From d.eldervass at ntlworld.com Sat Apr 4 05:56:28 2009 From: d.eldervass at ntlworld.com (Dave Elder-Vass) Date: Sat, 4 Apr 2009 12:56:28 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism References: <200903171633.n2HGXBpq011429@despam-11.iastate.edu> <6ad241360903171018v28d321a5h32fd738f86839354@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <14E3E3930BEF41EC9189F665775EB123@Presario> I wonder if anyone on the list could help me understand the relationship between the work of Kant and constructionism in the social sciences? I'm increasingly drawn to the thought that one of the reasons that strong constructionism continues is that many of its advocates have been strongly influenced by Kant's distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds. As I understand this, the noumenal world is the 'real' world, but Kant believe that this is inaccessible to us; instead all we can perceive is the phenomenal world, which is a kind of distorted/selective understanding of the noumenal world that has been filtered through our limited perceptual abilities and our preconceived (or even innate) categories of understanding. While Kant acknowledges the existence of a noumenal world, he more or less dismisses it as an object of understanding, and thinks that we can only ever know the phenomenal world. If my understanding of Kant is sound (which it may well not be), this seems to encourage a strong constructionist point of view. All the constructionists need to add to this argument is that many of our categories are in fact socially influenced to conclude that our world (the phenomenal one, the only one we can know) is necessarily shaped by social influences on our understanding. And so we end up with the 'social construction of reality'. I would want to argue in response that the noumenal/phenomenal distinction is a false one; that we ourselves live in and are part of the actual world, and even if our understandings are limited by our perceptual abilities and influenced by our categories, what we perceive and interact with is nevertheless the actual world - and furthermore, that our categories are the way they are because they have developed from our interaction with that world, so that the actual world shapes our categories rather than the other way round. I suspect I'm reinventing a few wheels here, but I'd be interested to know if anyone on the list agrees/disagrees or could point me to some literature where these questions are discussed - not only as a discussion of Kant per se, but also as a discussion of the relation of these issues to contemporary social theory? Best Dave From rgroff at slu.edu Sat Apr 4 08:29:58 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Sat, 4 Apr 2009 09:29:58 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism In-Reply-To: <14E3E3930BEF41EC9189F665775EB123@Presario> References: <200903171633.n2HGXBpq011429@despam-11.iastate.edu> <6ad241360903171018v28d321a5h32fd738f86839354@mail.gmail.com> <14E3E3930BEF41EC9189F665775EB123@Presario> Message-ID: <6ad241360904040729p21fe3762u25cf0cb13a191e2a@mail.gmail.com> Hi Dave, I can't help with the social constructionists particularly, but it's important to appreciate that Kant himself precisely does NOT think that the noumenal realm is the "real world." Absolutely, totally completely not. I can give you some passages from the 1st Critique - and others may know more than I do - to look at if you'd like. The set of "things" in the noumenal world is empty, except for the transcendental ego. Now the issue about just what causality is, and just what it is in virtue of which objects are coherent, in our experience, as objects -- that's where you may disagree with Kant. But Kant thinks that we know objects just fine, thank-you. It's just that - for him - both the rationalist and the empiricist accounts of what's going on when we do are implausible and/or false. I have to run this second - am at a conference. Phil, do you have any thoughts on this front? Others? r. On Sat, Apr 4, 2009 at 6:56 AM, Dave Elder-Vass wrote: > I wonder if anyone on the list could help me understand the relationship > between the work of Kant and constructionism in the social sciences? > > > > I'm increasingly drawn to the thought that one of the reasons that strong > constructionism continues is that many of its advocates have been strongly > influenced by Kant's distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal > worlds. > As I understand this, the noumenal world is the 'real' world, but Kant > believe that this is inaccessible to us; instead all we can perceive is the > phenomenal world, which is a kind of distorted/selective understanding of > the noumenal world that has been filtered through our limited perceptual > abilities and our preconceived (or even innate) categories of > understanding. > While Kant acknowledges the existence of a noumenal world, he more or less > dismisses it as an object of understanding, and thinks that we can only > ever > know the phenomenal world. > > > > If my understanding of Kant is sound (which it may well not be), this seems > to encourage a strong constructionist point of view. All the > constructionists need to add to this argument is that many of our > categories > are in fact socially influenced to conclude that our world (the phenomenal > one, the only one we can know) is necessarily shaped by social influences > on > our understanding. And so we end up with the 'social construction of > reality'. > > > > I would want to argue in response that the noumenal/phenomenal distinction > is a false one; that we ourselves live in and are part of the actual world, > and even if our understandings are limited by our perceptual abilities and > influenced by our categories, what we perceive and interact with is > nevertheless the actual world - and furthermore, that our categories are > the > way they are because they have developed from our interaction with that > world, so that the actual world shapes our categories rather than the other > way round. > > > > I suspect I'm reinventing a few wheels here, but I'd be interested to know > if anyone on the list agrees/disagrees or could point me to some literature > where these questions are discussed - not only as a discussion of Kant per > se, but also as a discussion of the relation of these issues to > contemporary > social theory? > > > > Best > > > > Dave > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From louisirwin9 at aol.com Sat Apr 4 13:55:44 2009 From: louisirwin9 at aol.com (Louis Irwin) Date: Sat, 4 Apr 2009 15:55:44 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism In-Reply-To: <6ad241360904040729p21fe3762u25cf0cb13a191e2a@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: Dave, I think that your first paragraph on Kant is roughly correct, with the exception of the claim that Kant thinks "the noumenal world is the 'real' world" (Ruth's reply addresses that). And I more or less agree with your third paragraph on living in the world. However I believe that your second paragraph is misconceived. For, whatever ills "our preconceived (or even innate)categories of understanding" entrain, they are ills that are tied to our understanding and knowledge, and have nothing to do with noumena. (For Kant, only phenomena, not noumena, are knowable.) Even though "many of our categories are in fact socially influenced", it does not follow from Kant's phenomena/noumenal divide that "our world (the phenomenal one, the only one we can know) is necessarily shaped by social influences on our understanding." Such social influences as affect our concepts arguable lie entirely within the scope of knowledge, which is outside the scope of the noumenal (but within what Bhaskar calls the transitive dimension). Those social influence need not be, for Kant, any worse off than space and time, which (for Kant) are conceptually embedded in our makeup and are knowable. Louis Irwin -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff Sent: Saturday, April 04, 2009 10:30 AM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism Hi Dave, I can't help with the social constructionists particularly, but it's important to appreciate that Kant himself precisely does NOT think that the noumenal realm is the "real world." Absolutely, totally completely not. I can give you some passages from the 1st Critique - and others may know more than I do - to look at if you'd like. The set of "things" in the noumenal world is empty, except for the transcendental ego. Now the issue about just what causality is, and just what it is in virtue of which objects are coherent, in our experience, as objects -- that's where you may disagree with Kant. But Kant thinks that we know objects just fine, thank-you. It's just that - for him - both the rationalist and the empiricist accounts of what's going on when we do are implausible and/or false. I have to run this second - am at a conference. Phil, do you have any thoughts on this front? Others? r. On Sat, Apr 4, 2009 at 6:56 AM, Dave Elder-Vass wrote: > I wonder if anyone on the list could help me understand the > relationship between the work of Kant and constructionism in the social sciences? > > > > I'm increasingly drawn to the thought that one of the reasons that > strong constructionism continues is that many of its advocates have > been strongly influenced by Kant's distinction between the noumenal > and phenomenal worlds. > As I understand this, the noumenal world is the 'real' world, but Kant > believe that this is inaccessible to us; instead all we can perceive > is the phenomenal world, which is a kind of distorted/selective > understanding of the noumenal world that has been filtered through our > limited perceptual abilities and our preconceived (or even innate) > categories of understanding. > While Kant acknowledges the existence of a noumenal world, he more or > less dismisses it as an object of understanding, and thinks that we > can only ever know the phenomenal world. > > > > If my understanding of Kant is sound (which it may well not be), this > seems to encourage a strong constructionist point of view. All the > constructionists need to add to this argument is that many of our > categories are in fact socially influenced to conclude that our world > (the phenomenal one, the only one we can know) is necessarily shaped > by social influences on our understanding. And so we end up with the > 'social construction of reality'. > > > > I would want to argue in response that the noumenal/phenomenal > distinction is a false one; that we ourselves live in and are part of > the actual world, and even if our understandings are limited by our > perceptual abilities and influenced by our categories, what we > perceive and interact with is nevertheless the actual world - and > furthermore, that our categories are the way they are because they > have developed from our interaction with that world, so that the > actual world shapes our categories rather than the other way round. > > > > I suspect I'm reinventing a few wheels here, but I'd be interested to > know if anyone on the list agrees/disagrees or could point me to some > literature where these questions are discussed - not only as a > discussion of Kant per se, but also as a discussion of the relation of > these issues to contemporary social theory? > > > > Best > > > > Dave > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Sun Apr 5 05:07:57 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Sun, 5 Apr 2009 12:07:57 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism In-Reply-To: Message-ID: I think Louis' point re the second paragraph is correct, so to get social constructionism you need to take an additional step: you need to marry a neo-Kantian epistemology/understanding of the transitive dimension with a hermeneuticist social ontology, according to which the categories/structures of the mind and of the social generally are constituted by language/concepts. Then social reality is constituted in our linguistic experience and all we can know is what is so constituted. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis Irwin Sent: 04 April 2009 20:56 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism Dave, I think that your first paragraph on Kant is roughly correct, with the exception of the claim that Kant thinks "the noumenal world is the 'real' world" (Ruth's reply addresses that). And I more or less agree with your third paragraph on living in the world. However I believe that your second paragraph is misconceived. For, whatever ills "our preconceived (or even innate)categories of understanding" entrain, they are ills that are tied to our understanding and knowledge, and have nothing to do with noumena. (For Kant, only phenomena, not noumena, are knowable.) Even though "many of our categories are in fact socially influenced", it does not follow from Kant's phenomena/noumenal divide that "our world (the phenomenal one, the only one we can know) is necessarily shaped by social influences on our understanding." Such social influences as affect our concepts arguable lie entirely within the scope of knowledge, which is outside the scope of the noumenal (but within what Bhaskar calls the transitive dimension). Those social influence need not be, for Kant, any worse off than space and time, which (for Kant) are conceptually embedded in our makeup and are knowable. Louis Irwin -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff Sent: Saturday, April 04, 2009 10:30 AM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism Hi Dave, I can't help with the social constructionists particularly, but it's important to appreciate that Kant himself precisely does NOT think that the noumenal realm is the "real world." Absolutely, totally completely not. I can give you some passages from the 1st Critique - and others may know more than I do - to look at if you'd like. The set of "things" in the noumenal world is empty, except for the transcendental ego. Now the issue about just what causality is, and just what it is in virtue of which objects are coherent, in our experience, as objects -- that's where you may disagree with Kant. But Kant thinks that we know objects just fine, thank-you. It's just that - for him - both the rationalist and the empiricist accounts of what's going on when we do are implausible and/or false. I have to run this second - am at a conference. Phil, do you have any thoughts on this front? Others? r. On Sat, Apr 4, 2009 at 6:56 AM, Dave Elder-Vass wrote: > I wonder if anyone on the list could help me understand the > relationship between the work of Kant and constructionism in the > social sciences? > > > > I'm increasingly drawn to the thought that one of the reasons that > strong constructionism continues is that many of its advocates have > been strongly influenced by Kant's distinction between the noumenal > and phenomenal worlds. > As I understand this, the noumenal world is the 'real' world, but Kant > believe that this is inaccessible to us; instead all we can perceive > is the phenomenal world, which is a kind of distorted/selective > understanding of the noumenal world that has been filtered through our > limited perceptual abilities and our preconceived (or even innate) > categories of understanding. > While Kant acknowledges the existence of a noumenal world, he more or > less dismisses it as an object of understanding, and thinks that we > can only ever know the phenomenal world. > > > > If my understanding of Kant is sound (which it may well not be), this > seems to encourage a strong constructionist point of view. All the > constructionists need to add to this argument is that many of our > categories are in fact socially influenced to conclude that our world > (the phenomenal one, the only one we can know) is necessarily shaped > by social influences on our understanding. And so we end up with the > 'social construction of reality'. > > > > I would want to argue in response that the noumenal/phenomenal > distinction is a false one; that we ourselves live in and are part of > the actual world, and even if our understandings are limited by our > perceptual abilities and influenced by our categories, what we > perceive and interact with is nevertheless the actual world - and > furthermore, that our categories are the way they are because they > have developed from our interaction with that world, so that the > actual world shapes our categories rather than the other way round. > > > > I suspect I'm reinventing a few wheels here, but I'd be interested to > know if anyone on the list agrees/disagrees or could point me to some > literature where these questions are discussed - not only as a > discussion of Kant per se, but also as a discussion of the relation of > these issues to contemporary social theory? > > > > Best > > > > Dave > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3988 (20090404) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From d.eldervass at ntlworld.com Mon Apr 6 06:56:13 2009 From: d.eldervass at ntlworld.com (Dave Elder-Vass) Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2009 13:56:13 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism References: <7o4dbq$41g6ve@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: Many thanks to Mervyn, Louis, and Ruth. I wasn't suggesting that Kant's work entails social constructionism, only that it can perhaps be combined with the kind of additional step Mervyn mentions to justify it. Thanks also to Alan Norrie, who has pointed me to an interesting paper by Agar in New Formations 56 and suggested that Roy Bhaskar addresses some of these questions in A Realist Theory of Science. I'd still be grateful for any further pointers anyone has! Best, Dave ----- Original Message ----- From: "Mervyn Hartwig" To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Sent: 05 April 2009 12:07 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism > I think Louis' point re the second paragraph is correct, so to get social > constructionism you need to take an additional step: you need to marry a > neo-Kantian epistemology/understanding of the transitive dimension with a > hermeneuticist social ontology, according to which the > categories/structures > of the mind and of the social generally are constituted by > language/concepts. Then social reality is constituted in our linguistic > experience and all we can know is what is so constituted. > > Mervyn > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis > Irwin > Sent: 04 April 2009 20:56 > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism > > Dave, > > I think that your first paragraph on Kant is roughly correct, with the > exception of the claim that Kant thinks "the noumenal world is the 'real' > world" (Ruth's reply addresses that). And I more or less agree with your > third paragraph on living in the world. However I believe that your second > paragraph is misconceived. For, whatever ills "our preconceived (or even > innate)categories of understanding" entrain, they are ills that are tied > to > our understanding and knowledge, and have nothing to do with noumena. (For > Kant, only phenomena, not noumena, are knowable.) Even though "many of our > categories are in fact socially influenced", it does not follow from > Kant's > phenomena/noumenal divide that "our world (the phenomenal one, the only > one > we can know) is necessarily shaped by social influences on our > understanding." Such social influences as affect our concepts arguable lie > entirely within the scope of knowledge, which is outside the scope of the > noumenal (but within what Bhaskar calls the transitive dimension). Those > social influence need not be, for Kant, any worse off than space and time, > which (for Kant) are conceptually embedded in our makeup and are knowable. > > Louis Irwin > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth > Groff > Sent: Saturday, April 04, 2009 10:30 AM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism > > Hi Dave, > > I can't help with the social constructionists particularly, but it's > important to appreciate that Kant himself precisely does NOT think that > the > noumenal realm is the "real world." Absolutely, totally completely not. > I > can give you some passages from the 1st Critique - and others may know > more > than I do - to look at if you'd like. The set of "things" in the noumenal > world is empty, except for the transcendental ego. > > Now the issue about just what causality is, and just what it is in virtue > of > which objects are coherent, in our experience, as objects -- that's where > you may disagree with Kant. But Kant thinks that we know objects just > fine, > thank-you. It's just that - for him - both the rationalist and the > empiricist accounts of what's going on when we do are implausible and/or > false. > > I have to run this second - am at a conference. > > Phil, do you have any thoughts on this front? Others? > > r. > > > > > > > On Sat, Apr 4, 2009 at 6:56 AM, Dave Elder-Vass > wrote: > >> I wonder if anyone on the list could help me understand the >> relationship between the work of Kant and constructionism in the >> social > sciences? >> >> >> >> I'm increasingly drawn to the thought that one of the reasons that >> strong constructionism continues is that many of its advocates have >> been strongly influenced by Kant's distinction between the noumenal >> and phenomenal worlds. >> As I understand this, the noumenal world is the 'real' world, but Kant >> believe that this is inaccessible to us; instead all we can perceive >> is the phenomenal world, which is a kind of distorted/selective >> understanding of the noumenal world that has been filtered through our >> limited perceptual abilities and our preconceived (or even innate) >> categories of understanding. >> While Kant acknowledges the existence of a noumenal world, he more or >> less dismisses it as an object of understanding, and thinks that we >> can only ever know the phenomenal world. >> >> >> >> If my understanding of Kant is sound (which it may well not be), this >> seems to encourage a strong constructionist point of view. All the >> constructionists need to add to this argument is that many of our >> categories are in fact socially influenced to conclude that our world >> (the phenomenal one, the only one we can know) is necessarily shaped >> by social influences on our understanding. And so we end up with the >> 'social construction of reality'. >> >> >> >> I would want to argue in response that the noumenal/phenomenal >> distinction is a false one; that we ourselves live in and are part of >> the actual world, and even if our understandings are limited by our >> perceptual abilities and influenced by our categories, what we >> perceive and interact with is nevertheless the actual world - and >> furthermore, that our categories are the way they are because they >> have developed from our interaction with that world, so that the >> actual world shapes our categories rather than the other way round. >> >> >> >> I suspect I'm reinventing a few wheels here, but I'd be interested to >> know if anyone on the list agrees/disagrees or could point me to some >> literature where these questions are discussed - not only as a >> discussion of Kant per se, but also as a discussion of the relation of >> these issues to contemporary social theory? >> >> >> >> Best >> >> >> >> Dave >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3988 (20090404) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From rgroff at slu.edu Mon Apr 6 08:59:32 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2009 09:59:32 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism In-Reply-To: References: <7o4dbq$41g6ve@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: <6ad241360904060759pc9db13dua14d15ebf22434f@mail.gmail.com> Hi Dave, For what it's worth, I do think that much of the contemporary discussion is indeed just echoes of Kant. And I think he's a harder target than Hume. For me, it led me to spend two chapters in my book on the implications of cr for relativism trying to think through the questions involved, via Kant and then Hilary Putnam. So from my perspective your sense of it is completely correct! Warmly, r. On Mon, Apr 6, 2009 at 7:56 AM, Dave Elder-Vass wrote: > Many thanks to Mervyn, Louis, and Ruth. I wasn't suggesting that Kant's > work > entails social constructionism, only that it can perhaps be combined with > the kind of additional step Mervyn mentions to justify it. Thanks also to > Alan Norrie, who has pointed me to an interesting paper by Agar in New > Formations 56 and suggested that Roy Bhaskar addresses some of these > questions in A Realist Theory of Science. I'd still be grateful for any > further pointers anyone has! > > Best, > > Dave > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Sent: 05 April 2009 12:07 > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism > > > > I think Louis' point re the second paragraph is correct, so to get social > > constructionism you need to take an additional step: you need to marry a > > neo-Kantian epistemology/understanding of the transitive dimension with a > > hermeneuticist social ontology, according to which the > > categories/structures > > of the mind and of the social generally are constituted by > > language/concepts. Then social reality is constituted in our linguistic > > experience and all we can know is what is so constituted. > > > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis > > Irwin > > Sent: 04 April 2009 20:56 > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism > > > > Dave, > > > > I think that your first paragraph on Kant is roughly correct, with the > > exception of the claim that Kant thinks "the noumenal world is the 'real' > > world" (Ruth's reply addresses that). And I more or less agree with your > > third paragraph on living in the world. However I believe that your > second > > paragraph is misconceived. For, whatever ills "our preconceived (or even > > innate)categories of understanding" entrain, they are ills that are tied > > to > > our understanding and knowledge, and have nothing to do with noumena. > (For > > Kant, only phenomena, not noumena, are knowable.) Even though "many of > our > > categories are in fact socially influenced", it does not follow from > > Kant's > > phenomena/noumenal divide that "our world (the phenomenal one, the only > > one > > we can know) is necessarily shaped by social influences on our > > understanding." Such social influences as affect our concepts arguable > lie > > entirely within the scope of knowledge, which is outside the scope of the > > noumenal (but within what Bhaskar calls the transitive dimension). Those > > social influence need not be, for Kant, any worse off than space and > time, > > which (for Kant) are conceptually embedded in our makeup and are > knowable. > > > > Louis Irwin > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth > > Groff > > Sent: Saturday, April 04, 2009 10:30 AM > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism > > > > Hi Dave, > > > > I can't help with the social constructionists particularly, but it's > > important to appreciate that Kant himself precisely does NOT think that > > the > > noumenal realm is the "real world." Absolutely, totally completely not. > > I > > can give you some passages from the 1st Critique - and others may know > > more > > than I do - to look at if you'd like. The set of "things" in the > noumenal > > world is empty, except for the transcendental ego. > > > > Now the issue about just what causality is, and just what it is in virtue > > of > > which objects are coherent, in our experience, as objects -- that's where > > you may disagree with Kant. But Kant thinks that we know objects just > > fine, > > thank-you. It's just that - for him - both the rationalist and the > > empiricist accounts of what's going on when we do are implausible and/or > > false. > > > > I have to run this second - am at a conference. > > > > Phil, do you have any thoughts on this front? Others? > > > > r. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Apr 4, 2009 at 6:56 AM, Dave Elder-Vass > > wrote: > > > >> I wonder if anyone on the list could help me understand the > >> relationship between the work of Kant and constructionism in the > >> social > > sciences? > >> > >> > >> > >> I'm increasingly drawn to the thought that one of the reasons that > >> strong constructionism continues is that many of its advocates have > >> been strongly influenced by Kant's distinction between the noumenal > >> and phenomenal worlds. > >> As I understand this, the noumenal world is the 'real' world, but Kant > >> believe that this is inaccessible to us; instead all we can perceive > >> is the phenomenal world, which is a kind of distorted/selective > >> understanding of the noumenal world that has been filtered through our > >> limited perceptual abilities and our preconceived (or even innate) > >> categories of understanding. > >> While Kant acknowledges the existence of a noumenal world, he more or > >> less dismisses it as an object of understanding, and thinks that we > >> can only ever know the phenomenal world. > >> > >> > >> > >> If my understanding of Kant is sound (which it may well not be), this > >> seems to encourage a strong constructionist point of view. All the > >> constructionists need to add to this argument is that many of our > >> categories are in fact socially influenced to conclude that our world > >> (the phenomenal one, the only one we can know) is necessarily shaped > >> by social influences on our understanding. And so we end up with the > >> 'social construction of reality'. > >> > >> > >> > >> I would want to argue in response that the noumenal/phenomenal > >> distinction is a false one; that we ourselves live in and are part of > >> the actual world, and even if our understandings are limited by our > >> perceptual abilities and influenced by our categories, what we > >> perceive and interact with is nevertheless the actual world - and > >> furthermore, that our categories are the way they are because they > >> have developed from our interaction with that world, so that the > >> actual world shapes our categories rather than the other way round. > >> > >> > >> > >> I suspect I'm reinventing a few wheels here, but I'd be interested to > >> know if anyone on the list agrees/disagrees or could point me to some > >> literature where these questions are discussed - not only as a > >> discussion of Kant per se, but also as a discussion of the relation of > >> these issues to contemporary social theory? > >> > >> > >> > >> Best > >> > >> > >> > >> Dave > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > __________ NOD32 3988 (20090404) Information __________ > > > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk Mon Apr 6 15:03:18 2009 From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2009 22:03:18 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Kant phenomena/noumena Message-ID: Hi Dave, all Challenging the phenomena/noumena distinction as it arose in Kant is something that motivated the entirety of Hegel's thought, so I think one should begin with Hegel, as Kant's keenest critic. Of course that doesn't mean one has to end with Hegel too. cheers Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 06 April 2009 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 53, Issue 3 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Kant and social constructionism (Dave Elder-Vass) 2. Re: Kant and social constructionism (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2009 13:56:13 +0100 From: "Dave Elder-Vass" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; reply-type=original Many thanks to Mervyn, Louis, and Ruth. I wasn't suggesting that Kant's work entails social constructionism, only that it can perhaps be combined with the kind of additional step Mervyn mentions to justify it. Thanks also to Alan Norrie, who has pointed me to an interesting paper by Agar in New Formations 56 and suggested that Roy Bhaskar addresses some of these questions in A Realist Theory of Science. I'd still be grateful for any further pointers anyone has! Best, Dave ----- Original Message ----- From: "Mervyn Hartwig" To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Sent: 05 April 2009 12:07 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism > I think Louis' point re the second paragraph is correct, so to get social > constructionism you need to take an additional step: you need to marry a > neo-Kantian epistemology/understanding of the transitive dimension with a > hermeneuticist social ontology, according to which the > categories/structures > of the mind and of the social generally are constituted by > language/concepts. Then social reality is constituted in our linguistic > experience and all we can know is what is so constituted. > > Mervyn > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis > Irwin > Sent: 04 April 2009 20:56 > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism > > Dave, > > I think that your first paragraph on Kant is roughly correct, with the > exception of the claim that Kant thinks "the noumenal world is the 'real' > world" (Ruth's reply addresses that). And I more or less agree with your > third paragraph on living in the world. However I believe that your second > paragraph is misconceived. For, whatever ills "our preconceived (or even > innate)categories of understanding" entrain, they are ills that are tied > to > our understanding and knowledge, and have nothing to do with noumena. (For > Kant, only phenomena, not noumena, are knowable.) Even though "many of our > categories are in fact socially influenced", it does not follow from > Kant's > phenomena/noumenal divide that "our world (the phenomenal one, the only > one > we can know) is necessarily shaped by social influences on our > understanding." Such social influences as affect our concepts arguable lie > entirely within the scope of knowledge, which is outside the scope of the > noumenal (but within what Bhaskar calls the transitive dimension). Those > social influence need not be, for Kant, any worse off than space and time, > which (for Kant) are conceptually embedded in our makeup and are knowable. > > Louis Irwin > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth > Groff > Sent: Saturday, April 04, 2009 10:30 AM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism > > Hi Dave, > > I can't help with the social constructionists particularly, but it's > important to appreciate that Kant himself precisely does NOT think that > the > noumenal realm is the "real world." Absolutely, totally completely not. > I > can give you some passages from the 1st Critique - and others may know > more > than I do - to look at if you'd like. The set of "things" in the noumenal > world is empty, except for the transcendental ego. > > Now the issue about just what causality is, and just what it is in virtue > of > which objects are coherent, in our experience, as objects -- that's where > you may disagree with Kant. But Kant thinks that we know objects just > fine, > thank-you. It's just that - for him - both the rationalist and the > empiricist accounts of what's going on when we do are implausible and/or > false. > > I have to run this second - am at a conference. > > Phil, do you have any thoughts on this front? Others? > > r. > > > > > > > On Sat, Apr 4, 2009 at 6:56 AM, Dave Elder-Vass > wrote: > >> I wonder if anyone on the list could help me understand the >> relationship between the work of Kant and constructionism in the >> social > sciences? >> >> >> >> I'm increasingly drawn to the thought that one of the reasons that >> strong constructionism continues is that many of its advocates have >> been strongly influenced by Kant's distinction between the noumenal >> and phenomenal worlds. >> As I understand this, the noumenal world is the 'real' world, but Kant >> believe that this is inaccessible to us; instead all we can perceive >> is the phenomenal world, which is a kind of distorted/selective >> understanding of the noumenal world that has been filtered through our >> limited perceptual abilities and our preconceived (or even innate) >> categories of understanding. >> While Kant acknowledges the existence of a noumenal world, he more or >> less dismisses it as an object of understanding, and thinks that we >> can only ever know the phenomenal world. >> >> >> >> If my understanding of Kant is sound (which it may well not be), this >> seems to encourage a strong constructionist point of view. All the >> constructionists need to add to this argument is that many of our >> categories are in fact socially influenced to conclude that our world >> (the phenomenal one, the only one we can know) is necessarily shaped >> by social influences on our understanding. And so we end up with the >> 'social construction of reality'. >> >> >> >> I would want to argue in response that the noumenal/phenomenal >> distinction is a false one; that we ourselves live in and are part of >> the actual world, and even if our understandings are limited by our >> perceptual abilities and influenced by our categories, what we >> perceive and interact with is nevertheless the actual world - and >> furthermore, that our categories are the way they are because they >> have developed from our interaction with that world, so that the >> actual world shapes our categories rather than the other way round. >> >> >> >> I suspect I'm reinventing a few wheels here, but I'd be interested to >> know if anyone on the list agrees/disagrees or could point me to some >> literature where these questions are discussed - not only as a >> discussion of Kant per se, but also as a discussion of the relation of >> these issues to contemporary social theory? >> >> >> >> Best >> >> >> >> Dave >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3988 (20090404) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2009 09:59:32 -0500 From: Ruth Groff Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <6ad241360904060759pc9db13dua14d15ebf22434f at mail.gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Hi Dave, For what it's worth, I do think that much of the contemporary discussion is indeed just echoes of Kant. And I think he's a harder target than Hume. For me, it led me to spend two chapters in my book on the implications of cr for relativism trying to think through the questions involved, via Kant and then Hilary Putnam. So from my perspective your sense of it is completely correct! Warmly, r. On Mon, Apr 6, 2009 at 7:56 AM, Dave Elder-Vass wrote: > Many thanks to Mervyn, Louis, and Ruth. I wasn't suggesting that Kant's > work > entails social constructionism, only that it can perhaps be combined with > the kind of additional step Mervyn mentions to justify it. Thanks also to > Alan Norrie, who has pointed me to an interesting paper by Agar in New > Formations 56 and suggested that Roy Bhaskar addresses some of these > questions in A Realist Theory of Science. I'd still be grateful for any > further pointers anyone has! > > Best, > > Dave > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Sent: 05 April 2009 12:07 > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism > > > > I think Louis' point re the second paragraph is correct, so to get social > > constructionism you need to take an additional step: you need to marry a > > neo-Kantian epistemology/understanding of the transitive dimension with a > > hermeneuticist social ontology, according to which the > > categories/structures > > of the mind and of the social generally are constituted by > > language/concepts. Then social reality is constituted in our linguistic > > experience and all we can know is what is so constituted. > > > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis > > Irwin > > Sent: 04 April 2009 20:56 > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism > > > > Dave, > > > > I think that your first paragraph on Kant is roughly correct, with the > > exception of the claim that Kant thinks "the noumenal world is the 'real' > > world" (Ruth's reply addresses that). And I more or less agree with your > > third paragraph on living in the world. However I believe that your > second > > paragraph is misconceived. For, whatever ills "our preconceived (or even > > innate)categories of understanding" entrain, they are ills that are tied > > to > > our understanding and knowledge, and have nothing to do with noumena. > (For > > Kant, only phenomena, not noumena, are knowable.) Even though "many of > our > > categories are in fact socially influenced", it does not follow from > > Kant's > > phenomena/noumenal divide that "our world (the phenomenal one, the only > > one > > we can know) is necessarily shaped by social influences on our > > understanding." Such social influences as affect our concepts arguable > lie > > entirely within the scope of knowledge, which is outside the scope of the > > noumenal (but within what Bhaskar calls the transitive dimension). Those > > social influence need not be, for Kant, any worse off than space and > time, > > which (for Kant) are conceptually embedded in our makeup and are > knowable. > > > > Louis Irwin > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth > > Groff > > Sent: Saturday, April 04, 2009 10:30 AM > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Kant and social constructionism > > > > Hi Dave, > > > > I can't help with the social constructionists particularly, but it's > > important to appreciate that Kant himself precisely does NOT think that > > the > > noumenal realm is the "real world." Absolutely, totally completely not. > > I > > can give you some passages from the 1st Critique - and others may know > > more > > than I do - to look at if you'd like. The set of "things" in the > noumenal > > world is empty, except for the transcendental ego. > > > > Now the issue about just what causality is, and just what it is in virtue > > of > > which objects are coherent, in our experience, as objects -- that's where > > you may disagree with Kant. But Kant thinks that we know objects just > > fine, > > thank-you. It's just that - for him - both the rationalist and the > > empiricist accounts of what's going on when we do are implausible and/or > > false. > > > > I have to run this second - am at a conference. > > > > Phil, do you have any thoughts on this front? Others? > > > > r. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Apr 4, 2009 at 6:56 AM, Dave Elder-Vass > > wrote: > > > >> I wonder if anyone on the list could help me understand the > >> relationship between the work of Kant and constructionism in the > >> social > > sciences? > >> > >> > >> > >> I'm increasingly drawn to the thought that one of the reasons that > >> strong constructionism continues is that many of its advocates have > >> been strongly influenced by Kant's distinction between the noumenal > >> and phenomenal worlds. > >> As I understand this, the noumenal world is the 'real' world, but Kant > >> believe that this is inaccessible to us; instead all we can perceive > >> is the phenomenal world, which is a kind of distorted/selective > >> understanding of the noumenal world that has been filtered through our > >> limited perceptual abilities and our preconceived (or even innate) > >> categories of understanding. > >> While Kant acknowledges the existence of a noumenal world, he more or > >> less dismisses it as an object of understanding, and thinks that we > >> can only ever know the phenomenal world. > >> > >> > >> > >> If my understanding of Kant is sound (which it may well not be), this > >> seems to encourage a strong constructionist point of view. All the > >> constructionists need to add to this argument is that many of our > >> categories are in fact socially influenced to conclude that our world > >> (the phenomenal one, the only one we can know) is necessarily shaped > >> by social influences on our understanding. And so we end up with the > >> 'social construction of reality'. > >> > >> > >> > >> I would want to argue in response that the noumenal/phenomenal > >> distinction is a false one; that we ourselves live in and are part of > >> the actual world, and even if our understandings are limited by our > >> perceptual abilities and influenced by our categories, what we > >> perceive and interact with is nevertheless the actual world - and > >> furthermore, that our categories are the way they are because they > >> have developed from our interaction with that world, so that the > >> actual world shapes our categories rather than the other way round. > >> > >> > >> > >> I suspect I'm reinventing a few wheels here, but I'd be interested to > >> know if anyone on the list agrees/disagrees or could point me to some > >> literature where these questions are discussed - not only as a > >> discussion of Kant per se, but also as a discussion of the relation of > >> these issues to contemporary social theory? > >> > >> > >> > >> Best > >> > >> > >> > >> Dave > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > __________ NOD32 3988 (20090404) Information __________ > > > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 53, Issue 3 *********************************************** From davidboze at gmail.com Sat Apr 11 10:06:03 2009 From: davidboze at gmail.com (Dave) Date: Sat, 11 Apr 2009 17:06:03 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty Message-ID: Hi, 1. I am currently working through Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom. Does anyone know whether Rorty explicitly responded to Bhaskar's criticism or whether anyone did on his behalf, and - if so - where I might find this? 2. In Andrew Collier's introductory text on Critical Realism, which I think was published just before Dialectic: TPoF, Collier refers to a forthcoming text where Roy focuses on Nietzsche, Derrida and Heidegger, but I can't find anything that closely fits this description. Did this book materialise or did it transform into something else? If so, what is it? Thanks for any assistance anyone might be able to offer, David Aldridge From rgroff at slu.edu Sat Apr 11 16:39:06 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Sat, 11 Apr 2009 17:39:06 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <6ad241360904111539n24d1261an519c48470951aca2@mail.gmail.com> Hi David, Lucky you. 1. Not that I know of. 2. Not that I know of. Could be wrong though. Warmly, Ruth On Sat, Apr 11, 2009 at 11:06 AM, Dave wrote: > Hi, > 1. I am currently working through Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom. > Does > anyone know whether Rorty explicitly responded to Bhaskar's criticism or > whether anyone did on his behalf, and - if so - where I might find this? > > 2. In Andrew Collier's introductory text on Critical Realism, which I > think > was published just before Dialectic: TPoF, Collier refers to a forthcoming > text where Roy focuses on Nietzsche, Derrida and Heidegger, but I can't > find > anything that closely fits this description. Did this book materialise or > did it transform into something else? If so, what is it? > > Thanks for any assistance anyone might be able to offer, > > David Aldridge > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From par.engholm at soc.uu.se Sun Apr 12 03:11:01 2009 From: par.engholm at soc.uu.se (=?iso-8859-1?b?UORy?= Engholm) Date: Sun, 12 Apr 2009 11:11:01 +0200 Subject: [Critical-Realism] New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty In-Reply-To: <6ad241360904111539n24d1261an519c48470951aca2@mail.gmail.com> References: <6ad241360904111539n24d1261an519c48470951aca2@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <20090412111101.xknvelklws8o48ok@webmail6.uu.se> Hi David and Ruth, The answer is no on both questions. Rorty was supposed to make a reply to all the contributions to the book 'Reading Rorty' (Alan Malachowski, ed), in which Roy's initial critique of Rorty was written (which then was extended in PIF), but according to rumours Rorty stopped when he had reached Roy's chapter. If I would make a conjecture, I think Rorty didn't really know how to handle a critique of the 'epistemological tradition' which was much more radical than his own and which wasn't entrenched in the analytical dtraitjacket which Rorty himself was unable (or unwilling, or both) to abandon. Rorty never broke with the tradition in which he was brought up, so he could not deliver anything more than just an ironic 'edifying' philosophy. His break with philosophy always presupposed the ideas he supposedly criticised. Bhaskar is much more serious in his critique and Rorty couldn't follow. The project of the book on Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida didn't come to fruition, unfortunately. ******************************************************* Par Engholm Uppsala University Department of Sociology Phone: +46 18 4711082 Mobile: +46 709783546 http://www.soc.uu.se/kontaktpers.php?id=62 Journal of Critical Realism http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/index Quoting Ruth Groff : > Hi David, > > Lucky you. > > 1. Not that I know of. > 2. Not that I know of. > > Could be wrong though. > > Warmly, > Ruth > > > > On Sat, Apr 11, 2009 at 11:06 AM, Dave wrote: > >> Hi, >> 1. I am currently working through Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom. >> Does >> anyone know whether Rorty explicitly responded to Bhaskar's criticism or >> whether anyone did on his behalf, and - if so - where I might find this? >> >> 2. In Andrew Collier's introductory text on Critical Realism, which I >> think >> was published just before Dialectic: TPoF, Collier refers to a forthcoming >> text where Roy focuses on Nietzsche, Derrida and Heidegger, but I can't >> find >> anything that closely fits this description. Did this book materialise or >> did it transform into something else? If so, what is it? >> >> Thanks for any assistance anyone might be able to offer, >> >> David Aldridge >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk Sun Apr 12 05:19:36 2009 From: matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk (Karl Maton) Date: Sun, 12 Apr 2009 21:19:36 +1000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] New Critical Realism Seminars Message-ID: <49E1CE48.9030802@yahoo.co.uk> Getting Real AACR Seminars and Discussions The Australasian Association for Critical Realism is pleased to announce a new series of seminars and discussions, to be held at the University of Sydney. Thursday, 6th May Mervyn Hartwig, the editor-in-chief of the Journal of Critical Realism will kick off this year's seminars with a journey through the different dimensions of critical realist philosophy: "First wave, second wave, third wave: the moments of critical realism and the critical realist embrace" Thursday, 3rd June Dr Margaret Moussa, UWS, on J.S. Mill and empiricism Thursday, 5th August Assoc Prof Brian Pinkstone, UWS, on historical materialism Thursday, 2nd September Alison Gable, University of Queensland on 'underlabouring' Thursday, 7th October Sandra Wallace of University of Sydney - title to be announced. Thursday, 4th Nov Karl Maton, USyd, co-editor of Social Realism, Knowledge and the Sociology of Education, published by Continuum this month, will discuss the growing approach called 'social realism', which builds on critical realist philosophy and the sociologies of Basil Bernstein and Pierre Bourdieu. Thursday, 2nd Dec Melanie McDonald, who recently published in Journal of Critical Realism and is currently writing a chapter for a book on critical realism, will discuss 'meta-reality'. Seminars are held on the first Thursday of every month, at 6.30pm, in the R.C. Mills Building (room 148). From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Sun Apr 12 06:11:51 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Sun, 12 Apr 2009 13:11:51 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty In-Reply-To: <20090412111101.xknvelklws8o48ok@webmail6.uu.se> Message-ID: Hi Dave, Par Collier's book came out in 1994, Dialectic in 1993. Collier doesn't really buy Bhaskarian dialectic, then or now; he basically operates within the analytical problematic. Bhaskar had been planning the book Collier refers to, "Philosophical Ideologies", from the late 1960s, as part of a tripartite project: philosophy of science (published as RTS), philosophy of social science (PON) and then an explanation of prevailing ideologies in these fields, a full critique (Philosophical Ideolgies). It was to be about much more than Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida; it was rather to be an ideology-critique and sociology of knowledge of all those philosophies that stand in the way of human emancipation. It came to fruition in Ch. 3 of SRHE (re positivism), and the critique of irrealism in DPF and in Plato Etc., but was never got up as a separate book. The project of writing it basically gave way to the gestation and writing first of DPF and then of the books of the spiritual turn. All this is explained in some detail in Bhaskar with Hartwig, The Formation of CR: A Personal Perspective (Routledge forthcoming 2009 -- has been delayed owing to illness). A little of it is explained in my Introductions to the recent Routledge editions of RTS and SRHE. Par: Did Bhaskar actually publish anything in Malachowski, Reading Rorty; or was it that what was perhaps originally intended as a chapter in it grew into a book and was published in that form only? Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of P?r Engholm Sent: 12 April 2009 10:11 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty Hi David and Ruth, The answer is no on both questions. Rorty was supposed to make a reply to all the contributions to the book 'Reading Rorty' (Alan Malachowski, ed), in which Roy's initial critique of Rorty was written (which then was extended in PIF), but according to rumours Rorty stopped when he had reached Roy's chapter. If I would make a conjecture, I think Rorty didn't really know how to handle a critique of the 'epistemological tradition' which was much more radical than his own and which wasn't entrenched in the analytical dtraitjacket which Rorty himself was unable (or unwilling, or both) to abandon. Rorty never broke with the tradition in which he was brought up, so he could not deliver anything more than just an ironic 'edifying' philosophy. His break with philosophy always presupposed the ideas he supposedly criticised. Bhaskar is much more serious in his critique and Rorty couldn't follow. The project of the book on Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida didn't come to fruition, unfortunately. ******************************************************* Par Engholm Uppsala University Department of Sociology Phone: +46 18 4711082 Mobile: +46 709783546 http://www.soc.uu.se/kontaktpers.php?id=62 Journal of Critical Realism http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/index Quoting Ruth Groff : > Hi David, > > Lucky you. > > 1. Not that I know of. > 2. Not that I know of. > > Could be wrong though. > > Warmly, > Ruth > > > > On Sat, Apr 11, 2009 at 11:06 AM, Dave wrote: > >> Hi, >> 1. I am currently working through Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom. >> Does >> anyone know whether Rorty explicitly responded to Bhaskar's criticism >> or whether anyone did on his behalf, and - if so - where I might find this? >> >> 2. In Andrew Collier's introductory text on Critical Realism, which >> I think was published just before Dialectic: TPoF, Collier refers to >> a forthcoming text where Roy focuses on Nietzsche, Derrida and >> Heidegger, but I can't find anything that closely fits this >> description. Did this book materialise or did it transform into >> something else? If so, what is it? >> >> Thanks for any assistance anyone might be able to offer, >> >> David Aldridge >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 4001 (20090411) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From rgroff at slu.edu Sun Apr 12 07:48:40 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Sun, 12 Apr 2009 08:48:40 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty In-Reply-To: <7o7ghn$446c3i@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> References: <20090412111101.xknvelklws8o48ok@webmail6.uu.se> <7o7ghn$446c3i@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: <6ad241360904120648v449a3edfi3123778541d76180@mail.gmail.com> Yes, he has a chapter in it. On Sun, Apr 12, 2009 at 7:11 AM, Mervyn Hartwig wrote: > Hi Dave, Par > > Collier's book came out in 1994, Dialectic in 1993. Collier doesn't really > buy Bhaskarian dialectic, then or now; he basically operates within the > analytical problematic. > > Bhaskar had been planning the book Collier refers to, "Philosophical > Ideologies", from the late 1960s, as part of a tripartite project: > philosophy of science (published as RTS), philosophy of social science > (PON) > and then an explanation of prevailing ideologies in these fields, a full > critique (Philosophical Ideolgies). It was to be about much more than > Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida; it was rather to be an ideology-critique > and sociology of knowledge of all those philosophies that stand in the way > of human emancipation. It came to fruition in Ch. 3 of SRHE (re > positivism), > and the critique of irrealism in DPF and in Plato Etc., but was never got > up > as a separate book. The project of writing it basically gave way to the > gestation and writing first of DPF and then of the books of the spiritual > turn. All this is explained in some detail in Bhaskar with Hartwig, The > Formation of CR: A Personal Perspective (Routledge forthcoming 2009 -- has > been delayed owing to illness). A little of it is explained in my > Introductions to the recent Routledge editions of RTS and SRHE. > > Par: Did Bhaskar actually publish anything in Malachowski, Reading Rorty; > or > was it that what was perhaps originally intended as a chapter in it grew > into a book and was published in that form only? > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of P?r > Engholm > Sent: 12 April 2009 10:11 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty > > Hi David and Ruth, > The answer is no on both questions. > Rorty was supposed to make a reply to all the contributions to the book > 'Reading Rorty' (Alan Malachowski, ed), in which Roy's initial critique of > Rorty was written (which then was extended in PIF), but according to > rumours > Rorty stopped when he had reached Roy's chapter. > If I would make a conjecture, I think Rorty didn't really know how to > handle > a critique of the 'epistemological tradition' which was much more radical > than his own and which wasn't entrenched in the analytical dtraitjacket > which Rorty himself was unable (or unwilling, or both) to abandon. Rorty > never broke with the tradition in which he was brought up, so he could not > deliver anything more than just an ironic 'edifying' philosophy. His break > with philosophy always presupposed the ideas he supposedly criticised. > Bhaskar is much more serious in his critique and Rorty couldn't follow. > > The project of the book on Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida didn't come to > fruition, unfortunately. > > ******************************************************* > > Par Engholm > Uppsala University > Department of Sociology > Phone: +46 18 4711082 > Mobile: +46 709783546 > http://www.soc.uu.se/kontaktpers.php?id=62 > > > Journal of Critical Realism > > http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/index > Quoting Ruth Groff : > > > Hi David, > > > > Lucky you. > > > > 1. Not that I know of. > > 2. Not that I know of. > > > > Could be wrong though. > > > > Warmly, > > Ruth > > > > > > > > On Sat, Apr 11, 2009 at 11:06 AM, Dave wrote: > > > >> Hi, > >> 1. I am currently working through Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom. > >> Does > >> anyone know whether Rorty explicitly responded to Bhaskar's criticism > >> or whether anyone did on his behalf, and - if so - where I might find > this? > >> > >> 2. In Andrew Collier's introductory text on Critical Realism, which > >> I think was published just before Dialectic: TPoF, Collier refers to > >> a forthcoming text where Roy focuses on Nietzsche, Derrida and > >> Heidegger, but I can't find anything that closely fits this > >> description. Did this book materialise or did it transform into > >> something else? If so, what is it? > >> > >> Thanks for any assistance anyone might be able to offer, > >> > >> David Aldridge > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 4001 (20090411) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From davidboze at gmail.com Sun Apr 12 14:08:01 2009 From: davidboze at gmail.com (Dave) Date: Sun, 12 Apr 2009 21:08:01 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Bhaskar/ Rorty In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <8C85C067-AB7C-4631-92EE-0CCAB4DCE6DF@gmail.com> Thanks all, That clears a few things up. I guess I'll just go ahead and speculate on Rorty's possible response. David On 12 Apr 2009, at 19:00, critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty (Ruth Groff) > 2. Re: New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty (P?r Engholm) > 3. New Critical Realism Seminars (Karl Maton) > 4. Re: New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty (Mervyn Hartwig) > 5. Re: New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty (Ruth Groff) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Sat, 11 Apr 2009 17:39:06 -0500 > From: Ruth Groff > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: > <6ad241360904111539n24d1261an519c48470951aca2 at mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 > > Hi David, > > Lucky you. > > 1. Not that I know of. > 2. Not that I know of. > > Could be wrong though. > > Warmly, > Ruth > > > > On Sat, Apr 11, 2009 at 11:06 AM, Dave wrote: > >> Hi, >> 1. I am currently working through Philosophy and the Idea of >> Freedom. >> Does >> anyone know whether Rorty explicitly responded to Bhaskar's >> criticism or >> whether anyone did on his behalf, and - if so - where I might find >> this? >> >> 2. In Andrew Collier's introductory text on Critical Realism, >> which I >> think >> was published just before Dialectic: TPoF, Collier refers to a >> forthcoming >> text where Roy focuses on Nietzsche, Derrida and Heidegger, but I >> can't >> find >> anything that closely fits this description. Did this book >> materialise or >> did it transform into something else? If so, what is it? >> >> Thanks for any assistance anyone might be able to offer, >> >> David Aldridge >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Sun, 12 Apr 2009 11:11:01 +0200 > From: P?r Engholm > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Message-ID: <20090412111101.xknvelklws8o48ok at webmail6.uu.se> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; DelSp="Yes"; > format="flowed" > > Hi David and Ruth, > The answer is no on both questions. > Rorty was supposed to make a reply to all the contributions to the > book 'Reading Rorty' (Alan Malachowski, ed), in which Roy's initial > critique of Rorty was written (which then was extended in PIF), but > according to rumours Rorty stopped when he had reached Roy's chapter. > If I would make a conjecture, I think Rorty didn't really know how to > handle a critique of the 'epistemological tradition' which was much > more radical than his own and which wasn't entrenched in the > analytical dtraitjacket which Rorty himself was unable (or unwilling, > or both) to abandon. Rorty never broke with the tradition in which he > was brought up, so he could not deliver anything more than just an > ironic 'edifying' philosophy. His break with philosophy always > presupposed the ideas he supposedly criticised. Bhaskar is much more > serious in his critique and Rorty couldn't follow. > > The project of the book on Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida didn't > come to fruition, unfortunately. > > ******************************************************* > > Par Engholm > Uppsala University > Department of Sociology > Phone: +46 18 4711082 > Mobile: +46 709783546 > http://www.soc.uu.se/kontaktpers.php?id=62 > > > Journal of Critical Realism > > http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/index > Quoting Ruth Groff : > >> Hi David, >> >> Lucky you. >> >> 1. Not that I know of. >> 2. Not that I know of. >> >> Could be wrong though. >> >> Warmly, >> Ruth >> >> >> >> On Sat, Apr 11, 2009 at 11:06 AM, Dave wrote: >> >>> Hi, >>> 1. I am currently working through Philosophy and the Idea of >>> Freedom. >>> Does >>> anyone know whether Rorty explicitly responded to Bhaskar's >>> criticism or >>> whether anyone did on his behalf, and - if so - where I might find >>> this? >>> >>> 2. In Andrew Collier's introductory text on Critical Realism, >>> which I >>> think >>> was published just before Dialectic: TPoF, Collier refers to a >>> forthcoming >>> text where Roy focuses on Nietzsche, Derrida and Heidegger, but I >>> can't >>> find >>> anything that closely fits this description. Did this book >>> materialise or >>> did it transform into something else? If so, what is it? >>> >>> Thanks for any assistance anyone might be able to offer, >>> >>> David Aldridge >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 3 > Date: Sun, 12 Apr 2009 21:19:36 +1000 > From: Karl Maton > Subject: [Critical-Realism] New Critical Realism Seminars > To: Bernstein Listserv , > Bourdieu at googlegroups.com, Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: <49E1CE48.9030802 at yahoo.co.uk> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed > > Getting Real > > AACR Seminars and Discussions > > > The Australasian Association for Critical Realism is pleased to > announce > a new series of seminars and discussions, to be held at the University > of Sydney. > > > Thursday, 6th May > Mervyn Hartwig, the editor-in-chief of the Journal of Critical Realism > will kick off this year's seminars with a journey through the > different > dimensions of critical realist philosophy: "First wave, second wave, > third wave: the moments of critical realism and the critical realist > embrace" > > Thursday, 3rd June > Dr Margaret Moussa, UWS, on J.S. Mill and empiricism > > Thursday, 5th August > Assoc Prof Brian Pinkstone, UWS, on historical materialism > > Thursday, 2nd September > Alison Gable, University of Queensland on 'underlabouring' > > Thursday, 7th October > Sandra Wallace of University of Sydney - title to be announced. > > Thursday, 4th Nov > Karl Maton, USyd, co-editor of Social Realism, Knowledge and the > Sociology of Education, published by Continuum this month, will > discuss > the growing approach called 'social realism', which builds on critical > realist philosophy and the sociologies of Basil Bernstein and Pierre > Bourdieu. > > Thursday, 2nd Dec > Melanie McDonald, who recently published in Journal of Critical > Realism > and is currently writing a chapter for a book on critical realism, > will > discuss 'meta-reality'. > > Seminars are held on the first Thursday of every month, at 6.30pm, in > the R.C. Mills Building (room 148). > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 4 > Date: Sun, 12 Apr 2009 13:11:51 +0100 > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Hi Dave, Par > > Collier's book came out in 1994, Dialectic in 1993. Collier doesn't > really > buy Bhaskarian dialectic, then or now; he basically operates within > the > analytical problematic. > > Bhaskar had been planning the book Collier refers to, "Philosophical > Ideologies", from the late 1960s, as part of a tripartite project: > philosophy of science (published as RTS), philosophy of social > science (PON) > and then an explanation of prevailing ideologies in these fields, a > full > critique (Philosophical Ideolgies). It was to be about much more than > Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida; it was rather to be an ideology- > critique > and sociology of knowledge of all those philosophies that stand in > the way > of human emancipation. It came to fruition in Ch. 3 of SRHE (re > positivism), > and the critique of irrealism in DPF and in Plato Etc., but was > never got up > as a separate book. The project of writing it basically gave way to > the > gestation and writing first of DPF and then of the books of the > spiritual > turn. All this is explained in some detail in Bhaskar with Hartwig, > The > Formation of CR: A Personal Perspective (Routledge forthcoming 2009 > -- has > been delayed owing to illness). A little of it is explained in my > Introductions to the recent Routledge editions of RTS and SRHE. > > Par: Did Bhaskar actually publish anything in Malachowski, Reading > Rorty; or > was it that what was perhaps originally intended as a chapter in it > grew > into a book and was published in that form only? > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of P?r > Engholm > Sent: 12 April 2009 10:11 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty > > Hi David and Ruth, > The answer is no on both questions. > Rorty was supposed to make a reply to all the contributions to the > book > 'Reading Rorty' (Alan Malachowski, ed), in which Roy's initial > critique of > Rorty was written (which then was extended in PIF), but according to > rumours > Rorty stopped when he had reached Roy's chapter. > If I would make a conjecture, I think Rorty didn't really know how > to handle > a critique of the 'epistemological tradition' which was much more > radical > than his own and which wasn't entrenched in the analytical > dtraitjacket > which Rorty himself was unable (or unwilling, or both) to abandon. > Rorty > never broke with the tradition in which he was brought up, so he > could not > deliver anything more than just an ironic 'edifying' philosophy. His > break > with philosophy always presupposed the ideas he supposedly criticised. > Bhaskar is much more serious in his critique and Rorty couldn't > follow. > > The project of the book on Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida didn't > come to > fruition, unfortunately. > > ******************************************************* > > Par Engholm > Uppsala University > Department of Sociology > Phone: +46 18 4711082 > Mobile: +46 709783546 > http://www.soc.uu.se/kontaktpers.php?id=62 > > > Journal of Critical Realism > > http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/index > Quoting Ruth Groff : > >> Hi David, >> >> Lucky you. >> >> 1. Not that I know of. >> 2. Not that I know of. >> >> Could be wrong though. >> >> Warmly, >> Ruth >> >> >> >> On Sat, Apr 11, 2009 at 11:06 AM, Dave wrote: >> >>> Hi, >>> 1. I am currently working through Philosophy and the Idea of >>> Freedom. >>> Does >>> anyone know whether Rorty explicitly responded to Bhaskar's >>> criticism >>> or whether anyone did on his behalf, and - if so - where I might >>> find > this? >>> >>> 2. In Andrew Collier's introductory text on Critical Realism, which >>> I think was published just before Dialectic: TPoF, Collier refers to >>> a forthcoming text where Roy focuses on Nietzsche, Derrida and >>> Heidegger, but I can't find anything that closely fits this >>> description. Did this book materialise or did it transform into >>> something else? If so, what is it? >>> >>> Thanks for any assistance anyone might be able to offer, >>> >>> David Aldridge >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 4001 (20090411) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 5 > Date: Sun, 12 Apr 2009 08:48:40 -0500 > From: Ruth Groff > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: > <6ad241360904120648v449a3edfi3123778541d76180 at mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 > > Yes, he has a chapter in it. > > > > On Sun, Apr 12, 2009 at 7:11 AM, Mervyn Hartwig >wrote: > >> Hi Dave, Par >> >> Collier's book came out in 1994, Dialectic in 1993. Collier doesn't >> really >> buy Bhaskarian dialectic, then or now; he basically operates within >> the >> analytical problematic. >> >> Bhaskar had been planning the book Collier refers to, "Philosophical >> Ideologies", from the late 1960s, as part of a tripartite project: >> philosophy of science (published as RTS), philosophy of social >> science >> (PON) >> and then an explanation of prevailing ideologies in these fields, a >> full >> critique (Philosophical Ideolgies). It was to be about much more than >> Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida; it was rather to be an ideology- >> critique >> and sociology of knowledge of all those philosophies that stand in >> the way >> of human emancipation. It came to fruition in Ch. 3 of SRHE (re >> positivism), >> and the critique of irrealism in DPF and in Plato Etc., but was >> never got >> up >> as a separate book. The project of writing it basically gave way to >> the >> gestation and writing first of DPF and then of the books of the >> spiritual >> turn. All this is explained in some detail in Bhaskar with Hartwig, >> The >> Formation of CR: A Personal Perspective (Routledge forthcoming 2009 >> -- has >> been delayed owing to illness). A little of it is explained in my >> Introductions to the recent Routledge editions of RTS and SRHE. >> >> Par: Did Bhaskar actually publish anything in Malachowski, Reading >> Rorty; >> or >> was it that what was perhaps originally intended as a chapter in it >> grew >> into a book and was published in that form only? >> >> Mervyn >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >> P?r >> Engholm >> Sent: 12 April 2009 10:11 >> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty >> >> Hi David and Ruth, >> The answer is no on both questions. >> Rorty was supposed to make a reply to all the contributions to the >> book >> 'Reading Rorty' (Alan Malachowski, ed), in which Roy's initial >> critique of >> Rorty was written (which then was extended in PIF), but according to >> rumours >> Rorty stopped when he had reached Roy's chapter. >> If I would make a conjecture, I think Rorty didn't really know how to >> handle >> a critique of the 'epistemological tradition' which was much more >> radical >> than his own and which wasn't entrenched in the analytical >> dtraitjacket >> which Rorty himself was unable (or unwilling, or both) to abandon. >> Rorty >> never broke with the tradition in which he was brought up, so he >> could not >> deliver anything more than just an ironic 'edifying' philosophy. >> His break >> with philosophy always presupposed the ideas he supposedly >> criticised. >> Bhaskar is much more serious in his critique and Rorty couldn't >> follow. >> >> The project of the book on Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida didn't >> come to >> fruition, unfortunately. >> >> ******************************************************* >> >> Par Engholm >> Uppsala University >> Department of Sociology >> Phone: +46 18 4711082 >> Mobile: +46 709783546 >> http://www.soc.uu.se/kontaktpers.php?id=62 >> >> >> Journal of Critical Realism >> >> http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/index >> Quoting Ruth Groff : >> >>> Hi David, >>> >>> Lucky you. >>> >>> 1. Not that I know of. >>> 2. Not that I know of. >>> >>> Could be wrong though. >>> >>> Warmly, >>> Ruth >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Apr 11, 2009 at 11:06 AM, Dave wrote: >>> >>>> Hi, >>>> 1. I am currently working through Philosophy and the Idea of >>>> Freedom. >>>> Does >>>> anyone know whether Rorty explicitly responded to Bhaskar's >>>> criticism >>>> or whether anyone did on his behalf, and - if so - where I might >>>> find >> this? >>>> >>>> 2. In Andrew Collier's introductory text on Critical Realism, >>>> which >>>> I think was published just before Dialectic: TPoF, Collier refers >>>> to >>>> a forthcoming text where Roy focuses on Nietzsche, Derrida and >>>> Heidegger, but I can't find anything that closely fits this >>>> description. Did this book materialise or did it transform into >>>> something else? If so, what is it? >>>> >>>> Thanks for any assistance anyone might be able to offer, >>>> >>>> David Aldridge >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> __________ NOD32 4001 (20090411) Information __________ >> >> This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. >> http://www.eset.com >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 53, Issue 6 > *********************************************** From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Mon Apr 13 02:47:33 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2009 09:47:33 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty In-Reply-To: <6ad241360904120648v449a3edfi3123778541d76180@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: OK, thanks. It's the piece reprinted in Reclaiming Reality, Ch 8, ?Rorty, Realism and the Idea of Freedom? -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth Groff Sent: 12 April 2009 14:49 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty Yes, he has a chapter in it. On Sun, Apr 12, 2009 at 7:11 AM, Mervyn Hartwig wrote: > Hi Dave, Par > > Collier's book came out in 1994, Dialectic in 1993. Collier doesn't > really buy Bhaskarian dialectic, then or now; he basically operates > within the analytical problematic. > > Bhaskar had been planning the book Collier refers to, "Philosophical > Ideologies", from the late 1960s, as part of a tripartite project: > philosophy of science (published as RTS), philosophy of social science > (PON) > and then an explanation of prevailing ideologies in these fields, a > full critique (Philosophical Ideolgies). It was to be about much more > than Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida; it was rather to be an > ideology-critique and sociology of knowledge of all those philosophies > that stand in the way of human emancipation. It came to fruition in > Ch. 3 of SRHE (re positivism), and the critique of irrealism in DPF > and in Plato Etc., but was never got up as a separate book. The > project of writing it basically gave way to the gestation and writing > first of DPF and then of the books of the spiritual turn. All this is > explained in some detail in Bhaskar with Hartwig, The Formation of CR: > A Personal Perspective (Routledge forthcoming 2009 -- has been delayed > owing to illness). A little of it is explained in my Introductions to > the recent Routledge editions of RTS and SRHE. > > Par: Did Bhaskar actually publish anything in Malachowski, Reading > Rorty; or was it that what was perhaps originally intended as a > chapter in it grew into a book and was published in that form only? > > Mervyn > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of P?r > Engholm > Sent: 12 April 2009 10:11 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] New Subject: Bhaskar and Rorty > > Hi David and Ruth, > The answer is no on both questions. > Rorty was supposed to make a reply to all the contributions to the > book 'Reading Rorty' (Alan Malachowski, ed), in which Roy's initial > critique of Rorty was written (which then was extended in PIF), but > according to rumours Rorty stopped when he had reached Roy's chapter. > If I would make a conjecture, I think Rorty didn't really know how to > handle a critique of the 'epistemological tradition' which was much > more radical than his own and which wasn't entrenched in the > analytical dtraitjacket which Rorty himself was unable (or unwilling, > or both) to abandon. Rorty never broke with the tradition in which he > was brought up, so he could not deliver anything more than just an > ironic 'edifying' philosophy. His break with philosophy always > presupposed the ideas he supposedly criticised. > Bhaskar is much more serious in his critique and Rorty couldn't follow. > > The project of the book on Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida didn't > come to fruition, unfortunately. > > ******************************************************* > > Par Engholm > Uppsala University > Department of Sociology > Phone: +46 18 4711082 > Mobile: +46 709783546 > http://www.soc.uu.se/kontaktpers.php?id=62 > > > Journal of Critical Realism > > http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR/index > Quoting Ruth Groff : > > > Hi David, > > > > Lucky you. > > > > 1. Not that I know of. > > 2. Not that I know of. > > > > Could be wrong though. > > > > Warmly, > > Ruth > > > > > > > > On Sat, Apr 11, 2009 at 11:06 AM, Dave wrote: > > > >> Hi, > >> 1. I am currently working through Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom. > >> Does > >> anyone know whether Rorty explicitly responded to Bhaskar's > >> criticism or whether anyone did on his behalf, and - if so - where > >> I might find > this? > >> > >> 2. In Andrew Collier's introductory text on Critical Realism, > >> which I think was published just before Dialectic: TPoF, Collier > >> refers to a forthcoming text where Roy focuses on Nietzsche, > >> Derrida and Heidegger, but I can't find anything that closely fits > >> this description. Did this book materialise or did it transform > >> into something else? If so, what is it? > >> > >> Thanks for any assistance anyone might be able to offer, > >> > >> David Aldridge > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 4001 (20090411) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 4002 (20090411) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk Mon Apr 13 18:35:30 2009 From: matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk (Karl Maton) Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2009 10:35:30 +1000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] New Critical Realism Seminars In-Reply-To: <49E1CE48.9030802@yahoo.co.uk> References: <49E1CE48.9030802@yahoo.co.uk> Message-ID: <49E3DA52.8010201@yahoo.co.uk> Cunningly, I got the day of the week wrong. This year is Wednesday night! Getting Real AACR Seminars and Discussions The Australasian Association for Critical Realism is pleased to announce a new series of seminars and discussions, to be held at the University of Sydney. Wednesday, 6th May Mervyn Hartwig, the editor-in-chief of the Journal of Critical Realism will kick off this year's seminars with a journey through the different dimensions of critical realist philosophy: "First wave, second wave, third wave: the moments of critical realism and the critical realist embrace" Wednesday, 3rd June Dr Margaret Moussa, UWS, on J.S. Mill and empiricism Wednesday, 5th August Assoc Prof Brian Pinkstone, UWS, on historical materialism Wednesday, 2nd September Alison Gable, University of Queensland on 'underlabouring' Wednesday, 7th October Sandra Wallace of University of Sydney: Critical realism and archaeology: an ontology of the material Wednesday, 4th Nov Karl Maton, USyd, co-editor of Social Realism, Knowledge and the Sociology of Education, published by Continuum this month, will discuss the growing approach called 'social realism', which builds on critical realist philosophy and the sociologies of Basil Bernstein and Pierre Bourdieu. Wednesday, 2nd Dec Melanie McDonald, who recently published in Journal of Critical Realism and is currently writing a chapter for a book on critical realism, will discuss 'meta-reality'. Seminars are held on the first Wednesday of every month, at 6.30pm, in the R.C. Mills Building (room 148). -- With best wishes, Karl ---- Dr Karl Maton Department of Sociology & Social Policy Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney http://www.KarlMaton.com Editorial Board, Journal of Critical Realism President, Australasian Association for Critical Realism From shivahemmati at gmail.com Tue Apr 14 03:47:52 2009 From: shivahemmati at gmail.com (shiva hemmati) Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2009 13:17:52 +0330 Subject: [Critical-Realism] question Message-ID: Dear Sirs What is the criteria for criticizing a school of philosophy in Bhaskar's point of view? PHD student of Philosophy of education/ intrested in social constructivism (esp science teaching) Any recomandation makes me happy -- best wishes Shiva Hemati From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Tue Apr 14 06:53:28 2009 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2009 13:53:28 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] question In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Hi Shiva Basically, consistency. 1. Is the approach consistent with the possibility of some well attested human practice, e.g. science or human intentional practice as such? The procedure here is transcendental argument. 2. Is it theory-practice consistent? The classical philosophical discourse of modernity, e.g., arguably is not: it pronounces ontology to be impossible yet in practice generates an implicit ontology itself. This is immanent critique. Note that it asks whether an approach is consistent in its own terms, it does not introduce arbitrary external criteria. 3. You can then go further and explain the inconsistency or the approach as such. This is explanatory critique. 1 and 2 combined is 'transcendental critique', which is Bhaskar's characteristic procedure. If you've got access to my Dictionary of CR see the entries on Critique and Consistency and follow up the cross-references and above all the references, which take you to places in the CR literature where the approach is outlined. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of shiva hemmati Sent: 14 April 2009 10:48 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [Critical-Realism] question Dear Sirs What is the criteria for criticizing a school of philosophy in Bhaskar's point of view? PHD student of Philosophy of education/ intrested in social constructivism (esp science teaching) Any recomandation makes me happy -- best wishes Shiva Hemati _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 4002 (20090411) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk Tue Apr 14 09:19:39 2009 From: mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk (Mark Johnson) Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2009 16:19:39 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] question In-Reply-To: <7o4dbq$44bcdn@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> References: <7o4dbq$44bcdn@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: In matters of education these throw up some subtle distinctions... Regarding 1) - A typical 'educational' transcendental question might be: "given that children appear to learn science in such-and-such a way, what must the world be like?" .. which is where a lot of educational constructivists (starting with Piaget, Vygotsky, etc) start. Regarding 2) Sometimes theories and interventions with apparently suspect ontologies are nevertheless 'successful' as educational interventions. 'Half truths' seem to play an important role in succesful teaching (most school science is typical of it!) Education is about changing people, and people change in all sorts of ways for all sorts of reasons. I wonder if the ancient arguments between philosophy and rhetoric might be relevant here? Mark On 4/14/09, Mervyn Hartwig wrote: > Hi Shiva > > Basically, consistency. > > 1. Is the approach consistent with the possibility of some well attested > human practice, e.g. science or human intentional practice as such? The > procedure here is transcendental argument. > > 2. Is it theory-practice consistent? The classical philosophical discourse > of modernity, e.g., arguably is not: it pronounces ontology to be > impossible yet in practice generates an implicit ontology itself. This is > immanent critique. Note that it asks whether an approach is consistent in > its own terms, it does not introduce arbitrary external criteria. > > 3. You can then go further and explain the inconsistency or the approach as > such. This is explanatory critique. > > 1 and 2 combined is 'transcendental critique', which is Bhaskar's > characteristic procedure. > > If you've got access to my Dictionary of CR see the entries on Critique and > Consistency and follow up the cross-references and above all the references, > which take you to places in the CR literature where the approach is > outlined. > > Mervyn > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of shiva > hemmati > Sent: 14 April 2009 10:48 > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] question > > Dear Sirs > What is the criteria for criticizing a school of philosophy in Bhaskar's > point of view? > PHD student of Philosophy of education/ intrested in social constructivism > (esp science teaching) Any recomandation makes me happy > -- > best wishes > Shiva Hemati > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 4002 (20090411) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mark Johnson Institute for Educational Cybernetics University of Bolton BL3 5AB Tel. 01204 903567 Mob. 0778 6064505 From dogangoecmen at aol.com Wed Apr 15 12:22:36 2009 From: dogangoecmen at aol.com (dogangoecmen at aol.com) Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2009 14:22:36 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] the theory of evolution from marxist point of view Message-ID: <8CB8C0E4949C691-132C-C90@webmail-md20.sysops.aol.com> Dear Friends, Colleagues, leading Turkish journal of philosophy "Felsefe Logos" wants to publish in the next issue 4 or 5 articles on different aspects of the theory of evolution from Marxist perspective. If there is anybody interested in submitting a paper or wants to indicate to any paper or author please get in touch with me as soon as possible. Thanks a lot and best wishes, Dogan Gocmen ________________________________________________________________________ AOL Email goes Mobile! You can now read your AOL Emails whilst on the move. Sign up for a free AOL Email account with unlimited storage today. From lena.gunnarsson at oru.se Thu Apr 16 07:29:00 2009 From: lena.gunnarsson at oru.se (lena.gunnarsson at oru.se) Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2009 15:29:00 +0200 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critique of Laclau/Mouffe's concept of hegemony Message-ID: <81afcea420f5.49e74ebc@oru.se> The Swedish journal Socialistisk Debatt is about to give out an issue on hegemony and as theoretical underpinning we really need an article criticising the Laclau/Mouffe view on hegemony. Please, contact me if you have something written or want to write something on the subject for us to translate! Or if you know of someone else. Best Lena From btarpley at sfasu.edu Fri Apr 17 14:45:57 2009 From: btarpley at sfasu.edu (Bryan Tarpley) Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2009 15:45:57 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Blogging meta-Reality Message-ID: <56b3b1f80904171345n72e75b5fx9c1b1a87a664df41@mail.gmail.com> Hello, I'm new to this list and as such, forgive me if this is off-topic or breaching protocol. I just wanted to inform potentially interested parties that I'm blogging my read-through of Roy Bhaskar's new book _meta-Reality: Volume 1_ at this address: http://thehopefulmidwife.blogspot.com I also wanted to ask if anyone had any resources that broke down in layman's terms the Critical Realism MELD(ARA) schema? Regards, Bryan Tarpley -- Bryan Tarpley Stephen F. Austin State University 936.468.6112 | btarpley at sfasu.edu From mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk Sat Apr 18 08:33:54 2009 From: mwj1 at bolton.ac.uk (Mark Johnson) Date: Sat, 18 Apr 2009 15:33:54 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Blogging meta-Reality In-Reply-To: <56b3b1f80904171345n72e75b5fx9c1b1a87a664df41@mail.gmail.com> References: <56b3b1f80904171345n72e75b5fx9c1b1a87a664df41@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: Hi Bryan, To my knowledge, you're the first person to do something like this. As well as being really interesting to get your perspective, it helps raise the online profile of CR. Fantastic! Mark On Fri, Apr 17, 2009 at 9:45 PM, Bryan Tarpley wrote: > Hello, > > I'm new to this list and as such, forgive me if this is off-topic or > breaching protocol. I just wanted to inform potentially interested parties > that I'm blogging my read-through of Roy Bhaskar's new book _meta-Reality: > Volume 1_ at this address: > > http://thehopefulmidwife.blogspot.com > > I also wanted to ask if anyone had any resources that broke down in > layman's > terms the Critical Realism MELD(ARA) schema? > > Regards, > Bryan Tarpley > > -- > Bryan Tarpley > Stephen F. Austin State University > 936.468.6112 | btarpley at sfasu.edu > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mark Johnson Institute for Educational Cybernetics University of Bolton BL3 5AB Tel. 01204 903567 Mob. 0778 6064505 From matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk Tue Apr 21 00:35:16 2009 From: matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk (Karl Maton) Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2009 16:35:16 +1000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] New Critical Realism Seminar Message-ID: <49ED6924.50501@yahoo.co.uk> Getting Real: AACR Seminars and Discussions The Australasian Association for Critical Realism (AACR)is pleased to announce the latest in a new series of seminars, to be held at the University of Sydney. Wednesday 6th May, 6.30pm Room 148 (downstairs) R.C. Mills Building, University of Sydney Mervyn Hartwig Editor of Journal of Critical Realism, Dictionary of Critical Realism, and many more. First wave, Second Wave, Third Wave: The moments of critical realism and the critical realist embrace Getting Real is a new series of seminars and discussions of readings organised by the AACR. They are open to anyone interested in coming and engaging with realist ideas. Neither speakers nor other participants need be 'critical realists' - the aim is to open up and encourage debate and discussion. We adjourn to the pub afterwards as well. PLEASE send this on to anyone in your Dept or Faculty you think might be interested! Thanks. -- With best wishes, Karl ---- Dr Karl Maton Department of Sociology & Social Policy Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney http://www.KarlMaton.com Editorial Board, Journal of Critical Realism President, Australasian Association for Critical Realism From ehrbar at lists.econ.utah.edu Sun Apr 26 16:10:59 2009 From: ehrbar at lists.econ.utah.edu (ehrbar) Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2009 16:10:59 -0600 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Climate Science or Politics? Message-ID: The Economics Department of University of Utah is the sponsor of the critical-realism mailing list. One of our Economics students, Tim DeChristopher, made the News last December by bidding for oil and gas drilling rights in sensitive park lands in Utah. It was an auction hurriedly put together by the parting Bush administration. Tim did not have the intention to pay for these leases. This is a crime, and this Tuesday is Tim's arraignment. A peaceful demonstration is planned on the occasion of this arraignment, during which James Hansen, the top cimate scientist of the US, will speak in Tim's support. Hansen will also speak at the University of Utah and at Utah Valley University. This raises the issue: should Hansen be treated as a scientist or as a political advocate? Hansen is widely seen as a person playing different roles at different times. Sometimes he speaks as a scientist, and sometimes as a political advocate. When he outlines the urgency of properly responding to climate change, speaks to heads of state, etc., he is often seen as a scientist passing from science into politics. I'd like to argue that those actions which seem political are in fact necessitated by Hansen's commitment to scientific truth, i.e., this is still Hansen acting as a scientist. In our society there is a division of labor between science and politics. Scientists supply facts which allow politicians and the public to make better decisions, but the final decision is a political one. If a scientist enters the political debate in order to urge a particular application of his or her scientific results, then he or she has passed from the sphere of science to the sphere of politics. I'd like to argue that in climate science, two special circumstances make it necessary for scientists to question and perhaps break through this separation. If they are committed to scientific truth, it is no longer automatically correct for them to remain cloistered in their academic niche. The special circumstances which take this certainty away are: (1) The discrepancy is too large between what is actually done about the climate emergency and what needs to be done. This is no longer a question of what policy to pursue. Policy makers may disagree on specific policies, but everyone familiar with climate science can see that what is done now is sorely deficient and it will lead to disaster. (2) The implications of the present lack of action are too severe -- civilization itself is at stake. Academic freedom and scientific neutrality are institutions that maintain and promote civilization. As academics we are the product of civilization, committed to maintaining civilization. The lack of response in the political sphere, combined with the severity of the situation, reverses what, in the scientific sphere, counts as an action and what doesn't. If a climate scientist insists on academic neutrality under the present circumstances, this is not necessarily neutral. It may be tacit collusion with those forces (social, psychological, etc) that try to deny the reality of climate change. The traditional standards of scientific neutrality no longer apply because they would require the scientist to tear himself or herself apart: while doing research about the ever increasing and accelerating climate emergency he or she would be forced to play the dog that didn't bark and in this way help prevent the urgently necessary responses. In Hansen's case, the dilemma was even more direct. During the Bush years, the political sphere intruded into the scientific sphere trying to make it impossible for Hansen to do his research or to disseminate it. Hansen didn't even have the option of "just doing his research." The expulsion from the Eden of academic neutrality is, of course, not a license for the scientists to do whatever they please and have it counted as scientific. The criteria have become more difficult now, they have not disappeared. I will not try to decide what actions fall into the privileged and protected sphere of science and academic freedom, and which don't. All I wanted to show is that inaction is no longer the automatically correct default position for a scientist committed to the truth. ----- With this argument I am trying to go on the offensive against the canard that a scientist who warns about the dangers of climate change to humanity is automatically committing a political act. What do you think about this argument? Please help me strengthen it. It does not criticize the neutrality of science -- although one might argue that our society is too fragmented, that we would be better off without the separation between mental and manual labor. The argument remains in the framework of capitalist democracy, but claims exceptional circumstances for climate science. For a climate scientist, society is so obviously on a suicidal course that maintaining scientific neutrality is not a neutral act---instead it is collusion with those social forces which try to deny the severity of the situation. The scientist's commitment to the truth therefore prohibits the scientist from acting as if nothing was the matter. What he should do instead cannot be derived from the moral commitment as a scientist. The above argument uses at least three elements of critical realism: (1) The reality of absences: not speaking out can be a political act. (2) Certain empirical facts are so obvious that they can be taken as the basis for a philosophical argument: CR takes it as an obvious given that science is possible, i.e., that the scientific method has allowed humankind greater mastery over nature. Here the empirical fact on which the entire argument is based is that the current climate policies are insufficient. A climate scientist, who understands global warming, knows this without having to be a policy maker. (3) The phrase of the scientist "tearing himself of herself apart" referred to theory-practice inconsistency. Hans. Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar ehrbar at economics.utah.edu Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ office) Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) From rgroff at slu.edu Sun Apr 26 16:52:31 2009 From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2009 17:52:31 -0500 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Climate Science or Politics? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <6ad241360904261552r61c690c5i750f5ad53435453f@mail.gmail.com> Hi Hans, I think a really important person for you to have an exchange with is Hugh Lacey. He is a philosopher of science, a senior person, who is very friendly to cr, and who writes on exactly these issues. He's listed on the cr wiki, and you could get his e-mail probably just by googling him, too. He's half-time in Brazil, now, having retired from Swarthmore. I think he would be extremely insightful. Warmly, Ruth On Sun, Apr 26, 2009 at 5:10 PM, ehrbar wrote: > > > The Economics Department of University of Utah is the sponsor of the > critical-realism mailing list. One of our Economics students, Tim > DeChristopher, made the News last December by bidding for oil and gas > drilling rights in sensitive park lands in Utah. It was an auction > hurriedly put together by the parting Bush administration. Tim did > not have the intention to pay for these leases. This is a crime, and > this Tuesday is Tim's arraignment. > > A peaceful demonstration is planned on the occasion of this > arraignment, during which James Hansen, the top cimate scientist of > the US, will speak in Tim's support. Hansen will also speak at the > University of Utah and at Utah Valley University. This raises the > issue: should Hansen be treated as a scientist or as a political > advocate? > > Hansen is widely seen as a person playing different roles at different > times. Sometimes he speaks as a scientist, and sometimes as a > political advocate. When he outlines the urgency of properly > responding to climate change, speaks to heads of state, etc., he is > often seen as a scientist passing from science into politics. I'd > like to argue that those actions which seem political are in fact > necessitated by Hansen's commitment to scientific truth, i.e., this is > still Hansen acting as a scientist. > > In our society there is a division of labor between science and > politics. Scientists supply facts which allow politicians and the > public to make better decisions, but the final decision is a political > one. If a scientist enters the political debate in order to urge a > particular application of his or her scientific results, then he or > she has passed from the sphere of science to the sphere of politics. > > I'd like to argue that in climate science, two special circumstances > make it necessary for scientists to question and perhaps break through > this separation. If they are committed to scientific truth, it is no > longer automatically correct for them to remain cloistered in their > academic niche. The special circumstances which take this certainty > away are: > > (1) The discrepancy is too large between what is actually done about > the climate emergency and what needs to be done. This is no longer a > question of what policy to pursue. Policy makers may disagree on > specific policies, but everyone familiar with climate science can see > that what is done now is sorely deficient and it will lead to > disaster. > > (2) The implications of the present lack of action are too severe -- > civilization itself is at stake. Academic freedom and scientific > neutrality are institutions that maintain and promote civilization. > As academics we are the product of civilization, committed to > maintaining civilization. > > The lack of response in the political sphere, combined with the > severity of the situation, reverses what, in the scientific sphere, > counts as an action and what doesn't. If a climate scientist insists > on academic neutrality under the present circumstances, this is not > necessarily neutral. It may be tacit collusion with those forces > (social, psychological, etc) that try to deny the reality of climate > change. The traditional standards of scientific neutrality no longer > apply because they would require the scientist to tear himself or > herself apart: while doing research about the ever increasing and > accelerating climate emergency he or she would be forced to play the > dog that didn't bark and in this way help prevent the urgently > necessary responses. > > In Hansen's case, the dilemma was even more direct. During the Bush > years, the political sphere intruded into the scientific sphere trying > to make it impossible for Hansen to do his research or to disseminate > it. Hansen didn't even have the option of "just doing his research." > > The expulsion from the Eden of academic neutrality is, of course, not > a license for the scientists to do whatever they please and have it > counted as scientific. The criteria have become more difficult now, > they have not disappeared. I will not try to decide what actions > fall into the privileged and protected sphere of science and academic > freedom, and which don't. All I wanted to show is that inaction is > no longer the automatically correct default position for a scientist > committed to the truth. > > ----- > > > With this argument I am trying to go on the offensive against the > canard that a scientist who warns about the dangers of climate change > to humanity is automatically committing a political act. What do you > think about this argument? Please help me strengthen it. It does not > criticize the neutrality of science -- although one might argue that > our society is too fragmented, that we would be better off without the > separation between mental and manual labor. The argument remains in > the framework of capitalist democracy, but claims exceptional > circumstances for climate science. For a climate scientist, society > is so obviously on a suicidal course that maintaining scientific > neutrality is not a neutral act---instead it is collusion with those > social forces which try to deny the severity of the situation. The > scientist's commitment to the truth therefore prohibits the scientist > from acting as if nothing was the matter. What he should do instead > cannot be derived from the moral commitment as a scientist. > > > The above argument uses at least three elements of critical realism: > > (1) The reality of absences: not speaking out can be a political act. > > (2) Certain empirical facts are so obvious that they can be taken as the > basis for a philosophical argument: CR takes it as an obvious given > that science is possible, i.e., that the scientific method has allowed > humankind greater mastery over nature. Here the empirical > fact on which the entire argument is based is that the current climate > policies are insufficient. A climate scientist, who understands > global warming, knows this without having to be a policy maker. > > (3) The phrase of the scientist "tearing himself of herself apart" referred > to theory-practice inconsistency. > > > Hans. > > Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar > ehrbar at economics.utah.edu > Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) > 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ office) > Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From steveash at soton.ac.uk Tue Apr 28 02:42:21 2009 From: steveash at soton.ac.uk (Ash S.R.) Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2009 09:42:21 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 53, Issue 12 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: hans i think colliers distinction between abstract and concreate science made in 'in defence of objectivity' is useful here. Abstract science should not be applied to concreate situations but concreate sceinces can. my exanmple would be that an engineer looking at an area prone to flooding or a doctor looking at a man with a heart attack will both apply concreate science to the situation through their actions; to make the situation better. Wheras the sceintific knowledge of a physicist or a biologist would not be of use; as there abstact scientific knowledge can not be directly applied to the concreate situation. I do not know the work of tim hansen, but i would argue that, in general, climate scientists are not like physisits or biologists who's work is abstract science but they are like doctors or engineers; in that they have concreate knowledge that needs to be applied to the concreate situation. Due to the nature of their subject that application is through the political process; it is the domain in which that concrete knowledge muat be applied. Therefore, to ban a climate scientist from political pronuncements would be like banning a doctor from an operating theatre steve ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 27 April 2009 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 53, Issue 12 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Climate Science or Politics? (ehrbar) 2. Re: Climate Science or Politics? (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2009 16:10:59 -0600 From: ehrbar Subject: [Critical-Realism] Climate Science or Politics? To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Message-ID: The Economics Department of University of Utah is the sponsor of the critical-realism mailing list. One of our Economics students, Tim DeChristopher, made the News last December by bidding for oil and gas drilling rights in sensitive park lands in Utah. It was an auction hurriedly put together by the parting Bush administration. Tim did not have the intention to pay for these leases. This is a crime, and this Tuesday is Tim's arraignment. A peaceful demonstration is planned on the occasion of this arraignment, during which James Hansen, the top cimate scientist of the US, will speak in Tim's support. Hansen will also speak at the University of Utah and at Utah Valley University. This raises the issue: should Hansen be treated as a scientist or as a political advocate? Hansen is widely seen as a person playing different roles at different times. Sometimes he speaks as a scientist, and sometimes as a political advocate. When he outlines the urgency of properly responding to climate change, speaks to heads of state, etc., he is often seen as a scientist passing from science into politics. I'd like to argue that those actions which seem political are in fact necessitated by Hansen's commitment to scientific truth, i.e., this is still Hansen acting as a scientist. In our society there is a division of labor between science and politics. Scientists supply facts which allow politicians and the public to make better decisions, but the final decision is a political one. If a scientist enters the political debate in order to urge a particular application of his or her scientific results, then he or she has passed from the sphere of science to the sphere of politics. I'd like to argue that in climate science, two special circumstances make it necessary for scientists to question and perhaps break through this separation. If they are committed to scientific truth, it is no longer automatically correct for them to remain cloistered in their academic niche. The special circumstances which take this certainty away are: (1) The discrepancy is too large between what is actually done about the climate emergency and what needs to be done. This is no longer a question of what policy to pursue. Policy makers may disagree on specific policies, but everyone familiar with climate science can see that what is done now is sorely deficient and it will lead to disaster. (2) The implications of the present lack of action are too severe -- civilization itself is at stake. Academic freedom and scientific neutrality are institutions that maintain and promote civilization. As academics we are the product of civilization, committed to maintaining civilization. The lack of response in the political sphere, combined with the severity of the situation, reverses what, in the scientific sphere, counts as an action and what doesn't. If a climate scientist insists on academic neutrality under the present circumstances, this is not necessarily neutral. It may be tacit collusion with those forces (social, psychological, etc) that try to deny the reality of climate change. The traditional standards of scientific neutrality no longer apply because they would require the scientist to tear himself or herself apart: while doing research about the ever increasing and accelerating climate emergency he or she would be forced to play the dog that didn't bark and in this way help prevent the urgently necessary responses. In Hansen's case, the dilemma was even more direct. During the Bush years, the political sphere intruded into the scientific sphere trying to make it impossible for Hansen to do his research or to disseminate it. Hansen didn't even have the option of "just doing his research." The expulsion from the Eden of academic neutrality is, of course, not a license for the scientists to do whatever they please and have it counted as scientific. The criteria have become more difficult now, they have not disappeared. I will not try to decide what actions fall into the privileged and protected sphere of science and academic freedom, and which don't. All I wanted to show is that inaction is no longer the automatically correct default position for a scientist committed to the truth. ----- With this argument I am trying to go on the offensive against the canard that a scientist who warns about the dangers of climate change to humanity is automatically committing a political act. What do you think about this argument? Please help me strengthen it. It does not criticize the neutrality of science -- although one might argue that our society is too fragmented, that we would be better off without the separation between mental and manual labor. The argument remains in the framework of capitalist democracy, but claims exceptional circumstances for climate science. For a climate scientist, society is so obviously on a suicidal course that maintaining scientific neutrality is not a neutral act---instead it is collusion with those social forces which try to deny the severity of the situation. The scientist's commitment to the truth therefore prohibits the scientist from acting as if nothing was the matter. What he should do instead cannot be derived from the moral commitment as a scientist. The above argument uses at least three elements of critical realism: (1) The reality of absences: not speaking out can be a political act. (2) Certain empirical facts are so obvious that they can be taken as the basis for a philosophical argument: CR takes it as an obvious given that science is possible, i.e., that the scientific method has allowed humankind greater mastery over nature. Here the empirical fact on which the entire argument is based is that the current climate policies are insufficient. A climate scientist, who understands global warming, knows this without having to be a policy maker. (3) The phrase of the scientist "tearing himself of herself apart" referred to theory-practice inconsistency. Hans. Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar ehrbar at economics.utah.edu Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ office) Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2009 17:52:31 -0500 From: Ruth Groff Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Climate Science or Politics? To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <6ad241360904261552r61c690c5i750f5ad53435453f at mail.gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Hi Hans, I think a really important person for you to have an exchange with is Hugh Lacey. He is a philosopher of science, a senior person, who is very friendly to cr, and who writes on exactly these issues. He's listed on the cr wiki, and you could get his e-mail probably just by googling him, too. He's half-time in Brazil, now, having retired from Swarthmore. I think he would be extremely insightful. Warmly, Ruth On Sun, Apr 26, 2009 at 5:10 PM, ehrbar wrote: > > > The Economics Department of University of Utah is the sponsor of the > critical-realism mailing list. One of our Economics students, Tim > DeChristopher, made the News last December by bidding for oil and gas > drilling rights in sensitive park lands in Utah. It was an auction > hurriedly put together by the parting Bush administration. Tim did > not have the intention to pay for these leases. This is a crime, and > this Tuesday is Tim's arraignment. > > A peaceful demonstration is planned on the occasion of this > arraignment, during which James Hansen, the top cimate scientist of > the US, will speak in Tim's support. Hansen will also speak at the > University of Utah and at Utah Valley University. This raises the > issue: should Hansen be treated as a scientist or as a political > advocate? > > Hansen is widely seen as a person playing different roles at different > times. Sometimes he speaks as a scientist, and sometimes as a > political advocate. When he outlines the urgency of properly > responding to climate change, speaks to heads of state, etc., he is > often seen as a scientist passing from science into politics. I'd > like to argue that those actions which seem political are in fact > necessitated by Hansen's commitment to scientific truth, i.e., this is > still Hansen acting as a scientist. > > In our society there is a division of labor between science and > politics. Scientists supply facts which allow politicians and the > public to make better decisions, but the final decision is a political > one. If a scientist enters the political debate in order to urge a > particular application of his or her scientific results, then he or > she has passed from the sphere of science to the sphere of politics. > > I'd like to argue that in climate science, two special circumstances > make it necessary for scientists to question and perhaps break through > this separation. If they are committed to scientific truth, it is no > longer automatically correct for them to remain cloistered in their > academic niche. The special circumstances which take this certainty > away are: > > (1) The discrepancy is too large between what is actually done about > the climate emergency and what needs to be done. This is no longer a > question of what policy to pursue. Policy makers may disagree on > specific policies, but everyone familiar with climate science can see > that what is done now is sorely deficient and it will lead to > disaster. > > (2) The implications of the present lack of action are too severe -- > civilization itself is at stake. Academic freedom and scientific > neutrality are institutions that maintain and promote civilization. > As academics we are the product of civilization, committed to > maintaining civilization. > > The lack of response in the political sphere, combined with the > severity of the situation, reverses what, in the scientific sphere, > counts as an action and what doesn't. If a climate scientist insists > on academic neutrality under the present circumstances, this is not > necessarily neutral. It may be tacit collusion with those forces > (social, psychological, etc) that try to deny the reality of climate > change. The traditional standards of scientific neutrality no longer > apply because they would require the scientist to tear himself or > herself apart: while doing research about the ever increasing and > accelerating climate emergency he or she would be forced to play the > dog that didn't bark and in this way help prevent the urgently > necessary responses. > > In Hansen's case, the dilemma was even more direct. During the Bush > years, the political sphere intruded into the scientific sphere trying > to make it impossible for Hansen to do his research or to disseminate > it. Hansen didn't even have the option of "just doing his research." > > The expulsion from the Eden of academic neutrality is, of course, not > a license for the scientists to do whatever they please and have it > counted as scientific. The criteria have become more difficult now, > they have not disappeared. I will not try to decide what actions > fall into the privileged and protected sphere of science and academic > freedom, and which don't. All I wanted to show is that inaction is > no longer the automatically correct default position for a scientist > committed to the truth. > > ----- > > > With this argument I am trying to go on the offensive against the > canard that a scientist who warns about the dangers of climate change > to humanity is automatically committing a political act. What do you > think about this argument? Please help me strengthen it. It does not > criticize the neutrality of science -- although one might argue that > our society is too fragmented, that we would be better off without the > separation between mental and manual labor. The argument remains in > the framework of capitalist democracy, but claims exceptional > circumstances for climate science. For a climate scientist, society > is so obviously on a suicidal course that maintaining scientific > neutrality is not a neutral act---instead it is collusion with those > social forces which try to deny the severity of the situation. The > scientist's commitment to the truth therefore prohibits the scientist > from acting as if nothing was the matter. What he should do instead > cannot be derived from the moral commitment as a scientist. > > > The above argument uses at least three elements of critical realism: > > (1) The reality of absences: not speaking out can be a political act. > > (2) Certain empirical facts are so obvious that they can be taken as the > basis for a philosophical argument: CR takes it as an obvious given > that science is possible, i.e., that the scientific method has allowed > humankind greater mastery over nature. Here the empirical > fact on which the entire argument is based is that the current climate > policies are insufficient. A climate scientist, who understands > global warming, knows this without having to be a policy maker. > > (3) The phrase of the scientist "tearing himself of herself apart" referred > to theory-practice inconsistency. > > > Hans. > > Hans G. Ehrbar http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar > ehrbar at economics.utah.edu > Economics Department, University of Utah (801) 581 7797 (my office) > 1645 Campus Center Dr., Rm 308 (801) 581 7481 (econ office) > Salt Lake City UT 84112-9300 (801) 585 5649 (FAX) > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 53, Issue 12 ************************************************ From matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk Wed Apr 29 03:51:13 2009 From: matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk (Karl Maton) Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2009 19:51:13 +1000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] New Critical Realism Seminar Message-ID: <49F82311.2050301@yahoo.co.uk> Getting Real: AACR Seminars and Discussions The Australasian Association for Critical Realism (AACR)is pleased to announce the latest in a new series of seminars, to be held at the University of Sydney. Wednesday 6th May, 6.30pm Room 148 (downstairs) R.C. Mills Building, University of Sydney Mervyn Hartwig Editor of Journal of Critical Realism, Dictionary of Critical Realism, and many more. First wave, Second Wave, Third Wave: The moments of critical realism and the critical realist embrace Getting Real is a new series of seminars and discussions of readings organised by the AACR. They are open to anyone interested in coming and engaging with realist ideas. Neither speakers nor other participants need be 'critical realists' - the aim is to open up and encourage debate and discussion. We adjourn to the pub afterwards as well. PLEASE send this on to anyone in your Dept or Faculty you think might be interested! Thanks. -- With best wishes, Karl ---- Dr Karl Maton Department of Sociology & Social Policy Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney http://www.KarlMaton.com Editorial Board, Journal of Critical Realism President, Australasian Association for Critical Realism