  Surely this needs a qualifier added: "in the social sphere". In other
> > > spheres it of course remains the case that causality is "not
> > > restricted to persons", and there is arguably no inconsistency. This
> > > is why I insist on the implicitly dialectical character of the early
> > > work: it thinks the coincidence of distinctions and connections.
> > >
> > > I don't think Bhaskar actually says in so many words in PON that
> > > social structures are 'only' material causes. The way I read him is
> > > that they are also 'formal' causes in Aristotelian terms (cf pervasive
> > > deployment of the concept 'social form'), and they provide the
> > > indispensable context for the efficient/final causation of
> > > people-in-society. The 'causal power' of the social (p. 26) is an
> > > integral aspect of people's efficient and final causal powers.
> > >
> > > Mervyn
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> > > Ruth Groff
> > > Sent: 15 June 2009 23:35
> > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> > >
> > > Hi Dave,
> > >
> > > I sort of think it's hard to know for sure how to make all the parts
> > > add up exactly, in the earlier work anyway.  Yes on powerful
> > > particulars, but then it turns out that there are some "things" that
> > > are just powers.  Not restricted to persons, but then in PON it seems
> > > that it is, actually, only persons, who do things.  Even though he
> > > can't possibly think that.  But he says it -- such that Ted Benton
> > > then criticizes him for it -- and says also in PON that structures are
> > only material causes.  Etc.
> > >
> > > r.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Mon, Jun 15, 2009 at 4:41 PM, Dave Elder-Vass
> > > <d.eldervass at ntlworld.com>wrote:
> > >
> > > > Excellent - and thank you both. I've often cited the early part of
> > > > that quote but I'd forgotten the two quotes fitted together.
> > > >
> > > > Incidentally, in response to Ruth, I think RB is very close to the
> > > > 'powerful particulars' view, certainly in RTS, but without the odd
> > > > qualification that Harre later makes, restricting powerful
> > > > particulars to persons and fields.
> > > >
> > > > Best,
> > > >
> > > > Dave
> > > >
> > > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > > From: "hbar12yahoo.com" <hbar12 at yahoo.com>
> > > > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > > > <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > > Sent: 15 June 2009 16:13
> > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Here is some more on that.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > http://books.google.com/books?id=lrK5m8NThWYC&pg=PA37&lpg=PA37&dq=Bh
> > > > as
> > > > kar+reify&source=bl&ots=AzGzsKWnIB&sig=uiPE4h6t96TGbqNUsDbjZ9gIUSE&h
> > > > kar+l=
> > > > en&ei=aWQ2SonBM42OMu-Q9YgK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > hbar12 at yahoo.com
> > > > http://hbar12.bravehost.com
> > > > Washington, DC USA
> > > >
> > > > --- On Mon, 6/15/09, Wan Yu-ze <b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw> wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > From: Wan Yu-ze <b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw>
> > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> > > > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > > > <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > > Date: Monday, June 15, 2009, 10:53 AM
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Hi Dave,
> > > >
> > > > I think you're refering to the following passage:
> > > >
> > > > "On this interpretation then the generative mechanisms of nature
> > > > exist as the causal powers of things.
> > > > We now have a perfectly acceptable ontological basis for causal laws.
> > > > For if it is wrong to reify causal laws, and it is wrong to reify
> > > > generative mechanisms, it cannot be wrong to reify things!"
> > > > (A Realist Theory of Science, p. 50)
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan
> > > > Department of Sociology
> > > > National Taiwan University
> > > >
> > > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > > From: "Dave Elder-Vass" <d.eldervass at ntlworld.com>
> > > > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > > > <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > > Sent: Monday, June 15, 2009 6:57 PM
> > > > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > Dear listers,
> > > > >
> > > > > I seem to recall that somewhere in one of his early works Bhaskar
> > > > > writes something along the lines of "It cannot be an error to
> > > > > reify a thing" but
> > > > I
> > > > > can't find the quote at the moment. Could anyone point me to the
> > > > > right place? Or am I just getting confused?
> > > > >
> > > > > Best,
> > > > >
> > > > > Dave
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> > > __________ NOD32 4156 (20090615) Information __________
> > >
> > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system.
> > > http://www.eset.com
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> > __________ NOD32 4160 (20090616) Information __________
> >
> > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system.
> > http://www.eset.com
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> 







From rgroff at slu.edu  Wed Jun 17 10:15:14 2009
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2009 11:15:14 -0500
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
In-Reply-To: <10231017510931671@webmail.iastate.edu>
References: <10231017510931671@webmail.iastate.edu>
Message-ID: <6ad241360906170915q6405d76v3d33c88a5711e5b6@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Howard, all,

This makes sense - a nice way to talk about formal cause.  The question I
had was whether or not RB thinks structures ARE formal causes, or only
material causes.  In PON, when he connects his position to Aristotle, he
says structures are material causes.  As I said to Mervyn, I can't imagine
that he doesn't (or, didn't) think they are formal causes, too, considered
from a different angle, but he doesn't say it and he does say the other, so
it would be great if Mervyn could give him a chance to actually say it.

r.




On Wed, Jun 17, 2009 at 10:23 AM, <howarde at iastate.edu> wrote:

>
> Hi Ruth,
>
> Doesn't the confusion turn on an ambiguity, and isn't the ambiguity really
> unnecessary?
>
> "only persons do things" can mean that in the social sphere only
> individuals
> have causal efficacy.  A methodological individualist would assert this.
>
> Or "only persons do things" can mean that individual persons are the moving
> part
> in any causal complex of the social.
>
> If the second point is what is meant, then there is no problem in accepting
> that
> only persons do things while simultaneously affirming that different social
> arrangements have different causal consequences.  If you pass buckets of
> water
> along a line, you will get more water to a fire than if each individual
> carries
> a bucket individually.  But in either case only individuals do anything.
>
> Or take the furniture in a room.  Only the material pieces do anything, but
> you
> can arrange them so people can walk through or arrange them so they can't.
>
> Another way of stating the point would be this:  only if there is an
> efficient
> or moving cause is a causal complex of any sort causally efficacious.
>
> howard
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > That would be great!  I'd love to know if he agrees on them being formal
> > causes.
> >
> >
> >
> > On Wed, Jun 17, 2009 at 4:57 AM, Mervyn Hartwig <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk
> >wrote:
> >
> > > It's probably too late, as we're in the final draft stage, but I'll
> see.
> > >
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> Ruth
> > > Groff
> > > Sent: 16 June 2009 14:14
> > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> > >
> > > Yes, in the social sphere.  I've argued that they are formal causes
> (too),
> > > as you know.  I can't imagine how RB couldn't think so; it's just that
> it's
> > > not actually what he says there, where he says what kind of
> Aristotelian
> > > cause they are.  Hey maybe you could get him to say it when you
> interview
> > > him!
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Tue, Jun 16, 2009 at 7:08 AM, Mervyn Hartwig
> > > <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>wrote:
> > >
> > > > Hi Ruth, Dave
> > > >
> > > > Ruth wrote: "Not restricted to persons, but then in PON it seems that
> > > > it is, actually, only persons, who do things."
> > > >
> > > >  Surely this needs a qualifier added: "in the social sphere". In
> other
> > > > spheres it of course remains the case that causality is "not
> > > > restricted to persons", and there is arguably no inconsistency. This
> > > > is why I insist on the implicitly dialectical character of the early
> > > > work: it thinks the coincidence of distinctions and connections.
> > > >
> > > > I don't think Bhaskar actually says in so many words in PON that
> > > > social structures are 'only' material causes. The way I read him is
> > > > that they are also 'formal' causes in Aristotelian terms (cf
> pervasive
> > > > deployment of the concept 'social form'), and they provide the
> > > > indispensable context for the efficient/final causation of
> > > > people-in-society. The 'causal power' of the social (p. 26) is an
> > > > integral aspect of people's efficient and final causal powers.
> > > >
> > > > Mervyn
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> > > > Ruth Groff
> > > > Sent: 15 June 2009 23:35
> > > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> > > >
> > > > Hi Dave,
> > > >
> > > > I sort of think it's hard to know for sure how to make all the parts
> > > > add up exactly, in the earlier work anyway.  Yes on powerful
> > > > particulars, but then it turns out that there are some "things" that
> > > > are just powers.  Not restricted to persons, but then in PON it seems
> > > > that it is, actually, only persons, who do things.  Even though he
> > > > can't possibly think that.  But he says it -- such that Ted Benton
> > > > then criticizes him for it -- and says also in PON that structures
> are
> > > only material causes.  Etc.
> > > >
> > > > r.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Mon, Jun 15, 2009 at 4:41 PM, Dave Elder-Vass
> > > > <d.eldervass at ntlworld.com>wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Excellent - and thank you both. I've often cited the early part of
> > > > > that quote but I'd forgotten the two quotes fitted together.
> > > > >
> > > > > Incidentally, in response to Ruth, I think RB is very close to the
> > > > > 'powerful particulars' view, certainly in RTS, but without the odd
> > > > > qualification that Harre later makes, restricting powerful
> > > > > particulars to persons and fields.
> > > > >
> > > > > Best,
> > > > >
> > > > > Dave
> > > > >
> > > > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > > > From: "hbar12yahoo.com" <hbar12 at yahoo.com>
> > > > > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > > > > <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > > > Sent: 15 June 2009 16:13
> > > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Here is some more on that.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> http://books.google.com/books?id=lrK5m8NThWYC&pg=PA37&lpg=PA37&dq=Bh
> > > > > as
> > > > >
> kar+reify&source=bl&ots=AzGzsKWnIB&sig=uiPE4h6t96TGbqNUsDbjZ9gIUSE&h
> > > > > kar+l=
> > > > > en&ei=aWQ2SonBM42OMu-Q9YgK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > hbar12 at yahoo.com
> > > > > http://hbar12.bravehost.com
> > > > > Washington, DC USA
> > > > >
> > > > > --- On Mon, 6/15/09, Wan Yu-ze <b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > From: Wan Yu-ze <b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw>
> > > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> > > > > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > > > > <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > > > Date: Monday, June 15, 2009, 10:53 AM
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Hi Dave,
> > > > >
> > > > > I think you're refering to the following passage:
> > > > >
> > > > > "On this interpretation then the generative mechanisms of nature
> > > > > exist as the causal powers of things.
> > > > > We now have a perfectly acceptable ontological basis for causal
> laws.
> > > > > For if it is wrong to reify causal laws, and it is wrong to reify
> > > > > generative mechanisms, it cannot be wrong to reify things!"
> > > > > (A Realist Theory of Science, p. 50)
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan
> > > > > Department of Sociology
> > > > > National Taiwan University
> > > > >
> > > > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > > > From: "Dave Elder-Vass" <d.eldervass at ntlworld.com>
> > > > > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > > > > <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > > > Sent: Monday, June 15, 2009 6:57 PM
> > > > > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Help!
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > > Dear listers,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I seem to recall that somewhere in one of his early works Bhaskar
> > > > > > writes something along the lines of "It cannot be an error to
> > > > > > reify a thing" but
> > > > > I
> > > > > > can't find the quote at the moment. Could anyone point me to the
> > > > > > right place? Or am I just getting confused?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Best,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Dave
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > > >
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From dondazsa at aol.com  Mon Jun 22 18:20:34 2009
From: dondazsa at aol.com (dondazsa at aol.com)
Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2009 20:20:34 -0400
Subject: [Critical-Realism] RTS - Chapter 4
Message-ID: <8CBC1AF8F216886-1608-5FE@mblk-d32.sysops.aol.com>

Does anyone have RTS chapter 4 in a file format that you could send me. I am doing a review and I cannot find my book and the online version does not have chapter 4 or the appendix (I think).

Thanks for the consideration.

Don

From ehrbar at lists.econ.utah.edu  Tue Jun 23 05:03:57 2009
From: ehrbar at lists.econ.utah.edu (ehrbar)
Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2009 05:03:57 -0600
Subject: [Critical-Realism] RTS2, Chapter 4
Message-ID: <E1MJ3nB-0002hX-0w@lists.econ.utah.edu>



=======================================================
{RTS2:239} 4. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science
=======================================================


If science is to be possible men must possess certain
essential powers.  Among these is the power of affecting
the sequences of states and events in the world in the
sense of bringing about effects which but for their
action would not have been realized.  In this way men
contribute to the universal maelstrom of existence.  More
specific to men is their power to initiate and prevent
change in a purposeful way.  The possession of this power
seems to stem from the fact that men are material things
with a particular degree of neuro-physiological
complexity which enables them to monitor and control
their own actions.  Foremost among the powers necessary
for science and, as far as we know, distinctive of men is
their power of intentional action, which enables them to
act self-consciously on the world: that is not just to
monitor and control their performance, but to monitor the
monitoring of their performance: to plan, to act and so
to make an anticipatory commentary come true.

         Among the powers falling within this genus perhaps
the most basic and certainly the most studied is the
power to acquire and use language.  The latter implies at
the very least that we are material things with a point
of view in space and an existence in time, so that we
must be able to communicate with each other from
different spatio-temporal locations.  And the former
implies at the very least that we must be able to
communicate with each other on the basis of the
possession of differing cognitive equipment, so that
reindividuation and recharacterization must be possible
and the definitions of terms must be at least partially
open.  However language is by no means the only vehicle
of thought; nor is language-using our only intellectual
skill.  Pictures, diagrams and iconic models play, it has
been argued, an indispensable role in scientific thought.

         Now endowed with our ensemble of intellectual
powers we {RTS2:240} are able not just to describe the
patterns of events but by imagining structures (which may
come to be established as real) to grasp the mechanisms of
their production.

         Closely related to these powers is our capacity to
design, manufacture and use tools.  This inter alia
enables us to act at a distance; and in the course of
science it has enormously extended our powers of
perception and detection.  More generally, it has
enormously increased our powers of intervention in and
control over, as we say, `the course of nature'.

         In all these activities - involving perceiving,
manipulating, discoursive and pictorial thought - the
role of the nature of men as mechanisms capable of
second-order monitoring and feed- back is vital.  In
virtue of it our diverse perceptual, manipulative and
cognitive performances become possible objects of self-
criticism; and inter alia through our capacity to make
public our monitored commentaries upon these monitored
performances open to the criticism of others.  Simple
rudimentary perception, such as sniffing, and basic
actions, such as raising one's arm, which depend in
general only upon a first-order monitoring, are in
themselves relatively insignificant in science.  The
chemist who sneezes while conducting an experiment is
aware of himself in a certain way, but not in the way
that the physiologist understands all sneezes, including
his own.  For the latter knows the mechanism of sneezing,
while the former merely experiences its effects.  (The
chemist, unlike the layman, may however be aware of the
cause, in the sense of antecedent or stimulus conditions
for the mechanism, in this case).

         Scientific perception is non-simple then in the
sense that it must normally be theoretically-informed.  And
most scientific actions are non-basic (in Danto's sense)l in
that they consist in doing things to bring other things
about (i.e. phiing to psi),^2 that is initiating sequences
of events whose outcome is both distant and planned.  It is
through our acquired skills of perception that we come to be
in a position to formulate propositions concerning the
behaviour of things, to identify and describe the flux of
events.  But it is through our manipulative powers that, by
interfering with the course of nature (this flow of events),
we {RTS2:241} are able to check the reality and study the
operation of the hypothetical generative mechanisms that in
the scientific imagination we picture as responsible for
their behaviour.

         In such a move we disrupt the sequences of events to
identify the underlying causal laws.  Its significance -
the significance of experimentation - lies in the
consideration that it gives us access to causal
structures that exist and act independently of the
experiment.  In the same way the significance of
perception lies in the consideration that it gives us
access to things that exist independently of it.  And in
a sense scientifically-relevant perception depends upon
an anterior disruption too - of the sequence of
common-sense experiences in a scientific education or
training.

         Now the crux of my objection to the doctrine of
empirical realism should be clear.  It is that it cannot
sustain the intelligibility of perception and
experimental activity; and that in positing a
correspondence (or even in its positivist form an
identity) between:

         (a) sense-experiences, which are in general only
made significant by the transformation of antecedent
common sense, and their objects, viz. events and the
states of things, as expressed in the concept of the
empirical world; and

         (b) constant conjunctions, which are in general
only made possible by human activity, and causal laws, as
expressed in the idea of the actuality of causal laws


it makes impossible both scientific change (at least in
our descriptions of possible objects of experience) and
the scientific explanation of things existing and acting
in open systems (that is, in systems where invariant
conjunctions of events have not been found or made to
prevail).  In this way empirical realism comes to
seriously understate the critical significance and scope
of application of science.

         (a) depends upon the possibility of identifying or
characterizing the same thing or phenomenon (or explaining
the same event) in a different way, as well as from
different spatio- temporal locations. (b) depends upon the
intelligibility of the idea of causal structures existing
and acting where no empirical regularities prevail.  Both
depend upon the non-identity and possible disjuncture of the
terms of the pairs; that is, upon the {RTS2:242} possibility
of one varying without the other.  Thus we must have a
concept of facts as social products and what is described
and/or explained as independent of men.  And we must have a
concept of the mechanisms that generate phenomena
irreducible to the phenomena they generate.  And so two
dimensions must be established in the philosophy of science:
a transitive dimension, in which experiences and
conjunctions of events are seen as socially produced; and an
intransitive dimension, in which the objects of scientific
thought are seen as generative mechanisms and structures
which exist and act independently of men.

         Now empirical realism is characterized by the
absence of an intransitive dimension and of a transitive
dimension with respect to experience.  But I have already
argued that this merely results in the generation of an
implicit ontology, based on the category of experience
and an implicit sociology, based on the category of men:
that is, in the generation of an ontological atomism and
an epistemological individualism (at least with respect
to experience).  I have further suggested in 3.4 above
that underpinning empirical realism is a particular
conception of men (at least with respect to experience):
in which men are seen as passive sensors of given facts
and recorders of their given conjunctions. This model of
man constitutes, together with the celestial closure and
the classical paradigm of action, the analogical
grammar'^3 of empirical realism, the scientific substance
that lends plausibility to its metaphysics, that gives
credence to its philosophical form.

         If there is a basic or fundamental level of
knowledge, at which what is expressed is certain and given
independently of any human activity and reflects (and
ultimately constitutes) the world, then its constituents
must be atomistic.  For if they were not atomistic they
would be themselves susceptible of analysis, and so require
justification.  Hence it is the characteristics of the
concept of knowledge to which empirical realists have
subscribed, that accounts for the disastrous ontology that
we have examined.  It is the desire for incorrigible
foundations in a level which constitutes the world that
generates the ontology of atomistic events and closed
systems responsible for the problems and errors analysed in
Chapters 2 and 3.  Against this I {RTS2:243} have argued
that knowledge depends upon knowledge-like antecedents and
that the world is independent of men.  But if it is the
requirements of an incorrigible ground for knowledge of the
world in empirical realism that generates the implicit
ontology of empirical realism, it is the model of man
necessary to sustain the incorrigibility of this ground that
forms the lynchpin of the tradition; and hence explains in
the last instance the doctrines and problems we have been
criticizing and examining This is of course as one would
expect given the epistemological bias and anthropocentricity
of our philosophical thought.

         Empirical realism is faced with the following
trilemma: either (i) our knowledge is determined (in part
or in whole) by experience or (ii) it is fixed a priori
as a necessary condition of experience or (iii) it is
free (in the sense of unconstrained by experience).^4  I
said at the outset that part of my intention was a
philosophy for science.  What, then, are the implications
of these three positions for scientific practice?  It is
clear that if knowledge is regarded as justified in terms
of given experience we have the makings of what is in
effect a conservative ideology, in which the current
experiences of a science are rationalized in being
thought of as natural, given or implied by the very
nature of things themselves.  If (ii) is seriously
considered it would tend to have the same conservative
effect.  It is less obvious that (iii) would too - until
we remember that science is an institutionalized activity
in which if to be free is to be unconstrained by the
possibility of critical experience a self-perpetuating
dogma may ensue.  Examples could be drawn from the
history of physics and chemistry and economics to show
how empirical realism has functioned in this way as a
conservative ideology for science.

         A philosophical system may serve to rationalize the
practice of a science in another way, viz. through its own
substantive scientific analogies and the correspondence or
resonance they find in the science.  Thus empirical realism
readily finds an echo in mechanistic explanations in physics
and psychology and reductionist programmes in sociology and
biology.  One would {RTS2:244} expect such a link to be
particularly strong in the case of the social sciences, if
only because of the greater sensitivity on the part of
social scientists to the philosophy of science - a
sensitivity partly explained by the apprehension of their
own underdevelopment and partly by the consideration that
science in general and social science in particular is also
part of their own field of inquiry.  The resonance between
Skinner and Hume or Marshall and Mill is too clear to need
further remarking.

         In addition to the effect of its concept of
knowledge and its own substantive scientific analogies a
philosophy of science may of course also, and most
obviously, rationalize the practice of a science through
its own conception of the methods of science and the
appropriate objects of scientific inquiry.  If I am right
in my argument the methodology of empirical realism is
not that of science but if it were to be acted upon it
would have the most deleterious effects on its practice.

         Now if empirical realism depends heavily for its
plausibility upon its analogical grammar, it could be
asked upon what substantive scientific analogy does
transcendental realism depend?  The answer is, I think,
none.  All philosophical argument that is not explicitly
transcendental depends, I think, upon more or less
strained scientific analogies or tacitly presupposed
substantive theories.  But a transcendental argument
whose premise is explicitly stated need not depend upon
any particular theory, other than those bound up in the
activity that is its object and which is its task to
explicate.

         The central argument of this study, establishing an
ontological distinction between causal laws and patterns
of events (the independence of the domains of the real
and the actual, the irreducibility of structures to
events), has turned on the possibility of experimental
activity.  Now as it is clear that experimental activity
is impossible in the social sciences and at the very
least devoid of the same significance in psychology as it
possesses in physics and chemistry, I want to round off
my argument by considering whether something analogous to
the controlled investigation of nature, making possible
the experimental confirmation and falsification of
theories, might be possible in the social sciences and
psychology and other fields where experimental activity
is impossible or more or less seriously circumscribed.

         {RTS2:245} Three points are clear.  First, that
there is a general problem of confirmation (or
corroboration) and falsification in the non-experimental
sciences.  Second, that though we can assume that there are
explanations for social and psychological phenomena (and
under social and psychological descriptions), we cannot
assume that the social or psychological sciences have got
anywhere near them.  Thirdly, that any adequate solution to
the methodological problems (and in particular problems of
confirmation and falsification) of the non-experimental
sciences must depend upon a more adequate conception of
natural science than that which has so far informed
discussion of them.

         An awareness of the general problem of confirmation
and falsification in the non-experimental sciences is
shown by the following quotation:

The linguist . . . is studying one fundamental factor
that is involved in performance, but not the only one.
This idealization must be kept in mind when considering
the problem of confirmation of grammars on the basis of
empirical evidence.  There is no reason why one should
not also study the interaction of several factors that
are involved in complex mental acts and that underlie
actual performance, but such a study is not likely to
proceed vary far unless the separate factors are
themselves reasonably well understood.^5

Now if I am right in arguing that the significance of
experimental activity in natural science is that it gives
us access to enduring and transfactually active
structures and that it is only under closed conditions
that confirmation and falsification of theory is
possible, then we are in a better position to see that
the central problem of the psychological and social (and
other non- experimental) sciences is that of devising (or
reconstructing) an analogous procedure of inquiry and
selectively empirical confirmation (and falsification)
and to appreciate the great gulf that must separate them,
in the absence of such a procedure, from the sciences of
nature.

         In the case of psychology the agent's capacity to
give a commentary on intentional action might provide an
experiment- analogue, though one cannot rule out the
possibility that new {RTS2:246} concepts will have to be
given by the investigator to the agent (even e.g. in the
case of the identification of emotions).  Much social
science can be seen to depend upon attempted real definition
of forms of social life which have already been identified
under certain descriptions and are known by the agents who
participate in the social activities concerned under those
or other descriptions.  Social structures, unlike natural
structures, cannot exist independently of their effects.
Thus real definitions of concepts such as capitalism,
democracy, power, love can only be Justified by their
capacity to render intelligible a certain domain of
phenomena.  I suggest that they are falsified by their
incapacity to explain in a non-ad-hoc way a range of
phenomena that takes on a special significance for the
agents that participate in the forms of social life they
define.  Thus it was the mass unemployment of the 1930's
that demonstrated the inadequacy of the neo-classical system
and provided the motor for the Keynesian innovation which
showed how an unemployment equilibrium was possible.
Clearly I have no space to defend or elaborate these
suggestions here.  It is sufficient for our purposes merely
to note the problem: what are the enduring and
transfactually active `mechanisms' of the sciences of
society and man ?  Transcendental realism conceives the
various sciences as unified in their method but specific to
(or differentiated with respect to) their particular
objects.

         Now once generative mechanisms are seen to be the
objects of scientific thought, it can be seen that four
questions can be asked of any generative mechanism G :-

(i) is the mechanism enduring?

(ii) is the mechanism operating?

(iii) are the results of the activity of the mechanism
unaffected by the operations of others (of either the same
or different

(iv) are the results of the activity of the mechanism
perceived or otherwise detected by men ?

Now if one assumes, as the actualist does, that laws are
empirical invariances (universal empirical generalizations)
one cannot sensibly ask these questions.  Two consequences
should be noted.  First, a neglect of the conscious human
activity that is necessary for the generation of
event-invariances under {RTS2:247} significant descriptions,
that is of the activity involved in (ii)-(iv).  Thus the
stimulus and enabling conditions for the operation of the
mechanism must be satisfied; the mechanism must be isolated
and the flux of conditions held constant or otherwise
controlled; and skilled observers must be present to
perceive or detect it.  And secondly, neglect of the
possibility of non-enduring mechanisms, of laws which
though universal and normic in form (i.e. transfactually
applicable) are themselves bounded in space and restricted
in time.  On the transcendental realist ontology, the
description of what the world must be like if science is to
be possible, the classical principle of indifference (or
invariance) applies only to structures, not to events.  But
structures may themselves be transformed; and so concepts of
diversity and change, like that of structure, squeezed out
by the implicit undifferentiated ontology of empirical
realism, may come to occupy as significant a place in
ontology as the concept of indifference.

         I have stressed throughout this study the diversity
of phenomena and the autonomy of the various sciences (both
from one another and with respect to common sense), the
opacity of their concepts and the strangeness of the objects
with which they have to deal.  Natural processes are
independent of man but man is himself in, and in continual
interaction with, nature.  Nature itself is diversified and
complex.  But I doubt whether our concept of nature can be
understood in isolation from our concept of man; and I doubt
whether we understand the latter.  The scope of this enquiry
has how ever been strictly philosophical; and its
conclusions apodeictic.  I have shown the structured and
intransitive character of the objects of scientific enquiry
to be a condition of the intelligibility of experimental
activity and the social nature of knowledge to be a
condition of the intelligibility of scientific training.
(The laboratory and the classroom are the two most under
analysed, and yet the two most obvious, sites of science).
I have isolated the conditions of the plausibility of the
doctrine of empirical realism and shown then to be very
special.  A conception of both nature and our knowledge of
nature as differentiated and stratified has been advanced.
And I have developed two criteria for the adequacy of any
account of science: viz. its capacity to sustain the
possibility of a world without men and the impossibility of
knowledge without {RTS2:248} antecedents. These establish
the necessity for both of what I have called the
intransitive and transitive dimensions of the philosophy of
science: any account of science that does not view knowledge
as socially produced and the objects of knowledge as
independent of men must be ruled out as a possible account
of science.

         If science is to be possible the world must be one
of enduring and transfactually active mechanisms; and
society must be a structure (or ensemble of powers)
irreducible to but present only in the intentional action
of men.  Science must be conceived as an ongoing social
activity; and knowledge as a social product which
individuals must reproduce or transform, and which
individuals must draw upon to use in their own critical
explorations of nature.  Science is a process in motion,
continually on the move from manifest behaviour to
essential nature, from the description of things
identified at any one level of reality to the
construction and testing of possible explanations and
thus the discovery of the mechanisms responsible for
them.  This process necessitates the construction of both
new concepts and new tools (or the resurrection or
refinement of old ones).  The aim of science is the
discovery of the mechanisms of the production of
phenomena in nature; and it proceeds by way of a
dialectic of taxonomic (or descriptive) and explanatory
knowledge, in which the conflicting principles of
empiricism and rationalism can be reconciled, a dialectic
which has no foreseeable end.

         In order to render intelligible scientific change
and to reconcile it with the idea of scientific progress we
must have the concept of an ontological realm, of objects
apart from our descriptions of them.  We can then allow, for
example, that theory T_a is preferable to theory T_b, even
if in the terminology of Kuhn and Feyerabend it is
`incommensurable' with it if theory T_a can explain under
its descriptions almost all the phenomena p_1 . . . p_n that
T_b can explain under its descriptions B_p1 . . .B_pn plus
some significant phenomena that T_b cannot explain.  We can
speak in this way in the meta-language of philosophy, and we
must speak so if we are to retain the idea of scientific
progress without falling back on the idea of certain
foundations of knowledge or theory-free experience.  It is
the intuition of this necessity that accounts, I think, for
the readiness with which some philosophers of science have
embraced Tarski's {RTS2:249} theory of truth.^6  But this
theory cannot help us to resolve the problem posed by the
apprehension of the general relativity of our knowledge:
viz. that whenever we speak of things or of events etc. in
science we must always speak of them and know them under
particular descriptions, descriptions which will always be
to a greater or lesser extent theoretically determined,
which are not neutral reflections of a given
world. Epistemological relativism, in this sense, is the
handmaiden of ontological realism and must be accepted.  Now
this does not mean that it is impossible to communicate
between different theoretical or conceptual schemes or that
a scientist cannot know the same object under two or more
different descriptions.  To show the difference between say
Newtonian and Einsteinian dynamics and that the latter is an
advance on the former a scientist must be capable of doing
so.  Similarly though there is no guarantee of successful
communication between the adherents of two different
conceptual schemas, there is no inevitability about failure
(It is difficult to understand the concept of total
failure.)  Epistemological relativism insists only upon the
impossibility of knowing objects except under particular
descriptions.  And it entails the rejection of any
correspondence theory of truth.  A proposition is true if
and only if the state of affairs that it expresses
(describes) is real.  But propositions cannot be com pared
with states of affairs; their relationship cannot be
described as one of correspondence.  Philosophers have
wanted a theory of truth to provide a criterion or stamp of
knowledge.  But no such stamp is possible.  For the
judgement of the truth of a proposition is necessarily
intrinsic to the science concerned.  There is no way in
which we can look at the world and then at a sentence and
ask whether they fit.  There is just the expression (of the
world) in speech (or thought).

         Transcendental idealists are fond of saying that
either knowledge must conform to objects or objects conform
to knowledge: that either how we speak must be a function of
things or things must be a function of how we speak.^7  But
this dichotomy is bogus.  Science is an activity, a process
in thought and nature which attempts to express in thought
the natures and {RTS2:250} constitutions and ways of acting
of things that exist independently of thought.  Thought has
a reality not to be confused or identified with the reality
of its objects: knowledge may change without objects and
objects change without knowledge.  There is no
correspondence, no conformity, no similarity between objects
and thought.  Thoughts are only like other thoughts objects
(including thoughts) similar to or identical with other
things.  Things exist and act independently of our
descriptions but we can only know them under particular
descriptions Descriptions belong to the world of society and
of men; objects belong to the world of nature. We express
[our understanding of] nature in thought.

         Science, then, is the systematic attempt to express
in thought the structures and ways of acting of things
that exist and act independently of thought.  The world
is structured and complex and not made for men.  It is
entirely accidental that we exist, and understand
something about our bit of it.  It is important to avoid
the epistemic fallacy here.  This consists in confusing
the ontological order with the epistemic order, priority
in being with priority in deciding claims to being, the
question of what has relatively underived (or
independent) existence with the question of what entitles
us to regard some kinds of statements as grounds for
other kinds of statements, etc.  In particular the
question of what is capable of independent existence must
be distinguished from the question of what must be the
case for us to know that something is capable of
independent existence Thus electrons could exist without
material things; but we could not know this proposition,
let us say P, unless there were material things.  The
truth-conditions for our knowledge of P are not the same
as the truth-conditions for P.  There could be a world
without men; but there could not be knowledge without
antecedents.


 ^1 See A. C. Danto, `Basic Actions', A.P.Q. Vol. 2
(1965), reprinted in The Philosophy of Action,
ed. A. White, pp. 43-58.

 ^2 Cf. G. H. von Wright, op. cit., pp. 66ff.

 ^3 To borrow Buchdahl's useful concept.  See G. Buchdahl,
op. cit., p. 3 and passim.

 ^4 Radical conventionalists adopt a mixture of the first
and third horns in the sense of allowing that we are free
to decide what constitutes experience.

 ^5 N. Chomsky, `Problems of Explanation in Linguistics',
Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences, eds. R. Borger
and F. Cioffi, pp. 427-8.  I have of course already
argued against the use of the concept of `idealisation'
to refer to generative structures in 2.4 above.

 ^6 See, e.g. K. R. Popper, op.cit., p. 224.

 ^7 See e.g. H. Schwyzer, Thought and Reality: The
Metaphysics of Kant and Wittgenstein', Philosophical
Quarterly, 1973, p. 205.



From dondazsa at aol.com  Tue Jun 23 08:50:08 2009
From: dondazsa at aol.com (dondazsa at aol.com)
Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2009 10:50:08 -0400
Subject: [Critical-Realism] RTS2, Chapter 4
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 Thank you, thank you, thank you!!!!!

Don


 


 

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Subject: [Critical-Realism] RTS2, Chapter 4












=======================================================
{RTS2:239} 4. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science
=======================================================


If science is to be possible men must possess certain
essential powers.  Among these is the power of affecting
the sequences of states and events in the world in the
sense of bringing about effects which but for their
action would not have been realized.  In this way men
contribute to the universal maelstrom of existence.  More
specific to men is their power to initiate and prevent
change in a purposeful way.  The possession of this power
seems to stem from the fact that men are material things
with a particular degree of neuro-physiological
complexity which enables them to monitor and control
their own actions.  Foremost among the powers necessary
for science and, as far as we know, distinctive of men is
their power of intentional action, which enables them to
act self-consciously on the world: that is not just to
monitor and control their performance, but to monitor the
monitoring of their performance: to plan, to act and so
to make an anticipatory commentary come true.

         Among the powers falling within this genus perhaps
the most basic and certainly the most studied is the
power to acquire and use language.  The latter implies at
the very least that we are material things with a point
of view in space and an existence in time, so that we
must be able to communicate with each other from
different spatio-temporal locations.  And the former
implies at the very least that we must be able to
communicate with each other on the basis of the
possession of differing cognitive equipment, so that
reindividuation and recharacterization must be possible
and the definitions of terms must be at least partially
open.  However language is by no means the only vehicle
of thought; nor is language-using our only intellectual
skill.  Pictures, diagrams and iconic models play, it has
been argued, an indispensable role in scientific thought.

         Now endowed with our ensemble of intellectual
powers we {RTS2:240} are able not just to describe the
patterns of events but by imagining structures (which may
come to be established as real) to grasp the mechanisms of
their production.

         Closely related to these powers is our capacity to
design, manufacture and use tools.  This inter alia
enables us to act at a distance; and in the course of
science it has enormously extended our powers of
perception and detection.  More generally, it has
enormously increased our powers of intervention in and
control over, as we say, `the course of nature'.

         In all these activities - involving perceiving,
manipulating, discoursive and pictorial thought - the
role of the nature of men as mechanisms capable of
second-order monitoring and feed- back is vital.  In
virtue of it our diverse perceptual, manipulative and
cognitive performances become possible objects of self-
criticism; and inter alia through our capacity to make
public our monitored commentaries upon these monitored
performances open to the criticism of others.  Simple
rudimentary perception, such as sniffing, and basic
actions, such as raising one's arm, which depend in
general only upon a first-order monitoring, are in
themselves relatively insignificant in science.  The
chemist who sneezes while conducting an experiment is
aware of himself in a certain way, but not in the way
that the physiologist understands all sneezes, including
his own.  For the latter knows the mechanism of sneezing,
while the former merely experiences its effects.  (The
chemist, unlike the layman, may however be aware of the
cause, in the sense of antecedent or stimulus conditions
for the mechanism, in this case).

         Scientific perception is non-simple then in the
sense that it must normally be theoretically-informed.  And
most scientific actions are non-basic (in Danto's sense)l in
that they consist in doing things to bring other things
about (i.e. phiing to psi),^2 that is initiating sequences
of events whose outcome is both distant and planned.  It is
through our acquired skills of perception that we come to be
in a position to formulate propositions concerning the
behaviour of things, to identify and describe the flux of
events.  But it is through our manipulative powers that, by
interfering with the course of nature (this flow of events),
we {RTS2:241} are able to check the reality and study the
operation of the hypothetical generative mechanisms that in
the scientific imagination we picture as responsible for
their behaviour.

         In such a move we disrupt the sequences of events to
identify the underlying causal laws.  Its significance -
the significance of experimentation - lies in the
consideration that it gives us access to causal
structures that exist and act independently of the
experiment.  In the same way the significance of
perception lies in the consideration that it gives us
access to things that exist independently of it.  And in
a sense scientifically-relevant perception depends upon
an anterior disruption too - of the sequence of
common-sense experiences in a scientific education or
training.

         Now the crux of my objection to the doctrine of
empirical realism should be clear.  It is that it cannot
sustain the intelligibility of perception and
experimental activity; and that in positing a
correspondence (or even in its positivist form an
identity) between:

         (a) sense-experiences, which are in general only
made significant by the transformation of antecedent
common sense, and their objects, viz. events and the
states of things, as expressed in the concept of the
empirical world; and

         (b) constant conjunctions, which are in general
only made possible by human activity, and causal laws, as
expressed in the idea of the actuality of causal laws


it makes impossible both scientific change (at least in
our descriptions of possible objects of experience) and
the scientific explanation of things existing and acting
in open systems (that is, in systems where invariant
conjunctions of events have not been found or made to
prevail).  In this way empirical realism comes to
seriously understate the critical significance and scope
of application of science.

         (a) depends upon the possibility of identifying or
characterizing the same thing or phenomenon (or explaining
the same event) in a different way, as well as from
different spatio- temporal locations. (b) depends upon the
intelligibility of the idea of causal structures existing
and acting where no empirical regularities prevail.  Both
depend upon the non-identity and possible disjuncture of the
terms of the pairs; that is, upon the {RTS2:242} possibility
of one varying without the other.  Thus we must have a
concept of facts as social products and what is described
and/or explained as independent of men.  And we must have a
concept of the mechanisms that generate phenomena
irreducible to the phenomena they generate.  And so two
dimensions must be established in the philosophy of science:
a transitive dimension, in which experiences and
conjunctions of events are seen as socially produced; and an
intransitive dimension, in which the objects of scientific
thought are seen as generative mechanisms and structures
which exist and act independently of men.

         Now empirical realism is characterized by the
absence of an intransitive dimension and of a transitive
dimension with respect to experience.  But I have already
argued that this merely results in the generation of an
implicit ontology, based on the category of experience
and an implicit sociology, based on the category of men:
that is, in the generation of an ontological atomism and
an epistemological individualism (at least with respect
to experience).  I have further suggested in 3.4 above
that underpinning empirical realism is a particular
conception of men (at least with respect to experience):
in which men are seen as passive sensors of given facts
and recorders of their given conjunctions. This model of
man constitutes, together with the celestial closure and
the classical paradigm of action, the analogical
grammar'^3 of empirical realism, the scientific substance
that lends plausibility to its metaphysics, that gives
credence to its philosophical form.

         If there is a basic or fundamental level of
knowledge, at which what is expressed is certain and given
independently of any human activity and reflects (and
ultimately constitutes) the world, then its constituents
must be atomistic.  For if they were not atomistic they
would be themselves susceptible of analysis, and so require
justification.  Hence it is the characteristics of the
concept of knowledge to which empirical realists have
subscribed, that accounts for the disastrous ontology that
we have examined.  It is the desire for incorrigible
foundations in a level which constitutes the world that
generates the ontology of atomistic events and closed
systems responsible for the problems and errors analysed in
Chapters 2 and 3.  Against this I {RTS2:243} have argued
that knowledge depends upon knowledge-like antecedents and
that the world is independent of men.  But if it is the
requirements of an incorrigible ground for knowledge of the
world in empirical realism that generates the implicit
ontology of empirical realism, it is the model of man
necessary to sustain the incorrigibility of this ground that
forms the lynchpin of the tradition; and hence explains in
the last instance the doctrines and problems we have been
criticizing and examining This is of course as one would
expect given the epistemological bias and anthropocentricity
of our philosophical thought.

         Empirical realism is faced with the following
trilemma: either (i) our knowledge is determined (in part
or in whole) by experience or (ii) it is fixed a priori
as a necessary condition of experience or (iii) it is
free (in the sense of unconstrained by experience).^4  I
said at the outset that part of my intention was a
philosophy for science.  What, then, are the implications
of these three positions for scientific practice?  It is
clear that if knowledge is regarded as justified in terms
of given experience we have the makings of what is in
effect a conservative ideology, in which the current
experiences of a science are rationalized in being
thought of as natural, given or implied by the very
nature of things themselves.  If (ii) is seriously
considered it would tend to have the same conservative
effect.  It is less obvious that (iii) would too - until
we remember that science is an institutionalized activity
in which if to be free is to be unconstrained by the
possibility of critical experience a self-perpetuating
dogma may ensue.  Examples could be drawn from the
history of physics and chemistry and economics to show
how empirical realism has functioned in this way as a
conservative ideology for science.

         A philosophical system may serve to rationalize the
practice of a science in another way, viz. through its own
substantive scientific analogies and the correspondence or
resonance they find in the science.  Thus empirical realism
readily finds an echo in mechanistic explanations in physics
and psychology and reductionist programmes in sociology and
biology.  One would {RTS2:244} expect such a link to be
particularly strong in the case of the social sciences, if
only because of the greater sensitivity on the part of
social scientists to the philosophy of science - a
sensitivity partly explained by the apprehension of their
own underdevelopment and partly by the consideration that
science in general and social science in particular is also
part of their own field of inquiry.  The resonance between
Skinner and Hume or Marshall and Mill is too clear to need
further remarking.

         In addition to the effect of its concept of
knowledge and its own substantive scientific analogies a
philosophy of science may of course also, and most
obviously, rationalize the practice of a science through
its own conception of the methods of science and the
appropriate objects of scientific inquiry.  If I am right
in my argument the methodology of empirical realism is
not that of science but if it were to be acted upon it
would have the most deleterious effects on its practice.

         Now if empirical realism depends heavily for its
plausibility upon its analogical grammar, it could be
asked upon what substantive scientific analogy does
transcendental realism depend?  The answer is, I think,
none.  All philosophical argument that is not explicitly
transcendental depends, I think, upon more or less
strained scientific analogies or tacitly presupposed
substantive theories.  But a transcendental argument
whose premise is explicitly stated need not depend upon
any particular theory, other than those bound up in the
activity that is its object and which is its task to
explicate.

         The central argument of this study, establishing an
ontological distinction between causal laws and patterns
of events (the independence of the domains of the real
and the actual, the irreducibility of structures to
events), has turned on the possibility of experimental
activity.  Now as it is clear that experimental activity
is impossible in the social sciences and at the very
least devoid of the same significance in psychology as it
possesses in physics and chemistry, I want to round off
my argument by considering whether something analogous to
the controlled investigation of nature, making possible
the experimental confirmation and falsification of
theories, might be possible in the social sciences and
psychology and other fields where experimental activity
is impossible or more or less seriously circumscribed.

         {RTS2:245} Three points are clear.  First, that
there is a general problem of confirmation (or
corroboration) and falsification in the non-experimental
sciences.  Second, that though we can assume that there are
explanations for social and psychological phenomena (and
under social and psychological descriptions), we cannot
assume that the social or psychological sciences have got
anywhere near them.  Thirdly, that any adequate solution to
the methodological problems (and in particular problems of
confirmation and falsification) of the non-experimental
sciences must depend upon a more adequate conception of
natural science than that which has so far informed
discussion of them.

         An awareness of the general problem of confirmation
and falsification in the non-experimental sciences is
shown by the following quotation:

The linguist . . . is studying one fundamental factor
that is involved in performance, but not the only one.
This idealization must be kept in mind when considering
the problem of confirmation of grammars on the basis of
empirical evidence.  There is no reason why one should
not also study the interaction of several factors that
are involved in complex mental acts and that underlie
actual performance, but such a study is not likely to
proceed vary far unless the separate factors are
themselves reasonably well understood.^5

Now if I am right in arguing that the significance of
experimental activity in natural science is that it gives
us access to enduring and transfactually active
structures and that it is only under closed conditions
that confirmation and falsification of theory is
possible, then we are in a better position to see that
the central problem of the psychological and social (and
other non- experimental) sciences is that of devising (or
reconstructing) an analogous procedure of inquiry and
selectively empirical confirmation (and falsification)
and to appreciate the great gulf that must separate them,
in the absence of such a procedure, from the sciences of
nature.

         In the case of psychology the agent's capacity to
give a commentary on intentional action might provide an
experiment- analogue, though one cannot rule out the
possibility that new {RTS2:246} concepts will have to be
given by the investigator to the agent (even e.g. in the
case of the identification of emotions).  Much social
science can be seen to depend upon attempted real definition
of forms of social life which have already been identified
under certain descriptions and are known by the agents who
participate in the social activities concerned under those
or other descriptions.  Social structures, unlike natural
structures, cannot exist independently of their effects.
Thus real definitions of concepts such as capitalism,
democracy, power, love can only be Justified by their
capacity to render intelligible a certain domain of
phenomena.  I suggest that they are falsified by their
incapacity to explain in a non-ad-hoc way a range of
phenomena that takes on a special significance for the
agents that participate in the forms of social life they
define.  Thus it was the mass unemployment of the 1930's
that demonstrated the inadequacy of the neo-classical system
and provided the motor for the Keynesian innovation which
showed how an unemployment equilibrium was possible.
Clearly I have no space to defend or elaborate these
suggestions here.  It is sufficient for our purposes merely
to note the problem: what are the enduring and
transfactually active `mechanisms' of the sciences of
society and man ?  Transcendental realism conceives the
various sciences as unified in their method but specific to
(or differentiated with respect to) their particular
objects.

         Now once generative mechanisms are seen to be the
objects of scientific thought, it can be seen that four
questions can be asked of any generative mechanism G :-

(i) is the mechanism enduring?

(ii) is the mechanism operating?

(iii) are the results of the activity of the mechanism
unaffected by the operations of others (of either the same
or different

(iv) are the results of the activity of the mechanism
perceived or otherwise detected by men ?

Now if one assumes, as the actualist does, that laws are
empirical invariances (universal empirical generalizations)
one cannot sensibly ask these questions.  Two consequences
should be noted.  First, a neglect of the conscious human
activity that is necessary for the generation of
event-invariances under {RTS2:247} significant descriptions,
that is of the activity involved in (ii)-(iv).  Thus the
stimulus and enabling conditions for the operation of the
mechanism must be satisfied; the mechanism must be isolated
and the flux of conditions held constant or otherwise
controlled; and skilled observers must be present to
perceive or detect it.  And secondly, neglect of the
possibility of non-enduring mechanisms, of laws which
though universal and normic in form (i.e. transfactually
applicable) are themselves bounded in space and restricted
in time.  On the transcendental realist ontology, the
description of what the world must be like if science is to
be possible, the classical principle of indifference (or
invariance) applies only to structures, not to events.  But
structures may themselves be transformed; and so concepts of
diversity and change, like that of structure, squeezed out
by the implicit undifferentiated ontology of empirical
realism, may come to occupy as significant a place in
ontology as the concept of indifference.

         I have stressed throughout this study the diversity
of phenomena and the autonomy of the various sciences (both
from one another and with respect to common sense), the
opacity of their concepts and the strangeness of the objects
with which they have to deal.  Natural processes are
independent of man but man is himself in, and in continual
interaction with, nature.  Nature itself is diversified and
complex.  But I doubt whether our concept of nature can be
understood in isolation from our concept of man; and I doubt
whether we understand the latter.  The scope of this enquiry
has how ever been strictly philosophical; and its
conclusions apodeictic.  I have shown the structured and
intransitive character of the objects of scientific enquiry
to be a condition of the intelligibility of experimental
activity and the social nature of knowledge to be a
condition of the intelligibility of scientific training.
(The laboratory and the classroom are the two most under
analysed, and yet the two most obvious, sites of science).
I have isolated the conditions of the plausibility of the
doctrine of empirical realism and shown then to be very
special.  A conception of both nature and our knowledge of
nature as differentiated and stratified has been advanced.
And I have developed two criteria for the adequacy of any
account of science: viz. its capacity to sustain the
possibility of a world without men and the impossibility of
knowledge without {RTS2:248} antecedents. These establish
the necessity for both of what I have called the
intransitive and transitive dimensions of the philosophy of
science: any account of science that does not view knowledge
as socially produced and the objects of knowledge as
independent of men must be ruled out as a possible account
of science.

         If science is to be possible the world must be one
of enduring and transfactually active mechanisms; and
society must be a structure (or ensemble of powers)
irreducible to but present only in the intentional action
of men.  Science must be conceived as an ongoing social
activity; and knowledge as a social product which
individuals must reproduce or transform, and which
individuals must draw upon to use in their own critical
explorations of nature.  Science is a process in motion,
continually on the move from manifest behaviour to
essential nature, from the description of things
identified at any one level of reality to the
construction and testing of possible explanations and
thus the discovery of the mechanisms responsible for
them.  This process necessitates the construction of both
new concepts and new tools (or the resurrection or
refinement of old ones).  The aim of science is the
discovery of the mechanisms of the production of
phenomena in nature; and it proceeds by way of a
dialectic of taxonomic (or descriptive) and explanatory
knowledge, in which the conflicting principles of
empiricism and rationalism can be reconciled, a dialectic
which has no foreseeable end.

         In order to render intelligible scientific change
and to reconcile it with the idea of scientific progress we
must have the concept of an ontological realm, of objects
apart from our descriptions of them.  We can then allow, for
example, that theory T_a is preferable to theory T_b, even
if in the terminology of Kuhn and Feyerabend it is
`incommensurable' with it if theory T_a can explain under
its descriptions almost all the phenomena p_1 . . . p_n that
T_b can explain under its descriptions B_p1 . . .B_pn plus
some significant phenomena that T_b cannot explain.  We can
speak in this way in the meta-language of philosophy, and we
must speak so if we are to retain the idea of scientific
progress without falling back on the idea of certain
foundations of knowledge or theory-free experience.  It is
the intuition of this necessity that accounts, I think, for
the readiness with which some philosophers of science have
embraced Tarski's {RTS2:249} theory of truth.^6  But this
theory cannot help us to resolve the problem posed by the
apprehension of the general relativity of our knowledge:
viz. that whenever we speak of things or of events etc. in
science we must always speak of them and know them under
particular descriptions, descriptions which will always be
to a greater or lesser extent theoretically determined,
which are not neutral reflections of a given
world. Epistemological relativism, in this sense, is the
handmaiden of ontological realism and must be accepted.  Now
this does not mean that it is impossible to communicate
between different theoretical or conceptual schemes or that
a scientist cannot know the same object under two or more
different descriptions.  To show the difference between say
Newtonian and Einsteinian dynamics and that the latter is an
advance on the former a scientist must be capable of doing
so.  Similarly though there is no guarantee of successful
communication between the adherents of two different
conceptual schemas, there is no inevitability about failure
(It is difficult to understand the concept of total
failure.)  Epistemological relativism insists only upon the
impossibility of knowing objects except under particular
descriptions.  And it entails the rejection of any
correspondence theory of truth.  A proposition is true if
and only if the state of affairs that it expresses
(describes) is real.  But propositions cannot be com pared
with states of affairs; their relationship cannot be
described as one of correspondence.  Philosophers have
wanted a theory of truth to provide a criterion or stamp of
knowledge.  But no such stamp is possible.  For the
judgement of the truth of a proposition is necessarily
intrinsic to the science concerned.  There is no way in
which we can look at the world and then at a sentence and
ask whether they fit.  There is just the expression (of the
world) in speech (or thought).

         Transcendental idealists are fond of saying that
either knowledge must conform to objects or objects conform
to knowledge: that either how we speak must be a function of
things or things must be a function of how we speak.^7  But
this dichotomy is bogus.  Science is an activity, a process
in thought and nature which attempts to express in thought
the natures and {RTS2:250} constitutions and ways of acting
of things that exist independently of thought.  Thought has
a reality not to be confused or identified with the reality
of its objects: knowledge may change without objects and
objects change without knowledge.  There is no
correspondence, no conformity, no similarity between objects
and thought.  Thoughts are only like other thoughts objects
(including thoughts) similar to or identical with other
things.  Things exist and act independently of our
descriptions but we can only know them under particular
descriptions Descriptions belong to the world of society and
of men; objects belong to the world of nature. We express
[our understanding of] nature in thought.

         Science, then, is the systematic attempt to express
in thought the structures and ways of acting of things
that exist and act independently of thought.  The world
is structured and complex and not made for men.  It is
entirely accidental that we exist, and understand
something about our bit of it.  It is important to avoid
the epistemic fallacy here.  This consists in confusing
the ontological order with the epistemic order, priority
in being with priority in deciding claims to being, the
question of what has relatively underived (or
independent) existence with the question of what entitles
us to regard some kinds of statements as grounds for
other kinds of statements, etc.  In particular the
question of what is capable of independent existence must
be distinguished from the question of what must be the
case for us to know that something is capable of
independent existence Thus electrons could exist without
material things; but we could not know this proposition,
let us say P, unless there were material things.  The
truth-conditions for our knowledge of P are not the same
as the truth-conditions for P.  There could be a world
without men; but there could not be knowledge without
antecedents.


 ^1 See A. C. Danto, `Basic Actions', A.P.Q. Vol. 2
(1965), reprinted in The Philosophy of Action,
ed. A. White, pp. 43-58.

 ^2 Cf. G. H. von Wright, op. cit., pp. 66ff.

 ^3 To borrow Buchdahl's useful concept.  See G. Buchdahl,
op. cit., p. 3 and passim.

 ^4 Radical conventionalists adopt a mixture of the first
and third horns in the sense of allowing that we are free
to decide what constitutes experience.

 ^5 N. Chomsky, `Problems of Explanation in Linguistics',
Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences, eds. R. Borger
and F. Cioffi, pp. 427-8.  I have of course already
argued against the use of the concept of `idealisation'
to refer to generative structures in 2.4 above.

 ^6 See, e.g. K. R. Popper, op.cit., p. 224.

 ^7 See e.g. H. Schwyzer, Thought and Reality: The
Metaphysics of Kant and Wittgenstein', Philosophical
Quarterly, 1973, p. 205.


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From bwanika at yahoo.com  Sun Jun 28 03:39:21 2009
From: bwanika at yahoo.com (BD_wanika)
Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2009 02:39:21 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: [Critical-Realism] SYNOPSIS: TRAINING IN ART AND DESIGN SHOULD BE A
	NECESSITY FOR ALL
Message-ID: <693453.39382.qm@web58405.mail.re3.yahoo.com>

?Dear Mervyn 
?
Kindly post this to the discussion list for some critical moments it was given to me by Professor Mugumbya dean school industrial art for a philosophical refection. I thought educationist especially in practical education will find it interesting.
?
dan,.
?
SYNOPSIS: TRAINING IN ART AND DESIGN SHOULD BE A NECESSITY FOR ALL
?
When most people hear of Artists and Designers, the picture they have in their mind is of people who draw and paint copies and imitations of natural forms such as plants, animals and human beings. They see people who are capable of illustrating, depicting or representing sceneries, events, stories or, at best, people with the ability to visualize and present abstract and invisible ideas into understandable images and symbols that have natural correspondences, in order to make them understandable to the sensible mind.
?
Art and Design is viewed by many as limited to the skilful manipulation of the hands, and they do not connect them to the intensive, invisible, intellectual processes, expertise and creative competences, that must first take place before the manifestation of the physical forms, in terms of pictures and products that are but the likenesses representing the images that exist in the mind. The hands are only obedient tools that are external servants of the Artist?s and Designer?s thoughts cultivated in his/her mind.
?
Artists and Designers often draw their inspirations from a careful and critical study of natural forms and production processes, with the aim of utilizing their hidden intrinsic construction and reproductive principles. They discover and utilize the hidden relationships leading to harmonious compositions that are pleasing to the eyes and calmly to the heart, and leading to a sensation of beauty, harmony and unity of life and existence.
?
Seen from these points of view, Art and Design are not simply decorative or ornamental skills and processes, limited to ?creating beauty out of ugliness? but they involve organizing, polishing, enhancing and harnessing hidden and otherwise unidentified beauty and value in natural resources that God has endowed us with, each one of us in our own given environments. In this way, to the surprise of many of our students, and the general public, Art and Design turns out to be not only a practical field, but demands skills of study and research methodology, academic reasoning skills, as well as scientific and production technology. It stretches and heavily draws from the fields of theology, philosophy and psychology. Art and Design is the visible physical manifestation or translation of invisible intellectual and psychological creations, into usable utilitarian forms or products.
?
Art and Design is responsible for the production and supply of all our material culture and material wealth, such as the clothes and all body covers and decorations; the buildings and all the products contained therein; as well as tools, equipment and machines. Art and Design is indeed the mother and foundation of industry and, subsequently, of commerce. As of today, our standard of living is measured and valued in terms of our natural wealth (products) and techniques of production (technology). There cannot be a sustainable Industrial Development or a Technological Transformation, Evolution and Revolution; without an established foundation in a local ?Industrial Art and Design? tradition. This education and training is not simply a need but a necessity.
?
All human beings are naturally endowed with the creative faculty and abilities. It is this special creative talent, capacity and capability that differentiates us from other earthly creations. It enables us to improve our living conditions. Art and Design education and training, therefore, aims at polishing up and developing this creative faculty to the required level of practical application for the well being of our human societies. This potential lies idle and undeveloped or under-developed due to ignorance and mistaken or erroneous prejudices.
?
The purpose of life is for us to be transformed into the ?image and likeness? of God, by becoming pro-creators, and actively participating in the discovery, creation, formation and reproduction of new product forms, techniques and processes.
?
The School of Industrial Art and Design of Kampala University (SIAD) was established with the overall objective of providing the necessary education and training to supply the required manpower that is the foundation and backbone behind the creation and production of utilitarian products, that are the basis for the establishment of meaningful employment, industrial and commercial businesses. Each of the practical skills offered is, therefore, a fertile and potential mother of a future industry.
?
When Art and Design activities are geared towards reproduction and multiplication of the products in great numbers, and in factory set-ups, the education and training requires the development of communication and specification skills that include freehand and technical drawing, draftsmanship, photography, as well as computer technology.
?
All the relevant courses are currently being organized under the following departments:
?

Art and Design Appreciation (leading to the establishment of Galleries)
?

Drawing and Illustration
?

Painting
?

Graphics and Printmaking
?

Fabric Decoration and Fashion Design
?

Sculpture
?

Ceramics
?

Weaving and Fabric Construction
?

Jewelry and Multimedia Graphics
?

Interior and Landscape Design 
?
?
?
?
Prof. G. Mugumbya
DEAN, SIAD, kampala University
?


Daniel Bwanika
www.idrc-ug.com