From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk  Sun Feb  1 09:53:32 2009
From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig)
Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2009 16:53:32 -0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 33
In-Reply-To: <14a6419f0901302240m27f178a8kbd4a7573224a514f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <mailman.274.1233507216.2553.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>

There are no algorithms, just an argument that, contrary to Humean
understandings, you can do it. Then you have to do it.

I'm glad you're not a flamer!

Mervyn

 

-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ng Foo
Keong
Sent: 31 January 2009 06:40
To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 33

As a new comer to CR, I do not have much to offer in terms of applying CR to
solve problems.  In fact I'm looking for examples to have it seen applied to
real examples (instead of being directed to this book or that book, as if
everything has already been worked out in the books).  However, in Message 2
CR Digest, Vol 50, Issue 25 i did post a link regarding global warming,
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mF_anaVcCXg
as food for thought, but there is no response so far.  So I did try to
contribute constructively, nevertheless.  I'm not being a smart aleck or
playing the fool here.

There is high reflexivity and a long history to Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, so it is difficult to trace "who did what first to whom".
I think it can be traced to human hatred, of which we are all guilty from
time to time, to a greater or lesser extent.

I do suspect that CR as a philosophy is not final (or else we can remove the
C in the CR).  Test cases like global warming and Hamas-Israeli conflict are
good opportunities to surface the cracks and to strengthen and improve CR.
So any criticism is not meant to be an hominem attack.

I'm not satisfied with a vague notion of "there exists a way to go from the
'is' to the 'ought' (assuming we get the 'is' part right)".
I need a universal programme/method/algorithm (as it were) that churns out
all the steps, given any 'inputs'.  This program needs to be stress-tested
and bug-fixed.

I am specially looking out for insightful arguments to counter
post-modernist crap about local narratives (which do not turn out to be that
local) and lack of meta-narratives.  I 'know' they are crap, but I can't put
the final nail into the coffin of post-modernism (including moral
relativism).  Like Mathematicians solving Fermat's Last Theorem, it is the
elusive "final nail into the coffin" that keeps us searching.

regards,
F.K.


> Message: 2
> Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 12:50:04 -0000
> From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical application of facts and
>        values
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <mailman.2.1233342003.11815.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="us-ascii"
>
> War is inimical to human well-being.
> Other things being equal, you ought not to pursue it.
> The fact that for the Israelis and Hamas other things are not equal, 
> does not entail that the 'ought' does not follow. An aeroplane flies 
> in defiance of the law of gravity, but the law of gravity still holds.
> In this situation you clearly need more than the CR critique of facts 
> and values. You need peace studies and conflict resolution. The 
> philosophy of meta-Reality might offer some clues.
> However that may be, it's important to start by getting your facts 
> right and not perpetuate the lie about the rockets: it was Israel who
broke the truce.
> Alternatively, instead of being smart or facetious here, you might 
> offer Hans some constructive advice, which he's asked for. He's trying 
> to apply an explanatory critique re global warming and only a very few 
> listers have bothered to offer him any advice at all (other than the 
> implied message that he ought [sic] to give up on such a logically flawed
enterprise).
>
> Mervyn

_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism

__________ NOD32 3816 (20090201) Information __________

This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system.
http://www.eset.com




From mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk  Sun Feb  1 12:19:34 2009
From: mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk (Mark Johnson)
Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2009 19:19:34 +0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 33
In-Reply-To: <7alt5i$3c4f5v@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu>
References: <14a6419f0901302240m27f178a8kbd4a7573224a514f@mail.gmail.com>
	<7alt5i$3c4f5v@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu>
Message-ID: <d4aa99eb0902011119h269c58bao675b358c805ad077@mail.gmail.com>

I think the point is (and correct me if this isn't a critical realist point)
that argument won't cut the mustard..
On Sun, Feb 1, 2009 at 4:53 PM, Mervyn Hartwig <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>wrote:

> There are no algorithms, just an argument that, contrary to Humean
> understandings, you can do it. Then you have to do it.
>
> I'm glad you're not a flamer!
>
> Mervyn
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ng Foo
> Keong
> Sent: 31 January 2009 06:40
> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 33
>
> As a new comer to CR, I do not have much to offer in terms of applying CR
> to
> solve problems.  In fact I'm looking for examples to have it seen applied
> to
> real examples (instead of being directed to this book or that book, as if
> everything has already been worked out in the books).  However, in Message
> 2
> CR Digest, Vol 50, Issue 25 i did post a link regarding global warming,
>   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mF_anaVcCXg
> as food for thought, but there is no response so far.  So I did try to
> contribute constructively, nevertheless.  I'm not being a smart aleck or
> playing the fool here.
>
> There is high reflexivity and a long history to Palestinian-Israeli
> conflict, so it is difficult to trace "who did what first to whom".
> I think it can be traced to human hatred, of which we are all guilty from
> time to time, to a greater or lesser extent.
>
> I do suspect that CR as a philosophy is not final (or else we can remove
> the
> C in the CR).  Test cases like global warming and Hamas-Israeli conflict
> are
> good opportunities to surface the cracks and to strengthen and improve CR.
> So any criticism is not meant to be an hominem attack.
>
> I'm not satisfied with a vague notion of "there exists a way to go from the
> 'is' to the 'ought' (assuming we get the 'is' part right)".
> I need a universal programme/method/algorithm (as it were) that churns out
> all the steps, given any 'inputs'.  This program needs to be stress-tested
> and bug-fixed.
>
> I am specially looking out for insightful arguments to counter
> post-modernist crap about local narratives (which do not turn out to be
> that
> local) and lack of meta-narratives.  I 'know' they are crap, but I can't
> put
> the final nail into the coffin of post-modernism (including moral
> relativism).  Like Mathematicians solving Fermat's Last Theorem, it is the
> elusive "final nail into the coffin" that keeps us searching.
>
> regards,
> F.K.
>
>
> > Message: 2
> > Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 12:50:04 -0000
> > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical application of facts and
> >        values
> > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID:
> >        <mailman.2.1233342003.11815.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="us-ascii"
> >
> > War is inimical to human well-being.
> > Other things being equal, you ought not to pursue it.
> > The fact that for the Israelis and Hamas other things are not equal,
> > does not entail that the 'ought' does not follow. An aeroplane flies
> > in defiance of the law of gravity, but the law of gravity still holds.
> > In this situation you clearly need more than the CR critique of facts
> > and values. You need peace studies and conflict resolution. The
> > philosophy of meta-Reality might offer some clues.
> > However that may be, it's important to start by getting your facts
> > right and not perpetuate the lie about the rockets: it was Israel who
> broke the truce.
> > Alternatively, instead of being smart or facetious here, you might
> > offer Hans some constructive advice, which he's asked for. He's trying
> > to apply an explanatory critique re global warming and only a very few
> > listers have bothered to offer him any advice at all (other than the
> > implied message that he ought [sic] to give up on such a logically flawed
> enterprise).
> >
> > Mervyn
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
> __________ NOD32 3816 (20090201) Information __________
>
> This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system.
> http://www.eset.com
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>



-- 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Johnson
Institute for Educational Cybernetics
University of Bolton
BL3 5AB
Tel. 01204 903567
Mob. 0778 6064505

From rgroff at slu.edu  Sun Feb  1 16:50:28 2009
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2009 17:50:28 -0600
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 33
In-Reply-To: <d4aa99eb0902011119h269c58bao675b358c805ad077@mail.gmail.com>
References: <14a6419f0901302240m27f178a8kbd4a7573224a514f@mail.gmail.com>
	<7alt5i$3c4f5v@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu>
	<d4aa99eb0902011119h269c58bao675b358c805ad077@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <6ad241360902011550o316ba30bq1301c0b72a74cc1a@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Mark,

Ok, I'll correct you.

I'm assuming that your point here is that it's "action," not "argument" that
cuts mustard, as you put it.  From a critical realist perspective, argument
- indeed philosophy, and philosophy practiced in a particular
"transcendental" mode at that - is indeed central to political action.   At
least to sound, morally grounded, potentially effective political action.
This for the obvious reasons.

I don't know if you are intending to reference Marx in your comment, but
there too the point is not to just do stuff, any stuff, and leave the
thinking for eggheads, but rather to do precisely those things that will
lead to new relations of production, given the concrete specificities of
present circumstances.  Admittedly, argument back and forth concerning which
actual thing to do, and why, is not, for Marx *or* for critical realists,
carried out at the same level of abstraction as the required philosophical
argumentation, or even as the also-required over-arching
political-economic/socio-historical analysis (e.g., Capital), but it is no
less necessary for being more applied.

I know that my tone is snippy.  It's because the sentiment of your post made
me mad.  I think it's important to be much more careful than you were, about
setting up dichotomies between thought and action, especially ones in which
action is supposed to be the good guy in some kind of simple way.

r.



On Sun, Feb 1, 2009 at 1:19 PM, Mark Johnson <mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk> wrote:

> I think the point is (and correct me if this isn't a critical realist
> point)
> that argument won't cut the mustard..






>
> On Sun, Feb 1, 2009 at 4:53 PM, Mervyn Hartwig <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk
> >wrote:
>
> > There are no algorithms, just an argument that, contrary to Humean
> > understandings, you can do it. Then you have to do it.
> >
> > I'm glad you're not a flamer!
> >
> > Mervyn
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ng
> Foo
> > Keong
> > Sent: 31 January 2009 06:40
> > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 33
> >
> > As a new comer to CR, I do not have much to offer in terms of applying CR
> > to
> > solve problems.  In fact I'm looking for examples to have it seen applied
> > to
> > real examples (instead of being directed to this book or that book, as if
> > everything has already been worked out in the books).  However, in
> Message
> > 2
> > CR Digest, Vol 50, Issue 25 i did post a link regarding global warming,
> >   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mF_anaVcCXg
> > as food for thought, but there is no response so far.  So I did try to
> > contribute constructively, nevertheless.  I'm not being a smart aleck or
> > playing the fool here.
> >
> > There is high reflexivity and a long history to Palestinian-Israeli
> > conflict, so it is difficult to trace "who did what first to whom".
> > I think it can be traced to human hatred, of which we are all guilty from
> > time to time, to a greater or lesser extent.
> >
> > I do suspect that CR as a philosophy is not final (or else we can remove
> > the
> > C in the CR).  Test cases like global warming and Hamas-Israeli conflict
> > are
> > good opportunities to surface the cracks and to strengthen and improve
> CR.
> > So any criticism is not meant to be an hominem attack.
> >
> > I'm not satisfied with a vague notion of "there exists a way to go from
> the
> > 'is' to the 'ought' (assuming we get the 'is' part right)".
> > I need a universal programme/method/algorithm (as it were) that churns
> out
> > all the steps, given any 'inputs'.  This program needs to be
> stress-tested
> > and bug-fixed.
> >
> > I am specially looking out for insightful arguments to counter
> > post-modernist crap about local narratives (which do not turn out to be
> > that
> > local) and lack of meta-narratives.  I 'know' they are crap, but I can't
> > put
> > the final nail into the coffin of post-modernism (including moral
> > relativism).  Like Mathematicians solving Fermat's Last Theorem, it is
> the
> > elusive "final nail into the coffin" that keeps us searching.
> >
> > regards,
> > F.K.
> >
> >
> > > Message: 2
> > > Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 12:50:04 -0000
> > > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
> > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical application of facts and
> > >        values
> > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
> > >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > Message-ID:
> > >        <
> mailman.2.1233342003.11815.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="us-ascii"
> > >
> > > War is inimical to human well-being.
> > > Other things being equal, you ought not to pursue it.
> > > The fact that for the Israelis and Hamas other things are not equal,
> > > does not entail that the 'ought' does not follow. An aeroplane flies
> > > in defiance of the law of gravity, but the law of gravity still holds.
> > > In this situation you clearly need more than the CR critique of facts
> > > and values. You need peace studies and conflict resolution. The
> > > philosophy of meta-Reality might offer some clues.
> > > However that may be, it's important to start by getting your facts
> > > right and not perpetuate the lie about the rockets: it was Israel who
> > broke the truce.
> > > Alternatively, instead of being smart or facetious here, you might
> > > offer Hans some constructive advice, which he's asked for. He's trying
> > > to apply an explanatory critique re global warming and only a very few
> > > listers have bothered to offer him any advice at all (other than the
> > > implied message that he ought [sic] to give up on such a logically
> flawed
> > enterprise).
> > >
> > > Mervyn
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> > __________ NOD32 3816 (20090201) Information __________
> >
> > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system.
> > http://www.eset.com
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
>
>
>
> --
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Mark Johnson
> Institute for Educational Cybernetics
> University of Bolton
> BL3 5AB
> Tel. 01204 903567
> Mob. 0778 6064505
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>

From mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk  Mon Feb  2 00:10:47 2009
From: mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk (Mark Johnson)
Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2009 07:10:47 +0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 33
In-Reply-To: <6ad241360902011550o316ba30bq1301c0b72a74cc1a@mail.gmail.com>
References: <14a6419f0901302240m27f178a8kbd4a7573224a514f@mail.gmail.com>
	<7alt5i$3c4f5v@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu>
	<d4aa99eb0902011119h269c58bao675b358c805ad077@mail.gmail.com>
	<6ad241360902011550o316ba30bq1301c0b72a74cc1a@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <d4aa99eb0902012310g3859762h7bedda1ca9748a9d@mail.gmail.com>

What I should have said was

"argument

**** ALONE ****

won't cut the mustard"

Argument is,
of course,
action too.

It does stuff.

People position themselves around arguments
(often not too helpfully.)

(... or do arguments position people ??)

Which is part of the problem.

People.

They're all so different!
Some will not have a clue what you're talking about.
Others have axes to grind.

I don't want to make the distinction between action and argument

because they're the same.

but between different kinds of action.

For example -

... changing the WAY

we talk

...









On Sun, Feb 1, 2009 at 11:50 PM, Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu> wrote:

> Hi Mark,
>
> Ok, I'll correct you.
>
> I'm assuming that your point here is that it's "action," not "argument"
> that
> cuts mustard, as you put it.  From a critical realist perspective, argument
> - indeed philosophy, and philosophy practiced in a particular
> "transcendental" mode at that - is indeed central to political action.   At
> least to sound, morally grounded, potentially effective political action.
> This for the obvious reasons.
>
> I don't know if you are intending to reference Marx in your comment, but
> there too the point is not to just do stuff, any stuff, and leave the
> thinking for eggheads, but rather to do precisely those things that will
> lead to new relations of production, given the concrete specificities of
> present circumstances.  Admittedly, argument back and forth concerning
> which
> actual thing to do, and why, is not, for Marx *or* for critical realists,
> carried out at the same level of abstraction as the required philosophical
> argumentation, or even as the also-required over-arching
> political-economic/socio-historical analysis (e.g., Capital), but it is no
> less necessary for being more applied.
>
> I know that my tone is snippy.  It's because the sentiment of your post
> made
> me mad.  I think it's important to be much more careful than you were,
> about
> setting up dichotomies between thought and action, especially ones in which
> action is supposed to be the good guy in some kind of simple way.
>
> r.
>
>
>
> On Sun, Feb 1, 2009 at 1:19 PM, Mark Johnson <mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> > I think the point is (and correct me if this isn't a critical realist
> > point)
> > that argument won't cut the mustard..
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >
> > On Sun, Feb 1, 2009 at 4:53 PM, Mervyn Hartwig <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk
> > >wrote:
> >
> > > There are no algorithms, just an argument that, contrary to Humean
> > > understandings, you can do it. Then you have to do it.
> > >
> > > I'm glad you're not a flamer!
> > >
> > > Mervyn
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ng
> > Foo
> > > Keong
> > > Sent: 31 January 2009 06:40
> > > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue
> 33
> > >
> > > As a new comer to CR, I do not have much to offer in terms of applying
> CR
> > > to
> > > solve problems.  In fact I'm looking for examples to have it seen
> applied
> > > to
> > > real examples (instead of being directed to this book or that book, as
> if
> > > everything has already been worked out in the books).  However, in
> > Message
> > > 2
> > > CR Digest, Vol 50, Issue 25 i did post a link regarding global warming,
> > >   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mF_anaVcCXg
> > > as food for thought, but there is no response so far.  So I did try to
> > > contribute constructively, nevertheless.  I'm not being a smart aleck
> or
> > > playing the fool here.
> > >
> > > There is high reflexivity and a long history to Palestinian-Israeli
> > > conflict, so it is difficult to trace "who did what first to whom".
> > > I think it can be traced to human hatred, of which we are all guilty
> from
> > > time to time, to a greater or lesser extent.
> > >
> > > I do suspect that CR as a philosophy is not final (or else we can
> remove
> > > the
> > > C in the CR).  Test cases like global warming and Hamas-Israeli
> conflict
> > > are
> > > good opportunities to surface the cracks and to strengthen and improve
> > CR.
> > > So any criticism is not meant to be an hominem attack.
> > >
> > > I'm not satisfied with a vague notion of "there exists a way to go from
> > the
> > > 'is' to the 'ought' (assuming we get the 'is' part right)".
> > > I need a universal programme/method/algorithm (as it were) that churns
> > out
> > > all the steps, given any 'inputs'.  This program needs to be
> > stress-tested
> > > and bug-fixed.
> > >
> > > I am specially looking out for insightful arguments to counter
> > > post-modernist crap about local narratives (which do not turn out to be
> > > that
> > > local) and lack of meta-narratives.  I 'know' they are crap, but I
> can't
> > > put
> > > the final nail into the coffin of post-modernism (including moral
> > > relativism).  Like Mathematicians solving Fermat's Last Theorem, it is
> > the
> > > elusive "final nail into the coffin" that keeps us searching.
> > >
> > > regards,
> > > F.K.
> > >
> > >
> > > > Message: 2
> > > > Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 12:50:04 -0000
> > > > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
> > > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical application of facts and
> > > >        values
> > > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
> > > >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > > Message-ID:
> > > >        <
> > mailman.2.1233342003.11815.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > > Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="us-ascii"
> > > >
> > > > War is inimical to human well-being.
> > > > Other things being equal, you ought not to pursue it.
> > > > The fact that for the Israelis and Hamas other things are not equal,
> > > > does not entail that the 'ought' does not follow. An aeroplane flies
> > > > in defiance of the law of gravity, but the law of gravity still
> holds.
> > > > In this situation you clearly need more than the CR critique of facts
> > > > and values. You need peace studies and conflict resolution. The
> > > > philosophy of meta-Reality might offer some clues.
> > > > However that may be, it's important to start by getting your facts
> > > > right and not perpetuate the lie about the rockets: it was Israel who
> > > broke the truce.
> > > > Alternatively, instead of being smart or facetious here, you might
> > > > offer Hans some constructive advice, which he's asked for. He's
> trying
> > > > to apply an explanatory critique re global warming and only a very
> few
> > > > listers have bothered to offer him any advice at all (other than the
> > > > implied message that he ought [sic] to give up on such a logically
> > flawed
> > > enterprise).
> > > >
> > > > Mervyn
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
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> > >
> > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system.
> > > http://www.eset.com
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> >
> >
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > Mark Johnson
> > Institute for Educational Cybernetics
> > University of Bolton
> > BL3 5AB
> > Tel. 01204 903567
> > Mob. 0778 6064505
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>



-- 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Johnson
Institute for Educational Cybernetics
University of Bolton
BL3 5AB
Tel. 01204 903567
Mob. 0778 6064505

From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk  Mon Feb  2 04:26:52 2009
From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig)
Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2009 11:26:52 -0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] The way we talk
In-Reply-To: <d4aa99eb0902012310g3859762h7bedda1ca9748a9d@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <mailman.280.1233574021.2553.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>

"changing the WAY we talk..." Can you elaborate on this a bit please? The
Jewish practice of Haverim was recently invoked by Margaret Archer, Andrew
Collier and Doug Porpora (Transcendence: CR and God) as one to be aspired to
from a critical realist perspective, whereby 'study partners . inspire each
other's intellectual growth by lovingly challenging each other's claims to
the truth'. In general I agree, and I try to put it into practice. But
sometimes I think it's appropriate to talk tough (without of course ceasing
to love: so we have tough love).  E.g. if one of the parties is intent on
war, it's impossible to have a constructive dialogue and it might be
important to stand up to them. Thus many first-wave critical realists often
put a hostile and pejorative spin on the dialectical and spiritual turns,
e.g. Ted Benton in his recent Festshrift asserts that Bhaskar's CR was later
transformed "into an impenetrable dialectical metaphysic and then into an
all-consuming spiritual-theological world-system", citing in support an
essay by Gregor McLennan that does battle with straw versions of both turns.
It strikes me that it's important to point out/argue that this is
ill-informed, semi-hysterical, unconstructive etc.

On another front, when I recently read theological crititical realilst
Alister McGrath's critique of Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (which goes
to war against theists) I jotted down some of the phrases he uses: seemingly
pathological hostility; manifest lack of fairness; method: ridicule,
distort, belittle, demonise; creedal; flaky; tedious tirades; risible
caricatures; in denial. It seems to me that such talk can be perfectly
appropriate in the context of well supported argument. (I'm not, btw, a
theist, in the sense of having a religion as distinct from a secular
spirituality).

Mervyn


-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark
Johnson
Sent: 02 February 2009 07:11
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 33

What I should have said was

"argument

**** ALONE ****

won't cut the mustard"

Argument is,
of course,
action too.

It does stuff.

People position themselves around arguments (often not too helpfully.)

(... or do arguments position people ??)

Which is part of the problem.

People.

They're all so different!
Some will not have a clue what you're talking about.
Others have axes to grind.

I don't want to make the distinction between action and argument

because they're the same.

but between different kinds of action.

For example -

... changing the WAY

we talk

...






From mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk  Mon Feb  2 05:05:31 2009
From: mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk (Mark Johnson)
Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2009 12:05:31 +0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] The way we talk
In-Reply-To: <7alt5i$3cahe2@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu>
References: <d4aa99eb0902012310g3859762h7bedda1ca9748a9d@mail.gmail.com>
	<7alt5i$3cahe2@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu>
Message-ID: <d4aa99eb0902020405x7c4f401bl3191ce9bdccff396@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Mervyn,

I was very impressed by Rom Harre's presentations on Positioning Theory at
the CR conference last year. Harre's basic point that we make each others'
selves through our positioning of them is important. Some speech acts can
seem to effect a 'self-fulfilling prophecy' by positioning others' views in
a way which the other's behaviour increasingly seems to affirm. Harre and
Sabat's work with Alzheimers patients is particularly telling here; I see it
in education on a daily basis; Hamas and Israel are a classic case.

We need to understand this better and take better control of the positioning
that our actions (speech and otherwise) entail. To some extent this requires
experimentation (my last post was a simple experiment), and creativity.

Actually, I really think it boils down to 'good teaching'. Generally on this
list we don't teach each other well ("I'll tell you what's right...!") - and
so conversations usually go 'pathological'. We don't design and control
activities for others to engage in which allow them to explore their own and
others positions. What sort of activities can we consider? How should they
be coordinated?

As I see it, in CR at the moment we only look at a very narrow type of
activity ("you say... I say..."). It isn't particularly effective. What
other activities can we design? To  "study partners . inspire each other's
intellectual growth by lovingly challenging each other's claims to the
truth" sounds a bit Californian! But it's an example of a more interesting
learning activity than what we're engaged in at the moment...

Mark



On Mon, Feb 2, 2009 at 11:26 AM, Mervyn Hartwig <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>wrote:

> "changing the WAY we talk..." Can you elaborate on this a bit please? The
> Jewish practice of Haverim was recently invoked by Margaret Archer, Andrew
> Collier and Doug Porpora (Transcendence: CR and God) as one to be aspired
> to
> from a critical realist perspective, whereby 'study partners . inspire each
> other's intellectual growth by lovingly challenging each other's claims to
> the truth'. In general I agree, and I try to put it into practice. But
> sometimes I think it's appropriate to talk tough (without of course ceasing
> to love: so we have tough love).  E.g. if one of the parties is intent on
> war, it's impossible to have a constructive dialogue and it might be
> important to stand up to them. Thus many first-wave critical realists often
> put a hostile and pejorative spin on the dialectical and spiritual turns,
> e.g. Ted Benton in his recent Festshrift asserts that Bhaskar's CR was
> later
> transformed "into an impenetrable dialectical metaphysic and then into an
> all-consuming spiritual-theological world-system", citing in support an
> essay by Gregor McLennan that does battle with straw versions of both
> turns.
> It strikes me that it's important to point out/argue that this is
> ill-informed, semi-hysterical, unconstructive etc.
>
> On another front, when I recently read theological crititical realilst
> Alister McGrath's critique of Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (which goes
> to war against theists) I jotted down some of the phrases he uses:
> seemingly
> pathological hostility; manifest lack of fairness; method: ridicule,
> distort, belittle, demonise; creedal; flaky; tedious tirades; risible
> caricatures; in denial. It seems to me that such talk can be perfectly
> appropriate in the context of well supported argument. (I'm not, btw, a
> theist, in the sense of having a religion as distinct from a secular
> spirituality).
>
> Mervyn
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark
> Johnson
> Sent: 02 February 2009 07:11
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 33
>
> What I should have said was
>
> "argument
>
> **** ALONE ****
>
> won't cut the mustard"
>
> Argument is,
> of course,
> action too.
>
> It does stuff.
>
> People position themselves around arguments (often not too helpfully.)
>
> (... or do arguments position people ??)
>
> Which is part of the problem.
>
> People.
>
> They're all so different!
> Some will not have a clue what you're talking about.
> Others have axes to grind.
>
> I don't want to make the distinction between action and argument
>
> because they're the same.
>
> but between different kinds of action.
>
> For example -
>
> ... changing the WAY
>
> we talk
>
> ...
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>



-- 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Johnson
Institute for Educational Cybernetics
University of Bolton
BL3 5AB
Tel. 01204 903567
Mob. 0778 6064505

From dondazsa at aol.com  Mon Feb  2 07:00:39 2009
From: dondazsa at aol.com (dondazsa at aol.com)
Date: Mon, 02 Feb 2009 09:00:39 -0500
Subject: [Critical-Realism] The way we talk
In-Reply-To: <7alt5i$3cahe2@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu>
Message-ID: <8CB5355C3740732-4B0-2070@MBLK-M10.sysops.aol.com>


 Mervyn,

You stated in the email below: "I jotted down some of the phrases he uses: seemingly pathological hostility; manifest lack of fairness; method: ridicule, distort, belittle, demonise; creedal; flaky; tedious tirades; risible caricatures; in denial."


Could you clarify which person you were referring to: McGrath or Dawkins?

Thanks,

Don



 


 

-----Original Message-----
From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Mon, 2 Feb 2009 6:26 am
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] The way we talk










"changing the WAY we talk..." Can you elaborate on this a bit please? The
Jewish practice of Haverim was recently invoked by Margaret Archer, Andrew
Collier and Doug Porpora (Transcendence: CR and God) as one to be aspired to
from a critical realist perspective, whereby 'study partners . inspire each
other's intellectual growth by lovingly challenging each other's claims to
the truth'. In general I agree, and I try to put it into practice. But
sometimes I think it's appropriate to talk tough (without of course ceasing
to love: so we have tough love).  E.g. if one of the parties is intent on
war, it's impossible to have a constructive dialogue and it might be
important to stand up to them. Thus many first-wave critical realists often
put a hostile and pejorative spin on the dialectical and spiritual turns,
e.g. Ted Benton in his recent Festshrift asserts that Bhaskar's CR was later
transformed "into an impenetrable dialectical metaphysic and then into an
all-consuming spiritual-theological world-system", citing in support an
essay by Gregor McLennan that does battle with straw versions of both turns.
It strikes me that it's important to point out/argue that this is
ill-informed, semi-hysterical, unconstructive etc.

On another front, when I recently read theological crititical realilst
Alister McGrath's critique of Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (which goes
to war against theists) I jotted down some of the phrases he uses: seemingly
pathological hostility; manifest lack of fairness; method: ridicule,
distort, belittle, demonise; creedal; flaky; tedious tirades; risible
caricatures; in denial. It seems to me that such talk can be perfectly
appropriate in the context of well supported argument. (I'm not, btw, a
theist, in the sense of having a religion as distinct from a secular
spirituality).

Mervyn


-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark
Johnson
Sent: 02 February 2009 07:11
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 33

What I should have said was

"argument

**** ALONE ****

won't cut the mustard"

Argument is,
of course,
action too.

It does stuff.

People position themselves around arguments (often not too helpfully.)

(... or do arguments position people ??)

Which is part of the problem.

People.

They're all so different!
Some will not have a clue what you're talking about.
Others have axes to grind.

I don't want to make the distinction between action and argument

because they're the same.

but between different kinds of action.

For example -

... changing the WAY

we talk

...





_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism



 


From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk  Mon Feb  2 07:59:22 2009
From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig)
Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2009 14:59:22 -0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] The way we talk
In-Reply-To: <8CB5355C3740732-4B0-2070@MBLK-M10.sysops.aol.com>
Message-ID: <mailman.282.1233586772.2553.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>

McGrath's phrases re Dawkins. M 


-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
dondazsa at aol.com
Sent: 02 February 2009 14:01
To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] The way we talk


 Mervyn,

You stated in the email below: "I jotted down some of the phrases he uses:
seemingly pathological hostility; manifest lack of fairness; method:
ridicule, distort, belittle, demonise; creedal; flaky; tedious tirades;
risible caricatures; in denial."


Could you clarify which person you were referring to: McGrath or Dawkins?

Thanks,

Don



 


 

-----Original Message-----
From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
<critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Mon, 2 Feb 2009 6:26 am
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] The way we talk










"changing the WAY we talk..." Can you elaborate on this a bit please? The
Jewish practice of Haverim was recently invoked by Margaret Archer, Andrew
Collier and Doug Porpora (Transcendence: CR and God) as one to be aspired to
from a critical realist perspective, whereby 'study partners . inspire each
other's intellectual growth by lovingly challenging each other's claims to
the truth'. In general I agree, and I try to put it into practice. But
sometimes I think it's appropriate to talk tough (without of course ceasing
to love: so we have tough love).  E.g. if one of the parties is intent on
war, it's impossible to have a constructive dialogue and it might be
important to stand up to them. Thus many first-wave critical realists often
put a hostile and pejorative spin on the dialectical and spiritual turns,
e.g. Ted Benton in his recent Festshrift asserts that Bhaskar's CR was later
transformed "into an impenetrable dialectical metaphysic and then into an
all-consuming spiritual-theological world-system", citing in support an
essay by Gregor McLennan that does battle with straw versions of both turns.
It strikes me that it's important to point out/argue that this is
ill-informed, semi-hysterical, unconstructive etc.

On another front, when I recently read theological crititical realilst
Alister McGrath's critique of Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (which goes
to war against theists) I jotted down some of the phrases he uses: seemingly
pathological hostility; manifest lack of fairness; method: ridicule,
distort, belittle, demonise; creedal; flaky; tedious tirades; risible
caricatures; in denial. It seems to me that such talk can be perfectly
appropriate in the context of well supported argument. (I'm not, btw, a
theist, in the sense of having a religion as distinct from a secular
spirituality).

Mervyn


-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark
Johnson
Sent: 02 February 2009 07:11
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 33

What I should have said was

"argument

**** ALONE ****

won't cut the mustard"

Argument is,
of course,
action too.

It does stuff.

People position themselves around arguments (often not too helpfully.)

(... or do arguments position people ??)

Which is part of the problem.

People.

They're all so different!
Some will not have a clue what you're talking about.
Others have axes to grind.

I don't want to make the distinction between action and argument

because they're the same.

but between different kinds of action.

For example -

... changing the WAY

we talk

...





_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism



 

_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism

__________ NOD32 3817 (20090202) Information __________

This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system.
http://www.eset.com




From dondazsa at aol.com  Mon Feb  2 08:12:11 2009
From: dondazsa at aol.com (dondazsa at aol.com)
Date: Mon, 02 Feb 2009 10:12:11 -0500
Subject: [Critical-Realism] The way we talk
In-Reply-To: <7alt5i$3cc9iv@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu>
Message-ID: <8CB535FC193E92D-4B0-253F@MBLK-M10.sysops.aol.com>


 Thanks!


 


 

-----Original Message-----
From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Mon, 2 Feb 2009 9:59 am
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] The way we talk










McGrath's phrases re Dawkins. M 


-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
dondazsa at aol.com
Sent: 02 February 2009 14:01
To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] The way we talk


 Mervyn,

You stated in the email below: "I jotted down some of the phrases he uses:
seemingly pathological hostility; manifest lack of fairness; method:
ridicule, distort, belittle, demonise; creedal; flaky; tedious tirades;
risible caricatures; in denial."


Could you clarify which person you were referring to: McGrath or Dawkins?

Thanks,

Don



 


 

-----Original Message-----
From: Mervyn Hartwig <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
<critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Mon, 2 Feb 2009 6:26 am
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] The way we talk










"changing the WAY we talk..." Can you elaborate on this a bit please? The
Jewish practice of Haverim was recently invoked by Margaret Archer, Andrew
Collier and Doug Porpora (Transcendence: CR and God) as one to be aspired to
from a critical realist perspective, whereby 'study partners . inspire each
other's intellectual growth by lovingly challenging each other's claims to
the truth'. In general I agree, and I try to put it into practice. But
sometimes I think it's appropriate to talk tough (without of course ceasing
to love: so we have tough love).  E.g. if one of the parties is intent on
war, it's impossible to have a constructive dialogue and it might be
important to stand up to them. Thus many first-wave critical realists often
put a hostile and pejorative spin on the dialectical and spiritual turns,
e.g. Ted Benton in his recent Festshrift asserts that Bhaskar's CR was later
transformed "into an impenetrable dialectical metaphysic and then into an
all-consuming spiritual-theological world-system", citing in support an
essay by Gregor McLennan that does battle with straw versions of both turns.
It strikes me that it's important to point out/argue that this is
ill-informed, semi-hysterical, unconstructive etc.

On another front, when I recently read theological crititical realilst
Alister McGrath's critique of Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (which goes
to war against theists) I jotted down some of the phrases he uses: seemingly
pathological hostility; manifest lack of fairness; method: ridicule,
distort, belittle, demonise; creedal; flaky; tedious tirades; risible
caricatures; in denial. It seems to me that such talk can be perfectly
appropriate in the context of well supported argument. (I'm not, btw, a
theist, in the sense of having a religion as distinct from a secular
spirituality).

Mervyn


-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark
Johnson
Sent: 02 February 2009 07:11
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 33

What I should have said was

"argument

**** ALONE ****

won't cut the mustard"

Argument is,
of course,
action too.

It does stuff.

People position themselves around arguments (often not too helpfully.)

(... or do arguments position people ??)

Which is part of the problem.

People.

They're all so different!
Some will not have a clue what you're talking about.
Others have axes to grind.

I don't want to make the distinction between action and argument

because they're the same.

but between different kinds of action.

For example -

... changing the WAY

we talk

...





_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism



 

_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism

__________ NOD32 3817 (20090202) Information __________

This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system.
http://www.eset.com



_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism



 


From Hans.Despain at nichols.edu  Mon Feb  2 13:41:21 2009
From: Hans.Despain at nichols.edu (Despain, Hans G)
Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2009 15:41:21 -0500
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson on pathological
 conversation (continuation of The way we talk)
Message-ID: <CF5E68A7D4B2F7438DDD9199F67F54420DC1610A51@mb01.bison.nichols.edu>

Dear Mark,

In the last several weeks you have made numerous provocative comments and accusations toward employing CR in practical ways.

In your initial post on the matter (Jan 19), you seemed to want (in a highly condescending way) to reel-in a conversation (although I believe there was more than one motive here) which emerged around Hans Ehrbar?s open political letter.  The last sentence in that post stated ?My gut feeling is that being practical with CR is surely to be less overtly philosophical.?  Really this is your strong point that reemerges later, so let?s understand it.

It is not entirely clear if you mean Ehrbar was being over(t)ly philosophical or his respondents, or both.  Nonetheless, I would warn anyone engaging in political activity that power relations often require us to be (perhaps overly) philosophical (Gramci and Lukcas were haunted by this problem), and most certainly pedagogical in our approach (Freire suggests given the power relations we confront this is all we currently have, and radical pedagogy has been stuck here ever since.  Ultimately this is the root of the crisis in higher education, i.e. the relative disconnect between philosophy/science/knowledge/learning and action).  (What Ehrbar seems to me to be suggesting is that the environmental crisis has gotten to the point that teaching and learning will not be enough, at least not in a timely enough fashion.  So far there has been nothing suggested to how Ehrbar, or anyone, can confront this specific problem.  However, certainly DCR and Meta-Reality provide a multitude of insights, and indeed both were constructed with an intention to reclaim a bold sense of ethical action and agency!)  (we should also remember Hans Ehrbar?s original post asked about the logical consistency of his letter, not what strategies he should employ, or the ontology of institutions or agency.  Frankly, I know Hans already has a deep understanding of this, and is highly committed to T/P consistency.  Thus, even if I disagreed with his strategy, I was compelled to address only the logical consistency of his open letter.  I assumed he made up his mind concerning *action must be taken*.  He seems to be trying to understand how he has been able philosophically to come to the conclusion *action must be taken*, i.e. what are the philosophical steps that got him to that point.  These steps may compel others to understand, follow, and act.  Hence, a conversation concerning Hume?s Law seems highly relevant, at least at an elevated level of analysis or abstraction).

Mark, you then send a forward which claims that computer usage damages the environment, further you suggest (again condescendingly) we are being less then ?constructive? on this list.  No explanation otherwise, so I was left with the impression this was your way of telling people to shut-up.

Your next post (Jan. 25) you inform all of us: ?I?ve lost the will to live!? Scornfully you write ?If this is being practical about Critical Realism, then I think we need to revise our timescales for an emancipated society (by a few thousand years).?

In a second post on the same date (Jan. 25) instead of scolding the rest of us for not being constructive, you finally attempt something constructive yourself, concerning ?policy shifts? and ?institutional change,? specifically with respect to ?multiple levels of conversation which exist within institutions.?  Now much of what you had to say here seemed to be relevant to Ehrbar?s strategy, although not the conversation Ehrbar had requested (more to this point below).  What seems inconsistent to me is that you warn against being overtly philosophical, but provocatively, if implicitly, suggest in the Jan. 25 post sometimes we must be more or less overtly philosophical (e.g. reflexive, self-reflexive, and meta-self-reflexive) in institutional conversations and relationships.  Surely the latter is correct and important to Hans Ehrbar?s letter and his evolving strategy.

Yesterday, you chime in that ?argument won?t cut the mustard? with a preceding qualifier ?correct me if this isn?t a critical realist point.?  I would correct you here, but others already have, and you have conceded the point (Feb. 2), but in a way that only confuses the matter by pure conflation: ?I don?t want to make the distinction between action and argument because they?re the same.?  If this is true then it makes nonsense of your statement that arguments do not cut the mustard.  Otherwise you are saying change is not possible because if argument = action, and they don?t cut the mustard we are swimming in Parmenides? world that lacks change. If arguments are not enough change, but change occurs, then arguments must be distinct from action.   Nonetheless you have apparently accepted: argument matters (pun intended).

Most recently you have scolded the list for the practice of ?bad teaching? and ?pathological? conversations.  Surely you have point here.  And lets agree Harrean Positioning Theory is highly important, and perhaps relevant to Ehrbar?s practical application of CR and our engagement here on this list (however, once again not the conversation he explicitly called for).  However, you seem to be liable to your own critique more than anyone less on this list!

I would like to make another suggestion.  This technology and the relationships which emerge tacitly on an email list give rise to highly inefficient exchanges.  It is not like being present at lecture, nor giving a lecture.  The tacit expectation at lectures is to set patiently and allow the speaker to finish.  Even during the question phase the audience is very tacitly constrained. Here the constraints are very different, and so too are the tacitly accepted relationships.  Anyone can speak out at anytime.  You can attempt to engage the interlocutor directly, or share what thoughts your interlocutor engendered within your mind, and consequently the conversation can take many twists and turns.  Frankly I did not follow closely the exchange between Louis and Mervyn on Hume?s Law (however, I have learned much from both of them by participating on this list over the last decade).  But certainly I did not feel the need to express the irrelevance of their conversation; one because it might be relevant at certain levels (a point you have conceded), two because I understand the ontology of an email discussion list (something you seem to need to learn, or at least be more patient with).

A good example of the twists and turns of an email conversation are demonstrated by your comments of conversations within institutions.  Hans Ehrbar can correct me here, however I am all but certain that your insights on conversations within institutions were not what Ehrbar was overtly fishing for.  At the same time I thought, and bet that Hans Ehrbar too appreciated, the insights it provided were relevant and useful.  I couldn?t help but wonder why you held out before then, and instead scolded and berated the list participates (I was reminded of Thrasymachus in Book One of the Republic, smart enough to show off some clever knowledge, but lacked depth of understanding to carry the conversation.  In the Republic, Thrasymachus in the end is improved and becomes more knowledgeable!).  When the berating happened a second time on the same thread, I found myself compelled to address the abuse, theory/practice inconsistency, and your tendency to undermine a productive exchange toward defensive reactions.

I do not think this list is going to be a place to practice ?good teaching.?  Not because of insincere intentions or a lack of understanding of (radical) pedagogy, but by the chaotic nature of the conversations and the ontology of the technology.  At one level of course this is a weakness, at another level it is a great strength.  Mark I am sure that the vast majority of us are aware of the weaknesses of email discussions, no reason to reduce structural limitations of technology to individuals.  When it does prove to be individuals' ignorance, please guide us to some light (this is the reason I participate on any discussion list).  Moreover, berating participates can discourage others (especially new list members) from participation.

One last suggestion.  If someone is unhappy with the direction a conversation is taking, by all means chime in, with questions, comments, or suggestions.  One great strength of this technology is that multiple conservations can be supported, even when they are only loosely related to the original thread.  Mark you too have the agency on this list to keep the conservation (or your thread of it) less than ?pathological.?  If you don?t like the level of conversation, mend it!  Mend it with a constructive contribution.

Looking for forward to more or less ?pathological,? but fruitful and insightful conversations,

Hans Despain

The information contained in this e-mail is confidential.  Please do not cross-post.  This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential.  If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law.  If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system.  Thank you.


From sjjtas at yahoo.com  Mon Feb  2 13:46:28 2009
From: sjjtas at yahoo.com (Sebastian Job)
Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2009 12:46:28 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [Critical-Realism] The way we talk
References: <d4aa99eb0902012310g3859762h7bedda1ca9748a9d@mail.gmail.com>
	<7alt5i$3cahe2@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu>
	<d4aa99eb0902020405x7c4f401bl3191ce9bdccff396@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <958521.61337.qm@web36208.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

Hi Mark, Mervyn, Don,

The questions Mark is raising are, in my view,?pretty important. 
I would add that we risk reproducing *ourselves* and our limited intellectual-emotional-spiritual 
positions when we contribute to reproducing the limited positions 
that our interlocutors, and/or enemies occupy. And to be sure, those of 
us who are teachers are in a great position to experiment creatively with
more intelligent (but not necessarily less tough) ways of engaging others (i.e., not only in terms
of their enunciated arguments but in terms of their un/conscious positions of enunciation, 
as Benveniste might put it).

I would love to hear of any worthwhile literature that has taken up these issues,
whether in the field of intellectual struggles, or in the field of politics more generally.
It strikes me that Bhaskar is making some headway in these areas with his Meta-Reality
books, but that a lot more could be (and perhaps has been?) said.

Best wishes,

Sebastian




________________________________
From: Mark Johnson <mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk>
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Monday, February 2, 2009 6:05:31 AM
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] The way we talk

Hi Mervyn,

I was very impressed by Rom Harre's presentations on Positioning Theory at
the CR conference last year. Harre's basic point that we make each others'
selves through our positioning of them is important. Some speech acts can
seem to effect a 'self-fulfilling prophecy' by positioning others' views in
a way which the other's behaviour increasingly seems to affirm. Harre and
Sabat's work with Alzheimers patients is particularly telling here; I see it
in education on a daily basis; Hamas and Israel are a classic case.

We need to understand this better and take better control of the positioning
that our actions (speech and otherwise) entail. To some extent this requires
experimentation (my last post was a simple experiment), and creativity.

Actually, I really think it boils down to 'good teaching'. Generally on this
list we don't teach each other well ("I'll tell you what's right...!") - and
so conversations usually go 'pathological'. We don't design and control
activities for others to engage in which allow them to explore their own and
others positions. What sort of activities can we consider? How should they
be coordinated?

As I see it, in CR at the moment we only look at a very narrow type of
activity ("you say... I say..."). It isn't particularly effective. What
other activities can we design? To? "study partners . inspire each other's
intellectual growth by lovingly challenging each other's claims to the
truth" sounds a bit Californian! But it's an example of a more interesting
learning activity than what we're engaged in at the moment...

Mark



On Mon, Feb 2, 2009 at 11:26 AM, Mervyn Hartwig <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>wrote:

> "changing the WAY we talk..." Can you elaborate on this a bit please? The
> Jewish practice of Haverim was recently invoked by Margaret Archer, Andrew
> Collier and Doug Porpora (Transcendence: CR and God) as one to be aspired
> to
> from a critical realist perspective, whereby 'study partners . inspire each
> other's intellectual growth by lovingly challenging each other's claims to
> the truth'. In general I agree, and I try to put it into practice. But
> sometimes I think it's appropriate to talk tough (without of course ceasing
> to love: so we have tough love).? E.g. if one of the parties is intent on
> war, it's impossible to have a constructive dialogue and it might be
> important to stand up to them. Thus many first-wave critical realists often
> put a hostile and pejorative spin on the dialectical and spiritual turns,
> e.g. Ted Benton in his recent Festshrift asserts that Bhaskar's CR was
> later
> transformed "into an impenetrable dialectical metaphysic and then into an
> all-consuming spiritual-theological world-system", citing in support an
> essay by Gregor McLennan that does battle with straw versions of both
> turns.
> It strikes me that it's important to point out/argue that this is
> ill-informed, semi-hysterical, unconstructive etc.
>
> On another front, when I recently read theological crititical realilst
> Alister McGrath's critique of Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (which goes
> to war against theists) I jotted down some of the phrases he uses:
> seemingly
> pathological hostility; manifest lack of fairness; method: ridicule,
> distort, belittle, demonise; creedal; flaky; tedious tirades; risible
> caricatures; in denial. It seems to me that such talk can be perfectly
> appropriate in the context of well supported argument. (I'm not, btw, a
> theist, in the sense of having a religion as distinct from a secular
> spirituality).
>
> Mervyn
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark
> Johnson
> Sent: 02 February 2009 07:11
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 33
>
> What I should have said was
>
> "argument
>
> **** ALONE ****
>
> won't cut the mustard"
>
> Argument is,
> of course,
> action too.
>
> It does stuff.
>
> People position themselves around arguments (often not too helpfully.)
>
> (... or do arguments position people ??)
>
> Which is part of the problem.
>
> People.
>
> They're all so different!
> Some will not have a clue what you're talking about.
> Others have axes to grind.
>
> I don't want to make the distinction between action and argument
>
> because they're the same.
>
> but between different kinds of action.
>
> For example -
>
> ... changing the WAY
>
> we talk
>
> ...
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>



-- 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Johnson
Institute for Educational Cybernetics
University of Bolton
BL3 5AB
Tel. 01204 903567
Mob. 0778 6064505
_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism



      

From mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk  Mon Feb  2 14:20:03 2009
From: mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk (Mark Johnson)
Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2009 21:20:03 +0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson on pathological
	conversation (continuation of The way we talk)
In-Reply-To: <CF5E68A7D4B2F7438DDD9199F67F54420DC1610A51@mb01.bison.nichols.edu>
References: <CF5E68A7D4B2F7438DDD9199F67F54420DC1610A51@mb01.bison.nichols.edu>
Message-ID: <d4aa99eb0902021320x44f0c57fx71788eae908c20b9@mail.gmail.com>

Hans,
I find the tone of your 'open letter' quite insulting and I'm rather upset.
Clearly I've 'got your goat' in some way. Well, I'm sorry, it wasn't my
intention. The intention was to point to the obvious (to me) inconsistencies
between conduct and professed belief on the list: which I think is quite
legitimate. You may disagree, but there are ways of doing it which are
frankly more polite.

Mark

On Mon, Feb 2, 2009 at 8:41 PM, Despain, Hans G <Hans.Despain at nichols.edu>wrote:

> Dear Mark,
>
> In the last several weeks you have made numerous provocative comments and
> accusations toward employing CR in practical ways.
>
> In your initial post on the matter (Jan 19), you seemed to want (in a
> highly condescending way) to reel-in a conversation (although I believe
> there was more than one motive here) which emerged around Hans Ehrbar's open
> political letter.  The last sentence in that post stated "My gut feeling is
> that being practical with CR is surely to be less overtly philosophical."
>  Really this is your strong point that reemerges later, so let's understand
> it.
>
> It is not entirely clear if you mean Ehrbar was being over(t)ly
> philosophical or his respondents, or both.  Nonetheless, I would warn anyone
> engaging in political activity that power relations often require us to be
> (perhaps overly) philosophical (Gramci and Lukcas were haunted by this
> problem), and most certainly pedagogical in our approach (Freire suggests
> given the power relations we confront this is all we currently have, and
> radical pedagogy has been stuck here ever since.  Ultimately this is the
> root of the crisis in higher education, i.e. the relative disconnect between
> philosophy/science/knowledge/learning and action).  (What Ehrbar seems to me
> to be suggesting is that the environmental crisis has gotten to the point
> that teaching and learning will not be enough, at least not in a timely
> enough fashion.  So far there has been nothing suggested to how Ehrbar, or
> anyone, can confront this specific problem.  However, certainly DCR and
> Meta-Reality provide a multitude of insights, and indeed both were
> constructed with an intention to reclaim a bold sense of ethical action and
> agency!)  (we should also remember Hans Ehrbar's original post asked about
> the logical consistency of his letter, not what strategies he should employ,
> or the ontology of institutions or agency.  Frankly, I know Hans already has
> a deep understanding of this, and is highly committed to T/P consistency.
>  Thus, even if I disagreed with his strategy, I was compelled to address
> only the logical consistency of his open letter.  I assumed he made up his
> mind concerning *action must be taken*.  He seems to be trying to understand
> how he has been able philosophically to come to the conclusion *action must
> be taken*, i.e. what are the philosophical steps that got him to that point.
>  These steps may compel others to understand, follow, and act.  Hence, a
> conversation concerning Hume's Law seems highly relevant, at least at an
> elevated level of analysis or abstraction).
>
> Mark, you then send a forward which claims that computer usage damages the
> environment, further you suggest (again condescendingly) we are being less
> then "constructive" on this list.  No explanation otherwise, so I was left
> with the impression this was your way of telling people to shut-up.
>
> Your next post (Jan. 25) you inform all of us: "I've lost the will to
> live!" Scornfully you write "If this is being practical about Critical
> Realism, then I think we need to revise our timescales for an emancipated
> society (by a few thousand years)."
>
> In a second post on the same date (Jan. 25) instead of scolding the rest of
> us for not being constructive, you finally attempt something constructive
> yourself, concerning "policy shifts" and "institutional change,"
> specifically with respect to "multiple levels of conversation which exist
> within institutions."  Now much of what you had to say here seemed to be
> relevant to Ehrbar's strategy, although not the conversation Ehrbar had
> requested (more to this point below).  What seems inconsistent to me is that
> you warn against being overtly philosophical, but provocatively, if
> implicitly, suggest in the Jan. 25 post sometimes we must be more or less
> overtly philosophical (e.g. reflexive, self-reflexive, and
> meta-self-reflexive) in institutional conversations and relationships.
>  Surely the latter is correct and important to Hans Ehrbar's letter and his
> evolving strategy.
>
> Yesterday, you chime in that "argument won't cut the mustard" with a
> preceding qualifier "correct me if this isn't a critical realist point."  I
> would correct you here, but others already have, and you have conceded the
> point (Feb. 2), but in a way that only confuses the matter by pure
> conflation: "I don't want to make the distinction between action and
> argument because they're the same."  If this is true then it makes nonsense
> of your statement that arguments do not cut the mustard.  Otherwise you are
> saying change is not possible because if argument = action, and they don't
> cut the mustard we are swimming in Parmenides' world that lacks change. If
> arguments are not enough change, but change occurs, then arguments must be
> distinct from action.   Nonetheless you have apparently accepted: argument
> matters (pun intended).
>
> Most recently you have scolded the list for the practice of 'bad teaching'
> and "pathological" conversations.  Surely you have point here.  And lets
> agree Harrean Positioning Theory is highly important, and perhaps relevant
> to Ehrbar's practical application of CR and our engagement here on this list
> (however, once again not the conversation he explicitly called for).
>  However, you seem to be liable to your own critique more than anyone less
> on this list!
>
> I would like to make another suggestion.  This technology and the
> relationships which emerge tacitly on an email list give rise to highly
> inefficient exchanges.  It is not like being present at lecture, nor giving
> a lecture.  The tacit expectation at lectures is to set patiently and allow
> the speaker to finish.  Even during the question phase the audience is very
> tacitly constrained. Here the constraints are very different, and so too are
> the tacitly accepted relationships.  Anyone can speak out at anytime.  You
> can attempt to engage the interlocutor directly, or share what thoughts your
> interlocutor engendered within your mind, and consequently the conversation
> can take many twists and turns.  Frankly I did not follow closely the
> exchange between Louis and Mervyn on Hume's Law (however, I have learned
> much from both of them by participating on this list over the last decade).
>  But certainly I did not feel the need to express the irrelevance of their
> conversation; one because it might be relevant at certain levels (a point
> you have conceded), two because I understand the ontology of an email
> discussion list (something you seem to need to learn, or at least be more
> patient with).
>
> A good example of the twists and turns of an email conversation are
> demonstrated by your comments of conversations within institutions.  Hans
> Ehrbar can correct me here, however I am all but certain that your insights
> on conversations within institutions were not what Ehrbar was overtly
> fishing for.  At the same time I thought, and bet that Hans Ehrbar too
> appreciated, the insights it provided were relevant and useful.  I couldn't
> help but wonder why you held out before then, and instead scolded and
> berated the list participates (I was reminded of Thrasymachus in Book One of
> the Republic, smart enough to show off some clever knowledge, but lacked
> depth of understanding to carry the conversation.  In the Republic,
> Thrasymachus in the end is improved and becomes more knowledgeable!).  When
> the berating happened a second time on the same thread, I found myself
> compelled to address the abuse, theory/practice inconsistency, and your
> tendency to undermine a productive exchange toward defensive reactions.
>
> I do not think this list is going to be a place to practice "good
> teaching."  Not because of insincere intentions or a lack of understanding
> of (radical) pedagogy, but by the chaotic nature of the conversations and
> the ontology of the technology.  At one level of course this is a weakness,
> at another level it is a great strength.  Mark I am sure that the vast
> majority of us are aware of the weaknesses of email discussions, no reason
> to reduce structural limitations of technology to individuals.  When it does
> prove to be individuals' ignorance, please guide us to some light (this is
> the reason I participate on any discussion list).  Moreover, berating
> participates can discourage others (especially new list members) from
> participation.
>
> One last suggestion.  If someone is unhappy with the direction a
> conversation is taking, by all means chime in, with questions, comments, or
> suggestions.  One great strength of this technology is that multiple
> conservations can be supported, even when they are only loosely related to
> the original thread.  Mark you too have the agency on this list to keep the
> conservation (or your thread of it) less than "pathological."  If you don't
> like the level of conversation, mend it!  Mend it with a constructive
> contribution.
>
> Looking for forward to more or less "pathological," but fruitful and
> insightful conversations,
>
> Hans Despain
>
> The information contained in this e-mail is confidential.  Please do not
> cross-post.  This communication is intended only for the use of the
> addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential.  If you are not the
> intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance,
> disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited
> by law.  If you have received this communication in error, please notify the
> sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system.  Thank
> you.
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>



-- 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Johnson
Institute for Educational Cybernetics
University of Bolton
BL3 5AB
Tel. 01204 903567
Mob. 0778 6064505

From SCrow89055 at aol.com  Mon Feb  2 17:11:29 2009
From: SCrow89055 at aol.com (SCrow89055 at aol.com)
Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2009 19:11:29 EST
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson on pathological
	conversati...
Message-ID: <c48.28cda7fe.36b8e5b1@aol.com>

Mark,
 
I have been a lurker on this listserv for many years.  I am  currently 
working on a critical realist dissertation at the University of MO at  KC.  It is an 
analysis of the Northeast neighborhood of Kansas City,  MO.  Don't let the 
people on this list intimidate you.  They are not  very tolerant of people who 
question their ideas or who disagree with  them.  I find your posts quite 
refreshing and I presume that there other  lurkers who feel the same.  
 
Sam
**************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. 
(http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=http://ad.doubleclick.
net/clk;211531132;33070124;e)

From dbrereton at comcast.net  Mon Feb  2 20:52:47 2009
From: dbrereton at comcast.net (Derek P. Brereton)
Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2009 22:52:47 -0500
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 34
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1233428403.19789.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>
References: <mailman.1.1233428403.19789.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID: <2ff5c5f9d36decf3ea4ef70b75f59eda@comcast.net>

Mervyn:

I too would love to see you in Rio, but I'm afraid such a trip this 
summer is not in the cards for me/us. Best of luck with the project.

Derek



From Par.Engholm at soc.uu.se  Tue Feb  3 00:28:39 2009
From: Par.Engholm at soc.uu.se (Par Engholm)
Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 08:28:39 +0100
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson on
	pathologicalconversati...
In-Reply-To: <c48.28cda7fe.36b8e5b1@aol.com>
References: <c48.28cda7fe.36b8e5b1@aol.com>
Message-ID: <F39EA4467B45466A95618D32081AF6E1@acer86u03s59cr>

Hi all,
Please just calm down a bit all of you. I don't find either Mark's or Hans'
arguments that offensive on their own, but the brandishing of other people's
posts as offensive, intimidating etc is a very effective way of closing any
discussion. This list is in my opinion a very open and quite friendly forum
for discussions on quite a wide range of issues.
Take a deep breath and try to find something that might cut the mustard or
in any other way might change the way we talk or think or act, which of
course are various ways of 'acting' in a more general sense. That might
include arguing against other people on the list and finding their arguments
wanting in some respect, but that's part of any (intellectual) discussion.
Cheers,
P?r

*******************************************************
Par Engholm
Uppsala University
Department of Sociology
http://www.soc.uu.se/kontaktpers.php?id=62
Mobile: +46 709783546
 
Journal of Critical Realism
http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/index



-----Ursprungligt meddelande-----
Fr?n: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] F?r SCrow89055 at aol.com
Skickat: den 3 februari 2009 01:11
Till: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
?mne: Re: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson on
pathologicalconversati...

Mark,
 
I have been a lurker on this listserv for many years.  I am  currently 
working on a critical realist dissertation at the University of MO at  KC.
It is an 
analysis of the Northeast neighborhood of Kansas City,  MO.  Don't let the 
people on this list intimidate you.  They are not  very tolerant of people
who 
question their ideas or who disagree with  them.  I find your posts quite 
refreshing and I presume that there other  lurkers who feel the same.  
 
Sam
**************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499. 
(http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=htt
p://ad.doubleclick.
net/clk;211531132;33070124;e)
_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism



From rgroff at slu.edu  Tue Feb  3 08:18:57 2009
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 09:18:57 -0600
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson on
	pathologicalconversati...
In-Reply-To: <F39EA4467B45466A95618D32081AF6E1@acer86u03s59cr>
References: <c48.28cda7fe.36b8e5b1@aol.com>
	<F39EA4467B45466A95618D32081AF6E1@acer86u03s59cr>
Message-ID: <6ad241360902030718n626d0170u748efc40fca674f@mail.gmail.com>

Hi all,

I've been a participant on this list since 1997.  I've noticed a couple of
things during that time that, in my view, have been challenges for the list.
The first was around 99 or so, I'd say, after enough people had read DPF
that it was possible to accuse people of not being dialectical if they
disagreed with you.  Sometimes people *aren't* being dialectical, and should
be, in order to do justice to the object.  Other times saying it is just a
way to win.  You see the latter all the time in grad school seminars on
Adorno.  I don't mean to sound arrogant in saying that; it just is, indeed,
where you find it.  Anyway, there was around then a change in the rhetorical
practices operative on the list; before that it had been a kind of
shockingly pristine ideal speech situation.

As it happened, before that time we also mostly talked about different key
arguments of cr, trying to understand them, and to see if they made sense
and how they might apply.  That too started to shift, though not at first.
At first there was lots of discussion about some key concepts from DPF.
Then came the "spiritual turn" in Bhaskar's own thinking, and that, in my
view affected the list significantly.  By then, many of the original
participants had dropped out, and for some years after, what conversation
there was was fragmented and arguably tangential to cr, dcr or tdcr.

I've always thought that the list does best when there is an actual focus to
the discussion.  When I first joined in 97, we read things together as a
list, and "talked" about them virtually.  I tried to start a reading of RTS
again, a couple of years ago, but then pooped out, about which I still feel
guilty.  I'm not in a position to do something like that again, but others
may like to introduce particular topics for discussion.  Based on past
experience, the discussion is most productive if the topic is well-defined,
and not too huge, conceptually and/or empirically.  Perhaps the person who
has been lurking for years might like to describe his research and how you
are using cr?  Perhaps there are theoretical or conceptual issues that
you're trying to work out?  It's a problem in the US for people trying to do
cr work that the are so few cr-ers, and so few Marxists, and that social
science is so positivist still, or, otherwise, po-mo.  I found the list
invaluable as a kind of shadow committee, when I was in grad school.

For myself, I "corrected" Mark only because he said something that I thought
was both incorrect and politically very problematic, and he specifically
said "correct me if I'm wrong."  Even so, I felt it would be irresponsible
to be snippy in tone without explaining what in the post had made me mad, so
I did.

Warmly,
Ruth






On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 1:28 AM, Par Engholm <Par.Engholm at soc.uu.se> wrote:

> Hi all,
> Please just calm down a bit all of you. I don't find either Mark's or Hans'
> arguments that offensive on their own, but the brandishing of other
> people's
> posts as offensive, intimidating etc is a very effective way of closing any
> discussion. This list is in my opinion a very open and quite friendly forum
> for discussions on quite a wide range of issues.
> Take a deep breath and try to find something that might cut the mustard or
> in any other way might change the way we talk or think or act, which of
> course are various ways of 'acting' in a more general sense. That might
> include arguing against other people on the list and finding their
> arguments
> wanting in some respect, but that's part of any (intellectual) discussion.
> Cheers,
> P?r
>
> *******************************************************
> Par Engholm
> Uppsala University
> Department of Sociology
> http://www.soc.uu.se/kontaktpers.php?id=62
> Mobile: +46 709783546
>
> Journal of Critical Realism
> http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/index
>
>
>
> -----Ursprungligt meddelande-----
> Fr?n: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] F?r
> SCrow89055 at aol.com
> Skickat: den 3 februari 2009 01:11
> Till: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> ?mne: Re: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson on
> pathologicalconversati...
>
> Mark,
>
> I have been a lurker on this listserv for many years.  I am  currently
> working on a critical realist dissertation at the University of MO at  KC.
> It is an
> analysis of the Northeast neighborhood of Kansas City,  MO.  Don't let the
> people on this list intimidate you.  They are not  very tolerant of people
> who
> question their ideas or who disagree with  them.  I find your posts quite
> refreshing and I presume that there other  lurkers who feel the same.
>
> Sam
> **************Great Deals on Dell Laptops. Starting at $499.
> (
> http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1217883258x1201191827/aol?redir=htt
> p://ad.doubleclick.
> net/clk;211531132;33070124;e)
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>

From echna at gmx.net  Tue Feb  3 10:49:42 2009
From: echna at gmx.net (echna)
Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2009 18:49:42 +0100
Subject: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and frankfurt
	school
Message-ID: <498883B6.7020106@gmx.net>

Hi all,

I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of 
critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the 
Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also 
did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I 
couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment 
writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like 
the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The 
Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german 
original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz 
von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises 
of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion) 
with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the 
positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the 
"old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I 
think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar 
arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However, 
what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic 
translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different 
epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems 
to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite 
difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give 
me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly 
appreciated.

best regards,
e



From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk  Tue Feb  3 12:39:27 2009
From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig)
Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 19:39:27 -0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson
	onpathologicalconversati...
In-Reply-To: <F39EA4467B45466A95618D32081AF6E1@acer86u03s59cr>
Message-ID: <mailman.293.1233689974.2553.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>

 I agree, let's cool it. 

For what it's worth, Mark's posts didn't get on my goat and I agree with
Sebastian that the points he is raising are important and should be
discussed. Equally, I can understand that Hans D. took them the way he did
and don't really find his response over the top. Also, I think the list is
functioning pretty well. It provides very useful info re CR happenings,
people sometimes use it to get helpful info and feedback re their specific
projects, and now and again there is an interesting thread of discussion.
What more could a busy person want? There seems little point in harking back
to 'the good old days'. History has moved on, and critical realism with it
(if it hasn't, it's in a time warp). For good or ill, the dialectical and
spiritual turns are a reality, and we have to make of them what we can.
Nobody is wanting to say that work within the framework of first-wave
critical realism is not crucially important and indeed indispensable for the
health of the whole (which doesn't of course mean that there should not be
well informed criticism flowing both ways -- to the contrary). 

Mervyn



-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Par
Engholm
Sent: 03 February 2009 07:29
To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson
onpathologicalconversati...

Hi all,
Please just calm down a bit all of you. I don't find either Mark's or Hans'
arguments that offensive on their own, but the brandishing of other people's
posts as offensive, intimidating etc is a very effective way of closing any
discussion. This list is in my opinion a very open and quite friendly forum
for discussions on quite a wide range of issues.
Take a deep breath and try to find something that might cut the mustard or
in any other way might change the way we talk or think or act, which of
course are various ways of 'acting' in a more general sense. That might
include arguing against other people on the list and finding their arguments
wanting in some respect, but that's part of any (intellectual) discussion.
Cheers,
P?r

*******************************************************
Par Engholm
Uppsala University
Department of Sociology
http://www.soc.uu.se/kontaktpers.php?id=62
Mobile: +46 709783546
 
Journal of Critical Realism
http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/index




From rgroff at slu.edu  Tue Feb  3 13:30:07 2009
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 14:30:07 -0600
Subject: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and frankfurt
	school
In-Reply-To: <498883B6.7020106@gmx.net>
References: <498883B6.7020106@gmx.net>
Message-ID: <6ad241360902031230i39c76947s722566e0a4f6b8af@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Echna,

This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR a few
years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this is
short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.  Critical
realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal powers),
which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications of
this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge 2004,
CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be of some
interest.

Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."

Warmly,
Ruth




On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
> Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz
> von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
> of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
> with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
> positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the
> "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
> think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
> arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
> what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
> to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
> difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
> me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
> appreciated.
>
> best regards,
> e
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>

From echna at gmx.net  Tue Feb  3 14:27:14 2009
From: echna at gmx.net (echna)
Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2009 22:27:14 +0100
Subject: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and frankfurt
 school
In-Reply-To: <6ad241360902031230i39c76947s722566e0a4f6b8af@mail.gmail.com>
References: <498883B6.7020106@gmx.net>
	<6ad241360902031230i39c76947s722566e0a4f6b8af@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4988B6B2.1030305@gmx.net>

Hi Ruth,

thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on 
Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t find 
it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only text  I  
get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review Symposium: Taking 
relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of your book. 
Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name 
it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the 
reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno for 
example in his negative dialectic is talking about the preponderance of 
the object (his whole dialectical approach could also be compared to 
Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however, way beyond my scope as 
I have huge troubles understanding it, especially as a non native). This 
is something that might be interpreted as some kind of secreted 
ontology, which has to be made explicit. What is making the whole thing 
way more difficult and challenging is that the Frankfurt School and CR 
are coming from different "epsitemic communities" and notably texts of 
Adorno et al. have to be cut off  their embedding in the tradition of 
german phiosophy (as they have no straightforward text in which their 
principles are laid down). The question is this sense is also, whether 
this is possible without harming or destroying the inner core of the 
theroy. However, as I already stated I?m not quite sure on the whole 
issue yet. Maybe there is also a difference between Adorno and 
Horkheimer , as Horkheimer wrote his pieces on positivism and 
epistemology in general (for example the famous text "traditional and 
critical theory") in the 30s, whereas Adorno was especially engaged with 
epistemic (and ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these are just 
some preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I will presumably 
start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be glad about more 
"talk" :-) .

best wishes,
e
Ruth Groff schrieb:
> Hi Echna,
>
> This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
> anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR a few
> years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this is
> short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.  Critical
> realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal powers),
> which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
> Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
> There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications of
> this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge 2004,
> CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be of some
> interest.
>
> Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
>
> Warmly,
> Ruth
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>
>   
>> Hi all,
>>
>> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
>> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
>> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
>> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
>> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
>> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
>> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
>> Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
>> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz
>> von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
>> of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
>> with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
>> positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the
>> "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
>> think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
>> arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
>> what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
>> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
>> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
>> to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
>> difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
>> me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
>> appreciated.
>>
>> best regards,
>> e
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>
>>     
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>   



From battaday at yahoo.com.au  Tue Feb  3 18:05:12 2009
From: battaday at yahoo.com.au (Marcus Salisbury)
Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 17:05:12 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and frankfurt
	school
References: <498883B6.7020106@gmx.net>
Message-ID: <312028.19433.qm@web53411.mail.re2.yahoo.com>

Echna,

Marcuse's 'One-Dimensional Man' might be a useful?locus?for a comparative discussion of Frankfurt School thought and Critical Realism, given its?emphasis on the notion of the illusion of 'freedom' in contemporary consumer culture and?the need for authentic liberation from the psychological/environmental damage it causes.?

The problem here (as I have found it, at any rate) is that Adorno in particular often?conducts his argument?from a fundamentally elitist viewpoint, e.g. Mahler's symphonies are automatically?good for your mental well-being and personal growth while jazz music is bad because it's always made by zombies for zombies. 

However, CR and the Frankfurt School both place a good deal of emphasis on economic and social processes--as embodied by consumer society and the anxieties it imposes on our psyche--as barriers to authentic liberation. Hope that's of some use...
?Marcus Salisbury




----- Original Message ----
From: echna <echna at gmx.net>
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, 4 February, 2009 3:49:42 AM
Subject: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and frankfurt school

Hi all,

I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of 
critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the 
Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also 
did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I 
couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment 
writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like 
the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The 
Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german 
original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz 
von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises 
of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion) 
with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the 
positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the 
"old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I 
think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar 
arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However, 
what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic 
translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different 
epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems 
to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite 
difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give 
me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly 
appreciated.

best regards,
e


_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism



      Stay connected to the people that matter most with a smarter inbox. Take a look http://au.docs.yahoo.com/mail/smarterinbox


From rgroff at slu.edu  Tue Feb  3 18:21:27 2009
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 19:21:27 -0600
Subject: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and frankfurt
	school
In-Reply-To: <4988B6B2.1030305@gmx.net>
References: <498883B6.7020106@gmx.net>
	<6ad241360902031230i39c76947s722566e0a4f6b8af@mail.gmail.com>
	<4988B6B2.1030305@gmx.net>
Message-ID: <6ad241360902031721m43b49d0bpa3264cf65228988b@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Echna,

I don't remember when Howrd's piece appeared, but if you don't have a way to
search back JCR issues, Mervyn might be able to tell you.  Or Howard!

If you are cutting into the issue via positivism, my suggestion would be a
different from Marcus' I guess.  I'd say look at Horkheimer's early stuff in
the collection CRITICAL THEORY.  Especially, "The Latest Attack on
Metaphysics" and, of course, "Traditional and Critical Theory."  Adorno from
the Positivist Dispute ...   Also, H's ECLIPSE OF REASON and sections of H
and A's DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT.  But it sounds as though you are already
focused on these texts.

They're the basic ones to consider, though, if you want to get a handle on
what H and A have to say about positivism.  On the cr side, Bhaskar has a
very sophisticated analysis of the "fact-form" as an ideological phenomenon
in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, but I would say that you
should first really, really understand the arguments of A Realist Theory of
Science, in order to get at what is wrong, conceptually, with positivist
laws.  Many practicing cr social scientists and theorists have also weighed
in on the issue, but as I say, I'd first tackle RTS head on.  For help with
reading RTS, if you want or need it, I think Collier's 1994 book is very
ice: CRITICAL REALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ROY BHASKAR'S PHILOSOPHY Verso).

Personally, I do think that deep down an important difference between H and
A and cr is that H and A don't q-u-i-t-e get out from under Kant, though the
impulse is there, whereas cr points back to Aristotle.  But this may well be
besides the point for your interests at this time.

Warmly,
Ruth



On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 3:27 PM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:

> Hi Ruth,
>
> thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on
> Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t find
> it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only text  I
> get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review Symposium: Taking
> relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of your book.
> Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name
> it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the
> reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno for
> example in his negative dialectic is talking about the preponderance of
> the object (his whole dialectical approach could also be compared to
> Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however, way beyond my scope as
> I have huge troubles understanding it, especially as a non native). This
> is something that might be interpreted as some kind of secreted
> ontology, which has to be made explicit. What is making the whole thing
> way more difficult and challenging is that the Frankfurt School and CR
> are coming from different "epsitemic communities" and notably texts of
> Adorno et al. have to be cut off  their embedding in the tradition of
> german phiosophy (as they have no straightforward text in which their
> principles are laid down). The question is this sense is also, whether
> this is possible without harming or destroying the inner core of the
> theroy. However, as I already stated I?m not quite sure on the whole
> issue yet. Maybe there is also a difference between Adorno and
> Horkheimer , as Horkheimer wrote his pieces on positivism and
> epistemology in general (for example the famous text "traditional and
> critical theory") in the 30s, whereas Adorno was especially engaged with
> epistemic (and ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these are just
> some preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I will presumably
> start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be glad about more
> "talk" :-) .
>
> best wishes,
> e
> Ruth Groff schrieb:
> > Hi Echna,
> >
> > This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
> > anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR a
> few
> > years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this is
> > short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.
>  Critical
> > realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal powers),
> > which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
> > Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
> > There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications of
> > this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge 2004,
> > CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be of some
> > interest.
> >
> > Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
> >
> > Warmly,
> > Ruth
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
> >
> >
> >> Hi all,
> >>
> >> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> >> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> >> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
> >> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> >> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> >> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
> >> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
> >> Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
> >> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz
> >> von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
> >> of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
> >> with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
> >> positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the
> >> "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
> >> think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
> >> arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
> >> what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> >> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> >> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
> >> to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
> >> difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
> >> me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
> >> appreciated.
> >>
> >> best regards,
> >> e
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Critical-Realism mailing list
> >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >>
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>

From howarde at iastate.edu  Tue Feb  3 18:37:13 2009
From: howarde at iastate.edu (Howard Engelskirchen)
Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2009 20:37:13 -0500
Subject: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and frankfurt
 school
In-Reply-To: <4988B6B2.1030305@gmx.net>
References: <498883B6.7020106@gmx.net>
	<6ad241360902031230i39c76947s722566e0a4f6b8af@mail.gmail.com>
	<4988B6B2.1030305@gmx.net>
Message-ID: <200902040137.n141bFlJ030048@despam-11.iastate.edu>

Hi Echna,

I'm working on the relevance of the theory of 
science to the social sciences -- more 
specifically I consider advances in recent years 
that have been made in realist philosophy of 
science to our understanding of natural kinds and 
explore the degree to which they extend to the 
social sciences.   This goes to the question of 
'real definition' -- water is a natural kind and 
H2O is its real definition.  Marx is a wonderful 
resource.  In my view he anticipates powerfully 
the best in the contemporary philosophy of science.

The jcr text Ruth refers to is ?Powers and 
Particulars: Adorno and Scientific Realism,? 
Journal of Critical Realism, v.3, no. 1, p. 1 (2004)

An effort to explore our understanding of the 
commodity relation as a social kind, which 
includes a critique of Bhaskar's 'qualified 
naturalism', is ?Why is This Labour Value? ? 
Commodity Producing Labour as a Social Kind,? in 
Pearce and Frauley, eds., Critical Realism and 
the Social Sciences: Heterodox 
Elaborations  (Univ. of Toronto Press 
2007).  This text does not include a 
consideration of the Frankfurt School, 
though.  Also, in the book Ruth mentioned I 
explore natural kind methodology and its 
relevance to understanding the decisive Section 2 
of Chapter 1 of Marx's Capital, ?On the Clear 
Comprehension of Political Economy: Social Kinds 
and the Significance of ?2 of Marx?s Capital,? in 
Groff, ed., Revitalizing Causality: Realism About 
Causality in Philosophy and Social Science (Routledge 2007).

Feel free to email at howarde at iastate.edu

howard




At 04:27 PM 2/3/2009, you wrote:
>Hi Ruth,
>
>thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on
>Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t find
>it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only text  I
>get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review Symposium: Taking
>relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of your book.
>Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name
>it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the
>reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno for
>example in his negative dialectic is talking about the preponderance of
>the object (his whole dialectical approach could also be compared to
>Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however, way beyond my scope as
>I have huge troubles understanding it, especially as a non native). This
>is something that might be interpreted as some kind of secreted
>ontology, which has to be made explicit. What is making the whole thing
>way more difficult and challenging is that the Frankfurt School and CR
>are coming from different "epsitemic communities" and notably texts of
>Adorno et al. have to be cut off  their embedding in the tradition of
>german phiosophy (as they have no straightforward text in which their
>principles are laid down). The question is this sense is also, whether
>this is possible without harming or destroying the inner core of the
>theroy. However, as I already stated I?m not quite sure on the whole
>issue yet. Maybe there is also a difference between Adorno and
>Horkheimer , as Horkheimer wrote his pieces on positivism and
>epistemology in general (for example the famous text "traditional and
>critical theory") in the 30s, whereas Adorno was especially engaged with
>epistemic (and ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these are just
>some preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I will presumably
>start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be glad about more
>"talk" :-) .
>
>best wishes,
>e
>Ruth Groff schrieb:
> > Hi Echna,
> >
> > This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
> > anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish 
> a piece on Adorno in JCR a few
> > years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this is
> > short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.  Critical
> > realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal powers),
> > which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
> > Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
> > There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications of
> > this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge 2004,
> > CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be of some
> > interest.
> >
> > Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
> >
> > Warmly,
> > Ruth
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
> >
> >
> >> Hi all,
> >>
> >> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> >> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> >> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
> >> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> >> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> >> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
> >> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
> >> Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
> >> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz
> >> von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
> >> of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
> >> with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
> >> positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the
> >> "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
> >> think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
> >> arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
> >> what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> >> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> >> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
> >> to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
> >> difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
> >> me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
> >> appreciated.
> >>
> >> best regards,
> >> e
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Critical-Realism mailing list
> >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >>
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>Critical-Realism mailing list
>Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism


From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk  Tue Feb  3 21:55:41 2009
From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2009 04:55:41 +0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory
Message-ID: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C04@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>

Hi

Ruth says: "Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way."

This is a complex issues and not easily established in my view.  That Adorno has no explicit theory of causality, it seems true, but that does not mean he isn't a sort of realist.  I think we would need to specify in exactly what sense Adorno does not get beyond Kant, because I'm sometimes not sure that even RB decisively gets beyond Kant.  RB owes a lot more to Kant than is often given credit for.  Kant of course never denied the independently real.  He believed in noumena and thought we had to be able to think it, which could be read as a sort of minimal philosophical ontology of the type RB argues for in RTS.  Moreover, Erik Watkins "Kant and the metaphysics of causality" even argues that Kant HAD a causal powers based ontology.  More work needs to be done on CR vs Adorno.  Adorno lends himself so easily to being misread because of the notorious style.

On Adorno and elitism, this charge has become so common that has become banal, and it obstructs appreciation of the profound insights Adorno has to offer.

The clearest piece Adorno wrote which is less bogged down in the German tradition than most of his texts is the little known "The Actuality of Philosophy", Telos 1977.

Echna - which university are you at?

phil.



________________________________________
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
Sent: 04 February 2009 01:21
To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 6

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Today's Topics:

   1. Re: Open letter to Mark Johnson   onpathologicalconversati...
      (Mervyn Hartwig)
   2. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
      (Ruth Groff)
   3. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt school (echna)
   4. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
      (Marcus Salisbury)
   5. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
      (Ruth Groff)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 19:39:27 -0000
From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson
        onpathologicalconversati...
To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID:
        <mailman.7061.1233710490.2556.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="iso-8859-1"

 I agree, let's cool it.

For what it's worth, Mark's posts didn't get on my goat and I agree with
Sebastian that the points he is raising are important and should be
discussed. Equally, I can understand that Hans D. took them the way he did
and don't really find his response over the top. Also, I think the list is
functioning pretty well. It provides very useful info re CR happenings,
people sometimes use it to get helpful info and feedback re their specific
projects, and now and again there is an interesting thread of discussion.
What more could a busy person want? There seems little point in harking back
to 'the good old days'. History has moved on, and critical realism with it
(if it hasn't, it's in a time warp). For good or ill, the dialectical and
spiritual turns are a reality, and we have to make of them what we can.
Nobody is wanting to say that work within the framework of first-wave
critical realism is not crucially important and indeed indispensable for the
health of the whole (which doesn't of course mean that there should not be
well informed criticism flowing both ways -- to the contrary).

Mervyn



-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Par
Engholm
Sent: 03 February 2009 07:29
To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson
onpathologicalconversati...

Hi all,
Please just calm down a bit all of you. I don't find either Mark's or Hans'
arguments that offensive on their own, but the brandishing of other people's
posts as offensive, intimidating etc is a very effective way of closing any
discussion. This list is in my opinion a very open and quite friendly forum
for discussions on quite a wide range of issues.
Take a deep breath and try to find something that might cut the mustard or
in any other way might change the way we talk or think or act, which of
course are various ways of 'acting' in a more general sense. That might
include arguing against other people on the list and finding their arguments
wanting in some respect, but that's part of any (intellectual) discussion.
Cheers,
P?r

*******************************************************
Par Engholm
Uppsala University
Department of Sociology
http://www.soc.uu.se/kontaktpers.php?id=62
Mobile: +46 709783546

Journal of Critical Realism
http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/index





------------------------------

Message: 2
Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 14:30:07 -0600
From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
        frankfurt       school
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID:
        <6ad241360902031230i39c76947s722566e0a4f6b8af at mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Hi Echna,

This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR a few
years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this is
short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.  Critical
realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal powers),
which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications of
this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge 2004,
CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be of some
interest.

Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."

Warmly,
Ruth




On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
> Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz
> von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
> of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
> with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
> positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the
> "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
> think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
> arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
> what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
> to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
> difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
> me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
> appreciated.
>
> best regards,
> e
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>


------------------------------

Message: 3
Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2009 22:27:14 +0100
From: echna <echna at gmx.net>
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
        frankfurt school
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID: <4988B6B2.1030305 at gmx.net>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed

Hi Ruth,

thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on
Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t find
it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only text  I
get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review Symposium: Taking
relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of your book.
Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name
it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the
reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno for
example in his negative dialectic is talking about the preponderance of
the object (his whole dialectical approach could also be compared to
Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however, way beyond my scope as
I have huge troubles understanding it, especially as a non native). This
is something that might be interpreted as some kind of secreted
ontology, which has to be made explicit. What is making the whole thing
way more difficult and challenging is that the Frankfurt School and CR
are coming from different "epsitemic communities" and notably texts of
Adorno et al. have to be cut off  their embedding in the tradition of
german phiosophy (as they have no straightforward text in which their
principles are laid down). The question is this sense is also, whether
this is possible without harming or destroying the inner core of the
theroy. However, as I already stated I?m not quite sure on the whole
issue yet. Maybe there is also a difference between Adorno and
Horkheimer , as Horkheimer wrote his pieces on positivism and
epistemology in general (for example the famous text "traditional and
critical theory") in the 30s, whereas Adorno was especially engaged with
epistemic (and ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these are just
some preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I will presumably
start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be glad about more
"talk" :-) .

best wishes,
e
Ruth Groff schrieb:
> Hi Echna,
>
> This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
> anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR a few
> years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this is
> short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.  Critical
> realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal powers),
> which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
> Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
> There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications of
> this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge 2004,
> CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be of some
> interest.
>
> Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
>
> Warmly,
> Ruth
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>
>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
>> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
>> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
>> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
>> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
>> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
>> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
>> Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
>> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz
>> von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
>> of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
>> with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
>> positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the
>> "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
>> think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
>> arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
>> what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
>> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
>> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
>> to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
>> difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
>> me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
>> appreciated.
>>
>> best regards,
>> e
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>




------------------------------

Message: 4
Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 17:05:12 -0800 (PST)
From: Marcus Salisbury <battaday at yahoo.com.au>
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
        frankfurt       school
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID: <312028.19433.qm at web53411.mail.re2.yahoo.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1

Echna,

Marcuse's 'One-Dimensional Man' might be a useful?locus?for a comparative discussion of Frankfurt School thought and Critical Realism, given its?emphasis on the notion of the illusion of 'freedom' in contemporary consumer culture and?the need for authentic liberation from the psychological/environmental damage it causes.?

The problem here (as I have found it, at any rate) is that Adorno in particular often?conducts his argument?from a fundamentally elitist viewpoint, e.g. Mahler's symphonies are automatically?good for your mental well-being and personal growth while jazz music is bad because it's always made by zombies for zombies.

However, CR and the Frankfurt School both place a good deal of emphasis on economic and social processes--as embodied by consumer society and the anxieties it imposes on our psyche--as barriers to authentic liberation. Hope that's of some use...
?Marcus Salisbury




----- Original Message ----
From: echna <echna at gmx.net>
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, 4 February, 2009 3:49:42 AM
Subject: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and frankfurt school

Hi all,

I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz
von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the
"old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
appreciated.

best regards,
e


_______________________________________________
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------------------------------

Message: 5
Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 19:21:27 -0600
From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
        frankfurt       school
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID:
        <6ad241360902031721m43b49d0bpa3264cf65228988b at mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Hi Echna,

I don't remember when Howrd's piece appeared, but if you don't have a way to
search back JCR issues, Mervyn might be able to tell you.  Or Howard!

If you are cutting into the issue via positivism, my suggestion would be a
different from Marcus' I guess.  I'd say look at Horkheimer's early stuff in
the collection CRITICAL THEORY.  Especially, "The Latest Attack on
Metaphysics" and, of course, "Traditional and Critical Theory."  Adorno from
the Positivist Dispute ...   Also, H's ECLIPSE OF REASON and sections of H
and A's DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT.  But it sounds as though you are already
focused on these texts.

They're the basic ones to consider, though, if you want to get a handle on
what H and A have to say about positivism.  On the cr side, Bhaskar has a
very sophisticated analysis of the "fact-form" as an ideological phenomenon
in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, but I would say that you
should first really, really understand the arguments of A Realist Theory of
Science, in order to get at what is wrong, conceptually, with positivist
laws.  Many practicing cr social scientists and theorists have also weighed
in on the issue, but as I say, I'd first tackle RTS head on.  For help with
reading RTS, if you want or need it, I think Collier's 1994 book is very
ice: CRITICAL REALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ROY BHASKAR'S PHILOSOPHY Verso).

Personally, I do think that deep down an important difference between H and
A and cr is that H and A don't q-u-i-t-e get out from under Kant, though the
impulse is there, whereas cr points back to Aristotle.  But this may well be
besides the point for your interests at this time.

Warmly,
Ruth



On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 3:27 PM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:

> Hi Ruth,
>
> thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on
> Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t find
> it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only text  I
> get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review Symposium: Taking
> relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of your book.
> Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name
> it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the
> reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno for
> example in his negative dialectic is talking about the preponderance of
> the object (his whole dialectical approach could also be compared to
> Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however, way beyond my scope as
> I have huge troubles understanding it, especially as a non native). This
> is something that might be interpreted as some kind of secreted
> ontology, which has to be made explicit. What is making the whole thing
> way more difficult and challenging is that the Frankfurt School and CR
> are coming from different "epsitemic communities" and notably texts of
> Adorno et al. have to be cut off  their embedding in the tradition of
> german phiosophy (as they have no straightforward text in which their
> principles are laid down). The question is this sense is also, whether
> this is possible without harming or destroying the inner core of the
> theroy. However, as I already stated I?m not quite sure on the whole
> issue yet. Maybe there is also a difference between Adorno and
> Horkheimer , as Horkheimer wrote his pieces on positivism and
> epistemology in general (for example the famous text "traditional and
> critical theory") in the 30s, whereas Adorno was especially engaged with
> epistemic (and ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these are just
> some preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I will presumably
> start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be glad about more
> "talk" :-) .
>
> best wishes,
> e
> Ruth Groff schrieb:
> > Hi Echna,
> >
> > This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
> > anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR a
> few
> > years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this is
> > short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.
>  Critical
> > realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal powers),
> > which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
> > Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
> > There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications of
> > this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge 2004,
> > CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be of some
> > interest.
> >
> > Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
> >
> > Warmly,
> > Ruth
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
> >
> >
> >> Hi all,
> >>
> >> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> >> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> >> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
> >> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> >> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> >> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
> >> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
> >> Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
> >> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz
> >> von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
> >> of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
> >> with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
> >> positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the
> >> "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
> >> think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
> >> arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
> >> what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> >> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> >> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
> >> to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
> >> difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
> >> me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
> >> appreciated.
> >>
> >> best regards,
> >> e
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Critical-Realism mailing list
> >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >>
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>


------------------------------

_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism


End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 6
***********************************************


From echna at gmx.net  Wed Feb  4 00:41:15 2009
From: echna at gmx.net (echna)
Date: Wed, 04 Feb 2009 08:41:15 +0100
Subject: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory
In-Reply-To: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C04@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
References: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C04@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <4989469B.8080501@gmx.net>

Hi all,

thanks again for your interesting thoughts and objections. Howard, 
unfortunately that particular issue (v. 3 n.1) of JCR is not online. And 
as I have huge difficulties here in Vienna to get hold of JCR (the 
university library does not purchase access to it). So it would be great 
if you could send me your text as a pdf (if you don?t mind and it is not 
to much work for you).

In fact I thought of dealing with the Franfurt School (FS) in two 
different branches. One is the critique laid down by Horkheimer already 
in the 30s. Here to mention are the texts Ruth was pointing on, next to 
some others Horkheimer wrote in this time on materialism and "marxist 
epistemology". The other one I thought of could consists out of Adorno?s 
texts dealing with positivism in the 60s, most notably the dispute on 
positivism. Besides the famous "dispute", however, there are several 
other shorter texts of Adorno, which I find of vast interest. For 
example his "dialectical prolegomena", as he called the two texts, 
namely "Subject and Object" and "Marginalia to Theory and Praxis". 
Somehow I feel tempted to have a more thorough going look on the 
negative dialectic as Adorno said that "he?s putting his cards on the 
table" (preface) with this book. However, due to his notorious style it 
is probably a quite -too difficult- task for me (and as he is also 
always referring to Hegel in this text some deeper knowledge than I have 
about hegelian dialectic would also be of help).

Thanks Ruth, for pointing my attention again on RTS. I also know 
Collier?s valuable introduction of it. In fact I plan to start off my 
description of CR with RTS as I find its arguments indispensable to 
understand PON and its further implications for social science. The crux 
of the matter seems to be now for me the relation of both CR and FS to 
Kant. As I am not really familiar with his writings in detail I will 
first of all try to get in touch with his (lacking) theory of causality 
and the (in)famous "thing in itself" (hope it?s the right term in english).

I also thought about concluding my thesis  with some arguments on Marx. 
As I agree that the principles outlined by CR and FS, despite the 
differences among them, were already anticipated by Marx (even not just 
practical but also theoretically reflected; for example in a lucid 
manner in the manuscript M in the "Grundrisse"). I know that there is 
already some literature on the relation of CR and Marx, and FS and Marx 
as well. I also look at the texts on Marx you mentioned in your text, 
Howard, thanks again.

And, Phil, I?m currently studying at the University of Vienna, and I?m 
starting now in March my "Magisterarbeit" ( similar to master?s thesis). 
I hope I can finish by the end of summer (this is at least my plan). 
Let?s see.

best wishes,
e

Philip Anthony O'Hanlon schrieb:
> Hi
>
> Ruth says: "Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way."
>
> This is a complex issues and not easily established in my view.  That Adorno has no explicit theory of causality, it seems true, but that does not mean he isn't a sort of realist.  I think we would need to specify in exactly what sense Adorno does not get beyond Kant, because I'm sometimes not sure that even RB decisively gets beyond Kant.  RB owes a lot more to Kant than is often given credit for.  Kant of course never denied the independently real.  He believed in noumena and thought we had to be able to think it, which could be read as a sort of minimal philosophical ontology of the type RB argues for in RTS.  Moreover, Erik Watkins "Kant and the metaphysics of causality" even argues that Kant HAD a causal powers based ontology.  More work needs to be done on CR vs Adorno.  Adorno lends himself so easily to being misread because of the notorious style.
>
> On Adorno and elitism, this charge has become so common that has become banal, and it obstructs appreciation of the profound insights Adorno has to offer.
>
> The clearest piece Adorno wrote which is less bogged down in the German tradition than most of his texts is the little known "The Actuality of Philosophy", Telos 1977.
>
> Echna - which university are you at?
>
> phil.
>
>
>
> ________________________________________
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
> Sent: 04 February 2009 01:21
> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 6
>
> Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
>         critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>
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>         http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
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> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>    1. Re: Open letter to Mark Johnson   onpathologicalconversati...
>       (Mervyn Hartwig)
>    2. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
>       (Ruth Groff)
>    3. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt school (echna)
>    4. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
>       (Marcus Salisbury)
>    5. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
>       (Ruth Groff)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 19:39:27 -0000
> From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson
>         onpathologicalconversati...
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>         <mailman.7061.1233710490.2556.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="iso-8859-1"
>
>  I agree, let's cool it.
>
> For what it's worth, Mark's posts didn't get on my goat and I agree with
> Sebastian that the points he is raising are important and should be
> discussed. Equally, I can understand that Hans D. took them the way he did
> and don't really find his response over the top. Also, I think the list is
> functioning pretty well. It provides very useful info re CR happenings,
> people sometimes use it to get helpful info and feedback re their specific
> projects, and now and again there is an interesting thread of discussion.
> What more could a busy person want? There seems little point in harking back
> to 'the good old days'. History has moved on, and critical realism with it
> (if it hasn't, it's in a time warp). For good or ill, the dialectical and
> spiritual turns are a reality, and we have to make of them what we can.
> Nobody is wanting to say that work within the framework of first-wave
> critical realism is not crucially important and indeed indispensable for the
> health of the whole (which doesn't of course mean that there should not be
> well informed criticism flowing both ways -- to the contrary).
>
> Mervyn
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Par
> Engholm
> Sent: 03 February 2009 07:29
> To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson
> onpathologicalconversati...
>
> Hi all,
> Please just calm down a bit all of you. I don't find either Mark's or Hans'
> arguments that offensive on their own, but the brandishing of other people's
> posts as offensive, intimidating etc is a very effective way of closing any
> discussion. This list is in my opinion a very open and quite friendly forum
> for discussions on quite a wide range of issues.
> Take a deep breath and try to find something that might cut the mustard or
> in any other way might change the way we talk or think or act, which of
> course are various ways of 'acting' in a more general sense. That might
> include arguing against other people on the list and finding their arguments
> wanting in some respect, but that's part of any (intellectual) discussion.
> Cheers,
> P?r
>
> *******************************************************
> Par Engholm
> Uppsala University
> Department of Sociology
> http://www.soc.uu.se/kontaktpers.php?id=62
> Mobile: +46 709783546
>
> Journal of Critical Realism
> http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/index
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 14:30:07 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>         frankfurt       school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>         <6ad241360902031230i39c76947s722566e0a4f6b8af at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Echna,
>
> This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
> anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR a few
> years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this is
> short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.  Critical
> realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal powers),
> which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
> Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
> There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications of
> this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge 2004,
> CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be of some
> interest.
>
> Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
>
> Warmly,
> Ruth
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>
>   
>> Hi all,
>>
>> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
>> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
>> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
>> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
>> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
>> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
>> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
>> Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
>> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz
>> von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
>> of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
>> with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
>> positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the
>> "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
>> think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
>> arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
>> what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
>> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
>> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
>> to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
>> difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
>> me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
>> appreciated.
>>
>> best regards,
>> e
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>
>>     
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2009 22:27:14 +0100
> From: echna <echna at gmx.net>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>         frankfurt school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <4988B6B2.1030305 at gmx.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
>
> Hi Ruth,
>
> thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on
> Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t find
> it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only text  I
> get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review Symposium: Taking
> relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of your book.
> Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name
> it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the
> reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno for
> example in his negative dialectic is talking about the preponderance of
> the object (his whole dialectical approach could also be compared to
> Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however, way beyond my scope as
> I have huge troubles understanding it, especially as a non native). This
> is something that might be interpreted as some kind of secreted
> ontology, which has to be made explicit. What is making the whole thing
> way more difficult and challenging is that the Frankfurt School and CR
> are coming from different "epsitemic communities" and notably texts of
> Adorno et al. have to be cut off  their embedding in the tradition of
> german phiosophy (as they have no straightforward text in which their
> principles are laid down). The question is this sense is also, whether
> this is possible without harming or destroying the inner core of the
> theroy. However, as I already stated I?m not quite sure on the whole
> issue yet. Maybe there is also a difference between Adorno and
> Horkheimer , as Horkheimer wrote his pieces on positivism and
> epistemology in general (for example the famous text "traditional and
> critical theory") in the 30s, whereas Adorno was especially engaged with
> epistemic (and ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these are just
> some preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I will presumably
> start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be glad about more
> "talk" :-) .
>
> best wishes,
> e
> Ruth Groff schrieb:
>   
>> Hi Echna,
>>
>> This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
>> anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR a few
>> years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this is
>> short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.  Critical
>> realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal powers),
>> which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
>> Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
>> There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications of
>> this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge 2004,
>> CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be of some
>> interest.
>>
>> Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
>>
>> Warmly,
>> Ruth
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>>
>>
>>     
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
>>> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
>>> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
>>> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
>>> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
>>> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
>>> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
>>> Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
>>> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz
>>> von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
>>> of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
>>> with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
>>> positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the
>>> "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
>>> think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
>>> arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
>>> what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
>>> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
>>> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
>>> to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
>>> difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
>>> me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
>>> appreciated.
>>>
>>> best regards,
>>> e
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>>
>>>
>>>       
>> _______________________________________________
>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>
>>
>>     
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 17:05:12 -0800 (PST)
> From: Marcus Salisbury <battaday at yahoo.com.au>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>         frankfurt       school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <312028.19433.qm at web53411.mail.re2.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
>
> Echna,
>
> Marcuse's 'One-Dimensional Man' might be a useful?locus?for a comparative discussion of Frankfurt School thought and Critical Realism, given its?emphasis on the notion of the illusion of 'freedom' in contemporary consumer culture and?the need for authentic liberation from the psychological/environmental damage it causes.?
>
> The problem here (as I have found it, at any rate) is that Adorno in particular often?conducts his argument?from a fundamentally elitist viewpoint, e.g. Mahler's symphonies are automatically?good for your mental well-being and personal growth while jazz music is bad because it's always made by zombies for zombies.
>
> However, CR and the Frankfurt School both place a good deal of emphasis on economic and social processes--as embodied by consumer society and the anxieties it imposes on our psyche--as barriers to authentic liberation. Hope that's of some use...
> ?Marcus Salisbury
>
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message ----
> From: echna <echna at gmx.net>
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Sent: Wednesday, 4 February, 2009 3:49:42 AM
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and frankfurt school
>
> Hi all,
>
> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
> Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz
> von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
> of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
> with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
> positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the
> "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
> think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
> arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
> what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
> to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
> difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
> me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
> appreciated.
>
> best regards,
> e
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
>
>       Stay connected to the people that matter most with a smarter inbox. Take a look http://au.docs.yahoo.com/mail/smarterinbox
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 5
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 19:21:27 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>         frankfurt       school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>         <6ad241360902031721m43b49d0bpa3264cf65228988b at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Echna,
>
> I don't remember when Howrd's piece appeared, but if you don't have a way to
> search back JCR issues, Mervyn might be able to tell you.  Or Howard!
>
> If you are cutting into the issue via positivism, my suggestion would be a
> different from Marcus' I guess.  I'd say look at Horkheimer's early stuff in
> the collection CRITICAL THEORY.  Especially, "The Latest Attack on
> Metaphysics" and, of course, "Traditional and Critical Theory."  Adorno from
> the Positivist Dispute ...   Also, H's ECLIPSE OF REASON and sections of H
> and A's DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT.  But it sounds as though you are already
> focused on these texts.
>
> They're the basic ones to consider, though, if you want to get a handle on
> what H and A have to say about positivism.  On the cr side, Bhaskar has a
> very sophisticated analysis of the "fact-form" as an ideological phenomenon
> in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, but I would say that you
> should first really, really understand the arguments of A Realist Theory of
> Science, in order to get at what is wrong, conceptually, with positivist
> laws.  Many practicing cr social scientists and theorists have also weighed
> in on the issue, but as I say, I'd first tackle RTS head on.  For help with
> reading RTS, if you want or need it, I think Collier's 1994 book is very
> ice: CRITICAL REALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ROY BHASKAR'S PHILOSOPHY Verso).
>
> Personally, I do think that deep down an important difference between H and
> A and cr is that H and A don't q-u-i-t-e get out from under Kant, though the
> impulse is there, whereas cr points back to Aristotle.  But this may well be
> besides the point for your interests at this time.
>
> Warmly,
> Ruth
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 3:27 PM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>
>   
>> Hi Ruth,
>>
>> thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on
>> Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t find
>> it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only text  I
>> get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review Symposium: Taking
>> relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of your book.
>> Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name
>> it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the
>> reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno for
>> example in his negative dialectic is talking about the preponderance of
>> the object (his whole dialectical approach could also be compared to
>> Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however, way beyond my scope as
>> I have huge troubles understanding it, especially as a non native). This
>> is something that might be interpreted as some kind of secreted
>> ontology, which has to be made explicit. What is making the whole thing
>> way more difficult and challenging is that the Frankfurt School and CR
>> are coming from different "epsitemic communities" and notably texts of
>> Adorno et al. have to be cut off  their embedding in the tradition of
>> german phiosophy (as they have no straightforward text in which their
>> principles are laid down). The question is this sense is also, whether
>> this is possible without harming or destroying the inner core of the
>> theroy. However, as I already stated I?m not quite sure on the whole
>> issue yet. Maybe there is also a difference between Adorno and
>> Horkheimer , as Horkheimer wrote his pieces on positivism and
>> epistemology in general (for example the famous text "traditional and
>> critical theory") in the 30s, whereas Adorno was especially engaged with
>> epistemic (and ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these are just
>> some preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I will presumably
>> start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be glad about more
>> "talk" :-) .
>>
>> best wishes,
>> e
>> Ruth Groff schrieb:
>>     
>>> Hi Echna,
>>>
>>> This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
>>> anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR a
>>>       
>> few
>>     
>>> years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this is
>>> short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.
>>>       
>>  Critical
>>     
>>> realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal powers),
>>> which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
>>> Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
>>> There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications of
>>> this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge 2004,
>>> CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be of some
>>> interest.
>>>
>>> Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
>>>
>>> Warmly,
>>> Ruth
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>       
>>>> Hi all,
>>>>
>>>> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
>>>> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
>>>> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
>>>> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
>>>> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
>>>> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
>>>> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
>>>> Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
>>>> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz
>>>> von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
>>>> of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
>>>> with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
>>>> positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the
>>>> "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
>>>> think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
>>>> arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
>>>> what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
>>>> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
>>>> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
>>>> to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
>>>> difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
>>>> me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
>>>> appreciated.
>>>>
>>>> best regards,
>>>> e
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>         
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>>
>>>
>>>       
>> _______________________________________________
>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>
>>     
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 6
> ***********************************************
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>   



From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk  Wed Feb  4 03:45:01 2009
From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig)
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2009 10:45:01 -0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory
In-Reply-To: <4989469B.8080501@gmx.net>
Message-ID: <mailman.294.1233744309.2553.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>

Let me explain re the missing JCR online. When Equinox took over from Brill
as the JCR publisher, Brill did not pass v. 3, n.1 on. I then sent my only
hard copy of the issue to Equinox to be sent to India, where an e-copy was
to be made, and so far nothing has happened, although I have followed it up
several times... This was a couple of years ago. My apologies to the authors
affected. I'll try again but am not optimistic. My hunch is that my copy has
been lost. If someone has a clean copy they would be willing to part with
for this purpose please let me know.

Mervyn

General Editor
Journal of Critical Realism
 ISSN: 1476-7430 (print)
ISSN: 1572-5138 (online) 
http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR
 

-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna
Sent: 04 February 2009 07:41
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory

Hi all,

thanks again for your interesting thoughts and objections. Howard,
unfortunately that particular issue (v. 3 n.1) of JCR is not online. And as
I have huge difficulties here in Vienna to get hold of JCR (the university
library does not purchase access to it). So it would be great if you could
send me your text as a pdf (if you don?t mind and it is not to much work for
you).

In fact I thought of dealing with the Franfurt School (FS) in two different
branches. One is the critique laid down by Horkheimer already in the 30s.
Here to mention are the texts Ruth was pointing on, next to some others
Horkheimer wrote in this time on materialism and "marxist epistemology". The
other one I thought of could consists out of Adorno?s texts dealing with
positivism in the 60s, most notably the dispute on positivism. Besides the
famous "dispute", however, there are several other shorter texts of Adorno,
which I find of vast interest. For example his "dialectical prolegomena", as
he called the two texts, namely "Subject and Object" and "Marginalia to
Theory and Praxis". 
Somehow I feel tempted to have a more thorough going look on the negative
dialectic as Adorno said that "he?s putting his cards on the table"
(preface) with this book. However, due to his notorious style it is probably
a quite -too difficult- task for me (and as he is also always referring to
Hegel in this text some deeper knowledge than I have about hegelian
dialectic would also be of help).

Thanks Ruth, for pointing my attention again on RTS. I also know Collier?s
valuable introduction of it. In fact I plan to start off my description of
CR with RTS as I find its arguments indispensable to understand PON and its
further implications for social science. The crux of the matter seems to be
now for me the relation of both CR and FS to Kant. As I am not really
familiar with his writings in detail I will first of all try to get in touch
with his (lacking) theory of causality and the (in)famous "thing in itself"
(hope it?s the right term in english).

I also thought about concluding my thesis  with some arguments on Marx. 
As I agree that the principles outlined by CR and FS, despite the
differences among them, were already anticipated by Marx (even not just
practical but also theoretically reflected; for example in a lucid manner in
the manuscript M in the "Grundrisse"). I know that there is already some
literature on the relation of CR and Marx, and FS and Marx as well. I also
look at the texts on Marx you mentioned in your text, Howard, thanks again.

And, Phil, I?m currently studying at the University of Vienna, and I?m
starting now in March my "Magisterarbeit" ( similar to master?s thesis). 
I hope I can finish by the end of summer (this is at least my plan). 
Let?s see.

best wishes,
e

Philip Anthony O'Hanlon schrieb:
> Hi
>
> Ruth says: "Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in
this way."
>
> This is a complex issues and not easily established in my view.  That
Adorno has no explicit theory of causality, it seems true, but that does not
mean he isn't a sort of realist.  I think we would need to specify in
exactly what sense Adorno does not get beyond Kant, because I'm sometimes
not sure that even RB decisively gets beyond Kant.  RB owes a lot more to
Kant than is often given credit for.  Kant of course never denied the
independently real.  He believed in noumena and thought we had to be able to
think it, which could be read as a sort of minimal philosophical ontology of
the type RB argues for in RTS.  Moreover, Erik Watkins "Kant and the
metaphysics of causality" even argues that Kant HAD a causal powers based
ontology.  More work needs to be done on CR vs Adorno.  Adorno lends himself
so easily to being misread because of the notorious style.
>
> On Adorno and elitism, this charge has become so common that has become
banal, and it obstructs appreciation of the profound insights Adorno has to
offer.
>
> The clearest piece Adorno wrote which is less bogged down in the German
tradition than most of his texts is the little known "The Actuality of
Philosophy", Telos 1977.
>
> Echna - which university are you at?
>
> phil.
>
>
>
> ________________________________________
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu 
> [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of 
> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu 
> [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
> Sent: 04 February 2009 01:21
> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 6
>
> Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
>         critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
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> than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>    1. Re: Open letter to Mark Johnson   onpathologicalconversati...
>       (Mervyn Hartwig)
>    2. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
>       (Ruth Groff)
>    3. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt school (echna)
>    4. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
>       (Marcus Salisbury)
>    5. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
>       (Ruth Groff)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 19:39:27 -0000
> From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson
>         onpathologicalconversati...
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>
<mailman.7061.1233710490.2556.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="iso-8859-1"
>
>  I agree, let's cool it.
>
> For what it's worth, Mark's posts didn't get on my goat and I agree 
> with Sebastian that the points he is raising are important and should 
> be discussed. Equally, I can understand that Hans D. took them the way 
> he did and don't really find his response over the top. Also, I think 
> the list is functioning pretty well. It provides very useful info re 
> CR happenings, people sometimes use it to get helpful info and 
> feedback re their specific projects, and now and again there is an
interesting thread of discussion.
> What more could a busy person want? There seems little point in 
> harking back to 'the good old days'. History has moved on, and 
> critical realism with it (if it hasn't, it's in a time warp). For good 
> or ill, the dialectical and spiritual turns are a reality, and we have to
make of them what we can.
> Nobody is wanting to say that work within the framework of first-wave 
> critical realism is not crucially important and indeed indispensable 
> for the health of the whole (which doesn't of course mean that there 
> should not be well informed criticism flowing both ways -- to the
contrary).
>
> Mervyn
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Par 
> Engholm
> Sent: 03 February 2009 07:29
> To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson 
> onpathologicalconversati...
>
> Hi all,
> Please just calm down a bit all of you. I don't find either Mark's or
Hans'
> arguments that offensive on their own, but the brandishing of other 
> people's posts as offensive, intimidating etc is a very effective way 
> of closing any discussion. This list is in my opinion a very open and 
> quite friendly forum for discussions on quite a wide range of issues.
> Take a deep breath and try to find something that might cut the 
> mustard or in any other way might change the way we talk or think or 
> act, which of course are various ways of 'acting' in a more general 
> sense. That might include arguing against other people on the list and 
> finding their arguments wanting in some respect, but that's part of any
(intellectual) discussion.
> Cheers,
> P?r
>
> *******************************************************
> Par Engholm
> Uppsala University
> Department of Sociology
> http://www.soc.uu.se/kontaktpers.php?id=62
> Mobile: +46 709783546
>
> Journal of Critical Realism
> http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/index
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 14:30:07 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>         frankfurt       school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>         <6ad241360902031230i39c76947s722566e0a4f6b8af at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Echna,
>
> This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of 
> anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR 
> a few years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and 
> this is short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the 
> ontology.  Critical realism is a form of dispositional realism 
> (realism about causal powers), which is to say that the view is that
modality inheres in objects.
> Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
> There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications 
> of this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge 
> 2004, CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be 
> of some interest.
>
> Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
>
> Warmly,
> Ruth
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>
>   
>> Hi all,
>>
>> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of 
>> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the 
>> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also 
>> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I 
>> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment 
>> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like 
>> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? 
>> The Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the 
>> german
>> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen 
>> Relevanz von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare 
>> the premises of Critical Realism (most certainly in its 
>> "pre-dialectical" fashion) with the ones of the Frankfurt School 
>> outlined for example in the positivism dispute in german sociology 
>> (and I want to deal just with the "old" Frankfurt School not with 
>> Habermas and his fellows). In short, I think that both critical 
>> realism and frankfurt school develop similar arguments in their 
>> controversies with the positivist legacy. However, what has to be 
>> done in this case is some kind of "epistemic translation", as both 
>> theories are coming out of quite different epistemic communities, so 
>> that the constellation of the arguments seems to be more distant than 
>> it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite difficult task. Therefore 
>> I would be very happy if somebody could give me some hints of 
>> literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly appreciated.
>>
>> best regards,
>> e
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>
>>     
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2009 22:27:14 +0100
> From: echna <echna at gmx.net>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>         frankfurt school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <4988B6B2.1030305 at gmx.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
>
> Hi Ruth,
>
> thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on 
> Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t 
> find it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only 
> text  I get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review 
> Symposium: Taking relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of
your book.
> Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name 
> it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the 
> reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno 
> for example in his negative dialectic is talking about the 
> preponderance of the object (his whole dialectical approach could also 
> be compared to Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however, way 
> beyond my scope as I have huge troubles understanding it, especially 
> as a non native). This is something that might be interpreted as some 
> kind of secreted ontology, which has to be made explicit. What is 
> making the whole thing way more difficult and challenging is that the 
> Frankfurt School and CR are coming from different "epsitemic 
> communities" and notably texts of Adorno et al. have to be cut off  
> their embedding in the tradition of german phiosophy (as they have no 
> straightforward text in which their principles are laid down). The 
> question is this sense is also, whether this is possible without 
> harming or destroying the inner core of the theroy. However, as I 
> already stated I?m not quite sure on the whole issue yet. Maybe there 
> is also a difference between Adorno and Horkheimer , as Horkheimer 
> wrote his pieces on positivism and epistemology in general (for 
> example the famous text "traditional and critical theory") in the 30s, 
> whereas Adorno was especially engaged with epistemic (and 
> ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these are just some 
> preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I will presumably 
> start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be glad about more
"talk" :-) .
>
> best wishes,
> e
> Ruth Groff schrieb:
>   
>> Hi Echna,
>>
>> This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know 
>> of anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in 
>> JCR a few years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, 
>> and this is short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the 
>> ontology.  Critical realism is a form of dispositional realism 
>> (realism about causal powers), which is to say that the view is that
modality inheres in objects.
>> Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
>> There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications 
>> of this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book 
>> (Routledge 2004, CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of 
>> Knowledge) might be of some interest.
>>
>> Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
>>
>> Warmly,
>> Ruth
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>>
>>
>>     
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of 
>>> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the 
>>> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I 
>>> also did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism 
>>> but I couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the 
>>> moment writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" 
>>> (something like the master thesis), and the working title is 
>>> "Critical Methodology? The Relevance of Theory of Science for the 
>>> Social Sciences" (in the german
>>> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen 
>>> Relevanz von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare 
>>> the premises of Critical Realism (most certainly in its 
>>> "pre-dialectical" fashion) with the ones of the Frankfurt School 
>>> outlined for example in the positivism dispute in german sociology 
>>> (and I want to deal just with the "old" Frankfurt School not with 
>>> Habermas and his fellows). In short, I think that both critical 
>>> realism and frankfurt school develop similar arguments in their 
>>> controversies with the positivist legacy. However, what has to be 
>>> done in this case is some kind of "epistemic translation", as both 
>>> theories are coming out of quite different epistemic communities, so 
>>> that the constellation of the arguments seems to be more distant 
>>> than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite difficult task. 
>>> Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give me some hints 
>>> of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly appreciated.
>>>
>>> best regards,
>>> e
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>>
>>>
>>>       
>> _______________________________________________
>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>
>>
>>     
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 17:05:12 -0800 (PST)
> From: Marcus Salisbury <battaday at yahoo.com.au>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>         frankfurt       school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <312028.19433.qm at web53411.mail.re2.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
>
> Echna,
>
> Marcuse's 'One-Dimensional Man' might be a useful?locus?for a comparative
discussion of Frankfurt School thought and Critical Realism, given
its?emphasis on the notion of the illusion of 'freedom' in contemporary
consumer culture and?the need for authentic liberation from the
psychological/environmental damage it causes.?
>
> The problem here (as I have found it, at any rate) is that Adorno in
particular often?conducts his argument?from a fundamentally elitist
viewpoint, e.g. Mahler's symphonies are automatically?good for your mental
well-being and personal growth while jazz music is bad because it's always
made by zombies for zombies.
>
> However, CR and the Frankfurt School both place a good deal of emphasis on
economic and social processes--as embodied by consumer society and the
anxieties it imposes on our psyche--as barriers to authentic liberation.
Hope that's of some use...
> ?Marcus Salisbury
>
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message ----
> From: echna <echna at gmx.net>
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List 
> <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Sent: Wednesday, 4 February, 2009 3:49:42 AM
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and 
> frankfurt school
>
> Hi all,
>
> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of 
> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the 
> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also 
> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I 
> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment 
> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like 
> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? 
> The Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the 
> german
> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen 
> Relevanz von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the 
> premises of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" 
> fashion) with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in 
> the positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just 
> with the "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In 
> short, I think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop 
> similar arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. 
> However, what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic 
> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different 
> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments 
> seems to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a 
> quite difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody 
> could give me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would 
> be greatly appreciated.
>
> best regards,
> e
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
>
>       Stay connected to the people that matter most with a smarter 
> inbox. Take a look http://au.docs.yahoo.com/mail/smarterinbox
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 5
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 19:21:27 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>         frankfurt       school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>         <6ad241360902031721m43b49d0bpa3264cf65228988b at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Echna,
>
> I don't remember when Howrd's piece appeared, but if you don't have a 
> way to search back JCR issues, Mervyn might be able to tell you.  Or
Howard!
>
> If you are cutting into the issue via positivism, my suggestion would 
> be a different from Marcus' I guess.  I'd say look at Horkheimer's 
> early stuff in the collection CRITICAL THEORY.  Especially, "The 
> Latest Attack on Metaphysics" and, of course, "Traditional and Critical
Theory."  Adorno from
> the Positivist Dispute ...   Also, H's ECLIPSE OF REASON and sections of H
> and A's DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT.  But it sounds as though you are 
> already focused on these texts.
>
> They're the basic ones to consider, though, if you want to get a 
> handle on what H and A have to say about positivism.  On the cr side, 
> Bhaskar has a very sophisticated analysis of the "fact-form" as an 
> ideological phenomenon in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, 
> but I would say that you should first really, really understand the 
> arguments of A Realist Theory of Science, in order to get at what is 
> wrong, conceptually, with positivist laws.  Many practicing cr social 
> scientists and theorists have also weighed in on the issue, but as I 
> say, I'd first tackle RTS head on.  For help with reading RTS, if you 
> want or need it, I think Collier's 1994 book is very
> ice: CRITICAL REALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ROY BHASKAR'S PHILOSOPHY Verso).
>
> Personally, I do think that deep down an important difference between 
> H and A and cr is that H and A don't q-u-i-t-e get out from under 
> Kant, though the impulse is there, whereas cr points back to 
> Aristotle.  But this may well be besides the point for your interests at
this time.
>
> Warmly,
> Ruth
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 3:27 PM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>
>   
>> Hi Ruth,
>>
>> thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on 
>> Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t 
>> find it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only 
>> text  I get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review 
>> Symposium: Taking relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of
your book.
>> Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name 
>> it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the 
>> reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno 
>> for example in his negative dialectic is talking about the 
>> preponderance of the object (his whole dialectical approach could 
>> also be compared to Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however, 
>> way beyond my scope as I have huge troubles understanding it, 
>> especially as a non native). This is something that might be 
>> interpreted as some kind of secreted ontology, which has to be made 
>> explicit. What is making the whole thing way more difficult and 
>> challenging is that the Frankfurt School and CR are coming from 
>> different "epsitemic communities" and notably texts of Adorno et al. 
>> have to be cut off  their embedding in the tradition of german 
>> phiosophy (as they have no straightforward text in which their 
>> principles are laid down). The question is this sense is also, 
>> whether this is possible without harming or destroying the inner core 
>> of the theroy. However, as I already stated I?m not quite sure on the 
>> whole issue yet. Maybe there is also a difference between Adorno and 
>> Horkheimer , as Horkheimer wrote his pieces on positivism and 
>> epistemology in general (for example the famous text "traditional and 
>> critical theory") in the 30s, whereas Adorno was especially engaged 
>> with epistemic (and ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these 
>> are just some preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I 
>> will presumably start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be
glad about more "talk" :-) .
>>
>> best wishes,
>> e
>> Ruth Groff schrieb:
>>     
>>> Hi Echna,
>>>
>>> This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know 
>>> of anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno 
>>> in JCR a
>>>       
>> few
>>     
>>> years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this 
>>> is short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.
>>>       
>>  Critical
>>     
>>> realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal 
>>> powers), which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in
objects.
>>> Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
>>> There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications 
>>> of this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book 
>>> (Routledge 2004, CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of 
>>> Knowledge) might be of some interest.
>>>
>>> Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
>>>
>>> Warmly,
>>> Ruth
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>       
>>>> Hi all,
>>>>
>>>> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of 
>>>> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the 
>>>> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I 
>>>> also did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism 
>>>> but I couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the 
>>>> moment writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" 
>>>> (something like the master thesis), and the working title is 
>>>> "Critical Methodology? The Relevance of Theory of Science for the 
>>>> Social Sciences" (in the german
>>>> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen 
>>>> Relevanz von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare 
>>>> the premises of Critical Realism (most certainly in its 
>>>> "pre-dialectical" fashion) with the ones of the Frankfurt School 
>>>> outlined for example in the positivism dispute in german sociology 
>>>> (and I want to deal just with the "old" Frankfurt School not with 
>>>> Habermas and his fellows). In short, I think that both critical 
>>>> realism and frankfurt school develop similar arguments in their 
>>>> controversies with the positivist legacy. However, what has to be 
>>>> done in this case is some kind of "epistemic translation", as both 
>>>> theories are coming out of quite different epistemic communities, 
>>>> so that the constellation of the arguments seems to be more distant 
>>>> than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite difficult task. 
>>>> Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give me some 
>>>> hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
appreciated.
>>>>
>>>> best regards,
>>>> e
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>         
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>>
>>>
>>>       
>> _______________________________________________
>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>
>>     
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 6
> ***********************************************
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>   


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From wscr_wp at raggedclaws.com  Wed Feb  4 06:43:06 2009
From: wscr_wp at raggedclaws.com (WSCR)
Date: Wed, 04 Feb 2009 07:43:06 -0600
Subject: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory
In-Reply-To: <7alu89$3dg6u5@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu>
References: <7alu89$3dg6u5@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu>
Message-ID: <49899B6A.2040501@raggedclaws.com>

Mervyn Hartwig wrote:
 > Let me explain re the missing JCR online. When
 > Equinox took over from Brill as the JCR publisher,
 > Brill did not pass v. 3, n.1 on. I then sent my only
 > hard copy of the issue to Equinox to be sent to
 > India, where an e-copy was to be made, and so far
 > nothing has happened, although I have followed it up
 > several times... This was a couple of years ago. My
 > apologies to the authors affected. I'll try again but
 > am not optimistic. My hunch is that my copy has
 > been lost. If someone has a clean copy they would be
 > willing to part with for this purpose please let me
 > know.


http://www.raggedclaws.com/criticalrealism/index.php?sitesig=WSCR&page=WSCR_041_JCR_1998-2003&subpage=WSCR_005_Alethia_v3n1

or

http://tinyurl.com/c5rw3l




From wscr_wp at raggedclaws.com  Wed Feb  4 07:21:32 2009
From: wscr_wp at raggedclaws.com (WSCR)
Date: Wed, 04 Feb 2009 08:21:32 -0600
Subject: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory
In-Reply-To: <49899B6A.2040501@raggedclaws.com>
References: <7alu89$3dg6u5@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu>
	<49899B6A.2040501@raggedclaws.com>
Message-ID: <4989A46C.1060409@raggedclaws.com>

WSCR wrote:
> Mervyn Hartwig wrote:
>  > Let me explain re the missing JCR online. When
>  > Equinox took over from Brill as the JCR publisher,
>  > Brill did not pass v. 3, n.1 on. I then sent my only
>  > hard copy of the issue to Equinox to be sent to
>  > India, where an e-copy was to be made, and so far
>  > nothing has happened, although I have followed it up
>  > several times... This was a couple of years ago. My
>  > apologies to the authors affected. I'll try again but
>  > am not optimistic. My hunch is that my copy has
>  > been lost. If someone has a clean copy they would be
>  > willing to part with for this purpose please let me
>  > know.
> 
> 
> http://www.raggedclaws.com/criticalrealism/index.php?sitesig=WSCR&page=WSCR_041_JCR_1998-2003&subpage=WSCR_005_Alethia_v3n1
> 
> or
> 
> http://tinyurl.com/c5rw3l
> 

Oops, that's not the one you want. Sorry. Forgot that 
the numbering of the IACR's journal started over again 
in 2002. But it might be useful to know that all the 
issues of Alethia that were offered for free on the JCR 
site a few years back are now available for free on the 
WSCR site (along with links to the JCR page at 
Equinox). Enjoy!


From rgroff at slu.edu  Wed Feb  4 09:05:21 2009
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2009 10:05:21 -0600
Subject: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory
In-Reply-To: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C04@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
References: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C04@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <6ad241360902040805y1654304pf3812e724ae62c58@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Phil!

I didn't mean to say that Adorno is attached to Kant in some easy way.  Not
at all.  In ND he suggests that causality needs to somehow be conceived of
as grounded in objects.  But in the Lectures on Kant's Critique of Pure
Reason he talks a lot, actually, about the issue and I think you can see the
attachment still, and the reasons for it.  (I really recommend several of
those Lectures books; the language is crystal clear.  There is no way you'd
know it was Adorno, stylistically.)

I know about Watkins, have his book, though I haven't read it yet.
Meanwhile, I make some of the argument about noumena and philosophy and
Kant/cr that you allude to in that old chapter of mine on Kant that I
mentioned, and I do think that Kant is a realist about phenomenal objects.
But I can't imagine how Watkins can argue that he is a naturalist about
causality, which is what critical realists are.  ("Naturalist" - for people
who don't happen to know the philosophy jargon, just means that it is a
thing that actually inheres, realistically, in objects, not that such
objects can't be social ones.)  I'm teaching bits of the 1st Critique now,
as part of a larger class on Kant, and so have been re-immersed in him.  I
do want to see what Watkins says, but as I say I simply can't imagine how he
is going to get Kant out of saying that causality is a category of the
understanding, a synthetic operation performed by reason.  I agree that you
can think that reason pre-orders our experience in the way that Kant says
and ALSO say that phenomenal objects have dispositional properties -- and
even, that while it is nice that "causal order" is a category of the
understanding, it's not the real definition of causality, which, rather, is
something like "the display of dispositional properties."  But Kant himself
insists that that move is bogus, so I don't see how he can be read as having
endorsed it.  But as I say, I haven't actually read Watkins on this yet.

I will be writing on this some, in my current book project, so will have to
read EW soon!.

I'd be curious to hear more thoughts.

r.




On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 10:55 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:

> Hi
>
> Ruth says: "Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in
> this way."
>
> This is a complex issues and not easily established in my view.  That
> Adorno has no explicit theory of causality, it seems true, but that does not
> mean he isn't a sort of realist.  I think we would need to specify in
> exactly what sense Adorno does not get beyond Kant, because I'm sometimes
> not sure that even RB decisively gets beyond Kant.  RB owes a lot more to
> Kant than is often given credit for.  Kant of course never denied the
> independently real.  He believed in noumena and thought we had to be able to
> think it, which could be read as a sort of minimal philosophical ontology of
> the type RB argues for in RTS.  Moreover, Erik Watkins "Kant and the
> metaphysics of causality" even argues that Kant HAD a causal powers based
> ontology.  More work needs to be done on CR vs Adorno.  Adorno lends himself
> so easily to being misread because of the notorious style.
>
> On Adorno and elitism, this charge has become so common that has become
> banal, and it obstructs appreciation of the profound insights Adorno has to
> offer.
>
> The clearest piece Adorno wrote which is less bogged down in the German
> tradition than most of his texts is the little known "The Actuality of
> Philosophy", Telos 1977.
>
> Echna - which university are you at?
>
> phil.
>
>
>
> ________________________________________
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
> Sent: 04 February 2009 01:21
> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 6
>
> Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
>        critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>        http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
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> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>   1. Re: Open letter to Mark Johnson   onpathologicalconversati...
>      (Mervyn Hartwig)
>   2. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
>      (Ruth Groff)
>   3. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt school (echna)
>   4. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
>      (Marcus Salisbury)
>   5. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
>      (Ruth Groff)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 19:39:27 -0000
> From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson
>        onpathologicalconversati...
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <mailman.7061.1233710490.2556.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="iso-8859-1"
>
>  I agree, let's cool it.
>
> For what it's worth, Mark's posts didn't get on my goat and I agree with
> Sebastian that the points he is raising are important and should be
> discussed. Equally, I can understand that Hans D. took them the way he did
> and don't really find his response over the top. Also, I think the list is
> functioning pretty well. It provides very useful info re CR happenings,
> people sometimes use it to get helpful info and feedback re their specific
> projects, and now and again there is an interesting thread of discussion.
> What more could a busy person want? There seems little point in harking
> back
> to 'the good old days'. History has moved on, and critical realism with it
> (if it hasn't, it's in a time warp). For good or ill, the dialectical and
> spiritual turns are a reality, and we have to make of them what we can.
> Nobody is wanting to say that work within the framework of first-wave
> critical realism is not crucially important and indeed indispensable for
> the
> health of the whole (which doesn't of course mean that there should not be
> well informed criticism flowing both ways -- to the contrary).
>
> Mervyn
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Par
> Engholm
> Sent: 03 February 2009 07:29
> To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson
> onpathologicalconversati...
>
> Hi all,
> Please just calm down a bit all of you. I don't find either Mark's or Hans'
> arguments that offensive on their own, but the brandishing of other
> people's
> posts as offensive, intimidating etc is a very effective way of closing any
> discussion. This list is in my opinion a very open and quite friendly forum
> for discussions on quite a wide range of issues.
> Take a deep breath and try to find something that might cut the mustard or
> in any other way might change the way we talk or think or act, which of
> course are various ways of 'acting' in a more general sense. That might
> include arguing against other people on the list and finding their
> arguments
> wanting in some respect, but that's part of any (intellectual) discussion.
> Cheers,
> P?r
>
> *******************************************************
> Par Engholm
> Uppsala University
> Department of Sociology
> http://www.soc.uu.se/kontaktpers.php?id=62
> Mobile: +46 709783546
>
> Journal of Critical Realism
> http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/index
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 14:30:07 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>        frankfurt       school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <6ad241360902031230i39c76947s722566e0a4f6b8af at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Echna,
>
> This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
> anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR a
> few
> years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this is
> short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.  Critical
> realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal powers),
> which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
> Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
> There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications of
> this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge 2004,
> CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be of some
> interest.
>
> Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
>
> Warmly,
> Ruth
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>
> > Hi all,
> >
> > I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> > critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> > Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
> > did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> > couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> > writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
> > the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
> > Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
> > original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz
> > von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
> > of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
> > with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
> > positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the
> > "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
> > think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
> > arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
> > what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> > translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> > epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
> > to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
> > difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
> > me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
> > appreciated.
> >
> > best regards,
> > e
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2009 22:27:14 +0100
> From: echna <echna at gmx.net>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>        frankfurt school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <4988B6B2.1030305 at gmx.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
>
> Hi Ruth,
>
> thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on
> Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t find
> it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only text  I
> get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review Symposium: Taking
> relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of your book.
> Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name
> it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the
> reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno for
> example in his negative dialectic is talking about the preponderance of
> the object (his whole dialectical approach could also be compared to
> Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however, way beyond my scope as
> I have huge troubles understanding it, especially as a non native). This
> is something that might be interpreted as some kind of secreted
> ontology, which has to be made explicit. What is making the whole thing
> way more difficult and challenging is that the Frankfurt School and CR
> are coming from different "epsitemic communities" and notably texts of
> Adorno et al. have to be cut off  their embedding in the tradition of
> german phiosophy (as they have no straightforward text in which their
> principles are laid down). The question is this sense is also, whether
> this is possible without harming or destroying the inner core of the
> theroy. However, as I already stated I?m not quite sure on the whole
> issue yet. Maybe there is also a difference between Adorno and
> Horkheimer , as Horkheimer wrote his pieces on positivism and
> epistemology in general (for example the famous text "traditional and
> critical theory") in the 30s, whereas Adorno was especially engaged with
> epistemic (and ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these are just
> some preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I will presumably
> start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be glad about more
> "talk" :-) .
>
> best wishes,
> e
> Ruth Groff schrieb:
> > Hi Echna,
> >
> > This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
> > anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR a
> few
> > years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this is
> > short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.
>  Critical
> > realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal powers),
> > which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
> > Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
> > There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications of
> > this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge 2004,
> > CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be of some
> > interest.
> >
> > Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
> >
> > Warmly,
> > Ruth
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
> >
> >
> >> Hi all,
> >>
> >> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> >> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> >> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
> >> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> >> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> >> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
> >> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
> >> Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
> >> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz
> >> von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
> >> of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
> >> with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
> >> positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the
> >> "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
> >> think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
> >> arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
> >> what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> >> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> >> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
> >> to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
> >> difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
> >> me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
> >> appreciated.
> >>
> >> best regards,
> >> e
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Critical-Realism mailing list
> >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >>
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 17:05:12 -0800 (PST)
> From: Marcus Salisbury <battaday at yahoo.com.au>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>        frankfurt       school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <312028.19433.qm at web53411.mail.re2.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
>
> Echna,
>
> Marcuse's 'One-Dimensional Man' might be a useful?locus?for a comparative
> discussion of Frankfurt School thought and Critical Realism, given
> its?emphasis on the notion of the illusion of 'freedom' in contemporary
> consumer culture and?the need for authentic liberation from the
> psychological/environmental damage it causes.?
>
> The problem here (as I have found it, at any rate) is that Adorno in
> particular often?conducts his argument?from a fundamentally elitist
> viewpoint, e.g. Mahler's symphonies are automatically?good for your mental
> well-being and personal growth while jazz music is bad because it's always
> made by zombies for zombies.
>
> However, CR and the Frankfurt School both place a good deal of emphasis on
> economic and social processes--as embodied by consumer society and the
> anxieties it imposes on our psyche--as barriers to authentic liberation.
> Hope that's of some use...
> ?Marcus Salisbury
>
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message ----
> From: echna <echna at gmx.net>
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List <
> critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Sent: Wednesday, 4 February, 2009 3:49:42 AM
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and frankfurt
> school
>
> Hi all,
>
> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
> Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz
> von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
> of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
> with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
> positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the
> "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
> think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
> arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
> what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
> to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
> difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
> me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
> appreciated.
>
> best regards,
> e
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
>
>      Stay connected to the people that matter most with a smarter inbox.
> Take a look http://au.docs.yahoo.com/mail/smarterinbox
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 5
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 19:21:27 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>        frankfurt       school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <6ad241360902031721m43b49d0bpa3264cf65228988b at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Echna,
>
> I don't remember when Howrd's piece appeared, but if you don't have a way
> to
> search back JCR issues, Mervyn might be able to tell you.  Or Howard!
>
> If you are cutting into the issue via positivism, my suggestion would be a
> different from Marcus' I guess.  I'd say look at Horkheimer's early stuff
> in
> the collection CRITICAL THEORY.  Especially, "The Latest Attack on
> Metaphysics" and, of course, "Traditional and Critical Theory."  Adorno
> from
> the Positivist Dispute ...   Also, H's ECLIPSE OF REASON and sections of H
> and A's DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT.  But it sounds as though you are
> already
> focused on these texts.
>
> They're the basic ones to consider, though, if you want to get a handle on
> what H and A have to say about positivism.  On the cr side, Bhaskar has a
> very sophisticated analysis of the "fact-form" as an ideological phenomenon
> in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, but I would say that you
> should first really, really understand the arguments of A Realist Theory of
> Science, in order to get at what is wrong, conceptually, with positivist
> laws.  Many practicing cr social scientists and theorists have also weighed
> in on the issue, but as I say, I'd first tackle RTS head on.  For help with
> reading RTS, if you want or need it, I think Collier's 1994 book is very
> ice: CRITICAL REALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ROY BHASKAR'S PHILOSOPHY Verso).
>
> Personally, I do think that deep down an important difference between H and
> A and cr is that H and A don't q-u-i-t-e get out from under Kant, though
> the
> impulse is there, whereas cr points back to Aristotle.  But this may well
> be
> besides the point for your interests at this time.
>
> Warmly,
> Ruth
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 3:27 PM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>
> > Hi Ruth,
> >
> > thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on
> > Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t find
> > it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only text  I
> > get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review Symposium: Taking
> > relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of your book.
> > Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name
> > it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the
> > reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno for
> > example in his negative dialectic is talking about the preponderance of
> > the object (his whole dialectical approach could also be compared to
> > Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however, way beyond my scope as
> > I have huge troubles understanding it, especially as a non native). This
> > is something that might be interpreted as some kind of secreted
> > ontology, which has to be made explicit. What is making the whole thing
> > way more difficult and challenging is that the Frankfurt School and CR
> > are coming from different "epsitemic communities" and notably texts of
> > Adorno et al. have to be cut off  their embedding in the tradition of
> > german phiosophy (as they have no straightforward text in which their
> > principles are laid down). The question is this sense is also, whether
> > this is possible without harming or destroying the inner core of the
> > theroy. However, as I already stated I?m not quite sure on the whole
> > issue yet. Maybe there is also a difference between Adorno and
> > Horkheimer , as Horkheimer wrote his pieces on positivism and
> > epistemology in general (for example the famous text "traditional and
> > critical theory") in the 30s, whereas Adorno was especially engaged with
> > epistemic (and ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these are just
> > some preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I will presumably
> > start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be glad about more
> > "talk" :-) .
> >
> > best wishes,
> > e
> > Ruth Groff schrieb:
> > > Hi Echna,
> > >
> > > This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
> > > anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR
> a
> > few
> > > years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this is
> > > short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.
> >  Critical
> > > realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal
> powers),
> > > which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
> > > Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this
> way.
> > > There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications of
> > > this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge
> 2004,
> > > CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be of some
> > > interest.
> > >
> > > Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
> > >
> > > Warmly,
> > > Ruth
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > >> Hi all,
> > >>
> > >> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> > >> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> > >> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
> > >> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> > >> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> > >> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
> > >> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology?
> The
> > >> Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
> > >> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen
> Relevanz
> > >> von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
> > >> of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
> > >> with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
> > >> positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with
> the
> > >> "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
> > >> think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
> > >> arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
> > >> what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> > >> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> > >> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments
> seems
> > >> to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
> > >> difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
> > >> me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
> > >> appreciated.
> > >>
> > >> best regards,
> > >> e
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> _______________________________________________
> > >> Critical-Realism mailing list
> > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >>
> > >>
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 6
> ***********************************************
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>

From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk  Wed Feb  4 09:53:26 2009
From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2009 16:53:26 +0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Kant and causality
Message-ID: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C0A@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>

Hi Ruth

You know, after reading Kant for a bit I've come to the conclusion that there is not one Kant but several.  I should confess that I have not read the Watkins book myself either, but I attended a lecture where his theses were layed out.  I can't recall the precise argumentative procedure and am meaning to read the book as soon as poss.  But I know that Watkins makes a good deal of Kant's so-called pre-critical ideas.  We know Kant is supposed to have had a critical turn right, but Watkins argues that pre-critical themes are maintained throughout his works, and even the later ones.  There is for example the idea of a transcendental object that crops up every so often, and which seems do have more of a role than just negative or limit concept.  Watkins focuses on the Second Analogy, rather than the Deduction.

On the other hand, to push the phenomenalist line a little, of course, Kant says that causality is a concept of the understanding; but it surely must be for CR too.  It's just that CR claims that it is not only a concept of the understanding but one that corresponds in some way to the way the world *really* is.  Both Kant and CR have the category, Bhaskar tries to deduce its validity (or transcendental reality) on the basis of contingent facts about experience, and Kant tries to do the same.  Kant does not claim that the category is not also valid for objects in themselves; he's just more modestly agnostic about this point - maybe it does apply to noumena, maybe it doesn't.  What we know is that we cannot do without it as long as experience takes the form that it does for us.  A Kantian pragmatist might ask why do we need any more than this?  I'm not a Kantian pragmatist by the way.

I have the Adorno lectures and am actually reading them as I write.  I'll see what I think when I'm done.

Thanks
Phil





________________________________________
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
Sent: 04 February 2009 16:05
To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 10

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Today's Topics:

   1. Re: CR and critical theory (WSCR)
   2. Re: CR and critical theory (WSCR)
   3. Re: CR and critical theory (Ruth Groff)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Wed, 04 Feb 2009 07:43:06 -0600
From: WSCR <wscr_wp at raggedclaws.com>
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID: <49899B6A.2040501 at raggedclaws.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed

Mervyn Hartwig wrote:
 > Let me explain re the missing JCR online. When
 > Equinox took over from Brill as the JCR publisher,
 > Brill did not pass v. 3, n.1 on. I then sent my only
 > hard copy of the issue to Equinox to be sent to
 > India, where an e-copy was to be made, and so far
 > nothing has happened, although I have followed it up
 > several times... This was a couple of years ago. My
 > apologies to the authors affected. I'll try again but
 > am not optimistic. My hunch is that my copy has
 > been lost. If someone has a clean copy they would be
 > willing to part with for this purpose please let me
 > know.


http://www.raggedclaws.com/criticalrealism/index.php?sitesig=WSCR&page=WSCR_041_JCR_1998-2003&subpage=WSCR_005_Alethia_v3n1

or

http://tinyurl.com/c5rw3l





------------------------------

Message: 2
Date: Wed, 04 Feb 2009 08:21:32 -0600
From: WSCR <wscr_wp at raggedclaws.com>
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID: <4989A46C.1060409 at raggedclaws.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed

WSCR wrote:
> Mervyn Hartwig wrote:
>  > Let me explain re the missing JCR online. When
>  > Equinox took over from Brill as the JCR publisher,
>  > Brill did not pass v. 3, n.1 on. I then sent my only
>  > hard copy of the issue to Equinox to be sent to
>  > India, where an e-copy was to be made, and so far
>  > nothing has happened, although I have followed it up
>  > several times... This was a couple of years ago. My
>  > apologies to the authors affected. I'll try again but
>  > am not optimistic. My hunch is that my copy has
>  > been lost. If someone has a clean copy they would be
>  > willing to part with for this purpose please let me
>  > know.
>
>
> http://www.raggedclaws.com/criticalrealism/index.php?sitesig=WSCR&page=WSCR_041_JCR_1998-2003&subpage=WSCR_005_Alethia_v3n1
>
> or
>
> http://tinyurl.com/c5rw3l
>

Oops, that's not the one you want. Sorry. Forgot that
the numbering of the IACR's journal started over again
in 2002. But it might be useful to know that all the
issues of Alethia that were offered for free on the JCR
site a few years back are now available for free on the
WSCR site (along with links to the JCR page at
Equinox). Enjoy!



------------------------------

Message: 3
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2009 10:05:21 -0600
From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID:
        <6ad241360902040805y1654304pf3812e724ae62c58 at mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Hi Phil!

I didn't mean to say that Adorno is attached to Kant in some easy way.  Not
at all.  In ND he suggests that causality needs to somehow be conceived of
as grounded in objects.  But in the Lectures on Kant's Critique of Pure
Reason he talks a lot, actually, about the issue and I think you can see the
attachment still, and the reasons for it.  (I really recommend several of
those Lectures books; the language is crystal clear.  There is no way you'd
know it was Adorno, stylistically.)

I know about Watkins, have his book, though I haven't read it yet.
Meanwhile, I make some of the argument about noumena and philosophy and
Kant/cr that you allude to in that old chapter of mine on Kant that I
mentioned, and I do think that Kant is a realist about phenomenal objects.
But I can't imagine how Watkins can argue that he is a naturalist about
causality, which is what critical realists are.  ("Naturalist" - for people
who don't happen to know the philosophy jargon, just means that it is a
thing that actually inheres, realistically, in objects, not that such
objects can't be social ones.)  I'm teaching bits of the 1st Critique now,
as part of a larger class on Kant, and so have been re-immersed in him.  I
do want to see what Watkins says, but as I say I simply can't imagine how he
is going to get Kant out of saying that causality is a category of the
understanding, a synthetic operation performed by reason.  I agree that you
can think that reason pre-orders our experience in the way that Kant says
and ALSO say that phenomenal objects have dispositional properties -- and
even, that while it is nice that "causal order" is a category of the
understanding, it's not the real definition of causality, which, rather, is
something like "the display of dispositional properties."  But Kant himself
insists that that move is bogus, so I don't see how he can be read as having
endorsed it.  But as I say, I haven't actually read Watkins on this yet.

I will be writing on this some, in my current book project, so will have to
read EW soon!.

I'd be curious to hear more thoughts.

r.




On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 10:55 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:

> Hi
>
> Ruth says: "Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in
> this way."
>
> This is a complex issues and not easily established in my view.  That
> Adorno has no explicit theory of causality, it seems true, but that does not
> mean he isn't a sort of realist.  I think we would need to specify in
> exactly what sense Adorno does not get beyond Kant, because I'm sometimes
> not sure that even RB decisively gets beyond Kant.  RB owes a lot more to
> Kant than is often given credit for.  Kant of course never denied the
> independently real.  He believed in noumena and thought we had to be able to
> think it, which could be read as a sort of minimal philosophical ontology of
> the type RB argues for in RTS.  Moreover, Erik Watkins "Kant and the
> metaphysics of causality" even argues that Kant HAD a causal powers based
> ontology.  More work needs to be done on CR vs Adorno.  Adorno lends himself
> so easily to being misread because of the notorious style.
>
> On Adorno and elitism, this charge has become so common that has become
> banal, and it obstructs appreciation of the profound insights Adorno has to
> offer.
>
> The clearest piece Adorno wrote which is less bogged down in the German
> tradition than most of his texts is the little known "The Actuality of
> Philosophy", Telos 1977.
>
> Echna - which university are you at?
>
> phil.
>
>
>
> ________________________________________
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
> Sent: 04 February 2009 01:21
> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 6
>
> Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
>        critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
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> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
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> than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>   1. Re: Open letter to Mark Johnson   onpathologicalconversati...
>      (Mervyn Hartwig)
>   2. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
>      (Ruth Groff)
>   3. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt school (echna)
>   4. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
>      (Marcus Salisbury)
>   5. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
>      (Ruth Groff)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 19:39:27 -0000
> From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson
>        onpathologicalconversati...
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <mailman.7061.1233710490.2556.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="iso-8859-1"
>
>  I agree, let's cool it.
>
> For what it's worth, Mark's posts didn't get on my goat and I agree with
> Sebastian that the points he is raising are important and should be
> discussed. Equally, I can understand that Hans D. took them the way he did
> and don't really find his response over the top. Also, I think the list is
> functioning pretty well. It provides very useful info re CR happenings,
> people sometimes use it to get helpful info and feedback re their specific
> projects, and now and again there is an interesting thread of discussion.
> What more could a busy person want? There seems little point in harking
> back
> to 'the good old days'. History has moved on, and critical realism with it
> (if it hasn't, it's in a time warp). For good or ill, the dialectical and
> spiritual turns are a reality, and we have to make of them what we can.
> Nobody is wanting to say that work within the framework of first-wave
> critical realism is not crucially important and indeed indispensable for
> the
> health of the whole (which doesn't of course mean that there should not be
> well informed criticism flowing both ways -- to the contrary).
>
> Mervyn
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Par
> Engholm
> Sent: 03 February 2009 07:29
> To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson
> onpathologicalconversati...
>
> Hi all,
> Please just calm down a bit all of you. I don't find either Mark's or Hans'
> arguments that offensive on their own, but the brandishing of other
> people's
> posts as offensive, intimidating etc is a very effective way of closing any
> discussion. This list is in my opinion a very open and quite friendly forum
> for discussions on quite a wide range of issues.
> Take a deep breath and try to find something that might cut the mustard or
> in any other way might change the way we talk or think or act, which of
> course are various ways of 'acting' in a more general sense. That might
> include arguing against other people on the list and finding their
> arguments
> wanting in some respect, but that's part of any (intellectual) discussion.
> Cheers,
> P?r
>
> *******************************************************
> Par Engholm
> Uppsala University
> Department of Sociology
> http://www.soc.uu.se/kontaktpers.php?id=62
> Mobile: +46 709783546
>
> Journal of Critical Realism
> http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/index
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 14:30:07 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>        frankfurt       school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <6ad241360902031230i39c76947s722566e0a4f6b8af at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Echna,
>
> This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
> anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR a
> few
> years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this is
> short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.  Critical
> realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal powers),
> which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
> Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
> There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications of
> this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge 2004,
> CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be of some
> interest.
>
> Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
>
> Warmly,
> Ruth
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>
> > Hi all,
> >
> > I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> > critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> > Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
> > did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> > couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> > writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
> > the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
> > Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
> > original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz
> > von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
> > of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
> > with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
> > positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the
> > "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
> > think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
> > arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
> > what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> > translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> > epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
> > to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
> > difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
> > me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
> > appreciated.
> >
> > best regards,
> > e
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2009 22:27:14 +0100
> From: echna <echna at gmx.net>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>        frankfurt school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <4988B6B2.1030305 at gmx.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
>
> Hi Ruth,
>
> thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on
> Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t find
> it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only text  I
> get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review Symposium: Taking
> relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of your book.
> Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name
> it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the
> reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno for
> example in his negative dialectic is talking about the preponderance of
> the object (his whole dialectical approach could also be compared to
> Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however, way beyond my scope as
> I have huge troubles understanding it, especially as a non native). This
> is something that might be interpreted as some kind of secreted
> ontology, which has to be made explicit. What is making the whole thing
> way more difficult and challenging is that the Frankfurt School and CR
> are coming from different "epsitemic communities" and notably texts of
> Adorno et al. have to be cut off  their embedding in the tradition of
> german phiosophy (as they have no straightforward text in which their
> principles are laid down). The question is this sense is also, whether
> this is possible without harming or destroying the inner core of the
> theroy. However, as I already stated I?m not quite sure on the whole
> issue yet. Maybe there is also a difference between Adorno and
> Horkheimer , as Horkheimer wrote his pieces on positivism and
> epistemology in general (for example the famous text "traditional and
> critical theory") in the 30s, whereas Adorno was especially engaged with
> epistemic (and ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these are just
> some preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I will presumably
> start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be glad about more
> "talk" :-) .
>
> best wishes,
> e
> Ruth Groff schrieb:
> > Hi Echna,
> >
> > This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
> > anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR a
> few
> > years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this is
> > short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.
>  Critical
> > realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal powers),
> > which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
> > Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
> > There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications of
> > this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge 2004,
> > CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be of some
> > interest.
> >
> > Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
> >
> > Warmly,
> > Ruth
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
> >
> >
> >> Hi all,
> >>
> >> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> >> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> >> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
> >> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> >> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> >> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
> >> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
> >> Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
> >> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz
> >> von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
> >> of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
> >> with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
> >> positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the
> >> "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
> >> think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
> >> arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
> >> what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> >> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> >> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
> >> to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
> >> difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
> >> me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
> >> appreciated.
> >>
> >> best regards,
> >> e
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Critical-Realism mailing list
> >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >>
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 17:05:12 -0800 (PST)
> From: Marcus Salisbury <battaday at yahoo.com.au>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>        frankfurt       school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <312028.19433.qm at web53411.mail.re2.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
>
> Echna,
>
> Marcuse's 'One-Dimensional Man' might be a useful?locus?for a comparative
> discussion of Frankfurt School thought and Critical Realism, given
> its?emphasis on the notion of the illusion of 'freedom' in contemporary
> consumer culture and?the need for authentic liberation from the
> psychological/environmental damage it causes.?
>
> The problem here (as I have found it, at any rate) is that Adorno in
> particular often?conducts his argument?from a fundamentally elitist
> viewpoint, e.g. Mahler's symphonies are automatically?good for your mental
> well-being and personal growth while jazz music is bad because it's always
> made by zombies for zombies.
>
> However, CR and the Frankfurt School both place a good deal of emphasis on
> economic and social processes--as embodied by consumer society and the
> anxieties it imposes on our psyche--as barriers to authentic liberation.
> Hope that's of some use...
> ?Marcus Salisbury
>
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message ----
> From: echna <echna at gmx.net>
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List <
> critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Sent: Wednesday, 4 February, 2009 3:49:42 AM
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and frankfurt
> school
>
> Hi all,
>
> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
> Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz
> von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
> of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
> with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
> positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the
> "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
> think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
> arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
> what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
> to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
> difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
> me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
> appreciated.
>
> best regards,
> e
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
>
>      Stay connected to the people that matter most with a smarter inbox.
> Take a look http://au.docs.yahoo.com/mail/smarterinbox
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 5
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 19:21:27 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>        frankfurt       school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <6ad241360902031721m43b49d0bpa3264cf65228988b at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Echna,
>
> I don't remember when Howrd's piece appeared, but if you don't have a way
> to
> search back JCR issues, Mervyn might be able to tell you.  Or Howard!
>
> If you are cutting into the issue via positivism, my suggestion would be a
> different from Marcus' I guess.  I'd say look at Horkheimer's early stuff
> in
> the collection CRITICAL THEORY.  Especially, "The Latest Attack on
> Metaphysics" and, of course, "Traditional and Critical Theory."  Adorno
> from
> the Positivist Dispute ...   Also, H's ECLIPSE OF REASON and sections of H
> and A's DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT.  But it sounds as though you are
> already
> focused on these texts.
>
> They're the basic ones to consider, though, if you want to get a handle on
> what H and A have to say about positivism.  On the cr side, Bhaskar has a
> very sophisticated analysis of the "fact-form" as an ideological phenomenon
> in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, but I would say that you
> should first really, really understand the arguments of A Realist Theory of
> Science, in order to get at what is wrong, conceptually, with positivist
> laws.  Many practicing cr social scientists and theorists have also weighed
> in on the issue, but as I say, I'd first tackle RTS head on.  For help with
> reading RTS, if you want or need it, I think Collier's 1994 book is very
> ice: CRITICAL REALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ROY BHASKAR'S PHILOSOPHY Verso).
>
> Personally, I do think that deep down an important difference between H and
> A and cr is that H and A don't q-u-i-t-e get out from under Kant, though
> the
> impulse is there, whereas cr points back to Aristotle.  But this may well
> be
> besides the point for your interests at this time.
>
> Warmly,
> Ruth
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 3:27 PM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>
> > Hi Ruth,
> >
> > thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on
> > Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t find
> > it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only text  I
> > get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review Symposium: Taking
> > relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of your book.
> > Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name
> > it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the
> > reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno for
> > example in his negative dialectic is talking about the preponderance of
> > the object (his whole dialectical approach could also be compared to
> > Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however, way beyond my scope as
> > I have huge troubles understanding it, especially as a non native). This
> > is something that might be interpreted as some kind of secreted
> > ontology, which has to be made explicit. What is making the whole thing
> > way more difficult and challenging is that the Frankfurt School and CR
> > are coming from different "epsitemic communities" and notably texts of
> > Adorno et al. have to be cut off  their embedding in the tradition of
> > german phiosophy (as they have no straightforward text in which their
> > principles are laid down). The question is this sense is also, whether
> > this is possible without harming or destroying the inner core of the
> > theroy. However, as I already stated I?m not quite sure on the whole
> > issue yet. Maybe there is also a difference between Adorno and
> > Horkheimer , as Horkheimer wrote his pieces on positivism and
> > epistemology in general (for example the famous text "traditional and
> > critical theory") in the 30s, whereas Adorno was especially engaged with
> > epistemic (and ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these are just
> > some preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I will presumably
> > start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be glad about more
> > "talk" :-) .
> >
> > best wishes,
> > e
> > Ruth Groff schrieb:
> > > Hi Echna,
> > >
> > > This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
> > > anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR
> a
> > few
> > > years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this is
> > > short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.
> >  Critical
> > > realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal
> powers),
> > > which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
> > > Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this
> way.
> > > There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications of
> > > this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge
> 2004,
> > > CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be of some
> > > interest.
> > >
> > > Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
> > >
> > > Warmly,
> > > Ruth
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > >> Hi all,
> > >>
> > >> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> > >> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> > >> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
> > >> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> > >> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> > >> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
> > >> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology?
> The
> > >> Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
> > >> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen
> Relevanz
> > >> von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
> > >> of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
> > >> with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
> > >> positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with
> the
> > >> "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
> > >> think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
> > >> arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
> > >> what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> > >> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> > >> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments
> seems
> > >> to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
> > >> difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
> > >> me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
> > >> appreciated.
> > >>
> > >> best regards,
> > >> e
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> _______________________________________________
> > >> Critical-Realism mailing list
> > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >>
> > >>
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 6
> ***********************************************
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>


------------------------------

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End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 10
************************************************


From rgroff at slu.edu  Wed Feb  4 10:34:51 2009
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2009 11:34:51 -0600
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Kant and causality
In-Reply-To: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C0A@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
References: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C0A@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <6ad241360902040934je0a6c2ej8cfb1b2dc4f0bf7b@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Phil,

So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says at
the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck having in
on the brain today!

But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know about
them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems to me
they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the Prolegomena for
anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.

Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a way
that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know that it
does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
"apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.  Therefore it
must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they are
causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd An.]

As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism and
Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of natural
or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really is
provided by the object, not by the subject.

It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these days
the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did, that
ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.

Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But the
ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused them
last time, etc.

r.







On Wed, Feb 4, 2009 at 10:53 AM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:

> Hi Ruth
>
> You know, after reading Kant for a bit I've come to the conclusion that
> there is not one Kant but several.  I should confess that I have not read
> the Watkins book myself either, but I attended a lecture where his theses
> were layed out.  I can't recall the precise argumentative procedure and am
> meaning to read the book as soon as poss.  But I know that Watkins makes a
> good deal of Kant's so-called pre-critical ideas.  We know Kant is supposed
> to have had a critical turn right, but Watkins argues that pre-critical
> themes are maintained throughout his works, and even the later ones.  There
> is for example the idea of a transcendental object that crops up every so
> often, and which seems do have more of a role than just negative or limit
> concept.  Watkins focuses on the Second Analogy, rather than the Deduction.
>
> On the other hand, to push the phenomenalist line a little, of course, Kant
> says that causality is a concept of the understanding; but it surely must be
> for CR too.  It's just that CR claims that it is not only a concept of the
> understanding but one that corresponds in some way to the way the world
> *really* is.  Both Kant and CR have the category, Bhaskar tries to deduce
> its validity (or transcendental reality) on the basis of contingent facts
> about experience, and Kant tries to do the same.  Kant does not claim that
> the category is not also valid for objects in themselves; he's just more
> modestly agnostic about this point - maybe it does apply to noumena, maybe
> it doesn't.  What we know is that we cannot do without it as long as
> experience takes the form that it does for us.  A Kantian pragmatist might
> ask why do we need any more than this?  I'm not a Kantian pragmatist by the
> way.
>
> I have the Adorno lectures and am actually reading them as I write.  I'll
> see what I think when I'm done.
>
> Thanks
> Phil
>
>
>
>
>
> ________________________________________
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
> Sent: 04 February 2009 16:05
> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 10
>
> Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
>        critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>        http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
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>
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>
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>   1. Re: CR and critical theory (WSCR)
>   2. Re: CR and critical theory (WSCR)
>   3. Re: CR and critical theory (Ruth Groff)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Wed, 04 Feb 2009 07:43:06 -0600
> From: WSCR <wscr_wp at raggedclaws.com>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <49899B6A.2040501 at raggedclaws.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
>
> Mervyn Hartwig wrote:
>  > Let me explain re the missing JCR online. When
>  > Equinox took over from Brill as the JCR publisher,
>  > Brill did not pass v. 3, n.1 on. I then sent my only
>  > hard copy of the issue to Equinox to be sent to
>  > India, where an e-copy was to be made, and so far
>  > nothing has happened, although I have followed it up
>  > several times... This was a couple of years ago. My
>  > apologies to the authors affected. I'll try again but
>  > am not optimistic. My hunch is that my copy has
>  > been lost. If someone has a clean copy they would be
>  > willing to part with for this purpose please let me
>  > know.
>
>
>
> http://www.raggedclaws.com/criticalrealism/index.php?sitesig=WSCR&page=WSCR_041_JCR_1998-2003&subpage=WSCR_005_Alethia_v3n1
>
> or
>
> http://tinyurl.com/c5rw3l
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Wed, 04 Feb 2009 08:21:32 -0600
> From: WSCR <wscr_wp at raggedclaws.com>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <4989A46C.1060409 at raggedclaws.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
>
> WSCR wrote:
> > Mervyn Hartwig wrote:
> >  > Let me explain re the missing JCR online. When
> >  > Equinox took over from Brill as the JCR publisher,
> >  > Brill did not pass v. 3, n.1 on. I then sent my only
> >  > hard copy of the issue to Equinox to be sent to
> >  > India, where an e-copy was to be made, and so far
> >  > nothing has happened, although I have followed it up
> >  > several times... This was a couple of years ago. My
> >  > apologies to the authors affected. I'll try again but
> >  > am not optimistic. My hunch is that my copy has
> >  > been lost. If someone has a clean copy they would be
> >  > willing to part with for this purpose please let me
> >  > know.
> >
> >
> >
> http://www.raggedclaws.com/criticalrealism/index.php?sitesig=WSCR&page=WSCR_041_JCR_1998-2003&subpage=WSCR_005_Alethia_v3n1
> >
> > or
> >
> > http://tinyurl.com/c5rw3l
> >
>
> Oops, that's not the one you want. Sorry. Forgot that
> the numbering of the IACR's journal started over again
> in 2002. But it might be useful to know that all the
> issues of Alethia that were offered for free on the JCR
> site a few years back are now available for free on the
> WSCR site (along with links to the JCR page at
> Equinox). Enjoy!
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2009 10:05:21 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <6ad241360902040805y1654304pf3812e724ae62c58 at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Phil!
>
> I didn't mean to say that Adorno is attached to Kant in some easy way.  Not
> at all.  In ND he suggests that causality needs to somehow be conceived of
> as grounded in objects.  But in the Lectures on Kant's Critique of Pure
> Reason he talks a lot, actually, about the issue and I think you can see
> the
> attachment still, and the reasons for it.  (I really recommend several of
> those Lectures books; the language is crystal clear.  There is no way you'd
> know it was Adorno, stylistically.)
>
> I know about Watkins, have his book, though I haven't read it yet.
> Meanwhile, I make some of the argument about noumena and philosophy and
> Kant/cr that you allude to in that old chapter of mine on Kant that I
> mentioned, and I do think that Kant is a realist about phenomenal objects.
> But I can't imagine how Watkins can argue that he is a naturalist about
> causality, which is what critical realists are.  ("Naturalist" - for people
> who don't happen to know the philosophy jargon, just means that it is a
> thing that actually inheres, realistically, in objects, not that such
> objects can't be social ones.)  I'm teaching bits of the 1st Critique now,
> as part of a larger class on Kant, and so have been re-immersed in him.  I
> do want to see what Watkins says, but as I say I simply can't imagine how
> he
> is going to get Kant out of saying that causality is a category of the
> understanding, a synthetic operation performed by reason.  I agree that you
> can think that reason pre-orders our experience in the way that Kant says
> and ALSO say that phenomenal objects have dispositional properties -- and
> even, that while it is nice that "causal order" is a category of the
> understanding, it's not the real definition of causality, which, rather, is
> something like "the display of dispositional properties."  But Kant himself
> insists that that move is bogus, so I don't see how he can be read as
> having
> endorsed it.  But as I say, I haven't actually read Watkins on this yet.
>
> I will be writing on this some, in my current book project, so will have to
> read EW soon!.
>
> I'd be curious to hear more thoughts.
>
> r.
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 10:55 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> > Hi
> >
> > Ruth says: "Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant
> in
> > this way."
> >
> > This is a complex issues and not easily established in my view.  That
> > Adorno has no explicit theory of causality, it seems true, but that does
> not
> > mean he isn't a sort of realist.  I think we would need to specify in
> > exactly what sense Adorno does not get beyond Kant, because I'm sometimes
> > not sure that even RB decisively gets beyond Kant.  RB owes a lot more to
> > Kant than is often given credit for.  Kant of course never denied the
> > independently real.  He believed in noumena and thought we had to be able
> to
> > think it, which could be read as a sort of minimal philosophical ontology
> of
> > the type RB argues for in RTS.  Moreover, Erik Watkins "Kant and the
> > metaphysics of causality" even argues that Kant HAD a causal powers based
> > ontology.  More work needs to be done on CR vs Adorno.  Adorno lends
> himself
> > so easily to being misread because of the notorious style.
> >
> > On Adorno and elitism, this charge has become so common that has become
> > banal, and it obstructs appreciation of the profound insights Adorno has
> to
> > offer.
> >
> > The clearest piece Adorno wrote which is less bogged down in the German
> > tradition than most of his texts is the little known "The Actuality of
> > Philosophy", Telos 1977.
> >
> > Echna - which university are you at?
> >
> > phil.
> >
> >
> >
> > ________________________________________
> > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> > critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
> > Sent: 04 February 2009 01:21
> > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 6
> >
> > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
> >        critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> >
> > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> >        http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> >        critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu
> >
> > You can reach the person managing the list at
> >        critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu
> >
> > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..."
> >
> >
> > Today's Topics:
> >
> >   1. Re: Open letter to Mark Johnson   onpathologicalconversati...
> >      (Mervyn Hartwig)
> >   2. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
> >      (Ruth Groff)
> >   3. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt school (echna)
> >   4. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
> >      (Marcus Salisbury)
> >   5. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
> >      (Ruth Groff)
> >
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 1
> > Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 19:39:27 -0000
> > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson
> >        onpathologicalconversati...
> > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID:
> >        <
> mailman.7061.1233710490.2556.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="iso-8859-1"
> >
> >  I agree, let's cool it.
> >
> > For what it's worth, Mark's posts didn't get on my goat and I agree with
> > Sebastian that the points he is raising are important and should be
> > discussed. Equally, I can understand that Hans D. took them the way he
> did
> > and don't really find his response over the top. Also, I think the list
> is
> > functioning pretty well. It provides very useful info re CR happenings,
> > people sometimes use it to get helpful info and feedback re their
> specific
> > projects, and now and again there is an interesting thread of discussion.
> > What more could a busy person want? There seems little point in harking
> > back
> > to 'the good old days'. History has moved on, and critical realism with
> it
> > (if it hasn't, it's in a time warp). For good or ill, the dialectical and
> > spiritual turns are a reality, and we have to make of them what we can.
> > Nobody is wanting to say that work within the framework of first-wave
> > critical realism is not crucially important and indeed indispensable for
> > the
> > health of the whole (which doesn't of course mean that there should not
> be
> > well informed criticism flowing both ways -- to the contrary).
> >
> > Mervyn
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Par
> > Engholm
> > Sent: 03 February 2009 07:29
> > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson
> > onpathologicalconversati...
> >
> > Hi all,
> > Please just calm down a bit all of you. I don't find either Mark's or
> Hans'
> > arguments that offensive on their own, but the brandishing of other
> > people's
> > posts as offensive, intimidating etc is a very effective way of closing
> any
> > discussion. This list is in my opinion a very open and quite friendly
> forum
> > for discussions on quite a wide range of issues.
> > Take a deep breath and try to find something that might cut the mustard
> or
> > in any other way might change the way we talk or think or act, which of
> > course are various ways of 'acting' in a more general sense. That might
> > include arguing against other people on the list and finding their
> > arguments
> > wanting in some respect, but that's part of any (intellectual)
> discussion.
> > Cheers,
> > P?r
> >
> > *******************************************************
> > Par Engholm
> > Uppsala University
> > Department of Sociology
> > http://www.soc.uu.se/kontaktpers.php?id=62
> > Mobile: +46 709783546
> >
> > Journal of Critical Realism
> > http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/index
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 2
> > Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 14:30:07 -0600
> > From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
> >        frankfurt       school
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID:
> >        <6ad241360902031230i39c76947s722566e0a4f6b8af at mail.gmail.com>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
> >
> > Hi Echna,
> >
> > This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
> > anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR a
> > few
> > years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this is
> > short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.
>  Critical
> > realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal powers),
> > which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
> > Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
> > There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications of
> > this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge 2004,
> > CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be of some
> > interest.
> >
> > Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
> >
> > Warmly,
> > Ruth
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
> >
> > > Hi all,
> > >
> > > I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> > > critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> > > Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
> > > did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> > > couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> > > writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
> > > the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
> > > Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
> > > original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen
> Relevanz
> > > von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
> > > of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
> > > with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
> > > positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with
> the
> > > "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
> > > think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
> > > arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
> > > what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> > > translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> > > epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
> > > to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
> > > difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
> > > me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
> > > appreciated.
> > >
> > > best regards,
> > > e
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 3
> > Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2009 22:27:14 +0100
> > From: echna <echna at gmx.net>
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
> >        frankfurt school
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID: <4988B6B2.1030305 at gmx.net>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
> >
> > Hi Ruth,
> >
> > thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on
> > Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t find
> > it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only text  I
> > get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review Symposium: Taking
> > relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of your book.
> > Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name
> > it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the
> > reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno for
> > example in his negative dialectic is talking about the preponderance of
> > the object (his whole dialectical approach could also be compared to
> > Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however, way beyond my scope as
> > I have huge troubles understanding it, especially as a non native). This
> > is something that might be interpreted as some kind of secreted
> > ontology, which has to be made explicit. What is making the whole thing
> > way more difficult and challenging is that the Frankfurt School and CR
> > are coming from different "epsitemic communities" and notably texts of
> > Adorno et al. have to be cut off  their embedding in the tradition of
> > german phiosophy (as they have no straightforward text in which their
> > principles are laid down). The question is this sense is also, whether
> > this is possible without harming or destroying the inner core of the
> > theroy. However, as I already stated I?m not quite sure on the whole
> > issue yet. Maybe there is also a difference between Adorno and
> > Horkheimer , as Horkheimer wrote his pieces on positivism and
> > epistemology in general (for example the famous text "traditional and
> > critical theory") in the 30s, whereas Adorno was especially engaged with
> > epistemic (and ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these are just
> > some preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I will presumably
> > start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be glad about more
> > "talk" :-) .
> >
> > best wishes,
> > e
> > Ruth Groff schrieb:
> > > Hi Echna,
> > >
> > > This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
> > > anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR
> a
> > few
> > > years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this is
> > > short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.
> >  Critical
> > > realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal
> powers),
> > > which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
> > > Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this
> way.
> > > There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications of
> > > this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge
> 2004,
> > > CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be of some
> > > interest.
> > >
> > > Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
> > >
> > > Warmly,
> > > Ruth
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > >> Hi all,
> > >>
> > >> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> > >> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> > >> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
> > >> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> > >> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> > >> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
> > >> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology?
> The
> > >> Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
> > >> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen
> Relevanz
> > >> von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
> > >> of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
> > >> with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
> > >> positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with
> the
> > >> "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
> > >> think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
> > >> arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
> > >> what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> > >> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> > >> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments
> seems
> > >> to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
> > >> difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
> > >> me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
> > >> appreciated.
> > >>
> > >> best regards,
> > >> e
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> _______________________________________________
> > >> Critical-Realism mailing list
> > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >>
> > >>
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 4
> > Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 17:05:12 -0800 (PST)
> > From: Marcus Salisbury <battaday at yahoo.com.au>
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
> >        frankfurt       school
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID: <312028.19433.qm at web53411.mail.re2.yahoo.com>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
> >
> > Echna,
> >
> > Marcuse's 'One-Dimensional Man' might be a useful?locus?for a comparative
> > discussion of Frankfurt School thought and Critical Realism, given
> > its?emphasis on the notion of the illusion of 'freedom' in contemporary
> > consumer culture and?the need for authentic liberation from the
> > psychological/environmental damage it causes.?
> >
> > The problem here (as I have found it, at any rate) is that Adorno in
> > particular often?conducts his argument?from a fundamentally elitist
> > viewpoint, e.g. Mahler's symphonies are automatically?good for your
> mental
> > well-being and personal growth while jazz music is bad because it's
> always
> > made by zombies for zombies.
> >
> > However, CR and the Frankfurt School both place a good deal of emphasis
> on
> > economic and social processes--as embodied by consumer society and the
> > anxieties it imposes on our psyche--as barriers to authentic liberation.
> > Hope that's of some use...
> > ?Marcus Salisbury
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message ----
> > From: echna <echna at gmx.net>
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List <
> > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Sent: Wednesday, 4 February, 2009 3:49:42 AM
> > Subject: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and frankfurt
> > school
> >
> > Hi all,
> >
> > I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> > critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> > Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
> > did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> > couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> > writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
> > the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology? The
> > Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the german
> > original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz
> > von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises
> > of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion)
> > with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
> > positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the
> > "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I
> > think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop similar
> > arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy. However,
> > what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> > translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> > epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments seems
> > to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
> > difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give
> > me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
> > appreciated.
> >
> > best regards,
> > e
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
> >
> >      Stay connected to the people that matter most with a smarter inbox.
> > Take a look http://au.docs.yahoo.com/mail/smarterinbox
> >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 5
> > Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 19:21:27 -0600
> > From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
> >        frankfurt       school
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID:
> >        <6ad241360902031721m43b49d0bpa3264cf65228988b at mail.gmail.com>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
> >
> > Hi Echna,
> >
> > I don't remember when Howrd's piece appeared, but if you don't have a way
> > to
> > search back JCR issues, Mervyn might be able to tell you.  Or Howard!
> >
> > If you are cutting into the issue via positivism, my suggestion would be
> a
> > different from Marcus' I guess.  I'd say look at Horkheimer's early stuff
> > in
> > the collection CRITICAL THEORY.  Especially, "The Latest Attack on
> > Metaphysics" and, of course, "Traditional and Critical Theory."  Adorno
> > from
> > the Positivist Dispute ...   Also, H's ECLIPSE OF REASON and sections of
> H
> > and A's DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT.  But it sounds as though you are
> > already
> > focused on these texts.
> >
> > They're the basic ones to consider, though, if you want to get a handle
> on
> > what H and A have to say about positivism.  On the cr side, Bhaskar has a
> > very sophisticated analysis of the "fact-form" as an ideological
> phenomenon
> > in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, but I would say that you
> > should first really, really understand the arguments of A Realist Theory
> of
> > Science, in order to get at what is wrong, conceptually, with positivist
> > laws.  Many practicing cr social scientists and theorists have also
> weighed
> > in on the issue, but as I say, I'd first tackle RTS head on.  For help
> with
> > reading RTS, if you want or need it, I think Collier's 1994 book is very
> > ice: CRITICAL REALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ROY BHASKAR'S PHILOSOPHY
> Verso).
> >
> > Personally, I do think that deep down an important difference between H
> and
> > A and cr is that H and A don't q-u-i-t-e get out from under Kant, though
> > the
> > impulse is there, whereas cr points back to Aristotle.  But this may well
> > be
> > besides the point for your interests at this time.
> >
> > Warmly,
> > Ruth
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 3:27 PM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
> >
> > > Hi Ruth,
> > >
> > > thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on
> > > Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t
> find
> > > it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only text  I
> > > get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review Symposium: Taking
> > > relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of your book.
> > > Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name
> > > it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the
> > > reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno
> for
> > > example in his negative dialectic is talking about the preponderance of
> > > the object (his whole dialectical approach could also be compared to
> > > Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however, way beyond my scope as
> > > I have huge troubles understanding it, especially as a non native).
> This
> > > is something that might be interpreted as some kind of secreted
> > > ontology, which has to be made explicit. What is making the whole thing
> > > way more difficult and challenging is that the Frankfurt School and CR
> > > are coming from different "epsitemic communities" and notably texts of
> > > Adorno et al. have to be cut off  their embedding in the tradition of
> > > german phiosophy (as they have no straightforward text in which their
> > > principles are laid down). The question is this sense is also, whether
> > > this is possible without harming or destroying the inner core of the
> > > theroy. However, as I already stated I?m not quite sure on the whole
> > > issue yet. Maybe there is also a difference between Adorno and
> > > Horkheimer , as Horkheimer wrote his pieces on positivism and
> > > epistemology in general (for example the famous text "traditional and
> > > critical theory") in the 30s, whereas Adorno was especially engaged
> with
> > > epistemic (and ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these are just
> > > some preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I will
> presumably
> > > start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be glad about
> more
> > > "talk" :-) .
> > >
> > > best wishes,
> > > e
> > > Ruth Groff schrieb:
> > > > Hi Echna,
> > > >
> > > > This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know
> of
> > > > anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in
> JCR
> > a
> > > few
> > > > years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this is
> > > > short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.
> > >  Critical
> > > > realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal
> > powers),
> > > > which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
> > > > Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this
> > way.
> > > > There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications
> of
> > > > this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge
> > 2004,
> > > > CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be of
> some
> > > > interest.
> > > >
> > > > Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or,
> "talk."
> > > >
> > > > Warmly,
> > > > Ruth
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >> Hi all,
> > > >>
> > > >> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> > > >> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> > > >> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I
> also
> > > >> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> > > >> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> > > >> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something
> like
> > > >> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology?
> > The
> > > >> Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the
> german
> > > >> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen
> > Relevanz
> > > >> von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the
> premises
> > > >> of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical"
> fashion)
> > > >> with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the
> > > >> positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just with
> > the
> > > >> "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In short,
> I
> > > >> think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop
> similar
> > > >> arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy.
> However,
> > > >> what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> > > >> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> > > >> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments
> > seems
> > > >> to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite
> > > >> difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could
> give
> > > >> me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
> > > >> appreciated.
> > > >>
> > > >> best regards,
> > > >> e
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> _______________________________________________
> > > >> Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
> > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 6
> > ***********************************************
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 10
> ************************************************
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>

From nellhaus at mail.com  Wed Feb  4 14:28:43 2009
From: nellhaus at mail.com (Tobin Nellhaus)
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2009 16:28:43 -0500
Subject: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory
In-Reply-To: <7alu89$3dg6u5@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu>
References: <7alu89$3dg6u5@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu>
Message-ID: <CC06D8CBAA084427A9C45AA2264143FB@Godiva>

Hi Mervyn--

Thanks to the snafu with double membership back then, I happen to have two 
copies of that issue of JCR (in which I too have an article).  Give me a 
snail mail address and I'll send one along.

Tobin



----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" 
<critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, February 04, 2009 5:45 AM
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory


Let me explain re the missing JCR online. When Equinox took over from Brill
as the JCR publisher, Brill did not pass v. 3, n.1 on. I then sent my only
hard copy of the issue to Equinox to be sent to India, where an e-copy was
to be made, and so far nothing has happened, although I have followed it up
several times... This was a couple of years ago. My apologies to the authors
affected. I'll try again but am not optimistic. My hunch is that my copy has
been lost. If someone has a clean copy they would be willing to part with
for this purpose please let me know.

Mervyn

General Editor
Journal of Critical Realism
 ISSN: 1476-7430 (print)
ISSN: 1572-5138 (online)
http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR


-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna
Sent: 04 February 2009 07:41
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory

Hi all,

thanks again for your interesting thoughts and objections. Howard,
unfortunately that particular issue (v. 3 n.1) of JCR is not online. And as
I have huge difficulties here in Vienna to get hold of JCR (the university
library does not purchase access to it). So it would be great if you could
send me your text as a pdf (if you don?t mind and it is not to much work for
you).

In fact I thought of dealing with the Franfurt School (FS) in two different
branches. One is the critique laid down by Horkheimer already in the 30s.
Here to mention are the texts Ruth was pointing on, next to some others
Horkheimer wrote in this time on materialism and "marxist epistemology". The
other one I thought of could consists out of Adorno?s texts dealing with
positivism in the 60s, most notably the dispute on positivism. Besides the
famous "dispute", however, there are several other shorter texts of Adorno,
which I find of vast interest. For example his "dialectical prolegomena", as
he called the two texts, namely "Subject and Object" and "Marginalia to
Theory and Praxis".
Somehow I feel tempted to have a more thorough going look on the negative
dialectic as Adorno said that "he?s putting his cards on the table"
(preface) with this book. However, due to his notorious style it is probably
a quite -too difficult- task for me (and as he is also always referring to
Hegel in this text some deeper knowledge than I have about hegelian
dialectic would also be of help).

Thanks Ruth, for pointing my attention again on RTS. I also know Collier?s
valuable introduction of it. In fact I plan to start off my description of
CR with RTS as I find its arguments indispensable to understand PON and its
further implications for social science. The crux of the matter seems to be
now for me the relation of both CR and FS to Kant. As I am not really
familiar with his writings in detail I will first of all try to get in touch
with his (lacking) theory of causality and the (in)famous "thing in itself"
(hope it?s the right term in english).

I also thought about concluding my thesis  with some arguments on Marx.
As I agree that the principles outlined by CR and FS, despite the
differences among them, were already anticipated by Marx (even not just
practical but also theoretically reflected; for example in a lucid manner in
the manuscript M in the "Grundrisse"). I know that there is already some
literature on the relation of CR and Marx, and FS and Marx as well. I also
look at the texts on Marx you mentioned in your text, Howard, thanks again.

And, Phil, I?m currently studying at the University of Vienna, and I?m
starting now in March my "Magisterarbeit" ( similar to master?s thesis).
I hope I can finish by the end of summer (this is at least my plan).
Let?s see.

best wishes,
e

Philip Anthony O'Hanlon schrieb:
> Hi
>
> Ruth says: "Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in
this way."
>
> This is a complex issues and not easily established in my view.  That
Adorno has no explicit theory of causality, it seems true, but that does not
mean he isn't a sort of realist.  I think we would need to specify in
exactly what sense Adorno does not get beyond Kant, because I'm sometimes
not sure that even RB decisively gets beyond Kant.  RB owes a lot more to
Kant than is often given credit for.  Kant of course never denied the
independently real.  He believed in noumena and thought we had to be able to
think it, which could be read as a sort of minimal philosophical ontology of
the type RB argues for in RTS.  Moreover, Erik Watkins "Kant and the
metaphysics of causality" even argues that Kant HAD a causal powers based
ontology.  More work needs to be done on CR vs Adorno.  Adorno lends himself
so easily to being misread because of the notorious style.
>
> On Adorno and elitism, this charge has become so common that has become
banal, and it obstructs appreciation of the profound insights Adorno has to
offer.
>
> The clearest piece Adorno wrote which is less bogged down in the German
tradition than most of his texts is the little known "The Actuality of
Philosophy", Telos 1977.
>
> Echna - which university are you at?
>
> phil.
>
>
>
> ________________________________________
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
> Sent: 04 February 2009 01:21
> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 6
>
> Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
>         critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
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>
> Today's Topics:
>
>    1. Re: Open letter to Mark Johnson   onpathologicalconversati...
>       (Mervyn Hartwig)
>    2. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
>       (Ruth Groff)
>    3. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt school (echna)
>    4. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
>       (Marcus Salisbury)
>    5. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
>       (Ruth Groff)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 19:39:27 -0000
> From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson
>         onpathologicalconversati...
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>
<mailman.7061.1233710490.2556.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="iso-8859-1"
>
>  I agree, let's cool it.
>
> For what it's worth, Mark's posts didn't get on my goat and I agree
> with Sebastian that the points he is raising are important and should
> be discussed. Equally, I can understand that Hans D. took them the way
> he did and don't really find his response over the top. Also, I think
> the list is functioning pretty well. It provides very useful info re
> CR happenings, people sometimes use it to get helpful info and
> feedback re their specific projects, and now and again there is an
interesting thread of discussion.
> What more could a busy person want? There seems little point in
> harking back to 'the good old days'. History has moved on, and
> critical realism with it (if it hasn't, it's in a time warp). For good
> or ill, the dialectical and spiritual turns are a reality, and we have to
make of them what we can.
> Nobody is wanting to say that work within the framework of first-wave
> critical realism is not crucially important and indeed indispensable
> for the health of the whole (which doesn't of course mean that there
> should not be well informed criticism flowing both ways -- to the
contrary).
>
> Mervyn
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Par
> Engholm
> Sent: 03 February 2009 07:29
> To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson
> onpathologicalconversati...
>
> Hi all,
> Please just calm down a bit all of you. I don't find either Mark's or
Hans'
> arguments that offensive on their own, but the brandishing of other
> people's posts as offensive, intimidating etc is a very effective way
> of closing any discussion. This list is in my opinion a very open and
> quite friendly forum for discussions on quite a wide range of issues.
> Take a deep breath and try to find something that might cut the
> mustard or in any other way might change the way we talk or think or
> act, which of course are various ways of 'acting' in a more general
> sense. That might include arguing against other people on the list and
> finding their arguments wanting in some respect, but that's part of any
(intellectual) discussion.
> Cheers,
> P?r
>
> *******************************************************
> Par Engholm
> Uppsala University
> Department of Sociology
> http://www.soc.uu.se/kontaktpers.php?id=62
> Mobile: +46 709783546
>
> Journal of Critical Realism
> http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/index
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 14:30:07 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>         frankfurt       school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>         <6ad241360902031230i39c76947s722566e0a4f6b8af at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Echna,
>
> This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
> anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR
> a few years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and
> this is short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the
> ontology.  Critical realism is a form of dispositional realism
> (realism about causal powers), which is to say that the view is that
modality inheres in objects.
> Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
> There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications
> of this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge
> 2004, CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be
> of some interest.
>
> Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
>
> Warmly,
> Ruth
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>
>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
>> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
>> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
>> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
>> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
>> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
>> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology?
>> The Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the
>> german
>> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen
>> Relevanz von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare
>> the premises of Critical Realism (most certainly in its
>> "pre-dialectical" fashion) with the ones of the Frankfurt School
>> outlined for example in the positivism dispute in german sociology
>> (and I want to deal just with the "old" Frankfurt School not with
>> Habermas and his fellows). In short, I think that both critical
>> realism and frankfurt school develop similar arguments in their
>> controversies with the positivist legacy. However, what has to be
>> done in this case is some kind of "epistemic translation", as both
>> theories are coming out of quite different epistemic communities, so
>> that the constellation of the arguments seems to be more distant than
>> it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite difficult task. Therefore
>> I would be very happy if somebody could give me some hints of
>> literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly appreciated.
>>
>> best regards,
>> e
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>
>>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2009 22:27:14 +0100
> From: echna <echna at gmx.net>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>         frankfurt school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <4988B6B2.1030305 at gmx.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
>
> Hi Ruth,
>
> thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on
> Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t
> find it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only
> text  I get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review
> Symposium: Taking relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of
your book.
> Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name
> it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the
> reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno
> for example in his negative dialectic is talking about the
> preponderance of the object (his whole dialectical approach could also
> be compared to Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however, way
> beyond my scope as I have huge troubles understanding it, especially
> as a non native). This is something that might be interpreted as some
> kind of secreted ontology, which has to be made explicit. What is
> making the whole thing way more difficult and challenging is that the
> Frankfurt School and CR are coming from different "epsitemic
> communities" and notably texts of Adorno et al. have to be cut off
> their embedding in the tradition of german phiosophy (as they have no
> straightforward text in which their principles are laid down). The
> question is this sense is also, whether this is possible without
> harming or destroying the inner core of the theroy. However, as I
> already stated I?m not quite sure on the whole issue yet. Maybe there
> is also a difference between Adorno and Horkheimer , as Horkheimer
> wrote his pieces on positivism and epistemology in general (for
> example the famous text "traditional and critical theory") in the 30s,
> whereas Adorno was especially engaged with epistemic (and
> ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these are just some
> preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I will presumably
> start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be glad about more
"talk" :-) .
>
> best wishes,
> e
> Ruth Groff schrieb:
>
>> Hi Echna,
>>
>> This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know
>> of anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in
>> JCR a few years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say,
>> and this is short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the
>> ontology.  Critical realism is a form of dispositional realism
>> (realism about causal powers), which is to say that the view is that
modality inheres in objects.
>> Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
>> There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications
>> of this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book
>> (Routledge 2004, CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of
>> Knowledge) might be of some interest.
>>
>> Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
>>
>> Warmly,
>> Ruth
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
>>> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
>>> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I
>>> also did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism
>>> but I couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the
>>> moment writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit"
>>> (something like the master thesis), and the working title is
>>> "Critical Methodology? The Relevance of Theory of Science for the
>>> Social Sciences" (in the german
>>> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen
>>> Relevanz von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare
>>> the premises of Critical Realism (most certainly in its
>>> "pre-dialectical" fashion) with the ones of the Frankfurt School
>>> outlined for example in the positivism dispute in german sociology
>>> (and I want to deal just with the "old" Frankfurt School not with
>>> Habermas and his fellows). In short, I think that both critical
>>> realism and frankfurt school develop similar arguments in their
>>> controversies with the positivist legacy. However, what has to be
>>> done in this case is some kind of "epistemic translation", as both
>>> theories are coming out of quite different epistemic communities, so
>>> that the constellation of the arguments seems to be more distant
>>> than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite difficult task.
>>> Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give me some hints
>>> of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly appreciated.
>>>
>>> best regards,
>>> e
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 17:05:12 -0800 (PST)
> From: Marcus Salisbury <battaday at yahoo.com.au>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>         frankfurt       school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <312028.19433.qm at web53411.mail.re2.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
>
> Echna,
>
> Marcuse's 'One-Dimensional Man' might be a useful?locus?for a comparative
discussion of Frankfurt School thought and Critical Realism, given
its?emphasis on the notion of the illusion of 'freedom' in contemporary
consumer culture and?the need for authentic liberation from the
psychological/environmental damage it causes.?
>
> The problem here (as I have found it, at any rate) is that Adorno in
particular often?conducts his argument?from a fundamentally elitist
viewpoint, e.g. Mahler's symphonies are automatically?good for your mental
well-being and personal growth while jazz music is bad because it's always
made by zombies for zombies.
>
> However, CR and the Frankfurt School both place a good deal of emphasis on
economic and social processes--as embodied by consumer society and the
anxieties it imposes on our psyche--as barriers to authentic liberation.
Hope that's of some use...
> ?Marcus Salisbury
>
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message ----
> From: echna <echna at gmx.net>
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Sent: Wednesday, 4 February, 2009 3:49:42 AM
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
> frankfurt school
>
> Hi all,
>
> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology?
> The Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the
> german
> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen
> Relevanz von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the
> premises of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical"
> fashion) with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in
> the positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just
> with the "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In
> short, I think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop
> similar arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy.
> However, what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments
> seems to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a
> quite difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody
> could give me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would
> be greatly appreciated.
>
> best regards,
> e
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
>
>       Stay connected to the people that matter most with a smarter
> inbox. Take a look http://au.docs.yahoo.com/mail/smarterinbox
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 5
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 19:21:27 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>         frankfurt       school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>         <6ad241360902031721m43b49d0bpa3264cf65228988b at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Echna,
>
> I don't remember when Howrd's piece appeared, but if you don't have a
> way to search back JCR issues, Mervyn might be able to tell you.  Or
Howard!
>
> If you are cutting into the issue via positivism, my suggestion would
> be a different from Marcus' I guess.  I'd say look at Horkheimer's
> early stuff in the collection CRITICAL THEORY.  Especially, "The
> Latest Attack on Metaphysics" and, of course, "Traditional and Critical
Theory."  Adorno from
> the Positivist Dispute ...   Also, H's ECLIPSE OF REASON and sections of H
> and A's DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT.  But it sounds as though you are
> already focused on these texts.
>
> They're the basic ones to consider, though, if you want to get a
> handle on what H and A have to say about positivism.  On the cr side,
> Bhaskar has a very sophisticated analysis of the "fact-form" as an
> ideological phenomenon in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation,
> but I would say that you should first really, really understand the
> arguments of A Realist Theory of Science, in order to get at what is
> wrong, conceptually, with positivist laws.  Many practicing cr social
> scientists and theorists have also weighed in on the issue, but as I
> say, I'd first tackle RTS head on.  For help with reading RTS, if you
> want or need it, I think Collier's 1994 book is very
> ice: CRITICAL REALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ROY BHASKAR'S PHILOSOPHY Verso).
>
> Personally, I do think that deep down an important difference between
> H and A and cr is that H and A don't q-u-i-t-e get out from under
> Kant, though the impulse is there, whereas cr points back to
> Aristotle.  But this may well be besides the point for your interests at
this time.
>
> Warmly,
> Ruth
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 3:27 PM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>
>
>> Hi Ruth,
>>
>> thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on
>> Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t
>> find it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only
>> text  I get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review
>> Symposium: Taking relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of
your book.
>> Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name
>> it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the
>> reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno
>> for example in his negative dialectic is talking about the
>> preponderance of the object (his whole dialectical approach could
>> also be compared to Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however,
>> way beyond my scope as I have huge troubles understanding it,
>> especially as a non native). This is something that might be
>> interpreted as some kind of secreted ontology, which has to be made
>> explicit. What is making the whole thing way more difficult and
>> challenging is that the Frankfurt School and CR are coming from
>> different "epsitemic communities" and notably texts of Adorno et al.
>> have to be cut off  their embedding in the tradition of german
>> phiosophy (as they have no straightforward text in which their
>> principles are laid down). The question is this sense is also,
>> whether this is possible without harming or destroying the inner core
>> of the theroy. However, as I already stated I?m not quite sure on the
>> whole issue yet. Maybe there is also a difference between Adorno and
>> Horkheimer , as Horkheimer wrote his pieces on positivism and
>> epistemology in general (for example the famous text "traditional and
>> critical theory") in the 30s, whereas Adorno was especially engaged
>> with epistemic (and ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these
>> are just some preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I
>> will presumably start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be
glad about more "talk" :-) .
>>
>> best wishes,
>> e
>> Ruth Groff schrieb:
>>
>>> Hi Echna,
>>>
>>> This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know
>>> of anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno
>>> in JCR a
>>>
>> few
>>
>>> years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this
>>> is short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.
>>>
>>  Critical
>>
>>> realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal
>>> powers), which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in
objects.
>>> Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
>>> There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications
>>> of this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book
>>> (Routledge 2004, CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of
>>> Knowledge) might be of some interest.
>>>
>>> Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
>>>
>>> Warmly,
>>> Ruth
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Hi all,
>>>>
>>>> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
>>>> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
>>>> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I
>>>> also did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism
>>>> but I couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the
>>>> moment writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit"
>>>> (something like the master thesis), and the working title is
>>>> "Critical Methodology? The Relevance of Theory of Science for the
>>>> Social Sciences" (in the german
>>>> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen
>>>> Relevanz von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare
>>>> the premises of Critical Realism (most certainly in its
>>>> "pre-dialectical" fashion) with the ones of the Frankfurt School
>>>> outlined for example in the positivism dispute in german sociology
>>>> (and I want to deal just with the "old" Frankfurt School not with
>>>> Habermas and his fellows). In short, I think that both critical
>>>> realism and frankfurt school develop similar arguments in their
>>>> controversies with the positivist legacy. However, what has to be
>>>> done in this case is some kind of "epistemic translation", as both
>>>> theories are coming out of quite different epistemic communities,
>>>> so that the constellation of the arguments seems to be more distant
>>>> than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite difficult task.
>>>> Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give me some
>>>> hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
appreciated.
>>>>
>>>> best regards,
>>>> e
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>
>>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 6
> ***********************************************
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>


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From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk  Thu Feb  5 00:31:24 2009
From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig)
Date: Thu, 5 Feb 2009 07:31:24 -0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory
In-Reply-To: <49899B6A.2040501@raggedclaws.com>
Message-ID: <mailman.299.1233819091.2553.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>

Hi Wallace!

Many thanks for this.

Unfortunately WSCR ends at vol. 1, no. 2 (2003).
The missing one is vol. 3, no. 1 (2004).
(There was btw no vol. 2, no. 2 because we switched over to a calendar year
system in 2004.)

Mervyn

 

-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of WSCR
Sent: 04 February 2009 13:43
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory

Mervyn Hartwig wrote:
 > Let me explain re the missing JCR online. When  > Equinox took over from
Brill as the JCR publisher,  > Brill did not pass v. 3, n.1 on. I then sent
my only  > hard copy of the issue to Equinox to be sent to  > India, where
an e-copy was to be made, and so far  > nothing has happened, although I
have followed it up  > several times... This was a couple of years ago. My
> apologies to the authors affected. I'll try again but  > am not
optimistic. My hunch is that my copy has  > been lost. If someone has a
clean copy they would be  > willing to part with for this purpose please let
me  > know.


http://www.raggedclaws.com/criticalrealism/index.php?sitesig=WSCR&page=WSCR_
041_JCR_1998-2003&subpage=WSCR_005_Alethia_v3n1

or

http://tinyurl.com/c5rw3l



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From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk  Thu Feb  5 02:41:03 2009
From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig)
Date: Thu, 5 Feb 2009 09:41:03 -0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory
In-Reply-To: <CC06D8CBAA084427A9C45AA2264143FB@Godiva>
Message-ID: <mailman.301.1233826869.2553.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>

Hi Tobin

Many thanks. I'll contact you off-list. M 


 

-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Tobin
Nellhaus
Sent: 04 February 2009 21:29
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory

Hi Mervyn--

Thanks to the snafu with double membership back then, I happen to have two
copies of that issue of JCR (in which I too have an article).  Give me a
snail mail address and I'll send one along.

Tobin



----- Original Message -----
From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" 
<critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, February 04, 2009 5:45 AM
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory


Let me explain re the missing JCR online. When Equinox took over from Brill
as the JCR publisher, Brill did not pass v. 3, n.1 on. I then sent my only
hard copy of the issue to Equinox to be sent to India, where an e-copy was
to be made, and so far nothing has happened, although I have followed it up
several times... This was a couple of years ago. My apologies to the authors
affected. I'll try again but am not optimistic. My hunch is that my copy has
been lost. If someone has a clean copy they would be willing to part with
for this purpose please let me know.

Mervyn

General Editor
Journal of Critical Realism
 ISSN: 1476-7430 (print)
ISSN: 1572-5138 (online)
http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR


-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna
Sent: 04 February 2009 07:41
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] CR and critical theory

Hi all,

thanks again for your interesting thoughts and objections. Howard,
unfortunately that particular issue (v. 3 n.1) of JCR is not online. And as
I have huge difficulties here in Vienna to get hold of JCR (the university
library does not purchase access to it). So it would be great if you could
send me your text as a pdf (if you don?t mind and it is not to much work for
you).

In fact I thought of dealing with the Franfurt School (FS) in two different
branches. One is the critique laid down by Horkheimer already in the 30s.
Here to mention are the texts Ruth was pointing on, next to some others
Horkheimer wrote in this time on materialism and "marxist epistemology". The
other one I thought of could consists out of Adorno?s texts dealing with
positivism in the 60s, most notably the dispute on positivism. Besides the
famous "dispute", however, there are several other shorter texts of Adorno,
which I find of vast interest. For example his "dialectical prolegomena", as
he called the two texts, namely "Subject and Object" and "Marginalia to
Theory and Praxis".
Somehow I feel tempted to have a more thorough going look on the negative
dialectic as Adorno said that "he?s putting his cards on the table"
(preface) with this book. However, due to his notorious style it is probably
a quite -too difficult- task for me (and as he is also always referring to
Hegel in this text some deeper knowledge than I have about hegelian
dialectic would also be of help).

Thanks Ruth, for pointing my attention again on RTS. I also know Collier?s
valuable introduction of it. In fact I plan to start off my description of
CR with RTS as I find its arguments indispensable to understand PON and its
further implications for social science. The crux of the matter seems to be
now for me the relation of both CR and FS to Kant. As I am not really
familiar with his writings in detail I will first of all try to get in touch
with his (lacking) theory of causality and the (in)famous "thing in itself"
(hope it?s the right term in english).

I also thought about concluding my thesis  with some arguments on Marx.
As I agree that the principles outlined by CR and FS, despite the
differences among them, were already anticipated by Marx (even not just
practical but also theoretically reflected; for example in a lucid manner in
the manuscript M in the "Grundrisse"). I know that there is already some
literature on the relation of CR and Marx, and FS and Marx as well. I also
look at the texts on Marx you mentioned in your text, Howard, thanks again.

And, Phil, I?m currently studying at the University of Vienna, and I?m
starting now in March my "Magisterarbeit" ( similar to master?s thesis).
I hope I can finish by the end of summer (this is at least my plan).
Let?s see.

best wishes,
e

Philip Anthony O'Hanlon schrieb:
> Hi
>
> Ruth says: "Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in
this way."
>
> This is a complex issues and not easily established in my view.  That
Adorno has no explicit theory of causality, it seems true, but that does not
mean he isn't a sort of realist.  I think we would need to specify in
exactly what sense Adorno does not get beyond Kant, because I'm sometimes
not sure that even RB decisively gets beyond Kant.  RB owes a lot more to
Kant than is often given credit for.  Kant of course never denied the
independently real.  He believed in noumena and thought we had to be able to
think it, which could be read as a sort of minimal philosophical ontology of
the type RB argues for in RTS.  Moreover, Erik Watkins "Kant and the
metaphysics of causality" even argues that Kant HAD a causal powers based
ontology.  More work needs to be done on CR vs Adorno.  Adorno lends himself
so easily to being misread because of the notorious style.
>
> On Adorno and elitism, this charge has become so common that has become
banal, and it obstructs appreciation of the profound insights Adorno has to
offer.
>
> The clearest piece Adorno wrote which is less bogged down in the German
tradition than most of his texts is the little known "The Actuality of
Philosophy", Telos 1977.
>
> Echna - which university are you at?
>
> phil.
>
>
>
> ________________________________________
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
> Sent: 04 February 2009 01:21
> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 6
>
> Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
>         critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
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> Today's Topics:
>
>    1. Re: Open letter to Mark Johnson   onpathologicalconversati...
>       (Mervyn Hartwig)
>    2. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
>       (Ruth Groff)
>    3. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt school (echna)
>    4. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
>       (Marcus Salisbury)
>    5. Re: literature on critical realism and frankfurt  school
>       (Ruth Groff)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 19:39:27 -0000
> From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson
>         onpathologicalconversati...
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>
<mailman.7061.1233710490.2556.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="iso-8859-1"
>
>  I agree, let's cool it.
>
> For what it's worth, Mark's posts didn't get on my goat and I agree
> with Sebastian that the points he is raising are important and should
> be discussed. Equally, I can understand that Hans D. took them the way
> he did and don't really find his response over the top. Also, I think
> the list is functioning pretty well. It provides very useful info re
> CR happenings, people sometimes use it to get helpful info and
> feedback re their specific projects, and now and again there is an
interesting thread of discussion.
> What more could a busy person want? There seems little point in
> harking back to 'the good old days'. History has moved on, and
> critical realism with it (if it hasn't, it's in a time warp). For good
> or ill, the dialectical and spiritual turns are a reality, and we have to
make of them what we can.
> Nobody is wanting to say that work within the framework of first-wave
> critical realism is not crucially important and indeed indispensable
> for the health of the whole (which doesn't of course mean that there
> should not be well informed criticism flowing both ways -- to the
contrary).
>
> Mervyn
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Par
> Engholm
> Sent: 03 February 2009 07:29
> To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Open letter to Mark Johnson
> onpathologicalconversati...
>
> Hi all,
> Please just calm down a bit all of you. I don't find either Mark's or
Hans'
> arguments that offensive on their own, but the brandishing of other
> people's posts as offensive, intimidating etc is a very effective way
> of closing any discussion. This list is in my opinion a very open and
> quite friendly forum for discussions on quite a wide range of issues.
> Take a deep breath and try to find something that might cut the
> mustard or in any other way might change the way we talk or think or
> act, which of course are various ways of 'acting' in a more general
> sense. That might include arguing against other people on the list and
> finding their arguments wanting in some respect, but that's part of any
(intellectual) discussion.
> Cheers,
> P?r
>
> *******************************************************
> Par Engholm
> Uppsala University
> Department of Sociology
> http://www.soc.uu.se/kontaktpers.php?id=62
> Mobile: +46 709783546
>
> Journal of Critical Realism
> http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/index
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 14:30:07 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>         frankfurt       school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>         <6ad241360902031230i39c76947s722566e0a4f6b8af at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Echna,
>
> This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know of
> anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in JCR
> a few years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and
> this is short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the
> ontology.  Critical realism is a form of dispositional realism
> (realism about causal powers), which is to say that the view is that
modality inheres in objects.
> Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
> There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications
> of this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book (Routledge
> 2004, CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge) might be
> of some interest.
>
> Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
>
> Warmly,
> Ruth
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>
>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
>> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
>> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
>> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
>> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
>> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
>> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology?
>> The Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the
>> german
>> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen
>> Relevanz von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare
>> the premises of Critical Realism (most certainly in its
>> "pre-dialectical" fashion) with the ones of the Frankfurt School
>> outlined for example in the positivism dispute in german sociology
>> (and I want to deal just with the "old" Frankfurt School not with
>> Habermas and his fellows). In short, I think that both critical
>> realism and frankfurt school develop similar arguments in their
>> controversies with the positivist legacy. However, what has to be
>> done in this case is some kind of "epistemic translation", as both
>> theories are coming out of quite different epistemic communities, so
>> that the constellation of the arguments seems to be more distant than
>> it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite difficult task. Therefore
>> I would be very happy if somebody could give me some hints of
>> literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly appreciated.
>>
>> best regards,
>> e
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>
>>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2009 22:27:14 +0100
> From: echna <echna at gmx.net>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>         frankfurt school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <4988B6B2.1030305 at gmx.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
>
> Hi Ruth,
>
> thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on
> Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t
> find it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only
> text  I get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review
> Symposium: Taking relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of
your book.
> Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name
> it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the
> reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno
> for example in his negative dialectic is talking about the
> preponderance of the object (his whole dialectical approach could also
> be compared to Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however, way
> beyond my scope as I have huge troubles understanding it, especially
> as a non native). This is something that might be interpreted as some
> kind of secreted ontology, which has to be made explicit. What is
> making the whole thing way more difficult and challenging is that the
> Frankfurt School and CR are coming from different "epsitemic
> communities" and notably texts of Adorno et al. have to be cut off
> their embedding in the tradition of german phiosophy (as they have no
> straightforward text in which their principles are laid down). The
> question is this sense is also, whether this is possible without
> harming or destroying the inner core of the theroy. However, as I
> already stated I?m not quite sure on the whole issue yet. Maybe there
> is also a difference between Adorno and Horkheimer , as Horkheimer
> wrote his pieces on positivism and epistemology in general (for
> example the famous text "traditional and critical theory") in the 30s,
> whereas Adorno was especially engaged with epistemic (and
> ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these are just some
> preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I will presumably
> start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be glad about more
"talk" :-) .
>
> best wishes,
> e
> Ruth Groff schrieb:
>
>> Hi Echna,
>>
>> This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know
>> of anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno in
>> JCR a few years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say,
>> and this is short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the
>> ontology.  Critical realism is a form of dispositional realism
>> (realism about causal powers), which is to say that the view is that
modality inheres in objects.
>> Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
>> There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications
>> of this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book
>> (Routledge 2004, CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of
>> Knowledge) might be of some interest.
>>
>> Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
>>
>> Warmly,
>> Ruth
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
>>> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
>>> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I
>>> also did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism
>>> but I couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the
>>> moment writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit"
>>> (something like the master thesis), and the working title is
>>> "Critical Methodology? The Relevance of Theory of Science for the
>>> Social Sciences" (in the german
>>> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen
>>> Relevanz von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare
>>> the premises of Critical Realism (most certainly in its
>>> "pre-dialectical" fashion) with the ones of the Frankfurt School
>>> outlined for example in the positivism dispute in german sociology
>>> (and I want to deal just with the "old" Frankfurt School not with
>>> Habermas and his fellows). In short, I think that both critical
>>> realism and frankfurt school develop similar arguments in their
>>> controversies with the positivist legacy. However, what has to be
>>> done in this case is some kind of "epistemic translation", as both
>>> theories are coming out of quite different epistemic communities, so
>>> that the constellation of the arguments seems to be more distant
>>> than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite difficult task.
>>> Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give me some hints
>>> of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly appreciated.
>>>
>>> best regards,
>>> e
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 17:05:12 -0800 (PST)
> From: Marcus Salisbury <battaday at yahoo.com.au>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>         frankfurt       school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <312028.19433.qm at web53411.mail.re2.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
>
> Echna,
>
> Marcuse's 'One-Dimensional Man' might be a useful?locus?for a comparative
discussion of Frankfurt School thought and Critical Realism, given
its?emphasis on the notion of the illusion of 'freedom' in contemporary
consumer culture and?the need for authentic liberation from the
psychological/environmental damage it causes.?
>
> The problem here (as I have found it, at any rate) is that Adorno in
particular often?conducts his argument?from a fundamentally elitist
viewpoint, e.g. Mahler's symphonies are automatically?good for your mental
well-being and personal growth while jazz music is bad because it's always
made by zombies for zombies.
>
> However, CR and the Frankfurt School both place a good deal of emphasis on
economic and social processes--as embodied by consumer society and the
anxieties it imposes on our psyche--as barriers to authentic liberation.
Hope that's of some use...
> ?Marcus Salisbury
>
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message ----
> From: echna <echna at gmx.net>
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Sent: Wednesday, 4 February, 2009 3:49:42 AM
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
> frankfurt school
>
> Hi all,
>
> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I also
> did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism but I
> couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the moment
> writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" (something like
> the master thesis), and the working title is "Critical Methodology?
> The Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social Sciences" (in the
> german
> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen
> Relevanz von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the
> premises of Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical"
> fashion) with the ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in
> the positivism dispute in german sociology (and I want to deal just
> with the "old" Frankfurt School not with Habermas and his fellows). In
> short, I think that both critical realism and frankfurt school develop
> similar arguments in their controversies with the positivist legacy.
> However, what has to be done in this case is some kind of "epistemic
> translation", as both theories are coming out of quite different
> epistemic communities, so that the constellation of the arguments
> seems to be more distant than it is. As this is -at least for me- a
> quite difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy if somebody
> could give me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help would
> be greatly appreciated.
>
> best regards,
> e
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
>
>       Stay connected to the people that matter most with a smarter
> inbox. Take a look http://au.docs.yahoo.com/mail/smarterinbox
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 5
> Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2009 19:21:27 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
>         frankfurt       school
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>         <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>         <6ad241360902031721m43b49d0bpa3264cf65228988b at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Echna,
>
> I don't remember when Howrd's piece appeared, but if you don't have a
> way to search back JCR issues, Mervyn might be able to tell you.  Or
Howard!
>
> If you are cutting into the issue via positivism, my suggestion would
> be a different from Marcus' I guess.  I'd say look at Horkheimer's
> early stuff in the collection CRITICAL THEORY.  Especially, "The
> Latest Attack on Metaphysics" and, of course, "Traditional and Critical
Theory."  Adorno from
> the Positivist Dispute ...   Also, H's ECLIPSE OF REASON and sections of H
> and A's DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT.  But it sounds as though you are
> already focused on these texts.
>
> They're the basic ones to consider, though, if you want to get a
> handle on what H and A have to say about positivism.  On the cr side,
> Bhaskar has a very sophisticated analysis of the "fact-form" as an
> ideological phenomenon in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation,
> but I would say that you should first really, really understand the
> arguments of A Realist Theory of Science, in order to get at what is
> wrong, conceptually, with positivist laws.  Many practicing cr social
> scientists and theorists have also weighed in on the issue, but as I
> say, I'd first tackle RTS head on.  For help with reading RTS, if you
> want or need it, I think Collier's 1994 book is very
> ice: CRITICAL REALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ROY BHASKAR'S PHILOSOPHY Verso).
>
> Personally, I do think that deep down an important difference between
> H and A and cr is that H and A don't q-u-i-t-e get out from under
> Kant, though the impulse is there, whereas cr points back to
> Aristotle.  But this may well be besides the point for your interests at
this time.
>
> Warmly,
> Ruth
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 3:27 PM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>
>
>> Hi Ruth,
>>
>> thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on
>> Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t
>> find it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only
>> text  I get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review
>> Symposium: Taking relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of
your book.
>> Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name
>> it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the
>> reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno
>> for example in his negative dialectic is talking about the
>> preponderance of the object (his whole dialectical approach could
>> also be compared to Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however,
>> way beyond my scope as I have huge troubles understanding it,
>> especially as a non native). This is something that might be
>> interpreted as some kind of secreted ontology, which has to be made
>> explicit. What is making the whole thing way more difficult and
>> challenging is that the Frankfurt School and CR are coming from
>> different "epsitemic communities" and notably texts of Adorno et al.
>> have to be cut off  their embedding in the tradition of german
>> phiosophy (as they have no straightforward text in which their
>> principles are laid down). The question is this sense is also,
>> whether this is possible without harming or destroying the inner core
>> of the theroy. However, as I already stated I?m not quite sure on the
>> whole issue yet. Maybe there is also a difference between Adorno and
>> Horkheimer , as Horkheimer wrote his pieces on positivism and
>> epistemology in general (for example the famous text "traditional and
>> critical theory") in the 30s, whereas Adorno was especially engaged
>> with epistemic (and ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these
>> are just some preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I
>> will presumably start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be
glad about more "talk" :-) .
>>
>> best wishes,
>> e
>> Ruth Groff schrieb:
>>
>>> Hi Echna,
>>>
>>> This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know
>>> of anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish a piece on Adorno
>>> in JCR a
>>>
>> few
>>
>>> years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this
>>> is short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.
>>>
>>  Critical
>>
>>> realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about causal
>>> powers), which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in
objects.
>>> Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
>>> There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications
>>> of this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book
>>> (Routledge 2004, CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of
>>> Knowledge) might be of some interest.
>>>
>>> Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
>>>
>>> Warmly,
>>> Ruth
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Hi all,
>>>>
>>>> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of
>>>> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the
>>>> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I
>>>> also did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism
>>>> but I couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the
>>>> moment writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit"
>>>> (something like the master thesis), and the working title is
>>>> "Critical Methodology? The Relevance of Theory of Science for the
>>>> Social Sciences" (in the german
>>>> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen
>>>> Relevanz von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare
>>>> the premises of Critical Realism (most certainly in its
>>>> "pre-dialectical" fashion) with the ones of the Frankfurt School
>>>> outlined for example in the positivism dispute in german sociology
>>>> (and I want to deal just with the "old" Frankfurt School not with
>>>> Habermas and his fellows). In short, I think that both critical
>>>> realism and frankfurt school develop similar arguments in their
>>>> controversies with the positivist legacy. However, what has to be
>>>> done in this case is some kind of "epistemic translation", as both
>>>> theories are coming out of quite different epistemic communities,
>>>> so that the constellation of the arguments seems to be more distant
>>>> than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite difficult task.
>>>> Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give me some
>>>> hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly
appreciated.
>>>>
>>>> best regards,
>>>> e
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Critical-Realism mailing list
>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>>
>>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 6
> ***********************************************
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>


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From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk  Thu Feb  5 06:07:11 2009
From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig)
Date: Thu, 5 Feb 2009 13:07:11 -0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
	frankfurtschool
In-Reply-To: <498883B6.7020106@gmx.net>
Message-ID: <mailman.302.1233839237.2553.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>

Further to the suggestions you've already had re this, I think you'd find A
Philosophical History of German Sociology, by Fr?d?ric Vandenberghe
(Routeledge 2008) very useful. It elaborates a first-wave CR reconstruction
of critical theory.

Mervyn


-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna
Sent: 03 February 2009 17:50
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and
frankfurtschool

Hi all,

I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of critical
realism with the theoretical framework developed by the Frankfurt School. I
browsed through the net, using google, and I also did a search on that topic
in the journal for critical realism but I couldn?t find any suitable
literature. I for myself am at the moment writing in Vienna the proposal for
my "Magisterabeit" (something like the master thesis), and the working title
is "Critical Methodology? The Relevance of Theory of Science for the Social
Sciences" (in the german
original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Relevanz von
Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare the premises of
Critical Realism (most certainly in its "pre-dialectical" fashion) with the
ones of the Frankfurt School outlined for example in the positivism dispute
in german sociology (and I want to deal just with the "old" Frankfurt School
not with Habermas and his fellows). In short, I think that both critical
realism and frankfurt school develop similar arguments in their
controversies with the positivist legacy. However, what has to be done in
this case is some kind of "epistemic translation", as both theories are
coming out of quite different epistemic communities, so that the
constellation of the arguments seems to be more distant than it is. As this
is -at least for me- a quite difficult task. Therefore I would be very happy
if somebody could give me some hints of literature on this topic. Any help
would be greatly appreciated.

best regards,
e


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From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk  Sat Feb  7 08:13:46 2009
From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 15:13:46 +0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
Message-ID: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C16@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>


Hi Ruth

I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well the historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a very specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and indeed causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.  Kant wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a dispensible category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that it does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so he is not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It may well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need any more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for more is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.  I think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in the Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.

thanks
Phil


Hi Phil,
So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says at
the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck having in
on the brain today!
But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know about
them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems to me
they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the Prolegomena for
anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a way
that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know that it
does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
"apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.  Therefore it
must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they are
causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd An.]
As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism and
Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of natural
or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really is
provided by the object, not by the subject.
It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these days
the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did, that
ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But the
ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused them
last time, etc.
r.

From rgroff at slu.edu  Sat Feb  7 09:12:00 2009
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 10:12:00 -0600
Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
In-Reply-To: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C16@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
References: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C16@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <6ad241360902070812j49d8c97bq2344caf643cec380@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Phil,

I agree with you exactly about this,  except for that as I go over Kant this
time I find myself having to acknowledge that he himself does not seem to
take the position that natural necessity is an open question.  Or, more
precisely, a meaningless question, transcendentally, and perfectly allowable
(but for a dogmatic ban on it) empirically.  (After all, why should
phenomenal objects not have dispositional properties?)

Adorno, in ND especially, seems to register that there is something wrong
not just with constituting phenomenal objects via their concepts, as Kant
puts it when talking about the t. unity of apperception, but with extracting
causality from them (so that causality does not come from the object, as
Adorno puts it).

I think what you say about why is right.  I think too that insofar as he
reads Kant's transcendental idealism as a correct, if philosophically
encoded, sociological diagnosis, he winds up in a weird position where it is
hard to just say in an easy way that it is problematic, or even false,
philosophically.  And it's odd, because as I suggest above, I don't think
you even have to say that causality inheres in objects in and of themselves
-- you can just say that in addition to "causality" being a category of the
understanding, phenomenal objects have dispositional properties, the display
of which is what causality *really* is.

Anyway, thanks -- all interesting and helpful and relevant, for me.  How is
your work going?

r.


On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 9:13 AM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:

>
> Hi Ruth
>
> I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well the
> historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a very
> specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and indeed
> causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical
> realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.  Kant
> wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a dispensible
> category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was
> undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a
> property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot
> dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that it
> does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so he is
> not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It may
> well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need any
> more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for more
> is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.  I
> think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in the
> Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.
>
> thanks
> Phil
>
>
> Hi Phil,
> So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
> positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
> in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says at
> the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck having
> in
> on the brain today!
> But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know about
> them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems to
> me
> they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the Prolegomena
> for
> anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
> Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
> Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
> experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
> Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
> causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
> supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a way
> that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know that
> it
> does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
> "apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
> arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.  Therefore it
> must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they are
> causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd An.]
> As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism and
> Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
> naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of natural
> or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really is
> provided by the object, not by the subject.
> It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these days
> the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did, that
> ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
> categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
> Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
> moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But the
> ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
> solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
> people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused
> them
> last time, etc.
> r.
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>

From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk  Sat Feb  7 11:38:45 2009
From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 18:38:45 +0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
Message-ID: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C17@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>

Hi Ruth

Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in relation to the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be to appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of the Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation to things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and so-called "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the Critique of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's thought.  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could take from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might forward that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally real, - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least the reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one commentator who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes that the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in context.  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might suppose.

thanks
Phil


From rgroff at slu.edu  Sat Feb  7 11:59:03 2009
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 12:59:03 -0600
Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
In-Reply-To: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C17@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
References: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C17@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <6ad241360902071059h7602417pd98e1368e39cf6a8@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Phil,

Not to worry.  I don't think that I am at risk for reading Kant badly.  I
agree about the 3rd Critique -- it is enormously important to Kant's moral
thinking, and yes, seems to intersect with the account of schematism in the
1st c.  I am not saying that Kant is attracted to idealism in any way.  He
is an empirical realist.  There is no question about that, and I don't see
how anyone can read him otherwise.  But he is a transcendental idealist --
which, despite the name bears very little resemblance to idealism.  It's
true that he wasn't that always.  But that's the position that we're
considering.  I just think it's wishful thinking to read him as thinking
that, even empirically, causality is the display of dispositional
properties.  It's real, for him, causality - empirically real - but even
empirically it is, as with all post-Kantian moderns, the real fact of
phenomena being subject to an ordering principle, not the real fact of the
display of powers.

I admit that I haven't read Watkins yet, and I will, but I just don't see
how you can get Kant out of being a transcendental idealist with respect to
causality.

r.




On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 12:38 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:

> Hi Ruth
>
> Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in relation to
> the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even
> familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be to
> appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of the
> Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation to
> things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and so-called
> "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the Critique
> of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that
> "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the
> Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's thought.
>  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as
> exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate
> senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could take
> from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might forward
> that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a
> relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally real,
> - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least the
> reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one commentator
> who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes that
> the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in context.
>  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might
> suppose.
>
> thanks
> Phil
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>

From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk  Sat Feb  7 20:58:39 2009
From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2009 03:58:39 +0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] KAnt
Message-ID: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C1A@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>

Hi Ruth

just to be clear about it, I wasn't trying to suggest that you were reading Kant badly; not at all.  But I wouldn't worry about that too much anyway.  I do it all the time.  It's half the fun.  One has to be able to read an author badly!  We don't always want to be in the position of having to read an author perfectly:)  Neither do I want to defend Kant as a "dispositional realist".  Watkins may want to do that, but my knowledge of Kant (or dispositional realism) is not extensive enough to make an attempt at that, even if I wanted to.  I have no reason to disagree with what you say about causality.  You are much more familiar with the literature than I.  I raised the Watkins text because I think the idea is at least interesting, and points to the fact that there were many layers to Kant's thought and work.  I'm sure you don't disagree.  The Critique, after all, is a composite.  Also, I just want to clarify, when I said "I would perhaps read the Analytic in light of ....." I wasn't recommending, or advising, as it may have appeared, but expressing my own personal inclination.  I'm not really in a position to advise.  Reading my post back I saw how it could have been taken in that way.  I think a point I was trying to make (and I wasn't suggesting that the point was something you had not appreciated, or would have failed to appreciate if it weren't for my making it) was that Kant is more slippery and open to interpretation than a standard critical realist reading of him would tend to allow, if there is a standard reading.  I think RB's treatment of Kant for example in RTS doesn't do Kant justice, to be honest, and it's possibly not intended to do, as it's more a polemical contrast for the purposes of setting up the critical realist alternative.

I think the other (humble) point I wanted to raise was that there are many different streams running concurrently through Kant's work, of which the Analytic is just one.  This makes pinning Kant down extremely problematic, in my view, as the history of Kant interpretation testifies to.  (Again, I'm not saying you don't already appreciate that fact.)  The Aesthetic and the Analytic themselves can be seen as incongruent with each other (in that in the Aesthetic we are affected by objects, whereas in the Analytic we constitute objects), and the position forwarded in the Refutation of Idealism is markedly other than that put forth in either the Analytic or the Aesthetic.  Anyway, let me know what you make of Watkins eventually.

thanks
Phil



________________________________________
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Today's Topics:

   1. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
   2. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)
   3. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
   4. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 15:13:46 +0000
From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID:
        <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C16 at EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>

Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"


Hi Ruth

I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well the historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a very specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and indeed causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.  Kant wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a dispensible category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that it does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so he is not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It may well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need any more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for more is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.  I think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in the Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.

thanks
Phil


Hi Phil,
So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says at
the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck having in
on the brain today!
But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know about
them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems to me
they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the Prolegomena for
anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a way
that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know that it
does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
"apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.  Therefore it
must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they are
causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd An.]
As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism and
Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of natural
or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really is
provided by the object, not by the subject.
It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these days
the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did, that
ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But the
ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused them
last time, etc.
r.


------------------------------

Message: 2
Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 10:12:00 -0600
From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID:
        <6ad241360902070812j49d8c97bq2344caf643cec380 at mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Hi Phil,

I agree with you exactly about this,  except for that as I go over Kant this
time I find myself having to acknowledge that he himself does not seem to
take the position that natural necessity is an open question.  Or, more
precisely, a meaningless question, transcendentally, and perfectly allowable
(but for a dogmatic ban on it) empirically.  (After all, why should
phenomenal objects not have dispositional properties?)

Adorno, in ND especially, seems to register that there is something wrong
not just with constituting phenomenal objects via their concepts, as Kant
puts it when talking about the t. unity of apperception, but with extracting
causality from them (so that causality does not come from the object, as
Adorno puts it).

I think what you say about why is right.  I think too that insofar as he
reads Kant's transcendental idealism as a correct, if philosophically
encoded, sociological diagnosis, he winds up in a weird position where it is
hard to just say in an easy way that it is problematic, or even false,
philosophically.  And it's odd, because as I suggest above, I don't think
you even have to say that causality inheres in objects in and of themselves
-- you can just say that in addition to "causality" being a category of the
understanding, phenomenal objects have dispositional properties, the display
of which is what causality *really* is.

Anyway, thanks -- all interesting and helpful and relevant, for me.  How is
your work going?

r.


On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 9:13 AM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:

>
> Hi Ruth
>
> I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well the
> historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a very
> specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and indeed
> causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical
> realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.  Kant
> wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a dispensible
> category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was
> undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a
> property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot
> dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that it
> does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so he is
> not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It may
> well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need any
> more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for more
> is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.  I
> think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in the
> Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.
>
> thanks
> Phil
>
>
> Hi Phil,
> So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
> positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
> in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says at
> the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck having
> in
> on the brain today!
> But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know about
> them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems to
> me
> they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the Prolegomena
> for
> anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
> Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
> Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
> experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
> Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
> causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
> supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a way
> that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know that
> it
> does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
> "apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
> arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.  Therefore it
> must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they are
> causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd An.]
> As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism and
> Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
> naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of natural
> or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really is
> provided by the object, not by the subject.
> It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these days
> the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did, that
> ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
> categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
> Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
> moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But the
> ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
> solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
> people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused
> them
> last time, etc.
> r.
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>


------------------------------

Message: 3
Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 18:38:45 +0000
From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID:
        <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C17 at EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>

Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"

Hi Ruth

Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in relation to the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be to appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of the Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation to things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and so-called "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the Critique of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's thought.  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could take from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might forward that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally real, - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least the reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one commentator who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes that the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in context.  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might suppose.

thanks
Phil



------------------------------

Message: 4
Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 12:59:03 -0600
From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID:
        <6ad241360902071059h7602417pd98e1368e39cf6a8 at mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Hi Phil,

Not to worry.  I don't think that I am at risk for reading Kant badly.  I
agree about the 3rd Critique -- it is enormously important to Kant's moral
thinking, and yes, seems to intersect with the account of schematism in the
1st c.  I am not saying that Kant is attracted to idealism in any way.  He
is an empirical realist.  There is no question about that, and I don't see
how anyone can read him otherwise.  But he is a transcendental idealist --
which, despite the name bears very little resemblance to idealism.  It's
true that he wasn't that always.  But that's the position that we're
considering.  I just think it's wishful thinking to read him as thinking
that, even empirically, causality is the display of dispositional
properties.  It's real, for him, causality - empirically real - but even
empirically it is, as with all post-Kantian moderns, the real fact of
phenomena being subject to an ordering principle, not the real fact of the
display of powers.

I admit that I haven't read Watkins yet, and I will, but I just don't see
how you can get Kant out of being a transcendental idealist with respect to
causality.

r.




On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 12:38 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:

> Hi Ruth
>
> Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in relation to
> the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even
> familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be to
> appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of the
> Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation to
> things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and so-called
> "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the Critique
> of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that
> "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the
> Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's thought.
>  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as
> exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate
> senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could take
> from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might forward
> that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a
> relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally real,
> - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least the
> reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one commentator
> who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes that
> the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in context.
>  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might
> suppose.
>
> thanks
> Phil
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>


------------------------------

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End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 16
************************************************


From rgroff at slu.edu  Sat Feb  7 22:47:59 2009
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 23:47:59 -0600
Subject: [Critical-Realism] KAnt
In-Reply-To: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C1A@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
References: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C1A@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <6ad241360902072147l69bffd68q71e0461cf74ebed2@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Phil,

O no worries -- I realized after I wrote it that it might sound as if I had
taken offense in some way, and I hadn't.  I've really appreciated this
exchange -- am not a Kant expert in the slightest.  I just meant to say that
I try hard to read people carefully and generously, with as little prejudice
as possible, and that it wasn't a knee-jerk assessment.  (Don't even get me
started on Plato, who people read in insanely knee-jerky ways ALL the time!
)  And I really agree, about the treatment in RTS.  It's weird: he calls the
position "transcendental realism" - direct dig at Kant - but the whole
argument is aimed at Humeans.

Interesting, about the aesthetic vs. analytic.  Couldn't Kant say that all
he means is that when we do experience transcendentally constituted
phenomenal objects, we necessarily take in the associated sense data in
space and time?  I.e., that it's not really that first we are affected, via
the sensibility, by transcendentally real objects, and then swap them out
for phenomenal objects, synthesized by reason.  That it just sounds that way
because space and time are "prior" in the sense of being unmediated.

This too might be wishful thinking though!  I'd have to go back to the
text.

Warmly,
r.




On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 9:58 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:

> Hi Ruth
>
> just to be clear about it, I wasn't trying to suggest that you were reading
> Kant badly; not at all.  But I wouldn't worry about that too much anyway.  I
> do it all the time.  It's half the fun.  One has to be able to read an
> author badly!  We don't always want to be in the position of having to read
> an author perfectly:)  Neither do I want to defend Kant as a "dispositional
> realist".  Watkins may want to do that, but my knowledge of Kant (or
> dispositional realism) is not extensive enough to make an attempt at that,
> even if I wanted to.  I have no reason to disagree with what you say about
> causality.  You are much more familiar with the literature than I.  I raised
> the Watkins text because I think the idea is at least interesting, and
> points to the fact that there were many layers to Kant's thought and work.
>  I'm sure you don't disagree.  The Critique, after all, is a composite.
>  Also, I just want to clarify, when I said "I would perhaps read the
> Analytic in light of ....." I wasn't recommending, or advising, as it may
> have appeared, but expressing my own personal inclination.  I'm not really
> in a position to advise.  Reading my post back I saw how it could have been
> taken in that way.  I think a point I was trying to make (and I wasn't
> suggesting that the point was something you had not appreciated, or would
> have failed to appreciate if it weren't for my making it) was that Kant is
> more slippery and open to interpretation than a standard critical realist
> reading of him would tend to allow, if there is a standard reading.  I think
> RB's treatment of Kant for example in RTS doesn't do Kant justice, to be
> honest, and it's possibly not intended to do, as it's more a polemical
> contrast for the purposes of setting up the critical realist alternative.
>
> I think the other (humble) point I wanted to raise was that there are many
> different streams running concurrently through Kant's work, of which the
> Analytic is just one.  This makes pinning Kant down extremely problematic,
> in my view, as the history of Kant interpretation testifies to.  (Again, I'm
> not saying you don't already appreciate that fact.)  The Aesthetic and the
> Analytic themselves can be seen as incongruent with each other (in that in
> the Aesthetic we are affected by objects, whereas in the Analytic we
> constitute objects), and the position forwarded in the Refutation of
> Idealism is markedly other than that put forth in either the Analytic or the
> Aesthetic.  Anyway, let me know what you make of Watkins eventually.
>
> thanks
> Phil
>
>
>
> ________________________________________
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
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> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
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>
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> Today's Topics:
>
>   1. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
>   2. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)
>   3. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
>   4. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 15:13:46 +0000
> From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <
> B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C16 at EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
>
> Hi Ruth
>
> I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well the
> historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a very
> specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and indeed
> causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical
> realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.  Kant
> wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a dispensible
> category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was
> undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a
> property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot
> dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that it
> does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so he is
> not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It may
> well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need any
> more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for more
> is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.  I
> think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in the
> Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.
>
> thanks
> Phil
>
>
> Hi Phil,
> So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
> positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
> in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says at
> the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck having
> in
> on the brain today!
> But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know about
> them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems to
> me
> they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the Prolegomena
> for
> anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
> Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
> Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
> experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
> Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
> causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
> supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a way
> that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know that
> it
> does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
> "apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
> arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.  Therefore it
> must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they are
> causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd An.]
> As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism and
> Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
> naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of natural
> or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really is
> provided by the object, not by the subject.
> It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these days
> the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did, that
> ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
> categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
> Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
> moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But the
> ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
> solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
> people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused
> them
> last time, etc.
> r.
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 10:12:00 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <6ad241360902070812j49d8c97bq2344caf643cec380 at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Phil,
>
> I agree with you exactly about this,  except for that as I go over Kant
> this
> time I find myself having to acknowledge that he himself does not seem to
> take the position that natural necessity is an open question.  Or, more
> precisely, a meaningless question, transcendentally, and perfectly
> allowable
> (but for a dogmatic ban on it) empirically.  (After all, why should
> phenomenal objects not have dispositional properties?)
>
> Adorno, in ND especially, seems to register that there is something wrong
> not just with constituting phenomenal objects via their concepts, as Kant
> puts it when talking about the t. unity of apperception, but with
> extracting
> causality from them (so that causality does not come from the object, as
> Adorno puts it).
>
> I think what you say about why is right.  I think too that insofar as he
> reads Kant's transcendental idealism as a correct, if philosophically
> encoded, sociological diagnosis, he winds up in a weird position where it
> is
> hard to just say in an easy way that it is problematic, or even false,
> philosophically.  And it's odd, because as I suggest above, I don't think
> you even have to say that causality inheres in objects in and of themselves
> -- you can just say that in addition to "causality" being a category of the
> understanding, phenomenal objects have dispositional properties, the
> display
> of which is what causality *really* is.
>
> Anyway, thanks -- all interesting and helpful and relevant, for me.  How is
> your work going?
>
> r.
>
>
> On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 9:13 AM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> >
> > Hi Ruth
> >
> > I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well the
> > historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a
> very
> > specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and indeed
> > causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical
> > realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.
>  Kant
> > wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a
> dispensible
> > category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was
> > undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a
> > property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot
> > dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that
> it
> > does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so he
> is
> > not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It
> may
> > well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need
> any
> > more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for
> more
> > is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.
>  I
> > think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in
> the
> > Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.
> >
> > thanks
> > Phil
> >
> >
> > Hi Phil,
> > So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
> > positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
> > in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says at
> > the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck having
> > in
> > on the brain today!
> > But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know about
> > them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems to
> > me
> > they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the Prolegomena
> > for
> > anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
> > Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
> > Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
> > experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
> > Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
> > causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
> > supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a
> way
> > that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know that
> > it
> > does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
> > "apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
> > arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.  Therefore
> it
> > must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they
> are
> > causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd An.]
> > As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism
> and
> > Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
> > naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of
> natural
> > or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really is
> > provided by the object, not by the subject.
> > It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these
> days
> > the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did,
> that
> > ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
> > categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
> > Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
> > moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But the
> > ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
> > solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
> > people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused
> > them
> > last time, etc.
> > r.
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 18:38:45 +0000
> From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <
> B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C17 at EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Hi Ruth
>
> Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in relation to
> the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even
> familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be to
> appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of the
> Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation to
> things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and so-called
> "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the Critique
> of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that
> "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the
> Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's thought.
>  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as
> exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate
> senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could take
> from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might forward
> that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a
> relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally real,
> - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least the
> reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one commentator
> who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes that
> the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in context.
>  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might
> suppose.
>
> thanks
> Phil
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 12:59:03 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
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>
> Hi Phil,
>
> Not to worry.  I don't think that I am at risk for reading Kant badly.  I
> agree about the 3rd Critique -- it is enormously important to Kant's moral
> thinking, and yes, seems to intersect with the account of schematism in the
> 1st c.  I am not saying that Kant is attracted to idealism in any way.  He
> is an empirical realist.  There is no question about that, and I don't see
> how anyone can read him otherwise.  But he is a transcendental idealist --
> which, despite the name bears very little resemblance to idealism.  It's
> true that he wasn't that always.  But that's the position that we're
> considering.  I just think it's wishful thinking to read him as thinking
> that, even empirically, causality is the display of dispositional
> properties.  It's real, for him, causality - empirically real - but even
> empirically it is, as with all post-Kantian moderns, the real fact of
> phenomena being subject to an ordering principle, not the real fact of the
> display of powers.
>
> I admit that I haven't read Watkins yet, and I will, but I just don't see
> how you can get Kant out of being a transcendental idealist with respect to
> causality.
>
> r.
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 12:38 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> > Hi Ruth
> >
> > Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in relation
> to
> > the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even
> > familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be to
> > appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of the
> > Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation to
> > things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and
> so-called
> > "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the
> Critique
> > of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that
> > "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the
> > Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's
> thought.
> >  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as
> > exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate
> > senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could
> take
> > from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might
> forward
> > that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a
> > relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally
> real,
> > - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least the
> > reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one
> commentator
> > who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes
> that
> > the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in
> context.
> >  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might
> > suppose.
> >
> > thanks
> > Phil
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
>
>
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From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk  Sun Feb  8 11:52:03 2009
From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2009 18:52:03 +0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Kant
Message-ID: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C1B@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>

Hi Ruth

Me no expert either!  And I didn't want to appear over-zealous on any of this.  I'm still finding my way around much of it.

I think this point about the mismatch between the Aesthetic and Analytic is really interesting too, especially for a naturalist.  It is often noted in the secondary literature but the area is a bit of a minefield so I would be wanting to tread carefully.  I'm trying more thoroughly to understand this aspect at the moment.  I'll be in a much better position to talk about this in a couple of months.  I'm taking initial inspiration from Piotr Hoffman's The Anatomy of Idealism: Passivity and Activity in Kant, Hegel and Marx".  The argument is something like the Aesthetic expresses a need for a viable account of both intuition and concept, as independent faculties, both equally important for knowledge generation (concepts without intuitions are empty, etc) and the stabilisation of the self.  It is here too where Kant talks about objects affecting us in a sense which can only be read as noumenal objects because they still haven't been conceptualised at this point.  So in the Aesthetic a connection (of some indeterminate sort) seems to be preserved and needs to be preserved between intuition and an independent reality, for the coherence of Kant's project (this is the claim).  Apart from other things, intuitions need to be *of* something.  But in the Analytic, the integrity and independence of intuition is sacrificed to the exigencies of the aims of the Analytic, which involve firstly showing how the mind determines the object completely according to its own rules.  A shift takes place whereby pure intuition is treated as being already shot through with conceptual rules, and this shift mirrors competing conceptual strategies in the two sections.  I believe the same theme is treated by Beatrice Longuenesse in "Kant and the Capacity to Judge", and I have briefly noted something similar in Hermann Cohen's "Kant's Theory of Experience".  Kemp Smith discusses the lack of integration of the Aesthetic and Analytic at p.95 of his commentary.  It seems many commentators see the Aesthetic as motivated by "pre-critical" preoccupations.  I also think the third Critique is interesting precisely for the reassessment of the independent role of intuition, and would therefore be more useful for those who want to "naturalize" Kant, as Hoffman does.

Sorry if this confuses more than it clarifies.

Thanks
Phil.



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Today's Topics:

   1. KAnt (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
   2. Re: KAnt (Ruth Groff)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2009 03:58:39 +0000
From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
Subject: [Critical-Realism] KAnt
To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
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Hi Ruth

just to be clear about it, I wasn't trying to suggest that you were reading Kant badly; not at all.  But I wouldn't worry about that too much anyway.  I do it all the time.  It's half the fun.  One has to be able to read an author badly!  We don't always want to be in the position of having to read an author perfectly:)  Neither do I want to defend Kant as a "dispositional realist".  Watkins may want to do that, but my knowledge of Kant (or dispositional realism) is not extensive enough to make an attempt at that, even if I wanted to.  I have no reason to disagree with what you say about causality.  You are much more familiar with the literature than I.  I raised the Watkins text because I think the idea is at least interesting, and points to the fact that there were many layers to Kant's thought and work.  I'm sure you don't disagree.  The Critique, after all, is a composite.  Also, I just want to clarify, when I said "I would perhaps read the Analytic in light of ....." I wasn't recommending, or advising, as it may have appeared, but expressing my own personal inclination.  I'm not really in a position to advise.  Reading my post back I saw how it could have been taken in that way.  I think a point I was trying to make (and I wasn't suggesting that the point was something you had not appreciated, or would have failed to appreciate if it weren't for my making it) was that Kant is more slippery and open to interpretation than a standard critical realist reading of him would tend to allow, if there is a standard reading.  I think RB's treatment of Kant for example in RTS doesn't do Kant justice, to be honest, and it's possibly not intended to do, as it's more a polemical contrast for the purposes of setting up the critical realist alternative.

I think the other (humble) point I wanted to raise was that there are many different streams running concurrently through Kant's work, of which the Analytic is just one.  This makes pinning Kant down extremely problematic, in my view, as the history of Kant interpretation testifies to.  (Again, I'm not saying you don't already appreciate that fact.)  The Aesthetic and the Analytic themselves can be seen as incongruent with each other (in that in the Aesthetic we are affected by objects, whereas in the Analytic we constitute objects), and the position forwarded in the Refutation of Idealism is markedly other than that put forth in either the Analytic or the Aesthetic.  Anyway, let me know what you make of Watkins eventually.

thanks
Phil



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Today's Topics:

   1. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
   2. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)
   3. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
   4. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 15:13:46 +0000
From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
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Hi Ruth

I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well the historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a very specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and indeed causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.  Kant wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a dispensible category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that it does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so he is not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It may well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need any more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for more is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.  I think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in the Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.

thanks
Phil


Hi Phil,
So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says at
the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck having in
on the brain today!
But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know about
them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems to me
they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the Prolegomena for
anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a way
that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know that it
does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
"apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.  Therefore it
must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they are
causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd An.]
As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism and
Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of natural
or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really is
provided by the object, not by the subject.
It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these days
the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did, that
ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But the
ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused them
last time, etc.
r.


------------------------------

Message: 2
Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 10:12:00 -0600
From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID:
        <6ad241360902070812j49d8c97bq2344caf643cec380 at mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Hi Phil,

I agree with you exactly about this,  except for that as I go over Kant this
time I find myself having to acknowledge that he himself does not seem to
take the position that natural necessity is an open question.  Or, more
precisely, a meaningless question, transcendentally, and perfectly allowable
(but for a dogmatic ban on it) empirically.  (After all, why should
phenomenal objects not have dispositional properties?)

Adorno, in ND especially, seems to register that there is something wrong
not just with constituting phenomenal objects via their concepts, as Kant
puts it when talking about the t. unity of apperception, but with extracting
causality from them (so that causality does not come from the object, as
Adorno puts it).

I think what you say about why is right.  I think too that insofar as he
reads Kant's transcendental idealism as a correct, if philosophically
encoded, sociological diagnosis, he winds up in a weird position where it is
hard to just say in an easy way that it is problematic, or even false,
philosophically.  And it's odd, because as I suggest above, I don't think
you even have to say that causality inheres in objects in and of themselves
-- you can just say that in addition to "causality" being a category of the
understanding, phenomenal objects have dispositional properties, the display
of which is what causality *really* is.

Anyway, thanks -- all interesting and helpful and relevant, for me.  How is
your work going?

r.


On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 9:13 AM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:

>
> Hi Ruth
>
> I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well the
> historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a very
> specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and indeed
> causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical
> realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.  Kant
> wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a dispensible
> category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was
> undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a
> property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot
> dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that it
> does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so he is
> not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It may
> well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need any
> more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for more
> is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.  I
> think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in the
> Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.
>
> thanks
> Phil
>
>
> Hi Phil,
> So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
> positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
> in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says at
> the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck having
> in
> on the brain today!
> But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know about
> them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems to
> me
> they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the Prolegomena
> for
> anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
> Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
> Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
> experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
> Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
> causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
> supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a way
> that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know that
> it
> does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
> "apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
> arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.  Therefore it
> must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they are
> causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd An.]
> As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism and
> Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
> naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of natural
> or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really is
> provided by the object, not by the subject.
> It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these days
> the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did, that
> ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
> categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
> Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
> moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But the
> ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
> solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
> people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused
> them
> last time, etc.
> r.
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>


------------------------------

Message: 3
Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 18:38:45 +0000
From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID:
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Hi Ruth

Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in relation to the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be to appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of the Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation to things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and so-called "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the Critique of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's thought.  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could take from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might forward that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally real, - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least the reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one commentator who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes that the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in context.  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might suppose.

thanks
Phil



------------------------------

Message: 4
Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 12:59:03 -0600
From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID:
        <6ad241360902071059h7602417pd98e1368e39cf6a8 at mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Hi Phil,

Not to worry.  I don't think that I am at risk for reading Kant badly.  I
agree about the 3rd Critique -- it is enormously important to Kant's moral
thinking, and yes, seems to intersect with the account of schematism in the
1st c.  I am not saying that Kant is attracted to idealism in any way.  He
is an empirical realist.  There is no question about that, and I don't see
how anyone can read him otherwise.  But he is a transcendental idealist --
which, despite the name bears very little resemblance to idealism.  It's
true that he wasn't that always.  But that's the position that we're
considering.  I just think it's wishful thinking to read him as thinking
that, even empirically, causality is the display of dispositional
properties.  It's real, for him, causality - empirically real - but even
empirically it is, as with all post-Kantian moderns, the real fact of
phenomena being subject to an ordering principle, not the real fact of the
display of powers.

I admit that I haven't read Watkins yet, and I will, but I just don't see
how you can get Kant out of being a transcendental idealist with respect to
causality.

r.




On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 12:38 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:

> Hi Ruth
>
> Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in relation to
> the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even
> familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be to
> appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of the
> Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation to
> things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and so-called
> "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the Critique
> of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that
> "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the
> Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's thought.
>  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as
> exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate
> senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could take
> from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might forward
> that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a
> relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally real,
> - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least the
> reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one commentator
> who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes that
> the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in context.
>  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might
> suppose.
>
> thanks
> Phil
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>


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------------------------------

Message: 2
Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 23:47:59 -0600
From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] KAnt
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
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        <6ad241360902072147l69bffd68q71e0461cf74ebed2 at mail.gmail.com>
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Hi Phil,

O no worries -- I realized after I wrote it that it might sound as if I had
taken offense in some way, and I hadn't.  I've really appreciated this
exchange -- am not a Kant expert in the slightest.  I just meant to say that
I try hard to read people carefully and generously, with as little prejudice
as possible, and that it wasn't a knee-jerk assessment.  (Don't even get me
started on Plato, who people read in insanely knee-jerky ways ALL the time!
)  And I really agree, about the treatment in RTS.  It's weird: he calls the
position "transcendental realism" - direct dig at Kant - but the whole
argument is aimed at Humeans.

Interesting, about the aesthetic vs. analytic.  Couldn't Kant say that all
he means is that when we do experience transcendentally constituted
phenomenal objects, we necessarily take in the associated sense data in
space and time?  I.e., that it's not really that first we are affected, via
the sensibility, by transcendentally real objects, and then swap them out
for phenomenal objects, synthesized by reason.  That it just sounds that way
because space and time are "prior" in the sense of being unmediated.

This too might be wishful thinking though!  I'd have to go back to the
text.

Warmly,
r.




On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 9:58 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:

> Hi Ruth
>
> just to be clear about it, I wasn't trying to suggest that you were reading
> Kant badly; not at all.  But I wouldn't worry about that too much anyway.  I
> do it all the time.  It's half the fun.  One has to be able to read an
> author badly!  We don't always want to be in the position of having to read
> an author perfectly:)  Neither do I want to defend Kant as a "dispositional
> realist".  Watkins may want to do that, but my knowledge of Kant (or
> dispositional realism) is not extensive enough to make an attempt at that,
> even if I wanted to.  I have no reason to disagree with what you say about
> causality.  You are much more familiar with the literature than I.  I raised
> the Watkins text because I think the idea is at least interesting, and
> points to the fact that there were many layers to Kant's thought and work.
>  I'm sure you don't disagree.  The Critique, after all, is a composite.
>  Also, I just want to clarify, when I said "I would perhaps read the
> Analytic in light of ....." I wasn't recommending, or advising, as it may
> have appeared, but expressing my own personal inclination.  I'm not really
> in a position to advise.  Reading my post back I saw how it could have been
> taken in that way.  I think a point I was trying to make (and I wasn't
> suggesting that the point was something you had not appreciated, or would
> have failed to appreciate if it weren't for my making it) was that Kant is
> more slippery and open to interpretation than a standard critical realist
> reading of him would tend to allow, if there is a standard reading.  I think
> RB's treatment of Kant for example in RTS doesn't do Kant justice, to be
> honest, and it's possibly not intended to do, as it's more a polemical
> contrast for the purposes of setting up the critical realist alternative.
>
> I think the other (humble) point I wanted to raise was that there are many
> different streams running concurrently through Kant's work, of which the
> Analytic is just one.  This makes pinning Kant down extremely problematic,
> in my view, as the history of Kant interpretation testifies to.  (Again, I'm
> not saying you don't already appreciate that fact.)  The Aesthetic and the
> Analytic themselves can be seen as incongruent with each other (in that in
> the Aesthetic we are affected by objects, whereas in the Analytic we
> constitute objects), and the position forwarded in the Refutation of
> Idealism is markedly other than that put forth in either the Analytic or the
> Aesthetic.  Anyway, let me know what you make of Watkins eventually.
>
> thanks
> Phil
>
>
>
> ________________________________________
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
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> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
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> Today's Topics:
>
>   1. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
>   2. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)
>   3. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
>   4. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 15:13:46 +0000
> From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <
> B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C16 at EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
>
> Hi Ruth
>
> I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well the
> historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a very
> specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and indeed
> causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical
> realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.  Kant
> wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a dispensible
> category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was
> undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a
> property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot
> dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that it
> does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so he is
> not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It may
> well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need any
> more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for more
> is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.  I
> think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in the
> Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.
>
> thanks
> Phil
>
>
> Hi Phil,
> So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
> positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
> in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says at
> the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck having
> in
> on the brain today!
> But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know about
> them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems to
> me
> they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the Prolegomena
> for
> anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
> Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
> Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
> experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
> Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
> causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
> supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a way
> that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know that
> it
> does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
> "apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
> arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.  Therefore it
> must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they are
> causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd An.]
> As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism and
> Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
> naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of natural
> or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really is
> provided by the object, not by the subject.
> It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these days
> the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did, that
> ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
> categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
> Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
> moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But the
> ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
> solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
> people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused
> them
> last time, etc.
> r.
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 10:12:00 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <6ad241360902070812j49d8c97bq2344caf643cec380 at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Phil,
>
> I agree with you exactly about this,  except for that as I go over Kant
> this
> time I find myself having to acknowledge that he himself does not seem to
> take the position that natural necessity is an open question.  Or, more
> precisely, a meaningless question, transcendentally, and perfectly
> allowable
> (but for a dogmatic ban on it) empirically.  (After all, why should
> phenomenal objects not have dispositional properties?)
>
> Adorno, in ND especially, seems to register that there is something wrong
> not just with constituting phenomenal objects via their concepts, as Kant
> puts it when talking about the t. unity of apperception, but with
> extracting
> causality from them (so that causality does not come from the object, as
> Adorno puts it).
>
> I think what you say about why is right.  I think too that insofar as he
> reads Kant's transcendental idealism as a correct, if philosophically
> encoded, sociological diagnosis, he winds up in a weird position where it
> is
> hard to just say in an easy way that it is problematic, or even false,
> philosophically.  And it's odd, because as I suggest above, I don't think
> you even have to say that causality inheres in objects in and of themselves
> -- you can just say that in addition to "causality" being a category of the
> understanding, phenomenal objects have dispositional properties, the
> display
> of which is what causality *really* is.
>
> Anyway, thanks -- all interesting and helpful and relevant, for me.  How is
> your work going?
>
> r.
>
>
> On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 9:13 AM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> >
> > Hi Ruth
> >
> > I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well the
> > historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a
> very
> > specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and indeed
> > causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical
> > realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.
>  Kant
> > wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a
> dispensible
> > category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was
> > undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a
> > property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot
> > dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that
> it
> > does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so he
> is
> > not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It
> may
> > well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need
> any
> > more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for
> more
> > is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.
>  I
> > think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in
> the
> > Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.
> >
> > thanks
> > Phil
> >
> >
> > Hi Phil,
> > So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
> > positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
> > in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says at
> > the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck having
> > in
> > on the brain today!
> > But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know about
> > them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems to
> > me
> > they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the Prolegomena
> > for
> > anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
> > Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
> > Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
> > experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
> > Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
> > causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
> > supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a
> way
> > that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know that
> > it
> > does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
> > "apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
> > arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.  Therefore
> it
> > must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they
> are
> > causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd An.]
> > As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism
> and
> > Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
> > naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of
> natural
> > or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really is
> > provided by the object, not by the subject.
> > It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these
> days
> > the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did,
> that
> > ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
> > categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
> > Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
> > moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But the
> > ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
> > solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
> > people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused
> > them
> > last time, etc.
> > r.
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 18:38:45 +0000
> From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <
> B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C17 at EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Hi Ruth
>
> Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in relation to
> the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even
> familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be to
> appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of the
> Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation to
> things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and so-called
> "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the Critique
> of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that
> "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the
> Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's thought.
>  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as
> exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate
> senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could take
> from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might forward
> that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a
> relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally real,
> - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least the
> reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one commentator
> who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes that
> the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in context.
>  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might
> suppose.
>
> thanks
> Phil
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 12:59:03 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <6ad241360902071059h7602417pd98e1368e39cf6a8 at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Phil,
>
> Not to worry.  I don't think that I am at risk for reading Kant badly.  I
> agree about the 3rd Critique -- it is enormously important to Kant's moral
> thinking, and yes, seems to intersect with the account of schematism in the
> 1st c.  I am not saying that Kant is attracted to idealism in any way.  He
> is an empirical realist.  There is no question about that, and I don't see
> how anyone can read him otherwise.  But he is a transcendental idealist --
> which, despite the name bears very little resemblance to idealism.  It's
> true that he wasn't that always.  But that's the position that we're
> considering.  I just think it's wishful thinking to read him as thinking
> that, even empirically, causality is the display of dispositional
> properties.  It's real, for him, causality - empirically real - but even
> empirically it is, as with all post-Kantian moderns, the real fact of
> phenomena being subject to an ordering principle, not the real fact of the
> display of powers.
>
> I admit that I haven't read Watkins yet, and I will, but I just don't see
> how you can get Kant out of being a transcendental idealist with respect to
> causality.
>
> r.
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 12:38 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> > Hi Ruth
> >
> > Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in relation
> to
> > the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even
> > familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be to
> > appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of the
> > Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation to
> > things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and
> so-called
> > "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the
> Critique
> > of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that
> > "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the
> > Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's
> thought.
> >  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as
> > exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate
> > senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could
> take
> > from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might
> forward
> > that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a
> > relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally
> real,
> > - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least the
> > reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one
> commentator
> > who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes
> that
> > the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in
> context.
> >  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might
> > suppose.
> >
> > thanks
> > Phil
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 16
> ************************************************
>
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From rgroff at slu.edu  Sun Feb  8 14:46:52 2009
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2009 15:46:52 -0600
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Kant
In-Reply-To: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C1B@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
References: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C1B@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <6ad241360902081346x7b67ce64kf40fe1b6d42db8b8@mail.gmail.com>

No, it doesn't confuse.  How can all those fancy people not be right (!),
but I do wonder if the reading is - very technically speaking - not
dialectical enough.  That is, the point of the aesthetic is that we receive
sensory input in spacial and temporal terms, that we do so necessarily, and
that there is no active, synthesizing required for this to be the case.  It
is, as Kant says, simply the form of sensibility itself.

Now, what I'm wondering is if it is not a hypostatizing of that moment, as
our man Adorno would say, to think that literally we first receive sense
impressions of noumenal objects and then we synthesize the resultant
spacially and temporally located apprehensions into appearances, i.e., into
phenomenal objects, first through the unity of apperception and then through
the categories (with help from the schemas).  This seems too weird and sort
of obviously dumb, for it to be what Kant meant.  More plausible is that
form(s) of intuition come(s) "first" only analytically, in virtue of being
passive and unmediated.  But the object of experience (here, the object that
is being sensed in space and time) is what objects of experience always are:
phenomenal objects.

See what I mean?  Doesn't it seem that Kant had to mean something like
that?  I mean, the forms of intuition don't even tell us about objects
anyway, phenomenal or otherwise; they tell us only that we experience
objects, when we do, as existing outside of us, and that we experience them
at time x, which we immediately experience as before x+1 and after x-1.

r.



On Sun, Feb 8, 2009 at 12:52 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:

> Hi Ruth
>
> Me no expert either!  And I didn't want to appear over-zealous on any of
> this.  I'm still finding my way around much of it.
>
> I think this point about the mismatch between the Aesthetic and Analytic is
> really interesting too, especially for a naturalist.  It is often noted in
> the secondary literature but the area is a bit of a minefield so I would be
> wanting to tread carefully.  I'm trying more thoroughly to understand this
> aspect at the moment.  I'll be in a much better position to talk about this
> in a couple of months.  I'm taking initial inspiration from Piotr Hoffman's
> The Anatomy of Idealism: Passivity and Activity in Kant, Hegel and Marx".
>  The argument is something like the Aesthetic expresses a need for a viable
> account of both intuition and concept, as independent faculties, both
> equally important for knowledge generation (concepts without intuitions are
> empty, etc) and the stabilisation of the self.  It is here too where Kant
> talks about objects affecting us in a sense which can only be read as
> noumenal objects because they still haven't been conceptualised at this
> point.  So in the Aesthetic a connection (of some indeterminate sort) seems
> to be preserved and needs to be preserved between intuition and an
> independent reality, for the coherence of Kant's project (this is the
> claim).  Apart from other things, intuitions need to be *of* something.  But
> in the Analytic, the integrity and independence of intuition is sacrificed
> to the exigencies of the aims of the Analytic, which involve firstly showing
> how the mind determines the object completely according to its own rules.  A
> shift takes place whereby pure intuition is treated as being already shot
> through with conceptual rules, and this shift mirrors competing conceptual
> strategies in the two sections.  I believe the same theme is treated by
> Beatrice Longuenesse in "Kant and the Capacity to Judge", and I have briefly
> noted something similar in Hermann Cohen's "Kant's Theory of Experience".
>  Kemp Smith discusses the lack of integration of the Aesthetic and Analytic
> at p.95 of his commentary.  It seems many commentators see the Aesthetic as
> motivated by "pre-critical" preoccupations.  I also think the third Critique
> is interesting precisely for the reassessment of the independent role of
> intuition, and would therefore be more useful for those who want to
> "naturalize" Kant, as Hoffman does.
>
> Sorry if this confuses more than it clarifies.
>
> Thanks
> Phil.
>
>
>
> ________________________________________
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
> Sent: 08 February 2009 05:48
> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 17
>
> Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
>        critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>        http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
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> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>   1. KAnt (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
>   2. Re: KAnt (Ruth Groff)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2009 03:58:39 +0000
> From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] KAnt
> To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
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>
> Hi Ruth
>
> just to be clear about it, I wasn't trying to suggest that you were reading
> Kant badly; not at all.  But I wouldn't worry about that too much anyway.  I
> do it all the time.  It's half the fun.  One has to be able to read an
> author badly!  We don't always want to be in the position of having to read
> an author perfectly:)  Neither do I want to defend Kant as a "dispositional
> realist".  Watkins may want to do that, but my knowledge of Kant (or
> dispositional realism) is not extensive enough to make an attempt at that,
> even if I wanted to.  I have no reason to disagree with what you say about
> causality.  You are much more familiar with the literature than I.  I raised
> the Watkins text because I think the idea is at least interesting, and
> points to the fact that there were many layers to Kant's thought and work.
>  I'm sure you don't disagree.  The Critique, after all, is a composite.
>  Also, I just want to clarify, when I said "I would perhaps read the
> Analytic in light of ....." I wasn't recommending, or advising, as it may
> have appeared, but expressing my own personal inclination.  I'm not really
> in a position to advise.  Reading my post back I saw how it could have been
> taken in that way.  I think a point I was trying to make (and I wasn't
> suggesting that the point was something you had not appreciated, or would
> have failed to appreciate if it weren't for my making it) was that Kant is
> more slippery and open to interpretation than a standard critical realist
> reading of him would tend to allow, if there is a standard reading.  I think
> RB's treatment of Kant for example in RTS doesn't do Kant justice, to be
> honest, and it's possibly not intended to do, as it's more a polemical
> contrast for the purposes of setting up the critical realist alternative.
>
> I think the other (humble) point I wanted to raise was that there are many
> different streams running concurrently through Kant's work, of which the
> Analytic is just one.  This makes pinning Kant down extremely problematic,
> in my view, as the history of Kant interpretation testifies to.  (Again, I'm
> not saying you don't already appreciate that fact.)  The Aesthetic and the
> Analytic themselves can be seen as incongruent with each other (in that in
> the Aesthetic we are affected by objects, whereas in the Analytic we
> constitute objects), and the position forwarded in the Refutation of
> Idealism is markedly other than that put forth in either the Analytic or the
> Aesthetic.  Anyway, let me know what you make of Watkins eventually.
>
> thanks
> Phil
>
>
>
> ________________________________________
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> critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
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> Today's Topics:
>
>   1. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
>   2. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)
>   3. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
>   4. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 15:13:46 +0000
> From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
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>
> Hi Ruth
>
> I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well the
> historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a very
> specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and indeed
> causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical
> realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.  Kant
> wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a dispensible
> category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was
> undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a
> property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot
> dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that it
> does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so he is
> not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It may
> well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need any
> more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for more
> is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.  I
> think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in the
> Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.
>
> thanks
> Phil
>
>
> Hi Phil,
> So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
> positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
> in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says at
> the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck having
> in
> on the brain today!
> But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know about
> them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems to
> me
> they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the Prolegomena
> for
> anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
> Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
> Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
> experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
> Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
> causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
> supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a way
> that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know that
> it
> does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
> "apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
> arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.  Therefore it
> must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they are
> causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd An.]
> As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism and
> Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
> naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of natural
> or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really is
> provided by the object, not by the subject.
> It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these days
> the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did, that
> ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
> categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
> Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
> moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But the
> ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
> solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
> people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused
> them
> last time, etc.
> r.
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 10:12:00 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <6ad241360902070812j49d8c97bq2344caf643cec380 at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Phil,
>
> I agree with you exactly about this,  except for that as I go over Kant
> this
> time I find myself having to acknowledge that he himself does not seem to
> take the position that natural necessity is an open question.  Or, more
> precisely, a meaningless question, transcendentally, and perfectly
> allowable
> (but for a dogmatic ban on it) empirically.  (After all, why should
> phenomenal objects not have dispositional properties?)
>
> Adorno, in ND especially, seems to register that there is something wrong
> not just with constituting phenomenal objects via their concepts, as Kant
> puts it when talking about the t. unity of apperception, but with
> extracting
> causality from them (so that causality does not come from the object, as
> Adorno puts it).
>
> I think what you say about why is right.  I think too that insofar as he
> reads Kant's transcendental idealism as a correct, if philosophically
> encoded, sociological diagnosis, he winds up in a weird position where it
> is
> hard to just say in an easy way that it is problematic, or even false,
> philosophically.  And it's odd, because as I suggest above, I don't think
> you even have to say that causality inheres in objects in and of themselves
> -- you can just say that in addition to "causality" being a category of the
> understanding, phenomenal objects have dispositional properties, the
> display
> of which is what causality *really* is.
>
> Anyway, thanks -- all interesting and helpful and relevant, for me.  How is
> your work going?
>
> r.
>
>
> On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 9:13 AM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> >
> > Hi Ruth
> >
> > I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well the
> > historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a
> very
> > specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and indeed
> > causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical
> > realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.
>  Kant
> > wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a
> dispensible
> > category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was
> > undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a
> > property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot
> > dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that
> it
> > does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so he
> is
> > not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It
> may
> > well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need
> any
> > more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for
> more
> > is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.
>  I
> > think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in
> the
> > Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.
> >
> > thanks
> > Phil
> >
> >
> > Hi Phil,
> > So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
> > positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
> > in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says at
> > the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck having
> > in
> > on the brain today!
> > But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know about
> > them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems to
> > me
> > they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the Prolegomena
> > for
> > anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
> > Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
> > Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
> > experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
> > Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
> > causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
> > supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a
> way
> > that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know that
> > it
> > does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
> > "apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
> > arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.  Therefore
> it
> > must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they
> are
> > causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd An.]
> > As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism
> and
> > Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
> > naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of
> natural
> > or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really is
> > provided by the object, not by the subject.
> > It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these
> days
> > the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did,
> that
> > ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
> > categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
> > Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
> > moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But the
> > ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
> > solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
> > people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused
> > them
> > last time, etc.
> > r.
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 18:38:45 +0000
> From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <
> B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C17 at EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Hi Ruth
>
> Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in relation to
> the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even
> familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be to
> appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of the
> Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation to
> things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and so-called
> "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the Critique
> of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that
> "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the
> Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's thought.
>  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as
> exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate
> senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could take
> from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might forward
> that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a
> relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally real,
> - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least the
> reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one commentator
> who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes that
> the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in context.
>  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might
> suppose.
>
> thanks
> Phil
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 12:59:03 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <6ad241360902071059h7602417pd98e1368e39cf6a8 at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Phil,
>
> Not to worry.  I don't think that I am at risk for reading Kant badly.  I
> agree about the 3rd Critique -- it is enormously important to Kant's moral
> thinking, and yes, seems to intersect with the account of schematism in the
> 1st c.  I am not saying that Kant is attracted to idealism in any way.  He
> is an empirical realist.  There is no question about that, and I don't see
> how anyone can read him otherwise.  But he is a transcendental idealist --
> which, despite the name bears very little resemblance to idealism.  It's
> true that he wasn't that always.  But that's the position that we're
> considering.  I just think it's wishful thinking to read him as thinking
> that, even empirically, causality is the display of dispositional
> properties.  It's real, for him, causality - empirically real - but even
> empirically it is, as with all post-Kantian moderns, the real fact of
> phenomena being subject to an ordering principle, not the real fact of the
> display of powers.
>
> I admit that I haven't read Watkins yet, and I will, but I just don't see
> how you can get Kant out of being a transcendental idealist with respect to
> causality.
>
> r.
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 12:38 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> > Hi Ruth
> >
> > Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in relation
> to
> > the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even
> > familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be to
> > appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of the
> > Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation to
> > things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and
> so-called
> > "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the
> Critique
> > of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that
> > "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the
> > Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's
> thought.
> >  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as
> > exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate
> > senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could
> take
> > from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might
> forward
> > that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a
> > relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally
> real,
> > - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least the
> > reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one
> commentator
> > who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes
> that
> > the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in
> context.
> >  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might
> > suppose.
> >
> > thanks
> > Phil
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 16
> ************************************************
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 23:47:59 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] KAnt
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <6ad241360902072147l69bffd68q71e0461cf74ebed2 at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Phil,
>
> O no worries -- I realized after I wrote it that it might sound as if I had
> taken offense in some way, and I hadn't.  I've really appreciated this
> exchange -- am not a Kant expert in the slightest.  I just meant to say
> that
> I try hard to read people carefully and generously, with as little
> prejudice
> as possible, and that it wasn't a knee-jerk assessment.  (Don't even get me
> started on Plato, who people read in insanely knee-jerky ways ALL the time!
> )  And I really agree, about the treatment in RTS.  It's weird: he calls
> the
> position "transcendental realism" - direct dig at Kant - but the whole
> argument is aimed at Humeans.
>
> Interesting, about the aesthetic vs. analytic.  Couldn't Kant say that all
> he means is that when we do experience transcendentally constituted
> phenomenal objects, we necessarily take in the associated sense data in
> space and time?  I.e., that it's not really that first we are affected, via
> the sensibility, by transcendentally real objects, and then swap them out
> for phenomenal objects, synthesized by reason.  That it just sounds that
> way
> because space and time are "prior" in the sense of being unmediated.
>
> This too might be wishful thinking though!  I'd have to go back to the
> text.
>
> Warmly,
> r.
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 9:58 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> > Hi Ruth
> >
> > just to be clear about it, I wasn't trying to suggest that you were
> reading
> > Kant badly; not at all.  But I wouldn't worry about that too much anyway.
>  I
> > do it all the time.  It's half the fun.  One has to be able to read an
> > author badly!  We don't always want to be in the position of having to
> read
> > an author perfectly:)  Neither do I want to defend Kant as a
> "dispositional
> > realist".  Watkins may want to do that, but my knowledge of Kant (or
> > dispositional realism) is not extensive enough to make an attempt at
> that,
> > even if I wanted to.  I have no reason to disagree with what you say
> about
> > causality.  You are much more familiar with the literature than I.  I
> raised
> > the Watkins text because I think the idea is at least interesting, and
> > points to the fact that there were many layers to Kant's thought and
> work.
> >  I'm sure you don't disagree.  The Critique, after all, is a composite.
> >  Also, I just want to clarify, when I said "I would perhaps read the
> > Analytic in light of ....." I wasn't recommending, or advising, as it may
> > have appeared, but expressing my own personal inclination.  I'm not
> really
> > in a position to advise.  Reading my post back I saw how it could have
> been
> > taken in that way.  I think a point I was trying to make (and I wasn't
> > suggesting that the point was something you had not appreciated, or would
> > have failed to appreciate if it weren't for my making it) was that Kant
> is
> > more slippery and open to interpretation than a standard critical realist
> > reading of him would tend to allow, if there is a standard reading.  I
> think
> > RB's treatment of Kant for example in RTS doesn't do Kant justice, to be
> > honest, and it's possibly not intended to do, as it's more a polemical
> > contrast for the purposes of setting up the critical realist alternative.
> >
> > I think the other (humble) point I wanted to raise was that there are
> many
> > different streams running concurrently through Kant's work, of which the
> > Analytic is just one.  This makes pinning Kant down extremely
> problematic,
> > in my view, as the history of Kant interpretation testifies to.  (Again,
> I'm
> > not saying you don't already appreciate that fact.)  The Aesthetic and
> the
> > Analytic themselves can be seen as incongruent with each other (in that
> in
> > the Aesthetic we are affected by objects, whereas in the Analytic we
> > constitute objects), and the position forwarded in the Refutation of
> > Idealism is markedly other than that put forth in either the Analytic or
> the
> > Aesthetic.  Anyway, let me know what you make of Watkins eventually.
> >
> > thanks
> > Phil
> >
> >
> >
> > ________________________________________
> > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> > critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
> > Sent: 07 February 2009 19:00
> > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 16
> >
> > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
> >        critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> >
> > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> >        http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> >        critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu
> >
> > You can reach the person managing the list at
> >        critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu
> >
> > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..."
> >
> >
> > Today's Topics:
> >
> >   1. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
> >   2. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)
> >   3. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
> >   4. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)
> >
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 1
> > Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 15:13:46 +0000
> > From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
> > Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> > To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID:
> >        <
> > B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C16 at EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
> >
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> >
> >
> > Hi Ruth
> >
> > I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well the
> > historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a
> very
> > specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and indeed
> > causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical
> > realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.
>  Kant
> > wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a
> dispensible
> > category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was
> > undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a
> > property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot
> > dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that
> it
> > does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so he
> is
> > not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It
> may
> > well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need
> any
> > more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for
> more
> > is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.
>  I
> > think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in
> the
> > Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.
> >
> > thanks
> > Phil
> >
> >
> > Hi Phil,
> > So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
> > positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
> > in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says at
> > the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck having
> > in
> > on the brain today!
> > But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know about
> > them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems to
> > me
> > they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the Prolegomena
> > for
> > anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
> > Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
> > Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
> > experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
> > Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
> > causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
> > supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a
> way
> > that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know that
> > it
> > does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
> > "apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
> > arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.  Therefore
> it
> > must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they
> are
> > causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd An.]
> > As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism
> and
> > Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
> > naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of
> natural
> > or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really is
> > provided by the object, not by the subject.
> > It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these
> days
> > the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did,
> that
> > ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
> > categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
> > Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
> > moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But the
> > ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
> > solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
> > people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused
> > them
> > last time, etc.
> > r.
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 2
> > Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 10:12:00 -0600
> > From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID:
> >        <6ad241360902070812j49d8c97bq2344caf643cec380 at mail.gmail.com>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
> >
> > Hi Phil,
> >
> > I agree with you exactly about this,  except for that as I go over Kant
> > this
> > time I find myself having to acknowledge that he himself does not seem to
> > take the position that natural necessity is an open question.  Or, more
> > precisely, a meaningless question, transcendentally, and perfectly
> > allowable
> > (but for a dogmatic ban on it) empirically.  (After all, why should
> > phenomenal objects not have dispositional properties?)
> >
> > Adorno, in ND especially, seems to register that there is something wrong
> > not just with constituting phenomenal objects via their concepts, as Kant
> > puts it when talking about the t. unity of apperception, but with
> > extracting
> > causality from them (so that causality does not come from the object, as
> > Adorno puts it).
> >
> > I think what you say about why is right.  I think too that insofar as he
> > reads Kant's transcendental idealism as a correct, if philosophically
> > encoded, sociological diagnosis, he winds up in a weird position where it
> > is
> > hard to just say in an easy way that it is problematic, or even false,
> > philosophically.  And it's odd, because as I suggest above, I don't think
> > you even have to say that causality inheres in objects in and of
> themselves
> > -- you can just say that in addition to "causality" being a category of
> the
> > understanding, phenomenal objects have dispositional properties, the
> > display
> > of which is what causality *really* is.
> >
> > Anyway, thanks -- all interesting and helpful and relevant, for me.  How
> is
> > your work going?
> >
> > r.
> >
> >
> > On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 9:13 AM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> > pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > Hi Ruth
> > >
> > > I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well
> the
> > > historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a
> > very
> > > specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and
> indeed
> > > causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical
> > > realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.
> >  Kant
> > > wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a
> > dispensible
> > > category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was
> > > undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a
> > > property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot
> > > dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that
> > it
> > > does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so
> he
> > is
> > > not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It
> > may
> > > well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need
> > any
> > > more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for
> > more
> > > is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.
> >  I
> > > think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in
> > the
> > > Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.
> > >
> > > thanks
> > > Phil
> > >
> > >
> > > Hi Phil,
> > > So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
> > > positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
> > > in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says
> at
> > > the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck
> having
> > > in
> > > on the brain today!
> > > But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know
> about
> > > them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems
> to
> > > me
> > > they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the
> Prolegomena
> > > for
> > > anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
> > > Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
> > > Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
> > > experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
> > > Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
> > > causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
> > > supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a
> > way
> > > that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know
> that
> > > it
> > > does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
> > > "apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
> > > arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.
>  Therefore
> > it
> > > must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they
> > are
> > > causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd
> An.]
> > > As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism
> > and
> > > Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
> > > naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of
> > natural
> > > or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really
> is
> > > provided by the object, not by the subject.
> > > It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these
> > days
> > > the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did,
> > that
> > > ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
> > > categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
> > > Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
> > > moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But
> the
> > > ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
> > > solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
> > > people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused
> > > them
> > > last time, etc.
> > > r.
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 3
> > Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 18:38:45 +0000
> > From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
> > Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> > To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID:
> >        <
> > B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C17 at EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
> >
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> >
> > Hi Ruth
> >
> > Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in relation
> to
> > the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even
> > familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be to
> > appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of the
> > Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation to
> > things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and
> so-called
> > "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the
> Critique
> > of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that
> > "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the
> > Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's
> thought.
> >  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as
> > exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate
> > senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could
> take
> > from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might
> forward
> > that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a
> > relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally
> real,
> > - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least the
> > reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one
> commentator
> > who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes
> that
> > the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in
> context.
> >  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might
> > suppose.
> >
> > thanks
> > Phil
> >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 4
> > Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 12:59:03 -0600
> > From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID:
> >        <6ad241360902071059h7602417pd98e1368e39cf6a8 at mail.gmail.com>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
> >
> > Hi Phil,
> >
> > Not to worry.  I don't think that I am at risk for reading Kant badly.  I
> > agree about the 3rd Critique -- it is enormously important to Kant's
> moral
> > thinking, and yes, seems to intersect with the account of schematism in
> the
> > 1st c.  I am not saying that Kant is attracted to idealism in any way.
>  He
> > is an empirical realist.  There is no question about that, and I don't
> see
> > how anyone can read him otherwise.  But he is a transcendental idealist
> --
> > which, despite the name bears very little resemblance to idealism.  It's
> > true that he wasn't that always.  But that's the position that we're
> > considering.  I just think it's wishful thinking to read him as thinking
> > that, even empirically, causality is the display of dispositional
> > properties.  It's real, for him, causality - empirically real - but even
> > empirically it is, as with all post-Kantian moderns, the real fact of
> > phenomena being subject to an ordering principle, not the real fact of
> the
> > display of powers.
> >
> > I admit that I haven't read Watkins yet, and I will, but I just don't see
> > how you can get Kant out of being a transcendental idealist with respect
> to
> > causality.
> >
> > r.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 12:38 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> > pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
> >
> > > Hi Ruth
> > >
> > > Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in
> relation
> > to
> > > the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even
> > > familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be
> to
> > > appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of
> the
> > > Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation
> to
> > > things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and
> > so-called
> > > "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the
> > Critique
> > > of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that
> > > "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the
> > > Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's
> > thought.
> > >  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as
> > > exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate
> > > senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could
> > take
> > > from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might
> > forward
> > > that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a
> > > relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally
> > real,
> > > - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least
> the
> > > reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one
> > commentator
> > > who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes
> > that
> > > the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in
> > context.
> > >  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might
> > > suppose.
> > >
> > > thanks
> > > Phil
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
> > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 16
> > ************************************************
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 17
> ************************************************
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> _______________________________________________
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> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>

From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk  Sun Feb  8 15:36:25 2009
From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2009 22:36:25 +0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] (no subject)
Message-ID: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C1F@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>

Hi Ruth

Those "fancy" people could be wrong quite easily, imo.  As I said, I believe the Critique is a minefield with no single (coherent) unitary thesis, but a composite of several, probably written at different stages in Kant's development.  This is why any number of possibly a dozen interpretations could gain support from the text, some quite discrepant with others.  I guess that's one of the things that makes Kant so interesting.  I agree there would have to be some generally agreed upon parameters for interpretation, but I'm not sure where they would lie.  Kant contradicts himself more frequently than the bible.

You said that the point of the Aesthetic is that we receive sensory input with no active synthesising.  That seems to be the position of the Aesthetic.  But the position later on, is that intuition *does* require active synthesising,  (evidence at, e.g. B154 where time is represented in a line and Kant explicitly refers to time as a result of conceptual synthesis.)  So the faculties are not even separated analytically later on, which undermines the independent cognitive role of the sensuous faculty - the moment of giveness is vitiated.  The point (at least) Hoffman makes is that the "given" or "non-conceptual" aspects of intuition discovered by the Aesthetic are later seen as products of intellectual syntheses performed by the understanding.  And this amounts to a suppression of the passive moment of knowledge generation; a subjugation of sensuousness by logos, if you like.  Personally, I like this particular line and it fits in with my own agenda to naturalise Kant.  But you don't have to buy it, of course.

thanks
phil



________________________________________
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Today's Topics:

   1. Re: Kant (Ruth Groff)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2009 15:46:52 -0600
From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Kant
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Message-ID:
        <6ad241360902081346x7b67ce64kf40fe1b6d42db8b8 at mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

No, it doesn't confuse.  How can all those fancy people not be right (!),
but I do wonder if the reading is - very technically speaking - not
dialectical enough.  That is, the point of the aesthetic is that we receive
sensory input in spacial and temporal terms, that we do so necessarily, and
that there is no active, synthesizing required for this to be the case.  It
is, as Kant says, simply the form of sensibility itself.

Now, what I'm wondering is if it is not a hypostatizing of that moment, as
our man Adorno would say, to think that literally we first receive sense
impressions of noumenal objects and then we synthesize the resultant
spacially and temporally located apprehensions into appearances, i.e., into
phenomenal objects, first through the unity of apperception and then through
the categories (with help from the schemas).  This seems too weird and sort
of obviously dumb, for it to be what Kant meant.  More plausible is that
form(s) of intuition come(s) "first" only analytically, in virtue of being
passive and unmediated.  But the object of experience (here, the object that
is being sensed in space and time) is what objects of experience always are:
phenomenal objects.

See what I mean?  Doesn't it seem that Kant had to mean something like
that?  I mean, the forms of intuition don't even tell us about objects
anyway, phenomenal or otherwise; they tell us only that we experience
objects, when we do, as existing outside of us, and that we experience them
at time x, which we immediately experience as before x+1 and after x-1.

r.



On Sun, Feb 8, 2009 at 12:52 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:

> Hi Ruth
>
> Me no expert either!  And I didn't want to appear over-zealous on any of
> this.  I'm still finding my way around much of it.
>
> I think this point about the mismatch between the Aesthetic and Analytic is
> really interesting too, especially for a naturalist.  It is often noted in
> the secondary literature but the area is a bit of a minefield so I would be
> wanting to tread carefully.  I'm trying more thoroughly to understand this
> aspect at the moment.  I'll be in a much better position to talk about this
> in a couple of months.  I'm taking initial inspiration from Piotr Hoffman's
> The Anatomy of Idealism: Passivity and Activity in Kant, Hegel and Marx".
>  The argument is something like the Aesthetic expresses a need for a viable
> account of both intuition and concept, as independent faculties, both
> equally important for knowledge generation (concepts without intuitions are
> empty, etc) and the stabilisation of the self.  It is here too where Kant
> talks about objects affecting us in a sense which can only be read as
> noumenal objects because they still haven't been conceptualised at this
> point.  So in the Aesthetic a connection (of some indeterminate sort) seems
> to be preserved and needs to be preserved between intuition and an
> independent reality, for the coherence of Kant's project (this is the
> claim).  Apart from other things, intuitions need to be *of* something.  But
> in the Analytic, the integrity and independence of intuition is sacrificed
> to the exigencies of the aims of the Analytic, which involve firstly showing
> how the mind determines the object completely according to its own rules.  A
> shift takes place whereby pure intuition is treated as being already shot
> through with conceptual rules, and this shift mirrors competing conceptual
> strategies in the two sections.  I believe the same theme is treated by
> Beatrice Longuenesse in "Kant and the Capacity to Judge", and I have briefly
> noted something similar in Hermann Cohen's "Kant's Theory of Experience".
>  Kemp Smith discusses the lack of integration of the Aesthetic and Analytic
> at p.95 of his commentary.  It seems many commentators see the Aesthetic as
> motivated by "pre-critical" preoccupations.  I also think the third Critique
> is interesting precisely for the reassessment of the independent role of
> intuition, and would therefore be more useful for those who want to
> "naturalize" Kant, as Hoffman does.
>
> Sorry if this confuses more than it clarifies.
>
> Thanks
> Phil.
>
>
>
> ________________________________________
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> critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
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> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
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> Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 17
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>
>   1. KAnt (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
>   2. Re: KAnt (Ruth Groff)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2009 03:58:39 +0000
> From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] KAnt
> To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
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>
> Hi Ruth
>
> just to be clear about it, I wasn't trying to suggest that you were reading
> Kant badly; not at all.  But I wouldn't worry about that too much anyway.  I
> do it all the time.  It's half the fun.  One has to be able to read an
> author badly!  We don't always want to be in the position of having to read
> an author perfectly:)  Neither do I want to defend Kant as a "dispositional
> realist".  Watkins may want to do that, but my knowledge of Kant (or
> dispositional realism) is not extensive enough to make an attempt at that,
> even if I wanted to.  I have no reason to disagree with what you say about
> causality.  You are much more familiar with the literature than I.  I raised
> the Watkins text because I think the idea is at least interesting, and
> points to the fact that there were many layers to Kant's thought and work.
>  I'm sure you don't disagree.  The Critique, after all, is a composite.
>  Also, I just want to clarify, when I said "I would perhaps read the
> Analytic in light of ....." I wasn't recommending, or advising, as it may
> have appeared, but expressing my own personal inclination.  I'm not really
> in a position to advise.  Reading my post back I saw how it could have been
> taken in that way.  I think a point I was trying to make (and I wasn't
> suggesting that the point was something you had not appreciated, or would
> have failed to appreciate if it weren't for my making it) was that Kant is
> more slippery and open to interpretation than a standard critical realist
> reading of him would tend to allow, if there is a standard reading.  I think
> RB's treatment of Kant for example in RTS doesn't do Kant justice, to be
> honest, and it's possibly not intended to do, as it's more a polemical
> contrast for the purposes of setting up the critical realist alternative.
>
> I think the other (humble) point I wanted to raise was that there are many
> different streams running concurrently through Kant's work, of which the
> Analytic is just one.  This makes pinning Kant down extremely problematic,
> in my view, as the history of Kant interpretation testifies to.  (Again, I'm
> not saying you don't already appreciate that fact.)  The Aesthetic and the
> Analytic themselves can be seen as incongruent with each other (in that in
> the Aesthetic we are affected by objects, whereas in the Analytic we
> constitute objects), and the position forwarded in the Refutation of
> Idealism is markedly other than that put forth in either the Analytic or the
> Aesthetic.  Anyway, let me know what you make of Watkins eventually.
>
> thanks
> Phil
>
>
>
> ________________________________________
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
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> Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 16
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> Today's Topics:
>
>   1. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
>   2. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)
>   3. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
>   4. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 15:13:46 +0000
> From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
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>
>
> Hi Ruth
>
> I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well the
> historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a very
> specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and indeed
> causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical
> realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.  Kant
> wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a dispensible
> category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was
> undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a
> property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot
> dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that it
> does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so he is
> not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It may
> well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need any
> more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for more
> is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.  I
> think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in the
> Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.
>
> thanks
> Phil
>
>
> Hi Phil,
> So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
> positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
> in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says at
> the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck having
> in
> on the brain today!
> But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know about
> them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems to
> me
> they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the Prolegomena
> for
> anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
> Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
> Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
> experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
> Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
> causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
> supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a way
> that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know that
> it
> does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
> "apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
> arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.  Therefore it
> must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they are
> causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd An.]
> As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism and
> Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
> naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of natural
> or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really is
> provided by the object, not by the subject.
> It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these days
> the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did, that
> ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
> categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
> Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
> moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But the
> ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
> solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
> people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused
> them
> last time, etc.
> r.
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 10:12:00 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <6ad241360902070812j49d8c97bq2344caf643cec380 at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Phil,
>
> I agree with you exactly about this,  except for that as I go over Kant
> this
> time I find myself having to acknowledge that he himself does not seem to
> take the position that natural necessity is an open question.  Or, more
> precisely, a meaningless question, transcendentally, and perfectly
> allowable
> (but for a dogmatic ban on it) empirically.  (After all, why should
> phenomenal objects not have dispositional properties?)
>
> Adorno, in ND especially, seems to register that there is something wrong
> not just with constituting phenomenal objects via their concepts, as Kant
> puts it when talking about the t. unity of apperception, but with
> extracting
> causality from them (so that causality does not come from the object, as
> Adorno puts it).
>
> I think what you say about why is right.  I think too that insofar as he
> reads Kant's transcendental idealism as a correct, if philosophically
> encoded, sociological diagnosis, he winds up in a weird position where it
> is
> hard to just say in an easy way that it is problematic, or even false,
> philosophically.  And it's odd, because as I suggest above, I don't think
> you even have to say that causality inheres in objects in and of themselves
> -- you can just say that in addition to "causality" being a category of the
> understanding, phenomenal objects have dispositional properties, the
> display
> of which is what causality *really* is.
>
> Anyway, thanks -- all interesting and helpful and relevant, for me.  How is
> your work going?
>
> r.
>
>
> On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 9:13 AM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> >
> > Hi Ruth
> >
> > I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well the
> > historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a
> very
> > specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and indeed
> > causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical
> > realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.
>  Kant
> > wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a
> dispensible
> > category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was
> > undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a
> > property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot
> > dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that
> it
> > does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so he
> is
> > not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It
> may
> > well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need
> any
> > more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for
> more
> > is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.
>  I
> > think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in
> the
> > Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.
> >
> > thanks
> > Phil
> >
> >
> > Hi Phil,
> > So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
> > positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
> > in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says at
> > the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck having
> > in
> > on the brain today!
> > But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know about
> > them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems to
> > me
> > they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the Prolegomena
> > for
> > anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
> > Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
> > Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
> > experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
> > Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
> > causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
> > supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a
> way
> > that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know that
> > it
> > does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
> > "apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
> > arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.  Therefore
> it
> > must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they
> are
> > causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd An.]
> > As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism
> and
> > Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
> > naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of
> natural
> > or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really is
> > provided by the object, not by the subject.
> > It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these
> days
> > the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did,
> that
> > ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
> > categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
> > Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
> > moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But the
> > ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
> > solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
> > people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused
> > them
> > last time, etc.
> > r.
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 18:38:45 +0000
> From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <
> B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C17 at EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Hi Ruth
>
> Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in relation to
> the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even
> familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be to
> appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of the
> Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation to
> things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and so-called
> "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the Critique
> of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that
> "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the
> Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's thought.
>  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as
> exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate
> senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could take
> from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might forward
> that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a
> relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally real,
> - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least the
> reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one commentator
> who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes that
> the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in context.
>  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might
> suppose.
>
> thanks
> Phil
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 12:59:03 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <6ad241360902071059h7602417pd98e1368e39cf6a8 at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Phil,
>
> Not to worry.  I don't think that I am at risk for reading Kant badly.  I
> agree about the 3rd Critique -- it is enormously important to Kant's moral
> thinking, and yes, seems to intersect with the account of schematism in the
> 1st c.  I am not saying that Kant is attracted to idealism in any way.  He
> is an empirical realist.  There is no question about that, and I don't see
> how anyone can read him otherwise.  But he is a transcendental idealist --
> which, despite the name bears very little resemblance to idealism.  It's
> true that he wasn't that always.  But that's the position that we're
> considering.  I just think it's wishful thinking to read him as thinking
> that, even empirically, causality is the display of dispositional
> properties.  It's real, for him, causality - empirically real - but even
> empirically it is, as with all post-Kantian moderns, the real fact of
> phenomena being subject to an ordering principle, not the real fact of the
> display of powers.
>
> I admit that I haven't read Watkins yet, and I will, but I just don't see
> how you can get Kant out of being a transcendental idealist with respect to
> causality.
>
> r.
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 12:38 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> > Hi Ruth
> >
> > Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in relation
> to
> > the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even
> > familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be to
> > appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of the
> > Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation to
> > things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and
> so-called
> > "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the
> Critique
> > of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that
> > "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the
> > Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's
> thought.
> >  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as
> > exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate
> > senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could
> take
> > from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might
> forward
> > that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a
> > relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally
> real,
> > - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least the
> > reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one
> commentator
> > who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes
> that
> > the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in
> context.
> >  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might
> > suppose.
> >
> > thanks
> > Phil
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 16
> ************************************************
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 23:47:59 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] KAnt
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <6ad241360902072147l69bffd68q71e0461cf74ebed2 at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hi Phil,
>
> O no worries -- I realized after I wrote it that it might sound as if I had
> taken offense in some way, and I hadn't.  I've really appreciated this
> exchange -- am not a Kant expert in the slightest.  I just meant to say
> that
> I try hard to read people carefully and generously, with as little
> prejudice
> as possible, and that it wasn't a knee-jerk assessment.  (Don't even get me
> started on Plato, who people read in insanely knee-jerky ways ALL the time!
> )  And I really agree, about the treatment in RTS.  It's weird: he calls
> the
> position "transcendental realism" - direct dig at Kant - but the whole
> argument is aimed at Humeans.
>
> Interesting, about the aesthetic vs. analytic.  Couldn't Kant say that all
> he means is that when we do experience transcendentally constituted
> phenomenal objects, we necessarily take in the associated sense data in
> space and time?  I.e., that it's not really that first we are affected, via
> the sensibility, by transcendentally real objects, and then swap them out
> for phenomenal objects, synthesized by reason.  That it just sounds that
> way
> because space and time are "prior" in the sense of being unmediated.
>
> This too might be wishful thinking though!  I'd have to go back to the
> text.
>
> Warmly,
> r.
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 9:58 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> > Hi Ruth
> >
> > just to be clear about it, I wasn't trying to suggest that you were
> reading
> > Kant badly; not at all.  But I wouldn't worry about that too much anyway.
>  I
> > do it all the time.  It's half the fun.  One has to be able to read an
> > author badly!  We don't always want to be in the position of having to
> read
> > an author perfectly:)  Neither do I want to defend Kant as a
> "dispositional
> > realist".  Watkins may want to do that, but my knowledge of Kant (or
> > dispositional realism) is not extensive enough to make an attempt at
> that,
> > even if I wanted to.  I have no reason to disagree with what you say
> about
> > causality.  You are much more familiar with the literature than I.  I
> raised
> > the Watkins text because I think the idea is at least interesting, and
> > points to the fact that there were many layers to Kant's thought and
> work.
> >  I'm sure you don't disagree.  The Critique, after all, is a composite.
> >  Also, I just want to clarify, when I said "I would perhaps read the
> > Analytic in light of ....." I wasn't recommending, or advising, as it may
> > have appeared, but expressing my own personal inclination.  I'm not
> really
> > in a position to advise.  Reading my post back I saw how it could have
> been
> > taken in that way.  I think a point I was trying to make (and I wasn't
> > suggesting that the point was something you had not appreciated, or would
> > have failed to appreciate if it weren't for my making it) was that Kant
> is
> > more slippery and open to interpretation than a standard critical realist
> > reading of him would tend to allow, if there is a standard reading.  I
> think
> > RB's treatment of Kant for example in RTS doesn't do Kant justice, to be
> > honest, and it's possibly not intended to do, as it's more a polemical
> > contrast for the purposes of setting up the critical realist alternative.
> >
> > I think the other (humble) point I wanted to raise was that there are
> many
> > different streams running concurrently through Kant's work, of which the
> > Analytic is just one.  This makes pinning Kant down extremely
> problematic,
> > in my view, as the history of Kant interpretation testifies to.  (Again,
> I'm
> > not saying you don't already appreciate that fact.)  The Aesthetic and
> the
> > Analytic themselves can be seen as incongruent with each other (in that
> in
> > the Aesthetic we are affected by objects, whereas in the Analytic we
> > constitute objects), and the position forwarded in the Refutation of
> > Idealism is markedly other than that put forth in either the Analytic or
> the
> > Aesthetic.  Anyway, let me know what you make of Watkins eventually.
> >
> > thanks
> > Phil
> >
> >
> >
> > ________________________________________
> > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> > critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
> > Sent: 07 February 2009 19:00
> > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 16
> >
> > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
> >        critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> >
> > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> >        http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> >        critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu
> >
> > You can reach the person managing the list at
> >        critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu
> >
> > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..."
> >
> >
> > Today's Topics:
> >
> >   1. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
> >   2. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)
> >   3. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
> >   4. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)
> >
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 1
> > Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 15:13:46 +0000
> > From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
> > Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> > To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID:
> >        <
> > B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C16 at EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
> >
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> >
> >
> > Hi Ruth
> >
> > I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well the
> > historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a
> very
> > specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and indeed
> > causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical
> > realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.
>  Kant
> > wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a
> dispensible
> > category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was
> > undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a
> > property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot
> > dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that
> it
> > does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so he
> is
> > not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It
> may
> > well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need
> any
> > more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for
> more
> > is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.
>  I
> > think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in
> the
> > Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.
> >
> > thanks
> > Phil
> >
> >
> > Hi Phil,
> > So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
> > positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
> > in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says at
> > the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck having
> > in
> > on the brain today!
> > But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know about
> > them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems to
> > me
> > they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the Prolegomena
> > for
> > anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
> > Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
> > Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
> > experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
> > Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
> > causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
> > supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a
> way
> > that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know that
> > it
> > does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
> > "apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
> > arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.  Therefore
> it
> > must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they
> are
> > causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd An.]
> > As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism
> and
> > Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
> > naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of
> natural
> > or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really is
> > provided by the object, not by the subject.
> > It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these
> days
> > the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did,
> that
> > ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
> > categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
> > Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
> > moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But the
> > ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
> > solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
> > people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused
> > them
> > last time, etc.
> > r.
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 2
> > Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 10:12:00 -0600
> > From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID:
> >        <6ad241360902070812j49d8c97bq2344caf643cec380 at mail.gmail.com>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
> >
> > Hi Phil,
> >
> > I agree with you exactly about this,  except for that as I go over Kant
> > this
> > time I find myself having to acknowledge that he himself does not seem to
> > take the position that natural necessity is an open question.  Or, more
> > precisely, a meaningless question, transcendentally, and perfectly
> > allowable
> > (but for a dogmatic ban on it) empirically.  (After all, why should
> > phenomenal objects not have dispositional properties?)
> >
> > Adorno, in ND especially, seems to register that there is something wrong
> > not just with constituting phenomenal objects via their concepts, as Kant
> > puts it when talking about the t. unity of apperception, but with
> > extracting
> > causality from them (so that causality does not come from the object, as
> > Adorno puts it).
> >
> > I think what you say about why is right.  I think too that insofar as he
> > reads Kant's transcendental idealism as a correct, if philosophically
> > encoded, sociological diagnosis, he winds up in a weird position where it
> > is
> > hard to just say in an easy way that it is problematic, or even false,
> > philosophically.  And it's odd, because as I suggest above, I don't think
> > you even have to say that causality inheres in objects in and of
> themselves
> > -- you can just say that in addition to "causality" being a category of
> the
> > understanding, phenomenal objects have dispositional properties, the
> > display
> > of which is what causality *really* is.
> >
> > Anyway, thanks -- all interesting and helpful and relevant, for me.  How
> is
> > your work going?
> >
> > r.
> >
> >
> > On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 9:13 AM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> > pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > Hi Ruth
> > >
> > > I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well
> the
> > > historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a
> > very
> > > specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and
> indeed
> > > causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical
> > > realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.
> >  Kant
> > > wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a
> > dispensible
> > > category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was
> > > undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a
> > > property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot
> > > dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that
> > it
> > > does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so
> he
> > is
> > > not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It
> > may
> > > well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need
> > any
> > > more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for
> > more
> > > is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.
> >  I
> > > think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in
> > the
> > > Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.
> > >
> > > thanks
> > > Phil
> > >
> > >
> > > Hi Phil,
> > > So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
> > > positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
> > > in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says
> at
> > > the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck
> having
> > > in
> > > on the brain today!
> > > But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know
> about
> > > them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems
> to
> > > me
> > > they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the
> Prolegomena
> > > for
> > > anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
> > > Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
> > > Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
> > > experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
> > > Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
> > > causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
> > > supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a
> > way
> > > that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know
> that
> > > it
> > > does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
> > > "apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
> > > arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.
>  Therefore
> > it
> > > must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they
> > are
> > > causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd
> An.]
> > > As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism
> > and
> > > Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
> > > naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of
> > natural
> > > or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really
> is
> > > provided by the object, not by the subject.
> > > It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these
> > days
> > > the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did,
> > that
> > > ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
> > > categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
> > > Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
> > > moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But
> the
> > > ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
> > > solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
> > > people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused
> > > them
> > > last time, etc.
> > > r.
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 3
> > Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 18:38:45 +0000
> > From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
> > Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> > To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID:
> >        <
> > B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C17 at EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
> >
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> >
> > Hi Ruth
> >
> > Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in relation
> to
> > the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even
> > familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be to
> > appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of the
> > Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation to
> > things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and
> so-called
> > "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the
> Critique
> > of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that
> > "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the
> > Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's
> thought.
> >  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as
> > exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate
> > senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could
> take
> > from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might
> forward
> > that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a
> > relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally
> real,
> > - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least the
> > reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one
> commentator
> > who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes
> that
> > the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in
> context.
> >  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might
> > suppose.
> >
> > thanks
> > Phil
> >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 4
> > Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 12:59:03 -0600
> > From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID:
> >        <6ad241360902071059h7602417pd98e1368e39cf6a8 at mail.gmail.com>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
> >
> > Hi Phil,
> >
> > Not to worry.  I don't think that I am at risk for reading Kant badly.  I
> > agree about the 3rd Critique -- it is enormously important to Kant's
> moral
> > thinking, and yes, seems to intersect with the account of schematism in
> the
> > 1st c.  I am not saying that Kant is attracted to idealism in any way.
>  He
> > is an empirical realist.  There is no question about that, and I don't
> see
> > how anyone can read him otherwise.  But he is a transcendental idealist
> --
> > which, despite the name bears very little resemblance to idealism.  It's
> > true that he wasn't that always.  But that's the position that we're
> > considering.  I just think it's wishful thinking to read him as thinking
> > that, even empirically, causality is the display of dispositional
> > properties.  It's real, for him, causality - empirically real - but even
> > empirically it is, as with all post-Kantian moderns, the real fact of
> > phenomena being subject to an ordering principle, not the real fact of
> the
> > display of powers.
> >
> > I admit that I haven't read Watkins yet, and I will, but I just don't see
> > how you can get Kant out of being a transcendental idealist with respect
> to
> > causality.
> >
> > r.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 12:38 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> > pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
> >
> > > Hi Ruth
> > >
> > > Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in
> relation
> > to
> > > the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even
> > > familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be
> to
> > > appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of
> the
> > > Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation
> to
> > > things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and
> > so-called
> > > "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the
> > Critique
> > > of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that
> > > "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the
> > > Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's
> > thought.
> > >  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as
> > > exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate
> > > senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could
> > take
> > > from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might
> > forward
> > > that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a
> > > relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally
> > real,
> > > - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least
> the
> > > reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one
> > commentator
> > > who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes
> > that
> > > the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in
> > context.
> > >  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might
> > > suppose.
> > >
> > > thanks
> > > Phil
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
> > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 16
> > ************************************************
> >
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> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
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From rgroff at slu.edu  Sun Feb  8 16:57:44 2009
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2009 17:57:44 -0600
Subject: [Critical-Realism] (no subject)
In-Reply-To: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C1F@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
References: <B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C1F@EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <6ad241360902081557o32ad4bd6mcd9b0f2c768149ab@mail.gmail.com>

Yes (if this is indeed what you, or Hoffman (don't know him or her), are
saying): what is "given" is nothing other than the fact that synthesized,
phenomenal objects are, because of the form of human sensibility,
experienced as located in space and time.  Analytically, we can talk about
this happening "first" but it's an analytic ordering; in reality there is
always already a phenomenal object that is being experienced as being so
located.  No bait and switch with first a noumenal object and then a
phenomenal one, just a snake eating its own tail.

This is the only way it makes any sense, it seems to me.

 r.



On Sun, Feb 8, 2009 at 4:36 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:

> Hi Ruth
>
> Those "fancy" people could be wrong quite easily, imo.  As I said, I
> believe the Critique is a minefield with no single (coherent) unitary
> thesis, but a composite of several, probably written at different stages in
> Kant's development.  This is why any number of possibly a dozen
> interpretations could gain support from the text, some quite discrepant with
> others.  I guess that's one of the things that makes Kant so interesting.  I
> agree there would have to be some generally agreed upon parameters for
> interpretation, but I'm not sure where they would lie.  Kant contradicts
> himself more frequently than the bible.
>
> You said that the point of the Aesthetic is that we receive sensory input
> with no active synthesising.  That seems to be the position of the
> Aesthetic.  But the position later on, is that intuition *does* require
> active synthesising,  (evidence at, e.g. B154 where time is represented in a
> line and Kant explicitly refers to time as a result of conceptual
> synthesis.)  So the faculties are not even separated analytically later on,
> which undermines the independent cognitive role of the sensuous faculty -
> the moment of giveness is vitiated.  The point (at least) Hoffman makes is
> that the "given" or "non-conceptual" aspects of intuition discovered by the
> Aesthetic are later seen as products of intellectual syntheses performed by
> the understanding.  And this amounts to a suppression of the passive moment
> of knowledge generation; a subjugation of sensuousness by logos, if you
> like.  Personally, I like this particular line and it fits in with my own
> agenda to naturalise Kant.  But you don't have to buy it, of course.
>
> thanks
> phil
>
>
>
> ________________________________________
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [
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> critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
> Sent: 08 February 2009 21:46
> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 19
>
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>   1. Re: Kant (Ruth Groff)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2009 15:46:52 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Kant
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <6ad241360902081346x7b67ce64kf40fe1b6d42db8b8 at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> No, it doesn't confuse.  How can all those fancy people not be right (!),
> but I do wonder if the reading is - very technically speaking - not
> dialectical enough.  That is, the point of the aesthetic is that we receive
> sensory input in spacial and temporal terms, that we do so necessarily, and
> that there is no active, synthesizing required for this to be the case.  It
> is, as Kant says, simply the form of sensibility itself.
>
> Now, what I'm wondering is if it is not a hypostatizing of that moment, as
> our man Adorno would say, to think that literally we first receive sense
> impressions of noumenal objects and then we synthesize the resultant
> spacially and temporally located apprehensions into appearances, i.e., into
> phenomenal objects, first through the unity of apperception and then
> through
> the categories (with help from the schemas).  This seems too weird and sort
> of obviously dumb, for it to be what Kant meant.  More plausible is that
> form(s) of intuition come(s) "first" only analytically, in virtue of being
> passive and unmediated.  But the object of experience (here, the object
> that
> is being sensed in space and time) is what objects of experience always
> are:
> phenomenal objects.
>
> See what I mean?  Doesn't it seem that Kant had to mean something like
> that?  I mean, the forms of intuition don't even tell us about objects
> anyway, phenomenal or otherwise; they tell us only that we experience
> objects, when we do, as existing outside of us, and that we experience them
> at time x, which we immediately experience as before x+1 and after x-1.
>
> r.
>
>
>
> On Sun, Feb 8, 2009 at 12:52 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
>
> > Hi Ruth
> >
> > Me no expert either!  And I didn't want to appear over-zealous on any of
> > this.  I'm still finding my way around much of it.
> >
> > I think this point about the mismatch between the Aesthetic and Analytic
> is
> > really interesting too, especially for a naturalist.  It is often noted
> in
> > the secondary literature but the area is a bit of a minefield so I would
> be
> > wanting to tread carefully.  I'm trying more thoroughly to understand
> this
> > aspect at the moment.  I'll be in a much better position to talk about
> this
> > in a couple of months.  I'm taking initial inspiration from Piotr
> Hoffman's
> > The Anatomy of Idealism: Passivity and Activity in Kant, Hegel and Marx".
> >  The argument is something like the Aesthetic expresses a need for a
> viable
> > account of both intuition and concept, as independent faculties, both
> > equally important for knowledge generation (concepts without intuitions
> are
> > empty, etc) and the stabilisation of the self.  It is here too where Kant
> > talks about objects affecting us in a sense which can only be read as
> > noumenal objects because they still haven't been conceptualised at this
> > point.  So in the Aesthetic a connection (of some indeterminate sort)
> seems
> > to be preserved and needs to be preserved between intuition and an
> > independent reality, for the coherence of Kant's project (this is the
> > claim).  Apart from other things, intuitions need to be *of* something.
>  But
> > in the Analytic, the integrity and independence of intuition is
> sacrificed
> > to the exigencies of the aims of the Analytic, which involve firstly
> showing
> > how the mind determines the object completely according to its own rules.
>  A
> > shift takes place whereby pure intuition is treated as being already shot
> > through with conceptual rules, and this shift mirrors competing
> conceptual
> > strategies in the two sections.  I believe the same theme is treated by
> > Beatrice Longuenesse in "Kant and the Capacity to Judge", and I have
> briefly
> > noted something similar in Hermann Cohen's "Kant's Theory of Experience".
> >  Kemp Smith discusses the lack of integration of the Aesthetic and
> Analytic
> > at p.95 of his commentary.  It seems many commentators see the Aesthetic
> as
> > motivated by "pre-critical" preoccupations.  I also think the third
> Critique
> > is interesting precisely for the reassessment of the independent role of
> > intuition, and would therefore be more useful for those who want to
> > "naturalize" Kant, as Hoffman does.
> >
> > Sorry if this confuses more than it clarifies.
> >
> > Thanks
> > Phil.
> >
> >
> >
> > ________________________________________
> > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> > critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
> > Sent: 08 February 2009 05:48
> > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 17
> >
> > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
> >        critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> >
> > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> >        http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
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> >
> > You can reach the person managing the list at
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> >
> > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..."
> >
> >
> > Today's Topics:
> >
> >   1. KAnt (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
> >   2. Re: KAnt (Ruth Groff)
> >
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 1
> > Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2009 03:58:39 +0000
> > From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
> > Subject: [Critical-Realism] KAnt
> > To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID:
> >        <
> > B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C1A at EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
> >
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
> >
> > Hi Ruth
> >
> > just to be clear about it, I wasn't trying to suggest that you were
> reading
> > Kant badly; not at all.  But I wouldn't worry about that too much anyway.
>  I
> > do it all the time.  It's half the fun.  One has to be able to read an
> > author badly!  We don't always want to be in the position of having to
> read
> > an author perfectly:)  Neither do I want to defend Kant as a
> "dispositional
> > realist".  Watkins may want to do that, but my knowledge of Kant (or
> > dispositional realism) is not extensive enough to make an attempt at
> that,
> > even if I wanted to.  I have no reason to disagree with what you say
> about
> > causality.  You are much more familiar with the literature than I.  I
> raised
> > the Watkins text because I think the idea is at least interesting, and
> > points to the fact that there were many layers to Kant's thought and
> work.
> >  I'm sure you don't disagree.  The Critique, after all, is a composite.
> >  Also, I just want to clarify, when I said "I would perhaps read the
> > Analytic in light of ....." I wasn't recommending, or advising, as it may
> > have appeared, but expressing my own personal inclination.  I'm not
> really
> > in a position to advise.  Reading my post back I saw how it could have
> been
> > taken in that way.  I think a point I was trying to make (and I wasn't
> > suggesting that the point was something you had not appreciated, or would
> > have failed to appreciate if it weren't for my making it) was that Kant
> is
> > more slippery and open to interpretation than a standard critical realist
> > reading of him would tend to allow, if there is a standard reading.  I
> think
> > RB's treatment of Kant for example in RTS doesn't do Kant justice, to be
> > honest, and it's possibly not intended to do, as it's more a polemical
> > contrast for the purposes of setting up the critical realist alternative.
> >
> > I think the other (humble) point I wanted to raise was that there are
> many
> > different streams running concurrently through Kant's work, of which the
> > Analytic is just one.  This makes pinning Kant down extremely
> problematic,
> > in my view, as the history of Kant interpretation testifies to.  (Again,
> I'm
> > not saying you don't already appreciate that fact.)  The Aesthetic and
> the
> > Analytic themselves can be seen as incongruent with each other (in that
> in
> > the Aesthetic we are affected by objects, whereas in the Analytic we
> > constitute objects), and the position forwarded in the Refutation of
> > Idealism is markedly other than that put forth in either the Analytic or
> the
> > Aesthetic.  Anyway, let me know what you make of Watkins eventually.
> >
> > thanks
> > Phil
> >
> >
> >
> > ________________________________________
> > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> > critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
> > Sent: 07 February 2009 19:00
> > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 16
> >
> > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
> >        critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> >
> > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> >        http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> >        critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu
> >
> > You can reach the person managing the list at
> >        critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu
> >
> > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..."
> >
> >
> > Today's Topics:
> >
> >   1. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
> >   2. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)
> >   3. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
> >   4. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)
> >
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 1
> > Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 15:13:46 +0000
> > From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
> > Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> > To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID:
> >        <
> > B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C16 at EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
> >
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> >
> >
> > Hi Ruth
> >
> > I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well the
> > historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a
> very
> > specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and indeed
> > causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical
> > realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.
>  Kant
> > wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a
> dispensible
> > category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was
> > undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a
> > property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot
> > dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that
> it
> > does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so he
> is
> > not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It
> may
> > well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need
> any
> > more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for
> more
> > is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.
>  I
> > think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in
> the
> > Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.
> >
> > thanks
> > Phil
> >
> >
> > Hi Phil,
> > So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
> > positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
> > in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says at
> > the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck having
> > in
> > on the brain today!
> > But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know about
> > them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems to
> > me
> > they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the Prolegomena
> > for
> > anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
> > Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
> > Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
> > experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
> > Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
> > causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
> > supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a
> way
> > that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know that
> > it
> > does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
> > "apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
> > arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.  Therefore
> it
> > must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they
> are
> > causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd An.]
> > As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism
> and
> > Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
> > naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of
> natural
> > or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really is
> > provided by the object, not by the subject.
> > It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these
> days
> > the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did,
> that
> > ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
> > categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
> > Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
> > moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But the
> > ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
> > solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
> > people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused
> > them
> > last time, etc.
> > r.
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 2
> > Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 10:12:00 -0600
> > From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID:
> >        <6ad241360902070812j49d8c97bq2344caf643cec380 at mail.gmail.com>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
> >
> > Hi Phil,
> >
> > I agree with you exactly about this,  except for that as I go over Kant
> > this
> > time I find myself having to acknowledge that he himself does not seem to
> > take the position that natural necessity is an open question.  Or, more
> > precisely, a meaningless question, transcendentally, and perfectly
> > allowable
> > (but for a dogmatic ban on it) empirically.  (After all, why should
> > phenomenal objects not have dispositional properties?)
> >
> > Adorno, in ND especially, seems to register that there is something wrong
> > not just with constituting phenomenal objects via their concepts, as Kant
> > puts it when talking about the t. unity of apperception, but with
> > extracting
> > causality from them (so that causality does not come from the object, as
> > Adorno puts it).
> >
> > I think what you say about why is right.  I think too that insofar as he
> > reads Kant's transcendental idealism as a correct, if philosophically
> > encoded, sociological diagnosis, he winds up in a weird position where it
> > is
> > hard to just say in an easy way that it is problematic, or even false,
> > philosophically.  And it's odd, because as I suggest above, I don't think
> > you even have to say that causality inheres in objects in and of
> themselves
> > -- you can just say that in addition to "causality" being a category of
> the
> > understanding, phenomenal objects have dispositional properties, the
> > display
> > of which is what causality *really* is.
> >
> > Anyway, thanks -- all interesting and helpful and relevant, for me.  How
> is
> > your work going?
> >
> > r.
> >
> >
> > On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 9:13 AM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> > pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > Hi Ruth
> > >
> > > I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well
> the
> > > historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a
> > very
> > > specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and
> indeed
> > > causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical
> > > realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.
> >  Kant
> > > wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a
> > dispensible
> > > category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was
> > > undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a
> > > property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot
> > > dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that
> > it
> > > does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so
> he
> > is
> > > not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It
> > may
> > > well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need
> > any
> > > more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for
> > more
> > > is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.
> >  I
> > > think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in
> > the
> > > Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.
> > >
> > > thanks
> > > Phil
> > >
> > >
> > > Hi Phil,
> > > So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
> > > positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
> > > in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says
> at
> > > the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck
> having
> > > in
> > > on the brain today!
> > > But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know
> about
> > > them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems
> to
> > > me
> > > they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the
> Prolegomena
> > > for
> > > anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
> > > Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
> > > Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
> > > experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
> > > Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
> > > causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
> > > supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a
> > way
> > > that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know
> that
> > > it
> > > does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
> > > "apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
> > > arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.
>  Therefore
> > it
> > > must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they
> > are
> > > causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd
> An.]
> > > As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism
> > and
> > > Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
> > > naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of
> > natural
> > > or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really
> is
> > > provided by the object, not by the subject.
> > > It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these
> > days
> > > the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did,
> > that
> > > ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
> > > categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
> > > Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
> > > moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But
> the
> > > ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
> > > solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
> > > people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused
> > > them
> > > last time, etc.
> > > r.
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 3
> > Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 18:38:45 +0000
> > From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
> > Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> > To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID:
> >        <
> > B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C17 at EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
> >
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> >
> > Hi Ruth
> >
> > Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in relation
> to
> > the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even
> > familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be to
> > appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of the
> > Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation to
> > things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and
> so-called
> > "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the
> Critique
> > of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that
> > "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the
> > Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's
> thought.
> >  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as
> > exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate
> > senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could
> take
> > from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might
> forward
> > that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a
> > relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally
> real,
> > - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least the
> > reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one
> commentator
> > who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes
> that
> > the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in
> context.
> >  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might
> > suppose.
> >
> > thanks
> > Phil
> >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 4
> > Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 12:59:03 -0600
> > From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID:
> >        <6ad241360902071059h7602417pd98e1368e39cf6a8 at mail.gmail.com>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
> >
> > Hi Phil,
> >
> > Not to worry.  I don't think that I am at risk for reading Kant badly.  I
> > agree about the 3rd Critique -- it is enormously important to Kant's
> moral
> > thinking, and yes, seems to intersect with the account of schematism in
> the
> > 1st c.  I am not saying that Kant is attracted to idealism in any way.
>  He
> > is an empirical realist.  There is no question about that, and I don't
> see
> > how anyone can read him otherwise.  But he is a transcendental idealist
> --
> > which, despite the name bears very little resemblance to idealism.  It's
> > true that he wasn't that always.  But that's the position that we're
> > considering.  I just think it's wishful thinking to read him as thinking
> > that, even empirically, causality is the display of dispositional
> > properties.  It's real, for him, causality - empirically real - but even
> > empirically it is, as with all post-Kantian moderns, the real fact of
> > phenomena being subject to an ordering principle, not the real fact of
> the
> > display of powers.
> >
> > I admit that I haven't read Watkins yet, and I will, but I just don't see
> > how you can get Kant out of being a transcendental idealist with respect
> to
> > causality.
> >
> > r.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 12:38 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> > pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
> >
> > > Hi Ruth
> > >
> > > Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in
> relation
> > to
> > > the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even
> > > familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be
> to
> > > appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of
> the
> > > Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation
> to
> > > things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and
> > so-called
> > > "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the
> > Critique
> > > of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that
> > > "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the
> > > Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's
> > thought.
> > >  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as
> > > exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate
> > > senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could
> > take
> > > from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might
> > forward
> > > that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a
> > > relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally
> > real,
> > > - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least
> the
> > > reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one
> > commentator
> > > who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes
> > that
> > > the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in
> > context.
> > >  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might
> > > suppose.
> > >
> > > thanks
> > > Phil
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
> > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 16
> > ************************************************
> >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 2
> > Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 23:47:59 -0600
> > From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] KAnt
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > Message-ID:
> >        <6ad241360902072147l69bffd68q71e0461cf74ebed2 at mail.gmail.com>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
> >
> > Hi Phil,
> >
> > O no worries -- I realized after I wrote it that it might sound as if I
> had
> > taken offense in some way, and I hadn't.  I've really appreciated this
> > exchange -- am not a Kant expert in the slightest.  I just meant to say
> > that
> > I try hard to read people carefully and generously, with as little
> > prejudice
> > as possible, and that it wasn't a knee-jerk assessment.  (Don't even get
> me
> > started on Plato, who people read in insanely knee-jerky ways ALL the
> time!
> > )  And I really agree, about the treatment in RTS.  It's weird: he calls
> > the
> > position "transcendental realism" - direct dig at Kant - but the whole
> > argument is aimed at Humeans.
> >
> > Interesting, about the aesthetic vs. analytic.  Couldn't Kant say that
> all
> > he means is that when we do experience transcendentally constituted
> > phenomenal objects, we necessarily take in the associated sense data in
> > space and time?  I.e., that it's not really that first we are affected,
> via
> > the sensibility, by transcendentally real objects, and then swap them out
> > for phenomenal objects, synthesized by reason.  That it just sounds that
> > way
> > because space and time are "prior" in the sense of being unmediated.
> >
> > This too might be wishful thinking though!  I'd have to go back to the
> > text.
> >
> > Warmly,
> > r.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 9:58 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> > pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
> >
> > > Hi Ruth
> > >
> > > just to be clear about it, I wasn't trying to suggest that you were
> > reading
> > > Kant badly; not at all.  But I wouldn't worry about that too much
> anyway.
> >  I
> > > do it all the time.  It's half the fun.  One has to be able to read an
> > > author badly!  We don't always want to be in the position of having to
> > read
> > > an author perfectly:)  Neither do I want to defend Kant as a
> > "dispositional
> > > realist".  Watkins may want to do that, but my knowledge of Kant (or
> > > dispositional realism) is not extensive enough to make an attempt at
> > that,
> > > even if I wanted to.  I have no reason to disagree with what you say
> > about
> > > causality.  You are much more familiar with the literature than I.  I
> > raised
> > > the Watkins text because I think the idea is at least interesting, and
> > > points to the fact that there were many layers to Kant's thought and
> > work.
> > >  I'm sure you don't disagree.  The Critique, after all, is a composite.
> > >  Also, I just want to clarify, when I said "I would perhaps read the
> > > Analytic in light of ....." I wasn't recommending, or advising, as it
> may
> > > have appeared, but expressing my own personal inclination.  I'm not
> > really
> > > in a position to advise.  Reading my post back I saw how it could have
> > been
> > > taken in that way.  I think a point I was trying to make (and I wasn't
> > > suggesting that the point was something you had not appreciated, or
> would
> > > have failed to appreciate if it weren't for my making it) was that Kant
> > is
> > > more slippery and open to interpretation than a standard critical
> realist
> > > reading of him would tend to allow, if there is a standard reading.  I
> > think
> > > RB's treatment of Kant for example in RTS doesn't do Kant justice, to
> be
> > > honest, and it's possibly not intended to do, as it's more a polemical
> > > contrast for the purposes of setting up the critical realist
> alternative.
> > >
> > > I think the other (humble) point I wanted to raise was that there are
> > many
> > > different streams running concurrently through Kant's work, of which
> the
> > > Analytic is just one.  This makes pinning Kant down extremely
> > problematic,
> > > in my view, as the history of Kant interpretation testifies to.
>  (Again,
> > I'm
> > > not saying you don't already appreciate that fact.)  The Aesthetic and
> > the
> > > Analytic themselves can be seen as incongruent with each other (in that
> > in
> > > the Aesthetic we are affected by objects, whereas in the Analytic we
> > > constitute objects), and the position forwarded in the Refutation of
> > > Idealism is markedly other than that put forth in either the Analytic
> or
> > the
> > > Aesthetic.  Anyway, let me know what you make of Watkins eventually.
> > >
> > > thanks
> > > Phil
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > ________________________________________
> > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> > > critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> > > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [
> > > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu]
> > > Sent: 07 February 2009 19:00
> > > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 16
> > >
> > > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
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> > >
> > >
> > > Today's Topics:
> > >
> > >   1. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
> > >   2. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)
> > >   3. kant causality (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon)
> > >   4. Re: kant causality (Ruth Groff)
> > >
> > >
> > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >
> > > Message: 1
> > > Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 15:13:46 +0000
> > > From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
> > > Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> > > To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
> > >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > Message-ID:
> > >        <
> > > B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C16 at EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
> > >
> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> > >
> > >
> > > Hi Ruth
> > >
> > > I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well
> the
> > > historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a
> > very
> > > specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and
> indeed
> > > causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical
> > > realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.
> >  Kant
> > > wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a
> > dispensible
> > > category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that was
> > > undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a
> > > property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we cannot
> > > dispense with the category, given human experience having the form that
> > it
> > > does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so
> he
> > is
> > > not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them. It
> > may
> > > well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we need
> > any
> > > more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire for
> > more
> > > is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or immediacy.
> >  I
> > > think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist (in
> > the
> > > Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.
> > >
> > > thanks
> > > Phil
> > >
> > >
> > > Hi Phil,
> > > So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
> > > positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
> > > in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he says
> at
> > > the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck
> having
> > > in
> > > on the brain today!
> > > But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know
> about
> > > them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it seems
> to
> > > me
> > > they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the
> Prolegomena
> > > for
> > > anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
> > > Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip into
> > > Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets its
> > > experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of expectation.
> > > Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
> > > causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather is
> > > supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in a
> > way
> > > that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know
> that
> > > it
> > > does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
> > > "apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
> > > arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.
>  Therefore
> > it
> > > must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that they
> > are
> > > causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd
> An.]
> > > As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from empiricism
> > and
> > > Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
> > > naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of
> > natural
> > > or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective, really
> is
> > > provided by the object, not by the subject.
> > > It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics these
> > days
> > > the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you did,
> > that
> > > ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well as
> > > categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
> > > Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones on
> > > moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But
> the
> > > ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
> > > solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough, whether
> > > people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally confused
> > > them
> > > last time, etc.
> > > r.
> > >
> > >
> > > ------------------------------
> > >
> > > Message: 2
> > > Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 10:12:00 -0600
> > > From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> > >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > Message-ID:
> > >        <6ad241360902070812j49d8c97bq2344caf643cec380 at mail.gmail.com>
> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
> > >
> > > Hi Phil,
> > >
> > > I agree with you exactly about this,  except for that as I go over Kant
> > > this
> > > time I find myself having to acknowledge that he himself does not seem
> to
> > > take the position that natural necessity is an open question.  Or, more
> > > precisely, a meaningless question, transcendentally, and perfectly
> > > allowable
> > > (but for a dogmatic ban on it) empirically.  (After all, why should
> > > phenomenal objects not have dispositional properties?)
> > >
> > > Adorno, in ND especially, seems to register that there is something
> wrong
> > > not just with constituting phenomenal objects via their concepts, as
> Kant
> > > puts it when talking about the t. unity of apperception, but with
> > > extracting
> > > causality from them (so that causality does not come from the object,
> as
> > > Adorno puts it).
> > >
> > > I think what you say about why is right.  I think too that insofar as
> he
> > > reads Kant's transcendental idealism as a correct, if philosophically
> > > encoded, sociological diagnosis, he winds up in a weird position where
> it
> > > is
> > > hard to just say in an easy way that it is problematic, or even false,
> > > philosophically.  And it's odd, because as I suggest above, I don't
> think
> > > you even have to say that causality inheres in objects in and of
> > themselves
> > > -- you can just say that in addition to "causality" being a category of
> > the
> > > understanding, phenomenal objects have dispositional properties, the
> > > display
> > > of which is what causality *really* is.
> > >
> > > Anyway, thanks -- all interesting and helpful and relevant, for me.
>  How
> > is
> > > your work going?
> > >
> > > r.
> > >
> > >
> > > On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 9:13 AM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> > > pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Hi Ruth
> > > >
> > > > I get what you are saying here.  I think we have to remember as well
> > the
> > > > historical context when reading Kant, as always.  He was engaged in a
> > > very
> > > > specific task, which was defending knowledge, natural science and
> > indeed
> > > > causality from Humean and other sceptical attacks.  I think critical
> > > > realists tend to get hung up on this subjectivism/objectivism issue.
> > >  Kant
> > > > wanted to demonstrate how, given experience, causality was not a
> > > dispensible
> > > > category, and that it had a form of universality and necessity that
> was
> > > > undeniable.  I don't think Kant wants to say that causality is not a
> > > > property of objects in themselves, he just wants to say that we
> cannot
> > > > dispense with the category, given human experience having the form
> that
> > > it
> > > > does.  We have no knowledge of things in themselves (for Kant) and so
> > he
> > > is
> > > > not permitted to say that causality is not also a property of them.
> It
> > > may
> > > > well be.  In any case, it is essential to human experience.  Do we
> need
> > > any
> > > > more than this?  Adorno might butt in here and say that the desire
> for
> > > more
> > > > is precisely the desire for some ultimate pure foundation or
> immediacy.
> > >  I
> > > > think that is why Adorno is primarily a dialectical phenomenologist
> (in
> > > the
> > > > Hegelian sense), and not (primarily) an ontologist.
> > > >
> > > > thanks
> > > > Phil
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Hi Phil,
> > > > So far as I can tell, Kant himself is adamant that "noumena" are not
> > > > positive objects about which one might intelligibly ask if they are,
> > > > in-and-of-themselves, causally related.  At least, that's what he
> says
> > at
> > > > the close of the Analytic, which I'm teaching tomorrow so am stuck
> > having
> > > > in
> > > > on the brain today!
> > > > But the question isn't what noumena are, or whether you can to know
> > about
> > > > them.  (Let alone whether phenomena are "real" objects, which it
> seems
> > to
> > > > me
> > > > they *obviously* are for Kant.  So obvious that he wrote the
> > Prolegomena
> > > > for
> > > > anyone who didn't get it!)  The question is what causality is.
> > > > Hume said causal necessity does not inhere in the object, to slip
> into
> > > > Adorno-talk, and that what apparent causal necessity there is gets
> its
> > > > experiential force from the subject, from our own sense of
> expectation.
> > > > Kant (and Adorno, nicely, notices this) retains the assumption that
> > > > causality, whatever it is, does not inhere in the object, but rather
> is
> > > > supplied by the subject.  Not voluntaristically, of curse, and not in
> a
> > > way
> > > > that is negotiable!  But it comes from the subject.  [How do we know
> > that
> > > > it
> > > > does?  Because (a) it's not derivable from sense data and (b) if
> > > > "apprehensions" were not, in fact, causally ordered, if they could be
> > > > arranged any old way, they would not be empirical experience.
> >  Therefore
> > > it
> > > > must be that the understanding synthesizes apprehensions such that
> they
> > > are
> > > > causally ordered, subject to causality as a law.  This from the 2nd
> > An.]
> > > > As a metaphysics, what separates dispositional realism from
> empiricism
> > > and
> > > > Kantianism alike is that dispositional realists define causality
> > > > naturalistically.   Or, if you prefer, allow back in the concept of
> > > natural
> > > > or metaphysical necessity.  Modal force, from this perspective,
> really
> > is
> > > > provided by the object, not by the subject.
> > > > It seems to me that if you were a Kantian (though in metaphysics
> these
> > > days
> > > > the argument is entirely with Humeans), you'd want to say, if you
> did,
> > > that
> > > > ok, maybe phenomenal objects really do possess dispositional as well
> as
> > > > categorical properties, BUT that's still not what causality is.
> > > > Anyway, I'd love to hear what you think of those lectures.  The ones
> on
> > > > moral philosophy are great too.  And are also mostly about Kant.  But
> > the
> > > > ones on the 1st Critique I love.  And it pleases me how unbelievably
> > > > solicitous he is, in terms of whether he's being clear enough,
> whether
> > > > people are confused, whether - god forbid - he unintentionally
> confused
> > > > them
> > > > last time, etc.
> > > > r.
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > > ------------------------------
> > >
> > > Message: 3
> > > Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 18:38:45 +0000
> > > From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk>
> > > Subject: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> > > To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu"
> > >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > Message-ID:
> > >        <
> > > B1ED0DE51AC98D41BCF43145295D40B277A4097C17 at EX2K7-VIRT-3.ads.qub.ac.uk>
> > >
> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> > >
> > > Hi Ruth
> > >
> > > Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in
> relation
> > to
> > > the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or even
> > > familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be
> to
> > > appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of
> the
> > > Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our relation
> to
> > > things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and
> > so-called
> > > "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the
> > Critique
> > > of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that
> > > "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in the
> > > Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's
> > thought.
> > >  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as
> > > exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate
> > > senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one could
> > take
> > > from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might
> > forward
> > > that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from a
> > > relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally
> > real,
> > > - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least
> the
> > > reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one
> > commentator
> > > who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say sometimes
> > that
> > > the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in
> > context.
> > >  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some might
> > > suppose.
> > >
> > > thanks
> > > Phil
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > ------------------------------
> > >
> > > Message: 4
> > > Date: Sat, 7 Feb 2009 12:59:03 -0600
> > > From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] kant causality
> > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> > >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > Message-ID:
> > >        <6ad241360902071059h7602417pd98e1368e39cf6a8 at mail.gmail.com>
> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
> > >
> > > Hi Phil,
> > >
> > > Not to worry.  I don't think that I am at risk for reading Kant badly.
>  I
> > > agree about the 3rd Critique -- it is enormously important to Kant's
> > moral
> > > thinking, and yes, seems to intersect with the account of schematism in
> > the
> > > 1st c.  I am not saying that Kant is attracted to idealism in any way.
> >  He
> > > is an empirical realist.  There is no question about that, and I don't
> > see
> > > how anyone can read him otherwise.  But he is a transcendental idealist
> > --
> > > which, despite the name bears very little resemblance to idealism.
>  It's
> > > true that he wasn't that always.  But that's the position that we're
> > > considering.  I just think it's wishful thinking to read him as
> thinking
> > > that, even empirically, causality is the display of dispositional
> > > properties.  It's real, for him, causality - empirically real - but
> even
> > > empirically it is, as with all post-Kantian moderns, the real fact of
> > > phenomena being subject to an ordering principle, not the real fact of
> > the
> > > display of powers.
> > >
> > > I admit that I haven't read Watkins yet, and I will, but I just don't
> see
> > > how you can get Kant out of being a transcendental idealist with
> respect
> > to
> > > causality.
> > >
> > > r.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Sat, Feb 7, 2009 at 12:38 PM, Philip Anthony O'Hanlon <
> > > pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk> wrote:
> > >
> > > > Hi Ruth
> > > >
> > > > Also, I think the Analytic has to be read in context, I mean in
> > relation
> > > to
> > > > the whole of Kant's work (I'm not claiming to be in command of or
> even
> > > > familiar with that whole, but I don't think one necessarily has to be
> > to
> > > > appreciate the point).  I would perhaps read the analytic in light of
> > the
> > > > Refutation of Idealism, and what Kant says elswhere about our
> relation
> > to
> > > > things outside of us, the problem of incongruous counterparts and
> > > so-called
> > > > "pre-critical" stuff on the transcendental object, as well as the
> > > Critique
> > > > of Judgment.  As far as I have been made aware, Watkins argues that
> > > > "pre-critical" currents run simultaneously with "critical" ones in
> the
> > > > Critique, and challenge a one-dimensional interpretation of Kant's
> > > thought.
> > > >  I don't think it is that Kant offers a view of the categories as
> > > > exclusively inhering in the mind and then imposed on an indeterminate
> > > > senuous manifold.  I accept that this seems to be a position one
> could
> > > take
> > > > from a simple reading of the Analytic, and many commentators might
> > > forward
> > > > that view often for polemical purposes.  But in fact they result from
> a
> > > > relation of the subject to the noumenal sphere - the transcendentally
> > > real,
> > > > - and this relation contributes to their necessity.  This is at least
> > the
> > > > reading that I would be inclined towards.  I think Guyer is one
> > > commentator
> > > > who would be sympathetic to this sort of view.  Kant does say
> sometimes
> > > that
> > > > the noumenal object is "nothing for us", but this has to be read in
> > > context.
> > > >  The noumenal object plays a bigger role in Kant's work than some
> might
> > > > suppose.
> > > >
> > > > thanks
> > > > Phil
> > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > > ------------------------------
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> > >
> > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 16
> > > ************************************************
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> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
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> > Critical-Realism mailing list
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> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
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> >
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> End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 51, Issue 19
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From wendy.olsen at manchester.ac.uk  Mon Feb 16 07:51:39 2009
From: wendy.olsen at manchester.ac.uk (Wendy Olsen)
Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2009 14:51:39 +0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Ontology and Economics book, - avail
In-Reply-To: <200902040137.n141bFlJ030048@despam-11.iastate.edu>
Message-ID: <20090216145139484.00000003572@Workpcwo>

Hello
i found this book available via an online link.  It is a useful book.  I bought it.  It is oriented to the economists among you:

Ontology and Economics:  The advance paperback version
For your information the contents of the book are listed below:

The paperback version of this book can be purchased by bank transfer. Needless to say the cost of transfer may be an extra dollar or euro (or two).  But as the retail price of the book from other booksellers is 75 pounds sterling (before postage) and as the Cambridge Social Ontology Group is selling its (perfectly produced by Routledge) paperback version at just 12 pounds sterling (before postage and any other extras), the saving is still huge.  In our view the paperback version is much nicer anyway.

Rather than giving out the bank details etc here, we ask you to contact Emily Hudson (elh58 at cam.ac.uk) to obtain them. In previous emails we included estimates of postages costs.  What we did not anticipate was that many of you are ordering several copies of the book. Where this is so the postage cost per book is reduced.  So however you want to pay, if you want to order the book, do contact Emily and she will confirm costs.

One final word.  We have only a limited stock of the books to sell, and more than half have already gone.  So if you do want a reasonably priced version of this book (the contents are listed below), do get in touch now. 

Emily's full details are:
Emily Hudson
Faculty of Economics
Austin Robinson Building
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge
CB3 9DD
Phone:  +44 (0)1223 335211
Email: elh58 at cam.ac.uk
FAX (Economics Faculty general office: +44 (0)1223 3354 75

For your information the contents of the book are listed below:
Contents
Edward Fullbrook: Introduction: Lawson's Reorientation
Tony Lawson: Introduction
1a) Bruce Caldwell
Some Comments on Lawson's Reorienting Economics:  Same Facts, Different Conclusions
1b) Lawson Response
History, Causal Explanation and 'Basic Economic Reasoning'
2a) Bj?rn-Ivar Davidsen 
Critical Realism in Economics - a different view


2b) Lawson Response
Underlabouring for Substantive Theorising


3a) John B. Davis
The Nature of Heterodox Economics


3b) Lawson Response
Heterodox Economics and Pluralism


4a) Paul Downward, and Andrew Mearman
Reorienting Economics Through Triangulation of Methods


4b) Lawson Response
Triangulation and Social Research


5a) Bernard Guerrien
Irrelevance and Ideology


5b) Lawson Response
The Mainstream Orientation and Ideology


6a) Geoffrey M. Hodgson
On the Problem of Formalism in Economics


6b) Lawson Response
On the Nature and Roles of Formalism in Economics


7a) Bruce R. McFarling 
Finding a Critical Pragmatism in Reorienting Economics


7b) Lawson Response
Ontology or Epistemology?


8a) Ruccio, David
(Un)Real Criticism


8b) Lawson Response
Ontology and Postmodernism


9a) Staveren, Irene van
Feminism and Realism - A Contested Relationship


9b) Lawson Response
Feminism, Realism and Essentialism


10a) Vromen, Jack
Conjectural Revisionary Ontology


10b) Lawson Response
Provisionally Grounded Critical Ontology







 


Wendy Olsen
Senior Lecturer in Socio-Economic Research
Cathie Marsh Centre for Census & Survey Research
and Inst. for Development Policy and Management
Univ. of Manchester
Manchester M13 9PL
tel 0044-161-275-3043
www.ruralvisits.org 
web www.ccsr.ac.uk/staff/wo.htm
"Food has become an oral fixation, a primary sensory pleasure, a lifestyle choice, and a source of fear. Affluent over-consumption, knowledge of the mortality implications of the foods of choice, and obesity, channel us to the clinic, the diet book and the gym where hours of over-consumption of the world's resources are converted into joules of isolated exertion on yet more machines that are in turn the conversion point of food into further profit." - J. Morgan, to read more see http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue16.htm, Accessed May 2005.

-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Howard Engelskirchen
Sent: 04 February 2009 01:37
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] literature on critical realism and frankfurt school

Hi Echna,

I'm working on the relevance of the theory of science to the social sciences -- more specifically I consider advances in recent years that have been made in realist philosophy of science to our understanding of natural kinds and explore the degree to which they extend to the 
social sciences.   This goes to the question of 
'real definition' -- water is a natural kind and H2O is its real definition.  Marx is a wonderful resource.  In my view he anticipates powerfully the best in the contemporary philosophy of science.

The jcr text Ruth refers to is "Powers and
Particulars: Adorno and Scientific Realism," 
Journal of Critical Realism, v.3, no. 1, p. 1 (2004)

An effort to explore our understanding of the commodity relation as a social kind, which includes a critique of Bhaskar's 'qualified naturalism', is "Why is This Labour Value? - Commodity Producing Labour as a Social Kind," in Pearce and Frauley, eds., Critical Realism and the Social Sciences: Heterodox Elaborations  (Univ. of Toronto Press 2007).  This text does not include a consideration of the Frankfurt School, though.  Also, in the book Ruth mentioned I explore natural kind methodology and its relevance to understanding the decisive Section 2 of Chapter 1 of Marx's Capital, "On the Clear Comprehension of Political Economy: Social Kinds and the Significance of ?2 of Marx's Capital," in Groff, ed., Revitalizing Causality: Realism About Causality in Philosophy and Social Science (Routledge 2007).

Feel free to email at howarde at iastate.edu

howard




At 04:27 PM 2/3/2009, you wrote:
>Hi Ruth,
>
>thanks for your suggestions! Could you give some more details on 
>Engelskirchen?s text?  I searched it on the jcr page but I couldn?t 
>find it there. When I put his name into the search engine the only text  
>I get is one that is co-authored by you, named "Review Symposium: 
>Taking relativism seriously". I will also try to get hold of your book.
>Concerning the differences between frankfurt school  and CR you name 
>it?d say first of all: I?m really not sure yet (that?s one of the 
>reasons I want to dwell on this topic in my thesis). At least Adorno 
>for example in his negative dialectic is talking about the 
>preponderance of the object (his whole dialectical approach could also 
>be compared to Bhaskar?s development of DCR - this is, however, way 
>beyond my scope as I have huge troubles understanding it, especially as 
>a non native). This is something that might be interpreted as some kind 
>of secreted ontology, which has to be made explicit. What is making the 
>whole thing way more difficult and challenging is that the Frankfurt 
>School and CR are coming from different "epsitemic communities" and 
>notably texts of Adorno et al. have to be cut off  their embedding in 
>the tradition of german phiosophy (as they have no straightforward text 
>in which their principles are laid down). The question is this sense is 
>also, whether this is possible without harming or destroying the inner 
>core of the theroy. However, as I already stated I?m not quite sure on 
>the whole issue yet. Maybe there is also a difference between Adorno 
>and Horkheimer , as Horkheimer wrote his pieces on positivism and 
>epistemology in general (for example the famous text "traditional and 
>critical theory") in the 30s, whereas Adorno was especially engaged 
>with epistemic (and ontological?) issues in the 60s. Anyhow, these are 
>just some preliminary thoughts. As I?m not really into Kant I will 
>presumably start with your the chapter of your book. And I would be 
>glad about more "talk" :-) .
>
>best wishes,
>e
>Ruth Groff schrieb:
> > Hi Echna,
> >
> > This sounds really interesting.  There's not a lot, not that I know 
> > of anyway.  But Howard Engelskirchen did publish
> a piece on Adorno in JCR a few
> > years back, that you might want to look at.  I would say, and this 
> > is short-hand, that the most striking difference is in the ontology.  
> > Critical realism is a form of dispositional realism (realism about 
> > causal powers), which is to say that the view is that modality inheres in objects.
> > Horkheimer and Adorno are not prepared to dismiss with Kant in this way.
> > There are also some epistemological and meta-theoretial implications 
> > of this.  It's possible that the chapter on Kant in my book 
> > (Routledge 2004, CR, Post-Positivism and the Possibility of 
> > Knowledge) might be of some interest.
> >
> > Please feel free to e-mail me if you'd like to talk more.  Or, "talk."
> >
> > Warmly,
> > Ruth
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Feb 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, echna <echna at gmx.net> wrote:
> >
> >
> >> Hi all,
> >>
> >> I?m searching for texts, which compare the core characteristics of 
> >> critical realism with the theoretical framework developed by the 
> >> Frankfurt School. I browsed through the net, using google, and I 
> >> also did a search on that topic in the journal for critical realism 
> >> but I couldn?t find any suitable literature. I for myself am at the 
> >> moment writing in Vienna the proposal for my "Magisterabeit" 
> >> (something like the master thesis), and the working title is 
> >> "Critical Methodology? The Relevance of Theory of Science for the 
> >> Social Sciences" (in the german
> >> original: "Kritische Methodologie? Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen 
> >> Relevanz von Wissenschaftstheorie"). In my thesis I aim to compare 
> >> the premises of Critical Realism (most certainly in its 
> >> "pre-dialectical" fashion) with the ones of the Frankfurt School 
> >> outlined for example in the positivism dispute in german sociology 
> >> (and I want to deal just with the "old" Frankfurt School not with 
> >> Habermas and his fellows). In short, I think that both critical 
> >> realism and frankfurt school develop similar arguments in their 
> >> controversies with the positivist legacy. However, what has to be 
> >> done in this case is some kind of "epistemic translation", as both 
> >> theories are coming out of quite different epistemic communities, 
> >> so that the constellation of the arguments seems to be more distant 
> >> than it is. As this is -at least for me- a quite difficult task. 
> >> Therefore I would be very happy if somebody could give me some 
> >> hints of literature on this topic. Any help would be greatly appreciated.
> >>
> >> best regards,
> >> e
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Critical-Realism mailing list
> >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >>
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>Critical-Realism mailing list
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From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk  Wed Feb 18 11:11:30 2009
From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig)
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2009 18:11:30 -0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] FW: PhD Studentships in Law at The University of
	Westminster
Message-ID: <mailman.357.1234980697.2553.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>

Listers: 
 
For your information, on behalf of Radha D'Souza.
 
  _____  

From: Radha D'Souza 
Sent: 16 February 2009 11:38
Subject: FW: PhD Studentships in Law At Westminster



 

Dear Friends,

This email is sent to you either because you are interested in applying for
a PhD studentship or because you may know of people interested in applying.
Please pass it on to your networks and circulate widely.

One of the seven topics identified for PhD research concerns the problematic
of legal infrastructure for traditional irrigation, but there are several
others including Global Justice, media and gender & sexuality. Please visit
the website for more details.

Radha

 

 

Dr.Radha D'Souza

Reader, School of Law

University of Westminster

4, Little Titchfield Street

London W1W 7UW

United Kingdom

 

Tel: +44 (0) 20 791 5000 ext 2525
Fax: +44  (0) 207 7911 5821

email: R.Dsouza1 at westminster.ac.uk

 

 

  _____  

From: ahrbcentre-bounces at maillists.keele.ac.uk
[mailto:ahrbcentre-bounces at maillists.keele.ac.uk] On Behalf Of Oliver
Phillips
Sent: 13 February 2009 14:21
To: ahrbcentre at maillists.keele.ac.uk
Subject: CLGS Members: PhD Studentships in Law At Westminster

 

?15000 PHD STUDENTSHIPS IN LAW AT UNIVERSITY OF WESTMINSTER

The University of Westminster has three new studentships available for
students starting their PhD research in October 2009. Each studentship
includes a stipend of ?15000 and a fee waiver, and applications must be
received by 5pm on March 3rd, 2009.
Applicants need to apply for one of the specific projects advertised at
http://www.wmin.ac.uk/page-17661
Each project also offers specific contacts for more detailed information.

Further more general information on the studentship scheme see
http://www.westminster.ac.uk/page-17525

Oliver Phillips, PhD.
Research Director
School of Law
University of Westminster
4-12 Little Titchfield St
London W1W 7UW
Tel. 020 79115000 x 2626
email: phillio at wmin.ac.uk

 

The University of Westminster is a charity and a company limited by
guarantee. Registration number: 977818 England. Registered Office: 309
Regent Street, London W1B 2UW.

 


The University of Westminster is a charity and a company limited by
guarantee. Registration number: 977818 England. Registered Office: 309
Regent Street, London W1B 2UW.




__________ NOD32 3865 (20090218) Information __________

This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system.
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From shivahemmati at gmail.com  Sat Feb 28 19:28:24 2009
From: shivahemmati at gmail.com (shiva hemmati)
Date: Sat, 28 Feb 2009 18:28:24 -0800
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Fwd: Questions
In-Reply-To: <adf9704b0902250130p13b6c0e1h43973d045335a85@mail.gmail.com>
References: <adf9704b0902250130p13b6c0e1h43973d045335a85@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <adf9704b0902281828h60e861f7m8d873fd183e13137@mail.gmail.com>

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: shiva hemmati <shivahemmati at gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2009 01:30:33 -0800
Subject: Questions
To: mailman-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu

Hello
How can I be aware of Bhaskar's viewpoint about Social constructivism?

-- 
best wishes
Shiva Hemati



-- 
best wishes
Shiva Hemati


From rgroff at slu.edu  Sat Feb 28 19:49:33 2009
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Sat, 28 Feb 2009 20:49:33 -0600
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Fwd: Questions
In-Reply-To: <adf9704b0902281828h60e861f7m8d873fd183e13137@mail.gmail.com>
References: <adf9704b0902250130p13b6c0e1h43973d045335a85@mail.gmail.com>
	<adf9704b0902281828h60e861f7m8d873fd183e13137@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <6ad241360902281849g1fa89227v3b29957121d508d9@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Shiva,

Social constructivism about what?

Also, have you read any Bhaskar yet?

I continue to think that Collier's CRITICAL REALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ROY
BHASKAR'S PHILOSOPHY is the most accessible introduction.  What to read
first by Bhaskar really depends on who you ask!  Still, if you say more
about your interests and intellectual background, people might be able to
recommend things.

Warmly,
Ruth

On Sat, Feb 28, 2009 at 8:28 PM, shiva hemmati <shivahemmati at gmail.com>wrote:

> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: shiva hemmati <shivahemmati at gmail.com>
> Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2009 01:30:33 -0800
> Subject: Questions
> To: mailman-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu
>
> Hello
> How can I be aware of Bhaskar's viewpoint about Social constructivism?
>
> --
> best wishes
> Shiva Hemati
>
>
>
> --
> best wishes
> Shiva Hemati
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>