From rgroff at slu.edu Fri Jan 2 07:14:37 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Fri, 2 Jan 2009 08:14:37 -0600 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar In-Reply-To: <1230271110.9297.12.camel@ozgur-laptop> References: <1230158110.22281.28.camel@ozgur-laptop> <6ad241360812250943t1c9b2451p45b2a8135421ba44@mail.gmail.com> <1230271110.9297.12.camel@ozgur-laptop> Message-ID: <6ad241360901020614j46bd0495tf16e824149a5c897@mail.gmail.com> Hi Ozgur, Mervyn's advice sounds good -- I haven't spent enough time thinking about Althusser to be able to say anything much about the points that you're really interested in. I can see if I still have that old paper. But I suspect that it's on a floppy disk somewhere! I gave it at a Re-Thining Marxism Conference (1996 maybe, or otherwise 1997), but I never published it or anything. Send me a note off-list, ok? Warmly, Ruth On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 11:58 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > Thank you Ruth, > > You are right, regards to philosopy of science Bhaskar is better. > Is it possible to share your works about this issue? > And could you be so kind as say your views about my last questions: > What's the CR approach about to Althusser's "over-determination" > and"determination in the last instance"? > > By the way I've just asked to Versobooks Turkey office to translate RToS > into Turkish. Is there any attempt do you (list) know? > > Happy holidays > > ozgur > > On Thu, 2008-12-25 at 11:43 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > Yes, similar. I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished though; > probably > > other people have written on it too. > > > > My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for how science > > works. My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it! For > the > > nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and social and > > productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. Marxists better > than > > Althusser, myself. And some non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians. > > > > Happy holidays! > > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > Merry Christmas! > > > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > Hi All, > > > > > > Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps Althusser's > > > discrimination; object of knowledge and object of real. And Althusser's > > > Generalities > > > (..This point is essential to dialectical materialism, and Marx > > > discusses an illustration of it in the Introduction when he > demonstrates > > > that although the use of general concepts ? for example, 'production', > > > 'labour', 'exchange', etc. ? is indispensable to a scientific > > > theoretical practice, this first generality does not coincide with the > > > product of the scientific labour: it is not its achievement, it is its > > > prior condition. This first generality (which I shall call Generality > I) > > > constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical practice > > > will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, into that other > > > 'concrete' generality (which I shall call Generality III) which is a > > > knowledge... from for Marx) > > > concept is similar to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. What's your > > > opinions? > > > > > > What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" and > > > "determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > Hope to read your ideas > > > > > > best regards > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From Clive.Lawson at econ.cam.ac.uk Fri Jan 2 07:14:55 2009 From: Clive.Lawson at econ.cam.ac.uk (Clive.Lawson at econ.cam.ac.uk) Date: Fri, 2 Jan 2009 14:14:55 +0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar Message-ID: I am now away until 2nd January and unable to read mail. Apologies, but I'll get back to you as soon as I can after I return. Clive From jycostel at ucalgary.ca Fri Jan 9 09:07:25 2009 From: jycostel at ucalgary.ca (Joanne Costello) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 09:07:25 -0700 Subject: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates between "postpositivists" and critical realists Message-ID: <88ABE30C36064AB084F8953F5CE987B1@JoannePC> Hello, I'm a graduate student in Calgary, Canada. I wrote a term paper last semester on critical realism and its potential for emancipatory social work research and praxis. The professor raised the criticism that, in her view, critical realist arguments (or at least how I dealt with them) seem to engage with "dated" views of postpositivism. I am wondering if anyone might be able to point me to any recent literature where the critical realist position addresses "postpositivist" (as opposed to post-positivist) positions. Are there any self-identified postpositivists that have engaged the critical realist paradigm? Cheers, Joanne From rgroff at slu.edu Fri Jan 9 10:22:53 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 11:22:53 -0600 Subject: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates between "postpositivists" and critical realists In-Reply-To: <88ABE30C36064AB084F8953F5CE987B1@JoannePC> References: <88ABE30C36064AB084F8953F5CE987B1@JoannePC> Message-ID: <6ad241360901090922ub49abe2qe2c85f5549b84179@mail.gmail.com> Hi Joanne, Can you say more about who counts as postpositivist and who counts as post-positivist? Warmly, Ruth On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Joanne Costello wrote: > Hello, > > I'm a graduate student in Calgary, Canada. I wrote a term paper last > semester on critical realism and its potential for emancipatory social work > research and praxis. The professor raised the criticism that, in her view, > critical realist arguments (or at least how I dealt with them) seem to > engage with "dated" views of postpositivism. > > I am wondering if anyone might be able to point me to any recent literature > where the critical realist position addresses "postpositivist" (as opposed > to post-positivist) positions. Are there any self-identified postpositivists > that have engaged the critical realist paradigm? > > Cheers, > > Joanne > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From jycostel at ucalgary.ca Fri Jan 9 10:30:50 2009 From: jycostel at ucalgary.ca (Joanne Costello) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 10:30:50 -0700 Subject: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates between"postpositivists" and critical realists In-Reply-To: <6ad241360901090922ub49abe2qe2c85f5549b84179@mail.gmail.com> References: <88ABE30C36064AB084F8953F5CE987B1@JoannePC> <6ad241360901090922ub49abe2qe2c85f5549b84179@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <0B14123A435140A0B3F61CB7C3D3CEF2@JoannePC> Hi Ruth, Thank you for your response. My understanding is that some people use the term "postpositivist" to describe non-naive realism. In contrast, post-positivist thought would refer to various paradigms that came after or in response to positivism (e.g. social constructionism). Best wishes, Joanne ----- Original Message ----- From: "Ruth Groff" To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 10:22 AM Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates between"postpositivists" and critical realists > Hi Joanne, > > Can you say more about who counts as postpositivist and who counts as > post-positivist? > > Warmly, > Ruth > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Joanne Costello > wrote: > >> Hello, >> >> I'm a graduate student in Calgary, Canada. I wrote a term paper last >> semester on critical realism and its potential for emancipatory social >> work >> research and praxis. The professor raised the criticism that, in her >> view, >> critical realist arguments (or at least how I dealt with them) seem to >> engage with "dated" views of postpositivism. >> >> I am wondering if anyone might be able to point me to any recent >> literature >> where the critical realist position addresses "postpositivist" (as >> opposed >> to post-positivist) positions. Are there any self-identified >> postpositivists >> that have engaged the critical realist paradigm? >> >> Cheers, >> >> Joanne >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > From rgroff at slu.edu Fri Jan 9 12:28:59 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 13:28:59 -0600 Subject: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates between"postpositivists" and critical realists In-Reply-To: <0B14123A435140A0B3F61CB7C3D3CEF2@JoannePC> References: <88ABE30C36064AB084F8953F5CE987B1@JoannePC> <6ad241360901090922ub49abe2qe2c85f5549b84179@mail.gmail.com> <0B14123A435140A0B3F61CB7C3D3CEF2@JoannePC> Message-ID: <6ad241360901091128s487e34fxbff757d2c87aae7e@mail.gmail.com> Hi Joanne, So is the question "Are there discussions between critical realists and other non-naive realists?" If so, I think the best way to go at it is to figure out who falls into the "other non-naive realists" category, and then sort out what the difference is between the person(s) in question and some kind of ideal-type of cr. Non-philosophers often use these terms fairly loosely. I don't know what your disciplinary attachment is, but it a little bit matters, for what the differences will be between cr and other realisms. There are definitely a range of people in different social sciences who are realists as the term is used in their various fields, who are friendly to cr and with whom there's been discussion. But again, the nature of the points of disagreement will be different by discipline. In metaphysics and philosophy of science, for example, the realists who come closest to cr are "dispositional realists" and/or "scientific essentialists"; there hasn't been a lot cr engagement with that literature, though there's a little. If you can say more precisely who the relevant "non-naive realists" are for your purposes, I'm sure others can point you to useful literature. Warmly, Ruth On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 11:30 AM, Joanne Costello wrote: > Hi Ruth, > > Thank you for your response. My understanding is that some people use the > term "postpositivist" to describe non-naive realism. In contrast, > post-positivist thought would refer to various paradigms that came after or > in response to positivism (e.g. social constructionism). > > Best wishes, > > Joanne > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Ruth Groff" > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 10:22 AM > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > between"postpositivists" and critical realists > > > > Hi Joanne, > > > > Can you say more about who counts as postpositivist and who counts as > > post-positivist? > > > > Warmly, > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Joanne Costello > > wrote: > > > >> Hello, > >> > >> I'm a graduate student in Calgary, Canada. I wrote a term paper last > >> semester on critical realism and its potential for emancipatory social > >> work > >> research and praxis. The professor raised the criticism that, in her > >> view, > >> critical realist arguments (or at least how I dealt with them) seem to > >> engage with "dated" views of postpositivism. > >> > >> I am wondering if anyone might be able to point me to any recent > >> literature > >> where the critical realist position addresses "postpositivist" (as > >> opposed > >> to post-positivist) positions. Are there any self-identified > >> postpositivists > >> that have engaged the critical realist paradigm? > >> > >> Cheers, > >> > >> Joanne > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From Hans.Despain at nichols.edu Fri Jan 9 13:30:38 2009 From: Hans.Despain at nichols.edu (Despain, Hans G) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 15:30:38 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates between"postpositivists" and critical realists In-Reply-To: <6ad241360901091128s487e34fxbff757d2c87aae7e@mail.gmail.com> References: <88ABE30C36064AB084F8953F5CE987B1@JoannePC> <6ad241360901090922ub49abe2qe2c85f5549b84179@mail.gmail.com> <0B14123A435140A0B3F61CB7C3D3CEF2@JoannePC>, <6ad241360901091128s487e34fxbff757d2c87aae7e@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: Dear Joanne, Ruth makes good points for clarifying your purpose. Three sources you might find useful depending on the specific purpose Bhaksar provides a sustained in depth critique of postpositivism, specifically Richard Rorty in his "Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom." Rorty is a highly sophisticated pragmatic philosopher, and should surely fulfill the non-naive realist criteria. Bhaskar summarizes this critique in a chapter in "Reclaiming Reality." You also might find some valuable lessons in Lopez and Potter's "After Postmodernism: An introduction to critical realism" (2001). Suspecting you might want more field specific sources refer to Hartwig's "Dictionary of critical realism" there is an entry for "social work." I am not familiar with the cited literature, but you might find it useful for your purposes. Finally, don't be over-defensive, your interest in critical realism for informing social work is right on; in spite of your advisor's cryptic critique. It will take time to develop a full argument and defense that will be convincing to critics. If you stick with your interest you will find a revolutionary analysis, theory, and praxis for social theory/work and practice in Dialectical Critical Realism (DCR). DCR is a new theory of ethics, or a dialectical development of the ethical implications of critical realism. You do not necessarily have to push on to DCR, I do believe you can apply CR by itself to social work as an alternative to positivism and social constructivist approaches in highly successful and fruitful ways. all the best, Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff [rgroff at slu.edu] Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 2:28 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates between"postpositivists" and critical realists Hi Joanne, So is the question "Are there discussions between critical realists and other non-naive realists?" If so, I think the best way to go at it is to figure out who falls into the "other non-naive realists" category, and then sort out what the difference is between the person(s) in question and some kind of ideal-type of cr. Non-philosophers often use these terms fairly loosely. I don't know what your disciplinary attachment is, but it a little bit matters, for what the differences will be between cr and other realisms. There are definitely a range of people in different social sciences who are realists as the term is used in their various fields, who are friendly to cr and with whom there's been discussion. But again, the nature of the points of disagreement will be different by discipline. In metaphysics and philosophy of science, for example, the realists who come closest to cr are "dispositional realists" and/or "scientific essentialists"; there hasn't been a lot cr engagement with that literature, though there's a little. If you can say more precisely who the relevant "non-naive realists" are for your purposes, I'm sure others can point you to useful literature. Warmly, Ruth On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 11:30 AM, Joanne Costello wrote: > Hi Ruth, > > Thank you for your response. My understanding is that some people use the > term "postpositivist" to describe non-naive realism. In contrast, > post-positivist thought would refer to various paradigms that came after or > in response to positivism (e.g. social constructionism). > > Best wishes, > > Joanne > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Ruth Groff" > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 10:22 AM > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > between"postpositivists" and critical realists > > > > Hi Joanne, > > > > Can you say more about who counts as postpositivist and who counts as > > post-positivist? > > > > Warmly, > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Joanne Costello > > wrote: > > > >> Hello, > >> > >> I'm a graduate student in Calgary, Canada. I wrote a term paper last > >> semester on critical realism and its potential for emancipatory social > >> work > >> research and praxis. The professor raised the criticism that, in her > >> view, > >> critical realist arguments (or at least how I dealt with them) seem to > >> engage with "dated" views of postpositivism. > >> > >> I am wondering if anyone might be able to point me to any recent > >> literature > >> where the critical realist position addresses "postpositivist" (as > >> opposed > >> to post-positivist) positions. Are there any self-identified > >> postpositivists > >> that have engaged the critical realist paradigm? > >> > >> Cheers, > >> > >> Joanne > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. From jycostel at ucalgary.ca Fri Jan 9 14:45:59 2009 From: jycostel at ucalgary.ca (Joanne Costello) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 14:45:59 -0700 Subject: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates between"postpositivists" and critical realists In-Reply-To: References: <88ABE30C36064AB084F8953F5CE987B1@JoannePC><6ad241360901090922ub49abe2qe2c85f5549b84179@mail.gmail.com><0B14123A435140A0B3F61CB7C3D3CEF2@JoannePC>, <6ad241360901091128s487e34fxbff757d2c87aae7e@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <47B9957EC7424972BBB62659AB755CDA@JoannePC> Thank you, Ruth and Hans. My area is international social work and my research interests are around migrant workers. The critical realist stance lends to an understanding of the structures relating to the experiences of workers (e.g. capitalist relations, histories of colonialism, immigration legislation, etc.) My work overlaps to a large extent with sociology and IR and I have read work such as Bob Carter's 'Realism and Racism' and Branwen Gruffydd Jones' 'Explaining Global Poverty.' The few discussions of critical realism in social work relate to clinical social work (Houston) and program evaluation (Kazi). I think that you have given me some good starting points; I should definitely familiarize myself more with Rorty. Perhaps, if anyone on the list serve is in social work or psychology, they may be more familiar with literature that would be appropriate to a social work audience. My professor identified "Donald Campbell" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_T._Campbell) and Fred Kerlinger (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Foundations-Behavioural-Research-Fred-Kerlinger/dp/0030417619) as "current empiricism"; I am not sure if this the same as "postpositivism." In any case, I did well on the paper in spite of her criticisms. Still, I am looking forward to developing my knowledge of critical realism and my ability to clarify this perspective in relation to other paradigms. In terms of methodology, grounded theory is particularly popular in social work and I have found Derek Layder's work useful in that it recovers the value of theory and history for contextualizing data and moving beyond more myopic interactionist accounts. I have only recently engaged with the critical realist literature so I apologize if I don't entirely make sense. I sincerely appreciate your efforts to provide me some direction. Best wishes, Joanne ----- Original Message ----- From: "Despain, Hans G" To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 1:30 PM Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates between"postpositivists" and critical realists > Dear Joanne, > > Ruth makes good points for clarifying your purpose. > > Three sources you might find useful depending on the specific purpose > > Bhaksar provides a sustained in depth critique of postpositivism, > specifically Richard Rorty in his "Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom." > Rorty is a highly sophisticated pragmatic philosopher, and should surely > fulfill the non-naive realist criteria. Bhaskar summarizes this critique > in a chapter in "Reclaiming Reality." > > You also might find some valuable lessons in Lopez and Potter's "After > Postmodernism: An introduction to critical realism" (2001). > > Suspecting you might want more field specific sources refer to Hartwig's > "Dictionary of critical realism" there is an entry for "social work." I > am not familiar with the cited literature, but you might find it useful > for your purposes. > > Finally, don't be over-defensive, your interest in critical realism for > informing social work is right on; in spite of your advisor's cryptic > critique. It will take time to develop a full argument and defense that > will be convincing to critics. If you stick with your interest you will > find a revolutionary analysis, theory, and praxis for social theory/work > and practice in Dialectical Critical Realism (DCR). DCR is a new theory > of ethics, or a dialectical development of the ethical implications of > critical realism. You do not necessarily have to push on to DCR, I do > believe you can apply CR by itself to social work as an alternative to > positivism and social constructivist approaches in highly successful and > fruitful ways. > > all the best, > > Hans > > > ________________________________________ > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff > [rgroff at slu.edu] > Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 2:28 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > between"postpositivists" and critical realists > > Hi Joanne, > > So is the question "Are there discussions between critical realists and > other non-naive realists?" > > If so, I think the best way to go at it is to figure out who falls into > the > "other non-naive realists" category, and then sort out what the difference > is between the person(s) in question and some kind of ideal-type of cr. > Non-philosophers often use these terms fairly loosely. I don't know what > your disciplinary attachment is, but it a little bit matters, for what the > differences will be between cr and other realisms. There are definitely a > range of people in different social sciences who are realists as the term > is > used in their various fields, who are friendly to cr and with whom there's > been discussion. But again, the nature of the points of disagreement will > be different by discipline. In metaphysics and philosophy of science, for > example, the realists who come closest to cr are "dispositional realists" > and/or "scientific essentialists"; there hasn't been a lot cr engagement > with that literature, though there's a little. > > If you can say more precisely who the relevant "non-naive realists" are > for > your purposes, I'm sure others can point you to useful literature. > > Warmly, > Ruth > > > > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 11:30 AM, Joanne Costello > wrote: > >> Hi Ruth, >> >> Thank you for your response. My understanding is that some people use the >> term "postpositivist" to describe non-naive realism. In contrast, >> post-positivist thought would refer to various paradigms that came after >> or >> in response to positivism (e.g. social constructionism). >> >> Best wishes, >> >> Joanne >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: "Ruth Groff" >> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" >> >> Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 10:22 AM >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates >> between"postpositivists" and critical realists >> >> >> > Hi Joanne, >> > >> > Can you say more about who counts as postpositivist and who counts as >> > post-positivist? >> > >> > Warmly, >> > Ruth >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Joanne Costello >> > wrote: >> > >> >> Hello, >> >> >> >> I'm a graduate student in Calgary, Canada. I wrote a term paper last >> >> semester on critical realism and its potential for emancipatory social >> >> work >> >> research and praxis. The professor raised the criticism that, in her >> >> view, >> >> critical realist arguments (or at least how I dealt with them) seem to >> >> engage with "dated" views of postpositivism. >> >> >> >> I am wondering if anyone might be able to point me to any recent >> >> literature >> >> where the critical realist position addresses "postpositivist" (as >> >> opposed >> >> to post-positivist) positions. Are there any self-identified >> >> postpositivists >> >> that have engaged the critical realist paradigm? >> >> >> >> Cheers, >> >> >> >> Joanne >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> > >> > >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not > cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the > addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not > the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, > disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be > prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, > please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from > your system. Thank you. > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > From rgroff at slu.edu Fri Jan 9 17:48:40 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 18:48:40 -0600 Subject: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates between"postpositivists" and critical realists In-Reply-To: <47B9957EC7424972BBB62659AB755CDA@JoannePC> References: <88ABE30C36064AB084F8953F5CE987B1@JoannePC> <6ad241360901090922ub49abe2qe2c85f5549b84179@mail.gmail.com> <0B14123A435140A0B3F61CB7C3D3CEF2@JoannePC> <6ad241360901091128s487e34fxbff757d2c87aae7e@mail.gmail.com> <47B9957EC7424972BBB62659AB755CDA@JoannePC> Message-ID: <6ad241360901091648m4bb3b5d9k3d6ac1fb598fefad@mail.gmail.com> Hi Joanne, You might find Andrew Sayer's work useful. Also, if you can access back issues of the Journal for Critical Realism you might find articles in your area. I don't work in that area, but others on the list may respond as well. Warmly, Ruth On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 3:45 PM, Joanne Costello wrote: > Thank you, Ruth and Hans. > > My area is international social work and my research interests are around > migrant workers. The critical realist stance lends to an understanding of > the structures relating to the experiences of workers (e.g. capitalist > relations, histories of colonialism, immigration legislation, etc.) My work > overlaps to a large extent with sociology and IR and I have read work such > as Bob Carter's 'Realism and Racism' and Branwen Gruffydd Jones' > 'Explaining > Global Poverty.' The few discussions of critical realism in social work > relate to clinical social work (Houston) and program evaluation (Kazi). > > I think that you have given me some good starting points; I should > definitely familiarize myself more with Rorty. > Perhaps, if anyone on the list serve is in social work or psychology, they > may be more familiar with literature that would be appropriate to a social > work audience. > My professor identified "Donald Campbell" > (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_T._Campbell) and Fred Kerlinger > ( > http://www.amazon.co.uk/Foundations-Behavioural-Research-Fred-Kerlinger/dp/0030417619 > ) > as "current empiricism"; I am not sure if this the same as > "postpositivism." > > In any case, I did well on the paper in spite of her criticisms. Still, I > am > looking forward to developing my knowledge of critical realism and my > ability to clarify this perspective in relation to other paradigms. > > In terms of methodology, grounded theory is particularly popular in social > work and I have found Derek Layder's work useful in that it recovers the > value of theory and history for contextualizing data and moving beyond more > myopic interactionist accounts. > > I have only recently engaged with the critical realist literature so I > apologize if I don't entirely make sense. I sincerely appreciate your > efforts to provide me some direction. > > Best wishes, > > Joanne > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Despain, Hans G" > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 1:30 PM > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > between"postpositivists" > and critical realists > > > > Dear Joanne, > > > > Ruth makes good points for clarifying your purpose. > > > > Three sources you might find useful depending on the specific purpose > > > > Bhaksar provides a sustained in depth critique of postpositivism, > > specifically Richard Rorty in his "Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom." > > Rorty is a highly sophisticated pragmatic philosopher, and should surely > > fulfill the non-naive realist criteria. Bhaskar summarizes this critique > > in a chapter in "Reclaiming Reality." > > > > You also might find some valuable lessons in Lopez and Potter's "After > > Postmodernism: An introduction to critical realism" (2001). > > > > Suspecting you might want more field specific sources refer to Hartwig's > > "Dictionary of critical realism" there is an entry for "social work." I > > am not familiar with the cited literature, but you might find it useful > > for your purposes. > > > > Finally, don't be over-defensive, your interest in critical realism for > > informing social work is right on; in spite of your advisor's cryptic > > critique. It will take time to develop a full argument and defense that > > will be convincing to critics. If you stick with your interest you will > > find a revolutionary analysis, theory, and praxis for social theory/work > > and practice in Dialectical Critical Realism (DCR). DCR is a new theory > > of ethics, or a dialectical development of the ethical implications of > > critical realism. You do not necessarily have to push on to DCR, I do > > believe you can apply CR by itself to social work as an alternative to > > positivism and social constructivist approaches in highly successful and > > fruitful ways. > > > > all the best, > > > > Hans > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff > > [rgroff at slu.edu] > > Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 2:28 PM > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > > between"postpositivists" and critical realists > > > > Hi Joanne, > > > > So is the question "Are there discussions between critical realists and > > other non-naive realists?" > > > > If so, I think the best way to go at it is to figure out who falls into > > the > > "other non-naive realists" category, and then sort out what the > difference > > is between the person(s) in question and some kind of ideal-type of cr. > > Non-philosophers often use these terms fairly loosely. I don't know > what > > your disciplinary attachment is, but it a little bit matters, for what > the > > differences will be between cr and other realisms. There are definitely > a > > range of people in different social sciences who are realists as the term > > is > > used in their various fields, who are friendly to cr and with whom > there's > > been discussion. But again, the nature of the points of disagreement > will > > be different by discipline. In metaphysics and philosophy of science, > for > > example, the realists who come closest to cr are "dispositional realists" > > and/or "scientific essentialists"; there hasn't been a lot cr engagement > > with that literature, though there's a little. > > > > If you can say more precisely who the relevant "non-naive realists" are > > for > > your purposes, I'm sure others can point you to useful literature. > > > > Warmly, > > Ruth > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 11:30 AM, Joanne Costello > > wrote: > > > >> Hi Ruth, > >> > >> Thank you for your response. My understanding is that some people use > the > >> term "postpositivist" to describe non-naive realism. In contrast, > >> post-positivist thought would refer to various paradigms that came after > >> or > >> in response to positivism (e.g. social constructionism). > >> > >> Best wishes, > >> > >> Joanne > >> ----- Original Message ----- > >> From: "Ruth Groff" > >> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > >> > >> Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 10:22 AM > >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > >> between"postpositivists" and critical realists > >> > >> > >> > Hi Joanne, > >> > > >> > Can you say more about who counts as postpositivist and who counts as > >> > post-positivist? > >> > > >> > Warmly, > >> > Ruth > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Joanne Costello > >> > wrote: > >> > > >> >> Hello, > >> >> > >> >> I'm a graduate student in Calgary, Canada. I wrote a term paper last > >> >> semester on critical realism and its potential for emancipatory > social > >> >> work > >> >> research and praxis. The professor raised the criticism that, in her > >> >> view, > >> >> critical realist arguments (or at least how I dealt with them) seem > to > >> >> engage with "dated" views of postpositivism. > >> >> > >> >> I am wondering if anyone might be able to point me to any recent > >> >> literature > >> >> where the critical realist position addresses "postpositivist" (as > >> >> opposed > >> >> to post-positivist) positions. Are there any self-identified > >> >> postpositivists > >> >> that have engaged the critical realist paradigm? > >> >> > >> >> Cheers, > >> >> > >> >> Joanne > >> >> _______________________________________________ > >> >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> >> > >> > _______________________________________________ > >> > Critical-Realism mailing list > >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not > > cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the > > addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not > > the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, > reliance, > > disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be > > prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, > > please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from > > your system. Thank you. > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From dharvey at unr.nevada.edu Sat Jan 10 08:28:26 2009 From: dharvey at unr.nevada.edu (David Harvey) Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 07:28:26 -0800 Subject: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates between"postpositivists" and critical realists In-Reply-To: <6ad241360901091648m4bb3b5d9k3d6ac1fb598fefad@mail.gmail.com> References: <88ABE30C36064AB084F8953F5CE987B1@JoannePC> <6ad241360901090922ub49abe2qe2c85f5549b84179@mail.gmail.com> <0B14123A435140A0B3F61CB7C3D3CEF2@JoannePC> <6ad241360901091128s487e34fxbff757d2c87aae7e@mail.gmail.com> <47B9957EC7424972BBB62659AB755CDA@JoannePC> <6ad241360901091648m4bb3b5d9k3d6ac1fb598fefad@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <4968BE9A.3080701@unr.nevada.edu> Ruth Groff wrote: >Hi Joanne, > >You might find Andrew Sayer's work useful. Also, if you can access back >issues of the Journal for Critical Realism you might find articles in your >area. I don't work in that area, but others on the list may respond as >well. > >Warmly, >Ruth > > > > >On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 3:45 PM, Joanne Costello wrote: > > > >>Thank you, Ruth and Hans. >> >>My area is international social work and my research interests are around >>migrant workers. The critical realist stance lends to an understanding of >>the structures relating to the experiences of workers (e.g. capitalist >>relations, histories of colonialism, immigration legislation, etc.) My work >>overlaps to a large extent with sociology and IR and I have read work such >>as Bob Carter's 'Realism and Racism' and Branwen Gruffydd Jones' >>'Explaining >>Global Poverty.' The few discussions of critical realism in social work >>relate to clinical social work (Houston) and program evaluation (Kazi). >> >>I think that you have given me some good starting points; I should >>definitely familiarize myself more with Rorty. >>Perhaps, if anyone on the list serve is in social work or psychology, they >>may be more familiar with literature that would be appropriate to a social >>work audience. >>My professor identified "Donald Campbell" >>(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_T._Campbell) and Fred Kerlinger >>( >>http://www.amazon.co.uk/Foundations-Behavioural-Research-Fred-Kerlinger/dp/0030417619 >>) >>as "current empiricism"; I am not sure if this the same as >>"postpositivism." >> >>In any case, I did well on the paper in spite of her criticisms. Still, I >>am >>looking forward to developing my knowledge of critical realism and my >>ability to clarify this perspective in relation to other paradigms. >> >>In terms of methodology, grounded theory is particularly popular in social >>work and I have found Derek Layder's work useful in that it recovers the >>value of theory and history for contextualizing data and moving beyond more >>myopic interactionist accounts. >> >>I have only recently engaged with the critical realist literature so I >>apologize if I don't entirely make sense. I sincerely appreciate your >>efforts to provide me some direction. >> >>Best wishes, >> >>Joanne >> >>----- Original Message ----- >>From: "Despain, Hans G" >>To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" >> >>Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 1:30 PM >>Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates >>between"postpositivists" >>and critical realists >> >> >> >> >>>Dear Joanne, >>> >>>Ruth makes good points for clarifying your purpose. >>> >>>Three sources you might find useful depending on the specific purpose >>> >>>Bhaksar provides a sustained in depth critique of postpositivism, >>>specifically Richard Rorty in his "Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom." >>>Rorty is a highly sophisticated pragmatic philosopher, and should surely >>>fulfill the non-naive realist criteria. Bhaskar summarizes this critique >>>in a chapter in "Reclaiming Reality." >>> >>>You also might find some valuable lessons in Lopez and Potter's "After >>>Postmodernism: An introduction to critical realism" (2001). >>> >>>Suspecting you might want more field specific sources refer to Hartwig's >>>"Dictionary of critical realism" there is an entry for "social work." I >>>am not familiar with the cited literature, but you might find it useful >>>for your purposes. >>> >>>Finally, don't be over-defensive, your interest in critical realism for >>>informing social work is right on; in spite of your advisor's cryptic >>>critique. It will take time to develop a full argument and defense that >>>will be convincing to critics. If you stick with your interest you will >>>find a revolutionary analysis, theory, and praxis for social theory/work >>>and practice in Dialectical Critical Realism (DCR). DCR is a new theory >>>of ethics, or a dialectical development of the ethical implications of >>>critical realism. You do not necessarily have to push on to DCR, I do >>>believe you can apply CR by itself to social work as an alternative to >>>positivism and social constructivist approaches in highly successful and >>>fruitful ways. >>> >>>all the best, >>> >>>Hans >>> >>> >>>________________________________________ >>>From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>[critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff >>>[rgroff at slu.edu] >>>Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 2:28 PM >>>To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>>Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates >>>between"postpositivists" and critical realists >>> >>>Hi Joanne, >>> >>>So is the question "Are there discussions between critical realists and >>>other non-naive realists?" >>> >>>If so, I think the best way to go at it is to figure out who falls into >>>the >>>"other non-naive realists" category, and then sort out what the >>> >>> >>difference >> >> >>>is between the person(s) in question and some kind of ideal-type of cr. >>>Non-philosophers often use these terms fairly loosely. I don't know >>> >>> >>what >> >> >>>your disciplinary attachment is, but it a little bit matters, for what >>> >>> >>the >> >> >>>differences will be between cr and other realisms. There are definitely >>> >>> >>a >> >> >>>range of people in different social sciences who are realists as the term >>>is >>>used in their various fields, who are friendly to cr and with whom >>> >>> >>there's >> >> >>>been discussion. But again, the nature of the points of disagreement >>> >>> >>will >> >> >>>be different by discipline. In metaphysics and philosophy of science, >>> >>> >>for >> >> >>>example, the realists who come closest to cr are "dispositional realists" >>>and/or "scientific essentialists"; there hasn't been a lot cr engagement >>>with that literature, though there's a little. >>> >>>If you can say more precisely who the relevant "non-naive realists" are >>>for >>>your purposes, I'm sure others can point you to useful literature. >>> >>>Warmly, >>>Ruth >>> >>> >>> >>>On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 11:30 AM, Joanne Costello >>>wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>>Hi Ruth, >>>> >>>>Thank you for your response. My understanding is that some people use >>>> >>>> >>the >> >> >>>>term "postpositivist" to describe non-naive realism. In contrast, >>>>post-positivist thought would refer to various paradigms that came after >>>>or >>>>in response to positivism (e.g. social constructionism). >>>> >>>>Best wishes, >>>> >>>>Joanne >>>>----- Original Message ----- >>>>From: "Ruth Groff" >>>>To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" >>>> >>>>Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 10:22 AM >>>>Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates >>>>between"postpositivists" and critical realists >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>>Hi Joanne, >>>>> >>>>>Can you say more about who counts as postpositivist and who counts as >>>>>post-positivist? >>>>> >>>>>Warmly, >>>>>Ruth >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Joanne Costello >>>>>wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>Hello, >>>>>> >>>>>>I'm a graduate student in Calgary, Canada. I wrote a term paper last >>>>>>semester on critical realism and its potential for emancipatory >>>>>> >>>>>> >>social >> >> >>>>>>work >>>>>>research and praxis. The professor raised the criticism that, in her >>>>>>view, >>>>>>critical realist arguments (or at least how I dealt with them) seem >>>>>> >>>>>> >>to >> >> >>>>>>engage with "dated" views of postpositivism. >>>>>> >>>>>>I am wondering if anyone might be able to point me to any recent >>>>>>literature >>>>>>where the critical realist position addresses "postpositivist" (as >>>>>>opposed >>>>>>to post-positivist) positions. Are there any self-identified >>>>>>postpositivists >>>>>>that have engaged the critical realist paradigm? >>>>>> >>>>>>Cheers, >>>>>> >>>>>>Joanne >>>>>>_______________________________________________ >>>>>>Critical-Realism mailing list >>>>>>Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>>>http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>_______________________________________________ >>>>>Critical-Realism mailing list >>>>>Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>>http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>_______________________________________________ >>>>Critical-Realism mailing list >>>>Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>_______________________________________________ >>>Critical-Realism mailing list >>>Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>>The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not >>>cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the >>>addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not >>>the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, >>> >>> >>reliance, >> >> >>>disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be >>>prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, >>>please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from >>>your system. Thank you. >>> >>>_______________________________________________ >>>Critical-Realism mailing list >>>Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>_______________________________________________ >>Critical-Realism mailing list >>Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >_______________________________________________ >Critical-Realism mailing list >Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > You might want to check the works of Ernest R. House. He is one of the leading educational evaluators in the field, and has made extensive use of Bhaskar's early works in framing his evaluative methodolgys. Also take a look at David Byrne's work on "Exclusion" and especially his volume Interpreting Quantitative Data. Finally, on the subject of positivism and its philosophical roots, I would suggest Richardson's Parting of the Ways for understanding the historical context and linkages between Logical Positivism, Empirical Positivism, and Interpretive Theory. Ruth and Mervyn might not concur on this lastsuggestion. Dave Harvey From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Sat Jan 10 10:45:10 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 17:45:10 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates between"postpositivists" and critical realists In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Further to this excellent advice and info, Gideon Calder has a new book on Rorty from a CR perspective: Rorty's Politics of Redescription. By Gideon Calder. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2007. It is reviewed by Justin Cruickshank in Journal of Critical Realism 7(2) 2008, 314-29. In the same issue of JCR (pp. 235-275) there is also a debate between Peter Manicas (a critical realist) and Patrick Baert (a pragmatist), entitled 'A social theory dialogue'. This will probably be an ongoing exchange, with other people coming in. My entry on critical realism in A Dictionary of CR differentiates CR from other forms of realism in terms of 'its robustly transcendental and immanently critical method, its outright rejection of empiricism and positivism, its thoroughgoing emergentism, its understanding of social science as necessarily explanatory critical (entailing rejection of the fact-value and theory-practice dichotomies) and its explicitly emancipatory stance.' But not all critical realists (as distinct from dialectical critical realists) accept the last two positions. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [ mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Despain, Hans G Sent: 09 January 2009 20:31 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates between"postpositivists" and critical realists Dear Joanne, Ruth makes good points for clarifying your purpose. Three sources you might find useful depending on the specific purpose Bhaksar provides a sustained in depth critique of postpositivism, specifically Richard Rorty in his "Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom." Rorty is a highly sophisticated pragmatic philosopher, and should surely fulfill the non-naive realist criteria. Bhaskar summarizes this critique in a chapter in "Reclaiming Reality." You also might find some valuable lessons in Lopez and Potter's "After Postmodernism: An introduction to critical realism" (2001). Suspecting you might want more field specific sources refer to Hartwig's "Dictionary of critical realism" there is an entry for "social work." I am not familiar with the cited literature, but you might find it useful for your purposes. Finally, don't be over-defensive, your interest in critical realism for informing social work is right on; in spite of your advisor's cryptic critique. It will take time to develop a full argument and defense that will be convincing to critics. If you stick with your interest you will find a revolutionary analysis, theory, and praxis for social theory/work and practice in Dialectical Critical Realism (DCR). DCR is a new theory of ethics, or a dialectical development of the ethical implications of critical realism. You do not necessarily have to push on to DCR, I do believe you can apply CR by itself to social work as an alternative to positivism and social constructivist approaches in highly successful and fruitful ways. all the best, Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff [rgroff at slu.edu] Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 2:28 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates between"postpositivists" and critical realists Hi Joanne, So is the question "Are there discussions between critical realists and other non-naive realists?" If so, I think the best way to go at it is to figure out who falls into the "other non-naive realists" category, and then sort out what the difference is between the person(s) in question and some kind of ideal-type of cr. Non-philosophers often use these terms fairly loosely. I don't know what your disciplinary attachment is, but it a little bit matters, for what the differences will be between cr and other realisms. There are definitely a range of people in different social sciences who are realists as the term is used in their various fields, who are friendly to cr and with whom there's been discussion. But again, the nature of the points of disagreement will be different by discipline. In metaphysics and philosophy of science, for example, the realists who come closest to cr are "dispositional realists" and/or "scientific essentialists"; there hasn't been a lot cr engagement with that literature, though there's a little. If you can say more precisely who the relevant "non-naive realists" are for your purposes, I'm sure others can point you to useful literature. Warmly, Ruth On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 11:30 AM, Joanne Costello wrote: > Hi Ruth, > > Thank you for your response. My understanding is that some people use > the term "postpositivist" to describe non-naive realism. In contrast, > post-positivist thought would refer to various paradigms that came > after or in response to positivism (e.g. social constructionism). > > Best wishes, > > Joanne > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Ruth Groff" > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 10:22 AM > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > between"postpositivists" and critical realists > > > > Hi Joanne, > > > > Can you say more about who counts as postpositivist and who counts > > as post-positivist? > > > > Warmly, > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Joanne Costello > > wrote: > > > >> Hello, > >> > >> I'm a graduate student in Calgary, Canada. I wrote a term paper > >> last semester on critical realism and its potential for > >> emancipatory social work research and praxis. The professor raised > >> the criticism that, in her view, critical realist arguments (or at > >> least how I dealt with them) seem to engage with "dated" views of > >> postpositivism. > >> > >> I am wondering if anyone might be able to point me to any recent > >> literature where the critical realist position addresses > >> "postpositivist" (as opposed to post-positivist) positions. Are > >> there any self-identified postpositivists that have engaged the > >> critical realist paradigm? > >> > >> Cheers, > >> > >> Joanne > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3747 (20090107) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From rgroff at slu.edu Sat Jan 10 11:33:07 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 12:33:07 -0600 Subject: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates between"postpositivists" and critical realists In-Reply-To: <7alt5i$3487j8@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> References: <7alt5i$3487j8@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: <6ad241360901101033y4bece340k92b5f66b8c4cec52@mail.gmail.com> I have chapters on Kant and on Putnam in my book, too (Critical Realism, Postpositivism and the Possibility of Knowledge, Routledge 2004), but may be too abstract for your purposes. rg On Sat, Jan 10, 2009 at 11:45 AM, Mervyn Hartwig wrote: > Further to this excellent advice and info, Gideon Calder has a new book on > Rorty from a CR perspective: Rorty's Politics of Redescription. By Gideon > Calder. Cardiff: University of Wales > Press, 2007. It is reviewed by Justin Cruickshank in Journal of Critical > Realism 7(2) 2008, 314-29. > > In the same issue of JCR (pp. 235-275) there is also a debate between Peter > Manicas (a critical realist) and Patrick Baert (a pragmatist), entitled 'A > social theory dialogue'. This will probably be an ongoing exchange, with > other people coming in. > > My entry on critical realism in A Dictionary of CR differentiates CR from > other forms of realism in terms of 'its robustly transcendental and > immanently critical method, its outright rejection of empiricism and > positivism, its thoroughgoing emergentism, its understanding of social > science as necessarily explanatory critical (entailing rejection of the > fact-value and theory-practice dichotomies) and its explicitly emancipatory > stance.' But not all critical realists (as distinct from dialectical > critical realists) accept the last two positions. > > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [ > > mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Despain, > Hans G > Sent: 09 January 2009 20:31 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > between"postpositivists" > and critical realists > > Dear Joanne, > > Ruth makes good points for clarifying your purpose. > > Three sources you might find useful depending on the specific purpose > > Bhaksar provides a sustained in depth critique of postpositivism, > specifically Richard Rorty in his "Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom." > Rorty is a highly sophisticated pragmatic philosopher, and should surely > fulfill the non-naive realist criteria. Bhaskar summarizes this critique > in > a chapter in "Reclaiming Reality." > > You also might find some valuable lessons in Lopez and Potter's "After > Postmodernism: An introduction to critical realism" (2001). > > Suspecting you might want more field specific sources refer to Hartwig's > "Dictionary of critical realism" there is an entry for "social work." I am > not familiar with the cited literature, but you might find it useful for > your purposes. > > Finally, don't be over-defensive, your interest in critical realism for > informing social work is right on; in spite of your advisor's cryptic > critique. It will take time to develop a full argument and defense that > will be convincing to critics. If you stick with your interest you will > find a revolutionary analysis, theory, and praxis for social theory/work > and > practice in Dialectical Critical Realism (DCR). DCR is a new theory of > ethics, or a dialectical development of the ethical implications of > critical > realism. You do not necessarily have to push on to DCR, I do believe you > can apply CR by itself to social work as an alternative to positivism and > social constructivist approaches in highly successful and fruitful ways. > > all the best, > > Hans > > > ________________________________________ > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff > [rgroff at slu.edu] > Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 2:28 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > between"postpositivists" and critical realists > > Hi Joanne, > > So is the question "Are there discussions between critical realists and > other non-naive realists?" > > If so, I think the best way to go at it is to figure out who falls into the > "other non-naive realists" category, and then sort out what the difference > is between the person(s) in question and some kind of ideal-type of cr. > Non-philosophers often use these terms fairly loosely. I don't know what > your disciplinary attachment is, but it a little bit matters, for what the > differences will be between cr and other realisms. There are definitely a > range of people in different social sciences who are realists as the term > is > used in their various fields, who are friendly to cr and with whom there's > been discussion. But again, the nature of the points of disagreement will > be different by discipline. In metaphysics and philosophy of science, for > example, the realists who come closest to cr are "dispositional realists" > and/or "scientific essentialists"; there hasn't been a lot cr engagement > with that literature, though there's a little. > > If you can say more precisely who the relevant "non-naive realists" are for > your purposes, I'm sure others can point you to useful literature. > > Warmly, > Ruth > > > > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 11:30 AM, Joanne Costello > wrote: > > > Hi Ruth, > > > > Thank you for your response. My understanding is that some people use > > the term "postpositivist" to describe non-naive realism. In contrast, > > post-positivist thought would refer to various paradigms that came > > after or in response to positivism (e.g. social constructionism). > > > > Best wishes, > > > > Joanne > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: "Ruth Groff" > > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > > > Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 10:22 AM > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > > between"postpositivists" and critical realists > > > > > > > Hi Joanne, > > > > > > Can you say more about who counts as postpositivist and who counts > > > as post-positivist? > > > > > > Warmly, > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Joanne Costello > > > wrote: > > > > > >> Hello, > > >> > > >> I'm a graduate student in Calgary, Canada. I wrote a term paper > > >> last semester on critical realism and its potential for > > >> emancipatory social work research and praxis. The professor raised > > >> the criticism that, in her view, critical realist arguments (or at > > >> least how I dealt with them) seem to engage with "dated" views of > > >> postpositivism. > > >> > > >> I am wondering if anyone might be able to point me to any recent > > >> literature where the critical realist position addresses > > >> "postpositivist" (as opposed to post-positivist) positions. Are > > >> there any self-identified postpositivists that have engaged the > > >> critical realist paradigm? > > >> > > >> Cheers, > > >> > > >> Joanne > > >> _______________________________________________ > > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > >> > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not > cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the > addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not > the > intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, > disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited > by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify > the > sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank > you. > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3747 (20090107) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From jycostel at ucalgary.ca Sat Jan 10 20:33:51 2009 From: jycostel at ucalgary.ca (Joanne Costello) Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 20:33:51 -0700 Subject: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates between"postpositivists"and critical realists In-Reply-To: <7alt5i$3487j8@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> References: <7alt5i$3487j8@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: Thanks so much to everyone for pointing me towards a wealth of resources - I have a lot of reading to do! I think some of the debates between CR and pragmatism will help me. I'm also very interested in Byrne's "Social Exclusion." I have been exploring critical realism along with another student who is in sociology and we're both amazed at how willing people have been to help newcomers learn. I greatly appreciate your help. Joanne ----- Original Message ----- From: "Mervyn Hartwig" To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Sent: Saturday, January 10, 2009 10:45 AM Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates between"postpositivists"and critical realists > Further to this excellent advice and info, Gideon Calder has a new book on > Rorty from a CR perspective: Rorty's Politics of Redescription. By Gideon > Calder. Cardiff: University of Wales > Press, 2007. It is reviewed by Justin Cruickshank in Journal of Critical > Realism 7(2) 2008, 314-29. > > In the same issue of JCR (pp. 235-275) there is also a debate between > Peter > Manicas (a critical realist) and Patrick Baert (a pragmatist), entitled 'A > social theory dialogue'. This will probably be an ongoing exchange, with > other people coming in. > > My entry on critical realism in A Dictionary of CR differentiates CR from > other forms of realism in terms of 'its robustly transcendental and > immanently critical method, its outright rejection of empiricism and > positivism, its thoroughgoing emergentism, its understanding of social > science as necessarily explanatory critical (entailing rejection of the > fact-value and theory-practice dichotomies) and its explicitly > emancipatory > stance.' But not all critical realists (as distinct from dialectical > critical realists) accept the last two positions. > > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [ > > mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Despain, > Hans G > Sent: 09 January 2009 20:31 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > between"postpositivists" > and critical realists > > Dear Joanne, > > Ruth makes good points for clarifying your purpose. > > Three sources you might find useful depending on the specific purpose > > Bhaksar provides a sustained in depth critique of postpositivism, > specifically Richard Rorty in his "Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom." > Rorty is a highly sophisticated pragmatic philosopher, and should surely > fulfill the non-naive realist criteria. Bhaskar summarizes this critique > in > a chapter in "Reclaiming Reality." > > You also might find some valuable lessons in Lopez and Potter's "After > Postmodernism: An introduction to critical realism" (2001). > > Suspecting you might want more field specific sources refer to Hartwig's > "Dictionary of critical realism" there is an entry for "social work." I > am > not familiar with the cited literature, but you might find it useful for > your purposes. > > Finally, don't be over-defensive, your interest in critical realism for > informing social work is right on; in spite of your advisor's cryptic > critique. It will take time to develop a full argument and defense that > will be convincing to critics. If you stick with your interest you will > find a revolutionary analysis, theory, and praxis for social theory/work > and > practice in Dialectical Critical Realism (DCR). DCR is a new theory of > ethics, or a dialectical development of the ethical implications of > critical > realism. You do not necessarily have to push on to DCR, I do believe you > can apply CR by itself to social work as an alternative to positivism and > social constructivist approaches in highly successful and fruitful ways. > > all the best, > > Hans > > > ________________________________________ > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff > [rgroff at slu.edu] > Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 2:28 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > between"postpositivists" and critical realists > > Hi Joanne, > > So is the question "Are there discussions between critical realists and > other non-naive realists?" > > If so, I think the best way to go at it is to figure out who falls into > the > "other non-naive realists" category, and then sort out what the difference > is between the person(s) in question and some kind of ideal-type of cr. > Non-philosophers often use these terms fairly loosely. I don't know what > your disciplinary attachment is, but it a little bit matters, for what the > differences will be between cr and other realisms. There are definitely a > range of people in different social sciences who are realists as the term > is > used in their various fields, who are friendly to cr and with whom there's > been discussion. But again, the nature of the points of disagreement will > be different by discipline. In metaphysics and philosophy of science, for > example, the realists who come closest to cr are "dispositional realists" > and/or "scientific essentialists"; there hasn't been a lot cr engagement > with that literature, though there's a little. > > If you can say more precisely who the relevant "non-naive realists" are > for > your purposes, I'm sure others can point you to useful literature. > > Warmly, > Ruth > > > > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 11:30 AM, Joanne Costello > wrote: > >> Hi Ruth, >> >> Thank you for your response. My understanding is that some people use >> the term "postpositivist" to describe non-naive realism. In contrast, >> post-positivist thought would refer to various paradigms that came >> after or in response to positivism (e.g. social constructionism). >> >> Best wishes, >> >> Joanne >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: "Ruth Groff" >> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" >> >> Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 10:22 AM >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates >> between"postpositivists" and critical realists >> >> >> > Hi Joanne, >> > >> > Can you say more about who counts as postpositivist and who counts >> > as post-positivist? >> > >> > Warmly, >> > Ruth >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Joanne Costello >> > wrote: >> > >> >> Hello, >> >> >> >> I'm a graduate student in Calgary, Canada. I wrote a term paper >> >> last semester on critical realism and its potential for >> >> emancipatory social work research and praxis. The professor raised >> >> the criticism that, in her view, critical realist arguments (or at >> >> least how I dealt with them) seem to engage with "dated" views of >> >> postpositivism. >> >> >> >> I am wondering if anyone might be able to point me to any recent >> >> literature where the critical realist position addresses >> >> "postpositivist" (as opposed to post-positivist) positions. Are >> >> there any self-identified postpositivists that have engaged the >> >> critical realist paradigm? >> >> >> >> Cheers, >> >> >> >> Joanne >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> > >> > >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not > cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the > addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not > the > intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, > disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be > prohibited > by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify > the > sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank > you. > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3747 (20090107) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > From ozgurelibol at ttmail.com Sat Jan 10 23:18:36 2009 From: ozgurelibol at ttmail.com (ozgurelibol at ttmail.com) Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2009 08:18:36 +0200 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar In-Reply-To: <6ad241360901020614j46bd0495tf16e824149a5c897@mail.gmail.com> References: <1230158110.22281.28.camel@ozgur-laptop> <6ad241360812250943t1c9b2451p45b2a8135421ba44@mail.gmail.com> <1230271110.9297.12.camel@ozgur-laptop> <6ad241360901020614j46bd0495tf16e824149a5c897@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <1231654716.5935.19.camel@ozgur-laptop> Thank you Ruth, Mervyn, My problematic is CR position about Althusser's 'over determination' and 'determination in the last instance' more than the similarities Althusser and Bhaskar. Yes both of them propose to discriminate two sides of knowledge. I believe in this discrimination is basic and a big innovation. As if Althusser's mentioned concepts is an epistemic fallacy? I am not sure. best wishes On Fri, 2009-01-02 at 08:14 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > Hi Ozgur, > > Mervyn's advice sounds good -- I haven't spent enough time thinking about > Althusser to be able to say anything much about the points that you're > really interested in. I can see if I still have that old paper. But I > suspect that it's on a floppy disk somewhere! I gave it at a Re-Thining > Marxism Conference (1996 maybe, or otherwise 1997), but I never published it > or anything. Send me a note off-list, ok? > > Warmly, > Ruth > > > > On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 11:58 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > Thank you Ruth, > > > > You are right, regards to philosopy of science Bhaskar is better. > > Is it possible to share your works about this issue? > > And could you be so kind as say your views about my last questions: > > What's the CR approach about to Althusser's "over-determination" > > and"determination in the last instance"? > > > > By the way I've just asked to Versobooks Turkey office to translate RToS > > into Turkish. Is there any attempt do you (list) know? > > > > Happy holidays > > > > ozgur > > > > On Thu, 2008-12-25 at 11:43 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > Yes, similar. I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished though; > > probably > > > other people have written on it too. > > > > > > My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for how science > > > works. My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it! For > > the > > > nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and social and > > > productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. Marxists better > > than > > > Althusser, myself. And some non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians. > > > > > > Happy holidays! > > > > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > Merry Christmas! > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > Hi All, > > > > > > > > Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps Althusser's > > > > discrimination; object of knowledge and object of real. And Althusser's > > > > Generalities > > > > (..This point is essential to dialectical materialism, and Marx > > > > discusses an illustration of it in the Introduction when he > > demonstrates > > > > that although the use of general concepts ? for example, 'production', > > > > 'labour', 'exchange', etc. ? is indispensable to a scientific > > > > theoretical practice, this first generality does not coincide with the > > > > product of the scientific labour: it is not its achievement, it is its > > > > prior condition. This first generality (which I shall call Generality > > I) > > > > constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical practice > > > > will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, into that other > > > > 'concrete' generality (which I shall call Generality III) which is a > > > > knowledge... from for Marx) > > > > concept is similar to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. What's your > > > > opinions? > > > > > > > > What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" and > > > > "determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > Hope to read your ideas > > > > > > > > best regards > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Sun Jan 11 01:44:01 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2009 08:44:01 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar In-Reply-To: <1231654716.5935.19.camel@ozgur-laptop> Message-ID: Then you need to have a look at what Bhaskar says in Dialectic about the base/superstructure model. The entry in Dict CR on infra-/intra-/super-structure attempts a summary. Ronjon Paul Datta, 'From Foucault's genealogy to aleatory materialism: realism, nominalism and politics' in Critical Realism and the Social Sciences: Heterodox Elaborations. Edited by Jon Frauley and Frank Pearce. Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 2007, disagrees with Bhaskar that Althusser loses sight of the real object. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of ozgurelibol at ttmail.com Sent: 11 January 2009 06:19 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar Thank you Ruth, Mervyn, My problematic is CR position about Althusser's 'over determination' and 'determination in the last instance' more than the similarities Althusser and Bhaskar. Yes both of them propose to discriminate two sides of knowledge. I believe in this discrimination is basic and a big innovation. As if Althusser's mentioned concepts is an epistemic fallacy? I am not sure. best wishes On Fri, 2009-01-02 at 08:14 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > Hi Ozgur, > > Mervyn's advice sounds good -- I haven't spent enough time thinking > about Althusser to be able to say anything much about the points that > you're really interested in. I can see if I still have that old > paper. But I suspect that it's on a floppy disk somewhere! I gave it > at a Re-Thining Marxism Conference (1996 maybe, or otherwise 1997), > but I never published it or anything. Send me a note off-list, ok? > > Warmly, > Ruth > > > > On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 11:58 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > Thank you Ruth, > > > > You are right, regards to philosopy of science Bhaskar is better. > > Is it possible to share your works about this issue? > > And could you be so kind as say your views about my last questions: > > What's the CR approach about to Althusser's "over-determination" > > and"determination in the last instance"? > > > > By the way I've just asked to Versobooks Turkey office to translate > > RToS into Turkish. Is there any attempt do you (list) know? > > > > Happy holidays > > > > ozgur > > > > On Thu, 2008-12-25 at 11:43 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > Yes, similar. I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished though; > > probably > > > other people have written on it too. > > > > > > My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for how science > > > works. My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it! For > > the > > > nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and > > > social and productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. > > > Marxists better > > than > > > Althusser, myself. And some non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians. > > > > > > Happy holidays! > > > > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > Merry Christmas! > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > Hi All, > > > > > > > > Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps > > > > Althusser's discrimination; object of knowledge and object of > > > > real. And Althusser's Generalities (..This point is essential to > > > > dialectical materialism, and Marx discusses an illustration of > > > > it in the Introduction when he > > demonstrates > > > > that although the use of general concepts - for example, > > > > 'production', 'labour', 'exchange', etc. - is indispensable to a > > > > scientific theoretical practice, this first generality does not > > > > coincide with the product of the scientific labour: it is not > > > > its achievement, it is its prior condition. This first > > > > generality (which I shall call Generality > > I) > > > > constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical > > > > practice will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, into > > > > that other 'concrete' generality (which I shall call Generality > > > > III) which is a knowledge... from for Marx) concept is similar > > > > to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. What's your opinions? > > > > > > > > What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" and > > > > "determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > Hope to read your ideas > > > > > > > > best regards > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From gerardwalmsley at googlemail.com Tue Jan 13 05:49:34 2009 From: gerardwalmsley at googlemail.com (gerard walmsely) Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 12:49:34 +0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: It appears unfortunate but there apeears to be very few real debates actually between critical realists and others who are not critical realists. There is a claim that critical realists have developed the theory from an engagement with other main traditions, as immanent critique. But this is largely a monologue. GW On Sun, Jan 11, 2009 at 7:00 PM, < critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > between"postpositivists"and critical realists (Joanne Costello) > 2. Re: Althusser and Bhaskar (ozgurelibol at ttmail.com) > 3. Re: Althusser and Bhaskar (Mervyn Hartwig) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 20:33:51 -0700 > From: "Joanne Costello" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > between"postpositivists"and critical realists > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Message-ID: > Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; > reply-type=original > > Thanks so much to everyone for pointing me towards a wealth of resources - > I > have a lot of reading to do! > I think some of the debates between CR and pragmatism will help me. I'm > also > very interested in Byrne's "Social Exclusion." > > I have been exploring critical realism along with another student who is in > sociology and we're both amazed at how willing people have been to help > newcomers learn. > > I greatly appreciate your help. > > Joanne > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Sent: Saturday, January 10, 2009 10:45 AM > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > between"postpositivists"and critical realists > > > > Further to this excellent advice and info, Gideon Calder has a new book > on > > Rorty from a CR perspective: Rorty's Politics of Redescription. By Gideon > > Calder. Cardiff: University of Wales > > Press, 2007. It is reviewed by Justin Cruickshank in Journal of Critical > > Realism 7(2) 2008, 314-29. > > > > In the same issue of JCR (pp. 235-275) there is also a debate between > > Peter > > Manicas (a critical realist) and Patrick Baert (a pragmatist), entitled > 'A > > social theory dialogue'. This will probably be an ongoing exchange, with > > other people coming in. > > > > My entry on critical realism in A Dictionary of CR differentiates CR from > > other forms of realism in terms of 'its robustly transcendental and > > immanently critical method, its outright rejection of empiricism and > > positivism, its thoroughgoing emergentism, its understanding of social > > science as necessarily explanatory critical (entailing rejection of the > > fact-value and theory-practice dichotomies) and its explicitly > > emancipatory > > stance.' But not all critical realists (as distinct from dialectical > > critical realists) accept the last two positions. > > > > > > Mervyn > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [ > > > > mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Despain, > > Hans G > > Sent: 09 January 2009 20:31 > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > > between"postpositivists" > > and critical realists > > > > Dear Joanne, > > > > Ruth makes good points for clarifying your purpose. > > > > Three sources you might find useful depending on the specific purpose > > > > Bhaksar provides a sustained in depth critique of postpositivism, > > specifically Richard Rorty in his "Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom." > > Rorty is a highly sophisticated pragmatic philosopher, and should surely > > fulfill the non-naive realist criteria. Bhaskar summarizes this critique > > in > > a chapter in "Reclaiming Reality." > > > > You also might find some valuable lessons in Lopez and Potter's "After > > Postmodernism: An introduction to critical realism" (2001). > > > > Suspecting you might want more field specific sources refer to Hartwig's > > "Dictionary of critical realism" there is an entry for "social work." I > > am > > not familiar with the cited literature, but you might find it useful for > > your purposes. > > > > Finally, don't be over-defensive, your interest in critical realism for > > informing social work is right on; in spite of your advisor's cryptic > > critique. It will take time to develop a full argument and defense that > > will be convincing to critics. If you stick with your interest you will > > find a revolutionary analysis, theory, and praxis for social theory/work > > and > > practice in Dialectical Critical Realism (DCR). DCR is a new theory of > > ethics, or a dialectical development of the ethical implications of > > critical > > realism. You do not necessarily have to push on to DCR, I do believe > you > > can apply CR by itself to social work as an alternative to positivism and > > social constructivist approaches in highly successful and fruitful ways. > > > > all the best, > > > > Hans > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff > > [rgroff at slu.edu] > > Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 2:28 PM > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > > between"postpositivists" and critical realists > > > > Hi Joanne, > > > > So is the question "Are there discussions between critical realists and > > other non-naive realists?" > > > > If so, I think the best way to go at it is to figure out who falls into > > the > > "other non-naive realists" category, and then sort out what the > difference > > is between the person(s) in question and some kind of ideal-type of cr. > > Non-philosophers often use these terms fairly loosely. I don't know > what > > your disciplinary attachment is, but it a little bit matters, for what > the > > differences will be between cr and other realisms. There are definitely > a > > range of people in different social sciences who are realists as the term > > is > > used in their various fields, who are friendly to cr and with whom > there's > > been discussion. But again, the nature of the points of disagreement > will > > be different by discipline. In metaphysics and philosophy of science, > for > > example, the realists who come closest to cr are "dispositional realists" > > and/or "scientific essentialists"; there hasn't been a lot cr engagement > > with that literature, though there's a little. > > > > If you can say more precisely who the relevant "non-naive realists" are > > for > > your purposes, I'm sure others can point you to useful literature. > > > > Warmly, > > Ruth > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 11:30 AM, Joanne Costello > > wrote: > > > >> Hi Ruth, > >> > >> Thank you for your response. My understanding is that some people use > >> the term "postpositivist" to describe non-naive realism. In contrast, > >> post-positivist thought would refer to various paradigms that came > >> after or in response to positivism (e.g. social constructionism). > >> > >> Best wishes, > >> > >> Joanne > >> ----- Original Message ----- > >> From: "Ruth Groff" > >> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > >> > >> Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 10:22 AM > >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > >> between"postpositivists" and critical realists > >> > >> > >> > Hi Joanne, > >> > > >> > Can you say more about who counts as postpositivist and who counts > >> > as post-positivist? > >> > > >> > Warmly, > >> > Ruth > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Joanne Costello > >> > wrote: > >> > > >> >> Hello, > >> >> > >> >> I'm a graduate student in Calgary, Canada. I wrote a term paper > >> >> last semester on critical realism and its potential for > >> >> emancipatory social work research and praxis. The professor raised > >> >> the criticism that, in her view, critical realist arguments (or at > >> >> least how I dealt with them) seem to engage with "dated" views of > >> >> postpositivism. > >> >> > >> >> I am wondering if anyone might be able to point me to any recent > >> >> literature where the critical realist position addresses > >> >> "postpositivist" (as opposed to post-positivist) positions. Are > >> >> there any self-identified postpositivists that have engaged the > >> >> critical realist paradigm? > >> >> > >> >> Cheers, > >> >> > >> >> Joanne > >> >> _______________________________________________ > >> >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> >> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> >> > >> > _______________________________________________ > >> > Critical-Realism mailing list > >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not > > cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the > > addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not > > the > > intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, > > disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be > > prohibited > > by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify > > the > > sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank > > you. > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > __________ NOD32 3747 (20090107) Information __________ > > > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2009 08:18:36 +0200 > From: "ozgurelibol at ttmail.com" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: <1231654716.5935.19.camel at ozgur-laptop> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" > > Thank you Ruth, Mervyn, > > My problematic is CR position about Althusser's 'over determination' and > 'determination in the last instance' more than the similarities > Althusser and Bhaskar. > Yes both of them propose to discriminate two sides of knowledge. I > believe in this discrimination is basic and a big innovation. > As if Althusser's mentioned concepts is an epistemic fallacy? I am not > sure. > > best wishes > > > On Fri, 2009-01-02 at 08:14 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > Hi Ozgur, > > > > Mervyn's advice sounds good -- I haven't spent enough time thinking about > > Althusser to be able to say anything much about the points that you're > > really interested in. I can see if I still have that old paper. But I > > suspect that it's on a floppy disk somewhere! I gave it at a Re-Thining > > Marxism Conference (1996 maybe, or otherwise 1997), but I never published > it > > or anything. Send me a note off-list, ok? > > > > Warmly, > > Ruth > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 11:58 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > Thank you Ruth, > > > > > > You are right, regards to philosopy of science Bhaskar is better. > > > Is it possible to share your works about this issue? > > > And could you be so kind as say your views about my last questions: > > > What's the CR approach about to Althusser's "over-determination" > > > and"determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > By the way I've just asked to Versobooks Turkey office to translate > RToS > > > into Turkish. Is there any attempt do you (list) know? > > > > > > Happy holidays > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > On Thu, 2008-12-25 at 11:43 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > > Yes, similar. I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished though; > > > probably > > > > other people have written on it too. > > > > > > > > My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for how > science > > > > works. My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it! > For > > > the > > > > nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and social > and > > > > productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. Marxists > better > > > than > > > > Althusser, myself. And some non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians. > > > > > > > > Happy holidays! > > > > > > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Merry Christmas! > > > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > Hi All, > > > > > > > > > > Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps Althusser's > > > > > discrimination; object of knowledge and object of real. And > Althusser's > > > > > Generalities > > > > > (..This point is essential to dialectical materialism, and Marx > > > > > discusses an illustration of it in the Introduction when he > > > demonstrates > > > > > that although the use of general concepts ? for example, > 'production', > > > > > 'labour', 'exchange', etc. ? is indispensable to a scientific > > > > > theoretical practice, this first generality does not coincide with > the > > > > > product of the scientific labour: it is not its achievement, it is > its > > > > > prior condition. This first generality (which I shall call > Generality > > > I) > > > > > constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical > practice > > > > > will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, into that other > > > > > 'concrete' generality (which I shall call Generality III) which is > a > > > > > knowledge... from for Marx) > > > > > concept is similar to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. What's > your > > > > > opinions? > > > > > > > > > > What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" and > > > > > "determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > > > Hope to read your ideas > > > > > > > > > > best regards > > > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 3 > Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2009 08:44:01 -0000 > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > Then you need to have a look at what Bhaskar says in Dialectic about the > base/superstructure model. The entry in Dict CR on > infra-/intra-/super-structure attempts a summary. > > Ronjon Paul Datta, 'From Foucault's genealogy to aleatory materialism: > realism, nominalism and politics' in Critical Realism and the Social > Sciences: Heterodox Elaborations. Edited by Jon Frauley and Frank Pearce. > Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 2007, disagrees > with Bhaskar that Althusser loses sight of the real object. > > Mervyn > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com > Sent: 11 January 2009 06:19 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar > > Thank you Ruth, Mervyn, > > My problematic is CR position about Althusser's 'over determination' and > 'determination in the last instance' more than the similarities Althusser > and Bhaskar. > Yes both of them propose to discriminate two sides of knowledge. I believe > in this discrimination is basic and a big innovation. > As if Althusser's mentioned concepts is an epistemic fallacy? I am not > sure. > > > best wishes > > > On Fri, 2009-01-02 at 08:14 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > Hi Ozgur, > > > > Mervyn's advice sounds good -- I haven't spent enough time thinking > > about Althusser to be able to say anything much about the points that > > you're really interested in. I can see if I still have that old > > paper. But I suspect that it's on a floppy disk somewhere! I gave it > > at a Re-Thining Marxism Conference (1996 maybe, or otherwise 1997), > > but I never published it or anything. Send me a note off-list, ok? > > > > Warmly, > > Ruth > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 11:58 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > Thank you Ruth, > > > > > > You are right, regards to philosopy of science Bhaskar is better. > > > Is it possible to share your works about this issue? > > > And could you be so kind as say your views about my last questions: > > > What's the CR approach about to Althusser's "over-determination" > > > and"determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > By the way I've just asked to Versobooks Turkey office to translate > > > RToS into Turkish. Is there any attempt do you (list) know? > > > > > > Happy holidays > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > On Thu, 2008-12-25 at 11:43 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > > Yes, similar. I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished though; > > > probably > > > > other people have written on it too. > > > > > > > > My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for how > science > > > > works. My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it! > For > > > the > > > > nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and > > > > social and productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. > > > > Marxists better > > > than > > > > Althusser, myself. And some non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians. > > > > > > > > Happy holidays! > > > > > > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Merry Christmas! > > > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > Hi All, > > > > > > > > > > Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps > > > > > Althusser's discrimination; object of knowledge and object of > > > > > real. And Althusser's Generalities (..This point is essential to > > > > > dialectical materialism, and Marx discusses an illustration of > > > > > it in the Introduction when he > > > demonstrates > > > > > that although the use of general concepts - for example, > > > > > 'production', 'labour', 'exchange', etc. - is indispensable to a > > > > > scientific theoretical practice, this first generality does not > > > > > coincide with the product of the scientific labour: it is not > > > > > its achievement, it is its prior condition. This first > > > > > generality (which I shall call Generality > > > I) > > > > > constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical > > > > > practice will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, into > > > > > that other 'concrete' generality (which I shall call Generality > > > > > III) which is a knowledge... from for Marx) concept is similar > > > > > to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. What's your opinions? > > > > > > > > > > What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" and > > > > > "determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > > > Hope to read your ideas > > > > > > > > > > best regards > > > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 > *********************************************** > From Par.Engholm at soc.uu.se Tue Jan 13 06:16:32 2009 From: Par.Engholm at soc.uu.se (Par Engholm) Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 14:16:32 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 References: Message-ID: <216D68139D6C41D593B0F8937208A698@kvk.uu.local> Hi Gerard, It might appear that CR would perform a monologue, judging from the scant attention it is given by other schools of thought in philosophy and in the social sciences, but this is not due to the lack of engagement from advocates of CR with other traditions but rather from the sad fact that representatives of other traditions don't reply to the comments on them. One could only guess that this is due to the lack of understanding of the main traits of CR or that the critique levelled against other traditions is such that they can't answer. The critique is too fundamental and too thorough. Best, Par ******************************************************* Par Engholm Uppsala University Department of Sociology http://www.soc.uu.se/kontaktpers.php?id=62 Mobile: +46 709783546 ----- Original Message ----- From: "gerard walmsely" To: Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2009 1:49 PM Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 > It appears unfortunate but there apeears to be very few real debates > actually between critical realists and others who are not critical > realists. There is a claim that critical realists have developed the > theory > from an engagement with other main traditions, as immanent critique. But > this is largely a monologue. > > GW > > > > > On Sun, Jan 11, 2009 at 7:00 PM, < > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > >> Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to >> critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> >> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu >> >> You can reach the person managing the list at >> critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu >> >> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >> than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." >> >> >> Today's Topics: >> >> 1. Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates >> between"postpositivists"and critical realists (Joanne Costello) >> 2. Re: Althusser and Bhaskar (ozgurelibol at ttmail.com) >> 3. Re: Althusser and Bhaskar (Mervyn Hartwig) >> >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >> Message: 1 >> Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 20:33:51 -0700 >> From: "Joanne Costello" >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates >> between"postpositivists"and critical realists >> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" >> >> Message-ID: >> Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; >> reply-type=original >> >> Thanks so much to everyone for pointing me towards a wealth of >> resources - >> I >> have a lot of reading to do! >> I think some of the debates between CR and pragmatism will help me. I'm >> also >> very interested in Byrne's "Social Exclusion." >> >> I have been exploring critical realism along with another student who is >> in >> sociology and we're both amazed at how willing people have been to help >> newcomers learn. >> >> I greatly appreciate your help. >> >> Joanne >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: "Mervyn Hartwig" >> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" >> >> Sent: Saturday, January 10, 2009 10:45 AM >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates >> between"postpositivists"and critical realists >> >> >> > Further to this excellent advice and info, Gideon Calder has a new book >> on >> > Rorty from a CR perspective: Rorty's Politics of Redescription. By >> > Gideon >> > Calder. Cardiff: University of Wales >> > Press, 2007. It is reviewed by Justin Cruickshank in Journal of >> > Critical >> > Realism 7(2) 2008, 314-29. >> > >> > In the same issue of JCR (pp. 235-275) there is also a debate between >> > Peter >> > Manicas (a critical realist) and Patrick Baert (a pragmatist), entitled >> 'A >> > social theory dialogue'. This will probably be an ongoing exchange, >> > with >> > other people coming in. >> > >> > My entry on critical realism in A Dictionary of CR differentiates CR >> > from >> > other forms of realism in terms of 'its robustly transcendental and >> > immanently critical method, its outright rejection of empiricism and >> > positivism, its thoroughgoing emergentism, its understanding of social >> > science as necessarily explanatory critical (entailing rejection of the >> > fact-value and theory-practice dichotomies) and its explicitly >> > emancipatory >> > stance.' But not all critical realists (as distinct from dialectical >> > critical realists) accept the last two positions. >> > >> > >> > Mervyn >> > >> > >> > >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [ >> > >> > mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >> Despain, >> > Hans G >> > Sent: 09 January 2009 20:31 >> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates >> > between"postpositivists" >> > and critical realists >> > >> > Dear Joanne, >> > >> > Ruth makes good points for clarifying your purpose. >> > >> > Three sources you might find useful depending on the specific purpose >> > >> > Bhaksar provides a sustained in depth critique of postpositivism, >> > specifically Richard Rorty in his "Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom." >> > Rorty is a highly sophisticated pragmatic philosopher, and should >> > surely >> > fulfill the non-naive realist criteria. Bhaskar summarizes this >> > critique >> > in >> > a chapter in "Reclaiming Reality." >> > >> > You also might find some valuable lessons in Lopez and Potter's "After >> > Postmodernism: An introduction to critical realism" (2001). >> > >> > Suspecting you might want more field specific sources refer to >> > Hartwig's >> > "Dictionary of critical realism" there is an entry for "social work." >> > I >> > am >> > not familiar with the cited literature, but you might find it useful >> > for >> > your purposes. >> > >> > Finally, don't be over-defensive, your interest in critical realism for >> > informing social work is right on; in spite of your advisor's cryptic >> > critique. It will take time to develop a full argument and defense >> > that >> > will be convincing to critics. If you stick with your interest you >> > will >> > find a revolutionary analysis, theory, and praxis for social >> > theory/work >> > and >> > practice in Dialectical Critical Realism (DCR). DCR is a new theory of >> > ethics, or a dialectical development of the ethical implications of >> > critical >> > realism. You do not necessarily have to push on to DCR, I do believe >> you >> > can apply CR by itself to social work as an alternative to positivism >> > and >> > social constructivist approaches in highly successful and fruitful >> > ways. >> > >> > all the best, >> > >> > Hans >> > >> > >> > ________________________________________ >> > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff >> > [rgroff at slu.edu] >> > Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 2:28 PM >> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates >> > between"postpositivists" and critical realists >> > >> > Hi Joanne, >> > >> > So is the question "Are there discussions between critical realists and >> > other non-naive realists?" >> > >> > If so, I think the best way to go at it is to figure out who falls into >> > the >> > "other non-naive realists" category, and then sort out what the >> difference >> > is between the person(s) in question and some kind of ideal-type of cr. >> > Non-philosophers often use these terms fairly loosely. I don't know >> what >> > your disciplinary attachment is, but it a little bit matters, for what >> the >> > differences will be between cr and other realisms. There are >> > definitely >> a >> > range of people in different social sciences who are realists as the >> > term >> > is >> > used in their various fields, who are friendly to cr and with whom >> there's >> > been discussion. But again, the nature of the points of disagreement >> will >> > be different by discipline. In metaphysics and philosophy of science, >> for >> > example, the realists who come closest to cr are "dispositional >> > realists" >> > and/or "scientific essentialists"; there hasn't been a lot cr >> > engagement >> > with that literature, though there's a little. >> > >> > If you can say more precisely who the relevant "non-naive realists" are >> > for >> > your purposes, I'm sure others can point you to useful literature. >> > >> > Warmly, >> > Ruth >> > >> > >> > >> > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 11:30 AM, Joanne Costello >> > wrote: >> > >> >> Hi Ruth, >> >> >> >> Thank you for your response. My understanding is that some people use >> >> the term "postpositivist" to describe non-naive realism. In contrast, >> >> post-positivist thought would refer to various paradigms that came >> >> after or in response to positivism (e.g. social constructionism). >> >> >> >> Best wishes, >> >> >> >> Joanne >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> >> From: "Ruth Groff" >> >> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" >> >> >> >> Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 10:22 AM >> >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates >> >> between"postpositivists" and critical realists >> >> >> >> >> >> > Hi Joanne, >> >> > >> >> > Can you say more about who counts as postpositivist and who counts >> >> > as post-positivist? >> >> > >> >> > Warmly, >> >> > Ruth >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Joanne Costello >> >> > wrote: >> >> > >> >> >> Hello, >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm a graduate student in Calgary, Canada. I wrote a term paper >> >> >> last semester on critical realism and its potential for >> >> >> emancipatory social work research and praxis. The professor raised >> >> >> the criticism that, in her view, critical realist arguments (or at >> >> >> least how I dealt with them) seem to engage with "dated" views of >> >> >> postpositivism. >> >> >> >> >> >> I am wondering if anyone might be able to point me to any recent >> >> >> literature where the critical realist position addresses >> >> >> "postpositivist" (as opposed to post-positivist) positions. Are >> >> >> there any self-identified postpositivists that have engaged the >> >> >> critical realist paradigm? >> >> >> >> >> >> Cheers, >> >> >> >> >> >> Joanne >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> >> >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> >> >> >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> >> > _______________________________________________ >> >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> >> > >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> >> >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> > The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do >> > not >> > cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the >> > addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are >> > not >> > the >> > intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, >> > disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be >> > prohibited >> > by law. If you have received this communication in error, please >> > notify >> > the >> > sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. >> > Thank >> > you. >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> > __________ NOD32 3747 (20090107) Information __________ >> > >> > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. >> > http://www.eset.com >> > >> > >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> > >> > >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> Message: 2 >> Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2009 08:18:36 +0200 >> From: "ozgurelibol at ttmail.com" >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> >> Message-ID: <1231654716.5935.19.camel at ozgur-laptop> >> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" >> >> Thank you Ruth, Mervyn, >> >> My problematic is CR position about Althusser's 'over determination' and >> 'determination in the last instance' more than the similarities >> Althusser and Bhaskar. >> Yes both of them propose to discriminate two sides of knowledge. I >> believe in this discrimination is basic and a big innovation. >> As if Althusser's mentioned concepts is an epistemic fallacy? I am not >> sure. >> >> best wishes >> >> >> On Fri, 2009-01-02 at 08:14 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: >> > Hi Ozgur, >> > >> > Mervyn's advice sounds good -- I haven't spent enough time thinking >> > about >> > Althusser to be able to say anything much about the points that you're >> > really interested in. I can see if I still have that old paper. But I >> > suspect that it's on a floppy disk somewhere! I gave it at a >> > Re-Thining >> > Marxism Conference (1996 maybe, or otherwise 1997), but I never >> > published >> it >> > or anything. Send me a note off-list, ok? >> > >> > Warmly, >> > Ruth >> > >> > >> > >> > On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 11:58 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < >> > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: >> > >> > > Thank you Ruth, >> > > >> > > You are right, regards to philosopy of science Bhaskar is better. >> > > Is it possible to share your works about this issue? >> > > And could you be so kind as say your views about my last questions: >> > > What's the CR approach about to Althusser's "over-determination" >> > > and"determination in the last instance"? >> > > >> > > By the way I've just asked to Versobooks Turkey office to translate >> RToS >> > > into Turkish. Is there any attempt do you (list) know? >> > > >> > > Happy holidays >> > > >> > > ozgur >> > > >> > > On Thu, 2008-12-25 at 11:43 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: >> > > > Yes, similar. I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished though; >> > > probably >> > > > other people have written on it too. >> > > > >> > > > My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for how >> science >> > > > works. My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it! >> For >> > > the >> > > > nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and >> > > > social >> and >> > > > productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. Marxists >> better >> > > than >> > > > Althusser, myself. And some non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians. >> > > > >> > > > Happy holidays! >> > > > >> > > > Ruth >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > Merry Christmas! >> > > > >> > > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < >> > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: >> > > > >> > > > > Hi All, >> > > > > >> > > > > Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps Althusser's >> > > > > discrimination; object of knowledge and object of real. And >> Althusser's >> > > > > Generalities >> > > > > (..This point is essential to dialectical materialism, and Marx >> > > > > discusses an illustration of it in the Introduction when he >> > > demonstrates >> > > > > that although the use of general concepts ? for example, >> 'production', >> > > > > 'labour', 'exchange', etc. ? is indispensable to a scientific >> > > > > theoretical practice, this first generality does not coincide >> > > > > with >> the >> > > > > product of the scientific labour: it is not its achievement, it >> > > > > is >> its >> > > > > prior condition. This first generality (which I shall call >> Generality >> > > I) >> > > > > constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical >> practice >> > > > > will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, into that >> > > > > other >> > > > > 'concrete' generality (which I shall call Generality III) which >> > > > > is >> a >> > > > > knowledge... from for Marx) >> > > > > concept is similar to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. What's >> your >> > > > > opinions? >> > > > > >> > > > > What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" and >> > > > > "determination in the last instance"? >> > > > > >> > > > > Hope to read your ideas >> > > > > >> > > > > best regards >> > > > > >> > > > > ozgur >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > _______________________________________________ >> > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > > > >> > > > _______________________________________________ >> > > > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > >> > > >> > > _______________________________________________ >> > > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> Message: 3 >> Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2009 08:44:01 -0000 >> From: "Mervyn Hartwig" >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar >> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" >> >> Message-ID: >> >> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" >> >> Then you need to have a look at what Bhaskar says in Dialectic about the >> base/superstructure model. The entry in Dict CR on >> infra-/intra-/super-structure attempts a summary. >> >> Ronjon Paul Datta, 'From Foucault's genealogy to aleatory materialism: >> realism, nominalism and politics' in Critical Realism and the Social >> Sciences: Heterodox Elaborations. Edited by Jon Frauley and Frank Pearce. >> Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 2007, disagrees >> with Bhaskar that Althusser loses sight of the real object. >> >> Mervyn >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >> ozgurelibol at ttmail.com >> Sent: 11 January 2009 06:19 >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar >> >> Thank you Ruth, Mervyn, >> >> My problematic is CR position about Althusser's 'over determination' and >> 'determination in the last instance' more than the similarities Althusser >> and Bhaskar. >> Yes both of them propose to discriminate two sides of knowledge. I >> believe >> in this discrimination is basic and a big innovation. >> As if Althusser's mentioned concepts is an epistemic fallacy? I am not >> sure. >> >> >> best wishes >> >> >> On Fri, 2009-01-02 at 08:14 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: >> > Hi Ozgur, >> > >> > Mervyn's advice sounds good -- I haven't spent enough time thinking >> > about Althusser to be able to say anything much about the points that >> > you're really interested in. I can see if I still have that old >> > paper. But I suspect that it's on a floppy disk somewhere! I gave it >> > at a Re-Thining Marxism Conference (1996 maybe, or otherwise 1997), >> > but I never published it or anything. Send me a note off-list, ok? >> > >> > Warmly, >> > Ruth >> > >> > >> > >> > On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 11:58 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < >> > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: >> > >> > > Thank you Ruth, >> > > >> > > You are right, regards to philosopy of science Bhaskar is better. >> > > Is it possible to share your works about this issue? >> > > And could you be so kind as say your views about my last questions: >> > > What's the CR approach about to Althusser's "over-determination" >> > > and"determination in the last instance"? >> > > >> > > By the way I've just asked to Versobooks Turkey office to translate >> > > RToS into Turkish. Is there any attempt do you (list) know? >> > > >> > > Happy holidays >> > > >> > > ozgur >> > > >> > > On Thu, 2008-12-25 at 11:43 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: >> > > > Yes, similar. I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished though; >> > > probably >> > > > other people have written on it too. >> > > > >> > > > My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for how >> science >> > > > works. My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it! >> For >> > > the >> > > > nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and >> > > > social and productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. >> > > > Marxists better >> > > than >> > > > Althusser, myself. And some non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians. >> > > > >> > > > Happy holidays! >> > > > >> > > > Ruth >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > Merry Christmas! >> > > > >> > > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < >> > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: >> > > > >> > > > > Hi All, >> > > > > >> > > > > Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps >> > > > > Althusser's discrimination; object of knowledge and object of >> > > > > real. And Althusser's Generalities (..This point is essential to >> > > > > dialectical materialism, and Marx discusses an illustration of >> > > > > it in the Introduction when he >> > > demonstrates >> > > > > that although the use of general concepts - for example, >> > > > > 'production', 'labour', 'exchange', etc. - is indispensable to a >> > > > > scientific theoretical practice, this first generality does not >> > > > > coincide with the product of the scientific labour: it is not >> > > > > its achievement, it is its prior condition. This first >> > > > > generality (which I shall call Generality >> > > I) >> > > > > constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical >> > > > > practice will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, into >> > > > > that other 'concrete' generality (which I shall call Generality >> > > > > III) which is a knowledge... from for Marx) concept is similar >> > > > > to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. What's your opinions? >> > > > > >> > > > > What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" and >> > > > > "determination in the last instance"? >> > > > > >> > > > > Hope to read your ideas >> > > > > >> > > > > best regards >> > > > > >> > > > > ozgur >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > _______________________________________________ >> > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > > > >> > > > _______________________________________________ >> > > > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > >> > > >> > > _______________________________________________ >> > > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 >> *********************************************** >> > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From rgroff at slu.edu Tue Jan 13 07:49:16 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 08:49:16 -0600 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <6ad241360901130649r74d2d32cl2b3d9865b207495a@mail.gmail.com> Hi Gerard, I think Par's right, about those being "debated" not feeling the need to respond. I can only speak for philosophy, but there you see a direct hit on Hume, in RTS, and some attention to then-contemporary Humeans. Nowadays, of course, there is a well-established, growing camp of realists about powers within analytic metaphysics. There is debate between THEM and Humeans, but that's because all of them are Anglo-analytic philosophers. They all have the same training; they go to the same conferences; they publish in the same journals; etc. You don't see a lot of serious exchange between major academic/intellectual camps in general. At least in philosophy. If you are an analytic philosopher of mind, say, you don't have to get into it with the leading Hegelian. The people who cross those divides are rare: Charles Taylor, e.g. But neither side has to actually engage with him, since he's an outsider. I don't mean to suggest that it's impossible to slug it out within a home discipline, or a home sub-field or specialty, nor to suggest that cr is integrated into non-cr debates, at least in my area. But I think it's a harder thing to pull off than it seems. Also, I'm sympathetic to the problem that so much of the "leading" work in many fields is Kuhnian normal science in relation to paradigms that are just dumb, at best. It's hard to muster the will to wade in. Anyway, why not write something in your area? Warmly, r. On Tue, Jan 13, 2009 at 6:49 AM, gerard walmsely < gerardwalmsley at googlemail.com> wrote: > It appears unfortunate but there apeears to be very few real debates > actually between critical realists and others who are not critical > realists. There is a claim that critical realists have developed the > theory > from an engagement with other main traditions, as immanent critique. But > this is largely a monologue. > > GW > > > > > On Sun, Jan 11, 2009 at 7:00 PM, < > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > > > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > You can reach the person managing the list at > > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > > > > Today's Topics: > > > > 1. Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > > between"postpositivists"and critical realists (Joanne Costello) > > 2. Re: Althusser and Bhaskar (ozgurelibol at ttmail.com) > > 3. Re: Althusser and Bhaskar (Mervyn Hartwig) > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Message: 1 > > Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 20:33:51 -0700 > > From: "Joanne Costello" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > > between"postpositivists"and critical realists > > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; > > reply-type=original > > > > Thanks so much to everyone for pointing me towards a wealth of resources > - > > I > > have a lot of reading to do! > > I think some of the debates between CR and pragmatism will help me. I'm > > also > > very interested in Byrne's "Social Exclusion." > > > > I have been exploring critical realism along with another student who is > in > > sociology and we're both amazed at how willing people have been to help > > newcomers learn. > > > > I greatly appreciate your help. > > > > Joanne > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > > > Sent: Saturday, January 10, 2009 10:45 AM > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > > between"postpositivists"and critical realists > > > > > > > Further to this excellent advice and info, Gideon Calder has a new book > > on > > > Rorty from a CR perspective: Rorty's Politics of Redescription. By > Gideon > > > Calder. Cardiff: University of Wales > > > Press, 2007. It is reviewed by Justin Cruickshank in Journal of > Critical > > > Realism 7(2) 2008, 314-29. > > > > > > In the same issue of JCR (pp. 235-275) there is also a debate between > > > Peter > > > Manicas (a critical realist) and Patrick Baert (a pragmatist), entitled > > 'A > > > social theory dialogue'. This will probably be an ongoing exchange, > with > > > other people coming in. > > > > > > My entry on critical realism in A Dictionary of CR differentiates CR > from > > > other forms of realism in terms of 'its robustly transcendental and > > > immanently critical method, its outright rejection of empiricism and > > > positivism, its thoroughgoing emergentism, its understanding of social > > > science as necessarily explanatory critical (entailing rejection of the > > > fact-value and theory-practice dichotomies) and its explicitly > > > emancipatory > > > stance.' But not all critical realists (as distinct from dialectical > > > critical realists) accept the last two positions. > > > > > > > > > Mervyn > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [ > > > > > > mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Despain, > > > Hans G > > > Sent: 09 January 2009 20:31 > > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > > > between"postpositivists" > > > and critical realists > > > > > > Dear Joanne, > > > > > > Ruth makes good points for clarifying your purpose. > > > > > > Three sources you might find useful depending on the specific purpose > > > > > > Bhaksar provides a sustained in depth critique of postpositivism, > > > specifically Richard Rorty in his "Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom." > > > Rorty is a highly sophisticated pragmatic philosopher, and should > surely > > > fulfill the non-naive realist criteria. Bhaskar summarizes this > critique > > > in > > > a chapter in "Reclaiming Reality." > > > > > > You also might find some valuable lessons in Lopez and Potter's "After > > > Postmodernism: An introduction to critical realism" (2001). > > > > > > Suspecting you might want more field specific sources refer to > Hartwig's > > > "Dictionary of critical realism" there is an entry for "social work." > I > > > am > > > not familiar with the cited literature, but you might find it useful > for > > > your purposes. > > > > > > Finally, don't be over-defensive, your interest in critical realism for > > > informing social work is right on; in spite of your advisor's cryptic > > > critique. It will take time to develop a full argument and defense > that > > > will be convincing to critics. If you stick with your interest you > will > > > find a revolutionary analysis, theory, and praxis for social > theory/work > > > and > > > practice in Dialectical Critical Realism (DCR). DCR is a new theory of > > > ethics, or a dialectical development of the ethical implications of > > > critical > > > realism. You do not necessarily have to push on to DCR, I do believe > > you > > > can apply CR by itself to social work as an alternative to positivism > and > > > social constructivist approaches in highly successful and fruitful > ways. > > > > > > all the best, > > > > > > Hans > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff > > > [rgroff at slu.edu] > > > Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 2:28 PM > > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > > > between"postpositivists" and critical realists > > > > > > Hi Joanne, > > > > > > So is the question "Are there discussions between critical realists and > > > other non-naive realists?" > > > > > > If so, I think the best way to go at it is to figure out who falls into > > > the > > > "other non-naive realists" category, and then sort out what the > > difference > > > is between the person(s) in question and some kind of ideal-type of cr. > > > Non-philosophers often use these terms fairly loosely. I don't know > > what > > > your disciplinary attachment is, but it a little bit matters, for what > > the > > > differences will be between cr and other realisms. There are > definitely > > a > > > range of people in different social sciences who are realists as the > term > > > is > > > used in their various fields, who are friendly to cr and with whom > > there's > > > been discussion. But again, the nature of the points of disagreement > > will > > > be different by discipline. In metaphysics and philosophy of science, > > for > > > example, the realists who come closest to cr are "dispositional > realists" > > > and/or "scientific essentialists"; there hasn't been a lot cr > engagement > > > with that literature, though there's a little. > > > > > > If you can say more precisely who the relevant "non-naive realists" are > > > for > > > your purposes, I'm sure others can point you to useful literature. > > > > > > Warmly, > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 11:30 AM, Joanne Costello > > > wrote: > > > > > >> Hi Ruth, > > >> > > >> Thank you for your response. My understanding is that some people use > > >> the term "postpositivist" to describe non-naive realism. In contrast, > > >> post-positivist thought would refer to various paradigms that came > > >> after or in response to positivism (e.g. social constructionism). > > >> > > >> Best wishes, > > >> > > >> Joanne > > >> ----- Original Message ----- > > >> From: "Ruth Groff" > > >> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > >> > > >> Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 10:22 AM > > >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > > >> between"postpositivists" and critical realists > > >> > > >> > > >> > Hi Joanne, > > >> > > > >> > Can you say more about who counts as postpositivist and who counts > > >> > as post-positivist? > > >> > > > >> > Warmly, > > >> > Ruth > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Joanne Costello > > >> > wrote: > > >> > > > >> >> Hello, > > >> >> > > >> >> I'm a graduate student in Calgary, Canada. I wrote a term paper > > >> >> last semester on critical realism and its potential for > > >> >> emancipatory social work research and praxis. The professor raised > > >> >> the criticism that, in her view, critical realist arguments (or at > > >> >> least how I dealt with them) seem to engage with "dated" views of > > >> >> postpositivism. > > >> >> > > >> >> I am wondering if anyone might be able to point me to any recent > > >> >> literature where the critical realist position addresses > > >> >> "postpositivist" (as opposed to post-positivist) positions. Are > > >> >> there any self-identified postpositivists that have engaged the > > >> >> critical realist paradigm? > > >> >> > > >> >> Cheers, > > >> >> > > >> >> Joanne > > >> >> _______________________________________________ > > >> >> Critical-Realism mailing list > > >> >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > >> >> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > >> >> > > >> > _______________________________________________ > > >> > Critical-Realism mailing list > > >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > >> > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> _______________________________________________ > > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > >> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > >> > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do > not > > > cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the > > > addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are > not > > > the > > > intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, > > > disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be > > > prohibited > > > by law. If you have received this communication in error, please > notify > > > the > > > sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. > Thank > > > you. > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > __________ NOD32 3747 (20090107) Information __________ > > > > > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > > > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > Message: 2 > > Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2009 08:18:36 +0200 > > From: "ozgurelibol at ttmail.com" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > > Message-ID: <1231654716.5935.19.camel at ozgur-laptop> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" > > > > Thank you Ruth, Mervyn, > > > > My problematic is CR position about Althusser's 'over determination' and > > 'determination in the last instance' more than the similarities > > Althusser and Bhaskar. > > Yes both of them propose to discriminate two sides of knowledge. I > > believe in this discrimination is basic and a big innovation. > > As if Althusser's mentioned concepts is an epistemic fallacy? I am not > > sure. > > > > best wishes > > > > > > On Fri, 2009-01-02 at 08:14 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > Hi Ozgur, > > > > > > Mervyn's advice sounds good -- I haven't spent enough time thinking > about > > > Althusser to be able to say anything much about the points that you're > > > really interested in. I can see if I still have that old paper. But I > > > suspect that it's on a floppy disk somewhere! I gave it at a > Re-Thining > > > Marxism Conference (1996 maybe, or otherwise 1997), but I never > published > > it > > > or anything. Send me a note off-list, ok? > > > > > > Warmly, > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 11:58 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > Thank you Ruth, > > > > > > > > You are right, regards to philosopy of science Bhaskar is better. > > > > Is it possible to share your works about this issue? > > > > And could you be so kind as say your views about my last questions: > > > > What's the CR approach about to Althusser's "over-determination" > > > > and"determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > By the way I've just asked to Versobooks Turkey office to translate > > RToS > > > > into Turkish. Is there any attempt do you (list) know? > > > > > > > > Happy holidays > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > On Thu, 2008-12-25 at 11:43 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > > > Yes, similar. I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished though; > > > > probably > > > > > other people have written on it too. > > > > > > > > > > My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for how > > science > > > > > works. My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it! > > For > > > > the > > > > > nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and > social > > and > > > > > productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. Marxists > > better > > > > than > > > > > Althusser, myself. And some non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians. > > > > > > > > > > Happy holidays! > > > > > > > > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Merry Christmas! > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Hi All, > > > > > > > > > > > > Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps Althusser's > > > > > > discrimination; object of knowledge and object of real. And > > Althusser's > > > > > > Generalities > > > > > > (..This point is essential to dialectical materialism, and Marx > > > > > > discusses an illustration of it in the Introduction when he > > > > demonstrates > > > > > > that although the use of general concepts ? for example, > > 'production', > > > > > > 'labour', 'exchange', etc. ? is indispensable to a scientific > > > > > > theoretical practice, this first generality does not coincide > with > > the > > > > > > product of the scientific labour: it is not its achievement, it > is > > its > > > > > > prior condition. This first generality (which I shall call > > Generality > > > > I) > > > > > > constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical > > practice > > > > > > will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, into that > other > > > > > > 'concrete' generality (which I shall call Generality III) which > is > > a > > > > > > knowledge... from for Marx) > > > > > > concept is similar to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. What's > > your > > > > > > opinions? > > > > > > > > > > > > What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" and > > > > > > "determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > > > > > Hope to read your ideas > > > > > > > > > > > > best regards > > > > > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > Message: 3 > > Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2009 08:44:01 -0000 > > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > > > Message-ID: > > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > > > Then you need to have a look at what Bhaskar says in Dialectic about the > > base/superstructure model. The entry in Dict CR on > > infra-/intra-/super-structure attempts a summary. > > > > Ronjon Paul Datta, 'From Foucault's genealogy to aleatory materialism: > > realism, nominalism and politics' in Critical Realism and the Social > > Sciences: Heterodox Elaborations. Edited by Jon Frauley and Frank Pearce. > > Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 2007, disagrees > > with Bhaskar that Althusser loses sight of the real object. > > > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com > > Sent: 11 January 2009 06:19 > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar > > > > Thank you Ruth, Mervyn, > > > > My problematic is CR position about Althusser's 'over determination' and > > 'determination in the last instance' more than the similarities Althusser > > and Bhaskar. > > Yes both of them propose to discriminate two sides of knowledge. I > believe > > in this discrimination is basic and a big innovation. > > As if Althusser's mentioned concepts is an epistemic fallacy? I am not > > sure. > > > > > > best wishes > > > > > > On Fri, 2009-01-02 at 08:14 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > Hi Ozgur, > > > > > > Mervyn's advice sounds good -- I haven't spent enough time thinking > > > about Althusser to be able to say anything much about the points that > > > you're really interested in. I can see if I still have that old > > > paper. But I suspect that it's on a floppy disk somewhere! I gave it > > > at a Re-Thining Marxism Conference (1996 maybe, or otherwise 1997), > > > but I never published it or anything. Send me a note off-list, ok? > > > > > > Warmly, > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 11:58 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > Thank you Ruth, > > > > > > > > You are right, regards to philosopy of science Bhaskar is better. > > > > Is it possible to share your works about this issue? > > > > And could you be so kind as say your views about my last questions: > > > > What's the CR approach about to Althusser's "over-determination" > > > > and"determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > By the way I've just asked to Versobooks Turkey office to translate > > > > RToS into Turkish. Is there any attempt do you (list) know? > > > > > > > > Happy holidays > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > On Thu, 2008-12-25 at 11:43 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > > > Yes, similar. I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished though; > > > > probably > > > > > other people have written on it too. > > > > > > > > > > My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for how > > science > > > > > works. My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it! > > For > > > > the > > > > > nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and > > > > > social and productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. > > > > > Marxists better > > > > than > > > > > Althusser, myself. And some non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians. > > > > > > > > > > Happy holidays! > > > > > > > > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Merry Christmas! > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Hi All, > > > > > > > > > > > > Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps > > > > > > Althusser's discrimination; object of knowledge and object of > > > > > > real. And Althusser's Generalities (..This point is essential to > > > > > > dialectical materialism, and Marx discusses an illustration of > > > > > > it in the Introduction when he > > > > demonstrates > > > > > > that although the use of general concepts - for example, > > > > > > 'production', 'labour', 'exchange', etc. - is indispensable to a > > > > > > scientific theoretical practice, this first generality does not > > > > > > coincide with the product of the scientific labour: it is not > > > > > > its achievement, it is its prior condition. This first > > > > > > generality (which I shall call Generality > > > > I) > > > > > > constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical > > > > > > practice will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, into > > > > > > that other 'concrete' generality (which I shall call Generality > > > > > > III) which is a knowledge... from for Marx) concept is similar > > > > > > to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. What's your opinions? > > > > > > > > > > > > What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" and > > > > > > "determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > > > > > Hope to read your ideas > > > > > > > > > > > > best regards > > > > > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 > > *********************************************** > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From Hans.Despain at nichols.edu Tue Jan 13 09:06:54 2009 From: Hans.Despain at nichols.edu (Despain, Hans G) Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 11:06:54 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: Gerard This is not true within disciplines. For example within economics there is fairly considerable engagement, and of course sociology and social theory critical realism is taken seriously by advocates and critics. Also in education and pedagogy, critical realism is making some important headway. Transcendental realism and critical naturalism were both pitched as a philosophy *for* (social) science. My intuition, confirmed by Ruth, is that within philosophy there is a dominance of an analytical approach. This is not critical realism. The theories and concepts are not static enough for analytical philosophers (this is also why Plato, Hegel, and to some extent Marx, are not taken serious in mainstream philosophy. Treat them as analytical philosophers and they become "naive," "sloppy," and "ideological." Bhaskar's attempt to develop a philosophy *for* science allows him to not get bogged down in timeless debates and stationary definitions. For example TMSA makes no analytical commitment to what a structure is, or even the specifics of agency. Rather Bhaskar loosens social science by affectively saying, lets proceed forward by giving ontological status to both, in the various ways social theories might conceive them. Bhaskar leaves the specifics of what a structure or agency is to social theorists and thinkers within a discipline. Instead he points out the impoverishment of neglecting the ontological status of either structure or agency. Bhaskar's work is full of such examples. Consider Bhaskar's theory of Truth, or his theory of absence, these are very cagey theories, not meant to be understood from analytical criteria. Critical realism and dialectical critical realism loosen up social theory and change how we understand institutions and policy. As such we should expect the initial debates to be within various disciplines, and eventually philosophy itself will begin to take critical realism more serious when it is demonstrated that social theorists are producing important results. Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of gerard walmsely [gerardwalmsley at googlemail.com] Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2009 7:49 AM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 It appears unfortunate but there apeears to be very few real debates actually between critical realists and others who are not critical realists. There is a claim that critical realists have developed the theory from an engagement with other main traditions, as immanent critique. But this is largely a monologue. GW On Sun, Jan 11, 2009 at 7:00 PM, < critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > between"postpositivists"and critical realists (Joanne Costello) > 2. Re: Althusser and Bhaskar (ozgurelibol at ttmail.com) > 3. Re: Althusser and Bhaskar (Mervyn Hartwig) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 20:33:51 -0700 > From: "Joanne Costello" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > between"postpositivists"and critical realists > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Message-ID: > Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; > reply-type=original > > Thanks so much to everyone for pointing me towards a wealth of resources - > I > have a lot of reading to do! > I think some of the debates between CR and pragmatism will help me. I'm > also > very interested in Byrne's "Social Exclusion." > > I have been exploring critical realism along with another student who is in > sociology and we're both amazed at how willing people have been to help > newcomers learn. > > I greatly appreciate your help. > > Joanne > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Sent: Saturday, January 10, 2009 10:45 AM > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > between"postpositivists"and critical realists > > > > Further to this excellent advice and info, Gideon Calder has a new book > on > > Rorty from a CR perspective: Rorty's Politics of Redescription. By Gideon > > Calder. Cardiff: University of Wales > > Press, 2007. It is reviewed by Justin Cruickshank in Journal of Critical > > Realism 7(2) 2008, 314-29. > > > > In the same issue of JCR (pp. 235-275) there is also a debate between > > Peter > > Manicas (a critical realist) and Patrick Baert (a pragmatist), entitled > 'A > > social theory dialogue'. This will probably be an ongoing exchange, with > > other people coming in. > > > > My entry on critical realism in A Dictionary of CR differentiates CR from > > other forms of realism in terms of 'its robustly transcendental and > > immanently critical method, its outright rejection of empiricism and > > positivism, its thoroughgoing emergentism, its understanding of social > > science as necessarily explanatory critical (entailing rejection of the > > fact-value and theory-practice dichotomies) and its explicitly > > emancipatory > > stance.' But not all critical realists (as distinct from dialectical > > critical realists) accept the last two positions. > > > > > > Mervyn > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [ > > > > mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Despain, > > Hans G > > Sent: 09 January 2009 20:31 > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > > between"postpositivists" > > and critical realists > > > > Dear Joanne, > > > > Ruth makes good points for clarifying your purpose. > > > > Three sources you might find useful depending on the specific purpose > > > > Bhaksar provides a sustained in depth critique of postpositivism, > > specifically Richard Rorty in his "Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom." > > Rorty is a highly sophisticated pragmatic philosopher, and should surely > > fulfill the non-naive realist criteria. Bhaskar summarizes this critique > > in > > a chapter in "Reclaiming Reality." > > > > You also might find some valuable lessons in Lopez and Potter's "After > > Postmodernism: An introduction to critical realism" (2001). > > > > Suspecting you might want more field specific sources refer to Hartwig's > > "Dictionary of critical realism" there is an entry for "social work." I > > am > > not familiar with the cited literature, but you might find it useful for > > your purposes. > > > > Finally, don't be over-defensive, your interest in critical realism for > > informing social work is right on; in spite of your advisor's cryptic > > critique. It will take time to develop a full argument and defense that > > will be convincing to critics. If you stick with your interest you will > > find a revolutionary analysis, theory, and praxis for social theory/work > > and > > practice in Dialectical Critical Realism (DCR). DCR is a new theory of > > ethics, or a dialectical development of the ethical implications of > > critical > > realism. You do not necessarily have to push on to DCR, I do believe > you > > can apply CR by itself to social work as an alternative to positivism and > > social constructivist approaches in highly successful and fruitful ways. > > > > all the best, > > > > Hans > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff > > [rgroff at slu.edu] > > Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 2:28 PM > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > > between"postpositivists" and critical realists > > > > Hi Joanne, > > > > So is the question "Are there discussions between critical realists and > > other non-naive realists?" > > > > If so, I think the best way to go at it is to figure out who falls into > > the > > "other non-naive realists" category, and then sort out what the > difference > > is between the person(s) in question and some kind of ideal-type of cr. > > Non-philosophers often use these terms fairly loosely. I don't know > what > > your disciplinary attachment is, but it a little bit matters, for what > the > > differences will be between cr and other realisms. There are definitely > a > > range of people in different social sciences who are realists as the term > > is > > used in their various fields, who are friendly to cr and with whom > there's > > been discussion. But again, the nature of the points of disagreement > will > > be different by discipline. In metaphysics and philosophy of science, > for > > example, the realists who come closest to cr are "dispositional realists" > > and/or "scientific essentialists"; there hasn't been a lot cr engagement > > with that literature, though there's a little. > > > > If you can say more precisely who the relevant "non-naive realists" are > > for > > your purposes, I'm sure others can point you to useful literature. > > > > Warmly, > > Ruth > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 11:30 AM, Joanne Costello > > wrote: > > > >> Hi Ruth, > >> > >> Thank you for your response. My understanding is that some people use > >> the term "postpositivist" to describe non-naive realism. In contrast, > >> post-positivist thought would refer to various paradigms that came > >> after or in response to positivism (e.g. social constructionism). > >> > >> Best wishes, > >> > >> Joanne > >> ----- Original Message ----- > >> From: "Ruth Groff" > >> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > >> > >> Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 10:22 AM > >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > >> between"postpositivists" and critical realists > >> > >> > >> > Hi Joanne, > >> > > >> > Can you say more about who counts as postpositivist and who counts > >> > as post-positivist? > >> > > >> > Warmly, > >> > Ruth > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Joanne Costello > >> > wrote: > >> > > >> >> Hello, > >> >> > >> >> I'm a graduate student in Calgary, Canada. I wrote a term paper > >> >> last semester on critical realism and its potential for > >> >> emancipatory social work research and praxis. The professor raised > >> >> the criticism that, in her view, critical realist arguments (or at > >> >> least how I dealt with them) seem to engage with "dated" views of > >> >> postpositivism. > >> >> > >> >> I am wondering if anyone might be able to point me to any recent > >> >> literature where the critical realist position addresses > >> >> "postpositivist" (as opposed to post-positivist) positions. Are > >> >> there any self-identified postpositivists that have engaged the > >> >> critical realist paradigm? > >> >> > >> >> Cheers, > >> >> > >> >> Joanne > >> >> _______________________________________________ > >> >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> >> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> >> > >> > _______________________________________________ > >> > Critical-Realism mailing list > >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not > > cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the > > addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not > > the > > intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, > > disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be > > prohibited > > by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify > > the > > sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank > > you. > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > __________ NOD32 3747 (20090107) Information __________ > > > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2009 08:18:36 +0200 > From: "ozgurelibol at ttmail.com" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: <1231654716.5935.19.camel at ozgur-laptop> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" > > Thank you Ruth, Mervyn, > > My problematic is CR position about Althusser's 'over determination' and > 'determination in the last instance' more than the similarities > Althusser and Bhaskar. > Yes both of them propose to discriminate two sides of knowledge. I > believe in this discrimination is basic and a big innovation. > As if Althusser's mentioned concepts is an epistemic fallacy? I am not > sure. > > best wishes > > > On Fri, 2009-01-02 at 08:14 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > Hi Ozgur, > > > > Mervyn's advice sounds good -- I haven't spent enough time thinking about > > Althusser to be able to say anything much about the points that you're > > really interested in. I can see if I still have that old paper. But I > > suspect that it's on a floppy disk somewhere! I gave it at a Re-Thining > > Marxism Conference (1996 maybe, or otherwise 1997), but I never published > it > > or anything. Send me a note off-list, ok? > > > > Warmly, > > Ruth > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 11:58 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > Thank you Ruth, > > > > > > You are right, regards to philosopy of science Bhaskar is better. > > > Is it possible to share your works about this issue? > > > And could you be so kind as say your views about my last questions: > > > What's the CR approach about to Althusser's "over-determination" > > > and"determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > By the way I've just asked to Versobooks Turkey office to translate > RToS > > > into Turkish. Is there any attempt do you (list) know? > > > > > > Happy holidays > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > On Thu, 2008-12-25 at 11:43 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > > Yes, similar. I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished though; > > > probably > > > > other people have written on it too. > > > > > > > > My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for how > science > > > > works. My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it! > For > > > the > > > > nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and social > and > > > > productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. Marxists > better > > > than > > > > Althusser, myself. And some non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians. > > > > > > > > Happy holidays! > > > > > > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Merry Christmas! > > > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > Hi All, > > > > > > > > > > Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps Althusser's > > > > > discrimination; object of knowledge and object of real. And > Althusser's > > > > > Generalities > > > > > (..This point is essential to dialectical materialism, and Marx > > > > > discusses an illustration of it in the Introduction when he > > > demonstrates > > > > > that although the use of general concepts ? for example, > 'production', > > > > > 'labour', 'exchange', etc. ? is indispensable to a scientific > > > > > theoretical practice, this first generality does not coincide with > the > > > > > product of the scientific labour: it is not its achievement, it is > its > > > > > prior condition. This first generality (which I shall call > Generality > > > I) > > > > > constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical > practice > > > > > will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, into that other > > > > > 'concrete' generality (which I shall call Generality III) which is > a > > > > > knowledge... from for Marx) > > > > > concept is similar to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. What's > your > > > > > opinions? > > > > > > > > > > What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" and > > > > > "determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > > > Hope to read your ideas > > > > > > > > > > best regards > > > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 3 > Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2009 08:44:01 -0000 > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > Then you need to have a look at what Bhaskar says in Dialectic about the > base/superstructure model. The entry in Dict CR on > infra-/intra-/super-structure attempts a summary. > > Ronjon Paul Datta, 'From Foucault's genealogy to aleatory materialism: > realism, nominalism and politics' in Critical Realism and the Social > Sciences: Heterodox Elaborations. Edited by Jon Frauley and Frank Pearce. > Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 2007, disagrees > with Bhaskar that Althusser loses sight of the real object. > > Mervyn > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com > Sent: 11 January 2009 06:19 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar > > Thank you Ruth, Mervyn, > > My problematic is CR position about Althusser's 'over determination' and > 'determination in the last instance' more than the similarities Althusser > and Bhaskar. > Yes both of them propose to discriminate two sides of knowledge. I believe > in this discrimination is basic and a big innovation. > As if Althusser's mentioned concepts is an epistemic fallacy? I am not > sure. > > > best wishes > > > On Fri, 2009-01-02 at 08:14 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > Hi Ozgur, > > > > Mervyn's advice sounds good -- I haven't spent enough time thinking > > about Althusser to be able to say anything much about the points that > > you're really interested in. I can see if I still have that old > > paper. But I suspect that it's on a floppy disk somewhere! I gave it > > at a Re-Thining Marxism Conference (1996 maybe, or otherwise 1997), > > but I never published it or anything. Send me a note off-list, ok? > > > > Warmly, > > Ruth > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 11:58 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > Thank you Ruth, > > > > > > You are right, regards to philosopy of science Bhaskar is better. > > > Is it possible to share your works about this issue? > > > And could you be so kind as say your views about my last questions: > > > What's the CR approach about to Althusser's "over-determination" > > > and"determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > By the way I've just asked to Versobooks Turkey office to translate > > > RToS into Turkish. Is there any attempt do you (list) know? > > > > > > Happy holidays > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > On Thu, 2008-12-25 at 11:43 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > > Yes, similar. I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished though; > > > probably > > > > other people have written on it too. > > > > > > > > My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for how > science > > > > works. My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it! > For > > > the > > > > nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and > > > > social and productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. > > > > Marxists better > > > than > > > > Althusser, myself. And some non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians. > > > > > > > > Happy holidays! > > > > > > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Merry Christmas! > > > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > Hi All, > > > > > > > > > > Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps > > > > > Althusser's discrimination; object of knowledge and object of > > > > > real. And Althusser's Generalities (..This point is essential to > > > > > dialectical materialism, and Marx discusses an illustration of > > > > > it in the Introduction when he > > > demonstrates > > > > > that although the use of general concepts - for example, > > > > > 'production', 'labour', 'exchange', etc. - is indispensable to a > > > > > scientific theoretical practice, this first generality does not > > > > > coincide with the product of the scientific labour: it is not > > > > > its achievement, it is its prior condition. This first > > > > > generality (which I shall call Generality > > > I) > > > > > constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical > > > > > practice will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, into > > > > > that other 'concrete' generality (which I shall call Generality > > > > > III) which is a knowledge... from for Marx) concept is similar > > > > > to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. What's your opinions? > > > > > > > > > > What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" and > > > > > "determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > > > Hope to read your ideas > > > > > > > > > > best regards > > > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 > *********************************************** > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Thu Jan 15 02:43:05 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2009 09:43:05 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] [Critical realism and debate In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Dear Gerald I think this claim is wildly exaggerated. In the latest JCR, e.g., as I mentioned here only the other day, there's a debate between a pragmatist and a critical realist and we've also recently carried an exchange between a mainstream realist and a critical realist on transcendental arguments/ the philosophy of science. CR is increasingly being taken up/ discussed/ differed from etc in a wide array of disciplines and area studies across the humanities and social sciences on an international scale. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of gerard walmsely Sent: 13 January 2009 12:50 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 It appears unfortunate but there apeears to be very few real debates actually between critical realists and others who are not critical realists. There is a claim that critical realists have developed the theory from an engagement with other main traditions, as immanent critique. But this is largely a monologue. GW From rgroff at slu.edu Thu Jan 15 08:03:14 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2009 09:03:14 -0600 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <6ad241360901150703y35740de0v4a584783a1287adf@mail.gmail.com> Hi Hans, all, I have criticisms about analytic philosophy, but I don't actually agree with the idea that it sounds like you're coming close to, Hans, that a dialectical theory somehow needn't be, or can't be, rigorous philosophically. If one wants to talk about things that are dynamic, that's do-able in a rigorous way. Even in a clear and precise way -- I mean, jeeze, calculus is talk about change! Admittedly, trying to talk about things that can't be talked about -- as Plato does -- is harder. Then you really do have to switch genres I think. But right now, for example, in my view, the very best work on powers/dispositional properties is being done by Anglo-analytic philosophers. Their training brings with it various important limitations, but those limitations have to do mainly with breadth, I think, with taking in the full significance of what they are saying, not really with adequacy to the object per se. So, I don't know ... just a vote of caution or dissent or something. Warmly, r. On Tue, Jan 13, 2009 at 10:06 AM, Despain, Hans G wrote: > Gerard > > This is not true within disciplines. For example within economics there is > fairly considerable engagement, and of course sociology and social theory > critical realism is taken seriously by advocates and critics. Also in > education and pedagogy, critical realism is making some important headway. > > Transcendental realism and critical naturalism were both pitched as a > philosophy *for* (social) science. > > My intuition, confirmed by Ruth, is that within philosophy there is a > dominance of an analytical approach. This is not critical realism. The > theories and concepts are not static enough for analytical philosophers > (this is also why Plato, Hegel, and to some extent Marx, are not taken > serious in mainstream philosophy. Treat them as analytical philosophers and > they become "naive," "sloppy," and "ideological." > > Bhaskar's attempt to develop a philosophy *for* science allows him to not > get bogged down in timeless debates and stationary definitions. For example > TMSA makes no analytical commitment to what a structure is, or even the > specifics of agency. Rather Bhaskar loosens social science by affectively > saying, lets proceed forward by giving ontological status to both, in the > various ways social theories might conceive them. Bhaskar leaves the > specifics of what a structure or agency is to social theorists and thinkers > within a discipline. Instead he points out the impoverishment of neglecting > the ontological status of either structure or agency. Bhaskar's work is > full of such examples. > > Consider Bhaskar's theory of Truth, or his theory of absence, these are > very cagey theories, not meant to be understood from analytical criteria. > Critical realism and dialectical critical realism loosen up social theory > and change how we understand institutions and policy. As such we should > expect the initial debates to be within various disciplines, and eventually > philosophy itself will begin to take critical realism more serious when it > is demonstrated that social theorists are producing important results. > > > Hans > > > ________________________________________ > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [ > critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of gerard walmsely > [gerardwalmsley at googlemail.com] > Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2009 7:49 AM > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 > > It appears unfortunate but there apeears to be very few real debates > actually between critical realists and others who are not critical > realists. There is a claim that critical realists have developed the > theory > from an engagement with other main traditions, as immanent critique. But > this is largely a monologue. > > GW > > > > > On Sun, Jan 11, 2009 at 7:00 PM, < > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > > > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > You can reach the person managing the list at > > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > > > > Today's Topics: > > > > 1. Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > > between"postpositivists"and critical realists (Joanne Costello) > > 2. Re: Althusser and Bhaskar (ozgurelibol at ttmail.com) > > 3. Re: Althusser and Bhaskar (Mervyn Hartwig) > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Message: 1 > > Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 20:33:51 -0700 > > From: "Joanne Costello" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > > between"postpositivists"and critical realists > > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; > > reply-type=original > > > > Thanks so much to everyone for pointing me towards a wealth of resources > - > > I > > have a lot of reading to do! > > I think some of the debates between CR and pragmatism will help me. I'm > > also > > very interested in Byrne's "Social Exclusion." > > > > I have been exploring critical realism along with another student who is > in > > sociology and we're both amazed at how willing people have been to help > > newcomers learn. > > > > I greatly appreciate your help. > > > > Joanne > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > > > Sent: Saturday, January 10, 2009 10:45 AM > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > > between"postpositivists"and critical realists > > > > > > > Further to this excellent advice and info, Gideon Calder has a new book > > on > > > Rorty from a CR perspective: Rorty's Politics of Redescription. By > Gideon > > > Calder. Cardiff: University of Wales > > > Press, 2007. It is reviewed by Justin Cruickshank in Journal of > Critical > > > Realism 7(2) 2008, 314-29. > > > > > > In the same issue of JCR (pp. 235-275) there is also a debate between > > > Peter > > > Manicas (a critical realist) and Patrick Baert (a pragmatist), entitled > > 'A > > > social theory dialogue'. This will probably be an ongoing exchange, > with > > > other people coming in. > > > > > > My entry on critical realism in A Dictionary of CR differentiates CR > from > > > other forms of realism in terms of 'its robustly transcendental and > > > immanently critical method, its outright rejection of empiricism and > > > positivism, its thoroughgoing emergentism, its understanding of social > > > science as necessarily explanatory critical (entailing rejection of the > > > fact-value and theory-practice dichotomies) and its explicitly > > > emancipatory > > > stance.' But not all critical realists (as distinct from dialectical > > > critical realists) accept the last two positions. > > > > > > > > > Mervyn > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [ > > > > > > mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Despain, > > > Hans G > > > Sent: 09 January 2009 20:31 > > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > > > between"postpositivists" > > > and critical realists > > > > > > Dear Joanne, > > > > > > Ruth makes good points for clarifying your purpose. > > > > > > Three sources you might find useful depending on the specific purpose > > > > > > Bhaksar provides a sustained in depth critique of postpositivism, > > > specifically Richard Rorty in his "Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom." > > > Rorty is a highly sophisticated pragmatic philosopher, and should > surely > > > fulfill the non-naive realist criteria. Bhaskar summarizes this > critique > > > in > > > a chapter in "Reclaiming Reality." > > > > > > You also might find some valuable lessons in Lopez and Potter's "After > > > Postmodernism: An introduction to critical realism" (2001). > > > > > > Suspecting you might want more field specific sources refer to > Hartwig's > > > "Dictionary of critical realism" there is an entry for "social work." > I > > > am > > > not familiar with the cited literature, but you might find it useful > for > > > your purposes. > > > > > > Finally, don't be over-defensive, your interest in critical realism for > > > informing social work is right on; in spite of your advisor's cryptic > > > critique. It will take time to develop a full argument and defense > that > > > will be convincing to critics. If you stick with your interest you > will > > > find a revolutionary analysis, theory, and praxis for social > theory/work > > > and > > > practice in Dialectical Critical Realism (DCR). DCR is a new theory of > > > ethics, or a dialectical development of the ethical implications of > > > critical > > > realism. You do not necessarily have to push on to DCR, I do believe > > you > > > can apply CR by itself to social work as an alternative to positivism > and > > > social constructivist approaches in highly successful and fruitful > ways. > > > > > > all the best, > > > > > > Hans > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff > > > [rgroff at slu.edu] > > > Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 2:28 PM > > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > > > between"postpositivists" and critical realists > > > > > > Hi Joanne, > > > > > > So is the question "Are there discussions between critical realists and > > > other non-naive realists?" > > > > > > If so, I think the best way to go at it is to figure out who falls into > > > the > > > "other non-naive realists" category, and then sort out what the > > difference > > > is between the person(s) in question and some kind of ideal-type of cr. > > > Non-philosophers often use these terms fairly loosely. I don't know > > what > > > your disciplinary attachment is, but it a little bit matters, for what > > the > > > differences will be between cr and other realisms. There are > definitely > > a > > > range of people in different social sciences who are realists as the > term > > > is > > > used in their various fields, who are friendly to cr and with whom > > there's > > > been discussion. But again, the nature of the points of disagreement > > will > > > be different by discipline. In metaphysics and philosophy of science, > > for > > > example, the realists who come closest to cr are "dispositional > realists" > > > and/or "scientific essentialists"; there hasn't been a lot cr > engagement > > > with that literature, though there's a little. > > > > > > If you can say more precisely who the relevant "non-naive realists" are > > > for > > > your purposes, I'm sure others can point you to useful literature. > > > > > > Warmly, > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 11:30 AM, Joanne Costello > > > wrote: > > > > > >> Hi Ruth, > > >> > > >> Thank you for your response. My understanding is that some people use > > >> the term "postpositivist" to describe non-naive realism. In contrast, > > >> post-positivist thought would refer to various paradigms that came > > >> after or in response to positivism (e.g. social constructionism). > > >> > > >> Best wishes, > > >> > > >> Joanne > > >> ----- Original Message ----- > > >> From: "Ruth Groff" > > >> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > >> > > >> Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 10:22 AM > > >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > > >> between"postpositivists" and critical realists > > >> > > >> > > >> > Hi Joanne, > > >> > > > >> > Can you say more about who counts as postpositivist and who counts > > >> > as post-positivist? > > >> > > > >> > Warmly, > > >> > Ruth > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Joanne Costello > > >> > wrote: > > >> > > > >> >> Hello, > > >> >> > > >> >> I'm a graduate student in Calgary, Canada. I wrote a term paper > > >> >> last semester on critical realism and its potential for > > >> >> emancipatory social work research and praxis. The professor raised > > >> >> the criticism that, in her view, critical realist arguments (or at > > >> >> least how I dealt with them) seem to engage with "dated" views of > > >> >> postpositivism. > > >> >> > > >> >> I am wondering if anyone might be able to point me to any recent > > >> >> literature where the critical realist position addresses > > >> >> "postpositivist" (as opposed to post-positivist) positions. Are > > >> >> there any self-identified postpositivists that have engaged the > > >> >> critical realist paradigm? > > >> >> > > >> >> Cheers, > > >> >> > > >> >> Joanne > > >> >> _______________________________________________ > > >> >> Critical-Realism mailing list > > >> >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > >> >> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > >> >> > > >> > _______________________________________________ > > >> > Critical-Realism mailing list > > >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > >> > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> _______________________________________________ > > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > >> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > >> > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do > not > > > cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the > > > addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are > not > > > the > > > intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, > > > disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be > > > prohibited > > > by law. If you have received this communication in error, please > notify > > > the > > > sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. > Thank > > > you. > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > __________ NOD32 3747 (20090107) Information __________ > > > > > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > > > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > Message: 2 > > Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2009 08:18:36 +0200 > > From: "ozgurelibol at ttmail.com" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > > Message-ID: <1231654716.5935.19.camel at ozgur-laptop> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" > > > > Thank you Ruth, Mervyn, > > > > My problematic is CR position about Althusser's 'over determination' and > > 'determination in the last instance' more than the similarities > > Althusser and Bhaskar. > > Yes both of them propose to discriminate two sides of knowledge. I > > believe in this discrimination is basic and a big innovation. > > As if Althusser's mentioned concepts is an epistemic fallacy? I am not > > sure. > > > > best wishes > > > > > > On Fri, 2009-01-02 at 08:14 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > Hi Ozgur, > > > > > > Mervyn's advice sounds good -- I haven't spent enough time thinking > about > > > Althusser to be able to say anything much about the points that you're > > > really interested in. I can see if I still have that old paper. But I > > > suspect that it's on a floppy disk somewhere! I gave it at a > Re-Thining > > > Marxism Conference (1996 maybe, or otherwise 1997), but I never > published > > it > > > or anything. Send me a note off-list, ok? > > > > > > Warmly, > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 11:58 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > Thank you Ruth, > > > > > > > > You are right, regards to philosopy of science Bhaskar is better. > > > > Is it possible to share your works about this issue? > > > > And could you be so kind as say your views about my last questions: > > > > What's the CR approach about to Althusser's "over-determination" > > > > and"determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > By the way I've just asked to Versobooks Turkey office to translate > > RToS > > > > into Turkish. Is there any attempt do you (list) know? > > > > > > > > Happy holidays > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > On Thu, 2008-12-25 at 11:43 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > > > Yes, similar. I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished though; > > > > probably > > > > > other people have written on it too. > > > > > > > > > > My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for how > > science > > > > > works. My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it! > > For > > > > the > > > > > nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and > social > > and > > > > > productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. Marxists > > better > > > > than > > > > > Althusser, myself. And some non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians. > > > > > > > > > > Happy holidays! > > > > > > > > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Merry Christmas! > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Hi All, > > > > > > > > > > > > Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps Althusser's > > > > > > discrimination; object of knowledge and object of real. And > > Althusser's > > > > > > Generalities > > > > > > (..This point is essential to dialectical materialism, and Marx > > > > > > discusses an illustration of it in the Introduction when he > > > > demonstrates > > > > > > that although the use of general concepts ? for example, > > 'production', > > > > > > 'labour', 'exchange', etc. ? is indispensable to a scientific > > > > > > theoretical practice, this first generality does not coincide > with > > the > > > > > > product of the scientific labour: it is not its achievement, it > is > > its > > > > > > prior condition. This first generality (which I shall call > > Generality > > > > I) > > > > > > constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical > > practice > > > > > > will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, into that > other > > > > > > 'concrete' generality (which I shall call Generality III) which > is > > a > > > > > > knowledge... from for Marx) > > > > > > concept is similar to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. What's > > your > > > > > > opinions? > > > > > > > > > > > > What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" and > > > > > > "determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > > > > > Hope to read your ideas > > > > > > > > > > > > best regards > > > > > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > Message: 3 > > Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2009 08:44:01 -0000 > > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > > > Message-ID: > > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > > > Then you need to have a look at what Bhaskar says in Dialectic about the > > base/superstructure model. The entry in Dict CR on > > infra-/intra-/super-structure attempts a summary. > > > > Ronjon Paul Datta, 'From Foucault's genealogy to aleatory materialism: > > realism, nominalism and politics' in Critical Realism and the Social > > Sciences: Heterodox Elaborations. Edited by Jon Frauley and Frank Pearce. > > Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 2007, disagrees > > with Bhaskar that Althusser loses sight of the real object. > > > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com > > Sent: 11 January 2009 06:19 > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar > > > > Thank you Ruth, Mervyn, > > > > My problematic is CR position about Althusser's 'over determination' and > > 'determination in the last instance' more than the similarities Althusser > > and Bhaskar. > > Yes both of them propose to discriminate two sides of knowledge. I > believe > > in this discrimination is basic and a big innovation. > > As if Althusser's mentioned concepts is an epistemic fallacy? I am not > > sure. > > > > > > best wishes > > > > > > On Fri, 2009-01-02 at 08:14 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > Hi Ozgur, > > > > > > Mervyn's advice sounds good -- I haven't spent enough time thinking > > > about Althusser to be able to say anything much about the points that > > > you're really interested in. I can see if I still have that old > > > paper. But I suspect that it's on a floppy disk somewhere! I gave it > > > at a Re-Thining Marxism Conference (1996 maybe, or otherwise 1997), > > > but I never published it or anything. Send me a note off-list, ok? > > > > > > Warmly, > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 11:58 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > Thank you Ruth, > > > > > > > > You are right, regards to philosopy of science Bhaskar is better. > > > > Is it possible to share your works about this issue? > > > > And could you be so kind as say your views about my last questions: > > > > What's the CR approach about to Althusser's "over-determination" > > > > and"determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > By the way I've just asked to Versobooks Turkey office to translate > > > > RToS into Turkish. Is there any attempt do you (list) know? > > > > > > > > Happy holidays > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > On Thu, 2008-12-25 at 11:43 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > > > Yes, similar. I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished though; > > > > probably > > > > > other people have written on it too. > > > > > > > > > > My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for how > > science > > > > > works. My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it! > > For > > > > the > > > > > nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and > > > > > social and productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. > > > > > Marxists better > > > > than > > > > > Althusser, myself. And some non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians. > > > > > > > > > > Happy holidays! > > > > > > > > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Merry Christmas! > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Hi All, > > > > > > > > > > > > Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps > > > > > > Althusser's discrimination; object of knowledge and object of > > > > > > real. And Althusser's Generalities (..This point is essential to > > > > > > dialectical materialism, and Marx discusses an illustration of > > > > > > it in the Introduction when he > > > > demonstrates > > > > > > that although the use of general concepts - for example, > > > > > > 'production', 'labour', 'exchange', etc. - is indispensable to a > > > > > > scientific theoretical practice, this first generality does not > > > > > > coincide with the product of the scientific labour: it is not > > > > > > its achievement, it is its prior condition. This first > > > > > > generality (which I shall call Generality > > > > I) > > > > > > constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical > > > > > > practice will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, into > > > > > > that other 'concrete' generality (which I shall call Generality > > > > > > III) which is a knowledge... from for Marx) concept is similar > > > > > > to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. What's your opinions? > > > > > > > > > > > > What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" and > > > > > > "determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > > > > > Hope to read your ideas > > > > > > > > > > > > best regards > > > > > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 > > *********************************************** > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not > cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the > addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the > intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, > disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited > by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the > sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank > you. > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Thu Jan 15 09:41:40 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2009 16:41:40 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] JCR Call for Papers, special issue on Engaging Postcolonialism Message-ID: Call for Papers: Special Issue of Journal of Critical Realism Engaging Postcolonialism Critical Realism, Marxism and Other Realisms Journal of Critical Realism 9(3) 2010 Guest editor: Radha D'Souza General editor: Mervyn Hartwig Submission deadline: 30 November 2009 http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR CALL FOR PAPERS Beginning as an off-shoot of poststructuralism, profoundly influenced by the so-called 'cultural turn' in social theory, postcolonialism has been characterized as the 'Third World' equivalent of postmodernism by scholars such as Arif Dirlik and remains influential in cultural and literary theory as well as sociological and political economy critique. This special issue of Journal of Critical Realism is devoted to promoting a theoretical engagement of postcolonialism from critical realist and Marxist as well as realist perspectives from non-European philosophical traditions, and vice versa: critiques of realism(s) from a postcolonial perspective would be very welcome. Postcolonialism raises a number of challenges for critical realism and for Marxism, which arguably has a special affinity with critical realism, as well as for non-European realist traditions. How do the ontological claims of critical realism help to understand societies with colonial histories? How is postcolonialism best characterised from realist and Marxist perspectives: as an irrealist project? as the inevitable logic of culturalism and utopianism? as an ideology of 'Third World' diasporas, of a class formed by colonialism? How should we evaluate postcolonialism's claims to transcend Eurocentrism? Is 'postcolonial reason' another type of reason? How do critical realists and Marxists respond to Spivak's claim that decoding 'Three Wise Men of Continental Europe (Kant-Hegel-Marx)' points to the 'foreclosure of the native informant'? On what grounds can critical realist and Marxist claims to being non-Eurocentric be accepted in so far as both theories are located unambiguously in Greco-Roman intellectual traditions? Can critical realism and Marxism provide a way out of modernity for oppressed nations without being trapped into dualist categories that dog modernist discourse on the one hand, and the unconstrained deconstructionism of postmodernism on the other, which impede the development of a political programme of emancipation? We invite submissions from all disciplines at any level of abstraction. More specifically, contributors may wish to (a) present an analysis of specific problems in postcolonial theory from realist perspectives; (b) critique specific works, or sets of works, influential in postcolonial thought; (c) present sociological, anthropological and historical critique of postcolonial theory; or (d) develop any other type of analysis that engages postcolonialism from realist perspectives. Alternatively, postcolonial scholars may wish to engage with realism in any of these ways. SUBMISSIONS Submissions should be made on-line at http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR (After registering and logging in, please click on For Authors, then Online Submissions and follow the instructions. Include a Comment for the Editor that the submission is for the special issue on causal powers.) INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS Papers should be no more than 7,000 words. In all other respects, our Author Guidelines apply. Please consult these at http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR (after clicking on For Authors, click on Author Guidelines). Papers will be subject to both internal and external peer review. IMPORTANT DATES 30 November 2009: submission deadline 1 July 2010: final revision deadline November 2010: publication ABOUT JCR Journal of Critical Realism (JCR) is the journal of the International Association for Critical Realism (IACR), established in 1997 to foster the discussion, propagation and development of critical realist approaches to understanding and changing the world. It provides a forum for scholars wishing to promote realist emancipatory philosophy, social theory and science on an interdisciplinary and international basis, and for those who wish to engage with such an approach. CONTACT Special issue guest editor: Radha D'Souza R.Dsouza1 at westminster.ac.uk General editor: Mervyn Hartwig mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Thu Jan 15 10:01:58 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2009 17:01:58 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] FW: JCR Call for Papers, special issue on Engaging Postcolonialism Message-ID: PS. Oops, sorry, "Include a Comment for the Editor that the submission is for the special issue on causal powers" should of course read "... special issue on postcolonialism" -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: 15 January 2009 16:42 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: [Critical-Realism] JCR Call for Papers,special issue on Engaging Postcolonialism Call for Papers: Special Issue of Journal of Critical Realism Engaging Postcolonialism Critical Realism, Marxism and Other Realisms Journal of Critical Realism 9(3) 2010 Guest editor: Radha D'Souza General editor: Mervyn Hartwig Submission deadline: 30 November 2009 http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR CALL FOR PAPERS Beginning as an off-shoot of poststructuralism, profoundly influenced by the so-called 'cultural turn' in social theory, postcolonialism has been characterized as the 'Third World' equivalent of postmodernism by scholars such as Arif Dirlik and remains influential in cultural and literary theory as well as sociological and political economy critique. This special issue of Journal of Critical Realism is devoted to promoting a theoretical engagement of postcolonialism from critical realist and Marxist as well as realist perspectives from non-European philosophical traditions, and vice versa: critiques of realism(s) from a postcolonial perspective would be very welcome. Postcolonialism raises a number of challenges for critical realism and for Marxism, which arguably has a special affinity with critical realism, as well as for non-European realist traditions. How do the ontological claims of critical realism help to understand societies with colonial histories? How is postcolonialism best characterised from realist and Marxist perspectives: as an irrealist project? as the inevitable logic of culturalism and utopianism? as an ideology of 'Third World' diasporas, of a class formed by colonialism? How should we evaluate postcolonialism's claims to transcend Eurocentrism? Is 'postcolonial reason' another type of reason? How do critical realists and Marxists respond to Spivak's claim that decoding 'Three Wise Men of Continental Europe (Kant-Hegel-Marx)' points to the 'foreclosure of the native informant'? On what grounds can critical realist and Marxist claims to being non-Eurocentric be accepted in so far as both theories are located unambiguously in Greco-Roman intellectual traditions? Can critical realism and Marxism provide a way out of modernity for oppressed nations without being trapped into dualist categories that dog modernist discourse on the one hand, and the unconstrained deconstructionism of postmodernism on the other, which impede the development of a political programme of emancipation? We invite submissions from all disciplines at any level of abstraction. More specifically, contributors may wish to (a) present an analysis of specific problems in postcolonial theory from realist perspectives; (b) critique specific works, or sets of works, influential in postcolonial thought; (c) present sociological, anthropological and historical critique of postcolonial theory; or (d) develop any other type of analysis that engages postcolonialism from realist perspectives. Alternatively, postcolonial scholars may wish to engage with realism in any of these ways. SUBMISSIONS Submissions should be made on-line at http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR (After registering and logging in, please click on For Authors, then Online Submissions and follow the instructions. Include a Comment for the Editor that the submission is for the special issue on powers.) INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS Papers should be no more than 7,000 words. In all other respects, our Author Guidelines apply. Please consult these at http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR (after clicking on For Authors, click on Author Guidelines). Papers will be subject to both internal and external peer review. IMPORTANT DATES 30 November 2009: submission deadline 1 July 2010: final revision deadline November 2010: publication ABOUT JCR Journal of Critical Realism (JCR) is the journal of the International Association for Critical Realism (IACR), established in 1997 to foster the discussion, propagation and development of critical realist approaches to understanding and changing the world. It provides a forum for scholars wishing to promote realist emancipatory philosophy, social theory and science on an interdisciplinary and international basis, and for those who wish to engage with such an approach. CONTACT Special issue guest editor: Radha D'Souza R.Dsouza1 at westminster.ac.uk General editor: Mervyn Hartwig mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3756 (20090110) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Thu Jan 15 10:12:06 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2009 17:12:06 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 In-Reply-To: <6ad241360901150703y35740de0v4a584783a1287adf@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: Hi Ruth, Hans For what it's worth, the way I read Hans you both agree. I took the allusion to be to Bhaskar's understanding of dialectic as 'the great loosener' of fixed categories so that they can handle change. This carries no implication of lack of rigour - on the contrary, because fixed categories won't be able to do justice to process half as well. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff Sent: 15 January 2009 15:03 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 Hi Hans, all, I have criticisms about analytic philosophy, but I don't actually agree with the idea that it sounds like you're coming close to, Hans, that a dialectical theory somehow needn't be, or can't be, rigorous philosophically. If one wants to talk about things that are dynamic, that's do-able in a rigorous way. Even in a clear and precise way -- I mean, jeeze, calculus is talk about change! Admittedly, trying to talk about things that can't be talked about -- as Plato does -- is harder. Then you really do have to switch genres I think. But right now, for example, in my view, the very best work on powers/dispositional properties is being done by Anglo-analytic philosophers. Their training brings with it various important limitations, but those limitations have to do mainly with breadth, I think, with taking in the full significance of what they are saying, not really with adequacy to the object per se. So, I don't know ... just a vote of caution or dissent or something. Warmly, r. On Tue, Jan 13, 2009 at 10:06 AM, Despain, Hans G wrote: > Gerard > > This is not true within disciplines. For example within economics > there is fairly considerable engagement, and of course sociology and > social theory critical realism is taken seriously by advocates and > critics. Also in education and pedagogy, critical realism is making some important headway. > > Transcendental realism and critical naturalism were both pitched as a > philosophy *for* (social) science. > > My intuition, confirmed by Ruth, is that within philosophy there is a > dominance of an analytical approach. This is not critical realism. > The theories and concepts are not static enough for analytical > philosophers (this is also why Plato, Hegel, and to some extent Marx, > are not taken serious in mainstream philosophy. Treat them as > analytical philosophers and they become "naive," "sloppy," and "ideological." > > Bhaskar's attempt to develop a philosophy *for* science allows him to > not get bogged down in timeless debates and stationary definitions. > For example TMSA makes no analytical commitment to what a structure > is, or even the specifics of agency. Rather Bhaskar loosens social > science by affectively saying, lets proceed forward by giving > ontological status to both, in the various ways social theories might > conceive them. Bhaskar leaves the specifics of what a structure or > agency is to social theorists and thinkers within a discipline. > Instead he points out the impoverishment of neglecting the ontological > status of either structure or agency. Bhaskar's work is full of such examples. > > Consider Bhaskar's theory of Truth, or his theory of absence, these > are very cagey theories, not meant to be understood from analytical criteria. > Critical realism and dialectical critical realism loosen up social > theory and change how we understand institutions and policy. As such > we should expect the initial debates to be within various disciplines, > and eventually philosophy itself will begin to take critical realism > more serious when it is demonstrated that social theorists are producing important results. > > > Hans > > > ________________________________________ > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [ > critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of gerard > walmsely [gerardwalmsley at googlemail.com] > Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2009 7:49 AM > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue > 5 > > It appears unfortunate but there apeears to be very few real debates > actually between critical realists and others who are not critical > realists. There is a claim that critical realists have developed the > theory from an engagement with other main traditions, as immanent > critique. But this is largely a monologue. > > GW > > > > > On Sun, Jan 11, 2009 at 7:00 PM, < > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > > > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > You can reach the person managing the list at > > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > > > > Today's Topics: > > > > 1. Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > > between"postpositivists"and critical realists (Joanne Costello) > > 2. Re: Althusser and Bhaskar (ozgurelibol at ttmail.com) > > 3. Re: Althusser and Bhaskar (Mervyn Hartwig) > > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > > > > Message: 1 > > Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 20:33:51 -0700 > > From: "Joanne Costello" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > > between"postpositivists"and critical realists > > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; > > reply-type=original > > > > Thanks so much to everyone for pointing me towards a wealth of > > resources > - > > I > > have a lot of reading to do! > > I think some of the debates between CR and pragmatism will help me. > > I'm also very interested in Byrne's "Social Exclusion." > > > > I have been exploring critical realism along with another student > > who is > in > > sociology and we're both amazed at how willing people have been to > > help newcomers learn. > > > > I greatly appreciate your help. > > > > Joanne > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > > > Sent: Saturday, January 10, 2009 10:45 AM > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > > between"postpositivists"and critical realists > > > > > > > Further to this excellent advice and info, Gideon Calder has a new > > > book > > on > > > Rorty from a CR perspective: Rorty's Politics of Redescription. By > Gideon > > > Calder. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2007. It is reviewed > > > by Justin Cruickshank in Journal of > Critical > > > Realism 7(2) 2008, 314-29. > > > > > > In the same issue of JCR (pp. 235-275) there is also a debate > > > between Peter Manicas (a critical realist) and Patrick Baert (a > > > pragmatist), entitled > > 'A > > > social theory dialogue'. This will probably be an ongoing > > > exchange, > with > > > other people coming in. > > > > > > My entry on critical realism in A Dictionary of CR differentiates > > > CR > from > > > other forms of realism in terms of 'its robustly transcendental > > > and immanently critical method, its outright rejection of > > > empiricism and positivism, its thoroughgoing emergentism, its > > > understanding of social science as necessarily explanatory > > > critical (entailing rejection of the fact-value and > > > theory-practice dichotomies) and its explicitly emancipatory > > > stance.' But not all critical realists (as distinct from > > > dialectical critical realists) accept the last two positions. > > > > > > > > > Mervyn > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [ > > > > > > mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Despain, > > > Hans G > > > Sent: 09 January 2009 20:31 > > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > > > between"postpositivists" > > > and critical realists > > > > > > Dear Joanne, > > > > > > Ruth makes good points for clarifying your purpose. > > > > > > Three sources you might find useful depending on the specific > > > purpose > > > > > > Bhaksar provides a sustained in depth critique of postpositivism, > > > specifically Richard Rorty in his "Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom." > > > Rorty is a highly sophisticated pragmatic philosopher, and should > surely > > > fulfill the non-naive realist criteria. Bhaskar summarizes this > critique > > > in > > > a chapter in "Reclaiming Reality." > > > > > > You also might find some valuable lessons in Lopez and Potter's > > > "After > > > Postmodernism: An introduction to critical realism" (2001). > > > > > > Suspecting you might want more field specific sources refer to > Hartwig's > > > "Dictionary of critical realism" there is an entry for "social work." > I > > > am > > > not familiar with the cited literature, but you might find it > > > useful > for > > > your purposes. > > > > > > Finally, don't be over-defensive, your interest in critical > > > realism for informing social work is right on; in spite of your > > > advisor's cryptic critique. It will take time to develop a full > > > argument and defense > that > > > will be convincing to critics. If you stick with your interest > > > you > will > > > find a revolutionary analysis, theory, and praxis for social > theory/work > > > and > > > practice in Dialectical Critical Realism (DCR). DCR is a new > > > theory of ethics, or a dialectical development of the ethical > > > implications of critical realism. You do not necessarily have to > > > push on to DCR, I do believe > > you > > > can apply CR by itself to social work as an alternative to > > > positivism > and > > > social constructivist approaches in highly successful and fruitful > ways. > > > > > > all the best, > > > > > > Hans > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth > > > Groff [rgroff at slu.edu] > > > Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 2:28 PM > > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > > > between"postpositivists" and critical realists > > > > > > Hi Joanne, > > > > > > So is the question "Are there discussions between critical > > > realists and other non-naive realists?" > > > > > > If so, I think the best way to go at it is to figure out who falls > > > into the "other non-naive realists" category, and then sort out > > > what the > > difference > > > is between the person(s) in question and some kind of ideal-type of cr. > > > Non-philosophers often use these terms fairly loosely. I don't know > > what > > > your disciplinary attachment is, but it a little bit matters, for > > > what > > the > > > differences will be between cr and other realisms. There are > definitely > > a > > > range of people in different social sciences who are realists as > > > the > term > > > is > > > used in their various fields, who are friendly to cr and with whom > > there's > > > been discussion. But again, the nature of the points of > > > disagreement > > will > > > be different by discipline. In metaphysics and philosophy of > > > science, > > for > > > example, the realists who come closest to cr are "dispositional > realists" > > > and/or "scientific essentialists"; there hasn't been a lot cr > engagement > > > with that literature, though there's a little. > > > > > > If you can say more precisely who the relevant "non-naive > > > realists" are for your purposes, I'm sure others can point you to > > > useful literature. > > > > > > Warmly, > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 11:30 AM, Joanne Costello > > > wrote: > > > > > >> Hi Ruth, > > >> > > >> Thank you for your response. My understanding is that some people > > >> use the term "postpositivist" to describe non-naive realism. In > > >> contrast, post-positivist thought would refer to various > > >> paradigms that came after or in response to positivism (e.g. social constructionism). > > >> > > >> Best wishes, > > >> > > >> Joanne > > >> ----- Original Message ----- > > >> From: "Ruth Groff" > > >> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > >> > > >> Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 10:22 AM > > >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > > >> between"postpositivists" and critical realists > > >> > > >> > > >> > Hi Joanne, > > >> > > > >> > Can you say more about who counts as postpositivist and who > > >> > counts as post-positivist? > > >> > > > >> > Warmly, > > >> > Ruth > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Joanne Costello > > >> > wrote: > > >> > > > >> >> Hello, > > >> >> > > >> >> I'm a graduate student in Calgary, Canada. I wrote a term > > >> >> paper last semester on critical realism and its potential for > > >> >> emancipatory social work research and praxis. The professor > > >> >> raised the criticism that, in her view, critical realist > > >> >> arguments (or at least how I dealt with them) seem to engage > > >> >> with "dated" views of postpositivism. > > >> >> > > >> >> I am wondering if anyone might be able to point me to any > > >> >> recent literature where the critical realist position > > >> >> addresses "postpositivist" (as opposed to post-positivist) > > >> >> positions. Are there any self-identified postpositivists that > > >> >> have engaged the critical realist paradigm? > > >> >> > > >> >> Cheers, > > >> >> > > >> >> Joanne > > >> >> _______________________________________________ > > >> >> Critical-Realism mailing list > > >> >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > >> >> > > >> >> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > >> >> > > >> > _______________________________________________ > > >> > Critical-Realism mailing list > > >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > >> > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> _______________________________________________ > > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > >> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > >> > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please > > > do > not > > > cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of > > > the > > > addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you > > > are > not > > > the > > > intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, > > > reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this > > > communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this > > > communication in error, please > notify > > > the > > > sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. > Thank > > > you. > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > __________ NOD32 3747 (20090107) Information __________ > > > > > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > > > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > Message: 2 > > Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2009 08:18:36 +0200 > > From: "ozgurelibol at ttmail.com" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > > Message-ID: <1231654716.5935.19.camel at ozgur-laptop> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" > > > > Thank you Ruth, Mervyn, > > > > My problematic is CR position about Althusser's 'over determination' > > and 'determination in the last instance' more than the similarities > > Althusser and Bhaskar. > > Yes both of them propose to discriminate two sides of knowledge. I > > believe in this discrimination is basic and a big innovation. > > As if Althusser's mentioned concepts is an epistemic fallacy? I am > > not sure. > > > > best wishes > > > > > > On Fri, 2009-01-02 at 08:14 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > Hi Ozgur, > > > > > > Mervyn's advice sounds good -- I haven't spent enough time > > > thinking > about > > > Althusser to be able to say anything much about the points that > > > you're really interested in. I can see if I still have that old > > > paper. But I suspect that it's on a floppy disk somewhere! I > > > gave it at a > Re-Thining > > > Marxism Conference (1996 maybe, or otherwise 1997), but I never > published > > it > > > or anything. Send me a note off-list, ok? > > > > > > Warmly, > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 11:58 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > Thank you Ruth, > > > > > > > > You are right, regards to philosopy of science Bhaskar is better. > > > > Is it possible to share your works about this issue? > > > > And could you be so kind as say your views about my last questions: > > > > What's the CR approach about to Althusser's "over-determination" > > > > and"determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > By the way I've just asked to Versobooks Turkey office to > > > > translate > > RToS > > > > into Turkish. Is there any attempt do you (list) know? > > > > > > > > Happy holidays > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > On Thu, 2008-12-25 at 11:43 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > > > Yes, similar. I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished > > > > > though; > > > > probably > > > > > other people have written on it too. > > > > > > > > > > My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for > > > > > how > > science > > > > > works. My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it! > > For > > > > the > > > > > nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and > social > > and > > > > > productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. > > > > > Marxists > > better > > > > than > > > > > Althusser, myself. And some non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians. > > > > > > > > > > Happy holidays! > > > > > > > > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Merry Christmas! > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Hi All, > > > > > > > > > > > > Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps > > > > > > Althusser's discrimination; object of knowledge and object > > > > > > of real. And > > Althusser's > > > > > > Generalities > > > > > > (..This point is essential to dialectical materialism, and > > > > > > Marx discusses an illustration of it in the Introduction > > > > > > when he > > > > demonstrates > > > > > > that although the use of general concepts ? for example, > > 'production', > > > > > > 'labour', 'exchange', etc. ? is indispensable to a > > > > > > scientific theoretical practice, this first generality does > > > > > > not coincide > with > > the > > > > > > product of the scientific labour: it is not its achievement, > > > > > > it > is > > its > > > > > > prior condition. This first generality (which I shall call > > Generality > > > > I) > > > > > > constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical > > practice > > > > > > will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, into that > other > > > > > > 'concrete' generality (which I shall call Generality III) > > > > > > which > is > > a > > > > > > knowledge... from for Marx) > > > > > > concept is similar to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. > > > > > > What's > > your > > > > > > opinions? > > > > > > > > > > > > What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" > > > > > > and "determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > > > > > Hope to read your ideas > > > > > > > > > > > > best regards > > > > > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > Message: 3 > > Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2009 08:44:01 -0000 > > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > > > Message-ID: > > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > > > Then you need to have a look at what Bhaskar says in Dialectic about > > the base/superstructure model. The entry in Dict CR on > > infra-/intra-/super-structure attempts a summary. > > > > Ronjon Paul Datta, 'From Foucault's genealogy to aleatory materialism: > > realism, nominalism and politics' in Critical Realism and the Social > > Sciences: Heterodox Elaborations. Edited by Jon Frauley and Frank Pearce. > > Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 2007, > > disagrees with Bhaskar that Althusser loses sight of the real object. > > > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com > > Sent: 11 January 2009 06:19 > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar > > > > Thank you Ruth, Mervyn, > > > > My problematic is CR position about Althusser's 'over determination' > > and 'determination in the last instance' more than the similarities > > Althusser and Bhaskar. > > Yes both of them propose to discriminate two sides of knowledge. I > believe > > in this discrimination is basic and a big innovation. > > As if Althusser's mentioned concepts is an epistemic fallacy? I am > > not sure. > > > > > > best wishes > > > > > > On Fri, 2009-01-02 at 08:14 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > Hi Ozgur, > > > > > > Mervyn's advice sounds good -- I haven't spent enough time > > > thinking about Althusser to be able to say anything much about the > > > points that you're really interested in. I can see if I still > > > have that old paper. But I suspect that it's on a floppy disk > > > somewhere! I gave it at a Re-Thining Marxism Conference (1996 > > > maybe, or otherwise 1997), but I never published it or anything. Send me a note off-list, ok? > > > > > > Warmly, > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 11:58 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > Thank you Ruth, > > > > > > > > You are right, regards to philosopy of science Bhaskar is better. > > > > Is it possible to share your works about this issue? > > > > And could you be so kind as say your views about my last questions: > > > > What's the CR approach about to Althusser's "over-determination" > > > > and"determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > By the way I've just asked to Versobooks Turkey office to > > > > translate RToS into Turkish. Is there any attempt do you (list) know? > > > > > > > > Happy holidays > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > On Thu, 2008-12-25 at 11:43 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > > > Yes, similar. I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished > > > > > though; > > > > probably > > > > > other people have written on it too. > > > > > > > > > > My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for > > > > > how > > science > > > > > works. My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it! > > For > > > > the > > > > > nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and > > > > > social and productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. > > > > > Marxists better > > > > than > > > > > Althusser, myself. And some non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians. > > > > > > > > > > Happy holidays! > > > > > > > > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Merry Christmas! > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Hi All, > > > > > > > > > > > > Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps > > > > > > Althusser's discrimination; object of knowledge and object > > > > > > of real. And Althusser's Generalities (..This point is > > > > > > essential to dialectical materialism, and Marx discusses an > > > > > > illustration of it in the Introduction when he > > > > demonstrates > > > > > > that although the use of general concepts - for example, > > > > > > 'production', 'labour', 'exchange', etc. - is indispensable > > > > > > to a scientific theoretical practice, this first generality > > > > > > does not coincide with the product of the scientific labour: > > > > > > it is not its achievement, it is its prior condition. This > > > > > > first generality (which I shall call Generality > > > > I) > > > > > > constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical > > > > > > practice will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, > > > > > > into that other 'concrete' generality (which I shall call > > > > > > Generality > > > > > > III) which is a knowledge... from for Marx) concept is > > > > > > similar to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. What's your opinions? > > > > > > > > > > > > What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" > > > > > > and "determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > > > > > Hope to read your ideas > > > > > > > > > > > > best regards > > > > > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 > > *********************************************** > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do > not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of > the > addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are > not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, > reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication > may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in > error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all > copies from your system. Thank you. > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3756 (20090110) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From Hans.Despain at nichols.edu Thu Jan 15 12:51:26 2009 From: Hans.Despain at nichols.edu (Despain, Hans G) Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2009 14:51:26 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 In-Reply-To: <6ad241360901150703y35740de0v4a584783a1287adf@mail.gmail.com> References: , <6ad241360901150703y35740de0v4a584783a1287adf@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: Dear, Ruth, Mervyn certainly has point. I am not one to say analytical philosophy is bad. Nor did I mean to imply Dialectical theory needn't be rigorous (in an analytical way). On the contrary, the dialectical tradition (e.g. Plato, Hegel, Marx, Bhaskar) is in many ways the most rigorous, and draws heavily from the standards of analytical philosophy. For the record, it seems to me dialectical theory has an advantage over analytical philosophy on theorizing change, but I never said analytical philosophy can't theorize change. Analytical historical materialists for example theorize change. Analytical philosophy does tend to be reductionist. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that my beef is really not with analytical philosophy per se, but its reductionist tendency. Now I am not a philosopher but I am convinced by Bhaskar's argument that in mainstream philosophy there is a tendency toward the epistemic fallacy and ontological monovalence, in particular analytical philosophy seems to be particularly liable towards these tendencies. The difference seems to me to be threefold: (1) Mode of explanation; (2) relationship between conceptions and reality; and (3) totality. Hegel argued that when there emerges an "apparent" contradiction (say in structure and agency, or more Hegelian categories freedom and determinism) the resolution would not be found by a closer (i.e. reductionist) analysis of the concepts. And unlike Kant, Hegel could not live with the contradictions. Hegel argued the resolution would be to expand our conception of reality (or a least in my CR driven interpretation), for Hegel by expanding our concepts employed to understand reality. For Hegel this was a transition from "Understanding" to "Reason." Nothing here is out of phase with analytical philosophy, in fact it might be a type of hyperanalytical philosophy. I think Plato is Hegelian in this sense. Plato however employees not merely new concepts, but metaphor, analogy, allegory, and myth. What Bhaskar argues is that these methods of Plato and Hegel work because of how reality is constituted, and our limited immediate access to it. I think this is correct. Analytical philosophers are most often not willing to take the ontological turn. They dislike Hegel's expansion of categories (which seems to be Marx's method, a least according to New Dialecticians such as Tony Smith). They see Plato as less than serious, and they see Marx (and Bhaskar) as ideological. The real issue is ontology, beginning with the stratification of reality. Bhaskar makes a rather Hegelian move in RTS with the distinction between the real, actual and empirical. We are told in DPF the real basis of the stratification of reality is absence (as a noun). These are nearly impossible transitions to make for a reductionist, but they are not anti-analytical. Analytical philosophy overemphasizes formal logic at the expense of ontology and history. Now I do not think this neglect of ontology and history is necessary, but the "formalness" does tend to want a suprahistorical analysis, I think this is were dialecticians begin to part company. Analytical philosophy overemphasizes language, in the sense they tend to desire specification of concepts at the expense of concept expansion. But again with emphasis, formal logic and language specification are not out a phase with dialectics; my point is that there are epistemological tendencies within the analytical tradition that tend toward reductionism, and neglect ontology, history, and (to a less extent) concept expansion. Think of Harry Frankfurt's book "Bullshit" which we both adore. 80 percent of the book is analytical, very precise and helpful for understanding what we mean by the term. But the most provocative part, the last 6 pages has to do with the ontology of "bullshit," i.e, why "bullshit" is so pervasive. Frankfurt says "bullshit" is pervasive because of democratic politics, irrealist philosophy, and capitalist/commercial economics. But it is here that he runs away, just as he is beginning to say something. This is less than an accident. Or read Russell's analysis of Plato and Hegel in his History of Western Philosophy and explain to me why you get so pissed off. sincerely, Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff [rgroff at slu.edu] Sent: Thursday, January 15, 2009 10:03 AM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 Hi Hans, all, I have criticisms about analytic philosophy, but I don't actually agree with the idea that it sounds like you're coming close to, Hans, that a dialectical theory somehow needn't be, or can't be, rigorous philosophically. If one wants to talk about things that are dynamic, that's do-able in a rigorous way. Even in a clear and precise way -- I mean, jeeze, calculus is talk about change! Admittedly, trying to talk about things that can't be talked about -- as Plato does -- is harder. Then you really do have to switch genres I think. But right now, for example, in my view, the very best work on powers/dispositional properties is being done by Anglo-analytic philosophers. Their training brings with it various important limitations, but those limitations have to do mainly with breadth, I think, with taking in the full significance of what they are saying, not really with adequacy to the object per se. So, I don't know ... just a vote of caution or dissent or something. Warmly, r. On Tue, Jan 13, 2009 at 10:06 AM, Despain, Hans G wrote: > Gerard > > This is not true within disciplines. For example within economics there is > fairly considerable engagement, and of course sociology and social theory > critical realism is taken seriously by advocates and critics. Also in > education and pedagogy, critical realism is making some important headway. > > Transcendental realism and critical naturalism were both pitched as a > philosophy *for* (social) science. > > My intuition, confirmed by Ruth, is that within philosophy there is a > dominance of an analytical approach. This is not critical realism. The > theories and concepts are not static enough for analytical philosophers > (this is also why Plato, Hegel, and to some extent Marx, are not taken > serious in mainstream philosophy. Treat them as analytical philosophers and > they become "naive," "sloppy," and "ideological." > > Bhaskar's attempt to develop a philosophy *for* science allows him to not > get bogged down in timeless debates and stationary definitions. For example > TMSA makes no analytical commitment to what a structure is, or even the > specifics of agency. Rather Bhaskar loosens social science by affectively > saying, lets proceed forward by giving ontological status to both, in the > various ways social theories might conceive them. Bhaskar leaves the > specifics of what a structure or agency is to social theorists and thinkers > within a discipline. Instead he points out the impoverishment of neglecting > the ontological status of either structure or agency. Bhaskar's work is > full of such examples. > > Consider Bhaskar's theory of Truth, or his theory of absence, these are > very cagey theories, not meant to be understood from analytical criteria. > Critical realism and dialectical critical realism loosen up social theory > and change how we understand institutions and policy. As such we should > expect the initial debates to be within various disciplines, and eventually > philosophy itself will begin to take critical realism more serious when it > is demonstrated that social theorists are producing important results. > > > Hans > > > ________________________________________ > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [ > critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of gerard walmsely > [gerardwalmsley at googlemail.com] > Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2009 7:49 AM > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 > > It appears unfortunate but there apeears to be very few real debates > actually between critical realists and others who are not critical > realists. There is a claim that critical realists have developed the > theory > from an engagement with other main traditions, as immanent critique. But > this is largely a monologue. > > GW > > > > > On Sun, Jan 11, 2009 at 7:00 PM, < > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > > > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > You can reach the person managing the list at > > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > > > > Today's Topics: > > > > 1. Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > > between"postpositivists"and critical realists (Joanne Costello) > > 2. Re: Althusser and Bhaskar (ozgurelibol at ttmail.com) > > 3. Re: Althusser and Bhaskar (Mervyn Hartwig) > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Message: 1 > > Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 20:33:51 -0700 > > From: "Joanne Costello" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > > between"postpositivists"and critical realists > > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; > > reply-type=original > > > > Thanks so much to everyone for pointing me towards a wealth of resources > - > > I > > have a lot of reading to do! > > I think some of the debates between CR and pragmatism will help me. I'm > > also > > very interested in Byrne's "Social Exclusion." > > > > I have been exploring critical realism along with another student who is > in > > sociology and we're both amazed at how willing people have been to help > > newcomers learn. > > > > I greatly appreciate your help. > > > > Joanne > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > > > Sent: Saturday, January 10, 2009 10:45 AM > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > > between"postpositivists"and critical realists > > > > > > > Further to this excellent advice and info, Gideon Calder has a new book > > on > > > Rorty from a CR perspective: Rorty's Politics of Redescription. By > Gideon > > > Calder. Cardiff: University of Wales > > > Press, 2007. It is reviewed by Justin Cruickshank in Journal of > Critical > > > Realism 7(2) 2008, 314-29. > > > > > > In the same issue of JCR (pp. 235-275) there is also a debate between > > > Peter > > > Manicas (a critical realist) and Patrick Baert (a pragmatist), entitled > > 'A > > > social theory dialogue'. This will probably be an ongoing exchange, > with > > > other people coming in. > > > > > > My entry on critical realism in A Dictionary of CR differentiates CR > from > > > other forms of realism in terms of 'its robustly transcendental and > > > immanently critical method, its outright rejection of empiricism and > > > positivism, its thoroughgoing emergentism, its understanding of social > > > science as necessarily explanatory critical (entailing rejection of the > > > fact-value and theory-practice dichotomies) and its explicitly > > > emancipatory > > > stance.' But not all critical realists (as distinct from dialectical > > > critical realists) accept the last two positions. > > > > > > > > > Mervyn > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [ > > > > > > mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Despain, > > > Hans G > > > Sent: 09 January 2009 20:31 > > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporarydebates > > > between"postpositivists" > > > and critical realists > > > > > > Dear Joanne, > > > > > > Ruth makes good points for clarifying your purpose. > > > > > > Three sources you might find useful depending on the specific purpose > > > > > > Bhaksar provides a sustained in depth critique of postpositivism, > > > specifically Richard Rorty in his "Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom." > > > Rorty is a highly sophisticated pragmatic philosopher, and should > surely > > > fulfill the non-naive realist criteria. Bhaskar summarizes this > critique > > > in > > > a chapter in "Reclaiming Reality." > > > > > > You also might find some valuable lessons in Lopez and Potter's "After > > > Postmodernism: An introduction to critical realism" (2001). > > > > > > Suspecting you might want more field specific sources refer to > Hartwig's > > > "Dictionary of critical realism" there is an entry for "social work." > I > > > am > > > not familiar with the cited literature, but you might find it useful > for > > > your purposes. > > > > > > Finally, don't be over-defensive, your interest in critical realism for > > > informing social work is right on; in spite of your advisor's cryptic > > > critique. It will take time to develop a full argument and defense > that > > > will be convincing to critics. If you stick with your interest you > will > > > find a revolutionary analysis, theory, and praxis for social > theory/work > > > and > > > practice in Dialectical Critical Realism (DCR). DCR is a new theory of > > > ethics, or a dialectical development of the ethical implications of > > > critical > > > realism. You do not necessarily have to push on to DCR, I do believe > > you > > > can apply CR by itself to social work as an alternative to positivism > and > > > social constructivist approaches in highly successful and fruitful > ways. > > > > > > all the best, > > > > > > Hans > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff > > > [rgroff at slu.edu] > > > Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 2:28 PM > > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > > > between"postpositivists" and critical realists > > > > > > Hi Joanne, > > > > > > So is the question "Are there discussions between critical realists and > > > other non-naive realists?" > > > > > > If so, I think the best way to go at it is to figure out who falls into > > > the > > > "other non-naive realists" category, and then sort out what the > > difference > > > is between the person(s) in question and some kind of ideal-type of cr. > > > Non-philosophers often use these terms fairly loosely. I don't know > > what > > > your disciplinary attachment is, but it a little bit matters, for what > > the > > > differences will be between cr and other realisms. There are > definitely > > a > > > range of people in different social sciences who are realists as the > term > > > is > > > used in their various fields, who are friendly to cr and with whom > > there's > > > been discussion. But again, the nature of the points of disagreement > > will > > > be different by discipline. In metaphysics and philosophy of science, > > for > > > example, the realists who come closest to cr are "dispositional > realists" > > > and/or "scientific essentialists"; there hasn't been a lot cr > engagement > > > with that literature, though there's a little. > > > > > > If you can say more precisely who the relevant "non-naive realists" are > > > for > > > your purposes, I'm sure others can point you to useful literature. > > > > > > Warmly, > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 11:30 AM, Joanne Costello > > > wrote: > > > > > >> Hi Ruth, > > >> > > >> Thank you for your response. My understanding is that some people use > > >> the term "postpositivist" to describe non-naive realism. In contrast, > > >> post-positivist thought would refer to various paradigms that came > > >> after or in response to positivism (e.g. social constructionism). > > >> > > >> Best wishes, > > >> > > >> Joanne > > >> ----- Original Message ----- > > >> From: "Ruth Groff" > > >> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > >> > > >> Sent: Friday, January 09, 2009 10:22 AM > > >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] contemporary debates > > >> between"postpositivists" and critical realists > > >> > > >> > > >> > Hi Joanne, > > >> > > > >> > Can you say more about who counts as postpositivist and who counts > > >> > as post-positivist? > > >> > > > >> > Warmly, > > >> > Ruth > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > On Fri, Jan 9, 2009 at 10:07 AM, Joanne Costello > > >> > wrote: > > >> > > > >> >> Hello, > > >> >> > > >> >> I'm a graduate student in Calgary, Canada. I wrote a term paper > > >> >> last semester on critical realism and its potential for > > >> >> emancipatory social work research and praxis. The professor raised > > >> >> the criticism that, in her view, critical realist arguments (or at > > >> >> least how I dealt with them) seem to engage with "dated" views of > > >> >> postpositivism. > > >> >> > > >> >> I am wondering if anyone might be able to point me to any recent > > >> >> literature where the critical realist position addresses > > >> >> "postpositivist" (as opposed to post-positivist) positions. Are > > >> >> there any self-identified postpositivists that have engaged the > > >> >> critical realist paradigm? > > >> >> > > >> >> Cheers, > > >> >> > > >> >> Joanne > > >> >> _______________________________________________ > > >> >> Critical-Realism mailing list > > >> >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > >> >> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > >> >> > > >> > _______________________________________________ > > >> > Critical-Realism mailing list > > >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > >> > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> _______________________________________________ > > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > >> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > >> > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do > not > > > cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the > > > addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are > not > > > the > > > intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, > > > disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be > > > prohibited > > > by law. If you have received this communication in error, please > notify > > > the > > > sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. > Thank > > > you. > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > __________ NOD32 3747 (20090107) Information __________ > > > > > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > > > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > Message: 2 > > Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2009 08:18:36 +0200 > > From: "ozgurelibol at ttmail.com" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > > Message-ID: <1231654716.5935.19.camel at ozgur-laptop> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" > > > > Thank you Ruth, Mervyn, > > > > My problematic is CR position about Althusser's 'over determination' and > > 'determination in the last instance' more than the similarities > > Althusser and Bhaskar. > > Yes both of them propose to discriminate two sides of knowledge. I > > believe in this discrimination is basic and a big innovation. > > As if Althusser's mentioned concepts is an epistemic fallacy? I am not > > sure. > > > > best wishes > > > > > > On Fri, 2009-01-02 at 08:14 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > Hi Ozgur, > > > > > > Mervyn's advice sounds good -- I haven't spent enough time thinking > about > > > Althusser to be able to say anything much about the points that you're > > > really interested in. I can see if I still have that old paper. But I > > > suspect that it's on a floppy disk somewhere! I gave it at a > Re-Thining > > > Marxism Conference (1996 maybe, or otherwise 1997), but I never > published > > it > > > or anything. Send me a note off-list, ok? > > > > > > Warmly, > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 11:58 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > Thank you Ruth, > > > > > > > > You are right, regards to philosopy of science Bhaskar is better. > > > > Is it possible to share your works about this issue? > > > > And could you be so kind as say your views about my last questions: > > > > What's the CR approach about to Althusser's "over-determination" > > > > and"determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > By the way I've just asked to Versobooks Turkey office to translate > > RToS > > > > into Turkish. Is there any attempt do you (list) know? > > > > > > > > Happy holidays > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > On Thu, 2008-12-25 at 11:43 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > > > Yes, similar. I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished though; > > > > probably > > > > > other people have written on it too. > > > > > > > > > > My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for how > > science > > > > > works. My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it! > > For > > > > the > > > > > nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and > social > > and > > > > > productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. Marxists > > better > > > > than > > > > > Althusser, myself. And some non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians. > > > > > > > > > > Happy holidays! > > > > > > > > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Merry Christmas! > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Hi All, > > > > > > > > > > > > Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps Althusser's > > > > > > discrimination; object of knowledge and object of real. And > > Althusser's > > > > > > Generalities > > > > > > (..This point is essential to dialectical materialism, and Marx > > > > > > discusses an illustration of it in the Introduction when he > > > > demonstrates > > > > > > that although the use of general concepts ? for example, > > 'production', > > > > > > 'labour', 'exchange', etc. ? is indispensable to a scientific > > > > > > theoretical practice, this first generality does not coincide > with > > the > > > > > > product of the scientific labour: it is not its achievement, it > is > > its > > > > > > prior condition. This first generality (which I shall call > > Generality > > > > I) > > > > > > constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical > > practice > > > > > > will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, into that > other > > > > > > 'concrete' generality (which I shall call Generality III) which > is > > a > > > > > > knowledge... from for Marx) > > > > > > concept is similar to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. What's > > your > > > > > > opinions? > > > > > > > > > > > > What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" and > > > > > > "determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > > > > > Hope to read your ideas > > > > > > > > > > > > best regards > > > > > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > Message: 3 > > Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2009 08:44:01 -0000 > > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > > > Message-ID: > > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > > > Then you need to have a look at what Bhaskar says in Dialectic about the > > base/superstructure model. The entry in Dict CR on > > infra-/intra-/super-structure attempts a summary. > > > > Ronjon Paul Datta, 'From Foucault's genealogy to aleatory materialism: > > realism, nominalism and politics' in Critical Realism and the Social > > Sciences: Heterodox Elaborations. Edited by Jon Frauley and Frank Pearce. > > Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 2007, disagrees > > with Bhaskar that Althusser loses sight of the real object. > > > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com > > Sent: 11 January 2009 06:19 > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar > > > > Thank you Ruth, Mervyn, > > > > My problematic is CR position about Althusser's 'over determination' and > > 'determination in the last instance' more than the similarities Althusser > > and Bhaskar. > > Yes both of them propose to discriminate two sides of knowledge. I > believe > > in this discrimination is basic and a big innovation. > > As if Althusser's mentioned concepts is an epistemic fallacy? I am not > > sure. > > > > > > best wishes > > > > > > On Fri, 2009-01-02 at 08:14 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > Hi Ozgur, > > > > > > Mervyn's advice sounds good -- I haven't spent enough time thinking > > > about Althusser to be able to say anything much about the points that > > > you're really interested in. I can see if I still have that old > > > paper. But I suspect that it's on a floppy disk somewhere! I gave it > > > at a Re-Thining Marxism Conference (1996 maybe, or otherwise 1997), > > > but I never published it or anything. Send me a note off-list, ok? > > > > > > Warmly, > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 25, 2008 at 11:58 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > Thank you Ruth, > > > > > > > > You are right, regards to philosopy of science Bhaskar is better. > > > > Is it possible to share your works about this issue? > > > > And could you be so kind as say your views about my last questions: > > > > What's the CR approach about to Althusser's "over-determination" > > > > and"determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > By the way I've just asked to Versobooks Turkey office to translate > > > > RToS into Turkish. Is there any attempt do you (list) know? > > > > > > > > Happy holidays > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > On Thu, 2008-12-25 at 11:43 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > > > Yes, similar. I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished though; > > > > probably > > > > > other people have written on it too. > > > > > > > > > > My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for how > > science > > > > > works. My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it! > > For > > > > the > > > > > nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and > > > > > social and productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. > > > > > Marxists better > > > > than > > > > > Althusser, myself. And some non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians. > > > > > > > > > > Happy holidays! > > > > > > > > > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Merry Christmas! > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < > > > > > ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Hi All, > > > > > > > > > > > > Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps > > > > > > Althusser's discrimination; object of knowledge and object of > > > > > > real. And Althusser's Generalities (..This point is essential to > > > > > > dialectical materialism, and Marx discusses an illustration of > > > > > > it in the Introduction when he > > > > demonstrates > > > > > > that although the use of general concepts - for example, > > > > > > 'production', 'labour', 'exchange', etc. - is indispensable to a > > > > > > scientific theoretical practice, this first generality does not > > > > > > coincide with the product of the scientific labour: it is not > > > > > > its achievement, it is its prior condition. This first > > > > > > generality (which I shall call Generality > > > > I) > > > > > > constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical > > > > > > practice will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, into > > > > > > that other 'concrete' generality (which I shall call Generality > > > > > > III) which is a knowledge... from for Marx) concept is similar > > > > > > to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. What's your opinions? > > > > > > > > > > > > What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" and > > > > > > "determination in the last instance"? > > > > > > > > > > > > Hope to read your ideas > > > > > > > > > > > > best regards > > > > > > > > > > > > ozgur > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 5 > > *********************************************** > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not > cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the > addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the > intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, > disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited > by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the > sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank > you. > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. From ehrbar at lists.econ.utah.edu Mon Jan 19 04:15:28 2009 From: ehrbar at lists.econ.utah.edu (ehrbar) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 04:15:28 -0700 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Message-ID: The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of Utah are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat rash proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University President asking him to take a more active leadership regarding global warming. During this discussion it occurred to me that the critical realist critique of the fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I attempted, in an email sent to them, to make a serious philosophical derivation of our obligations as scientists. Please look it over, I value your trained philosophers' eyes: does my argument hold water or am I overlooking something, and is this identical to the critical realist critique? Here is what I sent: I agree that education about global warming is our most important mission. Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As everyone knows, when the students come out of our classrooms, they see a world which is acting as if global warming was only marginally relevant. We cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this truth. Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we have to *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the envelope on this front. So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. Hans E. Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar ehrbar at economics.utah.edu Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ office) Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) From J.A.Toynbee at open.ac.uk Mon Jan 19 05:02:44 2009 From: J.A.Toynbee at open.ac.uk (J.A.Toynbee) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 12:02:44 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism References: Message-ID: Hans, This is a brave and important move. The statement itself is clear and well constructed. More importantly, it's the sort of call to action we ought to be doing much more of in academia. Could we circulate it, or a version of it, as model for others to use? Jason -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of ehrbar Sent: 19 January 2009 11:15 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of Utah are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat rash proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University President asking him to take a more active leadership regarding global warming. During this discussion it occurred to me that the critical realist critique of the fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I attempted, in an email sent to them, to make a serious philosophical derivation of our obligations as scientists. Please look it over, I value your trained philosophers' eyes: does my argument hold water or am I overlooking something, and is this identical to the critical realist critique? Here is what I sent: I agree that education about global warming is our most important mission. Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As everyone knows, when the students come out of our classrooms, they see a world which is acting as if global warming was only marginally relevant. We cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this truth. Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we have to *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the envelope on this front. So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. Hans E. Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar ehrbar at economics.utah.edu Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ office) Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism --------------------------------- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Mon Jan 19 06:02:13 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 13:02:13 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: Message-ID: I agree. Of course, a large contingent of basic or original critical realists are staunch upholders of 'Hume's Law', denying that it is logically possible to get from facts to values, but every time they so much as criticise an opinion they contradict this in practice, their message being that the person should change the opinion, CP (other things being equal), because it is mistaken, misleading etc. That we always have to make a judgement as to whether things are indeed equal, i.e. worse consequences won't ensue, is no different from the application of any piece of science in open systems, e.g. building a bridge or whatever. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of J.A.Toynbee Sent: 19 January 2009 12:03 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hans, This is a brave and important move. The statement itself is clear and well constructed. More importantly, it's the sort of call to action we ought to be doing much more of in academia. Could we circulate it, or a version of it, as model for others to use? Jason -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of ehrbar Sent: 19 January 2009 11:15 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of Utah are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat rash proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University President asking him to take a more active leadership regarding global warming. During this discussion it occurred to me that the critical realist critique of the fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I attempted, in an email sent to them, to make a serious philosophical derivation of our obligations as scientists. Please look it over, I value your trained philosophers' eyes: does my argument hold water or am I overlooking something, and is this identical to the critical realist critique? Here is what I sent: I agree that education about global warming is our most important mission. Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As everyone knows, when the students come out of our classrooms, they see a world which is acting as if global warming was only marginally relevant. We cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this . Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we have to *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the envelope on this front. So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. Hans E. Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar ehrbar at economics.utah.edu Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ office) Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism --------------------------------- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From ehrbar at lists.econ.utah.edu Mon Jan 19 07:02:54 2009 From: ehrbar at lists.econ.utah.edu (ehrbar) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 07:02:54 -0700 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: (J.A.Toynbee@open.ac.uk) References: Message-ID: Jason, of course you have permission to circulate it or a modification of it! This would help us greatly, because it would answer the question: if all this is so logical, why is no other university doing it or even discussing it? Hans. From louisirwin9 at aol.com Mon Jan 19 11:10:31 2009 From: louisirwin9 at aol.com (Louis Irwin) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 13:10:31 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: <7alu89$37e8h7@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: Hi Mervyn, Your point about changing opinions in the face of criticism is well stated, but I wonder if Humeans could not accommodate the point within their own framework. Here is the way a 'Humean critique' of an opinion could go: 1. Premiss: You have some specific opinion - say a belief that P. 2. Grounds that P is false are presented here. 3. Anyone persuaded by the grounds in 2 will believe that P is false, or at least refuse to believe that P is true, because either the grounds logically entail that P is false, or they at least make it empirically or scientifically likely. 4. Premiss: Up to now you have been a seeker of truth. 5. If a seeker of truth is shown that there are grounds to believe that something is false, he/she will refuse to believe it [by the meaning of a "seeker of truth"]. 6. You have been shown [in 2] that there are grounds to believe that P is false. 7. Therefore if you are to remain a seeker of truth, then you must change your opinion, either believing that P is false or at least withholding your belief that it is true. Everything in this 'Humean critique' seems acceptable to a Humean, including the conclusion. Not the conclusion can be read as "If you want to remain a seeker of truth, then you ought to change your opinion" - where the Humean "ought" is relative to an empirical desire (namely to remain a seeker of truth). Louis Irwin -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 8:02 AM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism I agree. Of course, a large contingent of basic or original critical realists are staunch upholders of 'Hume's Law', denying that it is logically possible to get from facts to values, but every time they so much as criticise an opinion they contradict this in practice, their message being that the person should change the opinion, CP (other things being equal), because it is mistaken, misleading etc. That we always have to make a judgement as to whether things are indeed equal, i.e. worse consequences won't ensue, is no different from the application of any piece of science in open systems, e.g. building a bridge or whatever. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of J.A.Toynbee Sent: 19 January 2009 12:03 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hans, This is a brave and important move. The statement itself is clear and well constructed. More importantly, it's the sort of call to action we ought to be doing much more of in academia. Could we circulate it, or a version of it, as model for others to use? Jason -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of ehrbar Sent: 19 January 2009 11:15 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of Utah are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat rash proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University President asking him to take a more active leadership regarding global warming. During this discussion it occurred to me that the critical realist critique of the fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I attempted, in an email sent to them, to make a serious philosophical derivation of our obligations as scientists. Please look it over, I value your trained philosophers' eyes: does my argument hold water or am I overlooking something, and is this identical to the critical realist critique? Here is what I sent: I agree that education about global warming is our most important mission. Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As everyone knows, when the students come out of our classrooms, they see a world which is acting as if global warming was only marginally relevant. We cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this . Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we have to *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the envelope on this front. So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. Hans E. Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar ehrbar at economics.utah.edu Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ office) Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism --------------------------------- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From rgroff at slu.edu Mon Jan 19 11:29:19 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 12:29:19 -0600 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: References: <7alu89$37e8h7@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: <6ad241360901191029n62b66465j648fdd042aad78a7@mail.gmail.com> This is interesting. I think the Humean would just say that there is nothing about the fact(s) of the matter regarding P (or ~P) that will LOGICALLY require you to adopt the normative belief "I ought to pursue the truth regarding P" -- or even "I ought to be a truth-seeker generally." IFyou already are one, then various things follow. To my mind, the strong arguments against Hume are comprehensive ones, about what kinds of reactions to things are psychically viable, ultimately. A slightly narrower version would be Habermas' arguments about what is implied normatively by the fact of language. Sorry to just dip in, in this wildly unsatisfying way. r. On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 12:10 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > Hi Mervyn, > > Your point about changing opinions in the face of criticism is well > stated, > but I wonder if Humeans could not accommodate the point within their own > framework. Here is the way a 'Humean critique' of an opinion could go: > > 1. Premiss: You have some specific opinion - say a belief that P. > > 2. Grounds that P is false are presented here. > > 3. Anyone persuaded by the grounds in 2 will believe that P is false, or at > least refuse to believe that P is true, because either the grounds > logically > entail that P is false, or they at least make it empirically or > scientifically likely. > > 4. Premiss: Up to now you have been a seeker of truth. > > 5. If a seeker of truth is shown that there are grounds to believe that > something is false, he/she will refuse to believe it [by the meaning of a > "seeker of truth"]. > > 6. You have been shown [in 2] that there are grounds to believe that P is > false. > > 7. Therefore if you are to remain a seeker of truth, then you must change > your opinion, either believing that P is false or at least withholding your > belief that it is true. > > Everything in this 'Humean critique' seems acceptable to a Humean, > including > the conclusion. Not the conclusion can be read as "If you want to remain a > seeker of truth, then you ought to change your opinion" - where the Humean > "ought" is relative to an empirical desire (namely to remain a seeker of > truth). > > > Louis Irwin > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn > Hartwig > Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 8:02 AM > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > I agree. > > Of course, a large contingent of basic or original critical realists are > staunch upholders of 'Hume's Law', denying that it is logically possible to > get from facts to values, but every time they so much as criticise an > opinion they contradict this in practice, their message being that the > person should change the opinion, CP (other things being equal), because it > is mistaken, misleading etc. That we always have to make a judgement as to > whether things are indeed equal, i.e. worse consequences won't ensue, is no > different from the application of any piece of science in open systems, > e.g. > building a bridge or whatever. > > Mervyn > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > J.A.Toynbee > Sent: 19 January 2009 12:03 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > Hans, > > This is a brave and important move. The statement itself is clear and well > constructed. More importantly, it's the sort of call to action we ought to > be doing much more of in academia. Could we circulate it, or a version of > it, as model for others to use? > > Jason > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of ehrbar > Sent: 19 January 2009 11:15 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > > The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of Utah > are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat rash > proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University President asking > him to take a more active leadership regarding global warming. During this > discussion it occurred to me that the critical realist critique of the > fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I attempted, in an email sent to > them, to make a serious philosophical derivation of our obligations as > scientists. Please look it over, I value your trained philosophers' eyes: > does my argument hold water or am I overlooking something, and is this > identical to the critical realist critique? Here is what I sent: > > > I agree that education about global warming is our most important mission. > Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As everyone knows, when > the students come out of our classrooms, they see a world which is acting > as > if global warming was only marginally relevant. We cannot leave this > unaddressed, therefore our mission > expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming is > serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this . > Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission > expands > a third time: we have to teach them not only why society denies the truth > but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I would argue that our > mission expands a fourth time: not only do we have to > *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to overcome > society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we commit the > error > of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our actions to contradict > what we say. If we value truth, and as scientists we do, this does, > indeed, > have practical implications for us, not only in the laboratory but also in > society at large. > > There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical obligation > to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the truth, is always > a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are such that direct action > on > this would be counterproductive, then of course we do not have to act. But > I am willing to argue that it is not only our obligation but also that the > time is ripe to push the envelope on this front. > > > So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. > If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. > > Hans E. > > Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar > ehrbar at economics.utah.edu > Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) > 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ > office) > Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > --------------------------------- > The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt > charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC > 038302). > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Mon Jan 19 12:26:45 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 19:26:45 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: <6ad241360901191029n62b66465j648fdd042aad78a7@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: Hi Louis, Ruth My point, concretely illustrated, was that (1) fact: 'racism is false' and (2) fact: 'your beliefs are racist' DO logically entail (3) the valuation: 'you should change your racist beliefs', and that we (quite rightly) act as if this is the case all the time. Commitment to truth is intrinsic to what a fact is and transcendentally necessary for any communication whatsoever (Habermas' point) and so, as Bhaskar pointed out already in PON, 'cannot be seized upon as a concealed (value) premise to rescue the autonomy of values from factual discourse, without destroying the distinction between the two, the distinction that it is the point of the objection to uphold'. Ths is a point that is nearly always ignored by Bhaskar's critics on this issue. (The objection was that the premises include commitment to truth). Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff Sent: 19 January 2009 18:29 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism This is interesting. I think the Humean would just say that there is nothing about the fact(s) of the matter regarding P (or ~P) that will LOGICALLY require you to adopt the normative belief "I ought to pursue the truth regarding P" -- or even "I ought to be a truth-seeker generally." IFyou already are one, then various things follow. To my mind, the strong arguments against Hume are comprehensive ones, about what kinds of reactions to things are psychically viable, ultimately. A slightly narrower version would be Habermas' arguments about what is implied normatively by the fact of language. Sorry to just dip in, in this wildly unsatisfying way. r. On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 12:10 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > Hi Mervyn, > > Your point about changing opinions in the face of criticism is well > stated, but I wonder if Humeans could not accommodate the point within > their own framework. Here is the way a 'Humean critique' of an > opinion could go: > > 1. Premiss: You have some specific opinion - say a belief that P. > > 2. Grounds that P is false are presented here. > > 3. Anyone persuaded by the grounds in 2 will believe that P is false, > or at least refuse to believe that P is true, because either the > grounds logically entail that P is false, or they at least make it > empirically or scientifically likely. > > 4. Premiss: Up to now you have been a seeker of truth. > > 5. If a seeker of truth is shown that there are grounds to believe > that something is false, he/she will refuse to believe it [by the > meaning of a "seeker of truth"]. > > 6. You have been shown [in 2] that there are grounds to believe that P > is false. > > 7. Therefore if you are to remain a seeker of truth, then you must > change your opinion, either believing that P is false or at least > withholding your belief that it is true. > > Everything in this 'Humean critique' seems acceptable to a Humean, > including the conclusion. Not the conclusion can be read as "If you > want to remain a seeker of truth, then you ought to change your > opinion" - where the Humean "ought" is relative to an empirical desire > (namely to remain a seeker of truth). > > > Louis Irwin > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mervyn Hartwig > Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 8:02 AM > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > I agree. > > Of course, a large contingent of basic or original critical realists > are staunch upholders of 'Hume's Law', denying that it is logically > possible to get from facts to values, but every time they so much as > criticise an opinion they contradict this in practice, their message > being that the person should change the opinion, CP (other things > being equal), because it is mistaken, misleading etc. That we always > have to make a judgement as to whether things are indeed equal, i.e. > worse consequences won't ensue, is no different from the application > of any piece of science in open systems, e.g. > building a bridge or whatever. > > Mervyn > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > J.A.Toynbee > Sent: 19 January 2009 12:03 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > Hans, > > This is a brave and important move. The statement itself is clear and > well constructed. More importantly, it's the sort of call to action we > ought to be doing much more of in academia. Could we circulate it, or > a version of it, as model for others to use? > > Jason > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > ehrbar > Sent: 19 January 2009 11:15 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > > The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of > Utah are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat > rash proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University > President asking him to take a more active leadership regarding global > warming. During this discussion it occurred to me that the critical > realist critique of the fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I > attempted, in an email sent to them, to make a serious philosophical > derivation of our obligations as scientists. Please look it over, I value your trained philosophers' eyes: > does my argument hold water or am I overlooking something, and is this > identical to the critical realist critique? Here is what I sent: > > > I agree that education about global warming is our most important mission. > Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As everyone knows, > when the students come out of our classrooms, they see a world which > is acting as if global warming was only marginally relevant. We > cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission > expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming > is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this . > Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission > expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society > denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I > would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we > have to > *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to > overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we > commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our > actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as > scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for > us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. > > There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical > obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the > truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are > such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of > course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is > not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the > envelope on this front. > > > So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. > If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. > > Hans E. > > Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar > ehrbar at economics.utah.edu > Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) > 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ > office) > Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > --------------------------------- > The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an > exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland > (SC 038302). > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From Hans.Despain at nichols.edu Mon Jan 19 12:40:06 2009 From: Hans.Despain at nichols.edu (Despain, Hans G) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 14:40:06 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear Hans, Thanks for sharing this open letter with the list. The presentation is highly (DCR) logical argument. Each transition or expansion follows very closely DCR's topology of critique (Bhaskar:242). Hans, this is a highly political letter. But the justification is stated to be scientific. Unless your audience has accepted the science, then some type of scientific appendix must accompany the statement. Otherwise, it may appear highly ideological and overly radical (in the bad sense of the term). Let me attempt to explain what I mean: The letter suggests that the President has in fact accepted teaching about global warming is an important mission of higher education. Has the University's President accepted this? If such a mission has been accepted by the letter's audience then the first paragraph holds, and the question is strategy and (as you rightly emphasize) theory/practice consistency. Otherwise, your audience may need an expansion of evidence (or metacritique1 expansion), and an explanation of why global warming is only marginally relevant in day to day action (or a metacritique2 expansion); even if both expansions are appendices to the original statement. The third expansion is strategy. What are you proposing for both "hermeneutical" struggles and personal depth praxis of educators and students? Your second paragraph is more problematic. Why do you apologize that action is "conditional." Besides, your statement that "I am willing to argue ..." is too weak to address the conditionality. It seems to me that in the first paragraph you have already implicitly stated the "conditions" for action have been met. If you place the idea of conditionality in the last paragraph for emphasis, then the ways these conditions have been met need to be more strongly stated than "I am willing to argue ...". sincerely and in solidarity, Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of ehrbar [ehrbar at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 6:15 AM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of Utah are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat rash proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University President asking him to take a more active leadership regarding global warming. During this discussion it occurred to me that the critical realist critique of the fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I attempted, in an email sent to them, to make a serious philosophical derivation of our obligations as scientists. Please look it over, I value your trained philosophers' eyes: does my argument hold water or am I overlooking something, and is this identical to the critical realist critique? Here is what I sent: I agree that education about global warming is our most important mission. Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As everyone knows, when the students come out of our classrooms, they see a world which is acting as if global warming was only marginally relevant. We cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this truth. Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we have to *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the envelope on this front. So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. Hans E. Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar ehrbar at economics.utah.edu Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ office) Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. From mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk Mon Jan 19 14:28:27 2009 From: mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk (Mark Johnson) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 21:28:27 +0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hans, you've started a conversation here! it seems to have moved off the point somewhat... Are you in control of it any more? Is it the conversation you intended? What about the conversation in your University? Will that be the conversation you intended? Will you be able to steer it to your desired outcome? My gut feeling is that being practical with CR is surely to be less overtly philosophical! Mark On 1/19/09, Despain, Hans G wrote: > Dear Hans, > > Thanks for sharing this open letter with the list. The presentation is > highly (DCR) logical argument. Each transition or expansion follows very > closely DCR's topology of critique (Bhaskar:242). > > Hans, this is a highly political letter. But the justification is stated to > be scientific. Unless your audience has accepted the science, then some > type of scientific appendix must accompany the statement. Otherwise, it may > appear highly ideological and overly radical (in the bad sense of the term). > Let me attempt to explain what I mean: > > The letter suggests that the President has in fact accepted teaching about > global warming is an important mission of higher education. Has the > University's President accepted this? > > If such a mission has been accepted by the letter's audience then the first > paragraph holds, and the question is strategy and (as you rightly emphasize) > theory/practice consistency. Otherwise, your audience may need an expansion > of evidence (or metacritique1 expansion), and an explanation of why global > warming is only marginally relevant in day to day action (or a metacritique2 > expansion); even if both expansions are appendices to the original > statement. The third expansion is strategy. What are you proposing for > both "hermeneutical" struggles and personal depth praxis of educators and > students? > > Your second paragraph is more problematic. Why do you apologize that action > is "conditional." Besides, your statement that "I am willing to argue ..." > is too weak to address the conditionality. It seems to me that in the first > paragraph you have already implicitly stated the "conditions" for action > have been met. If you place the idea of conditionality in the last > paragraph for emphasis, then the ways these conditions have been met need to > be more strongly stated than "I am willing to argue ...". > > sincerely and in solidarity, > > Hans > > > ________________________________________ > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of ehrbar > [ehrbar at lists.econ.utah.edu] > Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 6:15 AM > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of > Utah are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat > rash proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University > President asking him to take a more active leadership regarding global > warming. During this discussion it occurred to me that the critical > realist critique of the fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I > attempted, in an email sent to them, to make a serious philosophical > derivation of our obligations as scientists. Please look it over, I > value your trained philosophers' eyes: does my argument hold water or > am I overlooking something, and is this identical to the critical > realist critique? Here is what I sent: > > > I agree that education about global warming is our most important > mission. Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As > everyone knows, when the students come out of our classrooms, they see > a world which is acting as if global warming was only marginally > relevant. We cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission > expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming > is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this truth. > Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission > expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society > denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I > would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we > have to *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to > overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we > commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our > actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as > scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for > us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. > > There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical > obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the > truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are > such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of > course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is > not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the > envelope on this front. > > > So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. > If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. > > Hans E. > > Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar ehrbar at economics.utah.edu > Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) > 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ office) > Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not > cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the > addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the > intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, > disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited > by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the > sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank > you. > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mark Johnson Institute for Educational Cybernetics University of Bolton BL3 5AB Tel. 01204 903567 Mob. 0778 6064505 From ehrbar at lists.econ.utah.edu Mon Jan 19 16:01:43 2009 From: ehrbar at lists.econ.utah.edu (ehrbar) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 16:01:43 -0700 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: (mwj1@bolton.ac.uk) References: Message-ID: Mark, thanks for checking with me. I am deliberately taking the formalistic route, exposing the philosophical skeleton of my argument, because I want to stress that this is not an ad-hoc justification, but that my thinking stands on the shoulders of many others, on principles which I myself taught in my classes. I do learn from the thoughts of you all even if they are a little off my own target. My good friend Hans D.'s response was most in line with what I expected: going through each of the transitions in the original article with a fine tooth comb. (Hans D. used to be one of my students at the U of U.) Here is my response to Hans D. Hans writes: > The letter suggests that the President has in fact accepted teaching > about global warming is an important mission of higher education. > Has the University's President accepted this? My letter was (and you couldn't know that) a response to a colleague who argued that civil disobedience would not be helpful at this time. Since the University was not clearly immoral, we had no justification for civil disobedience. Instead, my colleague said that "shifts can happen quickly when people become educated about the facts," therefore the most important thing we can do is educate as many people as possible. This colleague therefore, not the University President, has conceded the importance of education, and I took off from there. Hans also writes: > Your second paragraph is more problematic. Why do you apologize > that action is "conditional." By "conditional" I mean the difference between inferences about facts and inferences about values explained by Andrew Collier on p. 170 of "Critical Realism", reprinted on p. 445 of the "Essential Readings": if you make an inference about facts, this inference remains true if you know the conditions better, i.e., from (A implies C) follows (A and B implies C). This is not true for inferences about values: stealing is bad, but if you steal because your child is hungry it is no longer bad. Value judgments can be derived (values can be "discovered"), but they are conditional on the absence of over-riding reasons. This seems to weaken my argument, but I think it strengthens it because I do not claim that I have a logical algorithm which tells me what to do. I reclaim my agency with this argument. Hans, you also write that I may need appendices to my original statement. I do not see this, can you please explain? I thought my argument was complete. That the looming environmental crisis only receives marginal attention in today's everyday life is not something I think I have to prove, everybody can see that this is the case, and the reason why this is so does not affect my argument. Hans E. Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar ehrbar at economics.utah.edu Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ office) Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) From wayburn at dematerialism.net Mon Jan 19 18:25:30 2009 From: wayburn at dematerialism.net (Tom Wayburn) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 19:25:30 -0600 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Hans, Mervyn, Mark, et al. I have been silent for a number of months; and, to be honest, I have not been following the list during that period. Therefore, to comment on the posts in today's Digest is risky and quite likely to excite opposition. I am concerned about two premises that strike me as begging open questions. The easiest to deal with is anthropogenic global warming (AGW): I have not seen a complete proof of the AGW claim; it is not clear that such a proof exists. To the best of my knowledge no one has produced a closed carbon dioxide balance on the Earth and its atmosphere. Nevertheless, the limited repositories of fossil fuel on the planet, the high energy investment costs of harvesting any other type of energy, the hard limits on the extent of the production of alternate forms of energy, the damage that has been done to the environment in other ways than increasing its temperature, and the manner in which excessive inputs of cheap energy has encouraged mankind to expand his numbers beyond the carrying capacity of Earth* - I say, all of these circumstances provide ample necessity to do that which would be done if AGW were actually occurring. Thus, we may remain agnostic as to its validity. What is important is to stress the true (well-established) reasons for reducing carbon dioxide effluents from fossil fuels, otherwise we may be satisfied with an unfortunate policy to reduce AGW that leaves all of our other problems catastrophically worsening. The plain fact is that we must replace our political-economic system with a non-expanding economy. Capitalism and virtually all market economies are unsustainable thermodynamically. The proof is by arithmetic, however it requires an understanding of the real-valued exponential function. The fact that many racist attitudes cannot be invalidated easily or at all can be discussed at another time. I just put it out there that it is an open question. In any case, due to our evolutionary past, there are few people in the world (if any) who do not harbor racist attitudes. Also, I find it hard to believe that racism is anywhere near the heart of our problems, which are engendered and worsened by gradients in real wealth. I may not be able to help my feelings toward others, but I can at least afford them a fair share of the community's sustainable dividend, i.e., share the wealth. * The carrying capacity of Earth is much less than our current population under a regime of dwindling petroleum production, i.e., post-Peak Oil. Tom Wayburn, Houston, Texas http://dematerialism.net/ -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 5:02 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 12 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Mervyn Hartwig) 2. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Despain, Hans G) 3. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Mark Johnson) 4. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (ehrbar) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 19:26:45 -0000 From: "Mervyn Hartwig" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Hi Louis, Ruth My point, concretely illustrated, was that (1) fact: 'racism is false' and (2) fact: 'your beliefs are racist' DO logically entail (3) the valuation: 'you should change your racist beliefs', and that we (quite rightly) act as if this is the case all the time. Commitment to truth is intrinsic to what a fact is and transcendentally necessary for any communication whatsoever (Habermas' point) and so, as Bhaskar pointed out already in PON, 'cannot be seized upon as a concealed (value) premise to rescue the autonomy of values from factual discourse, without destroying the distinction between the two, the distinction that it is the point of the objection to uphold'. Ths is a point that is nearly always ignored by Bhaskar's critics on this issue. (The objection was that the premises include commitment to truth). Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff Sent: 19 January 2009 18:29 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism This is interesting. I think the Humean would just say that there is nothing about the fact(s) of the matter regarding P (or ~P) that will LOGICALLY require you to adopt the normative belief "I ought to pursue the truth regarding P" -- or even "I ought to be a truth-seeker generally." IFyou already are one, then various things follow. To my mind, the strong arguments against Hume are comprehensive ones, about what kinds of reactions to things are psychically viable, ultimately. A slightly narrower version would be Habermas' arguments about what is implied normatively by the fact of language. Sorry to just dip in, in this wildly unsatisfying way. r. On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 12:10 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > Hi Mervyn, > > Your point about changing opinions in the face of criticism is well > stated, but I wonder if Humeans could not accommodate the point within > their own framework. Here is the way a 'Humean critique' of an > opinion could go: > > 1. Premiss: You have some specific opinion - say a belief that P. > > 2. Grounds that P is false are presented here. > > 3. Anyone persuaded by the grounds in 2 will believe that P is false, > or at least refuse to believe that P is true, because either the > grounds logically entail that P is false, or they at least make it > empirically or scientifically likely. > > 4. Premiss: Up to now you have been a seeker of truth. > > 5. If a seeker of truth is shown that there are grounds to believe > that something is false, he/she will refuse to believe it [by the > meaning of a "seeker of truth"]. > > 6. You have been shown [in 2] that there are grounds to believe that P > is false. > > 7. Therefore if you are to remain a seeker of truth, then you must > change your opinion, either believing that P is false or at least > withholding your belief that it is true. > > Everything in this 'Humean critique' seems acceptable to a Humean, > including the conclusion. Not the conclusion can be read as "If you > want to remain a seeker of truth, then you ought to change your > opinion" - where the Humean "ought" is relative to an empirical desire > (namely to remain a seeker of truth). > > > Louis Irwin > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mervyn Hartwig > Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 8:02 AM > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > I agree. > > Of course, a large contingent of basic or original critical realists > are staunch upholders of 'Hume's Law', denying that it is logically > possible to get from facts to values, but every time they so much as > criticise an opinion they contradict this in practice, their message > being that the person should change the opinion, CP (other things > being equal), because it is mistaken, misleading etc. That we always > have to make a judgement as to whether things are indeed equal, i.e. > worse consequences won't ensue, is no different from the application > of any piece of science in open systems, e.g. > building a bridge or whatever. > > Mervyn > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > J.A.Toynbee > Sent: 19 January 2009 12:03 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > Hans, > > This is a brave and important move. The statement itself is clear and > well constructed. More importantly, it's the sort of call to action we > ought to be doing much more of in academia. Could we circulate it, or > a version of it, as model for others to use? > > Jason > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > ehrbar > Sent: 19 January 2009 11:15 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > > The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of > Utah are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat > rash proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University > President asking him to take a more active leadership regarding global > warming. During this discussion it occurred to me that the critical > realist critique of the fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I > attempted, in an email sent to them, to make a serious philosophical > derivation of our obligations as scientists. Please look it over, I value your trained philosophers' eyes: > does my argument hold water or am I overlooking something, and is this > identical to the critical realist critique? Here is what I sent: > > > I agree that education about global warming is our most important mission. > Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As everyone knows, > when the students come out of our classrooms, they see a world which > is acting as if global warming was only marginally relevant. We > cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission > expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming > is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this . > Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission > expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society > denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I > would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we > have to > *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to > overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we > commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our > actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as > scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for > us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. > > There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical > obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the > truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are > such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of > course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is > not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the > envelope on this front. > > > So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. > If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. > > Hans E. > > Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar > ehrbar at economics.utah.edu > Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) > 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ > office) > Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > --------------------------------- > The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an > exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland > (SC 038302). > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 14:40:06 -0500 From: "Despain, Hans G" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Dear Hans, Thanks for sharing this open letter with the list. The presentation is highly (DCR) logical argument. Each transition or expansion follows very closely DCR's topology of critique (Bhaskar:242). Hans, this is a highly political letter. But the justification is stated to be scientific. Unless your audience has accepted the science, then some type of scientific appendix must accompany the statement. Otherwise, it may appear highly ideological and overly radical (in the bad sense of the term). Let me attempt to explain what I mean: The letter suggests that the President has in fact accepted teaching about global warming is an important mission of higher education. Has the University's President accepted this? If such a mission has been accepted by the letter's audience then the first paragraph holds, and the question is strategy and (as you rightly emphasize) theory/practice consistency. Otherwise, your audience may need an expansion of evidence (or metacritique1 expansion), and an explanation of why global warming is only marginally relevant in day to day action (or a metacritique2 expansion); even if both expansions are appendices to the original statement. The third expansion is strategy. What are you proposing for both "hermeneutical" struggles and personal depth praxis of educators and students? Your second paragraph is more problematic. Why do you apologize that action is "conditional." Besides, your statement that "I am willing to argue ..." is too weak to address the conditionality. It seems to me that in the first paragraph you have already implicitly stated the "conditions" for action have been met. If you place the idea of conditionality in the last paragraph for emphasis, then the ways these conditions have been met need to be more strongly stated than "I am willing to argue ...". sincerely and in solidarity, Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of ehrbar [ehrbar at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 6:15 AM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of Utah are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat rash proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University President asking him to take a more active leadership regarding global warming. During this discussion it occurred to me that the critical realist critique of the fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I attempted, in an email sent to them, to make a serious philosophical derivation of our obligations as scientists. Please look it over, I value your trained philosophers' eyes: does my argument hold water or am I overlooking something, and is this identical to the critical realist critique? Here is what I sent: I agree that education about global warming is our most important mission. Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As everyone knows, when the students come out of our classrooms, they see a world which is acting as if global warming was only marginally relevant. We cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this truth. Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we have to *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the envelope on this front. So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. Hans E. Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar ehrbar at economics.utah.edu Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ office) Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. ------------------------------ Message: 3 Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 21:28:27 +0000 From: "Mark Johnson" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Hans, you've started a conversation here! it seems to have moved off the point somewhat... Are you in control of it any more? Is it the conversation you intended? What about the conversation in your University? Will that be the conversation you intended? Will you be able to steer it to your desired outcome? My gut feeling is that being practical with CR is surely to be less overtly philosophical! Mark On 1/19/09, Despain, Hans G wrote: > Dear Hans, > > Thanks for sharing this open letter with the list. The presentation is > highly (DCR) logical argument. Each transition or expansion follows very > closely DCR's topology of critique (Bhaskar:242). > > Hans, this is a highly political letter. But the justification is stated to > be scientific. Unless your audience has accepted the science, then some > type of scientific appendix must accompany the statement. Otherwise, it may > appear highly ideological and overly radical (in the bad sense of the term). > Let me attempt to explain what I mean: > > The letter suggests that the President has in fact accepted teaching about > global warming is an important mission of higher education. Has the > University's President accepted this? > > If such a mission has been accepted by the letter's audience then the first > paragraph holds, and the question is strategy and (as you rightly emphasize) > theory/practice consistency. Otherwise, your audience may need an expansion > of evidence (or metacritique1 expansion), and an explanation of why global > warming is only marginally relevant in day to day action (or a metacritique2 > expansion); even if both expansions are appendices to the original > statement. The third expansion is strategy. What are you proposing for > both "hermeneutical" struggles and personal depth praxis of educators and > students? > > Your second paragraph is more problematic. Why do you apologize that action > is "conditional." Besides, your statement that "I am willing to argue ..." > is too weak to address the conditionality. It seems to me that in the first > paragraph you have already implicitly stated the "conditions" for action > have been met. If you place the idea of conditionality in the last > paragraph for emphasis, then the ways these conditions have been met need to > be more strongly stated than "I am willing to argue ...". > > sincerely and in solidarity, > > Hans > > > ________________________________________ > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of ehrbar > [ehrbar at lists.econ.utah.edu] > Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 6:15 AM > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of > Utah are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat > rash proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University > President asking him to take a more active leadership regarding global > warming. During this discussion it occurred to me that the critical > realist critique of the fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I > attempted, in an email sent to them, to make a serious philosophical > derivation of our obligations as scientists. Please look it over, I > value your trained philosophers' eyes: does my argument hold water or > am I overlooking something, and is this identical to the critical > realist critique? Here is what I sent: > > > I agree that education about global warming is our most important > mission. Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As > everyone knows, when the students come out of our classrooms, they see > a world which is acting as if global warming was only marginally > relevant. We cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission > expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming > is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this truth. > Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission > expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society > denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I > would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we > have to *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to > overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we > commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our > actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as > scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for > us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. > > There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical > obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the > truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are > such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of > course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is > not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the > envelope on this front. > > > So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. > If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. > > Hans E. > > Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar ehrbar at economics.utah.edu > Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) > 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ office) > Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not > cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the > addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the > intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, > disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited > by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the > sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank > you. > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- Mark Johnson Institute for Educational Cybernetics University of Bolton BL3 5AB Tel. 01204 903567 Mob. 0778 6064505 ------------------------------ Message: 4 Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 16:01:43 -0700 From: ehrbar Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Cc: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Message-ID: Mark, thanks for checking with me. I am deliberately taking the formalistic route, exposing the philosophical skeleton of my argument, because I want to stress that this is not an ad-hoc justification, but that my thinking stands on the shoulders of many others, on principles which I myself taught in my classes. I do learn from the thoughts of you all even if they are a little off my own target. My good friend Hans D.'s response was most in line with what I expected: going through each of the transitions in the original article with a fine tooth comb. (Hans D. used to be one of my students at the U of U.) Here is my response to Hans D. Hans writes: > The letter suggests that the President has in fact accepted teaching > about global warming is an important mission of higher education. > Has the University's President accepted this? My letter was (and you couldn't know that) a response to a colleague who argued that civil disobedience would not be helpful at this time. Since the University was not clearly immoral, we had no justification for civil disobedience. Instead, my colleague said that "shifts can happen quickly when people become educated about the facts," therefore the most important thing we can do is educate as many people as possible. This colleague therefore, not the University President, has conceded the importance of education, and I took off from there. Hans also writes: > Your second paragraph is more problematic. Why do you apologize > that action is "conditional." By "conditional" I mean the difference between inferences about facts and inferences about values explained by Andrew Collier on p. 170 of "Critical Realism", reprinted on p. 445 of the "Essential Readings": if you make an inference about facts, this inference remains true if you know the conditions better, i.e., from (A implies C) follows (A and B implies C). This is not true for inferences about values: stealing is bad, but if you steal because your child is hungry it is no longer bad. Value judgments can be derived (values can be "discovered"), but they are conditional on the absence of over-riding reasons. This seems to weaken my argument, but I think it strengthens it because I do not claim that I have a logical algorithm which tells me what to do. I reclaim my agency with this argument. Hans, you also write that I may need appendices to my original statement. I do not see this, can you please explain? I thought my argument was complete. That the looming environmental crisis only receives marginal attention in today's everyday life is not something I think I have to prove, everybody can see that this is the case, and the reason why this is so does not affect my argument. Hans E. Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar ehrbar at economics.utah.edu Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ office) Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 12 ************************************************ E-mail message checked by Spyware Doctor (6.0.0.386) Database version: 5.11570 http://www.pctools.com/en/spyware-doctor-antivirus/ From Hans.Despain at nichols.edu Mon Jan 19 20:46:27 2009 From: Hans.Despain at nichols.edu (Despain, Hans G) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 22:46:27 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: Hans, The audience is very important to the presentation of your argument. I thought your intended audience was the University President and campus population. Your audience accepts the explanatory critique (metacritique1 and metacritique2). Thus, I agree with you the looming environmental crisis only receiving marginal attention is enough for a call to action. So I concede no appendix is necessary. The second paragraph remains problematic, but perhaps for different reasons then I first stated. Most of us will accept that we can derive values from facts. But this tells us very little about the action that *should*, and less about the action that *must* be taken. The third step in DCR is totality, but it is an open totality. Thus we know that truth and facts will inform ethical action, but it gets very difficult to pinpoint the specific action to be taken (perhaps this is the warrant for holding on to Hume's Law, even though we all know we act as if Hume's Law is incorrect, as Mervyn pointed out). To be specific, although the logic of your first paragraph holds, I am not sure this means civil disobedience, or less strong, it does not imply and specific civil disobedience, such as taking over the President's office. Even Mervyn's example, (A) racist beliefs are false, (B) Perry holds racist beliefs, (C) Perry should give up his racist beliefs. Your problem in this example is between B and C, (i) what is our obligation to act to change people's mind about racist beliefs (e.g. education or direct action); (ii) what is the strategy to get Perry to give up his racist beliefs? Hans in your example of a hungry child, stealing could still be seen as bad. Lets say the parent stealing does not negatively effect the hunger of any other child. Still the conditions of society manifests hungry children. It is to be reformist to then turn into a thieve in such a society, that is the problem with Robin Hood, he actually did very little to change the conditions of society, instead adapted himself to the conditions, and justified his action on an unjust society, rather than towards a revolutionary transformation of society itself. Hans, I do not in any sense mean to suggest your proposal for civil disobedience is mere reformism, rather my point is the particular value action is not immediately given from the acceptance of the explanatory critique. The direction of the struggle needs to be well thought out, social being is embedded in an open totality which makes the correct action rather complicated. Your demand for action does seem correct to me, but any action depends on the state of ideology and power (the Gramsci problem) to be confronted and there may be much room for disagreement (the Socratic problem). In summary the logic of your argument seems to me to hold. Our commitment to truth demands we act to avoid T/P inc. But what actions are to be taking is open for discussion and struggle? sincerely, Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of ehrbar [ehrbar at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 6:01 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Cc: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Mark, thanks for checking with me. I am deliberately taking the formalistic route, exposing the philosophical skeleton of my argument, because I want to stress that this is not an ad-hoc justification, but that my thinking stands on the shoulders of many others, on principles which I myself taught in my classes. I do learn from the thoughts of you all even if they are a little off my own target. My good friend Hans D.'s response was most in line with what I expected: going through each of the transitions in the original article with a fine tooth comb. (Hans D. used to be one of my students at the U of U.) Here is my response to Hans D. Hans writes: > The letter suggests that the President has in fact accepted teaching > about global warming is an important mission of higher education. > Has the University's President accepted this? My letter was (and you couldn't know that) a response to a colleague who argued that civil disobedience would not be helpful at this time. Since the University was not clearly immoral, we had no justification for civil disobedience. Instead, my colleague said that "shifts can happen quickly when people become educated about the facts," therefore the most important thing we can do is educate as many people as possible. This colleague therefore, not the University President, has conceded the importance of education, and I took off from there. Hans also writes: > Your second paragraph is more problematic. Why do you apologize > that action is "conditional." By "conditional" I mean the difference between inferences about facts and inferences about values explained by Andrew Collier on p. 170 of "Critical Realism", reprinted on p. 445 of the "Essential Readings": if you make an inference about facts, this inference remains true if you know the conditions better, i.e., from (A implies C) follows (A and B implies C). This is not true for inferences about values: stealing is bad, but if you steal because your child is hungry it is no longer bad. Value judgments can be derived (values can be "discovered"), but they are conditional on the absence of over-riding reasons. This seems to weaken my argument, but I think it strengthens it because I do not claim that I have a logical algorithm which tells me what to do. I reclaim my agency with this argument. Hans, you also write that I may need appendices to my original statement. I do not see this, can you please explain? I thought my argument was complete. That the looming environmental crisis only receives marginal attention in today's everyday life is not something I think I have to prove, everybody can see that this is the case, and the reason why this is so does not affect my argument. Hans E. Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar ehrbar at economics.utah.edu Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ office) Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. From louisirwin9 at aol.com Mon Jan 19 21:11:49 2009 From: louisirwin9 at aol.com (Louis Irwin) Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 23:11:49 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: <7alu89$37hi6i@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: Hi Mervyn, Good points, however note that there is an ambiguity over "commitment to truth". If I make any kind of assertion, then I am certainly "committed to its truth" - even if I am lying. For example, if I say it is raining outside with the intention of deceiving you, my assertion nonetheless commits me to its truth, even though I know it is false. This is a sense of "commitment to truth" that John Searle explored many years ago in "Speech Acts", and relates to the Habermas view; it is "transcendentally necessary for any communication whatsoever" as you say. However there is a different sense of "commitment to truth" that someone can lack even when he/she has the first type of commitment. The second sort of "commitment to truth" involves a desire to communicate what happens to be true (and to refrain from communicating falsehoods); this is the commitment involved in what I called a "seeker of truth". A deceiver who has the first sort of "commitment to truth" lacks the second sort of commitment - the liar's communication transcendentally commits the liar to the truth of what he/she asserts, but the liar wants to communicate what he/she knows (or even just believes) to be false. [I believe that Searle responded along these lines to an essay by Habermas on Searle.] It seems to me that your position requires sliding mid-argument from the first type of "commitment to truth" to the second type. (My devil's advocate 'Humean critique' only involved the second type. And neither its premisses nor conclusion involve value assertions at all, although its conclusion can be parsed, as I noted, in terms of a Humean "ought".) Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 2:27 PM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis, Ruth My point, concretely illustrated, was that (1) fact: 'racism is false' and (2) fact: 'your beliefs are racist' DO logically entail (3) the valuation: 'you should change your racist beliefs', and that we (quite rightly) act as if this is the case all the time. Commitment to truth is intrinsic to what a fact is and transcendentally necessary for any communication whatsoever (Habermas' point) and so, as Bhaskar pointed out already in PON, 'cannot be seized upon as a concealed (value) premise to rescue the autonomy of values from factual discourse, without destroying the distinction between the two, the distinction that it is the point of the objection to uphold'. Ths is a point that is nearly always ignored by Bhaskar's critics on this issue. (The objection was that the premises include commitment to truth). Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff Sent: 19 January 2009 18:29 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism This is interesting. I think the Humean would just say that there is nothing about the fact(s) of the matter regarding P (or ~P) that will LOGICALLY require you to adopt the normative belief "I ought to pursue the truth regarding P" -- or even "I ought to be a truth-seeker generally." IFyou already are one, then various things follow. To my mind, the strong arguments against Hume are comprehensive ones, about what kinds of reactions to things are psychically viable, ultimately. A slightly narrower version would be Habermas' arguments about what is implied normatively by the fact of language. Sorry to just dip in, in this wildly unsatisfying way. r. On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 12:10 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > Hi Mervyn, > > Your point about changing opinions in the face of criticism is well > stated, but I wonder if Humeans could not accommodate the point within > their own framework. Here is the way a 'Humean critique' of an > opinion could go: > > 1. Premiss: You have some specific opinion - say a belief that P. > > 2. Grounds that P is false are presented here. > > 3. Anyone persuaded by the grounds in 2 will believe that P is false, > or at least refuse to believe that P is true, because either the > grounds logically entail that P is false, or they at least make it > empirically or scientifically likely. > > 4. Premiss: Up to now you have been a seeker of truth. > > 5. If a seeker of truth is shown that there are grounds to believe > that something is false, he/she will refuse to believe it [by the > meaning of a "seeker of truth"]. > > 6. You have been shown [in 2] that there are grounds to believe that P > is false. > > 7. Therefore if you are to remain a seeker of truth, then you must > change your opinion, either believing that P is false or at least > withholding your belief that it is true. > > Everything in this 'Humean critique' seems acceptable to a Humean, > including the conclusion. Note the conclusion can be read as "If you > want to remain a seeker of truth, then you ought to change your > opinion" - where the Humean "ought" is relative to an empirical desire > (namely to remain a seeker of truth). > > > Louis Irwin > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mervyn Hartwig > Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 8:02 AM > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > I agree. > > Of course, a large contingent of basic or original critical realists > are staunch upholders of 'Hume's Law', denying that it is logically > possible to get from facts to values, but every time they so much as > criticise an opinion they contradict this in practice, their message > being that the person should change the opinion, CP (other things > being equal), because it is mistaken, misleading etc. That we always > have to make a judgement as to whether things are indeed equal, i.e. > worse consequences won't ensue, is no different from the application > of any piece of science in open systems, e.g. > building a bridge or whatever. > > Mervyn > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > J.A.Toynbee > Sent: 19 January 2009 12:03 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > Hans, > > This is a brave and important move. The statement itself is clear and > well constructed. More importantly, it's the sort of call to action we > ought to be doing much more of in academia. Could we circulate it, or > a version of it, as model for others to use? > > Jason > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > ehrbar > Sent: 19 January 2009 11:15 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > > The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of > Utah are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat > rash proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University > President asking him to take a more active leadership regarding global > warming. During this discussion it occurred to me that the critical > realist critique of the fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I > attempted, in an email sent to them, to make a serious philosophical > derivation of our obligations as scientists. Please look it over, I > value your trained philosophers' eyes: > does my argument hold water or am I overlooking something, and is this > identical to the critical realist critique? Here is what I sent: > > > I agree that education about global warming is our most important mission. > Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As everyone knows, > when the students come out of our classrooms, they see a world which > is acting as if global warming was only marginally relevant. We > cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission > expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming > is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this . > Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission > expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society > denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I > would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we > have to > *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to > overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we > commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our > actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as > scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for > us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. > > There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical > obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the > truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are > such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of > course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is > not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the > envelope on this front. > > > So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. > If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. > > Hans E. > > Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar > ehrbar at economics.utah.edu > Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) > 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ > office) > Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > --------------------------------- > The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an > exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland > (SC 038302). > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From lefouque at gmail.com Tue Jan 20 01:02:25 2009 From: lefouque at gmail.com (Ng Foo Keong) Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 16:02:25 +0800 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 13 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <14a6419f0901200002y163b2c31h6d21df3d58cb5247@mail.gmail.com> hi everybody, i am a new-comer to critical realism. i am attracted to it because it seems to be a refreshing change from the excesses of scientism and the aimlessness of post-structuralism. this issue of "global warming" is a good opportunity for me to see how this philosophy is being applied, as opposed to just reading it in books and trying to figure things out in the abstract. commitment to /belief in a truth that is independent of observers does not equate to one having everything worked out and every possible angle covered with certainty. (now would this called 'ontic fallacy' or 'epistemic fallacy' or just plain presumptiousness?) i would like to know, how would a critical realist anticipate and address some of the possible critiques and rebuttals from the post-structuralist camp or from other people e.g. that this is just a p.o.v. that is has a history / context, blah blah blah ... that it could be politically / financially motivated ... not to mention various conspiracy theories. why don't some people just "get it"? maybe they have valid reservations. F.K. Sophus Ng PhD student National Institute of Education, Singapore From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Tue Jan 20 02:16:45 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 09:16:45 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 13 In-Reply-To: <14a6419f0901200002y163b2c31h6d21df3d58cb5247@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: Dear Foo Keong I'm not sure if this is the right way to address you... One reason some people don't get it is because it's part of the 'common sense' of the epoch that science can say nothing about values, that they're just your arbitrary personal preferences, etc. People in the West have been socialised to think that for centuries. Also, there is resistance for political reasons to the notion that social science is necessarily critical and emancipatory. Re a position being politically motivated etc, values can of course and do enter into science - science is not value-free - but I would argue that the only value that *necessarily* enters into a scientific result is commitment to truth; if you really want to know you can and do bracket other values such that they do not interfere with the finding (which of course is fallible), assessing it in terms of strictly cognitive criteria. I think this is Bhaskar's position, who holds that his whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ng Foo Keong Sent: 20 January 2009 08:02 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 13 hi everybody, i am a new-comer to critical realism. i am attracted to it because it seems to be a refreshing change from the excesses of scientism and the aimlessness of post-structuralism. this issue of "global warming" is a good opportunity for me to see how this philosophy is being applied, as opposed to just reading it in books and trying to figure things out in the abstract. commitment to /belief in a truth that is independent of observers does not equate to one having everything worked out and every possible angle covered with certainty. (now would this called 'ontic fallacy' or 'epistemic fallacy' or just plain presumptiousness?) i would like to know, how would a critical realist anticipate and address some of the possible critiques and rebuttals from the post-structuralist camp or from other people e.g. that this is just a p.o.v. that is has a history / context, blah blah blah ... that it could be politically / financially motivated ... not to mention various conspiracy theories. why don't some people just "get it"? maybe they have valid reservations. F.K. Sophus Ng PhD student National Institute of Education, Singapore _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3778 (20090119) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From lefouque at gmail.com Tue Jan 20 11:13:21 2009 From: lefouque at gmail.com (Ng Foo Keong) Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 02:13:21 +0800 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 14 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <14a6419f0901201013g206effa5wc346e68c39ac8d08@mail.gmail.com> so, how does a critical realist work out the "ought" from the "is"? F.K. > ------------------------------ > > Message: 4 > Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 09:16:45 -0000 > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue > 13 > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > Dear Foo Keong > > I'm not sure if this is the right way to address you... > > One reason some people don't get it is because it's part of the 'common > sense' of the epoch that science can say nothing about values, that they're > just your arbitrary personal preferences, etc. People in the West have been > socialised to think that for centuries. Also, there is resistance for > political reasons to the notion that social science is necessarily critical > and emancipatory. > > Re a position being politically motivated etc, values can of course and do > enter into science - science is not value-free - but I would argue that the > only value that *necessarily* enters into a scientific result is commitment > to truth; if you really want to know you can and do bracket other values > such that they do not interfere with the finding (which of course is > fallible), assessing it in terms of strictly cognitive criteria. I think > this is Bhaskar's position, who holds that his whole philosophical system is > driven by the sole norm of truth. > > Mervyn > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ng Foo > Keong > Sent: 20 January 2009 08:02 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 13 > > hi everybody, > > i am a new-comer to critical realism. i am attracted to it because it seems > to be a refreshing change from the excesses of scientism and the aimlessness > of post-structuralism. > > this issue of "global warming" is a good opportunity for me to see how this > philosophy is being applied, as opposed to just reading it in books and > trying to figure things out in the abstract. > > commitment to /belief in a truth that is independent of observers does not > equate to one having everything worked out and every possible angle covered > with certainty. (now would this called 'ontic fallacy' or 'epistemic > fallacy' or just plain presumptiousness?) > > i would like to know, how would a critical realist anticipate and address > some of the possible critiques and rebuttals from the post-structuralist > camp or from other people e.g. that this is just a p.o.v. that is has a > history / context, blah blah blah ... that it could be politically / > financially motivated ... not to mention various conspiracy theories. > > why don't some people just "get it"? maybe they have valid reservations. > > F.K. Sophus Ng > PhD student > National Institute of Education, Singapore From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Wed Jan 21 01:39:53 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 08:39:53 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Hi Louis I can't accept that lying is in any sense commitment to truth - it's commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud, although of course you do have to be consistent about it. Nor can I see any slide - my argument assumes truth-seeking. On looking again at your 'devil's advocate Humean critique' I can't see the point of it - are you saying that Hume's law isn't after all espoused by Humeans, it doesn't exist, it's just a figment of our imaginations or what? In what sense has a Humean accommodated my position as distinct from abandoning his own if he concedes that you can after all derive values from facts? Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis Irwin Sent: 20 January 2009 04:12 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Mervyn, Good points, however note that there is an ambiguity over "commitment to truth". If I make any kind of assertion, then I am certainly "committed to its truth" - even if I am lying. For example, if I say it is raining outside with the intention of deceiving you, my assertion nonetheless commits me to its truth, even though I know it is false. This is a sense of "commitment to truth" that John Searle explored many years ago in "Speech Acts", and relates to the Habermas view; it is "transcendentally necessary for any communication whatsoever" as you say. However there is a different sense of "commitment to truth" that someone can lack even when he/she has the first type of commitment. The second sort of "commitment to truth" involves a desire to communicate what happens to be true (and to refrain from communicating falsehoods); this is the commitment involved in what I called a "seeker of truth". A deceiver who has the first sort of "commitment to truth" lacks the second sort of commitment - the liar's communication transcendentally commits the liar to the truth of what he/she asserts, but the liar wants to communicate what he/she knows (or even just believes) to be false. [I believe that Searle responded along these lines to an essay by Habermas on Searle.] It seems to me that your position requires sliding mid-argument from the first type of "commitment to truth" to the second type. (My devil's advocate 'Humean critique' only involved the second type. And neither its premisses nor conclusion involve value assertions at all, although its conclusion can be parsed, as I noted, in terms of a Humean "ought".) Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 2:27 PM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis, Ruth My point, concretely illustrated, was that (1) fact: 'racism is false' and (2) fact: 'your beliefs are racist' DO logically entail (3) the valuation: 'you should change your racist beliefs', and that we (quite rightly) act as if this is the case all the time. Commitment to truth is intrinsic to what a fact is and transcendentally necessary for any communication whatsoever (Habermas' point) and so, as Bhaskar pointed out already in PON, 'cannot be seized upon as a concealed (value) premise to rescue the autonomy of values from factual discourse, without destroying the distinction between the two, the distinction that it is the point of the objection to uphold'. Ths is a point that is nearly always ignored by Bhaskar's critics on this issue. (The objection was that the premises include commitment to truth). Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff Sent: 19 January 2009 18:29 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism This is interesting. I think the Humean would just say that there is nothing about the fact(s) of the matter regarding P (or ~P) that will LOGICALLY require you to adopt the normative belief "I ought to pursue the truth regarding P" -- or even "I ought to be a truth-seeker generally." IFyou already are one, then various things follow. To my mind, the strong arguments against Hume are comprehensive ones, about what kinds of reactions to things are psychically viable, ultimately. A slightly narrower version would be Habermas' arguments about what is implied normatively by the fact of language. Sorry to just dip in, in this wildly unsatisfying way. r. On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 12:10 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > Hi Mervyn, > > Your point about changing opinions in the face of criticism is well > stated, but I wonder if Humeans could not accommodate the point within > their own framework. Here is the way a 'Humean critique' of an > opinion could go: > > 1. Premiss: You have some specific opinion - say a belief that P. > > 2. Grounds that P is false are presented here. > > 3. Anyone persuaded by the grounds in 2 will believe that P is false, > or at least refuse to believe that P is true, because either the > grounds logically entail that P is false, or they at least make it > empirically or scientifically likely. > > 4. Premiss: Up to now you have been a seeker of truth. > > 5. If a seeker of truth is shown that there are grounds to believe > that something is false, he/she will refuse to believe it [by the > meaning of a "seeker of truth"]. > > 6. You have been shown [in 2] that there are grounds to believe that P > is false. > > 7. Therefore if you are to remain a seeker of truth, then you must > change your opinion, either believing that P is false or at least > withholding your belief that it is true. > > Everything in this 'Humean critique' seems acceptable to a Humean, > including the conclusion. Note the conclusion can be read as "If you > want to remain a seeker of truth, then you ought to change your > opinion" - where the Humean "ought" is relative to an empirical desire > (namely to remain a seeker of truth). > > > Louis Irwin > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mervyn Hartwig > Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 8:02 AM > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > I agree. > > Of course, a large contingent of basic or original critical realists > are staunch upholders of 'Hume's Law', denying that it is logically > possible to get from facts to values, but every time they so much as > criticise an opinion they contradict this in practice, their message > being that the person should change the opinion, CP (other things > being equal), because it is mistaken, misleading etc. That we always > have to make a judgement as to whether things are indeed equal, i.e. > worse consequences won't ensue, is no different from the application > of any piece of science in open systems, e.g. > building a bridge or whatever. > > Mervyn > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > J.A.Toynbee > Sent: 19 January 2009 12:03 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > Hans, > > This is a brave and important move. The statement itself is clear and > well constructed. More importantly, it's the sort of call to action we > ought to be doing much more of in academia. Could we circulate it, or > a version of it, as model for others to use? > > Jason > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > ehrbar > Sent: 19 January 2009 11:15 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > > The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of > Utah are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat > rash proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University > President asking him to take a more active leadership regarding global > warming. During this discussion it occurred to me that the critical > realist critique of the fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I > attempted, in an email sent to them, to make a serious philosophical > derivation of our obligations as scientists. Please look it over, I > value your trained philosophers' eyes: > does my argument hold water or am I overlooking something, and is this > identical to the critical realist critique? Here is what I sent: > > > I agree that education about global warming is our most important mission. > Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As everyone knows, > when the students come out of our classrooms, they see a world which > is acting as if global warming was only marginally relevant. We > cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission > expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming > is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this . > Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission > expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society > denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I > would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we > have to > *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to > overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we > commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our > actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as > scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for > us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. > > There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical > obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the > truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are > such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of > course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is > not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the > envelope on this front. > > > So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. > If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. > > Hans E. > > Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar > ehrbar at economics.utah.edu > Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) > 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ > office) > Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > --------------------------------- > The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an > exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland > (SC 038302). > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3778 (20090119) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk Wed Jan 21 02:41:24 2009 From: mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk (Mark Johnson) Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 09:41:24 +0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: <7alu89$381vf6@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> References: <7alu89$381vf6@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: Did anyone see this? http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/article5489134.ece What about the environmental impact of our online discussion? If there is a measurable environmental impact to every contribution, would we be more careful in ensuring that our contributions were constructive? Face-to-face University committees (which discuss these things) are very expensive (academics don't come cheap!)... it tends to shape the conversation! Maybe something to consider if you're really going to be 'practical'. Mark On Wed, Jan 21, 2009 at 8:39 AM, Mervyn Hartwig wrote: > Hi Louis > > I can't accept that lying is in any sense commitment to truth - it's > commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud, although of course you do > have to be consistent about it. Nor can I see any slide - my argument > assumes truth-seeking. On looking again at your 'devil's advocate Humean > critique' I can't see the point of it - are you saying that Hume's law > isn't > after all espoused by Humeans, it doesn't exist, it's just a figment of our > imaginations or what? In what sense has a Humean accommodated my position > as > distinct from abandoning his own if he concedes that you can after all > derive values from facts? > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis > Irwin > Sent: 20 January 2009 04:12 > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > Hi Mervyn, > > Good points, however note that there is an ambiguity over "commitment to > truth". If I make any kind of assertion, then I am certainly "committed to > its truth" - even if I am lying. For example, if I say it is raining > outside with the intention of deceiving you, my assertion nonetheless > commits me to its truth, even though I know it is false. This is a sense of > "commitment to truth" that John Searle explored many years ago in "Speech > Acts", and relates to the Habermas view; it is "transcendentally necessary > for any communication whatsoever" as you say. However there is a different > sense of "commitment to truth" that someone can lack even when he/she has > the first type of commitment. The second sort of "commitment to truth" > involves a desire to communicate what happens to be true (and to refrain > from communicating falsehoods); this is the commitment involved in what I > called a "seeker of truth". A deceiver who has the first sort of > "commitment > to truth" lacks the second sort of commitment - the liar's communication > transcendentally commits the liar to the truth of what he/she asserts, but > the liar wants to communicate what he/she knows (or even just believes) to > be false. [I believe that Searle responded along these lines to an essay by > Habermas on Searle.] It seems to me that your position requires sliding > mid-argument from the first type of "commitment to truth" to the second > type. (My devil's advocate 'Humean critique' only involved the second type. > And neither its premisses nor conclusion involve value assertions at all, > although its conclusion can be parsed, as I noted, in terms of a Humean > "ought".) > > Louis > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn > Hartwig > Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 2:27 PM > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > Hi Louis, Ruth > > My point, concretely illustrated, was that (1) fact: 'racism is false' and > (2) fact: 'your beliefs are racist' DO logically entail (3) the valuation: > 'you should change your racist beliefs', and that we (quite rightly) act as > if this is the case all the time. Commitment to truth is intrinsic to what > a > fact is and transcendentally necessary for any communication whatsoever > (Habermas' point) and so, as Bhaskar pointed out already in PON, 'cannot be > seized upon as a concealed (value) premise to rescue the autonomy of values > from factual discourse, without destroying the distinction between the two, > the distinction that it is the point of the objection to uphold'. Ths is a > point that is nearly always ignored by Bhaskar's critics on this issue. > (The > objection was that the premises include commitment to truth). > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth > Groff > Sent: 19 January 2009 18:29 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > This is interesting. I think the Humean would just say that there is > nothing about the fact(s) of the matter regarding P (or ~P) that will > LOGICALLY require you to adopt the normative belief "I ought to pursue the > truth regarding P" -- or even "I ought to be a truth-seeker generally." > IFyou already are one, then various things follow. > > To my mind, the strong arguments against Hume are comprehensive ones, about > what kinds of reactions to things are psychically viable, ultimately. A > slightly narrower version would be Habermas' arguments about what is > implied > normatively by the fact of language. > > Sorry to just dip in, in this wildly unsatisfying way. > > r. > > On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 12:10 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > > > Hi Mervyn, > > > > Your point about changing opinions in the face of criticism is well > > stated, but I wonder if Humeans could not accommodate the point within > > their own framework. Here is the way a 'Humean critique' of an > > opinion could go: > > > > 1. Premiss: You have some specific opinion - say a belief that P. > > > > 2. Grounds that P is false are presented here. > > > > 3. Anyone persuaded by the grounds in 2 will believe that P is false, > > or at least refuse to believe that P is true, because either the > > grounds logically entail that P is false, or they at least make it > > empirically or scientifically likely. > > > > 4. Premiss: Up to now you have been a seeker of truth. > > > > 5. If a seeker of truth is shown that there are grounds to believe > > that something is false, he/she will refuse to believe it [by the > > meaning of a "seeker of truth"]. > > > > 6. You have been shown [in 2] that there are grounds to believe that P > > is false. > > > > 7. Therefore if you are to remain a seeker of truth, then you must > > change your opinion, either believing that P is false or at least > > withholding your belief that it is true. > > > > Everything in this 'Humean critique' seems acceptable to a Humean, > > including the conclusion. Note the conclusion can be read as "If you > > want to remain a seeker of truth, then you ought to change your > > opinion" - where the Humean "ought" is relative to an empirical desire > > (namely to remain a seeker of truth). > > > > > > Louis Irwin > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Mervyn Hartwig > > Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 8:02 AM > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > > > I agree. > > > > Of course, a large contingent of basic or original critical realists > > are staunch upholders of 'Hume's Law', denying that it is logically > > possible to get from facts to values, but every time they so much as > > criticise an opinion they contradict this in practice, their message > > being that the person should change the opinion, CP (other things > > being equal), because it is mistaken, misleading etc. That we always > > have to make a judgement as to whether things are indeed equal, i.e. > > worse consequences won't ensue, is no different from the application > > of any piece of science in open systems, e.g. > > building a bridge or whatever. > > > > Mervyn > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > J.A.Toynbee > > Sent: 19 January 2009 12:03 > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > > > Hans, > > > > This is a brave and important move. The statement itself is clear and > > well constructed. More importantly, it's the sort of call to action we > > ought to be doing much more of in academia. Could we circulate it, or > > a version of it, as model for others to use? > > > > Jason > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > ehrbar > > Sent: 19 January 2009 11:15 > > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > > > > > The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of > > Utah are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat > > rash proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University > > President asking him to take a more active leadership regarding global > > warming. During this discussion it occurred to me that the critical > > realist critique of the fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I > > attempted, in an email sent to them, to make a serious philosophical > > derivation of our obligations as scientists. Please look it over, I > > value > your trained philosophers' eyes: > > does my argument hold water or am I overlooking something, and is this > > identical to the critical realist critique? Here is what I sent: > > > > > > I agree that education about global warming is our most important > mission. > > Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As everyone knows, > > when the students come out of our classrooms, they see a world which > > is acting as if global warming was only marginally relevant. We > > cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission > > expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming > > is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this . > > Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission > > expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society > > denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I > > would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we > > have to > > *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to > > overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we > > commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our > > actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as > > scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for > > us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. > > > > There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical > > obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the > > truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are > > such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of > > course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is > > not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the > > envelope on this front. > > > > > > So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. > > If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. > > > > Hans E. > > > > Hans G. Ehrbar > http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar < > http://www.econ.utah.edu/%7Eehrbar> > > ehrbar at economics.utah.edu > > Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) > > 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ > > office) > > Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > --------------------------------- > > The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an > > exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland > > (SC 038302). > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ > > > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3778 (20090119) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mark Johnson Institute for Educational Cybernetics University of Bolton BL3 5AB Tel. 01204 903567 Mob. 0778 6064505 From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Wed Jan 21 02:51:22 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 09:51:22 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 14 In-Reply-To: <14a6419f0901201013g206effa5wc346e68c39ac8d08@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: The first thing to do is read up on the theory of explanatory critique. The best place to start is Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, section on 'Social Science as Critique: Facts, Values and Theories', pp. 54ff. I give a brief account of the issues in my entry on 'Critical naturalism' in Dictionary of CR, and Hugh Lacey (who disagrees that values can logically be derived from facts) has an entry on 'Explanatory critique'. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ng Foo Keong Sent: 20 January 2009 18:13 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 14 so, how does a critical realist work out the "ought" from the "is"? F.K. > ------------------------------ > > Message: 4 > Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 09:16:45 -0000 > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue > 13 > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > Dear Foo Keong > > I'm not sure if this is the right way to address you... > > One reason some people don't get it is because it's part of the > 'common sense' of the epoch that science can say nothing about values, > that they're just your arbitrary personal preferences, etc. People in > the West have been socialised to think that for centuries. Also, there > is resistance for political reasons to the notion that social science > is necessarily critical and emancipatory. > > Re a position being politically motivated etc, values can of course > and do enter into science - science is not value-free - but I would > argue that the only value that *necessarily* enters into a scientific > result is commitment to truth; if you really want to know you can and > do bracket other values such that they do not interfere with the > finding (which of course is fallible), assessing it in terms of > strictly cognitive criteria. I think this is Bhaskar's position, who > holds that his whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth. > > Mervyn > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ng > Foo Keong > Sent: 20 January 2009 08:02 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue > 13 > > hi everybody, > > i am a new-comer to critical realism. i am attracted to it because it > seems to be a refreshing change from the excesses of scientism and the > aimlessness of post-structuralism. > > this issue of "global warming" is a good opportunity for me to see how > this philosophy is being applied, as opposed to just reading it in > books and trying to figure things out in the abstract. > > commitment to /belief in a truth that is independent of observers does > not equate to one having everything worked out and every possible > angle covered with certainty. (now would this called 'ontic fallacy' > or 'epistemic fallacy' or just plain presumptiousness?) > > i would like to know, how would a critical realist anticipate and > address some of the possible critiques and rebuttals from the > post-structuralist camp or from other people e.g. that this is just a > p.o.v. that is has a history / context, blah blah blah ... that it > could be politically / financially motivated ... not to mention various conspiracy theories. > > why don't some people just "get it"? maybe they have valid reservations. > > F.K. Sophus Ng > PhD student > National Institute of Education, Singapore _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3784 (20090121) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From steveash at soton.ac.uk Wed Jan 21 03:21:57 2009 From: steveash at soton.ac.uk (Ash S.R.) Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 10:21:57 +0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] structual emergent properties Message-ID: sorry to raise a totally different subject while such an intresting debate is going on but... does any one know of where i can find a discussionof the concept of corperate manslaugter addressed by using the concept of structual emergent properties? thanks steve ash From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Wed Jan 21 04:33:10 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 11:33:10 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] structual emergent properties In-Reply-To: Message-ID: I don't know of anything specifically on coporate crime, but you might get some mileage out of the concept of 'structural sin', i.e. emergent social structures that are untrue to human nature - see the relevant parts of the entries in Dictionary of CR on 'demi-reality' and 'evil' and the references given. You're probably going to have to use CR resources to work out a position yourself. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ash S.R. Sent: 21 January 2009 10:22 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] structual emergent properties sorry to raise a totally different subject while such an intresting debate is going on but... does any one know of where i can find a discussionof the concept of corperate manslaugter addressed by using the concept of structual emergent properties? thanks steve ash _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3784 (20090121) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From dharvey at unr.nevada.edu Wed Jan 21 08:31:16 2009 From: dharvey at unr.nevada.edu (David Harvey) Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 07:31:16 -0800 Subject: [Critical-Realism] structual emergent properties In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <49773FC4.4040207@unr.nevada.edu> Ash S.R. wrote: >sorry to raise a totally different subject while such an intresting debate is going on but... >does any one know of where i can find a discussionof the concept of corperate manslaugter addressed by using the concept of structual emergent properties? >thanks >steve ash > > > >_______________________________________________ >Critical-Realism mailing list >Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > Please define "corporate manslaughter," I am not familiar with the concept. Dave Harvey. From louisirwin9 at aol.com Wed Jan 21 09:59:25 2009 From: louisirwin9 at aol.com (Louis Irwin) Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 11:59:25 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: <7alu89$381vf6@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: Hi Mervyn, The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth." Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based on instrumental values. You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with promising: if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that commitment). Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 3:40 AM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis I can't accept that lying is in any sense commitment to truth - it's commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud, although of course you do have to be consistent about it. Nor can I see any slide - my argument assumes truth-seeking. On looking again at your 'devil's advocate Humean critique' I can't see the point of it - are you saying that Hume's law isn't after all espoused by Humeans, it doesn't exist, it's just a figment of our imaginations or what? In what sense has a Humean accommodated my position as distinct from abandoning his own if he concedes that you can after all derive values from facts? Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis Irwin Sent: 20 January 2009 04:12 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Mervyn, Good points, however note that there is an ambiguity over "commitment to truth". If I make any kind of assertion, then I am certainly "committed to its truth" - even if I am lying. For example, if I say it is raining outside with the intention of deceiving you, my assertion nonetheless commits me to its truth, even though I know it is false. This is a sense of "commitment to truth" that John Searle explored many years ago in "Speech Acts", and relates to the Habermas view; it is "transcendentally necessary for any communication whatsoever" as you say. However there is a different sense of "commitment to truth" that someone can lack even when he/she has the first type of commitment. The second sort of "commitment to truth" involves a desire to communicate what happens to be true (and to refrain from communicating falsehoods); this is the commitment involved in what I called a "seeker of truth". A deceiver who has the first sort of "commitment to truth" lacks the second sort of commitment - the liar's communication transcendentally commits the liar to the truth of what he/she asserts, but the liar wants to communicate what he/she knows (or even just believes) to be false. [I believe that Searle responded along these lines to an essay by Habermas on Searle.] It seems to me that your position requires sliding mid-argument from the first type of "commitment to truth" to the second type. (My devil's advocate 'Humean critique' only involved the second type. And neither its premisses nor conclusion involve value assertions at all, although its conclusion can be parsed, as I noted, in terms of a Humean "ought".) Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 2:27 PM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis, Ruth My point, concretely illustrated, was that (1) fact: 'racism is false' and (2) fact: 'your beliefs are racist' DO logically entail (3) the valuation: 'you should change your racist beliefs', and that we (quite rightly) act as if this is the case all the time. Commitment to truth is intrinsic to what a fact is and transcendentally necessary for any communication whatsoever (Habermas' point) and so, as Bhaskar pointed out already in PON, 'cannot be seized upon as a concealed (value) premise to rescue the autonomy of values from factual discourse, without destroying the distinction between the two, the distinction that it is the point of the objection to uphold'. Ths is a point that is nearly always ignored by Bhaskar's critics on this issue. (The objection was that the premises include commitment to truth). Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff Sent: 19 January 2009 18:29 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism This is interesting. I think the Humean would just say that there is nothing about the fact(s) of the matter regarding P (or ~P) that will LOGICALLY require you to adopt the normative belief "I ought to pursue the truth regarding P" -- or even "I ought to be a truth-seeker generally." IFyou already are one, then various things follow. To my mind, the strong arguments against Hume are comprehensive ones, about what kinds of reactions to things are psychically viable, ultimately. A slightly narrower version would be Habermas' arguments about what is implied normatively by the fact of language. Sorry to just dip in, in this wildly unsatisfying way. r. On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 12:10 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > Hi Mervyn, > > Your point about changing opinions in the face of criticism is well > stated, but I wonder if Humeans could not accommodate the point within > their own framework. Here is the way a 'Humean critique' of an > opinion could go: > > 1. Premiss: You have some specific opinion - say a belief that P. > > 2. Grounds that P is false are presented here. > > 3. Anyone persuaded by the grounds in 2 will believe that P is false, > or at least refuse to believe that P is true, because either the > grounds logically entail that P is false, or they at least make it > empirically or scientifically likely. > > 4. Premiss: Up to now you have been a seeker of truth. > > 5. If a seeker of truth is shown that there are grounds to believe > that something is false, he/she will refuse to believe it [by the > meaning of a "seeker of truth"]. > > 6. You have been shown [in 2] that there are grounds to believe that P > is false. > > 7. Therefore if you are to remain a seeker of truth, then you must > change your opinion, either believing that P is false or at least > withholding your belief that it is true. > > Everything in this 'Humean critique' seems acceptable to a Humean, > including the conclusion. Note the conclusion can be read as "If you > want to remain a seeker of truth, then you ought to change your > opinion" - where the Humean "ought" is relative to an empirical desire > (namely to remain a seeker of truth). > > > Louis Irwin > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mervyn Hartwig > Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 8:02 AM > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > I agree. > > Of course, a large contingent of basic or original critical realists > are staunch upholders of 'Hume's Law', denying that it is logically > possible to get from facts to values, but every time they so much as > criticise an opinion they contradict this in practice, their message > being that the person should change the opinion, CP (other things > being equal), because it is mistaken, misleading etc. That we always > have to make a judgement as to whether things are indeed equal, i.e. > worse consequences won't ensue, is no different from the application > of any piece of science in open systems, e.g. > building a bridge or whatever. > > Mervyn > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > J.A.Toynbee > Sent: 19 January 2009 12:03 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > Hans, > > This is a brave and important move. The statement itself is clear and > well constructed. More importantly, it's the sort of call to action we > ought to be doing much more of in academia. Could we circulate it, or > a version of it, as model for others to use? > > Jason > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > ehrbar > Sent: 19 January 2009 11:15 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > > The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of > Utah are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat > rash proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University > President asking him to take a more active leadership regarding global > warming. During this discussion it occurred to me that the critical > realist critique of the fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I > attempted, in an email sent to them, to make a serious philosophical > derivation of our obligations as scientists. Please look it over, I > value your trained philosophers' eyes: > does my argument hold water or am I overlooking something, and is this > identical to the critical realist critique? Here is what I sent: > > > I agree that education about global warming is our most important mission. > Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As everyone knows, > when the students come out of our classrooms, they see a world which > is acting as if global warming was only marginally relevant. We > cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission > expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming > is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this . > Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission > expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society > denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I > would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we > have to > *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to > overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we > commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our > actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as > scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for > us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. > > There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical > obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the > truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are > such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of > course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is > not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the > envelope on this front. > > > So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. > If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. > > Hans E. > > Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar > ehrbar at economics.utah.edu > Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) > 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ > office) > Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > --------------------------------- > The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an > exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland > (SC 038302). > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3778 (20090119) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Wed Jan 21 15:24:44 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 22:24:44 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Hi Louis, Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, that values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with empirical realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing between (1) lying propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content (what they are 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of mass destruction" is designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to inducing people to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to either the communication or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is held to account socially, legally etc., that is an altogether different matter from his commitment - he wants to get away with it, and often does. Lying has a social context and truth-seeking as its condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to truth. The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to what a fact is - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the distinction between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point Bhaskar made in PON). Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor without clothes - because facts are the result of a social process of truth-seeking. There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves commmitted to this? Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary personal preference and instrumental reason. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis Irwin Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Mervyn, The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth." Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based on instrumental values. You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with promising: if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that commitment). Louis From gregoryarago at yahoo.ca Wed Jan 21 18:11:43 2009 From: gregoryarago at yahoo.ca (Gregory Arago) Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2009 17:11:43 -0800 (PST) Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <350412.98860.qm@web52401.mail.re2.yahoo.com> If you?folks will forgive a visit from out of nowhere, can I suggest a minor linguistic massage? ? Louis Irwin?writes: "the social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment" ? Why not instead say 'the social character of language'? This would instead imply personality and culture or civilisation and thus highlight human relationships. Is there any reason that 'character' shouldn't be seen as an appropriate substitute for 'nature' in the above expression? ? By signifying that language is 'natural' rather than 'personal' or 'characteristic' of people, there is a danger of falling into a naturalistic fallacy, which would imbalance the quest for truth expressed in this thread, even though Hume was not himself exposed to 'social science' as it is understood today, and thus cannot be guilty of knowing better.? ? Thank you?for considering?this?linguistic message. ? Gregory? --- On Wed, 1/21/09, Louis Irwin wrote: From: Louis Irwin Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Received: Wednesday, January 21, 2009, 7:59 PM Hi Mervyn, The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth." Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based on instrumental values. You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with promising: if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that commitment). Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 3:40 AM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis I can't accept that lying is in any sense commitment to truth - it's commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud, although of course you do have to be consistent about it. Nor can I see any slide - my argument assumes truth-seeking. On looking again at your 'devil's advocate Humean critique' I can't see the point of it - are you saying that Hume's law isn't after all espoused by Humeans, it doesn't exist, it's just a figment of our imaginations or what? In what sense has a Humean accommodated my position as distinct from abandoning his own if he concedes that you can after all derive values from facts? Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis Irwin Sent: 20 January 2009 04:12 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Mervyn, Good points, however note that there is an ambiguity over "commitment to truth". If I make any kind of assertion, then I am certainly "committed to its truth" - even if I am lying. For example, if I say it is raining outside with the intention of deceiving you, my assertion nonetheless commits me to its truth, even though I know it is false. This is a sense of "commitment to truth" that John Searle explored many years ago in "Speech Acts", and relates to the Habermas view; it is "transcendentally necessary for any communication whatsoever" as you say. However there is a different sense of "commitment to truth" that someone can lack even when he/she has the first type of commitment. The second sort of "commitment to truth" involves a desire to communicate what happens to be true (and to refrain from communicating falsehoods); this is the commitment involved in what I called a "seeker of truth". A deceiver who has the first sort of "commitment to truth" lacks the second sort of commitment - the liar's communication transcendentally commits the liar to the truth of what he/she asserts, but the liar wants to communicate what he/she knows (or even just believes) to be false. [I believe that Searle responded along these lines to an essay by Habermas on Searle.] It seems to me that your position requires sliding mid-argument from the first type of "commitment to truth" to the second type. (My devil's advocate 'Humean critique' only involved the second type. And neither its premisses nor conclusion involve value assertions at all, although its conclusion can be parsed, as I noted, in terms of a Humean "ought".) Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 2:27 PM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis, Ruth My point, concretely illustrated, was that (1) fact: 'racism is false' and (2) fact: 'your beliefs are racist' DO logically entail (3) the valuation: 'you should change your racist beliefs', and that we (quite rightly) act as if this is the case all the time. Commitment to truth is intrinsic to what a fact is and transcendentally necessary for any communication whatsoever (Habermas' point) and so, as Bhaskar pointed out already in PON, 'cannot be seized upon as a concealed (value) premise to rescue the autonomy of values from factual discourse, without destroying the distinction between the two, the distinction that it is the point of the objection to uphold'. Ths is a point that is nearly always ignored by Bhaskar's critics on this issue. (The objection was that the premises include commitment to truth). Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff Sent: 19 January 2009 18:29 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism This is interesting. I think the Humean would just say that there is nothing about the fact(s) of the matter regarding P (or ~P) that will LOGICALLY require you to adopt the normative belief "I ought to pursue the truth regarding P" -- or even "I ought to be a truth-seeker generally." IFyou already are one, then various things follow. To my mind, the strong arguments against Hume are comprehensive ones, about what kinds of reactions to things are psychically viable, ultimately. A slightly narrower version would be Habermas' arguments about what is implied normatively by the fact of language. Sorry to just dip in, in this wildly unsatisfying way. r. On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 12:10 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > Hi Mervyn, > > Your point about changing opinions in the face of criticism is well > stated, but I wonder if Humeans could not accommodate the point within > their own framework. Here is the way a 'Humean critique' of an > opinion could go: > > 1. Premiss: You have some specific opinion - say a belief that P. > > 2. Grounds that P is false are presented here. > > 3. Anyone persuaded by the grounds in 2 will believe that P is false, > or at least refuse to believe that P is true, because either the > grounds logically entail that P is false, or they at least make it > empirically or scientifically likely. > > 4. Premiss: Up to now you have been a seeker of truth. > > 5. If a seeker of truth is shown that there are grounds to believe > that something is false, he/she will refuse to believe it [by the > meaning of a "seeker of truth"]. > > 6. You have been shown [in 2] that there are grounds to believe that P > is false. > > 7. Therefore if you are to remain a seeker of truth, then you must > change your opinion, either believing that P is false or at least > withholding your belief that it is true. > > Everything in this 'Humean critique' seems acceptable to a Humean, > including the conclusion. Note the conclusion can be read as "If you > want to remain a seeker of truth, then you ought to change your > opinion" - where the Humean "ought" is relative to an empirical desire > (namely to remain a seeker of truth). > > > Louis Irwin > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mervyn Hartwig > Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 8:02 AM > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > I agree. > > Of course, a large contingent of basic or original critical realists > are staunch upholders of 'Hume's Law', denying that it is logically > possible to get from facts to values, but every time they so much as > criticise an opinion they contradict this in practice, their message > being that the person should change the opinion, CP (other things > being equal), because it is mistaken, misleading etc. That we always > have to make a judgement as to whether things are indeed equal, i.e. > worse consequences won't ensue, is no different from the application > of any piece of science in open systems, e.g. > building a bridge or whatever. > > Mervyn > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > J.A.Toynbee > Sent: 19 January 2009 12:03 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > Hans, > > This is a brave and important move. The statement itself is clear and > well constructed. More importantly, it's the sort of call to action we > ought to be doing much more of in academia. Could we circulate it, or > a version of it, as model for others to use? > > Jason > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > ehrbar > Sent: 19 January 2009 11:15 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > > The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of > Utah are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat > rash proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University > President asking him to take a more active leadership regarding global > warming. During this discussion it occurred to me that the critical > realist critique of the fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I > attempted, in an email sent to them, to make a serious philosophical > derivation of our obligations as scientists. Please look it over, I > value your trained philosophers' eyes: > does my argument hold water or am I overlooking something, and is this > identical to the critical realist critique? Here is what I sent: > > > I agree that education about global warming is our most important mission. > Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As everyone knows, > when the students come out of our classrooms, they see a world which > is acting as if global warming was only marginally relevant. We > cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission > expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming > is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this . > Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission > expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society > denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I > would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we > have to > *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to > overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we > commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our > actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as > scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for > us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. > > There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical > obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the > truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are > such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of > course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is > not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the > envelope on this front. > > > So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. > If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. > > Hans E. > > Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar > ehrbar at economics.utah.edu > Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) > 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ > office) > Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > --------------------------------- > The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an > exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland > (SC 038302). > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3778 (20090119) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________________________________________________________________ Instant Messaging, free SMS, sharing photos and more... Try the new Yahoo! Canada Messenger at http://ca.beta.messenger.yahoo.com/ From louisirwin9 at aol.com Sat Jan 24 19:29:11 2009 From: louisirwin9 at aol.com (Louis Irwin) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 21:29:11 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: <7alt5i$38351t@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: Mervyn, I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh please!! You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) for the sake of argument in order to see if the position holds up or falls apart shows that he/she just doesn't get the correct position. Is that the way your philosophy works? That would be to say that negative critiques do not work. My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the steps 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can criticize an opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have not identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a negative critique. Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to truth", because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if we have to give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth is accompanied by a subjective intention to communicate truths. Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental commitment. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis, Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, that values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with empirical realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing between (1) lying propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content (what they are 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of mass destruction" is designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to inducing people to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to either the communication or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is held to account socially, legally etc., that is an altogether different matter from his commitment - he wants to get away with it, and often does. Lying has a social context and truth-seeking as its condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to truth. The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to what a fact is - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the distinction between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point Bhaskar made in PON). Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor without clothes - because facts are the result of a social process of truth-seeking. There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves commmitted to this? Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary personal preference and instrumental reason. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis Irwin Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Mervyn, The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth." Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based on instrumental values. You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with promising: if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that commitment). Louis _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From louisirwin9 at aol.com Sat Jan 24 19:30:40 2009 From: louisirwin9 at aol.com (Louis Irwin) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 21:30:40 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: <350412.98860.qm@web52401.mail.re2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Hi Gregory, Yes, speaking of the "social nature" of something may be an unhappy phrase in various contexts, and what I meant would not change if you replace "nature" in that sentence by "character" or some other expression like "structure", etc. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Gregory Arago Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 8:12 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism If you?folks will forgive a visit from out of nowhere, can I suggest a minor linguistic massage? ? Louis Irwin?writes: "the social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment" ? Why not instead say 'the social character of language'? This would instead imply personality and culture or civilisation and thus highlight human relationships. Is there any reason that 'character' shouldn't be seen as an appropriate substitute for 'nature' in the above expression? ? By signifying that language is 'natural' rather than 'personal' or 'characteristic' of people, there is a danger of falling into a naturalistic fallacy, which would imbalance the quest for truth expressed in this thread, even though Hume was not himself exposed to 'social science' as it is understood today, and thus cannot be guilty of knowing better.? ? Thank you?for considering?this?linguistic message. ? Gregory? --- On Wed, 1/21/09, Louis Irwin wrote: From: Louis Irwin Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Received: Wednesday, January 21, 2009, 7:59 PM Hi Mervyn, The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth." Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based on instrumental values. You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with promising: if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that commitment). Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 3:40 AM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis I can't accept that lying is in any sense commitment to truth - it's commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud, although of course you do have to be consistent about it. Nor can I see any slide - my argument assumes truth-seeking. On looking again at your 'devil's advocate Humean critique' I can't see the point of it - are you saying that Hume's law isn't after all espoused by Humeans, it doesn't exist, it's just a figment of our imaginations or what? In what sense has a Humean accommodated my position as distinct from abandoning his own if he concedes that you can after all derive values from facts? Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis Irwin Sent: 20 January 2009 04:12 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Mervyn, Good points, however note that there is an ambiguity over "commitment to truth". If I make any kind of assertion, then I am certainly "committed to its truth" - even if I am lying. For example, if I say it is raining outside with the intention of deceiving you, my assertion nonetheless commits me to its truth, even though I know it is false. This is a sense of "commitment to truth" that John Searle explored many years ago in "Speech Acts", and relates to the Habermas view; it is "transcendentally necessary for any communication whatsoever" as you say. However there is a different sense of "commitment to truth" that someone can lack even when he/she has the first type of commitment. The second sort of "commitment to truth" involves a desire to communicate what happens to be true (and to refrain from communicating falsehoods); this is the commitment involved in what I called a "seeker of truth". A deceiver who has the first sort of "commitment to truth" lacks the second sort of commitment - the liar's communication transcendentally commits the liar to the truth of what he/she asserts, but the liar wants to communicate what he/she knows (or even just believes) to be false. [I believe that Searle responded along these lines to an essay by Habermas on Searle.] It seems to me that your position requires sliding mid-argument from the first type of "commitment to truth" to the second type. (My devil's advocate 'Humean critique' only involved the second type. And neither its premisses nor conclusion involve value assertions at all, although its conclusion can be parsed, as I noted, in terms of a Humean "ought".) Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 2:27 PM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis, Ruth My point, concretely illustrated, was that (1) fact: 'racism is false' and (2) fact: 'your beliefs are racist' DO logically entail (3) the valuation: 'you should change your racist beliefs', and that we (quite rightly) act as if this is the case all the time. Commitment to truth is intrinsic to what a fact is and transcendentally necessary for any communication whatsoever (Habermas' point) and so, as Bhaskar pointed out already in PON, 'cannot be seized upon as a concealed (value) premise to rescue the autonomy of values from factual discourse, without destroying the distinction between the two, the distinction that it is the point of the objection to uphold'. Ths is a point that is nearly always ignored by Bhaskar's critics on this issue. (The objection was that the premises include commitment to truth). Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff Sent: 19 January 2009 18:29 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism This is interesting. I think the Humean would just say that there is nothing about the fact(s) of the matter regarding P (or ~P) that will LOGICALLY require you to adopt the normative belief "I ought to pursue the truth regarding P" -- or even "I ought to be a truth-seeker generally." IFyou already are one, then various things follow. To my mind, the strong arguments against Hume are comprehensive ones, about what kinds of reactions to things are psychically viable, ultimately. A slightly narrower version would be Habermas' arguments about what is implied normatively by the fact of language. Sorry to just dip in, in this wildly unsatisfying way. r. On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 12:10 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > Hi Mervyn, > > Your point about changing opinions in the face of criticism is well > stated, but I wonder if Humeans could not accommodate the point within > their own framework. Here is the way a 'Humean critique' of an > opinion could go: > > 1. Premiss: You have some specific opinion - say a belief that P. > > 2. Grounds that P is false are presented here. > > 3. Anyone persuaded by the grounds in 2 will believe that P is false, > or at least refuse to believe that P is true, because either the > grounds logically entail that P is false, or they at least make it > empirically or scientifically likely. > > 4. Premiss: Up to now you have been a seeker of truth. > > 5. If a seeker of truth is shown that there are grounds to believe > that something is false, he/she will refuse to believe it [by the > meaning of a "seeker of truth"]. > > 6. You have been shown [in 2] that there are grounds to believe that P > is false. > > 7. Therefore if you are to remain a seeker of truth, then you must > change your opinion, either believing that P is false or at least > withholding your belief that it is true. > > Everything in this 'Humean critique' seems acceptable to a Humean, > including the conclusion. Note the conclusion can be read as "If you > want to remain a seeker of truth, then you ought to change your > opinion" - where the Humean "ought" is relative to an empirical desire > (namely to remain a seeker of truth). > > > Louis Irwin > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mervyn Hartwig > Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 8:02 AM > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > I agree. > > Of course, a large contingent of basic or original critical realists > are staunch upholders of 'Hume's Law', denying that it is logically > possible to get from facts to values, but every time they so much as > criticise an opinion they contradict this in practice, their message > being that the person should change the opinion, CP (other things > being equal), because it is mistaken, misleading etc. That we always > have to make a judgement as to whether things are indeed equal, i.e. > worse consequences won't ensue, is no different from the application > of any piece of science in open systems, e.g. > building a bridge or whatever. > > Mervyn > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > J.A.Toynbee > Sent: 19 January 2009 12:03 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > Hans, > > This is a brave and important move. The statement itself is clear and > well constructed. More importantly, it's the sort of call to action we > ought to be doing much more of in academia. Could we circulate it, or > a version of it, as model for others to use? > > Jason > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > ehrbar > Sent: 19 January 2009 11:15 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > > The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of > Utah are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat > rash proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University > President asking him to take a more active leadership regarding global > warming. During this discussion it occurred to me that the critical > realist critique of the fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I > attempted, in an email sent to them, to make a serious philosophical > derivation of our obligations as scientists. Please look it over, I > value your trained philosophers' eyes: > does my argument hold water or am I overlooking something, and is this > identical to the critical realist critique? Here is what I sent: > > > I agree that education about global warming is our most important mission. > Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As everyone knows, > when the students come out of our classrooms, they see a world which > is acting as if global warming was only marginally relevant. We > cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission > expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming > is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this . > Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission > expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society > denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I > would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we > have to > *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to > overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we > commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our > actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as > scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for > us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. > > There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical > obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the > truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are > such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of > course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is > not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the > envelope on this front. > > > So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. > If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. > > Hans E. > > Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar > ehrbar at economics.utah.edu > Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) > 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ > office) > Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > --------------------------------- > The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an > exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland > (SC 038302). > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3778 (20090119) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________________________________________________________________ Instant Messaging, free SMS, sharing photos and more... Try the new Yahoo! Canada Messenger at http://ca.beta.messenger.yahoo.com/ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From rgroff at slu.edu Sat Jan 24 20:09:30 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 21:09:30 -0600 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: References: <7alt5i$38351t@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: <6ad241360901241909g61967913w92a5f3cfff7fb99a@mail.gmail.com> Hi Louis, Yes, I think you are right that a Humean can say that, given his/her desire truth, s/he "ought" to reject p, upon being shown that it is false, and still not have gone from is to ought in the sense precluded by Hume. S/he could probably even deal with the transcendental/Habermas argument about language, too. At the transcendental level, I mean. The use of language in its primary mode doesn't imply that one *ought* be be a truth-seeker (in the relevant, transcendental sense); it implies that one is one, whether one likes it or not. It's all is's. The is-to-ought sell, there, is to say that the fact of being a language user logically implies that one ought not tell lies. My hunch is that what you need, in order to get LOGICAL implication from statements of fact to non-heteronomous normative statements, to use the Kantian parlance, is to be a particular kind of moral realist. I think to do it you need "facts" that are inherently normative. No? r. On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 8:29 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > > Mervyn, > > I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to > cheap > shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions > that you just don't get it." Oh please!! > > You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, > that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a > truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that someone (in this > case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) for the sake of > argument in order to see if the position holds up or falls apart shows that > he/she just doesn't get the correct position. Is that the way your > philosophy works? That would be to say that negative critiques do not work. > My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the steps > 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can criticize an > opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have not identified any > specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a negative critique. > Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. > > I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to truth", > because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if we have to > give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a "commitment to > truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth is accompanied by a > subjective intention to communicate truths. Otherwise, liars would be > exempted from the transcendental commitment. > > Louis > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn > Hartwig > Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > Hi Louis, > > Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other hand, it > could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't > get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, that > values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a > truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with empirical > realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing between (1) lying > propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content (what they are > 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of mass destruction" > is > designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an absence of > weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to inducing people > to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to either the > communication > or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is held to account socially, > legally etc., that is an altogether different matter from his commitment - > he wants to get away with it, and often does. Lying has a social context > and > truth-seeking as its condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to > truth. > > The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it allows, > with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to what a fact > is > - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not > necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow this - > facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the distinction > between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point Bhaskar made in > PON). > Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of > truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor without > clothes - because facts are the result of a social process of > truth-seeking. > > There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me that it > falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X is a fact; > you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves commmitted to this? > Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing truth-seeking > can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary personal preference and > instrumental reason. > > Mervyn > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis > Irwin > Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > Hi Mervyn, > > The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how a > Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to values, in > contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at it, there are no > transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a > transition > from empirically given desires (including a desire for truth) to what one > 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this > in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say > that > Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to > achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value > distinction > surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another post you stated > that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth." > Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based on > instrumental values. > > You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, to a > fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a truth, and > in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with > promising: > if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made a > promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such > promises > are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. A commitment > is > not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an objective grounding in > social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a "commitment to > truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the social > nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying > could not succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that > commitment). > > Louis > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk Sun Jan 25 04:35:43 2009 From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 11:35:43 +0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] transcendental commitment to truth Message-ID: Hi guys Sorry, I'm not following the detail of the arguments, but I think there is a simple sense in which the liar might be taken as having a commitment to truth; this is just the sense in which lying presupposes truth for its effectiveness; the sense used by Kant and Habermas. phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 25 January 2009 03:09 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 19 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Louis Irwin) 2. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Louis Irwin) 3. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 21:29:11 -0500 From: "Louis Irwin" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Mervyn, I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh please!! You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) for the sake of argument in order to see if the position holds up or falls apart shows that he/she just doesn't get the correct position. Is that the way your philosophy works? That would be to say that negative critiques do not work. My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the steps 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can criticize an opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have not identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a negative critique. Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to truth", because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if we have to give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth is accompanied by a subjective intention to communicate truths. Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental commitment. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis, Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, that values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with empirical realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing between (1) lying propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content (what they are 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of mass destruction" is designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to inducing people to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to either the communication or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is held to account socially, legally etc., that is an altogether different matter from his commitment - he wants to get away with it, and often does. Lying has a social context and truth-seeking as its condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to truth. The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to what a fact is - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the distinction between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point Bhaskar made in PON). Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor without clothes - because facts are the result of a social process of truth-seeking. There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves commmitted to this? Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary personal preference and instrumental reason. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis Irwin Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Mervyn, The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth." Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based on instrumental values. You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with promising: if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that commitment). Louis _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 21:30:40 -0500 From: "Louis Irwin" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Gregory, Yes, speaking of the "social nature" of something may be an unhappy phrase in various contexts, and what I meant would not change if you replace "nature" in that sentence by "character" or some other expression like "structure", etc. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Gregory Arago Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 8:12 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism If you?folks will forgive a visit from out of nowhere, can I suggest a minor linguistic massage? ? Louis Irwin?writes: "the social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment" ? Why not instead say 'the social character of language'? This would instead imply personality and culture or civilisation and thus highlight human relationships. Is there any reason that 'character' shouldn't be seen as an appropriate substitute for 'nature' in the above expression? ? By signifying that language is 'natural' rather than 'personal' or 'characteristic' of people, there is a danger of falling into a naturalistic fallacy, which would imbalance the quest for truth expressed in this thread, even though Hume was not himself exposed to 'social science' as it is understood today, and thus cannot be guilty of knowing better.? ? Thank you?for considering?this?linguistic message. ? Gregory? --- On Wed, 1/21/09, Louis Irwin wrote: From: Louis Irwin Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Received: Wednesday, January 21, 2009, 7:59 PM Hi Mervyn, The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth." Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based on instrumental values. You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with promising: if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that commitment). Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 3:40 AM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis I can't accept that lying is in any sense commitment to truth - it's commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud, although of course you do have to be consistent about it. Nor can I see any slide - my argument assumes truth-seeking. On looking again at your 'devil's advocate Humean critique' I can't see the point of it - are you saying that Hume's law isn't after all espoused by Humeans, it doesn't exist, it's just a figment of our imaginations or what? In what sense has a Humean accommodated my position as distinct from abandoning his own if he concedes that you can after all derive values from facts? Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis Irwin Sent: 20 January 2009 04:12 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Mervyn, Good points, however note that there is an ambiguity over "commitment to truth". If I make any kind of assertion, then I am certainly "committed to its truth" - even if I am lying. For example, if I say it is raining outside with the intention of deceiving you, my assertion nonetheless commits me to its truth, even though I know it is false. This is a sense of "commitment to truth" that John Searle explored many years ago in "Speech Acts", and relates to the Habermas view; it is "transcendentally necessary for any communication whatsoever" as you say. However there is a different sense of "commitment to truth" that someone can lack even when he/she has the first type of commitment. The second sort of "commitment to truth" involves a desire to communicate what happens to be true (and to refrain from communicating falsehoods); this is the commitment involved in what I called a "seeker of truth". A deceiver who has the first sort of "commitment to truth" lacks the second sort of commitment - the liar's communication transcendentally commits the liar to the truth of what he/she asserts, but the liar wants to communicate what he/she knows (or even just believes) to be false. [I believe that Searle responded along these lines to an essay by Habermas on Searle.] It seems to me that your position requires sliding mid-argument from the first type of "commitment to truth" to the second type. (My devil's advocate 'Humean critique' only involved the second type. And neither its premisses nor conclusion involve value assertions at all, although its conclusion can be parsed, as I noted, in terms of a Humean "ought".) Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 2:27 PM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis, Ruth My point, concretely illustrated, was that (1) fact: 'racism is false' and (2) fact: 'your beliefs are racist' DO logically entail (3) the valuation: 'you should change your racist beliefs', and that we (quite rightly) act as if this is the case all the time. Commitment to truth is intrinsic to what a fact is and transcendentally necessary for any communication whatsoever (Habermas' point) and so, as Bhaskar pointed out already in PON, 'cannot be seized upon as a concealed (value) premise to rescue the autonomy of values from factual discourse, without destroying the distinction between the two, the distinction that it is the point of the objection to uphold'. Ths is a point that is nearly always ignored by Bhaskar's critics on this issue. (The objection was that the premises include commitment to truth). Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff Sent: 19 January 2009 18:29 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism This is interesting. I think the Humean would just say that there is nothing about the fact(s) of the matter regarding P (or ~P) that will LOGICALLY require you to adopt the normative belief "I ought to pursue the truth regarding P" -- or even "I ought to be a truth-seeker generally." IFyou already are one, then various things follow. To my mind, the strong arguments against Hume are comprehensive ones, about what kinds of reactions to things are psychically viable, ultimately. A slightly narrower version would be Habermas' arguments about what is implied normatively by the fact of language. Sorry to just dip in, in this wildly unsatisfying way. r. On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 12:10 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > Hi Mervyn, > > Your point about changing opinions in the face of criticism is well > stated, but I wonder if Humeans could not accommodate the point within > their own framework. Here is the way a 'Humean critique' of an > opinion could go: > > 1. Premiss: You have some specific opinion - say a belief that P. > > 2. Grounds that P is false are presented here. > > 3. Anyone persuaded by the grounds in 2 will believe that P is false, > or at least refuse to believe that P is true, because either the > grounds logically entail that P is false, or they at least make it > empirically or scientifically likely. > > 4. Premiss: Up to now you have been a seeker of truth. > > 5. If a seeker of truth is shown that there are grounds to believe > that something is false, he/she will refuse to believe it [by the > meaning of a "seeker of truth"]. > > 6. You have been shown [in 2] that there are grounds to believe that P > is false. > > 7. Therefore if you are to remain a seeker of truth, then you must > change your opinion, either believing that P is false or at least > withholding your belief that it is true. > > Everything in this 'Humean critique' seems acceptable to a Humean, > including the conclusion. Note the conclusion can be read as "If you > want to remain a seeker of truth, then you ought to change your > opinion" - where the Humean "ought" is relative to an empirical desire > (namely to remain a seeker of truth). > > > Louis Irwin > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mervyn Hartwig > Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 8:02 AM > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > I agree. > > Of course, a large contingent of basic or original critical realists > are staunch upholders of 'Hume's Law', denying that it is logically > possible to get from facts to values, but every time they so much as > criticise an opinion they contradict this in practice, their message > being that the person should change the opinion, CP (other things > being equal), because it is mistaken, misleading etc. That we always > have to make a judgement as to whether things are indeed equal, i.e. > worse consequences won't ensue, is no different from the application > of any piece of science in open systems, e.g. > building a bridge or whatever. > > Mervyn > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > J.A.Toynbee > Sent: 19 January 2009 12:03 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > Hans, > > This is a brave and important move. The statement itself is clear and > well constructed. More importantly, it's the sort of call to action we > ought to be doing much more of in academia. Could we circulate it, or > a version of it, as model for others to use? > > Jason > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > ehrbar > Sent: 19 January 2009 11:15 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > > The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of > Utah are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat > rash proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University > President asking him to take a more active leadership regarding global > warming. During this discussion it occurred to me that the critical > realist critique of the fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I > attempted, in an email sent to them, to make a serious philosophical > derivation of our obligations as scientists. Please look it over, I > value your trained philosophers' eyes: > does my argument hold water or am I overlooking something, and is this > identical to the critical realist critique? Here is what I sent: > > > I agree that education about global warming is our most important mission. > Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As everyone knows, > when the students come out of our classrooms, they see a world which > is acting as if global warming was only marginally relevant. We > cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission > expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming > is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this . > Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission > expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society > denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I > would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we > have to > *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to > overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we > commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our > actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as > scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for > us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. > > There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical > obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the > truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are > such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of > course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is > not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the > envelope on this front. > > > So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. > If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. > > Hans E. > > Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar > ehrbar at economics.utah.edu > Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) > 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ > office) > Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > --------------------------------- > The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an > exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland > (SC 038302). > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3778 (20090119) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________________________________________________________________ Instant Messaging, free SMS, sharing photos and more... Try the new Yahoo! Canada Messenger at http://ca.beta.messenger.yahoo.com/ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 3 Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 21:09:30 -0600 From: Ruth Groff Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <6ad241360901241909g61967913w92a5f3cfff7fb99a at mail.gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Hi Louis, Yes, I think you are right that a Humean can say that, given his/her desire truth, s/he "ought" to reject p, upon being shown that it is false, and still not have gone from is to ought in the sense precluded by Hume. S/he could probably even deal with the transcendental/Habermas argument about language, too. At the transcendental level, I mean. The use of language in its primary mode doesn't imply that one *ought* be be a truth-seeker (in the relevant, transcendental sense); it implies that one is one, whether one likes it or not. It's all is's. The is-to-ought sell, there, is to say that the fact of being a language user logically implies that one ought not tell lies. My hunch is that what you need, in order to get LOGICAL implication from statements of fact to non-heteronomous normative statements, to use the Kantian parlance, is to be a particular kind of moral realist. I think to do it you need "facts" that are inherently normative. No? r. On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 8:29 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > > Mervyn, > > I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to > cheap > shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions > that you just don't get it." Oh please!! > > You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, > that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a > truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that someone (in this > case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) for the sake of > argument in order to see if the position holds up or falls apart shows that > he/she just doesn't get the correct position. Is that the way your > philosophy works? That would be to say that negative critiques do not work. > My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the steps > 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can criticize an > opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have not identified any > specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a negative critique. > Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. > > I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to truth", > because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if we have to > give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a "commitment to > truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth is accompanied by a > subjective intention to communicate truths. Otherwise, liars would be > exempted from the transcendental commitment. > > Louis > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn > Hartwig > Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > Hi Louis, > > Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other hand, it > could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't > get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, that > values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a > truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with empirical > realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing between (1) lying > propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content (what they are > 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of mass destruction" > is > designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an absence of > weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to inducing people > to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to either the > communication > or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is held to account socially, > legally etc., that is an altogether different matter from his commitment - > he wants to get away with it, and often does. Lying has a social context > and > truth-seeking as its condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to > truth. > > The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it allows, > with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to what a fact > is > - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not > necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow this - > facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the distinction > between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point Bhaskar made in > PON). > Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of > truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor without > clothes - because facts are the result of a social process of > truth-seeking. > > There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me that it > falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X is a fact; > you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves commmitted to this? > Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing truth-seeking > can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary personal preference and > instrumental reason. > > Mervyn > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis > Irwin > Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > Hi Mervyn, > > The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how a > Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to values, in > contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at it, there are no > transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a > transition > from empirically given desires (including a desire for truth) to what one > 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this > in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say > that > Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to > achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value > distinction > surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another post you stated > that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth." > Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based on > instrumental values. > > You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, to a > fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a truth, and > in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with > promising: > if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made a > promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such > promises > are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. A commitment > is > not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an objective grounding in > social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a "commitment to > truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the social > nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying > could not succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that > commitment). > > Louis > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 19 ************************************************ From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk Sun Jan 25 04:54:21 2009 From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 11:54:21 +0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] truth Message-ID: sorry, I'm a bit behind on this. my point has already been made by others. Louis, your Searlean distinction is helpful. I've often had a suspicion that there is some fudging going on in Bhaskar's treatment of facts/values. I may be missing something but I think the transition from 1) "racism is false" 2) you hold racist beliefs to 3 you ought to abandon racism, does conceal a prior value commitment to truth (in Searle's second sense). That is, the Searlean distinction Louis draws seems to imply only a minimal notion of truth as transcendentally necessary, whereas Bhaskar's move would require some other, more maximal notion of truth (i.e. Searle's second type). Generally I'm very wary of arguments that try to argue moral points solely on the basis of logic. MacIntyre makes this point in "On What Morality is Not". cheers phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 25 January 2009 03:09 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 19 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Louis Irwin) 2. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Louis Irwin) 3. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 21:29:11 -0500 From: "Louis Irwin" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Mervyn, I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh please!! You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) for the sake of argument in order to see if the position holds up or falls apart shows that he/she just doesn't get the correct position. Is that the way your philosophy works? That would be to say that negative critiques do not work. My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the steps 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can criticize an opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have not identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a negative critique. Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to truth", because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if we have to give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth is accompanied by a subjective intention to communicate truths. Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental commitment. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis, Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, that values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with empirical realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing between (1) lying propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content (what they are 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of mass destruction" is designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to inducing people to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to either the communication or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is held to account socially, legally etc., that is an altogether different matter from his commitment - he wants to get away with it, and often does. Lying has a social context and truth-seeking as its condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to truth. The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to what a fact is - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the distinction between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point Bhaskar made in PON). Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor without clothes - because facts are the result of a social process of truth-seeking. There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves commmitted to this? Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary personal preference and instrumental reason. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis Irwin Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Mervyn, The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth." Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based on instrumental values. You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with promising: if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that commitment). Louis _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 21:30:40 -0500 From: "Louis Irwin" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Gregory, Yes, speaking of the "social nature" of something may be an unhappy phrase in various contexts, and what I meant would not change if you replace "nature" in that sentence by "character" or some other expression like "structure", etc. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Gregory Arago Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 8:12 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism If you?folks will forgive a visit from out of nowhere, can I suggest a minor linguistic massage? ? Louis Irwin?writes: "the social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment" ? Why not instead say 'the social character of language'? This would instead imply personality and culture or civilisation and thus highlight human relationships. Is there any reason that 'character' shouldn't be seen as an appropriate substitute for 'nature' in the above expression? ? By signifying that language is 'natural' rather than 'personal' or 'characteristic' of people, there is a danger of falling into a naturalistic fallacy, which would imbalance the quest for truth expressed in this thread, even though Hume was not himself exposed to 'social science' as it is understood today, and thus cannot be guilty of knowing better.? ? Thank you?for considering?this?linguistic message. ? Gregory? --- On Wed, 1/21/09, Louis Irwin wrote: From: Louis Irwin Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Received: Wednesday, January 21, 2009, 7:59 PM Hi Mervyn, The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth." Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based on instrumental values. You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with promising: if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that commitment). Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 3:40 AM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis I can't accept that lying is in any sense commitment to truth - it's commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud, although of course you do have to be consistent about it. Nor can I see any slide - my argument assumes truth-seeking. On looking again at your 'devil's advocate Humean critique' I can't see the point of it - are you saying that Hume's law isn't after all espoused by Humeans, it doesn't exist, it's just a figment of our imaginations or what? In what sense has a Humean accommodated my position as distinct from abandoning his own if he concedes that you can after all derive values from facts? Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis Irwin Sent: 20 January 2009 04:12 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Mervyn, Good points, however note that there is an ambiguity over "commitment to truth". If I make any kind of assertion, then I am certainly "committed to its truth" - even if I am lying. For example, if I say it is raining outside with the intention of deceiving you, my assertion nonetheless commits me to its truth, even though I know it is false. This is a sense of "commitment to truth" that John Searle explored many years ago in "Speech Acts", and relates to the Habermas view; it is "transcendentally necessary for any communication whatsoever" as you say. However there is a different sense of "commitment to truth" that someone can lack even when he/she has the first type of commitment. The second sort of "commitment to truth" involves a desire to communicate what happens to be true (and to refrain from communicating falsehoods); this is the commitment involved in what I called a "seeker of truth". A deceiver who has the first sort of "commitment to truth" lacks the second sort of commitment - the liar's communication transcendentally commits the liar to the truth of what he/she asserts, but the liar wants to communicate what he/she knows (or even just believes) to be false. [I believe that Searle responded along these lines to an essay by Habermas on Searle.] It seems to me that your position requires sliding mid-argument from the first type of "commitment to truth" to the second type. (My devil's advocate 'Humean critique' only involved the second type. And neither its premisses nor conclusion involve value assertions at all, although its conclusion can be parsed, as I noted, in terms of a Humean "ought".) Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 2:27 PM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis, Ruth My point, concretely illustrated, was that (1) fact: 'racism is false' and (2) fact: 'your beliefs are racist' DO logically entail (3) the valuation: 'you should change your racist beliefs', and that we (quite rightly) act as if this is the case all the time. Commitment to truth is intrinsic to what a fact is and transcendentally necessary for any communication whatsoever (Habermas' point) and so, as Bhaskar pointed out already in PON, 'cannot be seized upon as a concealed (value) premise to rescue the autonomy of values from factual discourse, without destroying the distinction between the two, the distinction that it is the point of the objection to uphold'. Ths is a point that is nearly always ignored by Bhaskar's critics on this issue. (The objection was that the premises include commitment to truth). Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff Sent: 19 January 2009 18:29 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism This is interesting. I think the Humean would just say that there is nothing about the fact(s) of the matter regarding P (or ~P) that will LOGICALLY require you to adopt the normative belief "I ought to pursue the truth regarding P" -- or even "I ought to be a truth-seeker generally." IFyou already are one, then various things follow. To my mind, the strong arguments against Hume are comprehensive ones, about what kinds of reactions to things are psychically viable, ultimately. A slightly narrower version would be Habermas' arguments about what is implied normatively by the fact of language. Sorry to just dip in, in this wildly unsatisfying way. r. On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 12:10 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > Hi Mervyn, > > Your point about changing opinions in the face of criticism is well > stated, but I wonder if Humeans could not accommodate the point within > their own framework. Here is the way a 'Humean critique' of an > opinion could go: > > 1. Premiss: You have some specific opinion - say a belief that P. > > 2. Grounds that P is false are presented here. > > 3. Anyone persuaded by the grounds in 2 will believe that P is false, > or at least refuse to believe that P is true, because either the > grounds logically entail that P is false, or they at least make it > empirically or scientifically likely. > > 4. Premiss: Up to now you have been a seeker of truth. > > 5. If a seeker of truth is shown that there are grounds to believe > that something is false, he/she will refuse to believe it [by the > meaning of a "seeker of truth"]. > > 6. You have been shown [in 2] that there are grounds to believe that P > is false. > > 7. Therefore if you are to remain a seeker of truth, then you must > change your opinion, either believing that P is false or at least > withholding your belief that it is true. > > Everything in this 'Humean critique' seems acceptable to a Humean, > including the conclusion. Note the conclusion can be read as "If you > want to remain a seeker of truth, then you ought to change your > opinion" - where the Humean "ought" is relative to an empirical desire > (namely to remain a seeker of truth). > > > Louis Irwin > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mervyn Hartwig > Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 8:02 AM > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > I agree. > > Of course, a large contingent of basic or original critical realists > are staunch upholders of 'Hume's Law', denying that it is logically > possible to get from facts to values, but every time they so much as > criticise an opinion they contradict this in practice, their message > being that the person should change the opinion, CP (other things > being equal), because it is mistaken, misleading etc. That we always > have to make a judgement as to whether things are indeed equal, i.e. > worse consequences won't ensue, is no different from the application > of any piece of science in open systems, e.g. > building a bridge or whatever. > > Mervyn > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > J.A.Toynbee > Sent: 19 January 2009 12:03 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > Hans, > > This is a brave and important move. The statement itself is clear and > well constructed. More importantly, it's the sort of call to action we > ought to be doing much more of in academia. Could we circulate it, or > a version of it, as model for others to use? > > Jason > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > ehrbar > Sent: 19 January 2009 11:15 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > > The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of > Utah are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat > rash proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University > President asking him to take a more active leadership regarding global > warming. During this discussion it occurred to me that the critical > realist critique of the fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I > attempted, in an email sent to them, to make a serious philosophical > derivation of our obligations as scientists. Please look it over, I > value your trained philosophers' eyes: > does my argument hold water or am I overlooking something, and is this > identical to the critical realist critique? Here is what I sent: > > > I agree that education about global warming is our most important mission. > Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As everyone knows, > when the students come out of our classrooms, they see a world which > is acting as if global warming was only marginally relevant. We > cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission > expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming > is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this . > Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission > expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society > denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I > would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we > have to > *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to > overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we > commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our > actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as > scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for > us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. > > There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical > obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the > truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are > such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of > course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is > not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the > envelope on this front. > > > So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. > If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. > > Hans E. > > Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar > ehrbar at economics.utah.edu > Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) > 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ > office) > Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > --------------------------------- > The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an > exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland > (SC 038302). > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3778 (20090119) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________________________________________________________________ Instant Messaging, free SMS, sharing photos and more... Try the new Yahoo! Canada Messenger at http://ca.beta.messenger.yahoo.com/ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 3 Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 21:09:30 -0600 From: Ruth Groff Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <6ad241360901241909g61967913w92a5f3cfff7fb99a at mail.gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Hi Louis, Yes, I think you are right that a Humean can say that, given his/her desire truth, s/he "ought" to reject p, upon being shown that it is false, and still not have gone from is to ought in the sense precluded by Hume. S/he could probably even deal with the transcendental/Habermas argument about language, too. At the transcendental level, I mean. The use of language in its primary mode doesn't imply that one *ought* be be a truth-seeker (in the relevant, transcendental sense); it implies that one is one, whether one likes it or not. It's all is's. The is-to-ought sell, there, is to say that the fact of being a language user logically implies that one ought not tell lies. My hunch is that what you need, in order to get LOGICAL implication from statements of fact to non-heteronomous normative statements, to use the Kantian parlance, is to be a particular kind of moral realist. I think to do it you need "facts" that are inherently normative. No? r. On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 8:29 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > > Mervyn, > > I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to > cheap > shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions > that you just don't get it." Oh please!! > > You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, > that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a > truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that someone (in this > case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) for the sake of > argument in order to see if the position holds up or falls apart shows that > he/she just doesn't get the correct position. Is that the way your > philosophy works? That would be to say that negative critiques do not work. > My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the steps > 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can criticize an > opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have not identified any > specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a negative critique. > Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. > > I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to truth", > because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if we have to > give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a "commitment to > truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth is accompanied by a > subjective intention to communicate truths. Otherwise, liars would be > exempted from the transcendental commitment. > > Louis > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn > Hartwig > Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > Hi Louis, > > Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other hand, it > could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't > get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, that > values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a > truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with empirical > realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing between (1) lying > propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content (what they are > 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of mass destruction" > is > designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an absence of > weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to inducing people > to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to either the > communication > or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is held to account socially, > legally etc., that is an altogether different matter from his commitment - > he wants to get away with it, and often does. Lying has a social context > and > truth-seeking as its condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to > truth. > > The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it allows, > with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to what a fact > is > - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not > necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow this - > facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the distinction > between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point Bhaskar made in > PON). > Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of > truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor without > clothes - because facts are the result of a social process of > truth-seeking. > > There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me that it > falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X is a fact; > you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves commmitted to this? > Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing truth-seeking > can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary personal preference and > instrumental reason. > > Mervyn > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis > Irwin > Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > Hi Mervyn, > > The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how a > Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to values, in > contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at it, there are no > transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a > transition > from empirically given desires (including a desire for truth) to what one > 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this > in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say > that > Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to > achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value > distinction > surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another post you stated > that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth." > Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based on > instrumental values. > > You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, to a > fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a truth, and > in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with > promising: > if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made a > promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such > promises > are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. A commitment > is > not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an objective grounding in > social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a "commitment to > truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the social > nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying > could not succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that > commitment). > > Louis > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 19 ************************************************ From mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk Sun Jan 25 05:21:45 2009 From: mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk (Mark Johnson) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 12:21:45 +0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: <6ad241360901241909g61967913w92a5f3cfff7fb99a@mail.gmail.com> References: <7alt5i$38351t@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> <6ad241360901241909g61967913w92a5f3cfff7fb99a@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: Hans... are you still there? Personally, I've lost the will to live! If this is being practical about Critical Realism, then I think we need to revise our timescales for an emancipated society (by a few thousand years). Of course, by that time, we'll have toasted the planet anyway! Mark On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 3:09 AM, Ruth Groff wrote: > Hi Louis, > > Yes, I think you are right that a Humean can say that, given his/her desire > truth, s/he "ought" to reject p, upon being shown that it is false, and > still not have gone from is to ought in the sense precluded by Hume. S/he > could probably even deal with the transcendental/Habermas argument about > language, too. At the transcendental level, I mean. The use of language > in > its primary mode doesn't imply that one *ought* be be a truth-seeker (in > the > relevant, transcendental sense); it implies that one is one, whether one > likes it or not. It's all is's. The is-to-ought sell, there, is to say > that the fact of being a language user logically implies that one ought not > tell lies. > > My hunch is that what you need, in order to get LOGICAL implication from > statements of fact to non-heteronomous normative statements, to use the > Kantian parlance, is to be a particular kind of moral realist. I think to > do it you need "facts" that are inherently normative. > > No? > > r. > > > > On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 8:29 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > > > > > Mervyn, > > > > I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to > > cheap > > shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions > > that you just don't get it." Oh please!! > > > > You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of > argument, > > that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a > > truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that someone (in this > > case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) for the sake of > > argument in order to see if the position holds up or falls apart shows > that > > he/she just doesn't get the correct position. Is that the way your > > philosophy works? That would be to say that negative critiques do not > work. > > My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the > steps > > 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can criticize > an > > opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have not identified any > > specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a negative critique. > > Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. > > > > I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to > truth", > > because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if we have to > > give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a "commitment to > > truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth is accompanied by a > > subjective intention to communicate truths. Otherwise, liars would be > > exempted from the transcendental commitment. > > > > Louis > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mervyn > > Hartwig > > Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other hand, > it > > could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just > don't > > get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, that > > values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a > > truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with empirical > > realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing between (1) > lying > > propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content (what they are > > 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of mass destruction" > > is > > designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an absence > of > > weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to inducing > people > > to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to either the > > communication > > or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is held to account socially, > > legally etc., that is an altogether different matter from his commitment > - > > he wants to get away with it, and often does. Lying has a social context > > and > > truth-seeking as its condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to > > truth. > > > > The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it allows, > > with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to what a fact > > is > > - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not > > necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow this > - > > facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the distinction > > between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point Bhaskar made in > > PON). > > Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of > > truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor without > > clothes - because facts are the result of a social process of > > truth-seeking. > > > > There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me that > it > > falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X is a fact; > > you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves commmitted to > this? > > Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing > truth-seeking > > can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary personal preference and > > instrumental reason. > > > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis > > Irwin > > Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > > > Hi Mervyn, > > > > The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how a > > Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to values, in > > contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at it, there are > no > > transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a > > transition > > from empirically given desires (including a desire for truth) to what one > > 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but > this > > in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say > > that > > Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to > > achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value > > distinction > > surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another post you stated > > that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of > truth." > > Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based on > > instrumental values. > > > > You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, to > a > > fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a truth, > and > > in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with > > promising: > > if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made a > > promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such > > promises > > are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. A commitment > > is > > not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an objective grounding > in > > social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a "commitment > to > > truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the social > > nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying > > could not succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that > > commitment). > > > > Louis > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mark Johnson Institute for Educational Cybernetics University of Bolton BL3 5AB Tel. 01204 903567 Mob. 0778 6064505 From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Sun Jan 25 07:01:48 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 14:01:48 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] truth In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Hi Phil Nobody is trying to 'argue moral points solely on the basis of logic'. A whole process of detailed empirically based research goes into estabishing a fact, e.g. 'racism is false'. It is the Humeans who make logic the issue by maintaining that you can't get logically from facts to values - one has to clear away that road-block before proceeding and, especially if it comes to changing social structures that generate false ideas such as racism, many other arguments and types of assessment will be involved in any decision to act. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: 25 January 2009 11:54 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] truth sorry, I'm a bit behind on this. my point has already been made by others. Louis, your Searlean distinction is helpful. I've often had a suspicion that there is some fudging going on in Bhaskar's treatment of facts/values. I may be missing something but I think the transition from 1) "racism is false" 2) you hold racist beliefs to 3 you ought to abandon racism, does conceal a prior value commitment to truth (in Searle's second sense). That is, the Searlean distinction Louis draws seems to imply only a minimal notion of truth as transcendentally necessary, whereas Bhaskar's move would require some other, more maximal notion of truth (i.e. Searle's second type). Generally I'm very wary of arguments that try to argue moral points solely on the basis of logic. MacIntyre makes this point in "On What Morality is Not". cheers phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 25 January 2009 03:09 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 19 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Louis Irwin) 2. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Louis Irwin) 3. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 21:29:11 -0500 From: "Louis Irwin" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Mervyn, I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh please!! You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) for the sake of argument in order to see if the position holds up or falls apart shows that he/she just doesn't get the correct position. Is that the way your philosophy works? That would be to say that negative critiques do not work. My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the steps 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can criticize an opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have not identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a negative critique. Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to truth", because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if we have to give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth is accompanied by a subjective intention to communicate truths. Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental commitment. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis, Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, that values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with empirical realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing between (1) lying propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content (what they are 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of mass destruction" is designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to inducing people to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to either the communication or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is held to account socially, legally etc., that is an altogether different matter from his commitment - he wants to get away with it, and often does. Lying has a social context and truth-seeking as its condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to truth. The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to what a fact is - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the distinction between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point Bhaskar made in PON). Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor without clothes - because facts are the result of a social process of truth-seeking. There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves commmitted to this? Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary personal preference and instrumental reason. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis Irwin Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Mervyn, The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth." Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based on instrumental values. You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with promising: if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that commitment). Louis _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 21:30:40 -0500 From: "Louis Irwin" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Gregory, Yes, speaking of the "social nature" of something may be an unhappy phrase in various contexts, and what I meant would not change if you replace "nature" in that sentence by "character" or some other expression like "structure", etc. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Gregory Arago Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 8:12 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism If you?folks will forgive a visit from out of nowhere, can I suggest a minor linguistic massage? ? Louis Irwin?writes: "the social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment" ? Why not instead say 'the social character of language'? This would instead imply personality and culture or civilisation and thus highlight human relationships. Is there any reason that 'character' shouldn't be seen as an appropriate substitute for 'nature' in the above expression? ? By signifying that language is 'natural' rather than 'personal' or 'characteristic' of people, there is a danger of falling into a naturalistic fallacy, which would imbalance the quest for truth expressed in this thread, even though Hume was not himself exposed to 'social science' as it is understood today, and thus cannot be guilty of knowing better.? ? Thank you?for considering?this?linguistic message. ? Gregory? --- On Wed, 1/21/09, Louis Irwin wrote: From: Louis Irwin Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Received: Wednesday, January 21, 2009, 7:59 PM Hi Mervyn, The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth." Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based on instrumental values. You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with promising: if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that commitment). Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 3:40 AM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis I can't accept that lying is in any sense commitment to truth - it's commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud, although of course you do have to be consistent about it. Nor can I see any slide - my argument assumes truth-seeking. On looking again at your 'devil's advocate Humean critique' I can't see the point of it - are you saying that Hume's law isn't after all espoused by Humeans, it doesn't exist, it's just a figment of our imaginations or what? In what sense has a Humean accommodated my position as distinct from abandoning his own if he concedes that you can after all derive values from facts? Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis Irwin Sent: 20 January 2009 04:12 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Mervyn, Good points, however note that there is an ambiguity over "commitment to truth". If I make any kind of assertion, then I am certainly "committed to its truth" - even if I am lying. For example, if I say it is raining outside with the intention of deceiving you, my assertion nonetheless commits me to its truth, even though I know it is false. This is a sense of "commitment to truth" that John Searle explored many years ago in "Speech Acts", and relates to the Habermas view; it is "transcendentally necessary for any communication whatsoever" as you say. However there is a different sense of "commitment to truth" that someone can lack even when he/she has the first type of commitment. The second sort of "commitment to truth" involves a desire to communicate what happens to be true (and to refrain from communicating falsehoods); this is the commitment involved in what I called a "seeker of truth". A deceiver who has the first sort of "commitment to truth" lacks the second sort of commitment - the liar's communication transcendentally commits the liar to the truth of what he/she asserts, but the liar wants to communicate what he/she knows (or even just believes) to be false. [I believe that Searle responded along these lines to an essay by Habermas on Searle.] It seems to me that your position requires sliding mid-argument from the first type of "commitment to truth" to the second type. (My devil's advocate 'Humean critique' only involved the second type. And neither its premisses nor conclusion involve value assertions at all, although its conclusion can be parsed, as I noted, in terms of a Humean "ought".) Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 2:27 PM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis, Ruth My point, concretely illustrated, was that (1) fact: 'racism is false' and (2) fact: 'your beliefs are racist' DO logically entail (3) the valuation: 'you should change your racist beliefs', and that we (quite rightly) act as if this is the case all the time. Commitment to truth is intrinsic to what a fact is and transcendentally necessary for any communication whatsoever (Habermas' point) and so, as Bhaskar pointed out already in PON, 'cannot be seized upon as a concealed (value) premise to rescue the autonomy of values from factual discourse, without destroying the distinction between the two, the distinction that it is the point of the objection to uphold'. Ths is a point that is nearly always ignored by Bhaskar's critics on this issue. (The objection was that the premises include commitment to truth). Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff Sent: 19 January 2009 18:29 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism This is interesting. I think the Humean would just say that there is nothing about the fact(s) of the matter regarding P (or ~P) that will LOGICALLY require you to adopt the normative belief "I ought to pursue the truth regarding P" -- or even "I ought to be a truth-seeker generally." IFyou already are one, then various things follow. To my mind, the strong arguments against Hume are comprehensive ones, about what kinds of reactions to things are psychically viable, ultimately. A slightly narrower version would be Habermas' arguments about what is implied normatively by the fact of language. Sorry to just dip in, in this wildly unsatisfying way. r. On Mon, Jan 19, 2009 at 12:10 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > Hi Mervyn, > > Your point about changing opinions in the face of criticism is well > stated, but I wonder if Humeans could not accommodate the point within > their own framework. Here is the way a 'Humean critique' of an > opinion could go: > > 1. Premiss: You have some specific opinion - say a belief that P. > > 2. Grounds that P is false are presented here. > > 3. Anyone persuaded by the grounds in 2 will believe that P is false, > or at least refuse to believe that P is true, because either the > grounds logically entail that P is false, or they at least make it > empirically or scientifically likely. > > 4. Premiss: Up to now you have been a seeker of truth. > > 5. If a seeker of truth is shown that there are grounds to believe > that something is false, he/she will refuse to believe it [by the > meaning of a "seeker of truth"]. > > 6. You have been shown [in 2] that there are grounds to believe that P > is false. > > 7. Therefore if you are to remain a seeker of truth, then you must > change your opinion, either believing that P is false or at least > withholding your belief that it is true. > > Everything in this 'Humean critique' seems acceptable to a Humean, > including the conclusion. Note the conclusion can be read as "If you > want to remain a seeker of truth, then you ought to change your > opinion" - where the Humean "ought" is relative to an empirical desire > (namely to remain a seeker of truth). > > > Louis Irwin > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mervyn Hartwig > Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 8:02 AM > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > I agree. > > Of course, a large contingent of basic or original critical realists > are staunch upholders of 'Hume's Law', denying that it is logically > possible to get from facts to values, but every time they so much as > criticise an opinion they contradict this in practice, their message > being that the person should change the opinion, CP (other things > being equal), because it is mistaken, misleading etc. That we always > have to make a judgement as to whether things are indeed equal, i.e. > worse consequences won't ensue, is no different from the application > of any piece of science in open systems, e.g. > building a bridge or whatever. > > Mervyn > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > J.A.Toynbee > Sent: 19 January 2009 12:03 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > Hans, > > This is a brave and important move. The statement itself is clear and > well constructed. More importantly, it's the sort of call to action we > ought to be doing much more of in academia. Could we circulate it, or > a version of it, as model for others to use? > > Jason > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > ehrbar > Sent: 19 January 2009 11:15 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > > The environmental and sustainability instructors at the University of > Utah are involved in a heated discussion. It began with my somewhat > rash proposal to stage a sit-in at the office of the University > President asking him to take a more active leadership regarding global > warming. During this discussion it occurred to me that the critical > realist critique of the fact-value distinction applies. Therefore I > attempted, in an email sent to them, to make a serious philosophical > derivation of our obligations as scientists. Please look it over, I > value your trained philosophers' eyes: > does my argument hold water or am I overlooking something, and is this > identical to the critical realist critique? Here is what I sent: > > > I agree that education about global warming is our most important mission. > Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As everyone knows, > when the students come out of our classrooms, they see a world which > is acting as if global warming was only marginally relevant. We > cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission > expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming > is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this . > Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission > expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society > denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I > would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we > have to > *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to > overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we > commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our > actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as > scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for > us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. > > There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical > obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the > truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are > such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of > course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is > not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the > envelope on this front. > > > So far the excerpt from an email I just sent to a group of professors. > If you have feedback I would appreciate hearing about it. > > Hans E. > > Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar > ehrbar at economics.utah.edu > Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) > 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ > office) > Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > --------------------------------- > The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an > exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland > (SC 038302). > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3774 (20090117) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3778 (20090119) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________________________________________________________________ Instant Messaging, free SMS, sharing photos and more... Try the new Yahoo! Canada Messenger at http://ca.beta.messenger.yahoo.com/ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 3 Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2009 21:09:30 -0600 From: Ruth Groff Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <6ad241360901241909g61967913w92a5f3cfff7fb99a at mail.gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Hi Louis, Yes, I think you are right that a Humean can say that, given his/her desire truth, s/he "ought" to reject p, upon being shown that it is false, and still not have gone from is to ought in the sense precluded by Hume. S/he could probably even deal with the transcendental/Habermas argument about language, too. At the transcendental level, I mean. The use of language in its primary mode doesn't imply that one *ought* be be a truth-seeker (in the relevant, transcendental sense); it implies that one is one, whether one likes it or not. It's all is's. The is-to-ought sell, there, is to say that the fact of being a language user logically implies that one ought not tell lies. My hunch is that what you need, in order to get LOGICAL implication from statements of fact to non-heteronomous normative statements, to use the Kantian parlance, is to be a particular kind of moral realist. I think to do it you need "facts" that are inherently normative. No? r. On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 8:29 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > > Mervyn, > > I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to > cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean > assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh please!! > > You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of > argument, that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want > to remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that > someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) > for the sake of argument in order to see if the position holds up or > falls apart shows that he/she just doesn't get the correct position. > Is that the way your philosophy works? That would be to say that negative critiques do not work. > My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the > steps 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can > criticize an opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have > not identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a negative critique. > Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. > > I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to > truth", because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if > we have to give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a > "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth > is accompanied by a subjective intention to communicate truths. > Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental commitment. > > Louis > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mervyn Hartwig > Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > Hi Louis, > > Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other > hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that > you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes > of argument, that values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you > want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with > empirical realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing > between (1) lying propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content > (what they are 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of mass destruction" > is > designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an > absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to > inducing people to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to > either the communication or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is > held to account socially, legally etc., that is an altogether > different matter from his commitment - he wants to get away with it, > and often does. Lying has a social context and truth-seeking as its > condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to truth. > > The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it > allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to > what a fact is > - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not > necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow > this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the > distinction between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point > Bhaskar made in PON). > Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of > truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor > without clothes - because facts are the result of a social process of > truth-seeking. > > There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me > that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X > is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves commmitted to this? > Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing > truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary > personal preference and instrumental reason. > > Mervyn > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Louis Irwin > Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > Hi Mervyn, > > The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how > a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to > values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at > it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that > Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a > desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to > (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes > outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans > thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to > achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value > distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another > post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the > sole norm of truth." > Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based > on instrumental values. > > You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, > to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a > truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the > same with > promising: > if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made > a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such > promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. > A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an > objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that > a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what > his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the > liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the > liar was aware that he was making that commitment). > > Louis > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 19 ************************************************ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3798 (20090125) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Sun Jan 25 07:01:48 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 14:01:48 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Hi Louis, I said very clearly what I think the main defect in your 7 steps is. They treat truth-seeking as a personal preference when in fact it is intrinsic to what a fact is, i.e. the result of a social process, embodying commitment to deploy strictly cognitive criteria. (It can't be objected that this makes a fact 'normative' without destroying the distinction between facts and values, which the Humean wants to uphold. -Sorry to repeat a mantra, but what can else can one do if folks don't get it?). 'It is a fact that your opinion is false, therefore you ought to change it' cannot therefore be parsed as 'If you want to remain a truth-seeker.' etc. Re lying, I accept that it presupposes the commitment to truth embodied in discourse and praxis and as I think I've made clear I certainly don't want to give up on transcendental critique. But the act of lying and what is presupposed by it are hardly the same thing, and if lying transcendentally presupposes commitment to truth so does not-lying (communicating truth in your second sense) - one can't just split one off from the other, as in your Humean argument. As I implied, the difference between us here seems to me to come down to this: you are operating with an exclusively propositional understanding of truth, whereas for me truth is also and ultimately ontological and alethic. I can accept that the liar is committed to truth in a propositional sense in so far as he wants his false statement to be regarded as true, but this presupposes both a context of truth-seeking in your second sense and the falsity of the proposition in an ontological/ alethic sense. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis Irwin Sent: 25 January 2009 02:29 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Mervyn, I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh please!! You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) for the sake of argument in order to see if the position holds up or falls apart shows that he/she just doesn't get the correct position. Is that the way your philosophy works? That would be to say that negative critiques do not work. My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the steps 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can criticize an opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have not identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a negative critique. Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to truth", because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if we have to give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth is accompanied by a subjective intention to communicate truths. Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental commitment. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis, Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, that values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with empirical realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing between (1) lying propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content (what they are 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of mass destruction" is designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to inducing people to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to either the communication or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is held to account socially, legally etc., that is an altogether different matter from his commitment - he wants to get away with it, and often does. Lying has a social context and truth-seeking as its condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to truth. The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to what a fact is - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the distinction between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point Bhaskar made in PON). Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor without clothes - because facts are the result of a social process of truth-seeking. There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves commmitted to this? Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary personal preference and instrumental reason. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis Irwin Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Mervyn, The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth." Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based on instrumental values. You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with promising: if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that commitment). Louis _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3795 (20090123) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Sun Jan 25 07:11:59 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 14:11:59 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Hi Mark I can relate to your sentiment, but the struggle necessarily goes on at all levels, including the level of philosophy. At least I'm trying to defend the kind of argument Hans is making, whereas the import of what Louis et al are saying is that it is illicit. The current thread started when I commented re Hans: 'Of course, a large contingent of basic or original critical realists are staunch upholders of 'Hume's Law', denying that it is logically possible to get from facts to values' -- and lo, it is so. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark Johnson Sent: 25 January 2009 12:22 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hans... are you still there? Personally, I've lost the will to live! If this is being practical about Critical Realism, then I think we need to revise our timescales for an emancipated society (by a few thousand years). Of course, by that time, we'll have toasted the planet anyway! Mark On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 3:09 AM, Ruth Groff wrote: > Hi Louis, > > Yes, I think you are right that a Humean can say that, given his/her > desire truth, s/he "ought" to reject p, upon being shown that it is > false, and still not have gone from is to ought in the sense precluded > by Hume. S/he could probably even deal with the > transcendental/Habermas argument about language, too. At the > transcendental level, I mean. The use of language in its primary mode > doesn't imply that one *ought* be be a truth-seeker (in the relevant, > transcendental sense); it implies that one is one, whether one likes > it or not. It's all is's. The is-to-ought sell, there, is to say > that the fact of being a language user logically implies that one > ought not tell lies. > > My hunch is that what you need, in order to get LOGICAL implication > from statements of fact to non-heteronomous normative statements, to > use the Kantian parlance, is to be a particular kind of moral realist. > I think to do it you need "facts" that are inherently normative. > > No? > > r. > > > > On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 8:29 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > > > > > Mervyn, > > > > I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting > > to cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with > > Humean assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh please!! > > > > You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of > argument, > > that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want to > > remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that > > someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position (here, > > Hume's) for the sake of argument in order to see if the position > > holds up or falls apart shows > that > > he/she just doesn't get the correct position. Is that the way your > > philosophy works? That would be to say that negative critiques do > > not > work. > > My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of > > the > steps > > 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can > > criticize > an > > opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have not > > identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a negative critique. > > Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. > > > > I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to > truth", > > because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if we > > have to give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a > > "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth > > is accompanied by a subjective intention to communicate truths. > > Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental commitment. > > > > Louis > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mervyn > > Hartwig > > Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other > > hand, > it > > could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just > don't > > get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, > > that values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you want to > > remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with > > empirical realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing > > between (1) > lying > > propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content (what they are > > 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of mass destruction" > > is > > designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an > > absence > of > > weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to inducing > people > > to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to either the > > communication or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is held to > > account socially, legally etc., that is an altogether different > > matter from his commitment > - > > he wants to get away with it, and often does. Lying has a social > > context and truth-seeking as its condition, but that hardly makes it > > a commitment to truth. > > > > The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it > > allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic > > to what a fact is > > - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and > > not necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't > > allow this > - > > facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the > > distinction between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point > > Bhaskar made in PON). > > Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out > > of truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor > > without clothes - because facts are the result of a social process > > of truth-seeking. > > > > There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me > > that > it > > falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X is a > > fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves > > commmitted to > this? > > Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing > truth-seeking > > can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary personal preference > > and instrumental reason. > > > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Louis Irwin > > Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > > > Hi Mervyn, > > > > The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show > > how a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to > > values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at > > it, there are > no > > transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a > > transition from empirically given desires (including a desire for > > truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) > > achieve those desires, but > this > > in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might > > say that Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' > > (if you want to achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on > > the fact/value distinction surely has to be much stronger. > > Incidentally, in another post you stated that RB's "whole > > philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of > truth." > > Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based > > on instrumental values. > > > > You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of > > truth, to > a > > fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a > > truth, > and > > in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with > > promising: > > if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby > > made a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing > > so. Such promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my > > intentions were. A commitment is not just a subjective state of > > mind, it also has an objective grounding > in > > social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a > > "commitment > to > > truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the > > social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a > > commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the liar was aware > > that he was making that commitment). > > > > Louis > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- Mark Johnson Institute for Educational Cybernetics University of Bolton BL3 5AB Tel. 01204 903567 Mob. 0778 6064505 _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3798 (20090125) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From nellhaus at mail.com Sun Jan 25 08:15:34 2009 From: nellhaus at mail.com (Tobin Nellhaus) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 10:15:34 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: <7alu89$39nla6@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> References: <7alu89$39nla6@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: <082F6DD7FAEB48ED90D757B2CFBC8AE3@Godiva> Hi Mervyn-- At the risk of getting too embroiled in this, I'm not following your argument here: > I said very clearly what I think the main defect in your 7 steps is. They > treat truth-seeking as a personal preference when in fact it is intrinsic > to what a fact is, i.e. the result of a social process, embodying > commitment > to deploy strictly cognitive criteria. You appear to be arguing that a goal (in this instance, truth) is embodied by a result (in your example, a fact), and *therefore* adopting that goal is not a personal preference. But truth can quite easily be a personal preference without in any way changing the fact that knowledge results from social activity: those who prefer to seek truth collectively produce facts; those who don't, dont. I am *not* presenting this as an argument for the idea that truth is a personal preference, I'm only saying that your argument against that position doesn't hold water. There maybe better arguments against it. I'm not sure how you would disprove that personal preference is required for truth-seeking, however. Let's assume for the moment that for various reasons, one social group finds that its interests are better served by lies than by truth. Let's say, again for the sake of argument, that the bourgeoisie is one such social group. How, then, does one explain the scientists, social activists, socialists (Engels?) and I think you would accept as being committed to truth-finding and truth-telling, yet emerged from the bourgeoisie? Even if one relies on the role of possible counter-tendencies working on these people, nevertheless you *are* talking about tendencies, to which there are exceptions, and at some point the explanation for these individuals' commitments has to turn to their personal choices. My point is I think consistent with Archer's distinctions between agent, actor and person. So while I can imagine an argument that a commitment to truth-seeking is *more* than a personal preference, I don't think you can eliminate personal preference from it. > Re lying, I accept that it presupposes the commitment to truth embodied in > discourse and praxis and as I think I've made clear I certainly don't want > to give up on transcendental critique. But the act of lying and what is > presupposed by it are hardly the same thing, and if lying transcendentally > presupposes commitment to truth so does not-lying (communicating truth in > your second sense) - one can't just split one off from the other, as in > your > Humean argument. As I understood Louis's argument, the liar's commitment to truth is transcendental in the sense that one can't tell a lie without implicitly committing to the idea that there *is* such a thing as truth -- not in the sense of committing a liar to finding or telling the truth (which is what your phrase "committment to truth" seems to entail). So Louis's position seems parallel to RB's argument that irrealisms like positivism and relativism ultimately depend on realist assumptions: "realism is inexorable," or something to that effect. Thanks, Tobin ----- Original Message ----- From: "Mervyn Hartwig" To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2009 9:01 AM Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > Hi Louis, > > I said very clearly what I think the main defect in your 7 steps is. They > treat truth-seeking as a personal preference when in fact it is intrinsic > to what a fact is, i.e. the result of a social process, embodying > commitment > to deploy strictly cognitive criteria. (It can't be objected that this > makes > a fact 'normative' without destroying the distinction between facts and > values, which the Humean wants to uphold. -Sorry to repeat a mantra, but > what can else can one do if folks don't get it?). 'It is a fact that your > opinion is false, therefore you ought to change it' cannot therefore be > parsed as 'If you want to remain a truth-seeker.' etc. > > Re lying, I accept that it presupposes the commitment to truth embodied in > discourse and praxis and as I think I've made clear I certainly don't want > to give up on transcendental critique. But the act of lying and what is > presupposed by it are hardly the same thing, and if lying transcendentally > presupposes commitment to truth so does not-lying (communicating truth in > your second sense) - one can't just split one off from the other, as in > your > Humean argument. As I implied, the difference between us here seems to me > to come down to this: you are operating with an exclusively propositional > understanding of truth, whereas for me truth is also and ultimately > ontological and alethic. I can accept that the liar is committed to truth > in a propositional sense in so far as he wants his false statement to be > regarded as true, but this presupposes both a context of truth-seeking in > your second sense and the falsity of the proposition in an ontological/ > alethic sense. > > > Mervyn > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis > Irwin > Sent: 25 January 2009 02:29 > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > > Mervyn, > > I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to > cheap > shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions > that you just don't get it." Oh please!! > > You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, > that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a > truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that someone (in this > case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) for the sake of > argument in order to see if the position holds up or falls apart shows > that > he/she just doesn't get the correct position. Is that the way your > philosophy works? That would be to say that negative critiques do not > work. > My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the > steps > 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can criticize an > opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have not identified any > specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a negative critique. > Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. > > I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to truth", > because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if we have to > give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a "commitment to > truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth is accompanied by a > subjective intention to communicate truths. Otherwise, liars would be > exempted from the transcendental commitment. > > Louis > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn > Hartwig > Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > Hi Louis, > > Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other hand, it > could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't > get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, that > values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a > truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with empirical > realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing between (1) > lying > propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content (what they are > 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of mass destruction" > is > designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an absence > of > weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to inducing > people > to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to either the > communication > or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is held to account socially, > legally etc., that is an altogether different matter from his commitment - > he wants to get away with it, and often does. Lying has a social context > and > truth-seeking as its condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to > truth. > > The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it allows, > with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to what a fact > is > - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not > necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow > this - > facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the distinction > between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point Bhaskar made in > PON). > Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of > truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor without > clothes - because facts are the result of a social process of > truth-seeking. > > There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me that > it > falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X is a fact; > you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves commmitted to this? > Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing truth-seeking > can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary personal preference and > instrumental reason. > > Mervyn > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis > Irwin > Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > Hi Mervyn, > > The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how a > Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to values, in > contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at it, there are no > transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a > transition > from empirically given desires (including a desire for truth) to what one > 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this > in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say > that > Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to > achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value > distinction > surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another post you stated > that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of > truth." > Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based on > instrumental values. > > You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, to a > fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a truth, and > in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with > promising: > if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made a > promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such > promises > are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. A commitment > is > not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an objective grounding in > social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a "commitment to > truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the social > nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying > could not succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that > commitment). > > Louis > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3795 (20090123) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk Sun Jan 25 08:26:55 2009 From: mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk (Mark Johnson) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 15:26:55 +0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: <7alu89$39nn7u@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> References: <7alu89$39nn7u@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: Hi Mervyn, Hans, Yes, I agree that the struggle goes on at all levels. From what I understand from Hans, he is trying initiative some sort of policy shift in his University regarding the treatment of environmental issues. Great! (something similar is going on the UK, with some effect). I'm interested in Policy shifts generally - they are incredibly difficult, and in understanding why, CR can be helpful (there are mechanisms we need to uncover as to how to effect change in institutions). My frustration is that we (in this discussion at least) don't really face up to these real problems of effecting institutional change. Some mechanisms which I've been working with recently (as a rough working guide at least) involve the multiple levels of conversation which exist within institutions. Individual differences amongst institutional stakeholders amount to different sorts of conversations they have - some philosophical, some strategic, some operational, etc. I think that an intervention at one level only will not work (my worry about Hans' letter). Somehow a balance must be found between exhortation (which is pretty much what he's doing), coercion and disruption (any other levels?). Those stakeholders working with a primarily operational view of the institution tend not to respond to exhortation alone. This is what Hans is trying to do (Hans, please correct me if I'm wrong). Here CR, IMO, is being focused on the wrong thing for it to be effective. Rather than focus on the issue, perhaps focus on the institution and the challenge of changing people. Cheers, Mark On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 2:11 PM, Mervyn Hartwig wrote: > Hi Mark > > I can relate to your sentiment, but the struggle necessarily goes on at all > levels, including the level of philosophy. At least I'm trying to defend > the > kind of argument Hans is making, whereas the import of what Louis et al are > saying is that it is illicit. The current thread started when I commented > re > Hans: 'Of course, a large contingent of basic or original critical realists > are staunch upholders of 'Hume's Law', denying that it is logically > possible > to get from facts to values' -- and lo, it is so. > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark > Johnson > Sent: 25 January 2009 12:22 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > Hans... are you still there? Personally, I've lost the will to live! > > If this is being practical about Critical Realism, then I think we need to > revise our timescales for an emancipated society (by a few thousand years). > Of course, by that time, we'll have toasted the planet anyway! > > Mark > > On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 3:09 AM, Ruth Groff wrote: > > > Hi Louis, > > > > Yes, I think you are right that a Humean can say that, given his/her > > desire truth, s/he "ought" to reject p, upon being shown that it is > > false, and still not have gone from is to ought in the sense precluded > > by Hume. S/he could probably even deal with the > > transcendental/Habermas argument about language, too. At the > > transcendental level, I mean. The use of language in its primary mode > > doesn't imply that one *ought* be be a truth-seeker (in the relevant, > > transcendental sense); it implies that one is one, whether one likes > > it or not. It's all is's. The is-to-ought sell, there, is to say > > that the fact of being a language user logically implies that one > > ought not tell lies. > > > > My hunch is that what you need, in order to get LOGICAL implication > > from statements of fact to non-heteronomous normative statements, to > > use the Kantian parlance, is to be a particular kind of moral realist. > > I think to do it you need "facts" that are inherently normative. > > > > No? > > > > r. > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 8:29 PM, Louis Irwin > wrote: > > > > > > > > Mervyn, > > > > > > I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting > > > to cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with > > > Humean assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh please!! > > > > > > You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of > > argument, > > > that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want to > > > remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that > > > someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position (here, > > > Hume's) for the sake of argument in order to see if the position > > > holds up or falls apart shows > > that > > > he/she just doesn't get the correct position. Is that the way your > > > philosophy works? That would be to say that negative critiques do > > > not > > work. > > > My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of > > > the > > steps > > > 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can > > > criticize > > an > > > opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have not > > > identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a > negative critique. > > > Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. > > > > > > I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to > > truth", > > > because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if we > > > have to give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a > > > "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth > > > is accompanied by a subjective intention to communicate truths. > > > Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental commitment. > > > > > > Louis > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Mervyn > > > Hartwig > > > Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM > > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > > Realism > > > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > > > Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other > > > hand, > > it > > > could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just > > don't > > > get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, > > > that values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you want to > > > remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with > > > empirical realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing > > > between (1) > > lying > > > propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content (what they are > > > 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of mass > destruction" > > > is > > > designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an > > > absence > > of > > > weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to inducing > > people > > > to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to either the > > > communication or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is held to > > > account socially, legally etc., that is an altogether different > > > matter from his commitment > > - > > > he wants to get away with it, and often does. Lying has a social > > > context and truth-seeking as its condition, but that hardly makes it > > > a commitment to truth. > > > > > > The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it > > > allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic > > > to what a fact is > > > - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and > > > not necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't > > > allow this > > - > > > facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the > > > distinction between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point > > > Bhaskar made in PON). > > > Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out > > > of truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor > > > without clothes - because facts are the result of a social process > > > of truth-seeking. > > > > > > There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me > > > that > > it > > > falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X is a > > > fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves > > > commmitted to > > this? > > > Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing > > truth-seeking > > > can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary personal preference > > > and instrumental reason. > > > > > > Mervyn > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > > Louis Irwin > > > Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 > > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > > Realism > > > > > > Hi Mervyn, > > > > > > The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show > > > how a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to > > > values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at > > > it, there are > > no > > > transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a > > > transition from empirically given desires (including a desire for > > > truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) > > > achieve those desires, but > > this > > > in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might > > > say that Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' > > > (if you want to achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on > > > the fact/value distinction surely has to be much stronger. > > > Incidentally, in another post you stated that RB's "whole > > > philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of > > truth." > > > Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based > > > on instrumental values. > > > > > > You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of > > > truth, to > > a > > > fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a > > > truth, > > and > > > in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with > > > promising: > > > if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby > > > made a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing > > > so. Such promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my > > > intentions were. A commitment is not just a subjective state of > > > mind, it also has an objective grounding > > in > > > social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a > > > "commitment > > to > > > truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the > > > social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a > > > commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the liar was aware > > > that he was making that commitment). > > > > > > Louis > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > -- > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > ----- > Mark Johnson > Institute for Educational Cybernetics > University of Bolton > BL3 5AB > Tel. 01204 903567 > Mob. 0778 6064505 > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3798 (20090125) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mark Johnson Institute for Educational Cybernetics University of Bolton BL3 5AB Tel. 01204 903567 Mob. 0778 6064505 From lefouque at gmail.com Sun Jan 25 08:55:13 2009 From: lefouque at gmail.com (Ng Foo Keong) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 23:55:13 +0800 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 23 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <14a6419f0901250755k4cdbacb0jf45c4389e4991cb7@mail.gmail.com> Mervyn: I think Louis is just playing the devil's advocate by considering the Humean critique. if a position (such as the thesis that we can derive values from facts) is solid indeed, it should be able to withstand the fiercest criticism. your argument should not be like preaching to the choir, but you should be able to convince the enemy (who may not share your assumptions). In fact, i think we should take the bull by the horns. Assume Hume was right -- then find a way for him to contradict himself. Can we? regards, F.K. > Message: 1 > Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 14:01:48 -0000 > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > Hi Louis, > > I said very clearly what I think the main defect in your 7 steps is. They > treat truth-seeking as a personal preference when in fact it is intrinsic > to what a fact is, i.e. the result of a social process, embodying commitment > to deploy strictly cognitive criteria. (It can't be objected that this makes > a fact 'normative' without destroying the distinction between facts and > values, which the Humean wants to uphold. -Sorry to repeat a mantra, but > what can else can one do if folks don't get it?). 'It is a fact that your > opinion is false, therefore you ought to change it' cannot therefore be > parsed as 'If you want to remain a truth-seeker.' etc. > > Re lying, I accept that it presupposes the commitment to truth embodied in > discourse and praxis and as I think I've made clear I certainly don't want > to give up on transcendental critique. But the act of lying and what is > presupposed by it are hardly the same thing, and if lying transcendentally > presupposes commitment to truth so does not-lying (communicating truth in > your second sense) - one can't just split one off from the other, as in your > Humean argument. As I implied, the difference between us here seems to me > to come down to this: you are operating with an exclusively propositional > understanding of truth, whereas for me truth is also and ultimately > ontological and alethic. I can accept that the liar is committed to truth > in a propositional sense in so far as he wants his false statement to be > regarded as true, but this presupposes both a context of truth-seeking in > your second sense and the falsity of the proposition in an ontological/ > alethic sense. > > > Mervyn From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Sun Jan 25 11:41:32 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 18:41:32 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 23 In-Reply-To: <14a6419f0901250755k4cdbacb0jf45c4389e4991cb7@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: I'd be inclined to say it doesn't need a Devil's advocate because the Devil himself supports it! Can one convince the Devil? M PS. You could say, to switch metaphors, I myself am stirring the pot or rattling the bars a bit. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ng Foo Keong Sent: 25 January 2009 15:55 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 23 Mervyn: I think Louis is just playing the devil's advocate by considering the Humean critique. if a position (such as the thesis that we can derive values from facts) is solid indeed, it should be able to withstand the fiercest criticism. your argument should not be like preaching to the choir, but you should be able to convince the enemy (who may not share your assumptions). In fact, i think we should take the bull by the horns. Assume Hume was right -- then find a way for him to contradict himself. Can we? regards, F.K. > Message: 1 > Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 14:01:48 -0000 > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > Hi Louis, > > I said very clearly what I think the main defect in your 7 steps is. > They treat truth-seeking as a personal preference when in fact it is > intrinsic to what a fact is, i.e. the result of a social process, > embodying commitment to deploy strictly cognitive criteria. (It can't > be objected that this makes a fact 'normative' without destroying the > distinction between facts and values, which the Humean wants to > uphold. -Sorry to repeat a mantra, but what can else can one do if > folks don't get it?). 'It is a fact that your opinion is false, > therefore you ought to change it' cannot therefore be parsed as 'If you want to remain a truth-seeker.' etc. > > Re lying, I accept that it presupposes the commitment to truth > embodied in discourse and praxis and as I think I've made clear I > certainly don't want to give up on transcendental critique. But the > act of lying and what is presupposed by it are hardly the same thing, > and if lying transcendentally presupposes commitment to truth so does > not-lying (communicating truth in your second sense) - one can't just > split one off from the other, as in your Humean argument. As I > implied, the difference between us here seems to me to come down to > this: you are operating with an exclusively propositional > understanding of truth, whereas for me truth is also and ultimately > ontological and alethic. I can accept that the liar is committed to > truth in a propositional sense in so far as he wants his false > statement to be regarded as true, but this presupposes both a context > of truth-seeking in your second sense and the falsity of the proposition in an ontological/ alethic sense. > > > Mervyn _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3798 (20090125) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From rgroff at slu.edu Sun Jan 25 12:05:09 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 13:05:09 -0600 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 23 In-Reply-To: <7alu89$39p7a2@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> References: <14a6419f0901250755k4cdbacb0jf45c4389e4991cb7@mail.gmail.com> <7alu89$39p7a2@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: <6ad241360901251105u19275e7fh4c28274127806282@mail.gmail.com> Hi Mervyn, everybody, I don't understand why you say that Louis "just doesn't get it." I mean, at most he simply disagrees with Bhaskar on this point, as Hugh does, and perhaps Phil, and no doubt others who aren't particularly attached to Hume, to empiricism and/or to non-dialectical philosophy! In which case it would be that he "disagrees, for well-articulated reasons that you regard as flawed." But he didn't even say that. He just said that he wasn't sure that the Humean is defeated by the particular argument that RB advances. It's such an important thing, as Foo Kyong suggests, to be able to think as critically as possible about the views that one believes to be correct. I say it gently, but I think that in context it was actually Louis who was stirring the pot/rattling the bars! Warmly, Ruth On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 12:41 PM, Mervyn Hartwig wrote: > I'd be inclined to say it doesn't need a Devil's advocate because the Devil > himself supports it! Can one convince the Devil? > > M > > PS. You could say, to switch metaphors, I myself am stirring the pot or > rattling the bars a bit. > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ng Foo > Keong > Sent: 25 January 2009 15:55 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 23 > > Mervyn: > > I think Louis is just playing the devil's advocate by considering the > Humean > critique. if a position (such as the thesis that we can derive values from > facts) is solid indeed, it should be able to withstand the fiercest > criticism. your argument should not be like preaching to the choir, but > you > should be able to convince the enemy (who may not share your assumptions). > In fact, i think we should take the bull by the horns. Assume Hume was > right -- then find a way for him to contradict himself. Can we? > > regards, > F.K. > > > > > > > Message: 1 > > Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 14:01:48 -0000 > > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > > > Message-ID: > > < > mailman.5367.1232896549.2556.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > I said very clearly what I think the main defect in your 7 steps is. > > They treat truth-seeking as a personal preference when in fact it is > > intrinsic to what a fact is, i.e. the result of a social process, > > embodying commitment to deploy strictly cognitive criteria. (It can't > > be objected that this makes a fact 'normative' without destroying the > > distinction between facts and values, which the Humean wants to > > uphold. -Sorry to repeat a mantra, but what can else can one do if > > folks don't get it?). 'It is a fact that your opinion is false, > > therefore you ought to change it' cannot therefore be parsed as 'If you > want to remain a truth-seeker.' etc. > > > > Re lying, I accept that it presupposes the commitment to truth > > embodied in discourse and praxis and as I think I've made clear I > > certainly don't want to give up on transcendental critique. But the > > act of lying and what is presupposed by it are hardly the same thing, > > and if lying transcendentally presupposes commitment to truth so does > > not-lying (communicating truth in your second sense) - one can't just > > split one off from the other, as in your Humean argument. As I > > implied, the difference between us here seems to me to come down to > > this: you are operating with an exclusively propositional > > understanding of truth, whereas for me truth is also and ultimately > > ontological and alethic. I can accept that the liar is committed to > > truth in a propositional sense in so far as he wants his false > > statement to be regarded as true, but this presupposes both a context > > of truth-seeking in your second sense and the falsity of the proposition > in an ontological/ alethic sense. > > > > > > Mervyn > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3798 (20090125) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From ehrbar at lists.econ.utah.edu Sun Jan 25 13:24:09 2009 From: ehrbar at lists.econ.utah.edu (ehrbar) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 13:24:09 -0700 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Censorship (was: Practical Application of Critical Realism) Message-ID: Sorry for dropping the ball. My thinking has changed since the text I sent you originally, but so many things are happening here, as fallout of Tim DeChristopher's monkeywrench action, that I did not have the time to write it down. Three points: (1) I think now that in my original message the third expansion is redundant: it is not an expansion, and it was wrong of me to characterize it as an expansion. My original text is appended below, for your convenience. If I explain to my students why society is ignoring global warming, this does not commit me to the further step of teaching my students how to overcome this obstacle. My explanation itself is the tool to overcome this obstacle. The more correct this explanation is, the more effective and emancipatory is the tool. I may or may not go into the specifics (how to get policies passed, how to organize) but I don't *have* to go into specifics. (2) My fourth expansion was: climate change is such a severe issue that knowing about climate change and not putting one's best efforts into doing something about it is theory-practice inconsistency. This needs a stronger justification than just saying: if you know something and you are not acting on it then you commit theory-practice inconsistency. I think this would be an oversimplification which can be quickly refuted. Instead, I am looking for a justification in the following direction: As a University Professor I am committed to uphold the quest for scientific truth. For instance, knowing that science is a social project, it is my obligation to read what others have written. If the materials which I need are not in the library this does not excuse me but I have to get them through interlibrary loan etc. Now what if my research tells me that, unless I do something now, there will be no more libraries in 50 or 100 years. People will not have the time to read books but they will be out in the forests (if there are any left) foraging for food and fire wood. Does this obligate me, because of my commitment to science, to do something about it now? Does my commitment, which obligates me to search the world's libraries for the materials I need, also obligate me to see to it that the libraries remain open for more than 100 years? If I accept that science as we know it will no longer exist in 100 years, what does this tell me about my commitment to science now? Isn't science intrinsically something that has a shelf life of more than 100 years? After all, the books are printed on acid-free paper! All these are open questions and partial answers to me: I don't know if I can make this step or not. If I can make this step, then my obligation to act does not come from the fact that billions of people will die, but that we are entering a world in which libraries will no longer function. I think this is what you get if you derive your obligation to act from the commitment to truth. Please correct me if I am wrong. By the way, if you think this is a backward argument, my reply is that Marx's critique of capitalism (as I understand it) goes through a similar detour. Marx's main critique is not that capitalism unnecessarily kills innocent children, although it does. His main critique is that capitalism is a social order which keeps the members of society in the dark about the nature of their own social relations. (3) I turned away from these unresolved problems, and now I am taking a new tack, namely, I am wondering whether the inactivity of the University is an act of censorship. I just read the following draft letter to one of my colleages, and he thought it was clever rhetorics, but he did not think that actual censorship was involved. Please tell me whether I successfully argued that this is indeed censorship as it is usually defined: Dear University President Xxx: The University pays me for research, teaching, and service. I am taking each of these components seriously. But the University's practical denial of climate change hinders my efforts to tell the truth inside the classroom. Your inactivity, President Xxx, as the representative of the institution, erases, like a big blotch of censor's ink, my efforts to communicate truth to the students. The situation regarding climate change is so urgent and dire that students should expect blinking red lights when they come out of the classroom, warning everyone of the danger and exhorting them to re-think every aspect of their lives in the present emergency. There should be news bulletins at every corner about the state of the planet, there should be charts everywhere showing how quickly our vehicle miles are falling, how many homes in the area have been made energy-neutral, how much our carbon emissions have been declining, how many miles of railroads have been electrified, how many acres of solar collectors have been planted, how many roads have been re-converted into agricultural lands, how many airports have been closed -- comparing the achieved data to the trajectory necessary if our children and grandchildren want to enjoy a livable planet. None of this is happening. Even the University itself, one of the institutions where humankind's scientific knowledge about the present emergency is generated, is displaying exactly the usual drivel about the latest sporting event or the latest academic star, and nothing else. Because of your silence, President Xxx, my students must think that I am not telling the truth. At least one of my colleagues has received phone calls from the parents of his students that he should stop scaring his students. Most of our students think -- and they have to think -- that our urgency is our personal problem, that we are not talking about reality during our classes, but that we are exaggerating. If the situation is as urgent as we say, and if this urgency is as well established scientifically as we say, then in the University, where we say this science is created, at least some signs of this urgency should be visible, shouldn't they? The University's business as usual posture is erasing our efforts to tell the truth in the classroom. For instance the buildings which the University is planning in the next 20 years will increase the University's carbon footprint and fall far short of the changes necessary according to scientific evidence. I must respectfully protest this Master Plan because these are University buildings, and their open disregard of climate science is censorship of the things I am saying in these same classrooms. President Xxx, I appeal to you to make the necessary changes so that the University will play the role in leading us out of the present emergency which falls to it as an institution of higher learning. As is, we are part of the problem, despite the valiant efforts of countless individuals in the University Community. So far the draft letter. As always I am appreciative of your input, and apologies that I probably won't have the time to properly respond to your responses. Hans E. P.S. Here is my earlier text with the four transitions again, for your convenience: > I agree that education about global warming is our most important > mission. Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As > everyone knows, when the students come out of our classrooms, they see > a world which is acting as if global warming was only marginally > relevant. We cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission > expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming > is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this truth. > Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission > expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society > denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I > would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we > have to *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to > overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we > commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our > actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as > scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for > us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. > > There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical > obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the > truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are > such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of > course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is > not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the > envelope on this front. From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Sun Jan 25 14:53:53 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 21:53:53 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical application of critical realism In-Reply-To: <6ad241360901251105u19275e7fh4c28274127806282@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: Hi Ruth I didn't say Louis just doesn't get it -- I said either the case is weak, as he claims, or [it's strong and] he just doesn't get it, which is rather different. As for not being attached to empiricism: it seems to me that those who disagree with Bhaskar on this point are committed to an empiricist conception of a fact, whether they know it or not. As for rattling cages: actually, as I implied, it cuts both ways. If you want to invoke the context it is that Hans presented a piece of reasoning that he correctly imo says transgresses 'Hume's Law', I suggested that this is legitimate and very briefly why and that most original critical realists are committed to defending the 'law', and this unleashed a (shall we say) lively response aimed mainly at my argument. I would add that a profound commitment to 'Hume's Law' in the academy is precisely what Hans is mainly up against intellectually. His argument goes much further of course than the one I advanced -- it has the shape of an explanatory critique. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff Sent: 25 January 2009 19:05 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 23 Hi Mervyn, everybody, I don't understand why you say that Louis "just doesn't get it." I mean, at most he simply disagrees with Bhaskar on this point, as Hugh does, and perhaps Phil, and no doubt others who aren't particularly attached to Hume, to empiricism and/or to non-dialectical philosophy! In which case it would be that he "disagrees, for well-articulated reasons that you regard as flawed." But he didn't even say that. He just said that he wasn't sure that the Humean is defeated by the particular argument that RB advances. It's such an important thing, as Foo Kyong suggests, to be able to think as critically as possible about the views that one believes to be correct. I say it gently, but I think that in context it was actually Louis who was stirring the pot/rattling the bars! Warmly, Ruth From louisirwin9 at aol.com Sun Jan 25 20:39:20 2009 From: louisirwin9 at aol.com (Louis Irwin) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 22:39:20 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: <6ad241360901241909g61967913w92a5f3cfff7fb99a@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: Hi Ruth. You read me correctly. Just one comment on the need for moral realism. You suggest that "to get LOGICAL implication from statements of fact to non-heteronomous normative statements...you need "facts" that are inherently normative." I believe that you and Mervyn are in agreement on that (and I don't disagree), but Searle argued as long ago as 1964 that one can logically derive a genuine 'ought' from nothing but 'is' statements. He considered, for example, that it is part of the MEANING of "X made a promise" that "X is under an obligation to keep the promise" (other things being equal), so one does not have to refer to separately real moral premisses - the moral parts are real but they are internal to meanings. You can read this as transcendental argument. Maybe these are just two ways of saying the same thing. BTW, the Searle essay was reprinted in a 1969 collection entitled "The Is/Ought Question" with arguments for and against the divide, and clearly there were back then many prominent English-speaking philosophers who opposed the divide. I remember at the time several philosophers thought the volume was old hat because it was then widely accepted that there was an intrinsic link between facts and values. So RB was definitely following up on a strand that had already been around since 1958. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff Sent: Saturday, January 24, 2009 10:10 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis, Yes, I think you are right that a Humean can say that, given his/her desire truth, s/he "ought" to reject p, upon being shown that it is false, and still not have gone from is to ought in the sense precluded by Hume. S/he could probably even deal with the transcendental/Habermas argument about language, too. At the transcendental level, I mean. The use of language in its primary mode doesn't imply that one *ought* be be a truth-seeker (in the relevant, transcendental sense); it implies that one is one, whether one likes it or not. It's all is's. The is-to-ought sell, there, is to say that the fact of being a language user logically implies that one ought not tell lies. My hunch is that what you need, in order to get LOGICAL implication from statements of fact to non-heteronomous normative statements, to use the Kantian parlance, is to be a particular kind of moral realist. I think to do it you need "facts" that are inherently normative. No? r. On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 8:29 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > > Mervyn, > > I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to > cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean > assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh please!! > > You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of > argument, that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want > to remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that > someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) > for the sake of argument in order to see if the position holds up or > falls apart shows that he/she just doesn't get the correct position. > Is that the way your philosophy works? That would be to say that negative critiques do not work. > My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the > steps 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can > criticize an opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have > not identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a negative critique. > Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. > > I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to > truth", because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if > we have to give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a > "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth > is accompanied by a subjective intention to communicate truths. > Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental commitment. > > Louis > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mervyn Hartwig > Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > Hi Louis, > > Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other > hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that > you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes > of argument, that values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you > want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with > empirical realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing > between (1) lying propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content > (what they are 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of mass destruction" > is > designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an > absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to > inducing people to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to > either the communication or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is > held to account socially, legally etc., that is an altogether > different matter from his commitment - he wants to get away with it, > and often does. Lying has a social context and truth-seeking as its > condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to truth. > > The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it > allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to > what a fact is > - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not > necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow > this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the > distinction between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point > Bhaskar made in PON). > Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of > truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor > without clothes - because facts are the result of a social process of > truth-seeking. > > There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me > that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X > is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves commmitted to this? > Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing > truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary > personal preference and instrumental reason. > > Mervyn > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Louis Irwin > Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > Realism > > Hi Mervyn, > > The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how > a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to > values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at > it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that > Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a > desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to > (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes > outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans > thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to > achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value > distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another > post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the > sole norm of truth." > Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based > on instrumental values. > > You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, > to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a > truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the > same with > promising: > if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made > a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such > promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. > A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an > objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that > a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what > his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the > liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the > liar was aware that he was making that commitment). > > Louis > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From louisirwin9 at aol.com Sun Jan 25 20:51:54 2009 From: louisirwin9 at aol.com (Louis Irwin) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 22:51:54 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: <7alu89$39nla6@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: Hi Mervyn, Yes, I gathered all that in your first paragraph. I did not make my complaint specific enough. What I found non-responsive was the absence of any comments like "Your step X fails to follow from any of the preceding steps because...", or "Your step Y tacitly imports such-and-such a value commitment because...", or "Your step Z is incoherent because...", etc. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2009 9:02 AM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis, I said very clearly what I think the main defect in your 7 steps is. They treat truth-seeking as a personal preference when in fact it is intrinsic to what a fact is, i.e. the result of a social process, embodying commitment to deploy strictly cognitive criteria. (It can't be objected that this makes a fact 'normative' without destroying the distinction between facts and values, which the Humean wants to uphold. -Sorry to repeat a mantra, but what can else can one do if folks don't get it?). 'It is a fact that your opinion is false, therefore you ought to change it' cannot therefore be parsed as 'If you want to remain a truth-seeker.' etc. Re lying, I accept that it presupposes the commitment to truth embodied in discourse and praxis and as I think I've made clear I certainly don't want to give up on transcendental critique. But the act of lying and what is presupposed by it are hardly the same thing, and if lying transcendentally presupposes commitment to truth so does not-lying (communicating truth in your second sense) - one can't just split one off from the other, as in your Humean argument. As I implied, the difference between us here seems to me to come down to this: you are operating with an exclusively propositional understanding of truth, whereas for me truth is also and ultimately ontological and alethic. I can accept that the liar is committed to truth in a propositional sense in so far as he wants his false statement to be regarded as true, but this presupposes both a context of truth-seeking in your second sense and the falsity of the proposition in an ontological/ alethic sense. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis Irwin Sent: 25 January 2009 02:29 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Mervyn, I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh please!! You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) for the sake of argument in order to see if the position holds up or falls apart shows that he/she just doesn't get the correct position. Is that the way your philosophy works? That would be to say that negative critiques do not work. My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the steps 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can criticize an opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have not identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a negative critique. Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to truth", because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if we have to give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth is accompanied by a subjective intention to communicate truths. Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental commitment. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Louis, Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, that values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with empirical realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing between (1) lying propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content (what they are 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of mass destruction" is designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to inducing people to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to either the communication or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is held to account socially, legally etc., that is an altogether different matter from his commitment - he wants to get away with it, and often does. Lying has a social context and truth-seeking as its condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to truth. The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to what a fact is - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the distinction between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point Bhaskar made in PON). Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor without clothes - because facts are the result of a social process of truth-seeking. There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves commmitted to this? Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary personal preference and instrumental reason. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis Irwin Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism Hi Mervyn, The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth." Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based on instrumental values. You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with promising: if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that commitment). Louis _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3795 (20090123) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From louisirwin9 at aol.com Sun Jan 25 21:01:58 2009 From: louisirwin9 at aol.com (Louis Irwin) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 23:01:58 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 23 In-Reply-To: <6ad241360901251105u19275e7fh4c28274127806282@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: Hi Ruth, Foo Keong, Phil, Tobin, Thanks for understanding what I was trying to get at! Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2009 2:05 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 23 Hi Mervyn, everybody, I don't understand why you say that Louis "just doesn't get it." I mean, at most he simply disagrees with Bhaskar on this point, as Hugh does, and perhaps Phil, and no doubt others who aren't particularly attached to Hume, to empiricism and/or to non-dialectical philosophy! In which case it would be that he "disagrees, for well-articulated reasons that you regard as flawed." But he didn't even say that. He just said that he wasn't sure that the Humean is defeated by the particular argument that RB advances. It's such an important thing, as Foo Kyong suggests, to be able to think as critically as possible about the views that one believes to be correct. I say it gently, but I think that in context it was actually Louis who was stirring the pot/rattling the bars! Warmly, Ruth On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 12:41 PM, Mervyn Hartwig wrote: > I'd be inclined to say it doesn't need a Devil's advocate because the > Devil himself supports it! Can one convince the Devil? > > M > > PS. You could say, to switch metaphors, I myself am stirring the pot > or rattling the bars a bit. > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ng > Foo Keong > Sent: 25 January 2009 15:55 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue > 23 > > Mervyn: > > I think Louis is just playing the devil's advocate by considering the > Humean critique. if a position (such as the thesis that we can derive > values from > facts) is solid indeed, it should be able to withstand the fiercest > criticism. your argument should not be like preaching to the choir, > but you should be able to convince the enemy (who may not share your > assumptions). > In fact, i think we should take the bull by the horns. Assume Hume > was right -- then find a way for him to contradict himself. Can we? > > regards, > F.K. > > > > > > > Message: 1 > > Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 14:01:48 -0000 > > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > > > Message-ID: > > < > mailman.5367.1232896549.2556.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > I said very clearly what I think the main defect in your 7 steps is. > > They treat truth-seeking as a personal preference when in fact it > > is intrinsic to what a fact is, i.e. the result of a social process, > > embodying commitment to deploy strictly cognitive criteria. (It > > can't be objected that this makes a fact 'normative' without > > destroying the distinction between facts and values, which the > > Humean wants to uphold. -Sorry to repeat a mantra, but what can else > > can one do if folks don't get it?). 'It is a fact that your opinion > > is false, therefore you ought to change it' cannot therefore be > > parsed as 'If you > want to remain a truth-seeker.' etc. > > > > Re lying, I accept that it presupposes the commitment to truth > > embodied in discourse and praxis and as I think I've made clear I > > certainly don't want to give up on transcendental critique. But the > > act of lying and what is presupposed by it are hardly the same > > thing, and if lying transcendentally presupposes commitment to truth > > so does not-lying (communicating truth in your second sense) - one > > can't just split one off from the other, as in your Humean argument. > > As I implied, the difference between us here seems to me to come > > down to > > this: you are operating with an exclusively propositional > > understanding of truth, whereas for me truth is also and ultimately > > ontological and alethic. I can accept that the liar is committed to > > truth in a propositional sense in so far as he wants his false > > statement to be regarded as true, but this presupposes both a > > context of truth-seeking in your second sense and the falsity of the > > proposition > in an ontological/ alethic sense. > > > > > > Mervyn > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3798 (20090125) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From rgroff at slu.edu Sun Jan 25 20:58:39 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 21:58:39 -0600 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: References: <6ad241360901241909g61967913w92a5f3cfff7fb99a@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <6ad241360901251958q4e8e04aamc00fb8b0263311d5@mail.gmail.com> Hey, thanks for that reference. I want to read it now. I will have to think about it. The immediate thought that comes to mind is that it might be inherent in the definition of the word, as a matter of language-analysis, but not be inherent in the act. I don't know if I think that, but it's a really interesting example. I had had in mind "facts" like encountering a sad, lost child in the mall or something -- that just seems to me to be an is that self-evidently generate some oughts, though the implication is not a logical one! Or coming across a hurt animal. Or responding to a loved one. I'm pretty sure that I think that logical necessity is over-rated by empiricists, anyhow. I mean, it's big for them because they don't have any other kind. The Kantians let in some synthetic a prioris, but even there there is a kind of pressure put on the thing, I think, that is the result of having dispensed with natural necessity. (Itself different, I think I think, from the necessity associated with the kind of moral realism that I'm defending.) I love it when you post things. r. On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 9:39 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > Hi Ruth. > > You read me correctly. Just one comment on the need for moral realism. You > suggest that "to get LOGICAL implication from statements of fact to > non-heteronomous normative statements...you need "facts" that are > inherently > normative." I believe that you and Mervyn are in agreement on that (and I > don't disagree), but Searle argued as long ago as 1964 that one can > logically derive a genuine 'ought' from nothing but 'is' statements. He > considered, for example, that it is part of the MEANING of "X made a > promise" that "X is under an obligation to keep the promise" (other things > being equal), so one does not have to refer to separately real moral > premisses - the moral parts are real but they are internal to meanings. You > can read this as transcendental argument. Maybe these are just two ways of > saying the same thing. > > BTW, the Searle essay was reprinted in a 1969 collection entitled "The > Is/Ought Question" with arguments for and against the divide, and clearly > there were back then many prominent English-speaking philosophers who > opposed the divide. I remember at the time several philosophers thought the > volume was old hat because it was then widely accepted that there was an > intrinsic link between facts and values. So RB was definitely following up > on a strand that had already been around since 1958. > > Louis > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth > Groff > Sent: Saturday, January 24, 2009 10:10 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism > > Hi Louis, > > Yes, I think you are right that a Humean can say that, given his/her desire > truth, s/he "ought" to reject p, upon being shown that it is false, and > still not have gone from is to ought in the sense precluded by Hume. S/he > could probably even deal with the transcendental/Habermas argument about > language, too. At the transcendental level, I mean. The use of language > in > its primary mode doesn't imply that one *ought* be be a truth-seeker (in > the > relevant, transcendental sense); it implies that one is one, whether one > likes it or not. It's all is's. The is-to-ought sell, there, is to say > that the fact of being a language user logically implies that one ought not > tell lies. > > My hunch is that what you need, in order to get LOGICAL implication from > statements of fact to non-heteronomous normative statements, to use the > Kantian parlance, is to be a particular kind of moral realist. I think to > do it you need "facts" that are inherently normative. > > No? > > r. > > > > On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 8:29 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > > > > > Mervyn, > > > > I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to > > cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean > > assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh please!! > > > > You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of > > argument, that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want > > to remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that > > someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) > > for the sake of argument in order to see if the position holds up or > > falls apart shows that he/she just doesn't get the correct position. > > Is that the way your philosophy works? That would be to say that negative > critiques do not work. > > My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the > > steps 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can > > criticize an opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have > > not identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a > negative critique. > > Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. > > > > I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to > > truth", because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if > > we have to give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a > > "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth > > is accompanied by a subjective intention to communicate truths. > > Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental commitment. > > > > Louis > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Mervyn Hartwig > > Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other > > hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that > > you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes > > of argument, that values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you > > want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with > > empirical realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing > > between (1) lying propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content > > (what they are 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of > mass destruction" > > is > > designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an > > absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to > > inducing people to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to > > either the communication or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is > > held to account socially, legally etc., that is an altogether > > different matter from his commitment - he wants to get away with it, > > and often does. Lying has a social context and truth-seeking as its > > condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to truth. > > > > The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it > > allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to > > what a fact is > > - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not > > necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow > > this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the > > distinction between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point > > Bhaskar made in PON). > > Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of > > truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor > > without clothes - because facts are the result of a social process of > > truth-seeking. > > > > There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me > > that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X > > is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves > commmitted to this? > > Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing > > truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary > > personal preference and instrumental reason. > > > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Louis Irwin > > Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > > > Hi Mervyn, > > > > The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how > > a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to > > values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at > > it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that > > Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a > > desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to > > (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes > > outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans > > thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to > > achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value > > distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another > > post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the > > sole norm of truth." > > Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based > > on instrumental values. > > > > You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, > > to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a > > truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the > > same with > > promising: > > if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made > > a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such > > promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. > > A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an > > objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that > > a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what > > his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the > > liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the > > liar was aware that he was making that commitment). > > > > Louis > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From rgroff at slu.edu Sun Jan 25 20:59:49 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 21:59:49 -0600 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism In-Reply-To: <6ad241360901251958q4e8e04aamc00fb8b0263311d5@mail.gmail.com> References: <6ad241360901241909g61967913w92a5f3cfff7fb99a@mail.gmail.com> <6ad241360901251958q4e8e04aamc00fb8b0263311d5@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <6ad241360901251959v5e2d4634j27d0068a88c1a606@mail.gmail.com> I realize I made no reference to the fact that I was here responding to Louis' latest. Warmly, r. On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 9:58 PM, Ruth Groff wrote: > Hey, thanks for that reference. I want to read it now. I will have to > think about it. The immediate thought that comes to mind is that it might > be inherent in the definition of the word, as a matter of language-analysis, > but not be inherent in the act. I don't know if I think that, but it's a > really interesting example. I had had in mind "facts" like encountering a > sad, lost child in the mall or something -- that just seems to me to be an > is that self-evidently generate some oughts, though the implication is not a > logical one! Or coming across a hurt animal. Or responding to a loved > one. I'm pretty sure that I think that logical necessity is over-rated by > empiricists, anyhow. I mean, it's big for them because they don't have any > other kind. The Kantians let in some synthetic a prioris, but even there > there is a kind of pressure put on the thing, I think, that is the result of > having dispensed with natural necessity. (Itself different, I think I > think, from the necessity associated with the kind of moral realism that I'm > defending.) > > I love it when you post things. > > r. > > > On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 9:39 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: > >> Hi Ruth. >> >> You read me correctly. Just one comment on the need for moral realism. You >> suggest that "to get LOGICAL implication from statements of fact to >> non-heteronomous normative statements...you need "facts" that are >> inherently >> normative." I believe that you and Mervyn are in agreement on that (and I >> don't disagree), but Searle argued as long ago as 1964 that one can >> logically derive a genuine 'ought' from nothing but 'is' statements. He >> considered, for example, that it is part of the MEANING of "X made a >> promise" that "X is under an obligation to keep the promise" (other things >> being equal), so one does not have to refer to separately real moral >> premisses - the moral parts are real but they are internal to meanings. >> You >> can read this as transcendental argument. Maybe these are just two ways of >> saying the same thing. >> >> BTW, the Searle essay was reprinted in a 1969 collection entitled "The >> Is/Ought Question" with arguments for and against the divide, and clearly >> there were back then many prominent English-speaking philosophers who >> opposed the divide. I remember at the time several philosophers thought >> the >> volume was old hat because it was then widely accepted that there was an >> intrinsic link between facts and values. So RB was definitely following up >> on a strand that had already been around since 1958. >> >> Louis >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth >> Groff >> Sent: Saturday, January 24, 2009 10:10 PM >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism >> >> Hi Louis, >> >> Yes, I think you are right that a Humean can say that, given his/her >> desire >> truth, s/he "ought" to reject p, upon being shown that it is false, and >> still not have gone from is to ought in the sense precluded by Hume. S/he >> could probably even deal with the transcendental/Habermas argument about >> language, too. At the transcendental level, I mean. The use of language >> in >> its primary mode doesn't imply that one *ought* be be a truth-seeker (in >> the >> relevant, transcendental sense); it implies that one is one, whether one >> likes it or not. It's all is's. The is-to-ought sell, there, is to say >> that the fact of being a language user logically implies that one ought >> not >> tell lies. >> >> My hunch is that what you need, in order to get LOGICAL implication from >> statements of fact to non-heteronomous normative statements, to use the >> Kantian parlance, is to be a particular kind of moral realist. I think to >> do it you need "facts" that are inherently normative. >> >> No? >> >> r. >> >> >> >> On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 8:29 PM, Louis Irwin wrote: >> >> > >> > Mervyn, >> > >> > I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to >> > cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean >> > assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh please!! >> > >> > You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of >> > argument, that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want >> > to remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that >> > someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) >> > for the sake of argument in order to see if the position holds up or >> > falls apart shows that he/she just doesn't get the correct position. >> > Is that the way your philosophy works? That would be to say that >> negative >> critiques do not work. >> > My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the >> > steps 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can >> > criticize an opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have >> > not identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a >> negative critique. >> > Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. >> > >> > I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to >> > truth", because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if >> > we have to give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a >> > "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth >> > is accompanied by a subjective intention to communicate truths. >> > Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental commitment. >> > >> > Louis >> > >> > >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >> > Mervyn Hartwig >> > Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM >> > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' >> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical >> > Realism >> > >> > Hi Louis, >> > >> > Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other >> > hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that >> > you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes >> > of argument, that values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you >> > want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with >> > empirical realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing >> > between (1) lying propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content >> > (what they are 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of >> mass destruction" >> > is >> > designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an >> > absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to >> > inducing people to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to >> > either the communication or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is >> > held to account socially, legally etc., that is an altogether >> > different matter from his commitment - he wants to get away with it, >> > and often does. Lying has a social context and truth-seeking as its >> > condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to truth. >> > >> > The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it >> > allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to >> > what a fact is >> > - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not >> > necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow >> > this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the >> > distinction between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point >> > Bhaskar made in PON). >> > Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of >> > truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor >> > without clothes - because facts are the result of a social process of >> > truth-seeking. >> > >> > There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me >> > that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X >> > is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves >> commmitted to this? >> > Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing >> > truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary >> > personal preference and instrumental reason. >> > >> > Mervyn >> > >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >> > Louis Irwin >> > Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 >> > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' >> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical >> > Realism >> > >> > Hi Mervyn, >> > >> > The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how >> > a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to >> > values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at >> > it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that >> > Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a >> > desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to >> > (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes >> > outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans >> > thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to >> > achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value >> > distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another >> > post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the >> > sole norm of truth." >> > Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based >> > on instrumental values. >> > >> > You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, >> > to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a >> > truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the >> > same with >> > promising: >> > if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made >> > a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such >> > promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. >> > A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an >> > objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that >> > a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what >> > his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the >> > liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the >> > liar was aware that he was making that commitment). >> > >> > Louis >> > >> > >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > From lefouque at gmail.com Sun Jan 25 22:51:07 2009 From: lefouque at gmail.com (Ng Foo Keong) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 13:51:07 +0800 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 25 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <14a6419f0901252151v6e725263xcd047a00e95c9658@mail.gmail.com> hi all, while we're here debating about how to get from the "is" to the "ought", plus i'm not thoroughly convinced about the "is" part (that global warming is established irrefutable fact) and plus it would be expensive, time-consuming and untimely to get to the 'truth', here is (to me) a rather convincing risk-management argument to take action _despite_ all the above uncertainties. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mF_anaVcCXg regards, Foo Keong From gerardwalmsley at googlemail.com Mon Jan 26 04:42:29 2009 From: gerardwalmsley at googlemail.com (gerard walmsely) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 11:42:29 +0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] just dont get it Message-ID: Dear members From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Mon Jan 26 06:19:40 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 13:19:40 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Censorship (was: Practical Application ofCritical Realism) In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Hi Hans, all I don't think one can say the university is censoring your views. It's not preventing you from airing them (but I do hope your tenure is secure!) and they can be seen as in competition with its complacent views. But its inactivity is certainly having a causal impact (this is a case of the reality of absence) in that marginalises or sidelines your views (which is why you feel censored) and influences others to be complacent. This is because, as you say, you would expect a university of all institutions, to take global warming seriously. Its inactivity is a dereliction of its mission to promote truth - it is causally efficacious in the inculcation of false ideas. Therefore it ought to act, CP. This is a powerful line; introducing the more contentious idea of censorship would likely detract from it. Your four-stepped derivation of our obligation of scientists has the basic shape of an (incomplete) explanatory critique. Many critical realists are very sceptical about this theory. One reason sometimes given is that it's too cognitively oriented, but this overlooks that it can readily be extended to embrace other ills than cognitive ones, notably unfulfilled needs. Here is the basic shape or inference pattern, derived from Bhaskar's SRHE, of the explanatory critique of cognitive ills in its full extent. You might find it useful in developing or refining your ideas, and I think it shows that it embraces Mark's concerns re changing people and institutions (to put it into practice is of course another thing). I comment on your proposed changes to your four steps at the end. (i) [also your first step] theoretical or cognitive critique (demonstrating the falsity of some belief P - global warming is not a serious threat to the well-being of the species); (ii) [your 2] explanatory critique (identifying the structural source of P, why this is widely denied, e.g. a socio-economic system that depends on ever-expanding production and consumer-demand disposes people to minimise the ecological consequences of this); (iii) value judgement (negative evaluation, CP, of the structural source of P); (iv) practical judgement (positive evaluation, CP, of action rationally directed at removing the source of P); (v) [your 3] concrete axiological judgement (bridging the logical gap between [iv] and a particular course of action: this is what we should do in this context to remove the source of P) Teaching, discussion etc would certainly play a role in arriving at this judgement; (vi) transformation in the agent's praxis (bridging the logical gap between [v] and actually performing the action, that is, resolving the problem of akrasia); (vii) [your 4] emancipatory action (praxis oriented to emancipation from the structural source of falsity); (viii) transformative praxis (transformation of the source of P); and (ix) emancipated (free) action, in the sense that we've got rid of an unwanted constraint. I can't see that (v) [your 3] can be abandoned. It is indispensable for getting from (iv) to (vi) ff. The explanation can't effect this by itself. Nor can I see that you really need a stronger justification for (vii) [your 4] as such. It follows in terms of the logic of the inference schema that (since truth is a good and falsity an evil, CP) action should be taken to transform the source of falsity, CP. To do nothing would indeed be a form of theory-practice inconsistency. But of course the argument can be bolstered, and I think you're on the right track. But it won't be just books and libraries that are adversely impacted by severe climate change, but many of the other basic necessary conditions for truth-seeking to flourish: freedom, health, education, etc. And of course since ecological constraints are absolute in important senses and affect us all, it's easy to make an argument that everyone should pitch in. In a patently interconnected world the logic of dialectical universalisability patently applies. Note that, while the theory imo demonstrates that the transition from theory to practice is logically possible, it does not itself effect the transition. As you imply: 'Only practice itself can do that. It is in this sense that the explanatory critique is always conditioned critique' (SRHE, p. 188). It's sometimes complained that the CP clause is deployed 'casually' or 'complacently' here, but, as Bhaskar has pointed out, in an open world CP clauses are a condition for moving, not just from facts to values, but from facts to facts: to invoke a law of nature is not to say what will happen but what would happen, CP. Far from being casual, their deployment in the argument for EC is standard scientific (and philosophical) procedure. The CP clause is necessary at (iii) because the structure might be the source of a range of positively valued things; perhaps it can be changed in the relevant respect but not others; complex assessments will have to be made in practice by the people inolved in any movment for change. And at (iv) it's necessary because an assessment has to be made whether worse consequences would ensue. Of course, a decision not to act at (v) or failure to act at (vi) is always possible, in which case the dialectic would stop there. It's also sometimes claimed that there are no examples of successful explanatory critique. But I'd argue that the civil rights movement of the 20th century, e.g., is a brilliant, at least part example: the scientific demonstration that racism is false and of some of its structural causes certainly played a crucial role in the dismantling of segregationist structures world-wide. (Which is one reason why I keep using the racism example). The claim has been made here that inferences from facts to values do not LOGICALLY follow, which I take to mean that they don't follow with full deductive certainty - this seems to be entailed by the CP clause. But if that's all 'Hume's Law' means then it's a truism. However that interpretation of the 'Law' is debatable and in practice it has prohibited any strong inference from facts to values (deduction is not the only form of logic!), erecting an absolute gulf between them. If one accepts with Collier that the Bhaskarian inferences are 'more like evidential or scientific than deductive arguments', it still seems to me they refute the 'Law' as commonly understood. But although that's philosophically important, it's not of course the main point. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of ehrbar Sent: 25 January 2009 20:24 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [Critical-Realism] Censorship (was: Practical Application ofCritical Realism) Sorry for dropping the ball. My thinking has changed since the text I sent you originally, but so many things are happening here, as fallout of Tim DeChristopher's monkeywrench action, that I did not have the time to write it down. Three points: (1) I think now that in my original message the third expansion is redundant: it is not an expansion, and it was wrong of me to characterize it as an expansion. My original text is appended below, for your convenience. If I explain to my students why society is ignoring global warming, this does not commit me to the further step of teaching my students how to overcome this obstacle. My explanation itself is the tool to overcome this obstacle. The more correct this explanation is, the more effective and emancipatory is the tool. I may or may not go into the specifics (how to get policies passed, how to organize) but I don't *have* to go into specifics. (2) My fourth expansion was: climate change is such a severe issue that knowing about climate change and not putting one's best efforts into doing something about it is theory-practice inconsistency. This needs a stronger justification than just saying: if you know something and you are not acting on it then you commit theory-practice inconsistency. I think this would be an oversimplification which can be quickly refuted. Instead, I am looking for a justification in the following direction: As a University Professor I am committed to uphold the quest for scientific truth. For instance, knowing that science is a social project, it is my obligation to read what others have written. If the materials which I need are not in the library this does not excuse me but I have to get them through interlibrary loan etc. Now what if my research tells me that, unless I do something now, there will be no more libraries in 50 or 100 years. People will not have the time to read books but they will be out in the forests (if there are any left) foraging for food and fire wood. Does this obligate me, because of my commitment to science, to do something about it now? Does my commitment, which obligates me to search the world's libraries for the materials I need, also obligate me to see to it that the libraries remain open for more than 100 years? If I accept that science as we know it will no longer exist in 100 years, what does this tell me about my commitment to science now? Isn't science intrinsically something that has a shelf life of more than 100 years? After all, the books are printed on acid-free paper! All these are open questions and partial answers to me: I don't know if I can make this step or not. If I can make this step, then my obligation to act does not come from the fact that billions of people will die, but that we are entering a world in which libraries will no longer function. I think this is what you get if you derive your obligation to act from the commitment to truth. Please correct me if I am wrong. By the way, if you think this is a backward argument, my reply is that Marx's critique of capitalism (as I understand it) goes through a similar detour. Marx's main critique is not that capitalism unnecessarily kills innocent children, although it does. His main critique is that capitalism is a social order which keeps the members of society in the dark about the nature of their own social relations. (3) I turned away from these unresolved problems, and now I am taking a new tack, namely, I am wondering whether the inactivity of the University is an act of censorship. I just read the following draft letter to one of my colleages, and he thought it was clever rhetorics, but he did not think that actual censorship was involved. Please tell me whether I successfully argued that this is indeed censorship as it is usually defined: Dear University President Xxx: The University pays me for research, teaching, and service. I am taking each of these components seriously. But the University's practical denial of climate change hinders my efforts to tell the truth inside the classroom. Your inactivity, President Xxx, as the representative of the institution, erases, like a big blotch of censor's ink, my efforts to communicate truth to the students. The situation regarding climate change is so urgent and dire that students should expect blinking red lights when they come out of the classroom, warning everyone of the danger and exhorting them to re-think every aspect of their lives in the present emergency. There should be news bulletins at every corner about the state of the planet, there should be charts everywhere showing how quickly our vehicle miles are falling, how many homes in the area have been made energy-neutral, how much our carbon emissions have been declining, how many miles of railroads have been electrified, how many acres of solar collectors have been planted, how many roads have been re-converted into agricultural lands, how many airports have been closed -- comparing the achieved data to the trajectory necessary if our children and grandchildren want to enjoy a livable planet. None of this is happening. Even the University itself, one of the institutions where humankind's scientific knowledge about the present emergency is generated, is displaying exactly the usual drivel about the latest sporting event or the latest academic star, and nothing else. Because of your silence, President Xxx, my students must think that I am not telling the truth. At least one of my colleagues has received phone calls from the parents of his students that he should stop scaring his students. Most of our students think -- and they have to think -- that our urgency is our personal problem, that we are not talking about reality during our classes, but that we are exaggerating. If the situation is as urgent as we say, and if this urgency is as well established scientifically as we say, then in the University, where we say this science is created, at least some signs of this urgency should be visible, shouldn't they? The University's business as usual posture is erasing our efforts to tell the truth in the classroom. For instance the buildings which the University is planning in the next 20 years will increase the University's carbon footprint and fall far short of the changes necessary according to scientific evidence. I must respectfully protest this Master Plan because these are University buildings, and their open disregard of climate science is censorship of the things I am saying in these same classrooms. President Xxx, I appeal to you to make the necessary changes so that the University will play the role in leading us out of the present emergency which falls to it as an institution of higher learning. As is, we are part of the problem, despite the valiant efforts of countless individuals in the University Community. So far the draft letter. As always I am appreciative of your input, and apologies that I probably won't have the time to properly respond to your responses. Hans E. P.S. Here is my earlier text with the four transitions again, for your convenience: > I agree that education about global warming is our most important > mission. Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As > everyone knows, when the students come out of our classrooms, they see > a world which is acting as if global warming was only marginally > relevant. We cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission > expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming > is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this truth. > Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission > expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society > denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I > would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we > have to *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to > overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we > commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our > actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as > scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for > us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. > > There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical > obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the > truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are > such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of > course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is > not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the > envelope on this front. _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3798 (20090125) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Mon Jan 26 07:00:03 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 14:00:03 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] just dont get it In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Hi Gerard As I've already pointed out to Ruth, I did not assert that Louis just doesn't get it. I entertained it as one possibility. So much for your own careful scholarship. Are you asserting that it's impossible for intelligent people to fail to see a point? Now, that would be dogmatic. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of gerard walmsely Sent: 26 January 2009 11:42 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [Critical-Realism] just dont get it Dear members From gerardwalmsley at googlemail.com Mon Jan 26 10:14:58 2009 From: gerardwalmsley at googlemail.com (gerard walmsely) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 17:14:58 +0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] just don't get it Message-ID: Mr Mervyn I think it is possible for "intelligent" people to be wrong. However, in this case I think it was Lewis that was right and yourself that was wrong. It could just be that you are so underneath Bhaskar's assumptions that you just don't see it. GW. On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 2:00 PM, < critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Censorship (was: Practical Application ofCritical > Realism) (Mervyn Hartwig) > 2. Re: just dont get it (Mervyn Hartwig) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 13:19:40 -0000 > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Censorship (was: Practical Application > ofCritical Realism) > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > Hi Hans, all > > > > I don't think one can say the university is censoring your views. It's not > preventing you from airing them (but I do hope your tenure is secure!) and > they can be seen as in competition with its complacent views. But its > inactivity is certainly having a causal impact (this is a case of the > reality of absence) in that marginalises or sidelines your views (which is > why you feel censored) and influences others to be complacent. This is > because, as you say, you would expect a university of all institutions, to > take global warming seriously. Its inactivity is a dereliction of its > mission to promote truth - it is causally efficacious in the inculcation of > false ideas. Therefore it ought to act, CP. This is a powerful line; > introducing the more contentious idea of censorship would likely detract > from it. > > > > Your four-stepped derivation of our obligation of scientists has the basic > shape of an (incomplete) explanatory critique. Many critical realists are > very sceptical about this theory. One reason sometimes given is that it's > too cognitively oriented, but this overlooks that it can readily be > extended > to embrace other ills than cognitive ones, notably unfulfilled needs. Here > is the basic shape or inference pattern, derived from Bhaskar's SRHE, of > the > explanatory critique of cognitive ills in its full extent. You might find > it > useful in developing or refining your ideas, and I think it shows that it > embraces Mark's concerns re changing people and institutions (to put it > into > practice is of course another thing). I comment on your proposed changes to > your four steps at the end. > > > > (i) [also your first step] theoretical or cognitive critique (demonstrating > the falsity of some belief P - global warming is not a serious threat to > the > well-being of the species); (ii) [your 2] explanatory critique (identifying > the structural source of P, why this is widely denied, e.g. a > socio-economic > system that depends on ever-expanding production and consumer-demand > disposes people to minimise the ecological consequences of this); (iii) > value judgement (negative evaluation, CP, of the structural source of P); > (iv) practical judgement (positive evaluation, CP, of action rationally > directed at removing the source of P); (v) [your 3] concrete axiological > judgement (bridging the logical gap between [iv] and a particular course of > action: this is what we should do in this context to remove the source of > P) > Teaching, discussion etc would certainly play a role in arriving at this > judgement; (vi) transformation in the agent's praxis (bridging the logical > gap between [v] and actually performing the action, that is, resolving the > problem of akrasia); (vii) [your 4] emancipatory action (praxis oriented to > emancipation from the structural source of falsity); (viii) transformative > praxis (transformation of the source of P); and (ix) emancipated (free) > action, in the sense that we've got rid of an unwanted constraint. > > > > I can't see that (v) [your 3] can be abandoned. It is indispensable for > getting from (iv) to (vi) ff. The explanation can't effect this by itself. > > > > Nor can I see that you really need a stronger justification for (vii) [your > 4] as such. It follows in terms of the logic of the inference schema that > (since truth is a good and falsity an evil, CP) action should be taken to > transform the source of falsity, CP. To do nothing would indeed be a form > of > theory-practice inconsistency. But of course the argument can be bolstered, > and I think you're on the right track. But it won't be just books and > libraries that are adversely impacted by severe climate change, but many of > the other basic necessary conditions for truth-seeking to flourish: > freedom, > health, education, etc. And of course since ecological constraints are > absolute in important senses and affect us all, it's easy to make an > argument that everyone should pitch in. In a patently interconnected world > the logic of dialectical universalisability patently applies. > > > > Note that, while the theory imo demonstrates that the transition from > theory > to practice is logically possible, it does not itself effect the > transition. > As you imply: 'Only practice itself can do that. It is in this sense that > the explanatory critique is always conditioned critique' (SRHE, p. 188). > It's sometimes complained that the CP clause is deployed 'casually' or > 'complacently' here, but, as Bhaskar has pointed out, in an open world CP > clauses are a condition for moving, not just from facts to values, but from > facts to facts: to invoke a law of nature is not to say what will happen > but > what would happen, CP. Far from being casual, their deployment in the > argument for EC is standard scientific (and philosophical) procedure. The > CP > clause is necessary at (iii) because the structure might be the source of a > range of positively valued things; perhaps it can be changed in the > relevant > respect but not others; complex assessments will have to be made in > practice > by the people inolved in any movment for change. And at (iv) it's necessary > because an assessment has to be made whether worse consequences would > ensue. > Of course, a decision not to act at (v) or failure to act at (vi) is always > possible, in which case the dialectic would stop there. > > > > It's also sometimes claimed that there are no examples of successful > explanatory critique. But I'd argue that the civil rights movement of the > 20th century, e.g., is a brilliant, at least part example: the scientific > demonstration that racism is false and of some of its structural causes > certainly played a crucial role in the dismantling of segregationist > structures world-wide. (Which is one reason why I keep using the racism > example). > > > > The claim has been made here that inferences from facts to values do not > LOGICALLY follow, which I take to mean that they don't follow with full > deductive certainty - this seems to be entailed by the CP clause. But if > that's all 'Hume's Law' means then it's a truism. However that > interpretation of the 'Law' is debatable and in practice it has prohibited > any strong inference from facts to values (deduction is not the only form > of > logic!), erecting an absolute gulf between them. If one accepts with > Collier > that the Bhaskarian inferences are 'more like evidential or scientific than > deductive arguments', it still seems to me they refute the 'Law' as > commonly > understood. But although that's philosophically important, it's not of > course the main point. > > > > Mervyn > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of ehrbar > Sent: 25 January 2009 20:24 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Censorship (was: Practical Application > ofCritical Realism) > > > Sorry for dropping the ball. My thinking has changed since the text I sent > you originally, but so many things are happening here, as fallout of Tim > DeChristopher's monkeywrench action, that I did not have the time to write > it down. > > Three points: > > (1) > > I think now that in my original message the third expansion is > redundant: it is not an expansion, and it was wrong of me to characterize > it > as an expansion. My original text is appended below, for your convenience. > If I explain to my students why society is ignoring global warming, this > does not commit me to the further step of teaching my students how to > overcome this obstacle. My explanation itself is the tool to overcome this > obstacle. The more correct this explanation is, the more effective and > emancipatory is the tool. I may or may not go into the specifics (how to > get policies passed, how to organize) but I don't *have* to go into > specifics. > > (2) > > My fourth expansion was: climate change is such a severe issue that knowing > about climate change and not putting one's best efforts into doing > something > about it is theory-practice inconsistency. This needs a stronger > justification than just saying: if you know something and you are not > acting > on it then you commit theory-practice inconsistency. I think this would be > an oversimplification which can be quickly refuted. > > Instead, I am looking for a justification in the following direction: > As a University Professor I am committed to uphold the quest for scientific > truth. For instance, knowing that science is a social project, it is my > obligation to read what others have written. If the materials which I need > are not in the library this does not excuse me but I have to get them > through interlibrary loan etc. Now what if my research tells me that, > unless I do something now, there will be no more libraries in 50 or 100 > years. People will not have the time to read books but they will be out in > the forests (if there are any left) foraging for food and fire wood. Does > this obligate me, because of my commitment to science, to do something > about > it now? Does my commitment, which obligates me to search the world's > libraries for the materials I need, also obligate me to see to it that the > libraries remain open for more than 100 years? If I accept that science as > we know it will no longer exist in 100 years, what does this tell me about > my commitment to science now? Isn't science intrinsically something that > has a shelf life of more than 100 years? After all, the books are printed > on acid-free paper! All these are open questions and partial answers to > me: > I don't know if I can make this step or not. > > If I can make this step, then my obligation to act does not come from the > fact that billions of people will die, but that we are entering a world in > which libraries will no longer function. I think this is what you get if > you derive your obligation to act from the commitment to truth. Please > correct me if I am wrong. By the way, if you think this is a backward > argument, my reply is that Marx's critique of capitalism (as I understand > it) goes through a similar detour. Marx's main critique is not that > capitalism unnecessarily kills innocent children, although it does. His > main critique is that capitalism is a social order which keeps the members > of society in the dark about the nature of their own social relations. > > (3) > > I turned away from these unresolved problems, and now I am taking a new > tack, namely, I am wondering whether the inactivity of the University is an > act of censorship. I just read the following draft letter to one of my > colleages, and he thought it was clever rhetorics, but he did not think > that > actual censorship was involved. Please tell me whether I successfully > argued that this is indeed censorship as it is usually defined: > > > Dear University President Xxx: > > > The University pays me for research, teaching, and service. I am taking > each of these components seriously. But the University's practical denial > of climate change hinders my efforts to tell the truth inside the > classroom. > Your inactivity, President Xxx, as the representative of the institution, > erases, like a big blotch of censor's ink, my efforts to communicate truth > to the students. > > The situation regarding climate change is so urgent and dire that students > should expect blinking red lights when they come out of the classroom, > warning everyone of the danger and exhorting them to re-think every aspect > of their lives in the present emergency. There should be news bulletins at > every corner about the state of the planet, there should be charts > everywhere showing how quickly our vehicle miles are falling, how many > homes > in the area have been made energy-neutral, how much our carbon emissions > have been declining, how many miles of railroads have been electrified, how > many acres of solar collectors have been planted, how many roads have been > re-converted into agricultural lands, how many airports have been closed -- > comparing the achieved data to the trajectory necessary if our children and > grandchildren want to enjoy a livable planet. > > None of this is happening. Even the University itself, one of the > institutions where humankind's scientific knowledge about the present > emergency is generated, is displaying exactly the usual drivel about the > latest sporting event or the latest academic star, and nothing else. > Because of your silence, President Xxx, my students must think that I am > not > telling the truth. At least one of my colleagues has received phone calls > from the parents of his students that he should stop scaring his students. > Most of our students think -- and they have to think -- that our urgency is > our personal problem, that we are not talking about reality during our > classes, but that we are exaggerating. If the situation is as urgent as we > say, and if this urgency is as well established scientifically as we say, > then in the University, where we say this science is created, at least some > signs of this urgency should be visible, shouldn't they? The University's > business as usual posture is erasing our efforts to tell the truth in the > classroom. For instance the buildings which the University is planning in > the next 20 years will increase the University's carbon footprint and fall > far short of the changes necessary according to scientific evidence. I > must > respectfully protest this Master Plan because these are University > buildings, and their open disregard of climate science is censorship of the > things I am saying in these same classrooms. > > President Xxx, I appeal to you to make the necessary changes so that the > University will play the role in leading us out of the present emergency > which falls to it as an institution of higher learning. As is, we are part > of the problem, despite the valiant efforts of countless individuals in the > University Community. > > > So far the draft letter. As always I am appreciative of your input, and > apologies that I probably won't have the time to properly respond to your > responses. > > Hans E. > > > P.S. Here is my earlier text with the four transitions again, for your > convenience: > > > > > I agree that education about global warming is our most important > > mission. Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As > > everyone knows, when the students come out of our classrooms, they see > > a world which is acting as if global warming was only marginally > > relevant. We cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission > > expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming > > is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this truth. > > Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission > > expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society > > denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I > > would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we > > have to *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to > > overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we > > commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our > > actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as > > scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for > > us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. > > > > There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical > > obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the > > truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are > > such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of > > course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is > > not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the > > envelope on this front. > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3798 (20090125) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 14:00:03 -0000 > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] just dont get it > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > Hi Gerard > > As I've already pointed out to Ruth, I did not assert that Louis just > doesn't get it. I entertained it as one possibility. So much for your own > careful scholarship. Are you asserting that it's impossible for intelligent > people to fail to see a point? Now, that would be dogmatic. > > Mervyn > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of gerard > walmsely > Sent: 26 January 2009 11:42 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] just dont get it > > Dear members > > >From what I read, Louis is analysing the argument in the spirit of > critical > thought. He is an intelligent thinker by what we can see. You should not > say he doesnt get it. Or say he is too underneath Humean assumptions - > come > on this is patronising. of course he getrs it. analyse the arguments in a > disinterested manner, and see where the truth will lead you; dont prejudice > what is the truth and if it goes to inconvenient places then say a person > doesnt get it. Don't let people get away with it Lewis. i notice a > pattern > with this. A friend from another listserve - george demitrios - used to > beliong here and is an intelligent guy. He writes about education and > pragmatism. But he left because he showed the ability to think > independently and challenge things and was insulted for it. Beware: this > will lead to Stalinism > > GW > > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 3:58 AM, < > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > > > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > You can reach the person managing the list at > > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > > > > Today's Topics: > > > > 1. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Louis Irwin) > > 2. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 23 (Louis Irwin) > > 3. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Ruth Groff) > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Message: 1 > > Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 22:51:54 -0500 > > From: "Louis Irwin" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > > > Hi Mervyn, > > > > Yes, I gathered all that in your first paragraph. I did not make my > > complaint specific enough. What I found non-responsive was the absence > > of any comments like "Your step X fails to follow from any of the > > preceding steps because...", or "Your step Y tacitly imports > > such-and-such a value commitment because...", or "Your step Z is > incoherent because...", etc. > > > > Louis > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Mervyn Hartwig > > Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2009 9:02 AM > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > I said very clearly what I think the main defect in your 7 steps is. > > They treat truth-seeking as a personal preference when in fact it is > > intrinsic to what a fact is, i.e. the result of a social process, > > embodying commitment to deploy strictly cognitive criteria. (It can't > > be objected that this makes a fact 'normative' without destroying the > > distinction between facts and values, which the Humean wants to > > uphold. -Sorry to repeat a mantra, but what can else can one do if > > folks don't get it?). 'It is a fact that your opinion is false, > > therefore you ought to change it' cannot therefore be parsed as 'If > > you want to remain a truth-seeker.' etc. > > > > Re lying, I accept that it presupposes the commitment to truth > > embodied in discourse and praxis and as I think I've made clear I > > certainly don't want to give up on transcendental critique. But the > > act of lying and what is presupposed by it are hardly the same thing, > > and if lying transcendentally presupposes commitment to truth so does > > not-lying (communicating truth in your second sense) - one can't just > > split one off from the other, as in your Humean argument. As I > > implied, the difference between us here seems to me to come down to > > this: you are operating with an exclusively propositional > > understanding of truth, whereas for me truth is also and ultimately > > ontological and alethic. I can accept that the liar is committed to > > truth in a propositional sense in so far as he wants his false > > statement to be regarded as true, but this presupposes both a context > > of truth-seeking in your second sense and the falsity of the > > proposition in an ontological/ alethic sense. > > > > > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Louis Irwin > > Sent: 25 January 2009 02:29 > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > > > > > Mervyn, > > > > I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to > > cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean > > assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh please!! > > > > You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of > > argument, that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want > > to remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that > > someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) > > for the sake of argument in order to see if the position holds up or > > falls apart shows that he/she just doesn't get the correct position. > > Is that the way your philosophy works? That would be to say that negative > critiques do not work. > > My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the > > steps 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can > > criticize an opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have > > not identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a > negative critique. > > Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. > > > > I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to > > truth", because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if > > we have to give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a > > "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth > > is accompanied by a subjective intention to communicate truths. > > Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental commitment. > > > > Louis > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Mervyn Hartwig > > Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other > > hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that > > you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes > > of argument, that values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you > > want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with > > empirical realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing > > between (1) lying propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content > > (what they are 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of > mass destruction" > > is > > designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an > > absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to > > inducing people to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to > > either the communication or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is > > held to account socially, legally etc., that is an altogether > > different matter from his commitment - he wants to get away with it, > > and often does. Lying has a social context and truth-seeking as its > > condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to truth. > > > > The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it > > allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to > > what a fact is > > - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not > > necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow > > this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the > > distinction between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point > > Bhaskar made in PON). > > Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of > > truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor > > without clothes - because facts are the result of a social process of > > truth-seeking. > > > > There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me > > that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X > > is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves > commmitted to this? > > Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing > > truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary > > personal preference and instrumental reason. > > > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Louis Irwin > > Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > > > Hi Mervyn, > > > > The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how > > a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to > > values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at > > it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that > > Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a > > desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to > > (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes > > outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans > > thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to > > achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value > > distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another > > post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the > > sole norm of truth." > > Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based > > on instrumental values. > > > > You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, > > to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a > > truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the > > same with > > promising: > > if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made > > a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such > > promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. > > A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an > > objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that > > a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what > > his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the > > liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the > > liar was aware that he was making that commitment). > > > > Louis > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > __________ NOD32 3795 (20090123) Information __________ > > > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > Message: 2 > > Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 23:01:58 -0500 > > From: "Louis Irwin" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue > > 23 > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > > > Hi Ruth, Foo Keong, Phil, Tobin, > > > > Thanks for understanding what I was trying to get at! > > > > Louis > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Ruth Groff > > Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2009 2:05 PM > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue > > 23 > > > > Hi Mervyn, everybody, > > > > I don't understand why you say that Louis "just doesn't get it." I > > mean, at most he simply disagrees with Bhaskar on this point, as Hugh > > does, and perhaps Phil, and no doubt others who aren't particularly > > attached to Hume, to empiricism and/or to non-dialectical philosophy! > > In which case it would be that he "disagrees, for well-articulated > > reasons that you regard as flawed." But he didn't even say that. He > > just said that he wasn't sure that the Humean is defeated by the > > particular argument that RB advances. > > > > It's such an important thing, as Foo Kyong suggests, to be able to > > think as critically as possible about the views that one believes to > > be correct. I say it gently, but I think that in context it was > > actually Louis who was stirring the pot/rattling the bars! > > > > Warmly, > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 12:41 PM, Mervyn Hartwig > > wrote: > > > > > I'd be inclined to say it doesn't need a Devil's advocate because > > > the Devil himself supports it! Can one convince the Devil? > > > > > > M > > > > > > PS. You could say, to switch metaphors, I myself am stirring the pot > > > or rattling the bars a bit. > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > > Ng Foo Keong > > > Sent: 25 January 2009 15:55 > > > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, > > > Issue > > > 23 > > > > > > Mervyn: > > > > > > I think Louis is just playing the devil's advocate by considering > > > the Humean critique. if a position (such as the thesis that we can > > > derive values from > > > facts) is solid indeed, it should be able to withstand the fiercest > > > criticism. your argument should not be like preaching to the choir, > > > but you should be able to convince the enemy (who may not share your > > > assumptions). > > > In fact, i think we should take the bull by the horns. Assume Hume > > > was right -- then find a way for him to contradict himself. Can we? > > > > > > regards, > > > F.K. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Message: 1 > > > > Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 14:01:48 -0000 > > > > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > > > Realism > > > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > > > > > > > Message-ID: > > > > < > > > mailman.5367.1232896549.2556.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu> > > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > > > > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > > > > > I said very clearly what I think the main defect in your 7 steps is. > > > > They treat truth-seeking as a personal preference when in fact it > > > > is intrinsic to what a fact is, i.e. the result of a social > > > > process, embodying commitment to deploy strictly cognitive > > > > criteria. (It can't be objected that this makes a fact 'normative' > > > > without destroying the distinction between facts and values, which > > > > the Humean wants to uphold. -Sorry to repeat a mantra, but what > > > > can else can one do if folks don't get it?). 'It is a fact that > > > > your opinion is false, therefore you ought to change it' cannot > > > > therefore be parsed as 'If you > > > want to remain a truth-seeker.' etc. > > > > > > > > Re lying, I accept that it presupposes the commitment to truth > > > > embodied in discourse and praxis and as I think I've made clear I > > > > certainly don't want to give up on transcendental critique. But > > > > the act of lying and what is presupposed by it are hardly the same > > > > thing, and if lying transcendentally presupposes commitment to > > > > truth so does not-lying (communicating truth in your second sense) > > > > - one can't just split one off from the other, as in your Humean > argument. > > > > As I implied, the difference between us here seems to me to come > > > > down to > > > > this: you are operating with an exclusively propositional > > > > understanding of truth, whereas for me truth is also and > > > > ultimately ontological and alethic. I can accept that the liar is > > > > committed to truth in a propositional sense in so far as he wants > > > > his false statement to be regarded as true, but this presupposes > > > > both a context of truth-seeking in your second sense and the > > > > falsity of the proposition > > > in an ontological/ alethic sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > Mervyn > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > __________ NOD32 3798 (20090125) Information __________ > > > > > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > > > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > Message: 3 > > Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 21:58:39 -0600 > > From: Ruth Groff > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > > Message-ID: > > <6ad241360901251958q4e8e04aamc00fb8b0263311d5 at mail.gmail.com> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 > > > > Hey, thanks for that reference. I want to read it now. I will have > > to think about it. The immediate thought that comes to mind is that > > it might be inherent in the definition of the word, as a matter of > > language-analysis, but not be inherent in the act. I don't know if I > > think that, but it's a really interesting example. I had had in mind > > "facts" like encountering a sad, lost child in the mall or something > > -- that just seems to me to be an is that self-evidently generate some > > oughts, though the implication is not a logical one! Or coming across > > a hurt animal. Or responding to a loved one. I'm pretty sure that I > > think that logical necessity is over-rated by empiricists, anyhow. I > > mean, it's big for them because they don't have any > > other kind. The Kantians let in some synthetic a prioris, but even > there > > there is a kind of pressure put on the thing, I think, that is the > > result of having dispensed with natural necessity. (Itself different, > > I think I think, from the necessity associated with the kind of moral > > realism that I'm > > defending.) > > > > I love it when you post things. > > > > r. > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 9:39 PM, Louis Irwin > wrote: > > > > > Hi Ruth. > > > > > > You read me correctly. Just one comment on the need for moral realism. > > You > > > suggest that "to get LOGICAL implication from statements of fact to > > > non-heteronomous normative statements...you need "facts" that are > > > inherently normative." I believe that you and Mervyn are in > > > agreement on that (and I don't disagree), but Searle argued as long > > > ago as 1964 that one can logically derive a genuine 'ought' from > > > nothing but 'is' statements. He considered, for example, that it is > > > part of the MEANING of "X made a promise" that "X is under an > > > obligation to keep the promise" (other > > things > > > being equal), so one does not have to refer to separately real moral > > > premisses - the moral parts are real but they are internal to meanings. > > You > > > can read this as transcendental argument. Maybe these are just two > > > ways > > of > > > saying the same thing. > > > > > > BTW, the Searle essay was reprinted in a 1969 collection entitled > > > "The Is/Ought Question" with arguments for and against the divide, > > > and clearly there were back then many prominent English-speaking > > > philosophers who opposed the divide. I remember at the time several > > > philosophers thought > > the > > > volume was old hat because it was then widely accepted that there > > > was an intrinsic link between facts and values. So RB was definitely > > > following > > up > > > on a strand that had already been around since 1958. > > > > > > Louis > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > > Ruth Groff > > > Sent: Saturday, January 24, 2009 10:10 PM > > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > > Realism > > > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > > > Yes, I think you are right that a Humean can say that, given his/her > > desire > > > truth, s/he "ought" to reject p, upon being shown that it is false, > > > and still not have gone from is to ought in the sense precluded by > Hume. > > S/he > > > could probably even deal with the transcendental/Habermas argument > > > about language, too. At the transcendental level, I mean. The use > > > of language in its primary mode doesn't imply that one *ought* be be > > > a truth-seeker (in the relevant, transcendental sense); it implies > > > that one is one, whether one likes it or not. It's all is's. The > > > is-to-ought sell, there, is to say that the fact of being a language > > > user logically implies that one ought > > not > > > tell lies. > > > > > > My hunch is that what you need, in order to get LOGICAL implication > > > from statements of fact to non-heteronomous normative statements, to > > > use the Kantian parlance, is to be a particular kind of moral > > > realist. I think > > to > > > do it you need "facts" that are inherently normative. > > > > > > No? > > > > > > r. > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 8:29 PM, Louis Irwin > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Mervyn, > > > > > > > > I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are > > > > resorting to cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so > > > > imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh > please!! > > > > > > > > You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of > > > > argument, that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you > > > > want to remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying > > > > that someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position > > > > (here, Hume's) for the sake of argument in order to see if the > > > > position holds up or falls apart shows that he/she just doesn't get > the correct position. > > > > Is that the way your philosophy works? That would be to say that > > negative > > > critiques do not work. > > > > My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of > > > > the steps 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how > > > > one can criticize an opinion and get a person to change it. So far > > > > you have not identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be > > > > the basis of > > a > > > negative critique. > > > > Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. > > > > > > > > I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to > > > > truth", because I think transcendental critiques go out the window > > > > if we have to give up the idea that the very use of language > > > > exhibits a "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that > > > > commitment to truth is accompanied by a subjective intention to > communicate truths. > > > > Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental > commitment. > > > > > > > > Louis > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > > > Mervyn Hartwig > > > > Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM > > > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > > > Realism > > > > > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > > > > > Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other > > > > hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions > > > > that you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the > > > > purposes of argument, that values are abitrary personal > > > > perferences ('if you want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to > > > > me you're operating with empirical realist/actualist assumptions - > > > > you're not distinguishing between (1) lying propositions and (2) > > > > their ontic or de-ontic content (what they are 'about'). E.g. the > > > > statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of > > > mass destruction" > > > > is > > > > designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an > > > > absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed > > > > to inducing people to believe that (1) is true is hardly > > > > commitment to either the communication or the discovery of the > > > > truth (2)! If he is held to account socially, legally etc., that > > > > is an altogether different matter from his commitment - he wants > > > > to get away with it, and often does. Lying has a social context > > > > and truth-seeking as its condition, but that hardly makes it a > commitment to truth. > > > > > > > > The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it > > > > allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic > > > > to what a fact is > > > > - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and > > > > not necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't > > > > allow this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does > > > > allow it the distinction between (Humean) facts and values > > > > collapses (the point Bhaskar made in PON). > > > > Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out > > > > of truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an > > > > Emperor without clothes - because facts are the result of a > > > > social process of truth-seeking. > > > > > > > > There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to > > > > me that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, > > > > argument: 'X is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't > > > > Humeans themselves > > > commmitted to this? > > > > Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing > > > > truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary > > > > personal preference and instrumental reason. > > > > > > > > Mervyn > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > > > Louis Irwin > > > > Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 > > > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > > > Realism > > > > > > > > Hi Mervyn, > > > > > > > > The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show > > > > how a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts > > > > to values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look > > > > closely at it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I > > > > did note that Humeans allow a transition from empirically given > > > > desires (including a desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do > > > > in order to > > > > (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes > > > > outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that > > > > Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you > > > > want to achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the > > > > fact/value distinction surely has to be much stronger. > > > > Incidentally, in another post you stated that RB's "whole > > > > philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth." > > > > Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is > > > > based on instrumental values. > > > > > > > > You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of > > > > truth, to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as > > > > stating a truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to > > > > truth. It's the same with > > > > promising: > > > > if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby > > > > made a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing > > > > so. Such promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my > intentions were. > > > > A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has > > > > an objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that > > > > sense that a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; > > > > no matter what his intentions are, the social nature of language > > > > ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying could not > > > > succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that > commitment). > > > > > > > > Louis > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 26 > > ************************************************ > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3798 (20090125) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 28 > ************************************************ > From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Mon Jan 26 10:35:54 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 17:35:54 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] just don't get it In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Could be, and I certainly stand accused of misunderstanding Lewis. So, what's the problem? It's standard argumentative procedure to say 'I think you might be misunderstanding me and this is perhaps the reason why'. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of gerard walmsely Sent: 26 January 2009 17:15 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [Critical-Realism] just don't get it Mr Mervyn I think it is possible for "intelligent" people to be wrong. However, in this case I think it was Lewis that was right and yourself that was wrong. It could just be that you are so underneath Bhaskar's assumptions that you just don't see it. GW. On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 2:00 PM, < critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Censorship (was: Practical Application ofCritical > Realism) (Mervyn Hartwig) > 2. Re: just dont get it (Mervyn Hartwig) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 13:19:40 -0000 > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Censorship (was: Practical Application > ofCritical Realism) > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > Hi Hans, all > > > > I don't think one can say the university is censoring your views. It's not > preventing you from airing them (but I do hope your tenure is secure!) and > they can be seen as in competition with its complacent views. But its > inactivity is certainly having a causal impact (this is a case of the > reality of absence) in that marginalises or sidelines your views (which is > why you feel censored) and influences others to be complacent. This is > because, as you say, you would expect a university of all institutions, to > take global warming seriously. Its inactivity is a dereliction of its > mission to promote truth - it is causally efficacious in the inculcation of > false ideas. Therefore it ought to act, CP. This is a powerful line; > introducing the more contentious idea of censorship would likely detract > from it. > > > > Your four-stepped derivation of our obligation of scientists has the basic > shape of an (incomplete) explanatory critique. Many critical realists are > very sceptical about this theory. One reason sometimes given is that it's > too cognitively oriented, but this overlooks that it can readily be > extended > to embrace other ills than cognitive ones, notably unfulfilled needs. Here > is the basic shape or inference pattern, derived from Bhaskar's SRHE, of > the > explanatory critique of cognitive ills in its full extent. You might find > it > useful in developing or refining your ideas, and I think it shows that it > embraces Mark's concerns re changing people and institutions (to put it > into > practice is of course another thing). I comment on your proposed changes to > your four steps at the end. > > > > (i) [also your first step] theoretical or cognitive critique (demonstrating > the falsity of some belief P - global warming is not a serious threat to > the > well-being of the species); (ii) [your 2] explanatory critique (identifying > the structural source of P, why this is widely denied, e.g. a > socio-economic > system that depends on ever-expanding production and consumer-demand > disposes people to minimise the ecological consequences of this); (iii) > value judgement (negative evaluation, CP, of the structural source of P); > (iv) practical judgement (positive evaluation, CP, of action rationally > directed at removing the source of P); (v) [your 3] concrete axiological > judgement (bridging the logical gap between [iv] and a particular course of > action: this is what we should do in this context to remove the source of > P) > Teaching, discussion etc would certainly play a role in arriving at this > judgement; (vi) transformation in the agent's praxis (bridging the logical > gap between [v] and actually performing the action, that is, resolving the > problem of akrasia); (vii) [your 4] emancipatory action (praxis oriented to > emancipation from the structural source of falsity); (viii) transformative > praxis (transformation of the source of P); and (ix) emancipated (free) > action, in the sense that we've got rid of an unwanted constraint. > > > > I can't see that (v) [your 3] can be abandoned. It is indispensable for > getting from (iv) to (vi) ff. The explanation can't effect this by itself. > > > > Nor can I see that you really need a stronger justification for (vii) [your > 4] as such. It follows in terms of the logic of the inference schema that > (since truth is a good and falsity an evil, CP) action should be taken to > transform the source of falsity, CP. To do nothing would indeed be a form > of > theory-practice inconsistency. But of course the argument can be bolstered, > and I think you're on the right track. But it won't be just books and > libraries that are adversely impacted by severe climate change, but many of > the other basic necessary conditions for truth-seeking to flourish: > freedom, > health, education, etc. And of course since ecological constraints are > absolute in important senses and affect us all, it's easy to make an > argument that everyone should pitch in. In a patently interconnected world > the logic of dialectical universalisability patently applies. > > > > Note that, while the theory imo demonstrates that the transition from > theory > to practice is logically possible, it does not itself effect the > transition. > As you imply: 'Only practice itself can do that. It is in this sense that > the explanatory critique is always conditioned critique' (SRHE, p. 188). > It's sometimes complained that the CP clause is deployed 'casually' or > 'complacently' here, but, as Bhaskar has pointed out, in an open world CP > clauses are a condition for moving, not just from facts to values, but from > facts to facts: to invoke a law of nature is not to say what will happen > but > what would happen, CP. Far from being casual, their deployment in the > argument for EC is standard scientific (and philosophical) procedure. The > CP > clause is necessary at (iii) because the structure might be the source of a > range of positively valued things; perhaps it can be changed in the > relevant > respect but not others; complex assessments will have to be made in > practice > by the people inolved in any movment for change. And at (iv) it's necessary > because an assessment has to be made whether worse consequences would > ensue. > Of course, a decision not to act at (v) or failure to act at (vi) is always > possible, in which case the dialectic would stop there. > > > > It's also sometimes claimed that there are no examples of successful > explanatory critique. But I'd argue that the civil rights movement of the > 20th century, e.g., is a brilliant, at least part example: the scientific > demonstration that racism is false and of some of its structural causes > certainly played a crucial role in the dismantling of segregationist > structures world-wide. (Which is one reason why I keep using the racism > example). > > > > The claim has been made here that inferences from facts to values do not > LOGICALLY follow, which I take to mean that they don't follow with full > deductive certainty - this seems to be entailed by the CP clause. But if > that's all 'Hume's Law' means then it's a truism. However that > interpretation of the 'Law' is debatable and in practice it has prohibited > any strong inference from facts to values (deduction is not the only form > of > logic!), erecting an absolute gulf between them. If one accepts with > Collier > that the Bhaskarian inferences are 'more like evidential or scientific than > deductive arguments', it still seems to me they refute the 'Law' as > commonly > understood. But although that's philosophically important, it's not of > course the main point. > > > > Mervyn > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of ehrbar > Sent: 25 January 2009 20:24 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Censorship (was: Practical Application > ofCritical Realism) > > > Sorry for dropping the ball. My thinking has changed since the text I sent > you originally, but so many things are happening here, as fallout of Tim > DeChristopher's monkeywrench action, that I did not have the time to write > it down. > > Three points: > > (1) > > I think now that in my original message the third expansion is > redundant: it is not an expansion, and it was wrong of me to characterize > it > as an expansion. My original text is appended below, for your convenience. > If I explain to my students why society is ignoring global warming, this > does not commit me to the further step of teaching my students how to > overcome this obstacle. My explanation itself is the tool to overcome this > obstacle. The more correct this explanation is, the more effective and > emancipatory is the tool. I may or may not go into the specifics (how to > get policies passed, how to organize) but I don't *have* to go into > specifics. > > (2) > > My fourth expansion was: climate change is such a severe issue that knowing > about climate change and not putting one's best efforts into doing > something > about it is theory-practice inconsistency. This needs a stronger > justification than just saying: if you know something and you are not > acting > on it then you commit theory-practice inconsistency. I think this would be > an oversimplification which can be quickly refuted. > > Instead, I am looking for a justification in the following direction: > As a University Professor I am committed to uphold the quest for scientific > truth. For instance, knowing that science is a social project, it is my > obligation to read what others have written. If the materials which I need > are not in the library this does not excuse me but I have to get them > through interlibrary loan etc. Now what if my research tells me that, > unless I do something now, there will be no more libraries in 50 or 100 > years. People will not have the time to read books but they will be out in > the forests (if there are any left) foraging for food and fire wood. Does > this obligate me, because of my commitment to science, to do something > about > it now? Does my commitment, which obligates me to search the world's > libraries for the materials I need, also obligate me to see to it that the > libraries remain open for more than 100 years? If I accept that science as > we know it will no longer exist in 100 years, what does this tell me about > my commitment to science now? Isn't science intrinsically something that > has a shelf life of more than 100 years? After all, the books are printed > on acid-free paper! All these are open questions and partial answers to > me: > I don't know if I can make this step or not. > > If I can make this step, then my obligation to act does not come from the > fact that billions of people will die, but that we are entering a world in > which libraries will no longer function. I think this is what you get if > you derive your obligation to act from the commitment to truth. Please > correct me if I am wrong. By the way, if you think this is a backward > argument, my reply is that Marx's critique of capitalism (as I understand > it) goes through a similar detour. Marx's main critique is not that > capitalism unnecessarily kills innocent children, although it does. His > main critique is that capitalism is a social order which keeps the members > of society in the dark about the nature of their own social relations. > > (3) > > I turned away from these unresolved problems, and now I am taking a new > tack, namely, I am wondering whether the inactivity of the University is an > act of censorship. I just read the following draft letter to one of my > colleages, and he thought it was clever rhetorics, but he did not think > that > actual censorship was involved. Please tell me whether I successfully > argued that this is indeed censorship as it is usually defined: > > > Dear University President Xxx: > > > The University pays me for research, teaching, and service. I am taking > each of these components seriously. But the University's practical denial > of climate change hinders my efforts to tell the truth inside the > classroom. > Your inactivity, President Xxx, as the representative of the institution, > erases, like a big blotch of censor's ink, my efforts to communicate truth > to the students. > > The situation regarding climate change is so urgent and dire that students > should expect blinking red lights when they come out of the classroom, > warning everyone of the danger and exhorting them to re-think every aspect > of their lives in the present emergency. There should be news bulletins at > every corner about the state of the planet, there should be charts > everywhere showing how quickly our vehicle miles are falling, how many > homes > in the area have been made energy-neutral, how much our carbon emissions > have been declining, how many miles of railroads have been electrified, how > many acres of solar collectors have been planted, how many roads have been > re-converted into agricultural lands, how many airports have been closed -- > comparing the achieved data to the trajectory necessary if our children and > grandchildren want to enjoy a livable planet. > > None of this is happening. Even the University itself, one of the > institutions where humankind's scientific knowledge about the present > emergency is generated, is displaying exactly the usual drivel about the > latest sporting event or the latest academic star, and nothing else. > Because of your silence, President Xxx, my students must think that I am > not > telling the truth. At least one of my colleagues has received phone calls > from the parents of his students that he should stop scaring his students. > Most of our students think -- and they have to think -- that our urgency is > our personal problem, that we are not talking about reality during our > classes, but that we are exaggerating. If the situation is as urgent as we > say, and if this urgency is as well established scientifically as we say, > then in the University, where we say this science is created, at least some > signs of this urgency should be visible, shouldn't they? The University's > business as usual posture is erasing our efforts to tell the truth in the > classroom. For instance the buildings which the University is planning in > the next 20 years will increase the University's carbon footprint and fall > far short of the changes necessary according to scientific evidence. I > must > respectfully protest this Master Plan because these are University > buildings, and their open disregard of climate science is censorship of the > things I am saying in these same classrooms. > > President Xxx, I appeal to you to make the necessary changes so that the > University will play the role in leading us out of the present emergency > which falls to it as an institution of higher learning. As is, we are part > of the problem, despite the valiant efforts of countless individuals in the > University Community. > > > So far the draft letter. As always I am appreciative of your input, and > apologies that I probably won't have the time to properly respond to your > responses. > > Hans E. > > > P.S. Here is my earlier text with the four transitions again, for your > convenience: > > > > > I agree that education about global warming is our most important > > mission. Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As > > everyone knows, when the students come out of our classrooms, they see > > a world which is acting as if global warming was only marginally > > relevant. We cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission > > expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming > > is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this truth. > > Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission > > expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society > > denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I > > would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we > > have to *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to > > overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we > > commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our > > actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as > > scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for > > us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. > > > > There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical > > obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the > > truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are > > such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of > > course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is > > not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the > > envelope on this front. > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3798 (20090125) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 14:00:03 -0000 > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] just dont get it > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > Hi Gerard > > As I've already pointed out to Ruth, I did not assert that Louis just > doesn't get it. I entertained it as one possibility. So much for your own > careful scholarship. Are you asserting that it's impossible for intelligent > people to fail to see a point? Now, that would be dogmatic. > > Mervyn > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of gerard > walmsely > Sent: 26 January 2009 11:42 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] just dont get it > > Dear members > > >From what I read, Louis is analysing the argument in the spirit of > critical > thought. He is an intelligent thinker by what we can see. You should not > say he doesnt get it. Or say he is too underneath Humean assumptions - > come > on this is patronising. of course he getrs it. analyse the arguments in a > disinterested manner, and see where the truth will lead you; dont prejudice > what is the truth and if it goes to inconvenient places then say a person > doesnt get it. Don't let people get away with it Lewis. i notice a > pattern > with this. A friend from another listserve - george demitrios - used to > beliong here and is an intelligent guy. He writes about education and > pragmatism. But he left because he showed the ability to think > independently and challenge things and was insulted for it. Beware: this > will lead to Stalinism > > GW > > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 3:58 AM, < > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > > > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > You can reach the person managing the list at > > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > > > > Today's Topics: > > > > 1. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Louis Irwin) > > 2. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 23 (Louis Irwin) > > 3. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Ruth Groff) > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Message: 1 > > Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 22:51:54 -0500 > > From: "Louis Irwin" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > > > Hi Mervyn, > > > > Yes, I gathered all that in your first paragraph. I did not make my > > complaint specific enough. What I found non-responsive was the absence > > of any comments like "Your step X fails to follow from any of the > > preceding steps because...", or "Your step Y tacitly imports > > such-and-such a value commitment because...", or "Your step Z is > incoherent because...", etc. > > > > Louis > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Mervyn Hartwig > > Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2009 9:02 AM > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > I said very clearly what I think the main defect in your 7 steps is. > > They treat truth-seeking as a personal preference when in fact it is > > intrinsic to what a fact is, i.e. the result of a social process, > > embodying commitment to deploy strictly cognitive criteria. (It can't > > be objected that this makes a fact 'normative' without destroying the > > distinction between facts and values, which the Humean wants to > > uphold. -Sorry to repeat a mantra, but what can else can one do if > > folks don't get it?). 'It is a fact that your opinion is false, > > therefore you ought to change it' cannot therefore be parsed as 'If > > you want to remain a truth-seeker.' etc. > > > > Re lying, I accept that it presupposes the commitment to truth > > embodied in discourse and praxis and as I think I've made clear I > > certainly don't want to give up on transcendental critique. But the > > act of lying and what is presupposed by it are hardly the same thing, > > and if lying transcendentally presupposes commitment to truth so does > > not-lying (communicating truth in your second sense) - one can't just > > split one off from the other, as in your Humean argument. As I > > implied, the difference between us here seems to me to come down to > > this: you are operating with an exclusively propositional > > understanding of truth, whereas for me truth is also and ultimately > > ontological and alethic. I can accept that the liar is committed to > > truth in a propositional sense in so far as he wants his false > > statement to be regarded as true, but this presupposes both a context > > of truth-seeking in your second sense and the falsity of the > > proposition in an ontological/ alethic sense. > > > > > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Louis Irwin > > Sent: 25 January 2009 02:29 > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > > > > > Mervyn, > > > > I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to > > cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean > > assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh please!! > > > > You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of > > argument, that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want > > to remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that > > someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) > > for the sake of argument in order to see if the position holds up or > > falls apart shows that he/she just doesn't get the correct position. > > Is that the way your philosophy works? That would be to say that negative > critiques do not work. > > My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the > > steps 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can > > criticize an opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have > > not identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a > negative critique. > > Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. > > > > I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to > > truth", because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if > > we have to give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a > > "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth > > is accompanied by a subjective intention to communicate truths. > > Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental commitment. > > > > Louis > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Mervyn Hartwig > > Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other > > hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that > > you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes > > of argument, that values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you > > want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with > > empirical realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing > > between (1) lying propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content > > (what they are 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of > mass destruction" > > is > > designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an > > absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to > > inducing people to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to > > either the communication or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is > > held to account socially, legally etc., that is an altogether > > different matter from his commitment - he wants to get away with it, > > and often does. Lying has a social context and truth-seeking as its > > condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to truth. > > > > The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it > > allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to > > what a fact is > > - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not > > necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow > > this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the > > distinction between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point > > Bhaskar made in PON). > > Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of > > truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor > > without clothes - because facts are the result of a social process of > > truth-seeking. > > > > There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me > > that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X > > is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves > commmitted to this? > > Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing > > truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary > > personal preference and instrumental reason. > > > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Louis Irwin > > Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > > > Hi Mervyn, > > > > The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how > > a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to > > values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at > > it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that > > Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a > > desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to > > (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes > > outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans > > thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to > > achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value > > distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another > > post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the > > sole norm of truth." > > Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based > > on instrumental values. > > > > You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, > > to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a > > truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the > > same with > > promising: > > if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made > > a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such > > promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. > > A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an > > objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that > > a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what > > his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the > > liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the > > liar was aware that he was making that commitment). > > > > Louis > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > __________ NOD32 3795 (20090123) Information __________ > > > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > Message: 2 > > Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 23:01:58 -0500 > > From: "Louis Irwin" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue > > 23 > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > > > Hi Ruth, Foo Keong, Phil, Tobin, > > > > Thanks for understanding what I was trying to get at! > > > > Louis > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Ruth Groff > > Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2009 2:05 PM > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue > > 23 > > > > Hi Mervyn, everybody, > > > > I don't understand why you say that Louis "just doesn't get it." I > > mean, at most he simply disagrees with Bhaskar on this point, as Hugh > > does, and perhaps Phil, and no doubt others who aren't particularly > > attached to Hume, to empiricism and/or to non-dialectical philosophy! > > In which case it would be that he "disagrees, for well-articulated > > reasons that you regard as flawed." But he didn't even say that. He > > just said that he wasn't sure that the Humean is defeated by the > > particular argument that RB advances. > > > > It's such an important thing, as Foo Kyong suggests, to be able to > > think as critically as possible about the views that one believes to > > be correct. I say it gently, but I think that in context it was > > actually Louis who was stirring the pot/rattling the bars! > > > > Warmly, > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 12:41 PM, Mervyn Hartwig > > wrote: > > > > > I'd be inclined to say it doesn't need a Devil's advocate because > > > the Devil himself supports it! Can one convince the Devil? > > > > > > M > > > > > > PS. You could say, to switch metaphors, I myself am stirring the pot > > > or rattling the bars a bit. > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > > Ng Foo Keong > > > Sent: 25 January 2009 15:55 > > > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, > > > Issue > > > 23 > > > > > > Mervyn: > > > > > > I think Louis is just playing the devil's advocate by considering > > > the Humean critique. if a position (such as the thesis that we can > > > derive values from > > > facts) is solid indeed, it should be able to withstand the fiercest > > > criticism. your argument should not be like preaching to the choir, > > > but you should be able to convince the enemy (who may not share your > > > assumptions). > > > In fact, i think we should take the bull by the horns. Assume Hume > > > was right -- then find a way for him to contradict himself. Can we? > > > > > > regards, > > > F.K. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Message: 1 > > > > Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 14:01:48 -0000 > > > > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > > > Realism > > > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > > > > > > > Message-ID: > > > > < > > > mailman.5367.1232896549.2556.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu> > > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > > > > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > > > > > I said very clearly what I think the main defect in your 7 steps is. > > > > They treat truth-seeking as a personal preference when in fact it > > > > is intrinsic to what a fact is, i.e. the result of a social > > > > process, embodying commitment to deploy strictly cognitive > > > > criteria. (It can't be objected that this makes a fact 'normative' > > > > without destroying the distinction between facts and values, which > > > > the Humean wants to uphold. -Sorry to repeat a mantra, but what > > > > can else can one do if folks don't get it?). 'It is a fact that > > > > your opinion is false, therefore you ought to change it' cannot > > > > therefore be parsed as 'If you > > > want to remain a truth-seeker.' etc. > > > > > > > > Re lying, I accept that it presupposes the commitment to truth > > > > embodied in discourse and praxis and as I think I've made clear I > > > > certainly don't want to give up on transcendental critique. But > > > > the act of lying and what is presupposed by it are hardly the same > > > > thing, and if lying transcendentally presupposes commitment to > > > > truth so does not-lying (communicating truth in your second sense) > > > > - one can't just split one off from the other, as in your Humean > argument. > > > > As I implied, the difference between us here seems to me to come > > > > down to > > > > this: you are operating with an exclusively propositional > > > > understanding of truth, whereas for me truth is also and > > > > ultimately ontological and alethic. I can accept that the liar is > > > > committed to truth in a propositional sense in so far as he wants > > > > his false statement to be regarded as true, but this presupposes > > > > both a context of truth-seeking in your second sense and the > > > > falsity of the proposition > > > in an ontological/ alethic sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > Mervyn > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > __________ NOD32 3798 (20090125) Information __________ > > > > > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > > > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > Message: 3 > > Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 21:58:39 -0600 > > From: Ruth Groff > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > > Message-ID: > > <6ad241360901251958q4e8e04aamc00fb8b0263311d5 at mail.gmail.com> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 > > > > Hey, thanks for that reference. I want to read it now. I will have > > to think about it. The immediate thought that comes to mind is that > > it might be inherent in the definition of the word, as a matter of > > language-analysis, but not be inherent in the act. I don't know if I > > think that, but it's a really interesting example. I had had in mind > > "facts" like encountering a sad, lost child in the mall or something > > -- that just seems to me to be an is that self-evidently generate some > > oughts, though the implication is not a logical one! Or coming across > > a hurt animal. Or responding to a loved one. I'm pretty sure that I > > think that logical necessity is over-rated by empiricists, anyhow. I > > mean, it's big for them because they don't have any > > other kind. The Kantians let in some synthetic a prioris, but even > there > > there is a kind of pressure put on the thing, I think, that is the > > result of having dispensed with natural necessity. (Itself different, > > I think I think, from the necessity associated with the kind of moral > > realism that I'm > > defending.) > > > > I love it when you post things. > > > > r. > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 9:39 PM, Louis Irwin > wrote: > > > > > Hi Ruth. > > > > > > You read me correctly. Just one comment on the need for moral realism. > > You > > > suggest that "to get LOGICAL implication from statements of fact to > > > non-heteronomous normative statements...you need "facts" that are > > > inherently normative." I believe that you and Mervyn are in > > > agreement on that (and I don't disagree), but Searle argued as long > > > ago as 1964 that one can logically derive a genuine 'ought' from > > > nothing but 'is' statements. He considered, for example, that it is > > > part of the MEANING of "X made a promise" that "X is under an > > > obligation to keep the promise" (other > > things > > > being equal), so one does not have to refer to separately real moral > > > premisses - the moral parts are real but they are internal to meanings. > > You > > > can read this as transcendental argument. Maybe these are just two > > > ways > > of > > > saying the same thing. > > > > > > BTW, the Searle essay was reprinted in a 1969 collection entitled > > > "The Is/Ought Question" with arguments for and against the divide, > > > and clearly there were back then many prominent English-speaking > > > philosophers who opposed the divide. I remember at the time several > > > philosophers thought > > the > > > volume was old hat because it was then widely accepted that there > > > was an intrinsic link between facts and values. So RB was definitely > > > following > > up > > > on a strand that had already been around since 1958. > > > > > > Louis > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > > Ruth Groff > > > Sent: Saturday, January 24, 2009 10:10 PM > > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > > Realism > > > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > > > Yes, I think you are right that a Humean can say that, given his/her > > desire > > > truth, s/he "ought" to reject p, upon being shown that it is false, > > > and still not have gone from is to ought in the sense precluded by > Hume. > > S/he > > > could probably even deal with the transcendental/Habermas argument > > > about language, too. At the transcendental level, I mean. The use > > > of language in its primary mode doesn't imply that one *ought* be be > > > a truth-seeker (in the relevant, transcendental sense); it implies > > > that one is one, whether one likes it or not. It's all is's. The > > > is-to-ought sell, there, is to say that the fact of being a language > > > user logically implies that one ought > > not > > > tell lies. > > > > > > My hunch is that what you need, in order to get LOGICAL implication > > > from statements of fact to non-heteronomous normative statements, to > > > use the Kantian parlance, is to be a particular kind of moral > > > realist. I think > > to > > > do it you need "facts" that are inherently normative. > > > > > > No? > > > > > > r. > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 8:29 PM, Louis Irwin > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Mervyn, > > > > > > > > I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are > > > > resorting to cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so > > > > imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh > please!! > > > > > > > > You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of > > > > argument, that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you > > > > want to remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying > > > > that someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position > > > > (here, Hume's) for the sake of argument in order to see if the > > > > position holds up or falls apart shows that he/she just doesn't get > the correct position. > > > > Is that the way your philosophy works? That would be to say that > > negative > > > critiques do not work. > > > > My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of > > > > the steps 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how > > > > one can criticize an opinion and get a person to change it. So far > > > > you have not identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be > > > > the basis of > > a > > > negative critique. > > > > Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. > > > > > > > > I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to > > > > truth", because I think transcendental critiques go out the window > > > > if we have to give up the idea that the very use of language > > > > exhibits a "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that > > > > commitment to truth is accompanied by a subjective intention to > communicate truths. > > > > Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental > commitment. > > > > > > > > Louis > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > > > Mervyn Hartwig > > > > Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM > > > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > > > Realism > > > > > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > > > > > Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other > > > > hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions > > > > that you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the > > > > purposes of argument, that values are abitrary personal > > > > perferences ('if you want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to > > > > me you're operating with empirical realist/actualist assumptions - > > > > you're not distinguishing between (1) lying propositions and (2) > > > > their ontic or de-ontic content (what they are 'about'). E.g. the > > > > statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of > > > mass destruction" > > > > is > > > > designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an > > > > absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed > > > > to inducing people to believe that (1) is true is hardly > > > > commitment to either the communication or the discovery of the > > > > truth (2)! If he is held to account socially, legally etc., that > > > > is an altogether different matter from his commitment - he wants > > > > to get away with it, and often does. Lying has a social context > > > > and truth-seeking as its condition, but that hardly makes it a > commitment to truth. > > > > > > > > The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it > > > > allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic > > > > to what a fact is > > > > - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and > > > > not necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't > > > > allow this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does > > > > allow it the distinction between (Humean) facts and values > > > > collapses (the point Bhaskar made in PON). > > > > Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out > > > > of truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an > > > > Emperor without clothes - because facts are the result of a > > > > social process of truth-seeking. > > > > > > > > There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to > > > > me that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, > > > > argument: 'X is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't > > > > Humeans themselves > > > commmitted to this? > > > > Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing > > > > truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary > > > > personal preference and instrumental reason. > > > > > > > > Mervyn > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > > > Louis Irwin > > > > Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 > > > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > > > Realism > > > > > > > > Hi Mervyn, > > > > > > > > The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show > > > > how a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts > > > > to values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look > > > > closely at it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I > > > > did note that Humeans allow a transition from empirically given > > > > desires (including a desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do > > > > in order to > > > > (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes > > > > outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that > > > > Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you > > > > want to achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the > > > > fact/value distinction surely has to be much stronger. > > > > Incidentally, in another post you stated that RB's "whole > > > > philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth." > > > > Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is > > > > based on instrumental values. > > > > > > > > You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of > > > > truth, to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as > > > > stating a truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to > > > > truth. It's the same with > > > > promising: > > > > if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby > > > > made a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing > > > > so. Such promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my > intentions were. > > > > A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has > > > > an objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that > > > > sense that a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; > > > > no matter what his intentions are, the social nature of language > > > > ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying could not > > > > succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that > commitment). > > > > > > > > Louis > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 26 > > ************************************************ > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3798 (20090125) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 28 > ************************************************ > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3798 (20090125) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk Mon Jan 26 16:11:55 2009 From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 23:11:55 +0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] FW: BSPS talk - 2 Feb - London - Saatsi on scientific realism and the history of science In-Reply-To: <32BD2A8AF28D794DB8E14E9D0DE3F81B04D61428@exchange-be6.lancs.local> References: <32BD2A8AF28D794DB8E14E9D0DE3F81B04D61428@exchange-be6.lancs.local> Message-ID: ________________________________________ From: Philosophy in Europe [PHILOS-L at liverpool.ac.uk] On Behalf Of Cooper, Rachel (PH) [r.v.cooper at lancaster.ac.uk] Sent: 26 January 2009 14:10 To: PHILOS-L at liverpool.ac.uk Subject: BSPS talk - 2 Feb - London - Saatsi on scientific realism and the history of science BRITISH SOCIETY FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2 February Juha Saatsi (Leeds) Scientific Realism and the History of Science: Solutions and Open Problems Meetings are held at 5.15pm in room T206, in the Centre for the Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, Lakatos Building, Portugal Street , London WC2. Tea and biscuits are served at 5.00pm in Room T16. All welcome Abstract. Much of the contemporary realism debate concerns the question: how good is the historical evidence for and against realism? In this "big-picture" talk I will map out several open questions about how such evidence should be evaluated. Along the way I will also flag some of the right moves made in the realism debate to date. I will illustrate my general points by appealing to the details of a particular novel case-study from the history of optics. Messages to the list are archived at http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/philos-l.html. Prolonged discussions should be moved to chora: enrol via http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/chora.html. Other philosophical resources on the Web can be found at http://www.liv.ac.uk/pal. From lyochim at ualberta.ca Thu Jan 29 19:20:27 2009 From: lyochim at ualberta.ca (Lorin Yochim) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 10:20:27 +0800 Subject: [Critical-Realism] just don't get it In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <002101c98281$53b172a0$fb1457e0$@ca> Hello Everyone, My contribution to this conversation may seem out of line. If so, please disregard. It seems to me the this once interesting conversation has degenerated to a point where nothing is being discussed. Perhaps it's time to continue it off-listserv. This is only a suggestion. Of course if you want to continue I will respectfully delete. Cheers, Lorin -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of gerard walmsely Sent: January-27-09 1:15 AM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [Critical-Realism] just don't get it Mr Mervyn I think it is possible for "intelligent" people to be wrong. However, in this case I think it was Lewis that was right and yourself that was wrong. It could just be that you are so underneath Bhaskar's assumptions that you just don't see it. GW. On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 2:00 PM, < critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Censorship (was: Practical Application ofCritical > Realism) (Mervyn Hartwig) > 2. Re: just dont get it (Mervyn Hartwig) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 13:19:40 -0000 > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Censorship (was: Practical Application > ofCritical Realism) > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > Hi Hans, all > > > > I don't think one can say the university is censoring your views. It's not > preventing you from airing them (but I do hope your tenure is secure!) and > they can be seen as in competition with its complacent views. But its > inactivity is certainly having a causal impact (this is a case of the > reality of absence) in that marginalises or sidelines your views (which is > why you feel censored) and influences others to be complacent. This is > because, as you say, you would expect a university of all institutions, to > take global warming seriously. Its inactivity is a dereliction of its > mission to promote truth - it is causally efficacious in the inculcation of > false ideas. Therefore it ought to act, CP. This is a powerful line; > introducing the more contentious idea of censorship would likely detract > from it. > > > > Your four-stepped derivation of our obligation of scientists has the basic > shape of an (incomplete) explanatory critique. Many critical realists are > very sceptical about this theory. One reason sometimes given is that it's > too cognitively oriented, but this overlooks that it can readily be > extended > to embrace other ills than cognitive ones, notably unfulfilled needs. Here > is the basic shape or inference pattern, derived from Bhaskar's SRHE, of > the > explanatory critique of cognitive ills in its full extent. You might find > it > useful in developing or refining your ideas, and I think it shows that it > embraces Mark's concerns re changing people and institutions (to put it > into > practice is of course another thing). I comment on your proposed changes to > your four steps at the end. > > > > (i) [also your first step] theoretical or cognitive critique (demonstrating > the falsity of some belief P - global warming is not a serious threat to > the > well-being of the species); (ii) [your 2] explanatory critique (identifying > the structural source of P, why this is widely denied, e.g. a > socio-economic > system that depends on ever-expanding production and consumer-demand > disposes people to minimise the ecological consequences of this); (iii) > value judgement (negative evaluation, CP, of the structural source of P); > (iv) practical judgement (positive evaluation, CP, of action rationally > directed at removing the source of P); (v) [your 3] concrete axiological > judgement (bridging the logical gap between [iv] and a particular course of > action: this is what we should do in this context to remove the source of > P) > Teaching, discussion etc would certainly play a role in arriving at this > judgement; (vi) transformation in the agent's praxis (bridging the logical > gap between [v] and actually performing the action, that is, resolving the > problem of akrasia); (vii) [your 4] emancipatory action (praxis oriented to > emancipation from the structural source of falsity); (viii) transformative > praxis (transformation of the source of P); and (ix) emancipated (free) > action, in the sense that we've got rid of an unwanted constraint. > > > > I can't see that (v) [your 3] can be abandoned. It is indispensable for > getting from (iv) to (vi) ff. The explanation can't effect this by itself. > > > > Nor can I see that you really need a stronger justification for (vii) [your > 4] as such. It follows in terms of the logic of the inference schema that > (since truth is a good and falsity an evil, CP) action should be taken to > transform the source of falsity, CP. To do nothing would indeed be a form > of > theory-practice inconsistency. But of course the argument can be bolstered, > and I think you're on the right track. But it won't be just books and > libraries that are adversely impacted by severe climate change, but many of > the other basic necessary conditions for truth-seeking to flourish: > freedom, > health, education, etc. And of course since ecological constraints are > absolute in important senses and affect us all, it's easy to make an > argument that everyone should pitch in. In a patently interconnected world > the logic of dialectical universalisability patently applies. > > > > Note that, while the theory imo demonstrates that the transition from > theory > to practice is logically possible, it does not itself effect the > transition. > As you imply: 'Only practice itself can do that. It is in this sense that > the explanatory critique is always conditioned critique' (SRHE, p. 188). > It's sometimes complained that the CP clause is deployed 'casually' or > 'complacently' here, but, as Bhaskar has pointed out, in an open world CP > clauses are a condition for moving, not just from facts to values, but from > facts to facts: to invoke a law of nature is not to say what will happen > but > what would happen, CP. Far from being casual, their deployment in the > argument for EC is standard scientific (and philosophical) procedure. The > CP > clause is necessary at (iii) because the structure might be the source of a > range of positively valued things; perhaps it can be changed in the > relevant > respect but not others; complex assessments will have to be made in > practice > by the people inolved in any movment for change. And at (iv) it's necessary > because an assessment has to be made whether worse consequences would > ensue. > Of course, a decision not to act at (v) or failure to act at (vi) is always > possible, in which case the dialectic would stop there. > > > > It's also sometimes claimed that there are no examples of successful > explanatory critique. But I'd argue that the civil rights movement of the > 20th century, e.g., is a brilliant, at least part example: the scientific > demonstration that racism is false and of some of its structural causes > certainly played a crucial role in the dismantling of segregationist > structures world-wide. (Which is one reason why I keep using the racism > example). > > > > The claim has been made here that inferences from facts to values do not > LOGICALLY follow, which I take to mean that they don't follow with full > deductive certainty - this seems to be entailed by the CP clause. But if > that's all 'Hume's Law' means then it's a truism. However that > interpretation of the 'Law' is debatable and in practice it has prohibited > any strong inference from facts to values (deduction is not the only form > of > logic!), erecting an absolute gulf between them. If one accepts with > Collier > that the Bhaskarian inferences are 'more like evidential or scientific than > deductive arguments', it still seems to me they refute the 'Law' as > commonly > understood. But although that's philosophically important, it's not of > course the main point. > > > > Mervyn > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of ehrbar > Sent: 25 January 2009 20:24 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Censorship (was: Practical Application > ofCritical Realism) > > > Sorry for dropping the ball. My thinking has changed since the text I sent > you originally, but so many things are happening here, as fallout of Tim > DeChristopher's monkeywrench action, that I did not have the time to write > it down. > > Three points: > > (1) > > I think now that in my original message the third expansion is > redundant: it is not an expansion, and it was wrong of me to characterize > it > as an expansion. My original text is appended below, for your convenience. > If I explain to my students why society is ignoring global warming, this > does not commit me to the further step of teaching my students how to > overcome this obstacle. My explanation itself is the tool to overcome this > obstacle. The more correct this explanation is, the more effective and > emancipatory is the tool. I may or may not go into the specifics (how to > get policies passed, how to organize) but I don't *have* to go into > specifics. > > (2) > > My fourth expansion was: climate change is such a severe issue that knowing > about climate change and not putting one's best efforts into doing > something > about it is theory-practice inconsistency. This needs a stronger > justification than just saying: if you know something and you are not > acting > on it then you commit theory-practice inconsistency. I think this would be > an oversimplification which can be quickly refuted. > > Instead, I am looking for a justification in the following direction: > As a University Professor I am committed to uphold the quest for scientific > truth. For instance, knowing that science is a social project, it is my > obligation to read what others have written. If the materials which I need > are not in the library this does not excuse me but I have to get them > through interlibrary loan etc. Now what if my research tells me that, > unless I do something now, there will be no more libraries in 50 or 100 > years. People will not have the time to read books but they will be out in > the forests (if there are any left) foraging for food and fire wood. Does > this obligate me, because of my commitment to science, to do something > about > it now? Does my commitment, which obligates me to search the world's > libraries for the materials I need, also obligate me to see to it that the > libraries remain open for more than 100 years? If I accept that science as > we know it will no longer exist in 100 years, what does this tell me about > my commitment to science now? Isn't science intrinsically something that > has a shelf life of more than 100 years? After all, the books are printed > on acid-free paper! All these are open questions and partial answers to > me: > I don't know if I can make this step or not. > > If I can make this step, then my obligation to act does not come from the > fact that billions of people will die, but that we are entering a world in > which libraries will no longer function. I think this is what you get if > you derive your obligation to act from the commitment to truth. Please > correct me if I am wrong. By the way, if you think this is a backward > argument, my reply is that Marx's critique of capitalism (as I understand > it) goes through a similar detour. Marx's main critique is not that > capitalism unnecessarily kills innocent children, although it does. His > main critique is that capitalism is a social order which keeps the members > of society in the dark about the nature of their own social relations. > > (3) > > I turned away from these unresolved problems, and now I am taking a new > tack, namely, I am wondering whether the inactivity of the University is an > act of censorship. I just read the following draft letter to one of my > colleages, and he thought it was clever rhetorics, but he did not think > that > actual censorship was involved. Please tell me whether I successfully > argued that this is indeed censorship as it is usually defined: > > > Dear University President Xxx: > > > The University pays me for research, teaching, and service. I am taking > each of these components seriously. But the University's practical denial > of climate change hinders my efforts to tell the truth inside the > classroom. > Your inactivity, President Xxx, as the representative of the institution, > erases, like a big blotch of censor's ink, my efforts to communicate truth > to the students. > > The situation regarding climate change is so urgent and dire that students > should expect blinking red lights when they come out of the classroom, > warning everyone of the danger and exhorting them to re-think every aspect > of their lives in the present emergency. There should be news bulletins at > every corner about the state of the planet, there should be charts > everywhere showing how quickly our vehicle miles are falling, how many > homes > in the area have been made energy-neutral, how much our carbon emissions > have been declining, how many miles of railroads have been electrified, how > many acres of solar collectors have been planted, how many roads have been > re-converted into agricultural lands, how many airports have been closed -- > comparing the achieved data to the trajectory necessary if our children and > grandchildren want to enjoy a livable planet. > > None of this is happening. Even the University itself, one of the > institutions where humankind's scientific knowledge about the present > emergency is generated, is displaying exactly the usual drivel about the > latest sporting event or the latest academic star, and nothing else. > Because of your silence, President Xxx, my students must think that I am > not > telling the truth. At least one of my colleagues has received phone calls > from the parents of his students that he should stop scaring his students. > Most of our students think -- and they have to think -- that our urgency is > our personal problem, that we are not talking about reality during our > classes, but that we are exaggerating. If the situation is as urgent as we > say, and if this urgency is as well established scientifically as we say, > then in the University, where we say this science is created, at least some > signs of this urgency should be visible, shouldn't they? The University's > business as usual posture is erasing our efforts to tell the truth in the > classroom. For instance the buildings which the University is planning in > the next 20 years will increase the University's carbon footprint and fall > far short of the changes necessary according to scientific evidence. I > must > respectfully protest this Master Plan because these are University > buildings, and their open disregard of climate science is censorship of the > things I am saying in these same classrooms. > > President Xxx, I appeal to you to make the necessary changes so that the > University will play the role in leading us out of the present emergency > which falls to it as an institution of higher learning. As is, we are part > of the problem, despite the valiant efforts of countless individuals in the > University Community. > > > So far the draft letter. As always I am appreciative of your input, and > apologies that I probably won't have the time to properly respond to your > responses. > > Hans E. > > > P.S. Here is my earlier text with the four transitions again, for your > convenience: > > > > > I agree that education about global warming is our most important > > mission. Assume we fulfill this mission in the classroom. As > > everyone knows, when the students come out of our classrooms, they see > > a world which is acting as if global warming was only marginally > > relevant. We cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission > > expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming > > is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this truth. > > Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Our mission > > expands a third time: we have to teach them not only why society > > denies the truth but also how to *overcome* this obstacle. Finally I > > would argue that our mission expands a fourth time: not only do we > > have to *teach* them this but we, in our own practice, have to work to > > overcome society's denial of global warming. If we don't do this we > > commit the error of theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we allow our > > actions to contradict what we say. If we value truth, and as > > scientists we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for > > us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. > > > > There is still an additional step in the argument. Our ethical > > obligation to act, which flows from our scientific committment to the > > truth, is always a *conditional* obligation. If circumstances are > > such that direct action on this would be counterproductive, then of > > course we do not have to act. But I am willing to argue that it is > > not only our obligation but also that the time is ripe to push the > > envelope on this front. > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3798 (20090125) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2009 14:00:03 -0000 > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] just dont get it > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > Hi Gerard > > As I've already pointed out to Ruth, I did not assert that Louis just > doesn't get it. I entertained it as one possibility. So much for your own > careful scholarship. Are you asserting that it's impossible for intelligent > people to fail to see a point? Now, that would be dogmatic. > > Mervyn > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of gerard > walmsely > Sent: 26 January 2009 11:42 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] just dont get it > > Dear members > > >From what I read, Louis is analysing the argument in the spirit of > critical > thought. He is an intelligent thinker by what we can see. You should not > say he doesnt get it. Or say he is too underneath Humean assumptions - > come > on this is patronising. of course he getrs it. analyse the arguments in a > disinterested manner, and see where the truth will lead you; dont prejudice > what is the truth and if it goes to inconvenient places then say a person > doesnt get it. Don't let people get away with it Lewis. i notice a > pattern > with this. A friend from another listserve - george demitrios - used to > beliong here and is an intelligent guy. He writes about education and > pragmatism. But he left because he showed the ability to think > independently and challenge things and was insulted for it. Beware: this > will lead to Stalinism > > GW > > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 3:58 AM, < > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > > > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > You can reach the person managing the list at > > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > > > > Today's Topics: > > > > 1. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Louis Irwin) > > 2. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 23 (Louis Irwin) > > 3. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Ruth Groff) > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Message: 1 > > Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 22:51:54 -0500 > > From: "Louis Irwin" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > > > Hi Mervyn, > > > > Yes, I gathered all that in your first paragraph. I did not make my > > complaint specific enough. What I found non-responsive was the absence > > of any comments like "Your step X fails to follow from any of the > > preceding steps because...", or "Your step Y tacitly imports > > such-and-such a value commitment because...", or "Your step Z is > incoherent because...", etc. > > > > Louis > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Mervyn Hartwig > > Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2009 9:02 AM > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > I said very clearly what I think the main defect in your 7 steps is. > > They treat truth-seeking as a personal preference when in fact it is > > intrinsic to what a fact is, i.e. the result of a social process, > > embodying commitment to deploy strictly cognitive criteria. (It can't > > be objected that this makes a fact 'normative' without destroying the > > distinction between facts and values, which the Humean wants to > > uphold. -Sorry to repeat a mantra, but what can else can one do if > > folks don't get it?). 'It is a fact that your opinion is false, > > therefore you ought to change it' cannot therefore be parsed as 'If > > you want to remain a truth-seeker.' etc. > > > > Re lying, I accept that it presupposes the commitment to truth > > embodied in discourse and praxis and as I think I've made clear I > > certainly don't want to give up on transcendental critique. But the > > act of lying and what is presupposed by it are hardly the same thing, > > and if lying transcendentally presupposes commitment to truth so does > > not-lying (communicating truth in your second sense) - one can't just > > split one off from the other, as in your Humean argument. As I > > implied, the difference between us here seems to me to come down to > > this: you are operating with an exclusively propositional > > understanding of truth, whereas for me truth is also and ultimately > > ontological and alethic. I can accept that the liar is committed to > > truth in a propositional sense in so far as he wants his false > > statement to be regarded as true, but this presupposes both a context > > of truth-seeking in your second sense and the falsity of the > > proposition in an ontological/ alethic sense. > > > > > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Louis Irwin > > Sent: 25 January 2009 02:29 > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > > > > > Mervyn, > > > > I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to > > cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean > > assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh please!! > > > > You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of > > argument, that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want > > to remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that > > someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) > > for the sake of argument in order to see if the position holds up or > > falls apart shows that he/she just doesn't get the correct position. > > Is that the way your philosophy works? That would be to say that negative > critiques do not work. > > My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the > > steps 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can > > criticize an opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have > > not identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a > negative critique. > > Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. > > > > I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to > > truth", because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if > > we have to give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a > > "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth > > is accompanied by a subjective intention to communicate truths. > > Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental commitment. > > > > Louis > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Mervyn Hartwig > > Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other > > hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that > > you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes > > of argument, that values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you > > want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with > > empirical realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing > > between (1) lying propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content > > (what they are 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of > mass destruction" > > is > > designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an > > absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to > > inducing people to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to > > either the communication or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is > > held to account socially, legally etc., that is an altogether > > different matter from his commitment - he wants to get away with it, > > and often does. Lying has a social context and truth-seeking as its > > condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to truth. > > > > The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it > > allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to > > what a fact is > > - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not > > necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow > > this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the > > distinction between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point > > Bhaskar made in PON). > > Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of > > truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor > > without clothes - because facts are the result of a social process of > > truth-seeking. > > > > There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me > > that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X > > is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves > commmitted to this? > > Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing > > truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary > > personal preference and instrumental reason. > > > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Louis Irwin > > Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > > > Hi Mervyn, > > > > The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how > > a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to > > values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at > > it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that > > Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a > > desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to > > (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes > > outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans > > thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to > > achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value > > distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another > > post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the > > sole norm of truth." > > Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based > > on instrumental values. > > > > You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, > > to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a > > truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the > > same with > > promising: > > if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made > > a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such > > promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. > > A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an > > objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that > > a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what > > his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the > > liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the > > liar was aware that he was making that commitment). > > > > Louis > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > __________ NOD32 3795 (20090123) Information __________ > > > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > Message: 2 > > Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 23:01:58 -0500 > > From: "Louis Irwin" > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue > > 23 > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > > > Hi Ruth, Foo Keong, Phil, Tobin, > > > > Thanks for understanding what I was trying to get at! > > > > Louis > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > Ruth Groff > > Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2009 2:05 PM > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue > > 23 > > > > Hi Mervyn, everybody, > > > > I don't understand why you say that Louis "just doesn't get it." I > > mean, at most he simply disagrees with Bhaskar on this point, as Hugh > > does, and perhaps Phil, and no doubt others who aren't particularly > > attached to Hume, to empiricism and/or to non-dialectical philosophy! > > In which case it would be that he "disagrees, for well-articulated > > reasons that you regard as flawed." But he didn't even say that. He > > just said that he wasn't sure that the Humean is defeated by the > > particular argument that RB advances. > > > > It's such an important thing, as Foo Kyong suggests, to be able to > > think as critically as possible about the views that one believes to > > be correct. I say it gently, but I think that in context it was > > actually Louis who was stirring the pot/rattling the bars! > > > > Warmly, > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 12:41 PM, Mervyn Hartwig > > wrote: > > > > > I'd be inclined to say it doesn't need a Devil's advocate because > > > the Devil himself supports it! Can one convince the Devil? > > > > > > M > > > > > > PS. You could say, to switch metaphors, I myself am stirring the pot > > > or rattling the bars a bit. > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > > Ng Foo Keong > > > Sent: 25 January 2009 15:55 > > > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, > > > Issue > > > 23 > > > > > > Mervyn: > > > > > > I think Louis is just playing the devil's advocate by considering > > > the Humean critique. if a position (such as the thesis that we can > > > derive values from > > > facts) is solid indeed, it should be able to withstand the fiercest > > > criticism. your argument should not be like preaching to the choir, > > > but you should be able to convince the enemy (who may not share your > > > assumptions). > > > In fact, i think we should take the bull by the horns. Assume Hume > > > was right -- then find a way for him to contradict himself. Can we? > > > > > > regards, > > > F.K. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Message: 1 > > > > Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 14:01:48 -0000 > > > > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > > > Realism > > > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > > > > > > > Message-ID: > > > > < > > > mailman.5367.1232896549.2556.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu> > > > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > > > > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > > > > > I said very clearly what I think the main defect in your 7 steps is. > > > > They treat truth-seeking as a personal preference when in fact it > > > > is intrinsic to what a fact is, i.e. the result of a social > > > > process, embodying commitment to deploy strictly cognitive > > > > criteria. (It can't be objected that this makes a fact 'normative' > > > > without destroying the distinction between facts and values, which > > > > the Humean wants to uphold. -Sorry to repeat a mantra, but what > > > > can else can one do if folks don't get it?). 'It is a fact that > > > > your opinion is false, therefore you ought to change it' cannot > > > > therefore be parsed as 'If you > > > want to remain a truth-seeker.' etc. > > > > > > > > Re lying, I accept that it presupposes the commitment to truth > > > > embodied in discourse and praxis and as I think I've made clear I > > > > certainly don't want to give up on transcendental critique. But > > > > the act of lying and what is presupposed by it are hardly the same > > > > thing, and if lying transcendentally presupposes commitment to > > > > truth so does not-lying (communicating truth in your second sense) > > > > - one can't just split one off from the other, as in your Humean > argument. > > > > As I implied, the difference between us here seems to me to come > > > > down to > > > > this: you are operating with an exclusively propositional > > > > understanding of truth, whereas for me truth is also and > > > > ultimately ontological and alethic. I can accept that the liar is > > > > committed to truth in a propositional sense in so far as he wants > > > > his false statement to be regarded as true, but this presupposes > > > > both a context of truth-seeking in your second sense and the > > > > falsity of the proposition > > > in an ontological/ alethic sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > Mervyn > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > __________ NOD32 3798 (20090125) Information __________ > > > > > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > > > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > Message: 3 > > Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 21:58:39 -0600 > > From: Ruth Groff > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > Realism > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > > Message-ID: > > <6ad241360901251958q4e8e04aamc00fb8b0263311d5 at mail.gmail.com> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 > > > > Hey, thanks for that reference. I want to read it now. I will have > > to think about it. The immediate thought that comes to mind is that > > it might be inherent in the definition of the word, as a matter of > > language-analysis, but not be inherent in the act. I don't know if I > > think that, but it's a really interesting example. I had had in mind > > "facts" like encountering a sad, lost child in the mall or something > > -- that just seems to me to be an is that self-evidently generate some > > oughts, though the implication is not a logical one! Or coming across > > a hurt animal. Or responding to a loved one. I'm pretty sure that I > > think that logical necessity is over-rated by empiricists, anyhow. I > > mean, it's big for them because they don't have any > > other kind. The Kantians let in some synthetic a prioris, but even > there > > there is a kind of pressure put on the thing, I think, that is the > > result of having dispensed with natural necessity. (Itself different, > > I think I think, from the necessity associated with the kind of moral > > realism that I'm > > defending.) > > > > I love it when you post things. > > > > r. > > > > > > On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 9:39 PM, Louis Irwin > wrote: > > > > > Hi Ruth. > > > > > > You read me correctly. Just one comment on the need for moral realism. > > You > > > suggest that "to get LOGICAL implication from statements of fact to > > > non-heteronomous normative statements...you need "facts" that are > > > inherently normative." I believe that you and Mervyn are in > > > agreement on that (and I don't disagree), but Searle argued as long > > > ago as 1964 that one can logically derive a genuine 'ought' from > > > nothing but 'is' statements. He considered, for example, that it is > > > part of the MEANING of "X made a promise" that "X is under an > > > obligation to keep the promise" (other > > things > > > being equal), so one does not have to refer to separately real moral > > > premisses - the moral parts are real but they are internal to meanings. > > You > > > can read this as transcendental argument. Maybe these are just two > > > ways > > of > > > saying the same thing. > > > > > > BTW, the Searle essay was reprinted in a 1969 collection entitled > > > "The Is/Ought Question" with arguments for and against the divide, > > > and clearly there were back then many prominent English-speaking > > > philosophers who opposed the divide. I remember at the time several > > > philosophers thought > > the > > > volume was old hat because it was then widely accepted that there > > > was an intrinsic link between facts and values. So RB was definitely > > > following > > up > > > on a strand that had already been around since 1958. > > > > > > Louis > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > > Ruth Groff > > > Sent: Saturday, January 24, 2009 10:10 PM > > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > > Realism > > > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > > > Yes, I think you are right that a Humean can say that, given his/her > > desire > > > truth, s/he "ought" to reject p, upon being shown that it is false, > > > and still not have gone from is to ought in the sense precluded by > Hume. > > S/he > > > could probably even deal with the transcendental/Habermas argument > > > about language, too. At the transcendental level, I mean. The use > > > of language in its primary mode doesn't imply that one *ought* be be > > > a truth-seeker (in the relevant, transcendental sense); it implies > > > that one is one, whether one likes it or not. It's all is's. The > > > is-to-ought sell, there, is to say that the fact of being a language > > > user logically implies that one ought > > not > > > tell lies. > > > > > > My hunch is that what you need, in order to get LOGICAL implication > > > from statements of fact to non-heteronomous normative statements, to > > > use the Kantian parlance, is to be a particular kind of moral > > > realist. I think > > to > > > do it you need "facts" that are inherently normative. > > > > > > No? > > > > > > r. > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 8:29 PM, Louis Irwin > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Mervyn, > > > > > > > > I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are > > > > resorting to cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so > > > > imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh > please!! > > > > > > > > You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of > > > > argument, that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you > > > > want to remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying > > > > that someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position > > > > (here, Hume's) for the sake of argument in order to see if the > > > > position holds up or falls apart shows that he/she just doesn't get > the correct position. > > > > Is that the way your philosophy works? That would be to say that > > negative > > > critiques do not work. > > > > My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of > > > > the steps 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how > > > > one can criticize an opinion and get a person to change it. So far > > > > you have not identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be > > > > the basis of > > a > > > negative critique. > > > > Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over. > > > > > > > > I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to > > > > truth", because I think transcendental critiques go out the window > > > > if we have to give up the idea that the very use of language > > > > exhibits a "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that > > > > commitment to truth is accompanied by a subjective intention to > communicate truths. > > > > Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental > commitment. > > > > > > > > Louis > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > > > Mervyn Hartwig > > > > Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM > > > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > > > Realism > > > > > > > > Hi Louis, > > > > > > > > Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other > > > > hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions > > > > that you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the > > > > purposes of argument, that values are abitrary personal > > > > perferences ('if you want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to > > > > me you're operating with empirical realist/actualist assumptions - > > > > you're not distinguishing between (1) lying propositions and (2) > > > > their ontic or de-ontic content (what they are 'about'). E.g. the > > > > statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of > > > mass destruction" > > > > is > > > > designed to conceal (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an > > > > absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed > > > > to inducing people to believe that (1) is true is hardly > > > > commitment to either the communication or the discovery of the > > > > truth (2)! If he is held to account socially, legally etc., that > > > > is an altogether different matter from his commitment - he wants > > > > to get away with it, and often does. Lying has a social context > > > > and truth-seeking as its condition, but that hardly makes it a > commitment to truth. > > > > > > > > The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it > > > > allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic > > > > to what a fact is > > > > - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and > > > > not necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't > > > > allow this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does > > > > allow it the distinction between (Humean) facts and values > > > > collapses (the point Bhaskar made in PON). > > > > Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out > > > > of truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an > > > > Emperor without clothes - because facts are the result of a > > > > social process of truth-seeking. > > > > > > > > There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to > > > > me that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, > > > > argument: 'X is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't > > > > Humeans themselves > > > commmitted to this? > > > > Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing > > > > truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary > > > > personal preference and instrumental reason. > > > > > > > > Mervyn > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > > > > Louis Irwin > > > > Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59 > > > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical > > > > Realism > > > > > > > > Hi Mervyn, > > > > > > > > The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show > > > > how a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts > > > > to values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look > > > > closely at it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I > > > > did note that Humeans allow a transition from empirically given > > > > desires (including a desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do > > > > in order to > > > > (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes > > > > outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that > > > > Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you > > > > want to achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the > > > > fact/value distinction surely has to be much stronger. > > > > Incidentally, in another post you stated that RB's "whole > > > > philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth." > > > > Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is > > > > based on instrumental values. > > > > > > > > You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of > > > > truth, to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as > > > > stating a truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to > > > > truth. It's the same with > > > > promising: > > > > if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby > > > > made a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing > > > > so. Such promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my > intentions were. > > > > A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has > > > > an objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that > > > > sense that a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; > > > > no matter what his intentions are, the social nature of language > > > > ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying could not > > > > succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that > commitment). > > > > > > > > Louis > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 26 > > ************************************************ > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3798 (20090125) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 28 > ************************************************ > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From lefouque at gmail.com Fri Jan 30 05:05:37 2009 From: lefouque at gmail.com (Ng Foo Keong) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 04:05:37 -0800 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 32 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <14a6419f0901300405i2624170ep24e7f73c0d7bac43@mail.gmail.com> hi all, actually, i had wanted to restoke the flames by asking how a Critical Realist would use Explanatory Critique (1) to convince Hamas not to fire rockets into Israel and (2) to convince the Israelis not to repay multiple times any damage her enemies had done to her remember: neither party may share your world view. and it will not help matters by condemning them for not having the brains to "get it". i just hope i don't get a nuclear explosion out of this. regards, F.K. > Message: 1 > Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 10:20:27 +0800 > From: "Lorin Yochim" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] just don't get it > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Message-ID: <002101c98281$53b172a0$fb1457e0$@ca> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > Hello Everyone, > > My contribution to this conversation may seem out of line. If so, please > disregard. It seems to me the this once interesting conversation has > degenerated to a point where nothing is being discussed. Perhaps it's time > to continue it off-listserv. This is only a suggestion. Of course if you > want to continue I will respectfully delete. > > Cheers, > Lorin From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Fri Jan 30 05:50:04 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 12:50:04 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Practical application of facts and values In-Reply-To: <14a6419f0901300405i2624170ep24e7f73c0d7bac43@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: War is inimical to human well-being. Other things being equal, you ought not to pursue it. The fact that for the Israelis and Hamas other things are not equal, does not entail that the 'ought' does not follow. An aeroplane flies in defiance of the law of gravity, but the law of gravity still holds. In this situation you clearly need more than the CR critique of facts and values. You need peace studies and conflict resolution. The philosophy of meta-Reality might offer some clues. However that may be, it's important to start by getting your facts right and not perpetuate the lie about the rockets: it was Israel who broke the truce. Alternatively, instead of being smart or facetious here, you might offer Hans some constructive advice, which he's asked for. He's trying to apply an explanatory critique re global warming and only a very few listers have bothered to offer him any advice at all (other than the implied message that he ought [sic] to give up on such a logically flawed enterprise). Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ng Foo Keong Sent: 30 January 2009 12:06 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 32 hi all, actually, i had wanted to restoke the flames by asking how a Critical Realist would use Explanatory Critique (1) to convince Hamas not to fire rockets into Israel and (2) to convince the Israelis not to repay multiple times any damage her enemies had done to her remember: neither party may share your world view. and it will not help matters by condemning them for not having the brains to "get it". i just hope i don't get a nuclear explosion out of this. regards, F.K. From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Fri Jan 30 11:25:29 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 18:25:29 -0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] 2009 IACR conference in Rio Message-ID: Dear listers, This is to say that the website for the 2009 IACR Conference in Rio is now up and running: http://www.uff.br/iacr/ Realismo e Emancipa??o Humana. Um Outro Mundo ? Poss?vel? Realism and Human Emancipation. Is Another World Possible? IACR the International Association for Critical Realism Local / Venue: Universidade Federal Fluminense Niter?i - Rio de Janeiro - Brasil Instituto de Geoci?ncias 23-25 July 2009 (21-22 July 2009 Pre-Conference Workshop on Critical Realism) Contato / Contact: iacr2009 at vm.uff.br This is the first time IACR has held its annual conference in Latin America. It promises to be a very exciting and productive one. I very much hope to see you there! Mervyn Hartwig On behalf of IACR Secretariat From alan.norrie at kcl.ac.uk Fri Jan 30 12:39:28 2009 From: alan.norrie at kcl.ac.uk (Norrie, Alan) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 19:39:28 +0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] 2009 IACR conference in Rio In-Reply-To: <7alt5i$3bjrec@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> References: <7alt5i$3bjrec@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: <11D9615B89C10747B1C985966A63D7CA293ACC53B7@KCL-MAIL04.kclad.ds.kcl.ac.uk> Hi all, I just want to echo Mervyn's sentiments. This is the first time that IACR will have been to Latin America, and it should be a really exciting occasion. For many it will be a long journey, but I would really encourage people to start thinking about making arrangements to be there. Mario and Joao, the Brasilian organisers have invested a lot in coming from Brasil to conferences in the UK in the past. They deserve our support this time around. Look forward to seeing you in Rio! All best, Alan Alan Norrie Chair, IACR Edmund-Davies Professor of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice School of Law King's College London Strand London WC2R 2LS ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig [mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk] Sent: 30 January 2009 18:25 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: [Critical-Realism] 2009 IACR conference in Rio Dear listers, This is to say that the website for the 2009 IACR Conference in Rio is now up and running: http://www.uff.br/iacr/ Realismo e Emancipa??o Humana. Um Outro Mundo ? Poss?vel? Realism and Human Emancipation. Is Another World Possible? IACR the International Association for Critical Realism Local / Venue: Universidade Federal Fluminense Niter?i - Rio de Janeiro - Brasil Instituto de Geoci?ncias 23-25 July 2009 (21-22 July 2009 Pre-Conference Workshop on Critical Realism) Contato / Contact: iacr2009 at vm.uff.br This is the first time IACR has held its annual conference in Latin America. It promises to be a very exciting and productive one. I very much hope to see you there! Mervyn Hartwig On behalf of IACR Secretariat _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From lefouque at gmail.com Fri Jan 30 23:40:23 2009 From: lefouque at gmail.com (Ng Foo Keong) Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 22:40:23 -0800 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 33 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <14a6419f0901302240m27f178a8kbd4a7573224a514f@mail.gmail.com> As a new comer to CR, I do not have much to offer in terms of applying CR to solve problems. In fact I'm looking for examples to have it seen applied to real examples (instead of being directed to this book or that book, as if everything has already been worked out in the books). However, in Message 2 CR Digest, Vol 50, Issue 25 i did post a link regarding global warming, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mF_anaVcCXg as food for thought, but there is no response so far. So I did try to contribute constructively, nevertheless. I'm not being a smart aleck or playing the fool here. There is high reflexivity and a long history to Palestinian-Israeli conflict, so it is difficult to trace "who did what first to whom". I think it can be traced to human hatred, of which we are all guilty from time to time, to a greater or lesser extent. I do suspect that CR as a philosophy is not final (or else we can remove the C in the CR). Test cases like global warming and Hamas-Israeli conflict are good opportunities to surface the cracks and to strengthen and improve CR. So any criticism is not meant to be an hominem attack. I'm not satisfied with a vague notion of "there exists a way to go from the 'is' to the 'ought' (assuming we get the 'is' part right)". I need a universal programme/method/algorithm (as it were) that churns out all the steps, given any 'inputs'. This program needs to be stress-tested and bug-fixed. I am specially looking out for insightful arguments to counter post-modernist crap about local narratives (which do not turn out to be that local) and lack of meta-narratives. I 'know' they are crap, but I can't put the final nail into the coffin of post-modernism (including moral relativism). Like Mathematicians solving Fermat's Last Theorem, it is the elusive "final nail into the coffin" that keeps us searching. regards, F.K. > Message: 2 > Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 12:50:04 -0000 > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical application of facts and > values > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > War is inimical to human well-being. > Other things being equal, you ought not to pursue it. > The fact that for the Israelis and Hamas other things are not equal, does > not entail that the 'ought' does not follow. An aeroplane flies in defiance > of the law of gravity, but the law of gravity still holds. > In this situation you clearly need more than the CR critique of facts and > values. You need peace studies and conflict resolution. The philosophy of > meta-Reality might offer some clues. > However that may be, it's important to start by getting your facts right and > not perpetuate the lie about the rockets: it was Israel who broke the truce. > Alternatively, instead of being smart or facetious here, you might offer > Hans some constructive advice, which he's asked for. He's trying to apply an > explanatory critique re global warming and only a very few listers have > bothered to offer him any advice at all (other than the implied message that > he ought [sic] to give up on such a logically flawed enterprise). > > Mervyn From ehrbar at lists.econ.utah.edu Sat Jan 31 14:47:45 2009 From: ehrbar at lists.econ.utah.edu (ehrbar) Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2009 14:47:45 -0700 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 33 In-Reply-To: <14a6419f0901302240m27f178a8kbd4a7573224a514f@mail.gmail.com> (message from Ng Foo Keong on Fri, 30 Jan 2009 22:40:23 -0800) References: <14a6419f0901302240m27f178a8kbd4a7573224a514f@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: Hello Ng Foo Keong, and others: I just watched the YouTube Video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mF_anaVcCXg which you recommended. It is very thoughtful and educational. It was done by a science teacher, and I would argue that making this video is another example of the actions necessary if we science workers want to avoid theory-practice inconsistency. Here is the latest version of my essay. Can we turn this into something which the IACR or some other Critical Realist entity would adopt? What does critical realism have to say to those who do research and teach about global warming? Global warming is the most important subject humankind is facing. This is probably why we are in this field. Assume we fulfill our mission in the classroom and impress on the students how grave the danger is, even though this may not be apparent at first glance. Despite the scientific consensus, when the students come out of our classrooms, they see a world which is acting as if global warming was only marginally relevant. We cannot leave this unaddressed, therefore our mission expands: not only do we have to tell the students that global warming is serious, but we also have to explain why society denies this truth, and what has to be done to overcome this obstacle. Our committment to truth does not allow us to stop here. Since there is a disconnect between what is known about global warming, and the social responses to global warming, it is our obligation, as knowledge workers, to go beyond our social roles as producers and teachers of knowledge. If we were to ignore that our scientific work falls on deaf ears, we would commit theory-practice inconsistency, i.e., we would allow our actions to contradict our theory. If we value truth, and as knowledge workers we do, this does, indeed, have practical implications for us, not only in the laboratory but also in society at large. There are many examples illustrating which kinds of additional steps can be taken. James Hanson is advocating climate policies and has written letters to heads of state. Bill McKibben is going on speaking tours talking in person to the readers of his books, and his students maintain an action-oriented web site. The economist Martin Weitzmann has developed economic theory one step further to show that the usual cost-benefit analyses, according to which hardly anything has to be done about the climate, are wrong and misleading. Although this remains within theoretical work, for someone whose publications form the theoretical basis for many practical economic analyses, this is effective action. Those of us who have a standing in the Universities might want to push for it that the Universities as institutions place climate change visibly in the center of their educational missions, and that every University student has to learn about it. Those in the trenches might want reach out so that not only University students but everyone is familiarized with the facts humankind is facing. Everyone has to find the action where they can be most effective. Not only do we have to "go the extra mile", we may want to do so visibly, because we are at a point in history where civilization will only be preserved if society is transformed, and this transformation is only possible if many of us push the envelope in our social roles or step outside our social roles. Hans E. Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar ehrbar at economics.utah.edu Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ office) Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX)