From dogangoecmen at aol.com Sat Aug 1 05:35:06 2009 From: dogangoecmen at aol.com (=?utf-8?Q?DG=C3=B6=C3=A7men?=) Date: Sat, 01 Aug 2009 07:35:06 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] My papers are available now! Message-ID: <8CBE0B340B22C5B-EC8-2780@webmail-dx10.sysops.aol.com> Dear Friends and Colleagues, some of my papers in English, German and Turkish are now available at www.dogangocmen.wordpress.com. Others will be uploaded soon, I hope. You are very welcome to visit the web site and make comments and formulate critique if you wish. Best wishes, D.G??men http://dogangocmen.wordpress.com/ From matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk Sun Aug 2 22:00:05 2009 From: matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk (Karl Maton) Date: Mon, 03 Aug 2009 14:00:05 +1000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] [Fwd: New Critical Realism Seminar] Message-ID: <4A7660C5.1040901@yahoo.co.uk> Getting Real: AACR Seminars and Discussions The Australasian Association for Critical Realism (AACR)is pleased to announce the latest in a new series of seminars, to be held at the University of Sydney. Tuesday 4th August 6.30pm Room 148 (downstairs) R.C. Mills Building, University of Sydney Nitasha Kaul Nitasha Kaul holds a joint doctorate in Economics and Philosophy. Currently based at the University of Westminster in London, her publications are in areas of identity, political economy, democracy, social theory -- for more see http://www.wmin.ac.uk/sshl/page-3011. She chose to leave her permanent post in Economics at the University of the West of England in Bristol in 2006 to pursue interdisciplinary scholarly research and writing in freer forms. Her recent book is 'Imagining Economics Otherwise: enounters with identity/difference' (2008). At the moment, she is visiting the Humanities Research Centre at the Australia National University (ANU) as a Fellow completing her next book on Bhutan. Getting Real is a new series of seminars and discussions of readings organised by the AACR. They are open to anyone interested in coming and engaging with realist ideas. Neither speakers nor other participants need be 'critical realists' - the aim is to open up and encourage debate and discussion. We adjourn to the pub afterwards as well. PLEASE send this on to anyone in your Dept or Faculty you think might be interested! Thanks. -- With best wishes, Karl ---- Dr Karl Maton Department of Sociology & Social Policy Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney http://www.KarlMaton.com Editorial Board, Journal of Critical Realism President, Australasian Association for Critical Realism -- With best wishes, Karl ---- Dr Karl Maton Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney http://www.KarlMaton.com President, Australasian Association for Critical Realism Editorial Board, Journal of Critical Realism 'This is your life, and it's ending one minute at a time' 'The greatest pleasure in life is doing what people say you cannot do' From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Tue Aug 11 04:08:08 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2009 11:08:08 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Rio conference Message-ID: Just to report that imo the 12th annual IACR conference around the theme 'Realism and Human Emancipation: Is Another World Possible' in Rio, 23-25 July, was a great success. Some 80 people at the workshop (a record, I think) and 200 at the main conference. Brilliantly organised by Mario Duayer and Joao Medeiros et al., with amazingly good translators (who do work for Lula, apparently). The usual CR friendliness, warmth, etc, but with a great deal of special Brazilian zest. The highlights for me were the bringing together of (1) CR and the dynamism of the Marxist tradition in Brazil and Argentina (represented at the conference mainly by the Lukacians); and (2) CR and Moishe Postone's reinterpretation of Marx's critical theory. Postone gave a plenary address, and it was a great pleasure to get to know him a little personally. And then there was Rio itself, which the organisers made a great job of ensuring that we caught the flavour of. Shortly after our conference, there was a related one in Florianopolis, attended by many of our plenary speakers, that also went swimmingly I'm told (I didn't attend). It's all part of growing evidence that CR is very much on the up worldwide in a wide range of subject areas. One thing I hadn't fully registered before the conference is that Lukacs called his aesthetic theory 'critical realism', and I've since discovered that there is a lively (Lukacsian) critical realist scene in art and aesthetic theory in various places around the world. I'm sure there could be much mutual benefit from dialogue. Mervyn From echna at gmx.net Sun Aug 16 12:03:14 2009 From: echna at gmx.net (echna) Date: Sun, 16 Aug 2009 20:03:14 +0200 Subject: [Critical-Realism] CR and STS Message-ID: <4A8849E2.8080305@gmx.net> Hi all, I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whole field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the list). best wishes, e From matthewlongshore at yahoo.com Sun Aug 16 12:51:39 2009 From: matthewlongshore at yahoo.com (Matthew Smith) Date: Sun, 16 Aug 2009 11:51:39 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS In-Reply-To: <4A8849E2.8080305@gmx.net> References: <4A8849E2.8080305@gmx.net> Message-ID: <992332.6361.qm@web33505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Hi Echna, There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-theo.pdf). I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literature (here: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=981817881&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently don't have it online or accessible from where I currently am. Best, Matthew ----- Message initial ---- De : echna ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS Hi all, I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whole field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the list). best wishes, e _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ From b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw Sun Aug 16 13:23:02 2009 From: b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw (b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw) Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2009 03:23:02 +0800 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS In-Reply-To: <992332.6361.qm@web33505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <4A8849E2.8080305@gmx.net> <992332.6361.qm@web33505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20090817032302.h3nu5gev6ok44oog@wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw> Hi Echna, The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may be helpful too. Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): 455-73. Best wishes, Poe Poe Yu-ze Wan Department of Sociology National Taiwan University ?? Matthew Smith : > Hi Echna, > > There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main > theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-theo.pdf). I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literature (here: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=981817881&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently don't have it online or accessible from where I currently > am. > > > Best, > Matthew > > > ----- Message initial ---- > De : echna > ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > > Hi all, > > I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from > critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) > studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can > overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological > terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the > sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology > is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik > Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno > Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even > refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of > the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whole > field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of > contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either > of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the list). > > best wishes, > e > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel > http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From echna at gmx.net Mon Aug 17 05:43:28 2009 From: echna at gmx.net (echna) Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2009 13:43:28 +0200 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS In-Reply-To: <20090817032302.h3nu5gev6ok44oog@wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw> References: <4A8849E2.8080305@gmx.net> <992332.6361.qm@web33505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <20090817032302.h3nu5gev6ok44oog@wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw> Message-ID: <4A894260.4060308@gmx.net> Hi again, thank you very much, Poe and Matthew. I will try to get hold of the mentioned texts. If anybody has some more suggestions, please let me know. Best, e b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw schrieb: > Hi Echna, > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may > be helpful too. > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency > in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): > 455-73. > > Best wishes, > Poe > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > Department of Sociology > National Taiwan University > > > ?? Matthew Smith : > > >> Hi Echna, >> >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: >> http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-theo.pdf). I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literature (here: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=981817881&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently don't have it online or accessible from where I currently >> am. >> >> >> Best, >> Matthew >> >> >> ----- Message initial ---- >> De : echna >> ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> >> Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS >> >> Hi all, >> >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whole >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the list). >> >> best wishes, >> e >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From leigh at totalpc.co.zw Mon Aug 17 08:02:38 2009 From: leigh at totalpc.co.zw (Leigh Price) Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2009 16:02:38 +0200 Subject: [Critical-Realism] CR and STS In-Reply-To: <4A8849E2.8080305@gmx.net> References: <4A8849E2.8080305@gmx.net> Message-ID: Hi echna You may want to read Latour's "Pandora's Hope" (1999) in which he addressed the issue of whether or not he believed in reality. I felt he lands resoundingly on the side of realism, and that in this book he espouses a weak social constructivism. He called for a 'realistic realism' based on a fallibilism which embraces relative, rather than absolute, certainty. He gave a plausible explanation of the reason behind the mainstream attachment to irrealism, namely that it is based on the 'fear of mob rule'. He wrote that "we do not lack certainty because we never dreamed of dominating the people". He also wrote, "When we say there is no outside world, that does not mean we deny its existence, but, on the contrary, that we refuse to grant it the ahistorical, isolated, inhuman, cold, objective existence that it was given only to combat the crowd". An American writer influenced by Latour is Donna Haraway. Although she identifies her self as an anti-realist, Andrew Sayer has acknowledged (Realism and Social Science, 1999: 103, n.13): ?...despite Haraway?s professed rejection of her realism, her discussion of objectivity and the situated and perspectival nature of knowledge is compatible with critical realism, and indeed helps develop it.? Hope this is helpful, Leigh -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna Sent: 16 August 2009 20:03 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] CR and STS Hi all, I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whole field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the list). best wishes, e _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From d.eldervass at ntlworld.com Fri Aug 21 08:48:53 2009 From: d.eldervass at ntlworld.com (d.eldervass at ntlworld.com) Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 15:48:53 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS Message-ID: <20090821154853.TECVX.851901.root@web07-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existing external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't have any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is difficult to make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. He seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinction is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps = 'the phenomenal world' thought interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as if the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no piont in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed to depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as our cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of the world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in that world. My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! best Dave ---- b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw wrote: > Hi Echna, The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may be helpful too. Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): 455-73. Best wishes, Poe Poe Yu-ze Wan Department of Sociology National Taiwan University ?? Matthew Smith : > Hi Echna, > > There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main > theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-theo.pdf). I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literature (here: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=981817881&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently don't have it online or accessible from where I currently > am. > > > Best, > Matthew > > > ----- Message initial ---- > De : echna > ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > > Hi all, > > I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from > critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) > studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can > overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological > terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the > sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology > is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik > Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno > Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even > refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of > the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whole > field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of > contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either > of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the list). > > best wishes, > e > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel > http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From kate_303 at hotmail.co.uk Fri Aug 21 09:13:52 2009 From: kate_303 at hotmail.co.uk (kate martin) Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 15:13:52 +0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts Message-ID: Hi, I'm a PhD student and am about to begin exploring Critical Realism... I was wondering whether anyone could recommend any articles/texts that would a good introduction? Thanks in advance Kate _________________________________________________________________ Windows Live Messenger: Thanks for 10 great years?enjoy free winks and emoticons. http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/157562755/direct/01/ From b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw Fri Aug 21 09:37:56 2009 From: b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw (b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw) Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 23:37:56 +0800 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20090821233756.vi5swt4fk8ssc404@wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw> Hi Kate, I personally recommend the following texts: Sayer, Andrew. 1992. Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach. 2nd ed. London: Routledge. Sayer, Andrew. 2000. Realism and Social Science. London: Sage. Manicas, Peter T. 2006. Realist Philosophy of Social Science: Explanation and Understanding. New York: Cambridge University Press. Collier, Andrew. 1994. Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar's Philosophy. London: Verso. Danermark, Berth, Mats Ekstr?m, Liselotte Jakobsen, and Jan Ch. Karlsson. 2002. Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social Sciences. London: Routledge. Potter, Garry. 2000. The Philosophy of Social Science: New Perspectives. New York: Longman. And if you are a sociology major or take some interest in historical sociology, the following articles will be of particualr use: Steinmetz, George. 1998. "Critical Realism and Historical Sociology," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 40(1): 170-86. Gorski, Philip. 2009. "Social 'Mechanisms' and Comparative-Historical Sociology: A Critical Realist Proposal," in Bj?rn Wittrock and Peter Hedstr?m (eds) The Frontiers of Sociology. Leiden: Brill. (Of course, these are not a substitute for reading the original works by such authors as Rom Harr?, Roy Bhaskar, and Margaret Archer.) Best, Poe Poe Yu-ze Wan Department of Sociology National Taiwan University ?? kate martin : > > Hi, > > > > I'm a PhD student and am about to begin exploring Critical > Realism... I was wondering whether anyone could recommend any > articles/texts that would a good introduction? > > > > Thanks in advance > > Kate > > _________________________________________________________________ > Windows Live Messenger: Thanks for 10 great years?enjoy free winks > and emoticons. > http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/157562755/direct/01/ > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From rgroff at slu.edu Fri Aug 21 17:01:55 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 18:01:55 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts In-Reply-To: <20090821233756.vi5swt4fk8ssc404@wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw> References: <20090821233756.vi5swt4fk8ssc404@wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw> Message-ID: <6ad241360908211601n6c4207dboee80e0bd7fbe7d2a@mail.gmail.com> Hi Kate, My vote for the single best intro is the Collier, referenced by Poe. After that, you should just read A Realist Theory of Science and then The Possibility of Naturalism, both by Roy Bhaskar. After THAT, you're good to go to read however widely in CR you want! Warmly, Ruth On Fri, Aug 21, 2009 at 10:37 AM, wrote: > Hi Kate, > > I personally recommend the following texts: > > Sayer, Andrew. 1992. Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach. 2nd > ed. London: Routledge. > > Sayer, Andrew. 2000. Realism and Social Science. London: Sage. > > Manicas, Peter T. 2006. Realist Philosophy of Social Science: > Explanation and Understanding. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > Collier, Andrew. 1994. Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy > Bhaskar's Philosophy. London: Verso. > > Danermark, Berth, Mats Ekstr?m, Liselotte Jakobsen, and Jan Ch. > Karlsson. 2002. Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social > Sciences. London: Routledge. > > Potter, Garry. 2000. The Philosophy of Social Science: New > Perspectives. New York: Longman. > > And if you are a sociology major or take some interest in historical > sociology, > the following articles will be of particualr use: > > Steinmetz, George. 1998. "Critical Realism and Historical Sociology," > Comparative Studies in Society and History, 40(1): 170-86. > > Gorski, Philip. 2009. "Social 'Mechanisms' and Comparative-Historical > Sociology: A Critical Realist Proposal," in Bj?rn Wittrock and Peter > Hedstr?m (eds) The Frontiers of Sociology. Leiden: Brill. > > > (Of course, these are not a substitute for reading the original works by > such authors as Rom Harr?, Roy Bhaskar, and Margaret Archer.) > > Best, > > Poe > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > Department of Sociology > National Taiwan University > > > ?? kate martin : > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > > > I'm a PhD student and am about to begin exploring Critical > > Realism... I was wondering whether anyone could recommend any > > articles/texts that would a good introduction? > > > > > > > > Thanks in advance > > > > Kate > > > > _________________________________________________________________ > > Windows Live Messenger: Thanks for 10 great years?enjoy free winks > > and emoticons. > > http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/157562755/direct/01/ > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From alex.clark at ualberta.ca Fri Aug 21 17:47:46 2009 From: alex.clark at ualberta.ca (Alex Clark) Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 17:47:46 -0600 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts References: <20090821233756.vi5swt4fk8ssc404@wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw> <6ad241360908211601n6c4207dboee80e0bd7fbe7d2a@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: Collier's book has been re-printed I think and is available for a good price (circa 17 UK pounds) after being out of print for a while A -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ruth Groff Sent: Fri 8/21/2009 5:01 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts Hi Kate, My vote for the single best intro is the Collier, referenced by Poe. After that, you should just read A Realist Theory of Science and then The Possibility of Naturalism, both by Roy Bhaskar. After THAT, you're good to go to read however widely in CR you want! Warmly, Ruth On Fri, Aug 21, 2009 at 10:37 AM, wrote: > Hi Kate, > > I personally recommend the following texts: > > Sayer, Andrew. 1992. Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach. 2nd > ed. London: Routledge. > > Sayer, Andrew. 2000. Realism and Social Science. London: Sage. > > Manicas, Peter T. 2006. Realist Philosophy of Social Science: > Explanation and Understanding. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > Collier, Andrew. 1994. Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy > Bhaskar's Philosophy. London: Verso. > > Danermark, Berth, Mats Ekstr?m, Liselotte Jakobsen, and Jan Ch. > Karlsson. 2002. Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social > Sciences. London: Routledge. > > Potter, Garry. 2000. The Philosophy of Social Science: New > Perspectives. New York: Longman. > > And if you are a sociology major or take some interest in historical > sociology, > the following articles will be of particualr use: > > Steinmetz, George. 1998. "Critical Realism and Historical Sociology," > Comparative Studies in Society and History, 40(1): 170-86. > > Gorski, Philip. 2009. "Social 'Mechanisms' and Comparative-Historical > Sociology: A Critical Realist Proposal," in Bj?rn Wittrock and Peter > Hedstr?m (eds) The Frontiers of Sociology. Leiden: Brill. > > > (Of course, these are not a substitute for reading the original works by > such authors as Rom Harr?, Roy Bhaskar, and Margaret Archer.) > > Best, > > Poe > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > Department of Sociology > National Taiwan University > > > ?? kate martin : > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > > > I'm a PhD student and am about to begin exploring Critical > > Realism... I was wondering whether anyone could recommend any > > articles/texts that would a good introduction? > > > > > > > > Thanks in advance > > > > Kate > > > > _________________________________________________________________ > > Windows Live Messenger: Thanks for 10 great years-enjoy free winks > > and emoticons. > > http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/157562755/direct/01/ > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From kate_303 at hotmail.co.uk Sat Aug 22 04:01:27 2009 From: kate_303 at hotmail.co.uk (kate martin) Date: Sat, 22 Aug 2009 10:01:27 +0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts In-Reply-To: References: <20090821233756.vi5swt4fk8ssc404@wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw> <6ad241360908211601n6c4207dboee80e0bd7fbe7d2a@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: Thank you for all of your suggestions - that's a great help and will certainly keep me busy for a while!!! warm wishes kate > Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 17:47:46 -0600 > From: alex.clark at ualberta.ca > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts > > Collier's book has been re-printed I think and is available for a good price (circa 17 UK pounds) > after being out of print for a while > > A > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ruth Groff > Sent: Fri 8/21/2009 5:01 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts > > Hi Kate, > > My vote for the single best intro is the Collier, referenced by Poe. > > After that, you should just read A Realist Theory of Science and then The > Possibility of Naturalism, both by Roy Bhaskar. After THAT, you're good to > go to read however widely in CR you want! > > Warmly, > Ruth > > > > > > On Fri, Aug 21, 2009 at 10:37 AM, wrote: > > > Hi Kate, > > > > I personally recommend the following texts: > > > > Sayer, Andrew. 1992. Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach. 2nd > > ed. London: Routledge. > > > > Sayer, Andrew. 2000. Realism and Social Science. London: Sage. > > > > Manicas, Peter T. 2006. Realist Philosophy of Social Science: > > Explanation and Understanding. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > > > Collier, Andrew. 1994. Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy > > Bhaskar's Philosophy. London: Verso. > > > > Danermark, Berth, Mats Ekstr?m, Liselotte Jakobsen, and Jan Ch. > > Karlsson. 2002. Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social > > Sciences. London: Routledge. > > > > Potter, Garry. 2000. The Philosophy of Social Science: New > > Perspectives. New York: Longman. > > > > And if you are a sociology major or take some interest in historical > > sociology, > > the following articles will be of particualr use: > > > > Steinmetz, George. 1998. "Critical Realism and Historical Sociology," > > Comparative Studies in Society and History, 40(1): 170-86. > > > > Gorski, Philip. 2009. "Social 'Mechanisms' and Comparative-Historical > > Sociology: A Critical Realist Proposal," in Bj?rn Wittrock and Peter > > Hedstr?m (eds) The Frontiers of Sociology. Leiden: Brill. > > > > > > (Of course, these are not a substitute for reading the original works by > > such authors as Rom Harr?, Roy Bhaskar, and Margaret Archer.) > > > > Best, > > > > Poe > > > > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > > Department of Sociology > > National Taiwan University > > > > > > ?? kate martin : > > > > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > > > > > > > I'm a PhD student and am about to begin exploring Critical > > > Realism... I was wondering whether anyone could recommend any > > > articles/texts that would a good introduction? > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks in advance > > > > > > Kate > > > > > > _________________________________________________________________ > > > Windows Live Messenger: Thanks for 10 great years-enjoy free winks > > > and emoticons. > > > http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/157562755/direct/01/ > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _________________________________________________________________ Windows Live Messenger: Happy 10-Year Anniversary?get free winks and emoticons. http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/157562755/direct/01/ From rgroff at slu.edu Sat Aug 22 07:03:16 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Sat, 22 Aug 2009 08:03:16 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts In-Reply-To: References: <20090821233756.vi5swt4fk8ssc404@wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw> <6ad241360908211601n6c4207dboee80e0bd7fbe7d2a@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <6ad241360908220603n1bdca517m2d4869b34aa02ab2@mail.gmail.com> Hi Kate, Don't feel daunted. Collier's book is extremely clear and well written, and he really follows the contours of Bhaskar's first two books. RTS and PON (the first two books) are *not* especially easy, but if you've already read the Collier, you should be ok. As I said before, once you've got a handle on that material, you will be in a fine position to read further if you like, be it Bhaskar's later thinking or the work of others. Feel free to post any questions you may have to the list. Years ago, we read some of these works together on-line. Warmly, Ruth On Sat, Aug 22, 2009 at 5:01 AM, kate martin wrote: > > Thank you for all of your suggestions - that's a great help and will > certainly keep me busy for a while!!! > warm wishes > kate > > > Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 17:47:46 -0600 > > From: alex.clark at ualberta.ca > > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts > > > > Collier's book has been re-printed I think and is available for a good > price (circa 17 UK pounds) > > after being out of print for a while > > > > A > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ruth > Groff > > Sent: Fri 8/21/2009 5:01 PM > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts > > > > Hi Kate, > > > > My vote for the single best intro is the Collier, referenced by Poe. > > > > After that, you should just read A Realist Theory of Science and then The > > Possibility of Naturalism, both by Roy Bhaskar. After THAT, you're good > to > > go to read however widely in CR you want! > > > > Warmly, > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Aug 21, 2009 at 10:37 AM, wrote: > > > > > Hi Kate, > > > > > > I personally recommend the following texts: > > > > > > Sayer, Andrew. 1992. Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach. 2nd > > > ed. London: Routledge. > > > > > > Sayer, Andrew. 2000. Realism and Social Science. London: Sage. > > > > > > Manicas, Peter T. 2006. Realist Philosophy of Social Science: > > > Explanation and Understanding. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > > > > > Collier, Andrew. 1994. Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy > > > Bhaskar's Philosophy. London: Verso. > > > > > > Danermark, Berth, Mats Ekstr?m, Liselotte Jakobsen, and Jan Ch. > > > Karlsson. 2002. Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social > > > Sciences. London: Routledge. > > > > > > Potter, Garry. 2000. The Philosophy of Social Science: New > > > Perspectives. New York: Longman. > > > > > > And if you are a sociology major or take some interest in historical > > > sociology, > > > the following articles will be of particualr use: > > > > > > Steinmetz, George. 1998. "Critical Realism and Historical Sociology," > > > Comparative Studies in Society and History, 40(1): 170-86. > > > > > > Gorski, Philip. 2009. "Social 'Mechanisms' and Comparative-Historical > > > Sociology: A Critical Realist Proposal," in Bj?rn Wittrock and Peter > > > Hedstr?m (eds) The Frontiers of Sociology. Leiden: Brill. > > > > > > > > > (Of course, these are not a substitute for reading the original works > by > > > such authors as Rom Harr?, Roy Bhaskar, and Margaret Archer.) > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > Poe > > > > > > > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > > > Department of Sociology > > > National Taiwan University > > > > > > > > > ?? kate martin : > > > > > > > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I'm a PhD student and am about to begin exploring Critical > > > > Realism... I was wondering whether anyone could recommend any > > > > articles/texts that would a good introduction? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks in advance > > > > > > > > Kate > > > > > > > > _________________________________________________________________ > > > > Windows Live Messenger: Thanks for 10 great years-enjoy free winks > > > > and emoticons. > > > > http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/157562755/direct/01/ > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > _________________________________________________________________ > Windows Live Messenger: Happy 10-Year Anniversary?get free winks and > emoticons. > http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/157562755/direct/01/ > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From d.eldervass at ntlworld.com Mon Aug 24 12:34:42 2009 From: d.eldervass at ntlworld.com (d.eldervass at ntlworld.com) Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2009 19:34:42 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS In-Reply-To: <20090821154853.TECVX.851901.root@web07-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> Message-ID: <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> Hi Echna, and listers! Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a touch more coherently. I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empirical' (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observed by human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon known as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theorised by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it was observed, but we just didn't know about it. What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll suggest some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an authority on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructivism in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanities) has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on reflection. So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a very odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scientists observe and theorise them? First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on the categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We can never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filtered through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, but to the world-as-we-experience-it. Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social constructionists argue that these are social products, and although Latour rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be taken as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists employ rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical work, then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientists change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us of the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by science, therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence of this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our 'world'. Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for sure whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way of making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made within the constructivist tradition. This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excellent book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge') that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but they are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enable us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about our environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those in which our perceptual abilities developed). Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influence on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on our perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the world-in-itself. Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that the descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves strongly influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite of the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, I have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainly misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also some recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This is arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts to approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including inanimate objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other to produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about the phases of Venus. This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome views on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to make sense of Latour's ontology. Best, Dave ---- d.eldervass at ntlworld.com wrote: > Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existing external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't have any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is difficult to make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. He seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinction is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps = 'the phenomenal world' thought interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as if the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no piont in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed to depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as our cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of the world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in that world. My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! best Dave ---- b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw wrote: > Hi Echna, The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may be helpful too. Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): 455-73. Best wishes, Poe Poe Yu-ze Wan Department of Sociology National Taiwan University ?? Matthew Smith : > Hi Echna, > > There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main > theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-theo.pdf). I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literature (here: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=981817881&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently don't have it online or accessible from where I currently > am. > > > Best, > Matthew > > > ----- Message initial ---- > De : echna > ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > > Hi all, > > I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from > critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) > studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can > overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological > terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the > sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology > is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik > Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno > Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even > refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of > the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whole > field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of > contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either > of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the list). > > best wishes, > e > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel > http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk Tue Aug 25 01:50:01 2009 From: mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk (Mark Johnson) Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2009 08:50:01 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS In-Reply-To: <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> References: <20090821154853.TECVX.851901.root@web07-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> Message-ID: Hi Dave, Thanks for this ? very thought-provoking! These issues are quite ?hot? in the educational technology work I?m doing at the moment, but I must confess I?m now not sure how much the arguments between realists and constructivists matter ? or indeed, ought to matter. Why does it help constructivists to see the world as construct? I was struck by an interview with Heinz von Foerster on Youtube where, right at the end of his life (and he was quite ill), he insisted on the absence of reality ( http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PcPtl-vuGbI ? in German). His ?explanatory principle? had served him well through a rich and productive life up to the moment of his death. Similarly, Ernst Von Glasersfeld?s (a follower of Piaget, and founder of Radical Constructivism) justification of constructivism similarly strikes me as deeply humane ( http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zTsY3TosVX0). No doubt realists will insist at the end of their lives on the reality of the world. But is it any more than one set of distinctions against another, each serving their purpose, each probing the conscience of the individual making them as they seek to ?act well? in the world? If you believe there are discoverable real mechanisms, there are more difficult questions to ask. Are they worth arguing for? Are they worth falling-out with people for (or being rude to one another for)? Are they worth fighting for? Dying for? The more extreme our actions in the cause of an idea, the closer we risk becoming fundamentalist ? where actions and ideas become separated from personal conscience. It?s a slippery slope to fundamentalism! Of course constructivists too can become fundamentalists ? and it?s no less pathological, but insistence on ?reality? certainly (in my view) makes one more susceptible to it. History is littered with examples of where particular distinctions are made and shared, action taken in response to them, and then it is realised that they were wrong (I often think of the distinctions that must have been made when the library at Alexandria was destroyed, but there are many other worse examples of course). The idea that there are discoverable ?right? or ?real? distinctions doesn?t (in my view) help avoid these problems (indeed, it may exacerbate them). However, the idea that there are better methodologies for making distinctions (which is what I value from CR) may be very valuable to us: particularly if methodologies can dispel the ?rightness? or ?wrongness? of particular distinctions but rather help people to work and live with each other more peacefully. On this point, I don?t think any constructivist would disagree. Mark On Mon, Aug 24, 2009 at 7:34 PM, wrote: > Hi Echna, and listers! > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a > touch more coherently. > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say > here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour > acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empirical' > (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not > actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's > 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observed by > human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon known > as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theorised > by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and > common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it was > observed, but we just didn't know about it. > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this > contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm > offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered > explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong > constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll suggest > some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how > accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an authority > on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructivism > in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour > takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of > constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanities) > has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in > philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on > reflection. > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a very > odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scientists > observe and theorise them? > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the world-in-itself > and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on the categories of > perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, space, and > causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We can never > perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filtered > through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we can > know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the > world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, > when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not > referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, but > to the world-as-we-experience-it. > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience depends > not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on concepts, > theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) positively shape > our perception of the things we experience. Social constructionists argue > that these are social products, and although Latour rejects references to > the social, he continues to be a kind of constructionist, arguing that these > concepts and theories come to be taken as true as the result of historical > processes in which scientists employ rhetorical strategies to persuade > others of their merit. > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our categories, > which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical work, then the > radical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientists change our > categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of Venus, they > alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world about which we > can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong constructivists > find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us of the truth of some > new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out there'. The phases of > Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by science, therefore only exist > once they have been explained, but the consequence of this process is that > they become just as real as anything else in our 'world'. > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not aware > of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for sure > whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way of > making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made within > the constructivist tradition. > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the > contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excellent > book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge') > that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply > wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but they > are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have > enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our > categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the > actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enable > us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about our > environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those in > which our perceptual abilities developed). > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influence > on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on our > perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between > reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is > difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the > world-in-itself. > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that the > descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves strongly > influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite of > the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories > implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, I > have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainly > misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his > account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the > inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to > behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view > that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' > theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is > motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also some > recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This is > arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the > undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their > perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts to > approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including inanimate > objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other to > produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about the > phases of Venus. > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome views > on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to make > sense of Latour's ontology. > > Best, > > Dave > > > > ---- d.eldervass at ntlworld.com wrote: > > Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different sort > of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different from the > common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existing external > world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't have any access > to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that science does > describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other hand he and his > followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe did not exist > until they described them. At first sight this is difficult to make sense of > for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. He seems to be > committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinction is drawn > between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the > world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps = 'the phenomenal world' thought > interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because > Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as if > the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they > only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no piont > in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed to > depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as our > cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at > the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of the > world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in > that world. > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that (a) > makes sense; (and (b) helps! > > best > > Dave > > > > ---- b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw wrote: > > Hi Echna, > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may > be helpful too. > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency > in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): > 455-73. > > Best wishes, > Poe > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > Department of Sociology > National Taiwan University > > > ?? Matthew Smith : > > > Hi Echna, > > > > There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main > > theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: > > > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-theo.pdf). > I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which > touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the > perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literature > (here: > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=981817881&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). > If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently don't > have it online or accessible from where I currently > > am. > > > > > > Best, > > Matthew > > > > > > ----- Message initial ---- > > De : echna > > ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > > Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > > Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > > > > Hi all, > > > > I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from > > critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) > > studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can > > overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > > constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological > > terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the > > sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology > > is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik > > Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno > > Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even > > refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of > > the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whole > > field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of > > contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either > > of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the > list). > > > > best wishes, > > e > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel > > http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mark Johnson Institute for Educational Cybernetics University of Bolton BL3 5AB Tel. 01204 903567 Mob. 0778 6064505 From echna at gmx.net Tue Aug 25 06:01:59 2009 From: echna at gmx.net (echna) Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2009 14:01:59 +0200 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS In-Reply-To: <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> References: <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> Message-ID: <4A93D2B7.3090303@gmx.net> Hi David, hi all, first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your mail when you state that Latour?s position can?t be reconciled - it is just contradictory. I don?t know all of Latour?s work, but for example in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn?s contradictory sentence that scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don?t do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an "ontological tension", as one can?t talk about ontology in purely epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in general. The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I don?t know all of Latour?s work (or I am misstaken about his theory - but one last thing: Latour?s very essayistic and loose style is not really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more confusion) best, e d.eldervass at ntlworld.com schrieb: > Hi Echna, and listers! > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a touch more coherently. > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empirical' (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observed by human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon known as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theorised by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it was observed, but we just didn't know about it. > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll suggest some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an authority on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructivism in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanities) has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on reflection. > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a very odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scientists observe and theorise them? > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on the categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We can never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filtered through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, but to the world-as-we-experience-it. > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social constructionists argue that these are social products, and although Latour rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be taken as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists employ rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical work, then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientists change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us of the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by science, therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence of this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our 'world'. > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for sure whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way of making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made within the constructivist tradition. > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excellent book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge') that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but they are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enable us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about our environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those in which our perceptual abilities developed). > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influence on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on our perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the world-in-itself. > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that the descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves strongly influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite of the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, I have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainly misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also some recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This is arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts to approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including inanimate objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other to produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about the phases of Venus. > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome views on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to make sense of Latour's ontology. > > Best, > > Dave > > > > ---- d.eldervass at ntlworld.com wrote: > >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. >> > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existing external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't have any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is difficult to make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. He seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinction is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps = 'the phenomenal world' thought interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as if the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no piont in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed to depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as our cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of the world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in that world. > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! > > best > > Dave > > > > ---- b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw wrote: > >> Hi Echna, >> > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may > be helpful too. > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency > in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): > 455-73. > > Best wishes, > Poe > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > Department of Sociology > National Taiwan University > > > ?? Matthew Smith : > > >> Hi Echna, >> >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: >> http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-theo.pdf). I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literature (here: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=981817881&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently don't have it online or accessible from where I currently >> am. >> >> >> Best, >> Matthew >> >> >> ----- Message initial ---- >> De : echna >> ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> >> Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS >> >> Hi all, >> >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whole >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the list). >> >> best wishes, >> e >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From R.Dsouza1 at westminster.ac.uk Wed Aug 26 07:09:19 2009 From: R.Dsouza1 at westminster.ac.uk (Radha D'Souza) Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2009 14:09:19 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS In-Reply-To: <4A93D2B7.3090303@gmx.net> References: <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> <4A93D2B7.3090303@gmx.net> Message-ID: <999A7C2B264EA640B183B790D772DE769381BE@isls-exch-be-1.intranet.wmin.ac.uk> Dear David, Echna, all, Thanks for your contributions, a very interesting discussion indeed. Echna, your point about the 'ontological tension' is important. Latour identifies (correctly) a problem in the empirical world -that of relations between objects and people (actors) in the face of apparently increasing domination of objects over people in a technology dominated world. He goes the next step and figures (rightly) that this has to do with the divide between nature and society - but then stops short of interrogating that relationship by devising 'hybrids' as the third category - as mediators between nature/ society divide (which is hardly a category)- it is here that the ontological tension is most palpable - but the problem, in my view, is also to do with absence of dialectics which could have shifted his focus to the RELATIONSHIP between nature-society, society-individuals (actors) and individuals-nature and to locate the problem of technological interventions- his main concern - as one of specific conjunctures of the nature-society-people relationship in a geo-historical context. By focusing on objects and actors mechanically and in reductionist ways, instead of their dialectical relations, he objectifies actors, 'activates' objects and has no way of explaining the relationships between the two. The political ramifications of Latour are equally interesting - because ANT mirrors contemporary 'network' society including new ways of social engineering behind the facade of technology. What I find more difficult is this: if we are to be ontologically aware in our understanding of the world, and understand nature-society-people as ontologically distinct yet dialectically related (following RB), and reality as multi-tiered (following RB) then, whatever the problematic we are investigating, whether in the field of nature or culture or psyche, we cannot separate the nature/society/people dialectic of the problematic, because Being itself comprises the three dimensions in tension. That requires not only a completely non-disciplinary way of addressing a problem in any field - but equally, developing a non-dualist methodology for investigating problems. Latour's anthropological analogy of the pre-modern man points to the fact that the anthropologist's pre-modern man was much more ontologically grounded (even if less articulate) and therefore much more focused on policing the boundaries of relationships between nature/society/people. It is marginalising ontology that has caused the nature/society rift and the problem of objects and actors and their relationships in the first place. We are a long way away from bringing ontological, dialectical and non-dualist approaches to bear on the way we actually address problems of the world around us and that leaves us with a gap between philosophy and its effectiveness in changing the world. In case you have not already seen it already, Uberoi's 'The other mind of Europe: Goethe as a scientist' and his 'European Modernity: science, truth and method' could be a good anti-dote to Latour, and perhaps useful for STS studies. Sorry for the ramble, I am a lurker usually, but couldn't resist throwing my two cents worth... Radha -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna Sent: 25 August 2009 13:02 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS Hi David, hi all, first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your mail when you state that Latour?s position can?t be reconciled - it is just contradictory. I don?t know all of Latour?s work, but for example in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn?s contradictory sentence that scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don?t do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an "ontological tension", as one can?t talk about ontology in purely epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in general. The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I don?t know all of Latour?s work (or I am misstaken about his theory - but one last thing: Latour?s very essayistic and loose style is not really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more confusion) best, e d.eldervass at ntlworld.com schrieb: > Hi Echna, and listers! > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a touch more coherently. > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empirical' (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observed by human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon known as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theorised by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it was observed, but we just didn't know about it. > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll suggest some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an authority on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructivism in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanities) has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on reflection. > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a very odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scientists observe and theorise them? > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on the categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We can never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filtered through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, but to the world-as-we-experience-it. > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social constructionists argue that these are social products, and although Latour rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be taken as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists employ rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical work, then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientists change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us of the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by science, therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence of this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our 'world'. > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for sure whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way of making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made within the constructivist tradition. > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excellent book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge') that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but they are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enable us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about our environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those in which our perceptual abilities developed). > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influence on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on our perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the world-in-itself. > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that the descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves strongly influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite of the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, I have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainly misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also some recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This is arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts to approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including inanimate objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other to produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about the phases of Venus. > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome views on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to make sense of Latour's ontology. > > Best, > > Dave > > > > ---- d.eldervass at ntlworld.com wrote: > >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. >> > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existing external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't have any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is difficult to make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. He seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinction is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps = 'the phenomenal world' thought interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as if the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no piont in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed to depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as our cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of the world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in that world. > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! > > best > > Dave > > > > ---- b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw wrote: > >> Hi Echna, >> > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may > be helpful too. > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency > in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): > 455-73. > > Best wishes, > Poe > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > Department of Sociology > National Taiwan University > > > ?? Matthew Smith : > > >> Hi Echna, >> >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: >> http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-theo.pdf). I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literature (here: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=981817881&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently don't have it online or accessible from where I currently >> am. >> >> >> Best, >> Matthew >> >> >> ----- Message initial ---- >> De : echna >> ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> >> Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS >> >> Hi all, >> >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whole >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the list). >> >> best wishes, >> e >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism -- The University of Westminster is a charity and a company limited by guarantee. Registration number: 977818 England. Registered Office: 309 Regent Street, London W1B 2UW, UK From mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk Wed Aug 26 08:11:26 2009 From: mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk (Mark Johnson) Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2009 15:11:26 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS In-Reply-To: <999A7C2B264EA640B183B790D772DE769381BE@isls-exch-be-1.intranet.wmin.ac.uk> References: <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> <4A93D2B7.3090303@gmx.net> <999A7C2B264EA640B183B790D772DE769381BE@isls-exch-be-1.intranet.wmin.ac.uk> Message-ID: Hi everyone, The fact that "We are a long way away from bringing ontological, dialectical and non-dualist approaches to bear on the way we actually address problems of the world around us and that leaves us with a gap between philosophy and its effectiveness in changing the world" tells me something about the ontology of the world. In particular, it tells me that the issues that relate technologies to actors and institutions and society are rhetorical as much as dialectical. This is where ANT is quite strong (although there are many ways of describing a 'rhetoric of technological intervention' - and ANT clearly has weaknesses). I don't understand how Latour can be seen to adopt a "purely individualistic stance towards society". Is it because it's not a dialectical conception that he describes? It strikes me that a "purely individualistic stance" is inconceivable anyway (perhaps like a private language). It itself is a construct - here with the explicit purpose of making an apparent distinction between CR ontology and ANT; between one set of distinctions and another; perhaps most importantly, between the identity of one group and another. But does the distinction stick? I suspect only in a rather procrustean way! On the necessity of experiment, 'necessity' (like 'instinct') can be seen as an 'explanatory principle': it helps us explain what we do, have done and intend to do. Is there really anything to be gained from arguing that it's real? This is why I worry that the arguments between realists and constructivists become a bit specious. It's easy to lose sight of the point of it all. Paraphrasing Marx: "The philosophers have made distinctions about technology in various ways - but that is not the point; the point is how we organise ourselves with it." I would say that rhetoric and dialectic are both important in getting to grips with this. Mark On Wed, Aug 26, 2009 at 2:09 PM, Radha D'Souza wrote: > Dear David, Echna, all, > Thanks for your contributions, a very interesting discussion indeed. > Echna, your point about the 'ontological tension' is important. Latour > identifies (correctly) a problem in the empirical world -that of relations > between objects and people (actors) in the face of apparently increasing > domination of objects over people in a technology dominated world. He goes > the next step and figures (rightly) that this has to do with the divide > between nature and society - but then stops short of interrogating that > relationship by devising 'hybrids' as the third category - as mediators > between nature/ society divide (which is hardly a category)- it is here that > the ontological tension is most palpable - but the problem, in my view, is > also to do with absence of dialectics which could have shifted his focus to > the RELATIONSHIP between nature-society, society-individuals (actors) and > individuals-nature and to locate the problem of technological interventions- > his main concern - as one of specific conjunctures of the > nature-society-people relationship in a geo-historical context. By focusing > on objects and actors mechanically and in reductionist ways, instead of > their dialectical relations, he objectifies actors, 'activates' objects and > has no way of explaining the relationships between the two. > The political ramifications of Latour are equally interesting - because ANT > mirrors contemporary 'network' society including new ways of social > engineering behind the facade of technology. > What I find more difficult is this: if we are to be ontologically aware in > our understanding of the world, and understand nature-society-people as > ontologically distinct yet dialectically related (following RB), and reality > as multi-tiered (following RB) then, whatever the problematic we are > investigating, whether in the field of nature or culture or psyche, we > cannot separate the nature/society/people dialectic of the problematic, > because Being itself comprises the three dimensions in tension. That > requires not only a completely non-disciplinary way of addressing a problem > in any field - but equally, developing a non-dualist methodology for > investigating problems. Latour's anthropological analogy of the pre-modern > man points to the fact that the anthropologist's pre-modern man was much > more ontologically grounded (even if less articulate) and therefore much > more focused on policing the boundaries of relationships between > nature/society/people. It is marginalising ontology that has caused the > nature/society rift and the problem of objects and actors and their > relationships in the first place. > We are a long way away from bringing ontological, dialectical and > non-dualist approaches to bear on the way we actually address problems of > the world around us and that leaves us with a gap between philosophy and its > effectiveness in changing the world. In case you have not already seen it > already, Uberoi's 'The other mind of Europe: Goethe as a scientist' and his > 'European Modernity: science, truth and method' could be a good anti-dote to > Latour, and perhaps useful for STS studies. > Sorry for the ramble, I am a lurker usually, but couldn't resist throwing > my two cents worth... > Radha > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto: > critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna > Sent: 25 August 2009 13:02 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > > Hi David, hi all, > > first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really > insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your > mail when you state that Latour?s position can?t be reconciled - it is > just contradictory. I don?t know all of Latour?s work, but for example > in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his > "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong > constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout > the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn?s contradictory sentence that > scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don?t > do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, > like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just > constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real > formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common > cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). > Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an > "ontological tension", as one can?t talk about ontology in purely > epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are > then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments > in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be > rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? > Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour > and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all > the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and > that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it > has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others > is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, > as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by > scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing > of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability > unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in > general. > The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as > Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. > When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not > much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes > structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then > suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be > contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I > don?t know all of Latour?s work (or I am misstaken about his theory - > but one last thing: Latour?s very essayistic and loose style is not > really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more > confusion) > > best, > e > > d.eldervass at ntlworld.com schrieb: > > Hi Echna, and listers! > > > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a > touch more coherently. > > > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say > here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour > acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empirical' > (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not > actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's > 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observed by > human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon known > as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theorised > by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and > common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it was > observed, but we just didn't know about it. > > > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this > contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm > offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered > explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong > constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll suggest > some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). > > > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how > accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an authority > on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructivism > in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour > takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of > constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanities) > has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in > philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on > reflection. > > > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a very > odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scientists > observe and theorise them? > > > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the > world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on the > categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, > space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We can > never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filtered > through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we can > know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the > world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, > when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not > referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, but > to the world-as-we-experience-it. > > > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience > depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on > concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) > positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social > constructionists argue that these are social products, and although Latour > rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of > constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be taken > as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists employ > rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. > > > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our > categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical work, > then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientists > change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of > Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world > about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong > constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us of > the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out > there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by science, > therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence of > this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our > 'world'. > > > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not > aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for sure > whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way of > making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made within > the constructivist tradition. > > > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the > contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excellent > book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge') > that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply > wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but they > are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have > enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our > categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the > actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enable > us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about our > environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those in > which our perceptual abilities developed). > > > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influence > on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on our > perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between > reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is > difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the > world-in-itself. > > > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that the > descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves strongly > influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite of > the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories > implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. > > > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, I > have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainly > misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his > account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the > inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to > behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view > that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' > theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is > motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also some > recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This is > arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the > undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their > perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts to > approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including inanimate > objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other to > produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. > > > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about > the phases of Venus. > > > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome views > on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to make > sense of Latour's ontology. > > > > Best, > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- d.eldervass at ntlworld.com wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. > >> > > > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different > sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different > from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existing > external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't have > any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that > science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other > hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe > did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is difficult to > make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. He > seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinction > is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the > world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps = 'the phenomenal world' thought > interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because > Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as if > the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they > only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no piont > in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed to > depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as our > cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at > the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of the > world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in > that world. > > > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that > (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! > > > > best > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > > > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may > > be helpful too. > > > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency > > in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): > > 455-73. > > > > Best wishes, > > Poe > > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > > Department of Sociology > > National Taiwan University > > > > > > ?? Matthew Smith : > > > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main > >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: > >> > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-theo.pdf). > I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which > touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the > perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literature > (here: > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=981817881&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). > If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently don't > have it online or accessible from where I currently > >> am. > >> > >> > >> Best, > >> Matthew > >> > >> > >> ----- Message initial ---- > >> De : echna > >> ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > >> > >> Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > >> > >> Hi all, > >> > >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from > >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) > >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can > >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological > >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the > >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology > >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik > >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno > >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even > >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of > >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whole > >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of > >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either > >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the > list). > >> > >> best wishes, > >> e > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > >> > >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel > >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > -- > The University of Westminster is a charity and a company limited by > guarantee. Registration number: 977818 England. Registered Office: > 309 Regent Street, London W1B 2UW, UK > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mark Johnson Institute for Educational Cybernetics University of Bolton BL3 5AB Tel. 01204 903567 Mob. 0778 6064505 From lefouque at gmail.com Wed Aug 26 11:04:42 2009 From: lefouque at gmail.com (Ng Foo Keong) Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2009 01:04:42 +0800 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 57, Issue 9 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <14a6419f0908261004y7515acbdt309ba1a2527200ab@mail.gmail.com> hi all, i'm a CR neophyte here. first, i do agree with constructivists that in a sense, scientific knowledge is socially constructed, and that our "observations" are reported via our pre-conceived categories. however, i believe that there are real limits to what can be "constructed". proving this, however, is not an easy task. i was wondering: has Latour and/or Roy Bhaskar addressed the paradoxes in Quantum Mechanics (e.g. Schrodinger's Cat, Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, Copenhagen vs Multi-verse or other interpretations, the Einstein-Bohr debates viz. Particle-Wave duality and the difficulty of separating the observer and the observed ... ). because it is this that i feel is the really gets into the heart of the debate. the phases of Venus example seems (to me) to be a case of nominalism -- i agree with Shakespeare that a rose by another name smells as sweet. but in Quantum Mechanical paradoxes, IMHO, you really have to deal with the tension between ontology and epistemology and you can't run away from them. Physicists have not come to a consensus about this (as if consensus matters). anyway, it would appear that one's answer to these paradoxes betray's one's ontological and epistemological beliefs beyond just naming of categories. so i would appreciate comments from enlightened members, please. Ng, FK 2009/8/26 : > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Re : CR and STS (Radha D'Souza) > 2. Re: Re : CR and STS (Mark Johnson) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2009 14:09:19 +0100 > From: "Radha D'Souza" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Message-ID: > <999A7C2B264EA640B183B790D772DE769381BE at isls-exch-be-1.intranet.wmin.ac.uk> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > Dear David, Echna, all, > Thanks for your contributions, a very interesting discussion indeed. > Echna, your point about the 'ontological tension' is important. Latour identifies (correctly) a problem in the empirical world -that of relations between objects and people (actors) in the face of apparently increasing domination of objects over people in a technology dominated world. He goes the next step and figures (rightly) that this has to do with the divide between nature and society - but then stops short of interrogating that relationship by devising 'hybrids' as the third category - as mediators between nature/ society divide (which is hardly a category)- it is here that the ontological tension is most palpable - but the problem, in my view, is also to do with absence of dialectics which could have shifted his focus to the RELATIONSHIP between nature-society, society-individuals (actors) and individuals-nature and to locate the problem of technological interventions- his main concern - as one of specific conjunctures of the nature-society-people relationship in a geo-historical context. By focusing on objects and actors mechanically and in reductionist ways, instead of their dialectical relations, he objectifies actors, 'activates' objects and has no way of explaining the relationships between the two. > The political ramifications of Latour are equally interesting - because ANT mirrors contemporary 'network' society including new ways of social engineering behind the facade of technology. > What I find more difficult is this: if we are to be ontologically aware in our understanding of the world, and understand nature-society-people as ontologically distinct yet dialectically related (following RB), and reality as multi-tiered (following RB) then, whatever the problematic we are investigating, whether in the field of nature or culture or psyche, we cannot separate the nature/society/people dialectic of the problematic, because Being itself comprises the three dimensions in tension. That requires not only a completely non-disciplinary way of addressing a problem in any field - but equally, developing a non-dualist methodology for investigating problems. Latour's anthropological analogy of the pre-modern man points to the fact that the anthropologist's pre-modern man was much more ontologically grounded (even if less articulate) and therefore much more focused on policing the boundaries of relationships between nature/society/people. It is marginalising ontology that has caused the nature/society rift and the problem of objects and actors and their relationships in the first place. > We are a long way away from bringing ontological, dialectical and non-dualist approaches to bear on the way we actually address problems of the world around us and that leaves us with a gap between philosophy and its effectiveness in changing the world. In case you have not already seen it already, Uberoi's 'The other mind of Europe: Goethe as a scientist' and his 'European Modernity: science, truth and method' could be a good anti-dote to Latour, and perhaps useful for STS studies. > Sorry for the ramble, I am a lurker usually, but couldn't resist throwing my two cents worth... > Radha > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna > Sent: 25 August 2009 13:02 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > > Hi David, hi all, > > first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really > insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your > mail when you state that Latour?s position can?t be reconciled - it is > just contradictory. I don?t know all of Latour?s work, but for example > in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his > "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong > constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout > the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn?s contradictory sentence that > scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don?t > do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, > like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just > constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real > formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common > cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). > Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an > "ontological tension", as one can?t talk about ontology in purely > epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are > then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments > in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be > rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? > Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour > and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all > the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and > that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it > has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others > is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, > as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by > scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing > of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability > unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in > general. > The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as > Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. > When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not > much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes > structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then > suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be > contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I > don?t know all of Latour?s work (or I am misstaken about his theory - > but one last thing: Latour?s very essayistic and loose style is not > really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more > confusion) > > best, > e > > d.eldervass at ntlworld.com schrieb: >> Hi Echna, and listers! >> >> Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a touch more coherently. >> >> I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empirical' (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observed by human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon known as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theorised by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it was observed, but we just didn't know about it. >> >> What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll suggest some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). >> >> This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an authority on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructivism in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanities) has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on reflection. >> >> So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a very odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scientists observe and theorise them? >> >> First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on the categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We can never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filtered through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, but to the world-as-we-experience-it. >> >> Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social constructionists argue that these are social products, and although Latour rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be taken as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists employ rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. >> >> Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical work, then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientists change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us of the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by science, therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence of this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our 'world'. >> >> Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for sure whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way of making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made within the constructivist tradition. >> >> This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excellent book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge') that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but they are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enable us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about our environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those in which our perceptual abilities developed). >> >> Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influence on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on our perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the world-in-itself. >> >> Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that the descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves strongly influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite of the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. >> >> Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, I have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainly misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also some recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This is arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts to approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including inanimate objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other to produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. >> >> Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about the phases of Venus. >> >> This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome views on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to make sense of Latour's ontology. >> >> Best, >> >> Dave >> >> >> >> ---- d.eldervass at ntlworld.com wrote: >> >>> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. >>> >> >> Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existing external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't have any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is difficult to make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. He seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinction is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps = 'the phenomenal world' thought interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as if the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no piont in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed to depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as our cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of the world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in that world. >> >> My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! >> >> best >> >> Dave >> >> >> >> ---- b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw wrote: >> >>> Hi Echna, >>> >> >> The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may >> be helpful too. >> >> Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency >> in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): >> 455-73. >> >> Best wishes, >> Poe >> >> Poe Yu-ze Wan >> Department of Sociology >> National Taiwan University >> >> >> ?? Matthew Smith : >> >> >>> Hi Echna, >>> >>> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main >>> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: >>> http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-theo.pdf). I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literature (here: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=981817881&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently don't have it online or accessible from where I currently >>> am. >>> >>> >>> Best, >>> Matthew >>> >>> >>> ----- Message initial ---- >>> De : echna >>> ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>> >>> Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s >>> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS >>> >>> Hi all, >>> >>> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from >>> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) >>> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can >>> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and >>> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological >>> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the >>> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology >>> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik >>> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno >>> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even >>> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of >>> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whole >>> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of >>> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either >>> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the list). >>> >>> best wishes, >>> e >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >>> >>> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel >>> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > -- > The University of Westminster is a charity and a company limited by > guarantee. Registration number: 977818 England. Registered Office: > 309 Regent Street, London W1B 2UW, UK > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2009 15:11:26 +0100 > From: Mark Johnson > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Hi everyone, > > The fact that "We are a long way away from bringing ontological, dialectical > and non-dualist approaches to bear on the way we actually address problems > of the world around us and that leaves us with a gap between philosophy and > its effectiveness in changing the world" tells me something about the > ontology of the world. In particular, it tells me that the issues that > relate technologies to actors and institutions and society are rhetorical as > much as dialectical. This is where ANT is quite strong (although there are > many ways of describing a 'rhetoric of technological intervention' - and ANT > clearly has weaknesses). > I don't understand how Latour can be seen to adopt a "purely individualistic > stance towards society". Is it because it's not a dialectical conception > that he describes? It strikes me that a "purely individualistic stance" is > inconceivable anyway (perhaps like a private language). It itself is a > construct - here with the explicit purpose of making an apparent distinction > between CR ontology and ANT; between one set of distinctions and another; > perhaps most importantly, between the identity of one group and another. But > does the distinction stick? I suspect only in a rather procrustean way! > > On the necessity of experiment, 'necessity' (like 'instinct') can be seen as > an 'explanatory principle': it helps us explain what we do, have done and > intend to do. Is there really anything to be gained from arguing that it's > real? > > This is why I worry that the arguments between realists and constructivists > become a bit specious. It's easy to lose sight of the point of it all. > Paraphrasing Marx: "The philosophers have made distinctions about technology > in various ways - but that is not the point; the point is how we organise > ourselves with it." I would say that rhetoric and dialectic are both > important in getting to grips with this. > > Mark > > > > On Wed, Aug 26, 2009 at 2:09 PM, Radha D'Souza > wrote: > >> Dear David, Echna, all, >> Thanks for your contributions, a very interesting discussion indeed. >> Echna, your point about the 'ontological tension' is important. Latour >> identifies (correctly) a problem in the empirical world -that of relations >> between objects and people (actors) in the face of apparently increasing >> domination of objects over people in a technology dominated world. He goes >> the next step and figures (rightly) that this has to do with the divide >> between nature and society - but then stops short of interrogating that >> relationship by devising 'hybrids' as the third category - as mediators >> between nature/ society divide (which is hardly a category)- it is here that >> the ontological tension is most palpable - but the problem, in my view, is >> also to do with absence of dialectics which could have shifted his focus to >> the RELATIONSHIP between nature-society, society-individuals (actors) and >> individuals-nature and to locate the problem of technological interventions- >> his main concern - as one of specific conjunctures of the >> nature-society-people relationship in a geo-historical context. By focusing >> on objects and actors mechanically and in reductionist ways, instead of >> their dialectical relations, he objectifies actors, 'activates' objects and >> has no way of explaining the relationships between the two. >> The political ramifications of Latour are equally interesting - because ANT >> mirrors contemporary 'network' society including new ways of social >> engineering behind the facade of technology. >> What I find more difficult is this: if we are to be ontologically aware in >> our understanding of the world, and understand nature-society-people as >> ontologically distinct yet dialectically related (following RB), and reality >> as multi-tiered (following RB) then, whatever the problematic we are >> investigating, whether in the field of nature or culture or psyche, we >> cannot separate the nature/society/people dialectic of the problematic, >> because Being itself comprises the three dimensions in tension. That >> requires not only a completely non-disciplinary way of addressing a problem >> in any field - but equally, developing a non-dualist methodology for >> investigating problems. Latour's anthropological analogy of the pre-modern >> man points to the fact that the anthropologist's pre-modern man was much >> more ontologically grounded (even if less articulate) and therefore much >> more focused on policing the boundaries of relationships between >> nature/society/people. It is marginalising ontology that has caused the >> nature/society rift and the problem of objects and actors and their >> relationships in the first place. >> We are a long way away from bringing ontological, dialectical and >> non-dualist approaches to bear on the way we actually address problems of >> the world around us and that leaves us with a gap between philosophy and its >> effectiveness in changing the world. In case you have not already seen it >> already, Uberoi's 'The other mind of Europe: Goethe as a scientist' and his >> 'European Modernity: science, truth and method' could be a good anti-dote to >> Latour, and perhaps useful for STS studies. >> Sorry for the ramble, I am a lurker usually, but couldn't resist throwing >> my two cents worth... >> Radha >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto: >> critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna >> Sent: 25 August 2009 13:02 >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS >> >> Hi David, hi all, >> >> first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really >> insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your >> mail when you state that Latour?s position can?t be reconciled - it is >> just contradictory. I don?t know all of Latour?s work, but for example >> in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his >> "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong >> constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout >> the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn?s contradictory sentence that >> scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don?t >> do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, >> like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just >> constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real >> formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common >> cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). >> Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an >> "ontological tension", as one can?t talk about ontology in purely >> epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are >> then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments >> in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be >> rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? >> Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour >> and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all >> the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and >> that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it >> has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others >> is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, >> as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by >> scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing >> of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability >> unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in >> general. >> The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as >> Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. >> When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not >> much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes >> structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then >> suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be >> contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I >> don?t know all of Latour?s work (or I am misstaken about his theory - >> but one last thing: Latour?s very essayistic and loose style is not >> really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more >> confusion) >> >> best, >> e >> >> d.eldervass at ntlworld.com schrieb: >> > Hi Echna, and listers! >> > >> > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a >> touch more coherently. >> > >> > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say >> here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour >> acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empirical' >> (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not >> actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's >> 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observed by >> human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon known >> as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theorised >> by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and >> common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it was >> observed, but we just didn't know about it. >> > >> > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this >> contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm >> offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered >> explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong >> constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll suggest >> some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). >> > >> > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how >> accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an authority >> on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructivism >> in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour >> takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of >> constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanities) >> has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in >> philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on >> reflection. >> > >> > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a very >> odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scientists >> observe and theorise them? >> > >> > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the >> world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on the >> categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, >> space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We can >> never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filtered >> through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we can >> know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the >> world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, >> when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not >> referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, but >> to the world-as-we-experience-it. >> > >> > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience >> depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on >> concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) >> positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social >> constructionists argue that these are social products, and although Latour >> rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of >> constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be taken >> as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists employ >> rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. >> > >> > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our >> categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical work, >> then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientists >> change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of >> Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world >> about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong >> constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us of >> the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out >> there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by science, >> therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence of >> this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our >> 'world'. >> > >> > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not >> aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for sure >> whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way of >> making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made within >> the constructivist tradition. >> > >> > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the >> contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excellent >> book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge') >> that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply >> wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but they >> are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have >> enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our >> categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the >> actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enable >> us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about our >> environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those in >> which our perceptual abilities developed). >> > >> > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influence >> on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on our >> perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between >> reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is >> difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the >> world-in-itself. >> > >> > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that the >> descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves strongly >> influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite of >> the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories >> implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. >> > >> > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, I >> have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainly >> misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his >> account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the >> inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to >> behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view >> that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' >> theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is >> motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also some >> recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This is >> arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the >> undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their >> perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts to >> approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including inanimate >> objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other to >> produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. >> > >> > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about >> the phases of Venus. >> > >> > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome views >> on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to make >> sense of Latour's ontology. >> > >> > Best, >> > >> > Dave >> > >> > >> > >> > ---- d.eldervass at ntlworld.com wrote: >> > >> >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. >> >> >> > >> > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different >> sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different >> from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existing >> external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't have >> any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that >> science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other >> hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe >> did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is difficult to >> make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. He >> seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinction >> is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the >> world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps = 'the phenomenal world' thought >> interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because >> Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as if >> the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they >> only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no piont >> in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed to >> depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as our >> cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at >> the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of the >> world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in >> that world. >> > >> > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that >> (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! >> > >> > best >> > >> > Dave >> > >> > >> > >> > ---- b86102052 at ntu.edu.tw wrote: >> > >> >> Hi Echna, >> >> >> > >> > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may >> > be helpful too. >> > >> > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency >> > in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): >> > 455-73. >> > >> > Best wishes, >> > Poe >> > >> > Poe Yu-ze Wan >> > Department of Sociology >> > National Taiwan University >> > >> > >> > ?? Matthew Smith : >> > >> > >> >> Hi Echna, >> >> >> >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main >> >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: >> >> >> http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-theo.pdf). >> I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which >> touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the >> perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literature >> (here: >> http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=981817881&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). >> If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently don't >> have it online or accessible from where I currently >> >> am. >> >> >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Matthew >> >> >> >> >> >> ----- Message initial ---- >> >> De : echna >> >> ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> >> >> >> Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s >> >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS >> >> >> >> Hi all, >> >> >> >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from >> >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) >> >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can >> >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and >> >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological >> >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the >> >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology >> >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik >> >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno >> >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even >> >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of >> >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whole >> >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of >> >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either >> >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the >> list). >> >> >> >> best wishes, >> >> e >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel >> >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> > >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> > >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> -- >> The University of Westminster is a charity and a company limited by >> guarantee. Registration number: 977818 England. Registered Office: >> 309 Regent Street, London W1B 2UW, UK >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > > > -- > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Mark Johnson > Institute for Educational Cybernetics > University of Bolton > BL3 5AB > Tel. 01204 903567 > Mob. 0778 6064505 > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 57, Issue 9 > *********************************************** > From nellhaus at mail.com Wed Aug 26 15:08:50 2009 From: nellhaus at mail.com (Tobin Nellhaus) Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2009 17:08:50 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 57, Issue 9 In-Reply-To: <14a6419f0908261004y7515acbdt309ba1a2527200ab@mail.gmail.com> References: <14a6419f0908261004y7515acbdt309ba1a2527200ab@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <571246140E2E4FEF86497B1DDF0D8CD3@Godiva> Hi Ng, Welcome to the CR list! I don't think Bhaskar has said anything about quantum mechanics except that one shouldn't derive philosophy from the current state of a science. However, you may find it useful to read "The shaky game: Einstein, realism, and the quantum theory" by Arthur Fine. Fine makes a cogent argument (supported by the letters they wrote each other) that Bohr and Heisenberg were determined to preserve a positivist conception of the world, whereas Einstein and Schroedinger upheld realism and were willing to jettison positivist notions. (It is not well known that Schrodinger came up with his "cat" in order to *satirize* the Copenhagen Interpretation. Obviously Bohr and Heisenberg adopted the cat as their pet.) Fine isn't to my knowledge a critical realist, but certainly he's a realist, more or less along the lines of Bhaskar's "Realist theory of science." Christopher Norris *is* a critical realist, so you'll also want to see his "Quantum theory and the flight from realism: philosophical responses to quantum mechanics." Of course this is not to say that all of the puzzles that quantum mechanics discovered have a realist solution already at hand. But these books should give you some idea of how critical realism approaches the issues. Best, Tobin ----- Original Message ----- From: "Ng Foo Keong" To: Sent: Wednesday, August 26, 2009 1:04 PM Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 57, Issue 9 > hi all, > > i'm a CR neophyte here. first, i do agree with constructivists that in a > sense, > scientific knowledge is socially constructed, and that our "observations" > are > reported via our pre-conceived categories. however, i believe that there > are > real limits to what can be "constructed". proving this, however, is not > an > easy task. > > i was wondering: has Latour and/or Roy Bhaskar addressed the paradoxes > in Quantum > Mechanics (e.g. Schrodinger's Cat, Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, > Copenhagen > vs Multi-verse or other interpretations, the Einstein-Bohr debates viz. > Particle-Wave duality and the difficulty of separating the observer and > the > observed ... ). because it is this that i feel is the really gets into > the heart of the debate. the phases of Venus example seems (to me) to > be a case of > nominalism -- i agree with Shakespeare that a rose by another name > smells as sweet. > but in Quantum Mechanical paradoxes, IMHO, you really have to deal > with the tension > between ontology and epistemology and you can't run away from them. > Physicists have > not come to a consensus about this (as if consensus matters). anyway, it > would > appear that one's answer to these paradoxes betray's one's ontological and > epistemological beliefs beyond just naming of categories. > > so i would appreciate comments from enlightened members, please. > > Ng, FK > > From nellhaus at mail.com Thu Aug 27 18:28:21 2009 From: nellhaus at mail.com (Tobin Nellhaus) Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2009 20:28:21 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 57, Issue 9 In-Reply-To: <14a6419f0908261004y7515acbdt309ba1a2527200ab@mail.gmail.com> References: <14a6419f0908261004y7515acbdt309ba1a2527200ab@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <7F97E4BF97F24A95B790FFB78BCF91CE@Godiva> I noticed that Fine published a second edition of "The shaky game," and so I thought I'd take a look since it's been 15-20 years since I read it. I'll have to qualify my statement that he's realist. In fact he criticizes both realism and anti-realism (in his definitions of them), and instead espouses what he calls the "natural ontological attitude." However, the latter has some similarities to CR, enough to give it a charitable reading. In any case, his account of the early debates about quantum mechanics is fascinating. Thanks, T. --- Tobin Nellhaus nellhaus at mail.com "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce