From matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk Tue Jun 3 06:01:22 2008 From: matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk (Karl Maton) Date: Tue, 03 Jun 2008 22:01:22 +1000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] New Critical Realism Seminar Message-ID: <48453292.1060801@yahoo.co.uk> Engaging Realism AACR Seminars and Discussions The Australasian Association for Critical Realism (AACR)is pleased to announce the latest in a new series of seminars and discussions, to be held at the University of Sydney. Thursday 26th June, 6.30pm Seminar Room 435, Faculty of Education and Social Work, University of Sydney The Adventures of an Inkling: Unblocking the creative block in art education Melanie McDonald School of Education, Southern Cross University Engaging Realism is a new series of seminars and discussions of readings organised by the AACR. They are open to anyone interested in coming and engaging with realist ideas. Neither speakers nor other participants need be 'critical realists' - the aim is to open up and encourage debate and discussion. We adjourn to the pub afterwards as well. PLEASE send this on to anyone in your Dept or Faculty you think might be interested! Thanks. Abstract:This paper draws upon a doctoral research project which is concerned with utilising key concepts from the philosophy of critical realism and meta-Reality to develop an art education research project that can enhance the freedom of art students in their art work. The process of applying the philosophy of critical realism and the philosophy of meta-Reality to the field of art education in this project has involved a two-way interrogation both of concepts and empirical research. This study draws on the flow theory of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi to complement Roy Bhaskar's account of the ground-state and of the nature of free-flowing activity. In this paper, the stratified model of reality, with its application to intentional human agency and the tripartite nature of the self, together with the four planar social being and transformational model of social being, are applied to the specific context of learning to draw. This paper also draws on the habitus theory of Pierre Bourdieu to complement Roy Bhaskar's tripartite analysis of the self and of the role that past and present social conditions might play in experiencing free-flowing activity. The research results offer some empirical support for the philosophy of critical realism and the philosophy of meta-Reality for advancing an understanding of the elements at play when an adult art student experiences flow whilst learning to make art. -- With best wishes, Karl ---- Dr Karl Maton Department of Sociology & Social Policy Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney http://www.KarlMaton.com Editorial Board, Journal of Critical Realism President, Australasian Association for Critical Realism From agent.redstone at yahoo.com Thu Jun 5 06:44:44 2008 From: agent.redstone at yahoo.com (Fred Zaman) Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2008 05:44:44 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Critical-Realism] Natural Law & Volition: A Critical-Realist Reconciliation In-Reply-To: <360114.12492.qm@web63614.mail.re1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <208211.83308.qm@web63612.mail.re1.yahoo.com> The statement below is my considered response to a question asked about my interest in pursuing the highly theoretical ?Macrohistory?s Efficient and Final Causes: A Neo-Aristotelian Theory of Social Change,? presented at the 7th Hawaii International Conference on the Social Sciences 2008, May 29-June 1: In this regard consider the following: (1) We each are natural, not supernatural, beings--this is an implicit assumption of the social sciences; and also of Roy Bhaskar?s ?The Possibility of Naturalism? in the social sciences. (2) We in addition are natural beings that create and operate causally ?open systems?; with each possessing the emergent powers of both volition and purposivity--this is another implicit assumption, of both the social sciences and Bhaskar in ?The Possibility of Naturalism.? In this regard, however, we have been informed, rather authoritatively by Nobel laureate (physicist) Steven Weinberg, that ?nature is strictly governed by impersonal laws.? So that nature?s ?impersonal laws,? in their strict governance of everything natural, leave no room in ?human nature? for the emergent powers of personal volition and purposivity. As natural beings strictly governed by impersonal laws (i.e. mechanistically), we possess neither volition nor purposivity, and thus operate in causally closed systems. This is the philosophy of ?scientific materialism? in which all things natural, including human beings, are strictly governed by impersonal laws; disclaimers of individual scientists to the contrary notwithstanding. This inference of physical theory nevertheless may be wrong, regardless of the authority with which Steven Weinberg and others presume to speak on this fundamental issue. Nature to the contrary in truth may only be instrumentally--vis-?-vis strictly- -governed by the impersonal laws discovered by science; so that we each, in possessing the emergent powers of volition and purposivity, employ these impersonal laws as the personal instruments thereof, in the creation and operation of ?causally open systems.? We thus have two possible accounts of nature, through: (a) the ?transcendental realism? of causally open systems in which all things natural (vis-?-vis the supernatural) are instrumentally governed by impersonal laws; which is opposed to (b) the conventional ?scientific materialism? wherein causally closed systems in which all things natural (vis-?-vis the supernatural) are strictly governed by impersonal laws. Nature?s laws in the causally open systems of transcendental realism, systems created and operated by the emergent powers of volition and purposivity, are only ?tendencies.? Such is basic to the ?critical realist? philosophy of science. Critical realists, however, universally fail to explain the causal basis of such tendencies. The tendential causality of nature?s laws is nevertheless easily identified, however: the tendential nature of natural law in causally open systems is simply because these laws, rather than strictly governing such systems, are instrumentally employed therein. This is the source of their tendential character--that in causally open systems nature?s laws are the instruments by which the volition and purposivity of emergent powers are lawfully exercised, in both society and nature. In direct opposition, then, to the presumed knowledge of the physical sciences regarding the non-existence of causally open systems; proving (2) above correct--both empirically and theoretically through the assistance of critical realist underlaboring--should be the primary, top-most ?mission? of the social sciences. Why thus engage physical science in what very likely will be a contentious, bruising battle over the highly theoretical issue of natural causation in both natural and social systems: instrumentally in systems that are ?causally open? vs. mechanistically in systems that are strictly ?causally closed?? The answer is because there is a strong argument to be made that winning the battle on the ?natural causality? of volition and purposivity in causally open systems, and thus of agency and structure in society as well, will be key to any future theoretical development of social science in the 21st century that--in its scope and explanatory power--can rival that of natural science. And that once developed, will provide the scientific basis for sorely needed, future ?emancipatory projects? in the human sciences generally. Isn?t such a mission indeed the very essence of critical realism?s (Roy Bhaskar?s) ?immanent critique? (PON, p. 168)? Or do critical realists today lack the courage and fortitude to take on such a demanding project? The in-principle causal openness of social systems--made possible by emergent powers of volition and purposivity--is fundamental in critical realism, which must be theoretically distinguished from the in-principle causally closed systems of physics; and this can be accomplished only by in- principle distinguishing nature?s governance by impersonal laws-- ?instrumentally determined? vs. ?strictly determined.? It appears, though, that the fundamental character of causally open systems, regarded as the founding principle of transcendental realism that underlies virtually all else in critical-realist philosophy, is substantially misunderstood--as shown by its absence as its own topic in the Dictionary of Critical Realism, where it is indirectly covered under twenty different definitions of derivative concepts. Fred Zaman From agent.redstone at yahoo.com Thu Jun 5 06:45:13 2008 From: agent.redstone at yahoo.com (Fred Zaman) Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2008 05:45:13 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Critical-Realism] Natural Law & Volition: A Critical-Realist Reconciliation In-Reply-To: <360114.12492.qm@web63614.mail.re1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <495209.29529.qm@web63613.mail.re1.yahoo.com> The statement below is my considered response to a question asked about my interest in pursuing the highly theoretical ?Macrohistory?s Efficient and Final Causes: A Neo-Aristotelian Theory of Social Change,? presented at the 7th Hawaii International Conference on the Social Sciences 2008, May 29-June 1: In this regard consider the following: (1) We each are natural, not supernatural, beings--this is an implicit assumption of the social sciences; and also of Roy Bhaskar?s ?The Possibility of Naturalism? in the social sciences. (2) We in addition are natural beings that create and operate causally ?open systems?; with each possessing the emergent powers of both volition and purposivity--this is another implicit assumption, of both the social sciences and Bhaskar in ?The Possibility of Naturalism.? In this regard, however, we have been informed, rather authoritatively by Nobel laureate (physicist) Steven Weinberg, that ?nature is strictly governed by impersonal laws.? So that nature?s ?impersonal laws,? in their strict governance of everything natural, leave no room in ?human nature? for the emergent powers of personal volition and purposivity. As natural beings strictly governed by impersonal laws (i.e. mechanistically), we possess neither volition nor purposivity, and thus operate in causally closed systems. This is the philosophy of ?scientific materialism? in which all things natural, including human beings, are strictly governed by impersonal laws; disclaimers of individual scientists to the contrary notwithstanding. This inference of physical theory nevertheless may be wrong, regardless of the authority with which Steven Weinberg and others presume to speak on this fundamental issue. Nature to the contrary in truth may only be instrumentally--vis-?-vis strictly- -governed by the impersonal laws discovered by science; so that we each, in possessing the emergent powers of volition and purposivity, employ these impersonal laws as the personal instruments thereof, in the creation and operation of ?causally open systems.? We thus have two possible accounts of nature, through: (a) the ?transcendental realism? of causally open systems in which all things natural (vis-?-vis the supernatural) are instrumentally governed by impersonal laws; which is opposed to (b) the conventional ?scientific materialism? wherein causally closed systems in which all things natural (vis-?-vis the supernatural) are strictly governed by impersonal laws. Nature?s laws in the causally open systems of transcendental realism, systems created and operated by the emergent powers of volition and purposivity, are only ?tendencies.? Such is basic to the ?critical realist? philosophy of science. Critical realists, however, universally fail to explain the causal basis of such tendencies. The tendential causality of nature?s laws is nevertheless easily identified, however: the tendential nature of natural law in causally open systems is simply because these laws, rather than strictly governing such systems, are instrumentally employed therein. This is the source of their tendential character--that in causally open systems nature?s laws are the instruments by which the volition and purposivity of emergent powers are lawfully exercised, in both society and nature. In direct opposition, then, to the presumed knowledge of the physical sciences regarding the non-existence of causally open systems; proving (2) above correct--both empirically and theoretically through the assistance of critical realist underlaboring--should be the primary, top-most ?mission? of the social sciences. Why thus engage physical science in what very likely will be a contentious, bruising battle over the highly theoretical issue of natural causation in both natural and social systems: instrumentally in systems that are ?causally open? vs. mechanistically in systems that are strictly ?causally closed?? The answer is because there is a strong argument to be made that winning the battle on the ?natural causality? of volition and purposivity in causally open systems, and thus of agency and structure in society as well, will be key to any future theoretical development of social science in the 21st century that--in its scope and explanatory power--can rival that of natural science. And that once developed, will provide the scientific basis for sorely needed, future ?emancipatory projects? in the human sciences generally. Isn?t such a mission indeed the very essence of critical realism?s (Roy Bhaskar?s) ?immanent critique? (PON, p. 168)? Or do critical realists today lack the courage and fortitude to take on such a demanding project? The in-principle causal openness of social systems--made possible by emergent powers of volition and purposivity--is fundamental in critical realism, which must be theoretically distinguished from the in-principle causally closed systems of physics; and this can be accomplished only by in- principle distinguishing nature?s governance by impersonal laws-- ?instrumentally determined? vs. ?strictly determined.? It appears, though, that the fundamental character of causally open systems, regarded as the founding principle of transcendental realism that underlies virtually all else in critical-realist philosophy, is substantially misunderstood--as shown by its absence as its own topic in the Dictionary of Critical Realism, where it is indirectly covered under twenty different definitions of derivative concepts. Fred Zaman From dogangoecmen at aol.com Sun Jun 8 12:45:09 2008 From: dogangoecmen at aol.com (=?utf-8?Q?Do=C4=9Fan_G=C3=B6=C3=A7men?=) Date: Sun, 08 Jun 2008 14:45:09 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON GENDER AND DISASTERS Message-ID: <8CA97AEE92EA5E7-113C-478D@MBLK-M10.sysops.aol.com> PLEASE DISTRIBUTE WIDELY TO ALL RELEVANT LISTSERVERS ? ? THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON GENDER AND DISASTERS: ?CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE IN RELIEF WORK: LEARNING FROM WOMEN?S EXPERIENCES IN CULTURALLY DIVERSE CONDITIONS ? Date: 8-11 October 2008 Location: Derbent Hotel ? Kocaeli, Turkey Workshop Host: Kocaeli University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Turkey Deadline: July 15, 2008 ? Kocaeli University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Turkey, seeks proposals for participating in an interdisciplinary international workshop for the victims of the recent disasters, emergency responders, relief workers, volunteers of voluntary organizations, governmental representatives, as well as the researchers who focus on gender related disaster topics. The event will cover topics that integrate the gender perspective into all natural disaster related policies and decision-making processes with the consideration of cultural differences. Lodging, breakfast and some meals will be provided for all participants. Limited funds available for travel support for the international participants coming from the non-Western world. The language of the meetings will be Turkish and English. Simultaneous translation will be provided for all of the sessions. Participants will be notified by August 10, 2008. For more information please visit our website at? http://www.genderanddisaster2008.org For any queries, email to Ms. Derya Keskin Demirer at?? info at genderanddisaster2008.org ? Contact address: Y?cel Demirer ve G?ven Bak?rezer Kocaeli ?niversitesi ?ktisadi ve ?dari Bilimler Fak?ltesi Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Y?netimi B?l?m? Umuttepe Yerle?kesi 41380 ?zmit/Kocaeli ? Phone: +90-262-303 16 05 Fax:???? +90-262-303 15 03 ? ?---------------------- Do?an G??men Author of The Adam Smith Problem: Reconciling Human Nature and Society in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations, I. B. Tauris, London&New York 2007 ________________________________________________________________________ AOL's new homepage has launched. Take a tour at http://info.aol.co.uk/homepage/ now. From agent.redstone at yahoo.com Tue Jun 24 06:36:24 2008 From: agent.redstone at yahoo.com (Fred Zaman) Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2008 05:36:24 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Critical-Realism] =?utf-8?q?Toward_a_Post-modern_=E2=80=9CPhysic?= =?utf-8?b?YWwgU29jaW9sb2d54oCd?= In-Reply-To: <6tceqh$arpga@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: <56897.77779.qm@web63607.mail.re1.yahoo.com> Toward a Post-modern ?Physical Sociology?: Neo-Comptean Free Agents, Causal Powers, and Historical Materialism ? ? Is the principal explanandum of social science causal powers derived from free agents willfully and purposefully acting collectively in causally ?open? (voluntaristic) systems? And could it be true as well that, fundamentally, this explanandum is what both social science and history are about? It certainly can be argued that any given society or societal group is what it is because its members collectively, whether consciously or unconsciously, have in essence willed it to be thus. Similarly, human history, at whatever level of analysis, arguably is what it is because the subjects thereof, freely exercising their will collectively over the long term, have caused it to be thus as well, again whether consciously or unconsciously. What is therefore needed, if society and history are to be understood scientifically as a collective manifestation of free will, purpose and volition, is a neo-Comptean ?physical sociology? of these causal powers as they have been materially manifested historically over the long term--de facto a neo-Comptean ?historical materialism? in which causal powers manifesting a collective free will, purpose, and volition emerge in society out of individual cooperation. Genetic predispositions of the human psyche certainly are a factor in this regard, and the physical, social, and political environments are as well. But their effect on a given society or other social entity historically, it can argued from a scientific perspective, will be understood and explained only within the context of an empirically verifiable ?physical sociology? of free will, purpose, and volition; with ?volition? per se being a prerequisite for the existence of a physically efficacious ?free will.? Arguably every social collective possesses a characteristic will, purpose, and power of volition; through which it in the past propagated itself, and continues to do so presently, or evolves over the long term, or-- failing that--becomes extinct. And this precisely is what the essay introduced below is about in principle, which considers social agents--whether individuals or collectives--to be willful beings ?volitionally embedded? in nature as free agents; the causality of which at the same time is materially limited to the instruments provided by the natural world so that absolutely nothing ?supernatural? is involved. This essay in essence spans the nature/culture divide by transcending that divide, through social action causally grounded in nature?s dynamics. Published in the journal ?Theory & Science,? this essay was presented in preliminary form at the 7th Annual Hawaii International Conference on Social Sciences, May 29-June 1, 2008; and will be presented as well this fall from a somewhat more advanced perspective at the 2008 SSHA Annual Conference in Miami October, 23-26. A closely related work now in progress will more directly address the issue of a socially and historically verifiable ?physical sociology? of free will, purpose, and volition--in essence a ?neo-Comptean? rethinking of historical materialism that nevertheless is ?post-modern? in certain respects. ? ? ? ? ULTIMATE REALITY?S IDEALIST ONTOLOGY: A POSTMODERN ARISTOTELIAN NATURALISM ? ? Abstract. The Aristo-Newtonian formalism described in this essay for causally open systems, an idealist ontology of ultimate reality broadly covering both the natural and social, by way of example, has been applied to the sociopolitical forces driving an American ?macrohistorical Demiurge of secularism? circa 1650 to the present, and predictably beyond into the future. America?s macrohistorical powers, the source of an economic Demiurge, suggest that nature?s laws?contradicting what ?scientific materialism? herein defined requires about nature being ?strictly? governed by impersonal laws?have been employed instrumentally by holistic powers of natural creativity that geographically, economically, politically, and socially have purposefully ordered and fashioned the nation?s ?manifest destiny.? Social historian Walter Dean Burnham, frustrated at the inability to come up with anything remotely resembling a causal explanation of political development, fumed that politics is just ?one damn thing after another.? The Aristo-Newtonian formalism for causally open systems, in this essay apparently for the first time, thus introduces a high-level causal explanation thereof?specifically of the economic and sociopolitical machinery of American macrohistory circa 1650 to the present?grounded on a postmodern rethinking of Aristotelian naturalism. Nobel laureate (physicist) Steven Weinberg suggests, correctly, that one of the most important impacts science has made on society has been the (supposed) discovery that ?nature is strictly [i.e. mechanistically] governed by impersonal laws.? In this essay, however, taking a closer look at this ?discovery? here labeled scientific materialism; we find that ?scientific materialism? thus mechanistically formulated in fact may be existentially false. A postmodern rethinking of Aristotelian naturalism, creating in essence a higher ?Aristo-Newtonian formalism? for causally open systems, considers the alternative that nature is governed by impersonal laws instrumentally, meaning purposefully by naturally-constituted, volitionally-embedded agents qua intelligences that?unlike current Artificial Intelligence?possess the power of volition. In scientific materialism volition is nonexistent, while in an opposed neo-Aristotelian materialism (Aristo-Newtonian formalism for causally open systems) it is fundamental. Free agents exercise their volition through nature?s laws?specifically including the Newtonian laws reconceptualized in neo-Aristotelian terms as ?efficient causes??employed instrumentally by ?formal causes? seeking through ?material causes? to realize intended ?final causes.? And thereby does a broad theoretical, Aristo-Newtonian unification of the natural and social sciences become possible: one in which nature, rather than being governed strictly by laws that are impersonal, is instead governed through the same impersonal laws instrumentally, by free agents whose governance in nature and society is voluntaristic rather than strictly law-driven. The intelligence of Aristotelian agents here defined, naturalistically, is simply the intrinsic ability to pick one out of several possible courses of action, and then directly employ nature?s laws as instruments in the pursuit of the selected course. The philosophical ?underlaboring? needed to reinterpret Newtonian and other principles of science within this Aristo-Newtonian unification?the material, efficient, formal, and final causes thereof?is provided by Roy Bhaskar?s critical-realist philosophy of ?causal powers.? ? ? ? **Ignorance of one side of Truth or the choice of a partial ignorance or ignoring for better concentration on another side is often a necessity of our imperfect mental nature. It is unfortunate if ignorance becomes dogmatic and denies what it has refused to examine, but still no permanent harm need have been done if this willed self-limitation is compelled to disappear when the occasion of its utility is exhausted. Now that we have founded rigorously our knowledge of the physical, we can go forward with a much firmer step to a more open, secure, and luminous repossession of mental and psychic knowledge. (Sri Aurobindo,1918) ? Sociological theory currently is free floating in that it is not naturalistically grounded. The reason for this, of course, is the philosophy of ?scientific materialism? through which the natural sciences interpret nature as being devoid of purposivity, which philosophy of nature clearly cannot serve as the ground on which social science is positioned. Nobel laureate (physicist) Steven Weinberg, authoritatively stating in his essay Sokal?s Hoax that ?nature is strictly governed by impersonal laws,? provides what can be taken as a defining statement of that overarching mechanistic philosophy of science the present essay labels ?scientific materialism,? wherein nature is treated?and perhaps thought to be by natural scientists increasingly?as being devoid of volition and purpose. ? In the present essay, however, I abandon this philosophy of nature as a founding principle; and develop a very different, neo-Aristotelian framework more suited to sociological concerns, on which social science theory can be grounded naturalistically. Scientists might consider that ?scientific materialism,? in the form stated by Weinberg, has been proved many times over. It turns out, however, that this philosophy of science really hasn?t been proved; nor has it even been necessary in order for the natural sciences to have achieved their amazing success. ? Indeed, it can be forcefully argued to the contrary that the principle result of scientific materialism has been the profoundly negative effect of denying the life sciences the philosophical ground for recognizing what could be reality?s most fundamental character?an idealist ontology of volition and purposefulness that is both ?natural? and ?social.? ? The benefits of abandoning Weinberg?s touted scientific materialism as the overarching philosophy of science will be profound indeed. Evolution, in biology for example, when this mechanistic metaphilosophy is abandoned, becomes the evolution of nature?s innate purposivity in ever increasing variety and complexity, ever directed toward survival in a world of generally conflicting and constantly evolving purposes. Thus reconsidered, biological evolution is fundamentally purposive, the purpose of which is always the survival of nature?s manifest purposefulness. Genetic variation in this view, directed toward increasingly complex forms of purposivity, is the biological mechanism by which nature?through evolutionary experimentation?purposively evolves in terms of the survival of its organic purposefulness. Genetic variation is no accident in this view. It is the experimental engine par excellence driving the survival of nature?s purposivity. And natural selection then provides the guidance, the directional character of evolution, toward manifestations of purposivity that are successful in their ability to survive in a constantly evolving world. ? The principle of innate purposefulness that thus can be argued to operate in nature clearly operates in the social world equally. Social order always exhibits purposefulness; and social evolution appears to be generally directed toward increasingly different and more complex varieties of social purpose, all struggling to survive in a competitive and constantly evolving environment. The mechanism of variation by which the social world evolves purposefully, some have called ?memetic variation,? is directed toward evolving social orders of increasing complexity through selection processes both social and natural. The social world in this view, the same as its biological counterpart, is no accident?it is the product of ?purposive designs? spontaneously evolving out of innate social processes. ? Weinberg?s scientific materialism, although it is a doctrinaire approach to science that makes sense in the ?physical world? where nature?s purposivity is not visibly apparent (at least not to the modern mind thus trained), is nonsensical and counterproductive in the understanding of life per se. The purposivity of living organisms individually and collectively, considered with respect to their survival and in other ways as well, is abundantly clear. Scientific materialism furthermore, as a rebuttal of the existence of nature?s purposivity, has no objective empirical foundation in the life sciences; nor is it actually required as a philosophy of science for the physical sciences. It is becoming clear, to those not blinded by the successes of the mechanistic worldview in science, that the way forward for the life sciences in the 21st century will be opened up only after the physicists? doctrinaire ?scientific materialism? has been expurgated from the social text of science. ..... ? ? ? ? ? --- On Mon, 5/19/08, Mervyn Hartwig wrote: From: Mervyn Hartwig Subject: [Critical-Realism] Oops. FW: JCR, Call for papers: Causal powers To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Cc: "'Tone Skinningsrud'" , ramroy.bhaskar at hi.oru.se Date: Monday, May 19, 2008, 10:41 AM Oops. Please note that Submission deadline is 4 May 2009, as stated at the beginning, not 30 March 2009, as stated at the end. Sorry and thanks, Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: 19 May 2008 12:13 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: [Critical-Realism] JCR, Call for papers: Causal powers Call for Papers: Special Issue of Journal of Critical Realism Causal Powers Journal of Critical Realism 8(3) 2009 Special issue editor: Ruth Groff General editor: Mervyn Hartwig Submission deadline: 4 May 2009 http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR CALL FOR PAPERS Within critical realism, interest in causal powers dates to the mid-1970s, when Roy Bhaskar defended the concept of ?causal mechanisms? in A Realist Theory of Science and Rom Harr? and E. H. Madden developed the notion of ?powerful particulars? in Causal Powers. Our call for papers marks the excitement of the present moment, however, a moment in which the scientific essentialist critique of Humean and Kantian accounts of causality has begun to take hold more broadly within the discipline of philosophy, and in which the covering law model of social science is no longer taken for granted even by those in the social sciences who do quantitative work. Journal of Critical Realism is perhaps uniquely situated to publish a set of articles on causality that spans an array of disciplines, as critical realism itself is arguably grounded in both philosophy and radical social science. We invite submissions from all disciplines, at all levels of abstraction. Relatively technical philosophical discussions might address issues such as how, from a powers-based perspective, to define causality; what laws are (or aren?t); the relationship of powers to essential properties, kinds and/or form; and the ontological status of powers. More applied papers might be focused on the implications of a powers-based ontology for empirical research or methodological debates, but authors might apply the concept of causal powers to normative or aesthetic issues as well. Over-arching meta-theoretical reflections might involve thinking about powers in relation to realism, history, dialectics and/or explanation. SUBMISSIONS Submissions should be made on-line at http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR (After registering and logging in, please click on For Authors, then Online Submissions and follow the instructions. Include a Comment for the Editor that the submission is for the special issue on causal powers.) INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS Papers should be no more than 7,000 words. In all other respects, our Author Guidelines apply. Please consult these at http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR (after clicking on For Authors, click on Author Guidelines). Papers will be subject to both internal and external peer review. IMPORTANT DATES 30 March 2009: submission deadline 1 August 2009: final revision deadline November 2009: date of publication ABOUT JCR Journal of Critical Realism (JCR) is the journal of the International Association for Critical Realism (IACR), established in 1997 to foster the discussion, propagation and development of critical realist approaches to understanding and changing the world. It provides a forum for scholars wishing to promote realist emancipatory philosophy, social theory and science on an interdisciplinary and international basis, and for those who wish to engage with such an approach. From 2009 it will appear three times a year. CONTACT Special issue editor: Ruth Groff RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu General editor: Mervyn Hartwig mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3107 (20080518) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From d.eldervass at ntlworld.com Tue Jun 24 09:38:06 2008 From: d.eldervass at ntlworld.com (Dave Elder-Vass) Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2008 16:38:06 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Newton International Fellowships References: <6tcecr$9gma6@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: <009a01c8d610$4d33cb80$6501a8c0@Presario> Anyone outside the UK who has recently completed (up to 6 years ago), or is about to complete, a doctorate, might be interested in the announcement below, which would seem to provide a great opportunity to work with critical realists based in the UK, though I expect competition will be fierce. Dave ============================================================ A new multi-million pound initiative to fund research collaborations and improve links between UK and overseas researchers was launched by the Science Minister Ian Pearson on 4 June. The Newton International Fellowships will be overseen by the British Academy, the Royal Academy of Engineering and the Royal Society and aim to attract the most promising post-doctoral researchers working overseas in the fields of humanities, engineering, natural and social sciences. The Fellowships will offer researchers funding to work for two years with a UK research institution, thus establishing long term international collaborations. The funding will be distributed in the form of 50 research fellowships, awarded annually, each providing support of up to ?100,000 for a two year placement. Robin Jackson, the British Academy's Chief Executive and Secretary said: "The Academy has for many years supported international collaboration and academic exchange across the humanities and social sciences. The Newton International Fellowships will introduce a new dimension, enabling us to offer highly attractive awards to the best overseas postdoctoral researchers, which will strengthen international scholarly links." More details will be available from the Newton International Fellowships website: http://www.newtonfellowships.org/ The closing date for the first round is 4th August 2008. There will be a second round in autumn 2008. There will then be an annual round from spring 2010. Deadlines to be confirmed.