From ianverstegen at yahoo.com Tue Jul 1 11:33:35 2008 From: ianverstegen at yahoo.com (Ian Verstegen) Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm@web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com From RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu Tue Jul 1 11:35:32 2008 From: RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List References: <764888.3113.qm@web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From ianverstegen at yahoo.com Tue Jul 1 12:02:03 2008 From: ianverstegen at yahoo.com (Ian Verstegen) Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 11:02:03 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <543992.37795.qm@web56103.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Hi Ruth, It doesn't make sense because I'm not sure what to ask! I am thinking specifically of the opposition of speculative philosophy of history - what does it all mean, reason and historicity, providence, are we getting somewhere - and critical philosophy of history - can history be objective, etc. I would say that although Hegel and Heidegger make impressive attempts to explain the metaphysics through reason or philosophical principles, the lack of empirical description makes them uninteresting (Hegel on Africa!). Bhaskar joins company with these thinkers but his dialectic is unlike previous thinkers, it presumes realism. So perhaps he permits us simultaneously to describe a phase in history as part of the story of human emancipation AND in recognizable empirical terms, sort of Hegel AND Marx together. My real perplexity is what to do with Hegel and Heidegger and ultimately the metaphysics of history. When is it interesting and when just some elaborated system with no chance to claim to describe reality? Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com --- On Tue, 7/1/08, Ruth Groff wrote: From: Ruth Groff Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Date: Tuesday, July 1, 2008, 1:35 PM Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism_______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk Tue Jul 1 12:44:55 2008 From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 19:44:55 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** From gerardwalmsley at googlemail.com Tue Jul 1 14:06:33 2008 From: gerardwalmsley at googlemail.com (gerard walmsely) Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:06:33 -0700 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Yan If you ask me, your concept of metaphysical history needs to be clarified. Do you see an inherent meaning in history, or do you have anyone specific in mind with whom you contrast Bhaskar? IYou might find the works of RG COllingwood useful for a view on history from a philosophical perspective. GW On Tue, Jul 1, 2008 at 11:00 AM, < critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) > 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) > From: Ian Verstegen > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 > From: "Ruth Groff" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Hi Ian, > > Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not > in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you > say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining > it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't > have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will > appreciate it! > > Thanks, > Ruth > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian > Verstegen > Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 > *********************************************** > From Hans.Despain at nichols.edu Tue Jul 1 14:31:24 2008 From: Hans.Despain at nichols.edu (Despain, Hans G) Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 16:31:24 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List In-Reply-To: <764888.3113.qm@web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> References: <764888.3113.qm@web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Ian, I would reject the premise of your question: "Bhaskar provides 'another' metaphysics of history in his dialectic." Most generally DCR is an elaboration of the theory of explanatory critique. The two broadest implications being that social science is not neutral, or social science has political implications. The political implications can be potentially emancipatory. In this sense, ultimately Bhaskar in DPF is sketching out a new theory of ethics. Geo-historical processes demonstrate DCR, but Bhaskar's DPF is far from a metaphysics of history. (I do believe that Bhaskar as complicated his DCR metaphysically with an over emphasis on the concept of absence, and dialectic as the absenting of absence; but this is not a problem of metaphysics of history). Chistopher Lloyd published a book "The Structures of History" (1993), drawing heavily from CR, he argues that society transforms more or less independent from beliefs and theories (perhaps a case of Kantian self-dout or hermeneutical circle). I think in light of Bhaskar's DPF (not to mention SRHE) DCR would not endorse such a position. And if it is possible to argue that history has proceded largely independent from beliefs and theories, Bhaskar's aim in DPF is to change that. sincerely Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ian Verstegen [ianverstegen at yahoo.com] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. From RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu Tue Jul 1 15:15:42 2008 From: RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 17:15:42 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 References: Message-ID: Hey Phil, This is interesting. I am (believe it or not) checking my e-mail at the gym (I kid you not) so I can't be long about it, but what you say is interesting: viz., that the difference between a "science" of history and a "metaphysics" of history is their proponents' differential affirmation of empiricism. I predict a Kantian intervention to come, to the effect that the difference is not that about how one knows (only by observation or not) but about what one knows. It's a slippery slope from Kant back into empiricism, but still, you get the point. Anyway what you say is interesting. I think of talk about "the judgment form" as being vaguely Kantian, but you could argue that even in Aristotle there are distinct forms of jugment, more or less conceived as such (no pun intended) -- phronesis vs. nous+episteme, say. r. ________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 2:44 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk Tue Jul 1 15:56:37 2008 From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 22:56:37 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi I note your point Ruth about judgment form in Aristotle. I just feel that RB's treatment of this in dialectic is vague; he doesn't situate the concept at all, or explicate it very thoroughly, although it seems to be doing a lot of work. In any case, it's the criterion of universalisability that I'm wondering about, and whether judgment (practical judgment in any case) need be universalising. You will correct me if I'm wrong but phronesis is a particularistic form of judgment and not universalising. Hans, I'm just trying to read sections of DPF at the moment. I'm not sure yet what to make of it. But what do you (others) make of this argument?: "To say how the world is is implicitly to advice agents to act on that basis, therefore not to assist or empower them when it is in one's capacity to do so is to be guilty of a theory/practice inconsistency, ceteris paribus." p.222. I find this to be specious. I don't think to say how the world is necessarily implies any *advice* about how one is to act, and if it did, I don't think that one is guilty of TP inconsistency if one fails to empower someone to act in that way. The whole section around p.222 seems very iffy to me. thanks Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 22:15 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) 3. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (gerard walmsely) 4. Re: Question for List (Despain, Hans G) 5. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 11:02:03 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <543992.37795.qm at web56103.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Hi Ruth, It doesn't make sense because I'm not sure what to ask! I am thinking specifically of the opposition of speculative philosophy of history - what does it all mean, reason and historicity, providence, are we getting somewhere - and critical philosophy of history - can history be objective, etc. I would say that although Hegel and Heidegger make impressive attempts to explain the metaphysics through reason or philosophical principles, the lack of empirical description makes them uninteresting (Hegel on Africa!). Bhaskar joins company with these thinkers but his dialectic is unlike previous thinkers, it presumes realism. So perhaps he permits us simultaneously to describe a phase in history as part of the story of human emancipation AND in recognizable empirical terms, sort of Hegel AND Marx together. My real perplexity is what to do with Hegel and Heidegger and ultimately the metaphysics of history. When is it interesting and when just some elaborated system with no chance to claim to describe reality? Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com --- On Tue, 7/1/08, Ruth Groff wrote: From: Ruth Groff Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Date: Tuesday, July 1, 2008, 1:35 PM Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism_______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 19:44:55 +0100 From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** ------------------------------ Message: 3 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:06:33 -0700 From: "gerard walmsely" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Yan If you ask me, your concept of metaphysical history needs to be clarified. Do you see an inherent meaning in history, or do you have anyone specific in mind with whom you contrast Bhaskar? IYou might find the works of RG COllingwood useful for a view on history from a philosophical perspective. GW On Tue, Jul 1, 2008 at 11:00 AM, < critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) > 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) > From: Ian Verstegen > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 > From: "Ruth Groff" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Hi Ian, > > Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not > in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you > say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining > it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't > have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will > appreciate it! > > Thanks, > Ruth > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian > Verstegen > Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 > *********************************************** > ------------------------------ Message: 4 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 16:31:24 -0400 From: "Despain, Hans G" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian, I would reject the premise of your question: "Bhaskar provides 'another' metaphysics of history in his dialectic." Most generally DCR is an elaboration of the theory of explanatory critique. The two broadest implications being that social science is not neutral, or social science has political implications. The political implications can be potentially emancipatory. In this sense, ultimately Bhaskar in DPF is sketching out a new theory of ethics. Geo-historical processes demonstrate DCR, but Bhaskar's DPF is far from a metaphysics of history. (I do believe that Bhaskar as complicated his DCR metaphysically with an over emphasis on the concept of absence, and dialectic as the absenting of absence; but this is not a problem of metaphysics of history). Chistopher Lloyd published a book "The Structures of History" (1993), drawing heavily from CR, he argues that society transforms more or less independent from beliefs and theories (perhaps a case of Kantian self-dout or hermeneutical circle). I think in light of Bhaskar's DPF (not to mention SRHE) DCR would not endorse such a position. And if it is possible to argue that history has proceded largely independent from beliefs and theories, Bhaskar's aim in DPF is to change that. sincerely Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ian Verstegen [ianverstegen at yahoo.com] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. ------------------------------ Message: 5 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 17:15:42 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hey Phil, This is interesting. I am (believe it or not) checking my e-mail at the gym (I kid you not) so I can't be long about it, but what you say is interesting: viz., that the difference between a "science" of history and a "metaphysics" of history is their proponents' differential affirmation of empiricism. I predict a Kantian intervention to come, to the effect that the difference is not that about how one knows (only by observation or not) but about what one knows. It's a slippery slope from Kant back into empiricism, but still, you get the point. Anyway what you say is interesting. I think of talk about "the judgment form" as being vaguely Kantian, but you could argue that even in Aristotle there are distinct forms of jugment, more or less conceived as such (no pun intended) -- phronesis vs. nous+episteme, say. r. ________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 2:44 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 *********************************************** From RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu Tue Jul 1 16:36:34 2008 From: RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 18:36:34 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] to Phil References: Message-ID: Hi Phil, In no particular order ... 1. I wasn't defending RB particularly. 2. Yes, phronesis is particularistic in content. Still - and this is all I was noting - it's a form - viz., a specific kind of particularistic reasoning. [It's this kind: "I know I want to be courageous; here are the circumstances; phronesis: here is the action, x, the doing of which would constitute courageousness in this instance, or context." (For the record, you then need what A. calls "cleverness" in order to know how to pull off x successfully. Plus, of course, you had to want to be courageous in the first place, something that is a matter of `hexis', a way that one comes to be through habituation.) My point was only that even A. articulates various kinds, or forms, of judgment. But sure, yes, in Kant pure practical reason (itself a "judgment form" though not itself the "form" of "judgment as developed in the 3rd Critique!) is universal. 3. You wrote: "I don't think to say how the world is necessarily implies any *advice* about how one is to act, and if it did, I don't think that one is guilty of TP inconsistency if one fails to empower someone to act in that way. The whole section around p.222 seems very iffy to me." I think I agree with this. The difference between the implication for to HOW to act and the implication THAT one should act is important though -- I think they need separate arguments. Or rebuttals, as the case may be. r. From Hans.Despain at nichols.edu Tue Jul 1 21:35:56 2008 From: Hans.Despain at nichols.edu (Despain, Hans G) Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 23:35:56 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] To Phil, Ruth. Message-ID: Phil, You are in the context of "Dialectic of Truth." I would agree with Bhaskar that truth-talk performs an axilogical need for human beings. So the sentence just prior to your quote from p. 222 says "So every speech act [based on Truth-talk] must be regarded as making an axilogical commitment." This is a summary of the arugment for his theory of explanatory critique. Thus, if we accept his argument in SRHE pp. 169-211 for explanatory critique (or some amended version as suggested by Hugh Lacey) then we do necessarily move from facts to value, or from truth-talk to an axilogical commitment. The sentence you dislike is still problematic, and it seems overstated. However, it is not an argument itself, it is a more or less a theorem based on preceding discussion of "Dialectic of Truth." The discusion on Truth is itself being put forth as a type of basis or context for his theory of explanatory critique; which unfolds in summary on page 258 (His full argument is only found in SRHE pp. 169-211). And the sentence you dislike is not possible to defend until after an understanding of his theory of explanatory critique. And I wouldn't want to defend it even then ... however, I think there is an easier defense. I don't think the problem is the one Ruth identifies, i.e. a need for seperate arugments, because Bhaskar is not making an arugment. Thus, it seems to me the statement is much more Habermasian in form. If someone *is* making judgement statements, based on truth-talk, i.e. meant as "universalizable" corresponding to Bhaskar's "adequate theory of truth" in all of its four components (see DPF:217), hence meaning or implying all four aspects of the judgement form (see DPF:221), then "To say how the world is is implicitly to advice agents to act on that basis, therefore not to assist or empower them when it is in one's capacity to do so is to be guilty of a theory/practice inconsistency, ceteris paribus." p.222. That makes the statement much more humble. The statement is radically dependent on the fact of someone making very bold claims about 'what I would do if I were you, and in your circumstances; and these such and such is true of your circumstances'. If I am making those bold judgements, and then say "good luck with all that" and walk away, there is a very serious T/P inc. If I am serious with my judgement/advise I should say 'come on I will show you my seriousness by helping you do what I would do if I was you'. If I don't you should be worried about the degree of seriousness and truth of my judgment on you, and advise for you. Thus, this is a theorem to guide practical action of agent two, following the advise *and* *action* from agent one (who is claiming universalizablity of his judgement/advise). Bhaskar is not making an argument for action based on moral realism, because he has not yet developed that arugment either. Hence, he is not making an ethical judgement himself against agent 1. Rather it must be a very simply guide to follow when receiving judgement/advise from someone. A way to judge the degree to which agent 1 is engaging in truth-talk or bullshit. Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon [pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 5:56 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 Hi I note your point Ruth about judgment form in Aristotle. I just feel that RB's treatment of this in dialectic is vague; he doesn't situate the concept at all, or explicate it very thoroughly, although it seems to be doing a lot of work. In any case, it's the criterion of universalisability that I'm wondering about, and whether judgment (practical judgment in any case) need be universalising. You will correct me if I'm wrong but phronesis is a particularistic form of judgment and not universalising. Hans, I'm just trying to read sections of DPF at the moment. I'm not sure yet what to make of it. But what do you (others) make of this argument?: "To say how the world is is implicitly to advice agents to act on that basis, therefore not to assist or empower them when it is in one's capacity to do so is to be guilty of a theory/practice inconsistency, ceteris paribus." p.222. I find this to be specious. I don't think to say how the world is necessarily implies any *advice* about how one is to act, and if it did, I don't think that one is guilty of TP inconsistency if one fails to empower someone to act in that way. The whole section around p.222 seems very iffy to me. thanks Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 22:15 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) 3. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (gerard walmsely) 4. Re: Question for List (Despain, Hans G) 5. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 11:02:03 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <543992.37795.qm at web56103.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Hi Ruth, It doesn't make sense because I'm not sure what to ask! I am thinking specifically of the opposition of speculative philosophy of history - what does it all mean, reason and historicity, providence, are we getting somewhere - and critical philosophy of history - can history be objective, etc. I would say that although Hegel and Heidegger make impressive attempts to explain the metaphysics through reason or philosophical principles, the lack of empirical description makes them uninteresting (Hegel on Africa!). Bhaskar joins company with these thinkers but his dialectic is unlike previous thinkers, it presumes realism. So perhaps he permits us simultaneously to describe a phase in history as part of the story of human emancipation AND in recognizable empirical terms, sort of Hegel AND Marx together. My real perplexity is what to do with Hegel and Heidegger and ultimately the metaphysics of history. When is it interesting and when just some elaborated system with no chance to claim to describe reality? Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com --- On Tue, 7/1/08, Ruth Groff wrote: From: Ruth Groff Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Date: Tuesday, July 1, 2008, 1:35 PM Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism_______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 19:44:55 +0100 From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** ------------------------------ Message: 3 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:06:33 -0700 From: "gerard walmsely" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Yan If you ask me, your concept of metaphysical history needs to be clarified. Do you see an inherent meaning in history, or do you have anyone specific in mind with whom you contrast Bhaskar? IYou might find the works of RG COllingwood useful for a view on history from a philosophical perspective. GW On Tue, Jul 1, 2008 at 11:00 AM, < critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) > 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) > From: Ian Verstegen > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 > From: "Ruth Groff" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Hi Ian, > > Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not > in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you > say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining > it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't > have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will > appreciate it! > > Thanks, > Ruth > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian > Verstegen > Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 > *********************************************** > ------------------------------ Message: 4 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 16:31:24 -0400 From: "Despain, Hans G" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian, I would reject the premise of your question: "Bhaskar provides 'another' metaphysics of history in his dialectic." Most generally DCR is an elaboration of the theory of explanatory critique. The two broadest implications being that social science is not neutral, or social science has political implications. The political implications can be potentially emancipatory. In this sense, ultimately Bhaskar in DPF is sketching out a new theory of ethics. Geo-historical processes demonstrate DCR, but Bhaskar's DPF is far from a metaphysics of history. (I do believe that Bhaskar as complicated his DCR metaphysically with an over emphasis on the concept of absence, and dialectic as the absenting of absence; but this is not a problem of metaphysics of history). Chistopher Lloyd published a book "The Structures of History" (1993), drawing heavily from CR, he argues that society transforms more or less independent from beliefs and theories (perhaps a case of Kantian self-dout or hermeneutical circle). I think in light of Bhaskar's DPF (not to mention SRHE) DCR would not endorse such a position. And if it is possible to argue that history has proceded largely independent from beliefs and theories, Bhaskar's aim in DPF is to change that. sincerely Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ian Verstegen [ianverstegen at yahoo.com] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. ------------------------------ Message: 5 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 17:15:42 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hey Phil, This is interesting. I am (believe it or not) checking my e-mail at the gym (I kid you not) so I can't be long about it, but what you say is interesting: viz., that the difference between a "science" of history and a "metaphysics" of history is their proponents' differential affirmation of empiricism. I predict a Kantian intervention to come, to the effect that the difference is not that about how one knows (only by observation or not) but about what one knows. It's a slippery slope from Kant back into empiricism, but still, you get the point. Anyway what you say is interesting. I think of talk about "the judgment form" as being vaguely Kantian, but you could argue that even in Aristotle there are distinct forms of jugment, more or less conceived as such (no pun intended) -- phronesis vs. nous+episteme, say. r. ________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 2:44 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. From RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu Tue Jul 1 23:04:37 2008 From: RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 01:04:37 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Very small point References: Message-ID: Hi Hans, You wrote: Bhaskar is not making an argument for action based on moral realism, because he has not yet developed that argument either. Interesting. I had meant to send a ps saying that in fact one could, in principle at least, imagine a way-that-things-are [to use the technical term - :)] being such that it compels action. That's how Plato thinks things are, I think. Viz., structured by goodness -- to which, if one apprehends it at least, one is helpless but to respond. No doubt when that kind of ontology is assumed, a theory of history into which it fits is deemed metaphysical rather than scientific. :) r. From dogangoecmen at aol.com Wed Jul 2 04:58:59 2008 From: dogangoecmen at aol.com (=?utf-8?Q?Do=C4=9Fan_G=C3=B6=C3=A7men?=) Date: Wed, 02 Jul 2008 06:58:59 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Very small point In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <8CAAA49C416C8F4-107C-B53@WEBMAIL-DC11.sysops.aol.com> Ruth asserts: Interesting. I had meant to send a ps saying that in fact one could, in principle at least, imagine a way-that-things-are [to use the technical term - :)] being such that it compels action. That's how Plato thinks things are, I think. Viz., structured by goodness -- to which, if one apprehends it at least, one is helpless but to respond. No doubt when that kind of ontology is assumed, a theory of history into which it fits is deemed metaphysical rather than scientific. :) Dogan asks: Ruth, can you please say more about how you come to this conclusion? ?---------------------- Do?an G??men Author of The Adam Smith Problem: Reconciling Human Nature and Society in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations, I. B. Tauris, London&New York 2007 -----Original Message----- From: Ruth Groff To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Sent: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 7:04 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Very small point Hi Hans, You wrote: Bhaskar is not making an argument for action based on moral realism, because he has not yet developed that argument either. Interesting. I had meant to send a ps saying that in fact one could, in principle at least, imagine a way-that-things-are [to use the technical term - :)] being such that it compels action. That's how Plato thinks things are, I think. Viz., structured by goodness -- to which, if one apprehends it at least, one is helpless but to respond. No doubt when that kind of ontology is assumed, a theory of history into which it fits is deemed metaphysical rather than scientific. :) r. _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ________________________________________________________________________ AOL Email goes Mobile! You can now read your AOL Emails whilst on the move. Sign up for a free AOL Email account with unlimited storage today. From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk Wed Jul 2 05:56:16 2008 From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 12:56:16 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Ruth, Hans thanks Ruth, I know you weren?t necessarily defending Bhaskar, and your point about Aristotle is helpful. I guess I was trying to see if Bhaskar was developing his own particular account of judgment specifically out of e.g. Aristotle, Kant or someone else in the tradition because it seems quite idiosyncratic, using terms that I myself didn?t recognise. Actually, I think Hans is right that it seems very Habermassian but framed in an idiosyncratic language all of Bhaskar?s own which is more confusing than it needs to be as a result. It might have been better if Bhaskar had explicitly referred to Habermas here. Thanks for your very useful comments Hans. I agree with a lot of what you say there and I?m glad that you too have problems with the structure of the argument I noted. I agree that putting it in context makes it appear somewhat less bald but I still think there is a tendency more generally for using specious forms of argument in order to arrive at convenient conclusions. I think the ?derivation? of solidarity on that same page is even more suspect, or just weird, but I might be missing something. I say this as someone who found many (not all) of the arguments of SRHE quite compelling and the account of explanatory critique that Bhaskar puts forward generally very attractive. I just think he is sometimes too hasty in his attempt to derive socialism (as he sees it) from science (as he sees it). I also agree with the view that truth-talk fulfils an axiological need and I think Bhaskar is trying to draw ethical universals from this in a practically identical manner to Habermas. Again, reference to Habermas might have been useful here as I think he is drawing on him heavily, and even if he weren?t (which I doubt) he could still bring in Habermas for contrast and contextualisation given that the structure of the argument is so similar. In any case, I would moot the following: I think it is possible to make strong claims about how the world is and qualify those statements with ?but that?s just me and I wouldn?t want you to base any of your own actions on that (personal) judgment?. In that case I am not advising, but simply stating what I take the world to be like. I don?t want you to base your actions on my judgment because I may be wrong and I don?t want to take responsibility away from you for your own decisions etc. So I don?t think we can get to advice from assertions about how the world is that easily. But even if I were advising, do you still think that that commits me necessarily to empowering the other to do the advised upon thing? Imagine X works in the field all day and makes 100 grains of corn from which he is able to feed himself and his family for a week. Y on the other hand prefers to spend his time in the hey with a local maid. Y complains to X that he cannot feed his family as well as X and X strongly advises Y to stop playing with the maid and start working in the field. In order to do so though Y will need proper tools of which X has plenty but Y has none. X could lend Y his tools thus empowering Y to act in accord with his advice. But he could also point out that last time he lent Y the tools he misused them and didn?t bring them back/broke them or some other such thing. In this case X might be better to say to Y, ?I have given you the advice of what I would do but if you really want to do it then you are going to have to find the means to do it yourself?. Generally, if I always empower another to do some advised thing then there is an issue of undermining the other?s autonomy to do it him/herself. I think the T/P inc. and explanatory critique can work very well in some circumstances but we also have to be careful about bringing in our own political commitments and personal values as conclusions to premises that have already been implicitly loaded with said commitments and values. I share the goal of solidarity but question the manner of arriving at it in this particular case. Many thanks. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 02 July 2008 04:35 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: To Phil, Ruth. (Despain, Hans G) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 23:35:56 -0400 From: "Despain, Hans G" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] To Phil, Ruth. To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Phil, You are in the context of "Dialectic of Truth." I would agree with Bhaskar that truth-talk performs an axilogical need for human beings. So the sentence just prior to your quote from p. 222 says "So every speech act [based on Truth-talk] must be regarded as making an axilogical commitment." This is a summary of the arugment for his theory of explanatory critique. Thus, if we accept his argument in SRHE pp. 169-211 for explanatory critique (or some amended version as suggested by Hugh Lacey) then we do necessarily move from facts to value, or from truth-talk to an axilogical commitment. The sentence you dislike is still problematic, and it seems overstated. However, it is not an argument itself, it is a more or less a theorem based on preceding discussion of "Dialectic of Truth." The discusion on Truth is itself being put forth as a type of basis or context for his theory of explanatory critique; which unfolds in summary on page 258 (His full argument is only found in SRHE pp. 169-211). And the sentence you dislike is not possible to defend until after an understanding of his theory of explanatory critique. And I wouldn't want to defend it even then ... however, I think there is an easier defense. I don't think the problem is the one Ruth identifies, i.e. a need for seperate arugments, because Bhaskar is not making an arugment. Thus, it seems to me the statement is much more Habermasian in form. If someone *is* making judgement statements, based on truth-talk, i.e. meant as "universalizable" corresponding to Bhaskar's "adequate theory of truth" in all of its four components (see DPF:217), hence meaning or implying all four aspects of the judgement form (see DPF:221), then "To say how the world is is implicitly to advice agents to act on that basis, therefore not to assist or empower them when it is in one's capacity to do so is to be guilty of a theory/practice inconsistency, ceteris paribus." p.222. That makes the statement much more humble. The statement is radically dependent on the fact of someone making very bold claims about 'what I would do if I were you, and in your circumstances; and these such and such is true of your circumstances'. If I am making those bold judgements, and then say "good luck with all that" and walk away, there is a very serious T/P inc. If I am serious with my judgement/advise I should say 'come on I will show you my seriousness by helping you do what I would do if I was you'. If I don't you should be worried about the degree of seriousness and truth of my judgment on you, and advise for you. Thus, this is a theorem to guide practical action of agent two, following the advise *and* *action* from agent one (who is claiming universalizablity of his judgement/advise). Bhaskar is not making an argument for action based on moral realism, because he has not yet developed that arugment either. Hence, he is not making an ethical judgement himself against agent 1. Rather it must be a very simply guide to follow when receiving judgement/advise from someone. A way to judge the degree to which agent 1 is engaging in truth-talk or bullshit. Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon [pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 5:56 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 Hi I note your point Ruth about judgment form in Aristotle. I just feel that RB's treatment of this in dialectic is vague; he doesn't situate the concept at all, or explicate it very thoroughly, although it seems to be doing a lot of work. In any case, it's the criterion of universalisability that I'm wondering about, and whether judgment (practical judgment in any case) need be universalising. You will correct me if I'm wrong but phronesis is a particularistic form of judgment and not universalising. Hans, I'm just trying to read sections of DPF at the moment. I'm not sure yet what to make of it. But what do you (others) make of this argument?: "To say how the world is is implicitly to advice agents to act on that basis, therefore not to assist or empower them when it is in one's capacity to do so is to be guilty of a theory/practice inconsistency, ceteris paribus." p.222. I find this to be specious. I don't think to say how the world is necessarily implies any *advice* about how one is to act, and if it did, I don't think that one is guilty of TP inconsistency if one fails to empower someone to act in that way. The whole section around p.222 seems very iffy to me. thanks Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 22:15 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) 3. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (gerard walmsely) 4. Re: Question for List (Despain, Hans G) 5. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 11:02:03 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <543992.37795.qm at web56103.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Hi Ruth, It doesn't make sense because I'm not sure what to ask! I am thinking specifically of the opposition of speculative philosophy of history - what does it all mean, reason and historicity, providence, are we getting somewhere - and critical philosophy of history - can history be objective, etc. I would say that although Hegel and Heidegger make impressive attempts to explain the metaphysics through reason or philosophical principles, the lack of empirical description makes them uninteresting (Hegel on Africa!). Bhaskar joins company with these thinkers but his dialectic is unlike previous thinkers, it presumes realism. So perhaps he permits us simultaneously to describe a phase in history as part of the story of human emancipation AND in recognizable empirical terms, sort of Hegel AND Marx together. My real perplexity is what to do with Hegel and Heidegger and ultimately the metaphysics of history. When is it interesting and when just some elaborated system with no chance to claim to describe reality? Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com --- On Tue, 7/1/08, Ruth Groff wrote: From: Ruth Groff Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Date: Tuesday, July 1, 2008, 1:35 PM Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism_______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 19:44:55 +0100 From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** ------------------------------ Message: 3 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:06:33 -0700 From: "gerard walmsely" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Yan If you ask me, your concept of metaphysical history needs to be clarified. Do you see an inherent meaning in history, or do you have anyone specific in mind with whom you contrast Bhaskar? IYou might find the works of RG COllingwood useful for a view on history from a philosophical perspective. GW On Tue, Jul 1, 2008 at 11:00 AM, < critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) > 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) > From: Ian Verstegen > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 > From: "Ruth Groff" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Hi Ian, > > Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not > in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you > say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining > it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't > have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will > appreciate it! > > Thanks, > Ruth > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian > Verstegen > Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 > *********************************************** > ------------------------------ Message: 4 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 16:31:24 -0400 From: "Despain, Hans G" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian, I would reject the premise of your question: "Bhaskar provides 'another' metaphysics of history in his dialectic." Most generally DCR is an elaboration of the theory of explanatory critique. The two broadest implications being that social science is not neutral, or social science has political implications. The political implications can be potentially emancipatory. In this sense, ultimately Bhaskar in DPF is sketching out a new theory of ethics. Geo-historical processes demonstrate DCR, but Bhaskar's DPF is far from a metaphysics of history. (I do believe that Bhaskar as complicated his DCR metaphysically with an over emphasis on the concept of absence, and dialectic as the absenting of absence; but this is not a problem of metaphysics of history). Chistopher Lloyd published a book "The Structures of History" (1993), drawing heavily from CR, he argues that society transforms more or less independent from beliefs and theories (perhaps a case of Kantian self-dout or hermeneutical circle). I think in light of Bhaskar's DPF (not to mention SRHE) DCR would not endorse such a position. And if it is possible to argue that history has proceded largely independent from beliefs and theories, Bhaskar's aim in DPF is to change that. sincerely Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ian Verstegen [ianverstegen at yahoo.com] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. ------------------------------ Message: 5 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 17:15:42 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hey Phil, This is interesting. I am (believe it or not) checking my e-mail at the gym (I kid you not) so I can't be long about it, but what you say is interesting: viz., that the difference between a "science" of history and a "metaphysics" of history is their proponents' differential affirmation of empiricism. I predict a Kantian intervention to come, to the effect that the difference is not that about how one knows (only by observation or not) but about what one knows. It's a slippery slope from Kant back into empiricism, but still, you get the point. Anyway what you say is interesting. I think of talk about "the judgment form" as being vaguely Kantian, but you could argue that even in Aristotle there are distinct forms of jugment, more or less conceived as such (no pun intended) -- phronesis vs. nous+episteme, say. r. ________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 2:44 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 *********************************************** From MOODEY001 at gannon.edu Wed Jul 2 09:36:08 2008 From: MOODEY001 at gannon.edu (Moodey, Richard W) Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 11:36:08 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <1B45AE651C808D458990F881B2B6964301DC2168@exchange.gannon.edu> Hi Hans, I really appreciated your story about the two field hands, the maid in the hay, and the tools as an illustration of the limits of "empowerment." Dick Moodey -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Wednesday, July 02, 2008 7:56 AM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 Hi Ruth, Hans thanks Ruth, I know you weren't necessarily defending Bhaskar, and your point about Aristotle is helpful. I guess I was trying to see if Bhaskar was developing his own particular account of judgment specifically out of e.g. Aristotle, Kant or someone else in the tradition because it seems quite idiosyncratic, using terms that I myself didn't recognise. Actually, I think Hans is right that it seems very Habermassian but framed in an idiosyncratic language all of Bhaskar's own which is more confusing than it needs to be as a result. It might have been better if Bhaskar had explicitly referred to Habermas here. Thanks for your very useful comments Hans. I agree with a lot of what you say there and I'm glad that you too have problems with the structure of the argument I noted. I agree that putting it in context makes it appear somewhat less bald but I still think there is a tendency more generally for using specious forms of argument in order to arrive at convenient conclusions. I think the "derivation" of solidarity on that same page is even more suspect, or just weird, but I might be missing something. I say this as someone who found many (not all) of the arguments of SRHE quite compelling and the account of explanatory critique that Bhaskar puts forward generally very attractive. I just think he is sometimes too hasty in his attempt to derive socialism (as he sees it) from science (as he sees it). I also agree with the view that truth-talk fulfils an axiological need and I think Bhaskar is trying to draw ethical universals from this in a practically identical manner to Habermas. Again, reference to Habermas might have been useful here as I think he is drawing on him heavily, and even if he weren't (which I doubt) he could still bring in Habermas for contrast and contextualisation given that the structure of the argument is so similar. In any case, I would moot the following: I think it is possible to make strong claims about how the world is and qualify those statements with "but that's just me and I wouldn't want you to base any of your own actions on that (personal) judgment". In that case I am not advising, but simply stating what I take the world to be like. I don't want you to base your actions on my judgment because I may be wrong and I don't want to take responsibility away from you for your own decisions etc. So I don't think we can get to advice from assertions about how the world is that easily. But even if I were advising, do you still think that that commits me necessarily to empowering the other to do the advised upon thing? Imagine X works in the field all day and makes 100 grains of corn from which he is able to feed himself and his family for a week. Y on the other hand prefers to spend his time in the hey with a local maid. Y complains to X that he cannot feed his family as well as X and X strongly advises Y to stop playing with the maid and start working in the field. In order to do so though Y will need proper tools of which X has plenty but Y has none. X could lend Y his tools thus empowering Y to act in accord with his advice. But he could also point out that last time he lent Y the tools he misused them and didn't bring them back/broke them or some other such thing. In this case X might be better to say to Y, "I have given you the advice of what I would do but if you really want to do it then you are going to have to find the means to do it yourself". Generally, if I always empower another to do some advised thing then there is an issue of undermining the other's autonomy to do it him/herself. I think the T/P inc. and explanatory critique can work very well in some circumstances but we also have to be careful about bringing in our own political commitments and personal values as conclusions to premises that have already been implicitly loaded with said commitments and values. I share the goal of solidarity but question the manner of arriving at it in this particular case. Many thanks. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 02 July 2008 04:35 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: To Phil, Ruth. (Despain, Hans G) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 23:35:56 -0400 From: "Despain, Hans G" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] To Phil, Ruth. To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Phil, You are in the context of "Dialectic of Truth." I would agree with Bhaskar that truth-talk performs an axilogical need for human beings. So the sentence just prior to your quote from p. 222 says "So every speech act [based on Truth-talk] must be regarded as making an axilogical commitment." This is a summary of the arugment for his theory of explanatory critique. Thus, if we accept his argument in SRHE pp. 169-211 for explanatory critique (or some amended version as suggested by Hugh Lacey) then we do necessarily move from facts to value, or from truth-talk to an axilogical commitment. The sentence you dislike is still problematic, and it seems overstated. However, it is not an argument itself, it is a more or less a theorem based on preceding discussion of "Dialectic of Truth." The discusion on Truth is itself being put forth as a type of basis or context for his theory of explanatory critique; which unfolds in summary on page 258 (His full argument is only found in SRHE pp. 169-211). And the sentence you dislike is not possible to defend until after an understanding of his theory of explanatory critique. And I wouldn't want to defend it even then ... however, I think there is an easier defense. I don't think the problem is the one Ruth identifies, i.e. a need for seperate arugments, because Bhaskar is not making an arugment. Thus, it seems to me the statement is much more Habermasian in form. If someone *is* making judgement statements, based on truth-talk, i.e. meant as "universalizable" corresponding to Bhaskar's "adequate theory of truth" in all of its four components (see DPF:217), hence meaning or implying all four aspects of the judgement form (see DPF:221), then "To say how the world is is implicitly to advice agents to act on that basis, therefore not to assist or empower them when it is in one's capacity to do so is to be guilty of a theory/practice inconsistency, ceteris paribus." p.222. That makes the statement much more humble. The statement is radically dependent on the fact of someone making very bold claims about 'what I would do if I were you, and in your circumstances; and these such and such is true of your circumstances'. If I am making those bold judgements, and then say "good luck with all that" and walk away, there is a very serious T/P inc. If I am serious with my judgement/advise I should say 'come on I will show you my seriousness by helping you do what I would do if I was you'. If I don't you should be worried about the degree of seriousness and truth of my judgment on you, and advise for you. Thus, this is a theorem to guide practical action of agent two, following the advise *and* *action* from agent one (who is claiming universalizablity of his judgement/advise). Bhaskar is not making an argument for action based on moral realism, because he has not yet developed that arugment either. Hence, he is not making an ethical judgement himself against agent 1. Rather it must be a very simply guide to follow when receiving judgement/advise from someone. A way to judge the degree to which agent 1 is engaging in truth-talk or bullshit. Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon [pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 5:56 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 Hi I note your point Ruth about judgment form in Aristotle. I just feel that RB's treatment of this in dialectic is vague; he doesn't situate the concept at all, or explicate it very thoroughly, although it seems to be doing a lot of work. In any case, it's the criterion of universalisability that I'm wondering about, and whether judgment (practical judgment in any case) need be universalising. You will correct me if I'm wrong but phronesis is a particularistic form of judgment and not universalising. Hans, I'm just trying to read sections of DPF at the moment. I'm not sure yet what to make of it. But what do you (others) make of this argument?: "To say how the world is is implicitly to advice agents to act on that basis, therefore not to assist or empower them when it is in one's capacity to do so is to be guilty of a theory/practice inconsistency, ceteris paribus." p.222. I find this to be specious. I don't think to say how the world is necessarily implies any *advice* about how one is to act, and if it did, I don't think that one is guilty of TP inconsistency if one fails to empower someone to act in that way. The whole section around p.222 seems very iffy to me. thanks Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 22:15 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) 3. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (gerard walmsely) 4. Re: Question for List (Despain, Hans G) 5. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 11:02:03 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <543992.37795.qm at web56103.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Hi Ruth, It doesn't make sense because I'm not sure what to ask! I am thinking specifically of the opposition of speculative philosophy of history - what does it all mean, reason and historicity, providence, are we getting somewhere - and critical philosophy of history - can history be objective, etc. I would say that although Hegel and Heidegger make impressive attempts to explain the metaphysics through reason or philosophical principles, the lack of empirical description makes them uninteresting (Hegel on Africa!). Bhaskar joins company with these thinkers but his dialectic is unlike previous thinkers, it presumes realism. So perhaps he permits us simultaneously to describe a phase in history as part of the story of human emancipation AND in recognizable empirical terms, sort of Hegel AND Marx together. My real perplexity is what to do with Hegel and Heidegger and ultimately the metaphysics of history. When is it interesting and when just some elaborated system with no chance to claim to describe reality? Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com --- On Tue, 7/1/08, Ruth Groff wrote: From: Ruth Groff Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Date: Tuesday, July 1, 2008, 1:35 PM Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism____________ ___________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 19:44:55 +0100 From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** ------------------------------ Message: 3 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:06:33 -0700 From: "gerard walmsely" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Yan If you ask me, your concept of metaphysical history needs to be clarified. Do you see an inherent meaning in history, or do you have anyone specific in mind with whom you contrast Bhaskar? IYou might find the works of RG COllingwood useful for a view on history from a philosophical perspective. GW On Tue, Jul 1, 2008 at 11:00 AM, < critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) > 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) > From: Ian Verstegen > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 > From: "Ruth Groff" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Hi Ian, > > Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not > in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you > say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining > it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't > have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will > appreciate it! > > Thanks, > Ruth > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian > Verstegen > Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 > *********************************************** > ------------------------------ Message: 4 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 16:31:24 -0400 From: "Despain, Hans G" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian, I would reject the premise of your question: "Bhaskar provides 'another' metaphysics of history in his dialectic." Most generally DCR is an elaboration of the theory of explanatory critique. The two broadest implications being that social science is not neutral, or social science has political implications. The political implications can be potentially emancipatory. In this sense, ultimately Bhaskar in DPF is sketching out a new theory of ethics. Geo-historical processes demonstrate DCR, but Bhaskar's DPF is far from a metaphysics of history. (I do believe that Bhaskar as complicated his DCR metaphysically with an over emphasis on the concept of absence, and dialectic as the absenting of absence; but this is not a problem of metaphysics of history). Chistopher Lloyd published a book "The Structures of History" (1993), drawing heavily from CR, he argues that society transforms more or less independent from beliefs and theories (perhaps a case of Kantian self-dout or hermeneutical circle). I think in light of Bhaskar's DPF (not to mention SRHE) DCR would not endorse such a position. And if it is possible to argue that history has proceded largely independent from beliefs and theories, Bhaskar's aim in DPF is to change that. sincerely Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ian Verstegen [ianverstegen at yahoo.com] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. ------------------------------ Message: 5 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 17:15:42 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hey Phil, This is interesting. I am (believe it or not) checking my e-mail at the gym (I kid you not) so I can't be long about it, but what you say is interesting: viz., that the difference between a "science" of history and a "metaphysics" of history is their proponents' differential affirmation of empiricism. I predict a Kantian intervention to come, to the effect that the difference is not that about how one knows (only by observation or not) but about what one knows. It's a slippery slope from Kant back into empiricism, but still, you get the point. Anyway what you say is interesting. I think of talk about "the judgment form" as being vaguely Kantian, but you could argue that even in Aristotle there are distinct forms of jugment, more or less conceived as such (no pun intended) -- phronesis vs. nous+episteme, say. r. ________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 2:44 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. 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Thank you. ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu Wed Jul 2 09:35:02 2008 From: RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 11:35:02 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Very small point References: <8CAAA49C416C8F4-107C-B53@WEBMAIL-DC11.sysops.aol.com> Message-ID: Hi Dogan, I was mostly joking -- I don't know anything about the philosophy of history. But I suppose it does seem as though the mere fact of a philosophy of history containing such an ontology would be the sort of thing that would lead those who hold "scientific" theories to deem it a "metaphysical" one. I'm probably provisionally skeptical about the distinction in the first place. But really I was teasing, if provocatively, as it's not an area that I know about. r. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Dogan G??men Sent: Wed 02-Jul-08 6:58 AM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Very small point Ruth asserts: Interesting. I had meant to send a ps saying that in fact one could, in principle at least, imagine a way-that-things-are [to use the technical term - :)] being such that it compels action. That's how Plato thinks things are, I think. Viz., structured by goodness -- to which, if one apprehends it at least, one is helpless but to respond. No doubt when that kind of ontology is assumed, a theory of history into which it fits is deemed metaphysical rather than scientific. :) Dogan asks: Ruth, can you please say more about how you come to this conclusion? ---------------------- Dogan G??men Author of The Adam Smith Problem: Reconciling Human Nature and Society in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations, I. B. Tauris, London&New York 2007 -----Original Message----- From: Ruth Groff To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Sent: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 7:04 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Very small point Hi Hans, You wrote: Bhaskar is not making an argument for action based on moral realism, because he has not yet developed that argument either. Interesting. I had meant to send a ps saying that in fact one could, in principle at least, imagine a way-that-things-are [to use the technical term - :)] being such that it compels action. That's how Plato thinks things are, I think. Viz., structured by goodness -- to which, if one apprehends it at least, one is helpless but to respond. No doubt when that kind of ontology is assumed, a theory of history into which it fits is deemed metaphysical rather than scientific. :) r. _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ________________________________________________________________________ AOL Email goes Mobile! You can now read your AOL Emails whilst on the move. Sign up for a free AOL Email account with unlimited storage today. _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu Wed Jul 2 10:14:31 2008 From: RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 12:14:31 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 References: Message-ID: Hi Phil, Hans, I'll need to read those sections more carefully -- I am not sure, for myself, what verb I'd want to use to describe the relationship between RB and Habermas. Minimally, we know that both of them have a record of proposing lynch-pin arguments that they take to be Kantian in structure. Beyond that I'm not sure. I personally think that there is an enormous debt to Aristotle in RB. Not in this "judgment form" thing, particularly, but absolutely in other ways. "What is the world like such that we can know it (viz., it's form)?" -- it's an oddly Kantian formulation of De Anima. r. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Wed 02-Jul-08 7:56 AM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 Hi Ruth, Hans thanks Ruth, I know you weren't necessarily defending Bhaskar, and your point about Aristotle is helpful. I guess I was trying to see if Bhaskar was developing his own particular account of judgment specifically out of e.g. Aristotle, Kant or someone else in the tradition because it seems quite idiosyncratic, using terms that I myself didn't recognise. Actually, I think Hans is right that it seems very Habermassian but framed in an idiosyncratic language all of Bhaskar's own which is more confusing than it needs to be as a result. It might have been better if Bhaskar had explicitly referred to Habermas here. Thanks for your very useful comments Hans. I agree with a lot of what you say there and I'm glad that you too have problems with the structure of the argument I noted. I agree that putting it in context makes it appear somewhat less bald but I still think there is a tendency more generally for using specious forms of argument in order to arrive at convenient conclusions. I think the "derivation" of solidarity on that same page is even more suspect, or just weird, but I might be missing something. I say this as someone who found many (not all) of the arguments of SRHE quite compelling and the account of explanatory critique that Bhaskar puts forward generally very attractive. I just think he is sometimes too hasty in his attempt to derive socialism (as he sees it) from science (as he sees it). I also agree with the view that truth-talk fulfils an axiological need and I think Bhaskar is trying to draw ethical universals from this in a practically identical manner to Habermas. Again, reference to Habermas might have been useful here as I think he is drawing on him heavily, and even if he weren't (which I doubt) he could still bring in Habermas for contrast and contextualisation given that the structure of the argument is so similar. In any case, I would moot the following: I think it is possible to make strong claims about how the world is and qualify those statements with "but that's just me and I wouldn't want you to base any of your own actions on that (personal) judgment". In that case I am not advising, but simply stating what I take the world to be like. I don't want you to base your actions on my judgment because I may be wrong and I don't want to take responsibility away from you for your own decisions etc. So I don't think we can get to advice from assertions about how the world is that easily. But even if I were advising, do you still think that that commits me necessarily to empowering the other to do the advised upon thing? Imagine X works in the field all day and makes 100 grains of corn from which he is able to feed himself and his family for a week. Y on the other hand prefers to spend his time in the hey with a local maid. Y complains to X that he cannot feed his family as well as X and X strongly advises Y to stop playing with the maid and start working in the field. In order to do so though Y will need proper tools of which X has plenty but Y has none. X could lend Y his tools thus empowering Y to act in accord with his advice. But he could also point out that last time he lent Y the tools he misused them and didn't bring them back/broke them or some other such thing. In this case X might be better to say to Y, "I have given you the advice of what I would do but if you really want to do it then you are going to have to find the means to do it yourself". Generally, if I always empower another to do some advised thing then there is an issue of undermining the other's autonomy to do it him/herself. I think the T/P inc. and explanatory critique can work very well in some circumstances but we also have to be careful about bringing in our own political commitments and personal values as conclusions to premises that have already been implicitly loaded with said commitments and values. I share the goal of solidarity but question the manner of arriving at it in this particular case. Many thanks. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 02 July 2008 04:35 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: To Phil, Ruth. (Despain, Hans G) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 23:35:56 -0400 From: "Despain, Hans G" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] To Phil, Ruth. To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Phil, You are in the context of "Dialectic of Truth." I would agree with Bhaskar that truth-talk performs an axilogical need for human beings. So the sentence just prior to your quote from p. 222 says "So every speech act [based on Truth-talk] must be regarded as making an axilogical commitment." This is a summary of the arugment for his theory of explanatory critique. Thus, if we accept his argument in SRHE pp. 169-211 for explanatory critique (or some amended version as suggested by Hugh Lacey) then we do necessarily move from facts to value, or from truth-talk to an axilogical commitment. The sentence you dislike is still problematic, and it seems overstated. However, it is not an argument itself, it is a more or less a theorem based on preceding discussion of "Dialectic of Truth." The discusion on Truth is itself being put forth as a type of basis or context for his theory of explanatory critique; which unfolds in summary on page 258 (His full argument is only found in SRHE pp. 169-211). And the sentence you dislike is not possible to defend until after an understanding of his theory of explanatory critique. And I wouldn't want to defend it even then ... however, I think there is an easier defense. I don't think the problem is the one Ruth identifies, i.e. a need for seperate arugments, because Bhaskar is not making an arugment. Thus, it seems to me the statement is much more Habermasian in form. If someone *is* making judgement statements, based on truth-talk, i.e. meant as "universalizable" corresponding to Bhaskar's "adequate theory of truth" in all of its four components (see DPF:217), hence meaning or implying all four aspects of the judgement form (see DPF:221), then "To say how the world is is implicitly to advice agents to act on that basis, therefore not to assist or empower them when it is in one's capacity to do so is to be guilty of a theory/practice inconsistency, ceteris paribus." p.222. That makes the statement much more humble. The statement is radically dependent on the fact of someone making very bold claims about 'what I would do if I were you, and in your circumstances; and these such and such is true of your circumstances'. If I am making those bold judgements, and then say "good luck with all that" and walk away, there is a very serious T/P inc. If I am serious with my judgement/advise I should say 'come on I will show you my seriousness by helping you do what I would do if I was you'. If I don't you should be worried about the degree of seriousness and truth of my judgment on you, and advise for you. Thus, this is a theorem to guide practical action of agent two, following the advise *and* *action* from agent one (who is claiming universalizablity of his judgement/advise). Bhaskar is not making an argument for action based on moral realism, because he has not yet developed that arugment either. Hence, he is not making an ethical judgement himself against agent 1. Rather it must be a very simply guide to follow when receiving judgement/advise from someone. A way to judge the degree to which agent 1 is engaging in truth-talk or bullshit. Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon [pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 5:56 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 Hi I note your point Ruth about judgment form in Aristotle. I just feel that RB's treatment of this in dialectic is vague; he doesn't situate the concept at all, or explicate it very thoroughly, although it seems to be doing a lot of work. In any case, it's the criterion of universalisability that I'm wondering about, and whether judgment (practical judgment in any case) need be universalising. You will correct me if I'm wrong but phronesis is a particularistic form of judgment and not universalising. Hans, I'm just trying to read sections of DPF at the moment. I'm not sure yet what to make of it. But what do you (others) make of this argument?: "To say how the world is is implicitly to advice agents to act on that basis, therefore not to assist or empower them when it is in one's capacity to do so is to be guilty of a theory/practice inconsistency, ceteris paribus." p.222. I find this to be specious. I don't think to say how the world is necessarily implies any *advice* about how one is to act, and if it did, I don't think that one is guilty of TP inconsistency if one fails to empower someone to act in that way. The whole section around p.222 seems very iffy to me. thanks Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 22:15 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) 3. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (gerard walmsely) 4. Re: Question for List (Despain, Hans G) 5. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 11:02:03 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <543992.37795.qm at web56103.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Hi Ruth, It doesn't make sense because I'm not sure what to ask! I am thinking specifically of the opposition of speculative philosophy of history - what does it all mean, reason and historicity, providence, are we getting somewhere - and critical philosophy of history - can history be objective, etc. I would say that although Hegel and Heidegger make impressive attempts to explain the metaphysics through reason or philosophical principles, the lack of empirical description makes them uninteresting (Hegel on Africa!). Bhaskar joins company with these thinkers but his dialectic is unlike previous thinkers, it presumes realism. So perhaps he permits us simultaneously to describe a phase in history as part of the story of human emancipation AND in recognizable empirical terms, sort of Hegel AND Marx together. My real perplexity is what to do with Hegel and Heidegger and ultimately the metaphysics of history. When is it interesting and when just some elaborated system with no chance to claim to describe reality? Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com --- On Tue, 7/1/08, Ruth Groff wrote: From: Ruth Groff Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Date: Tuesday, July 1, 2008, 1:35 PM Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism_______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 19:44:55 +0100 From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** ------------------------------ Message: 3 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:06:33 -0700 From: "gerard walmsely" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Yan If you ask me, your concept of metaphysical history needs to be clarified. Do you see an inherent meaning in history, or do you have anyone specific in mind with whom you contrast Bhaskar? IYou might find the works of RG COllingwood useful for a view on history from a philosophical perspective. GW On Tue, Jul 1, 2008 at 11:00 AM, < critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) > 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) > From: Ian Verstegen > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 > From: "Ruth Groff" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Hi Ian, > > Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not > in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you > say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining > it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't > have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will > appreciate it! > > Thanks, > Ruth > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian > Verstegen > Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 > *********************************************** > ------------------------------ Message: 4 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 16:31:24 -0400 From: "Despain, Hans G" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian, I would reject the premise of your question: "Bhaskar provides 'another' metaphysics of history in his dialectic." Most generally DCR is an elaboration of the theory of explanatory critique. The two broadest implications being that social science is not neutral, or social science has political implications. The political implications can be potentially emancipatory. In this sense, ultimately Bhaskar in DPF is sketching out a new theory of ethics. Geo-historical processes demonstrate DCR, but Bhaskar's DPF is far from a metaphysics of history. (I do believe that Bhaskar as complicated his DCR metaphysically with an over emphasis on the concept of absence, and dialectic as the absenting of absence; but this is not a problem of metaphysics of history). Chistopher Lloyd published a book "The Structures of History" (1993), drawing heavily from CR, he argues that society transforms more or less independent from beliefs and theories (perhaps a case of Kantian self-dout or hermeneutical circle). I think in light of Bhaskar's DPF (not to mention SRHE) DCR would not endorse such a position. And if it is possible to argue that history has proceded largely independent from beliefs and theories, Bhaskar's aim in DPF is to change that. sincerely Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ian Verstegen [ianverstegen at yahoo.com] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. ------------------------------ Message: 5 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 17:15:42 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hey Phil, This is interesting. I am (believe it or not) checking my e-mail at the gym (I kid you not) so I can't be long about it, but what you say is interesting: viz., that the difference between a "science" of history and a "metaphysics" of history is their proponents' differential affirmation of empiricism. I predict a Kantian intervention to come, to the effect that the difference is not that about how one knows (only by observation or not) but about what one knows. It's a slippery slope from Kant back into empiricism, but still, you get the point. Anyway what you say is interesting. I think of talk about "the judgment form" as being vaguely Kantian, but you could argue that even in Aristotle there are distinct forms of jugment, more or less conceived as such (no pun intended) -- phronesis vs. nous+episteme, say. r. ________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 2:44 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From Hans.Despain at nichols.edu Wed Jul 2 11:14:33 2008 From: Hans.Despain at nichols.edu (Despain, Hans G) Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 13:14:33 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: Phil, it seems we are getting somewhere. I will address several of your points below. I am in full agreement with you that DCR is over-idiosyncratic in presentation. Some of the idiosyncratic is unavoidable, but much of it is just distractive. And those working on DCR too often present it in the same idiosyncratic language. It needs an interpreter, and perhaps the best way to do is in a serious of contrastive immanent critiques of related thinkers. But that could be a massive undertaking First to Ruth, I think that is right. Plato (Plato's Socrates), along with many other traditions believe Truth in part to be action dependent. Which is not to deny the intransitive or ontological, but to recognize epistemological relativism, and the difficulty we have in accessing the intransitive dimension and althetic truth. Bhaskar's point seems to say that human action, especially interaction, presumes an althetic level of Truth. The problem is our (Kantian in)ability to access it. Hence judgments must form in practical action everyday, (and social science becomes highly imperative). How should we form these judgments ... well action and inaction is part of the answer. I agree with Ruth this seems Plato?s commitment also. But of course it is not enough. After all Thraymachus would back up his bad advise with immoral action, and we are not any closer to truth, except that Thraymachus believes what he said. So it is only a first step in making our judgment. Plato?s Dialectic is a type of roadway to truth, partly based on action/inaction and also emergent powers. Phil, I am not sure how much Bhaskar is drawing from Habermas. But Habermas sure seems useful in these moments. I agree with you completely that a comparison would be most useful in these sections of DPF. So I look forward to your comparisons. Bhaskar might also be drawing from Eastern philosophy in DPF and PE. It becomes very obvious in meta-Reality that Bhaskar draws from the Hindu and Buddha traditions. For example Ghandi?s Satyagraha which presumes an althetic level of truth, but also accepts most people will be far from it (especially moral althetic truth); hence it will be very difficult for someone to act on it --- a Hegelian Unhappy Consciousness. Phil, you ask ?But even if I were advising, do you still think that that commits me necessarily to empowering the other to do the advised upon thing?? Bhaskar is not judging whether this is ethical, he is interested in judgment formation in practical activity. So if you advise me, and then don?t follow up your advise with action, that may inform me your advise has less to do with truth then with some other motive (which I may or may not be able to identify). In an ethical sense I am not sure DCR can help X and his friend Y with his desire for a maiden rather then food. DCR cannot comment on the level of concreteness you are imposing. However, in the context of the quote on p. 222 of DPF. If X is messing around with a maiden and not producing food, and Y is doing the same thing; and X says ?Y you should work the fields and quit messing around with maidens? but continues himself to mess around with maidens and not feed his family, Y?s judgment form is going to tend to think the T/P inc. is suggestive, the action of X may be more suggestive than the advise of X in the judgment formation. Your story does reveal how difficult, and contradictory social being can be. In capitalist relations the practical judgments we make seem to many people to be unethical. For example to ?assist or empower? could mean many things. You are interpreting that to mean give away my capital, and not expect it to be returned, which is over-shooting the mark. But it is very interesting in your story, your man Y has no capital, what are the conditions of that circumstance (laziness or power2 relations? Or something else entirely?) The point is the inaction of X is revealing of some truth: perhaps worries of enabling Y to be lazy and mess around, or perhaps of Power2 relations. If it is the latter, I would say, and this is me not any interpretation of DCR: Y should keep messing around with maidens. If it is the former, well Y should then get his shit together. But at this level in DCR there is no ethical naturalism yet introduced; and when it is DCR will not get concert enough, nor can it, to make up X?s mind about how to ?assist and empower? Y, or even determine if X can ?assist and empower? Y. This is the job of ethical theory, and the possibility for ethical practice given the power2 relations and structural conditions. DCR is only doing the underlaboring for ethical theory and ethical action. An ethical naturalism is possible from Bhaskar?s theory and *practice* of explanatory critique. In DCR and CR, ethics are grounded in explanatory critique. For a full Bhaskarian discussion of ethical action we would have to jump in to meta-Reality (which I am not recommending, but only pointing out that you are asking too much from Bhaskar?s comments on Dialectic of Truth. Which by the way is not even a defense of Truth, but the conditions of Truth if Truth is possible). Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon [pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk] Sent: Wednesday, July 02, 2008 7:56 AM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 Hi Ruth, Hans thanks Ruth, I know you weren?t necessarily defending Bhaskar, and your point about Aristotle is helpful. I guess I was trying to see if Bhaskar was developing his own particular account of judgment specifically out of e.g. Aristotle, Kant or someone else in the tradition because it seems quite idiosyncratic, using terms that I myself didn?t recognise. Actually, I think Hans is right that it seems very Habermassian but framed in an idiosyncratic language all of Bhaskar?s own which is more confusing than it needs to be as a result. It might have been better if Bhaskar had explicitly referred to Habermas here. Thanks for your very useful comments Hans. I agree with a lot of what you say there and I?m glad that you too have problems with the structure of the argument I noted. I agree that putting it in context makes it appear somewhat less bald but I still think there is a tendency more generally for using specious forms of argument in order to arrive at convenient conclusions. I think the ?derivation? of solidarity on that same page is even more suspect, or just weird, but I might be missing something. I say this as someone who found many (not all) of the arguments of SRHE quite compelling and the account of explanatory critique that Bhaskar puts forward generally very attractive. I just think he is sometimes too hasty in his attempt to derive socialism (as he sees it) from science (as he sees it). I also agree with the view that truth-talk fulfils an axiological need and I think Bhaskar is trying to draw ethical universals from this in a practically identical manner to Habermas. Again, reference to Habermas might have been useful here as I think he is drawing on him heavily, and even if he weren?t (which I doubt) he could still bring in Habermas for contrast and contextualisation given that the structure of the argument is so similar. In any case, I would moot the following: I think it is possible to make strong claims about how the world is and qualify those statements with ?but that?s just me and I wouldn?t want you to base any of your own actions on that (personal) judgment?. In that case I am not advising, but simply stating what I take the world to be like. I don?t want you to base your actions on my judgment because I may be wrong and I don?t want to take responsibility away from you for your own decisions etc. So I don?t think we can get to advice from assertions about how the world is that easily. But even if I were advising, do you still think that that commits me necessarily to empowering the other to do the advised upon thing? Imagine X works in the field all day and makes 100 grains of corn from which he is able to feed himself and his family for a week. Y on the other hand prefers to spend his time in the hey with a local maid. Y complains to X that he cannot feed his family as well as X and X strongly advises Y to stop playing with the maid and start working in the field. In order to do so though Y will need proper tools of which X has plenty but Y has none. X could lend Y his tools thus empowering Y to act in accord with his advice. But he could also point out that last time he lent Y the tools he misused them and didn?t bring them back/broke them or some other such thing. In this case X might be better to say to Y, ?I have given you the advice of what I would do but if you really want to do it then you are going to have to find the means to do it yourself?. Generally, if I always empower another to do some advised thing then there is an issue of undermining the other?s autonomy to do it him/herself. I think the T/P inc. and explanatory critique can work very well in some circumstances but we also have to be careful about bringing in our own political commitments and personal values as conclusions to premises that have already been implicitly loaded with said commitments and values. I share the goal of solidarity but question the manner of arriving at it in this particular case. Many thanks. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 02 July 2008 04:35 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: To Phil, Ruth. (Despain, Hans G) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 23:35:56 -0400 From: "Despain, Hans G" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] To Phil, Ruth. To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Phil, You are in the context of "Dialectic of Truth." I would agree with Bhaskar that truth-talk performs an axilogical need for human beings. So the sentence just prior to your quote from p. 222 says "So every speech act [based on Truth-talk] must be regarded as making an axilogical commitment." This is a summary of the arugment for his theory of explanatory critique. Thus, if we accept his argument in SRHE pp. 169-211 for explanatory critique (or some amended version as suggested by Hugh Lacey) then we do necessarily move from facts to value, or from truth-talk to an axilogical commitment. The sentence you dislike is still problematic, and it seems overstated. However, it is not an argument itself, it is a more or less a theorem based on preceding discussion of "Dialectic of Truth." The discusion on Truth is itself being put forth as a type of basis or context for his theory of explanatory critique; which unfolds in summary on page 258 (His full argument is only found in SRHE pp. 169-211). And the sentence you dislike is not possible to defend until after an understanding of his theory of explanatory critique. And I wouldn't want to defend it even then ... however, I think there is an easier defense. I don't think the problem is the one Ruth identifies, i.e. a need for seperate arugments, because Bhaskar is not making an arugment. Thus, it seems to me the statement is much more Habermasian in form. If someone *is* making judgement statements, based on truth-talk, i.e. meant as "universalizable" corresponding to Bhaskar's "adequate theory of truth" in all of its four components (see DPF:217), hence meaning or implying all four aspects of the judgement form (see DPF:221), then "To say how the world is is implicitly to advice agents to act on that basis, therefore not to assist or empower them when it is in one's capacity to do so is to be guilty of a theory/practice inconsistency, ceteris paribus." p.222. That makes the statement much more humble. The statement is radically dependent on the fact of someone making very bold claims about 'what I would do if I were you, and in your circumstances; and these such and such is true of your circumstances'. If I am making those bold judgements, and then say "good luck with all that" and walk away, there is a very serious T/P inc. If I am serious with my judgement/advise I should say 'come on I will show you my seriousness by helping you do what I would do if I was you'. If I don't you should be worried about the degree of seriousness and truth of my judgment on you, and advise for you. Thus, this is a theorem to guide practical action of agent two, following the advise *and* *action* from agent one (who is claiming universalizablity of his judgement/advise). Bhaskar is not making an argument for action based on moral realism, because he has not yet developed that arugment either. Hence, he is not making an ethical judgement himself against agent 1. Rather it must be a very simply guide to follow when receiving judgement/advise from someone. A way to judge the degree to which agent 1 is engaging in truth-talk or bullshit. Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon [pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 5:56 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 Hi I note your point Ruth about judgment form in Aristotle. I just feel that RB's treatment of this in dialectic is vague; he doesn't situate the concept at all, or explicate it very thoroughly, although it seems to be doing a lot of work. In any case, it's the criterion of universalisability that I'm wondering about, and whether judgment (practical judgment in any case) need be universalising. You will correct me if I'm wrong but phronesis is a particularistic form of judgment and not universalising. Hans, I'm just trying to read sections of DPF at the moment. I'm not sure yet what to make of it. But what do you (others) make of this argument?: "To say how the world is is implicitly to advice agents to act on that basis, therefore not to assist or empower them when it is in one's capacity to do so is to be guilty of a theory/practice inconsistency, ceteris paribus." p.222. I find this to be specious. I don't think to say how the world is necessarily implies any *advice* about how one is to act, and if it did, I don't think that one is guilty of TP inconsistency if one fails to empower someone to act in that way. The whole section around p.222 seems very iffy to me. thanks Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 22:15 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) 3. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (gerard walmsely) 4. Re: Question for List (Despain, Hans G) 5. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 11:02:03 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <543992.37795.qm at web56103.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Hi Ruth, It doesn't make sense because I'm not sure what to ask! I am thinking specifically of the opposition of speculative philosophy of history - what does it all mean, reason and historicity, providence, are we getting somewhere - and critical philosophy of history - can history be objective, etc. I would say that although Hegel and Heidegger make impressive attempts to explain the metaphysics through reason or philosophical principles, the lack of empirical description makes them uninteresting (Hegel on Africa!). Bhaskar joins company with these thinkers but his dialectic is unlike previous thinkers, it presumes realism. So perhaps he permits us simultaneously to describe a phase in history as part of the story of human emancipation AND in recognizable empirical terms, sort of Hegel AND Marx together. My real perplexity is what to do with Hegel and Heidegger and ultimately the metaphysics of history. When is it interesting and when just some elaborated system with no chance to claim to describe reality? Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com --- On Tue, 7/1/08, Ruth Groff wrote: From: Ruth Groff Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Date: Tuesday, July 1, 2008, 1:35 PM Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism_______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 19:44:55 +0100 From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** ------------------------------ Message: 3 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:06:33 -0700 From: "gerard walmsely" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Yan If you ask me, your concept of metaphysical history needs to be clarified. Do you see an inherent meaning in history, or do you have anyone specific in mind with whom you contrast Bhaskar? IYou might find the works of RG COllingwood useful for a view on history from a philosophical perspective. GW On Tue, Jul 1, 2008 at 11:00 AM, < critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) > 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) > From: Ian Verstegen > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 > From: "Ruth Groff" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Hi Ian, > > Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not > in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you > say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining > it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't > have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will > appreciate it! > > Thanks, > Ruth > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian > Verstegen > Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 > *********************************************** > ------------------------------ Message: 4 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 16:31:24 -0400 From: "Despain, Hans G" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian, I would reject the premise of your question: "Bhaskar provides 'another' metaphysics of history in his dialectic." Most generally DCR is an elaboration of the theory of explanatory critique. The two broadest implications being that social science is not neutral, or social science has political implications. The political implications can be potentially emancipatory. In this sense, ultimately Bhaskar in DPF is sketching out a new theory of ethics. Geo-historical processes demonstrate DCR, but Bhaskar's DPF is far from a metaphysics of history. (I do believe that Bhaskar as complicated his DCR metaphysically with an over emphasis on the concept of absence, and dialectic as the absenting of absence; but this is not a problem of metaphysics of history). Chistopher Lloyd published a book "The Structures of History" (1993), drawing heavily from CR, he argues that society transforms more or less independent from beliefs and theories (perhaps a case of Kantian self-dout or hermeneutical circle). I think in light of Bhaskar's DPF (not to mention SRHE) DCR would not endorse such a position. And if it is possible to argue that history has proceded largely independent from beliefs and theories, Bhaskar's aim in DPF is to change that. sincerely Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ian Verstegen [ianverstegen at yahoo.com] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. ------------------------------ Message: 5 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 17:15:42 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hey Phil, This is interesting. I am (believe it or not) checking my e-mail at the gym (I kid you not) so I can't be long about it, but what you say is interesting: viz., that the difference between a "science" of history and a "metaphysics" of history is their proponents' differential affirmation of empiricism. I predict a Kantian intervention to come, to the effect that the difference is not that about how one knows (only by observation or not) but about what one knows. It's a slippery slope from Kant back into empiricism, but still, you get the point. Anyway what you say is interesting. I think of talk about "the judgment form" as being vaguely Kantian, but you could argue that even in Aristotle there are distinct forms of jugment, more or less conceived as such (no pun intended) -- phronesis vs. nous+episteme, say. r. ________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 2:44 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk Wed Jul 2 11:45:01 2008 From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 18:45:01 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Re. Very small point Message-ID: Ruth I wanted to say about judgment form that RB should justify his use of specifically these 4 forms of judgment. I agree that Kant developed his own forms of judgment on the basis of the judgment forms appropriated from Aristotle, and one can see the connection and development. But I don't see any arguments justifying the use of these four judgment forms in dialectic; they just seem to appear from nowhere. However, I've yet to digest much more of DPF so it could be the case that I've just missed something. I must admit to being quite confused about the so-called ethical tetrapolity around p.262 of DPF. It seems to be a rather pedantic and obscure way of arriving at the basic Aristotelian idea that the good (conceived as universal human flourishing)is/ought to be the object of human desire. I'm sure there's a lot more going on there but it's not easy to unpack. Re. Plato and action, I think I remember that being the case through reading Iris Murdoch, where if one apprehends the nature of the world correctly, one cannot fail to act according to the apprehension. I always wondered where that leaves weakness of the will. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 02 July 2008 17:14 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 7 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Very small point (Ruth Groff) 2. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 11:35:02 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Very small point To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Dogan, I was mostly joking -- I don't know anything about the philosophy of history. But I suppose it does seem as though the mere fact of a philosophy of history containing such an ontology would be the sort of thing that would lead those who hold "scientific" theories to deem it a "metaphysical" one. I'm probably provisionally skeptical about the distinction in the first place. But really I was teasing, if provocatively, as it's not an area that I know about. r. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Dogan G??men Sent: Wed 02-Jul-08 6:58 AM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Very small point Ruth asserts: Interesting. I had meant to send a ps saying that in fact one could, in principle at least, imagine a way-that-things-are [to use the technical term - :)] being such that it compels action. That's how Plato thinks things are, I think. Viz., structured by goodness -- to which, if one apprehends it at least, one is helpless but to respond. No doubt when that kind of ontology is assumed, a theory of history into which it fits is deemed metaphysical rather than scientific. :) Dogan asks: Ruth, can you please say more about how you come to this conclusion? ---------------------- Dogan G??men Author of The Adam Smith Problem: Reconciling Human Nature and Society in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations, I. B. Tauris, London&New York 2007 -----Original Message----- From: Ruth Groff To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Sent: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 7:04 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Very small point Hi Hans, You wrote: Bhaskar is not making an argument for action based on moral realism, because he has not yet developed that argument either. Interesting. I had meant to send a ps saying that in fact one could, in principle at least, imagine a way-that-things-are [to use the technical term - :)] being such that it compels action. That's how Plato thinks things are, I think. Viz., structured by goodness -- to which, if one apprehends it at least, one is helpless but to respond. No doubt when that kind of ontology is assumed, a theory of history into which it fits is deemed metaphysical rather than scientific. :) r. _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ________________________________________________________________________ AOL Email goes Mobile! You can now read your AOL Emails whilst on the move. Sign up for a free AOL Email account with unlimited storage today. _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 12:14:31 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Phil, Hans, I'll need to read those sections more carefully -- I am not sure, for myself, what verb I'd want to use to describe the relationship between RB and Habermas. Minimally, we know that both of them have a record of proposing lynch-pin arguments that they take to be Kantian in structure. Beyond that I'm not sure. I personally think that there is an enormous debt to Aristotle in RB. Not in this "judgment form" thing, particularly, but absolutely in other ways. "What is the world like such that we can know it (viz., it's form)?" -- it's an oddly Kantian formulation of De Anima. r. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Wed 02-Jul-08 7:56 AM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 Hi Ruth, Hans thanks Ruth, I know you weren't necessarily defending Bhaskar, and your point about Aristotle is helpful. I guess I was trying to see if Bhaskar was developing his own particular account of judgment specifically out of e.g. Aristotle, Kant or someone else in the tradition because it seems quite idiosyncratic, using terms that I myself didn't recognise. Actually, I think Hans is right that it seems very Habermassian but framed in an idiosyncratic language all of Bhaskar's own which is more confusing than it needs to be as a result. It might have been better if Bhaskar had explicitly referred to Habermas here. Thanks for your very useful comments Hans. I agree with a lot of what you say there and I'm glad that you too have problems with the structure of the argument I noted. I agree that putting it in context makes it appear somewhat less bald but I still think there is a tendency more generally for using specious forms of argument in order to arrive at convenient conclusions. I think the "derivation" of solidarity on that same page is even more suspect, or just weird, but I might be missing something. I say this as someone who found many (not all) of the arguments of SRHE quite compelling and the account of explanatory critique that Bhaskar puts forward generally very attractive. I just think he is sometimes too hasty in his attempt to derive socialism (as he sees it) from science (as he sees it). I also agree with the view that truth-talk fulfils an axiological need and I think Bhaskar is trying to draw ethical universals from this in a practically identical manner to Habermas. Again, reference to Habermas might have been useful here as I think he is drawing on him heavily, and even if he weren't (which I doubt) he could still bring in Habermas for contrast and contextualisation given that the structure of the argument is so similar. In any case, I would moot the following: I think it is possible to make strong claims about how the world is and qualify those statements with "but that's just me and I wouldn't want you to base any of your own actions on that (personal) judgment". In that case I am not advising, but simply stating what I take the world to be like. I don't want you to base your actions on my judgment because I may be wrong and I don't want to take responsibility away from you for your own decisions etc. So I don't think we can get to advice from assertions about how the world is that easily. But even if I were advising, do you still think that that commits me necessarily to empowering the other to do the advised upon thing? Imagine X works in the field all day and makes 100 grains of corn from which he is able to feed himself and his family for a week. Y on the other hand prefers to spend his time in the hey with a local maid. Y complains to X that he cannot feed his family as well as X and X strongly advises Y to stop playing with the maid and start working in the field. In order to do so though Y will need proper tools of which X has plenty but Y has none. X could lend Y his tools thus empowering Y to act in accord with his advice. But he could also point out that last time he lent Y the tools he misused them and didn't bring them back/broke them or some other such thing. In this case X might be better to say to Y, "I have given you the advice of what I would do but if you really want to do it then you are going to have to find the means to do it yourself". Generally, if I always empower another to do some advised thing then there is an issue of undermining the other's autonomy to do it him/herself. I think the T/P inc. and explanatory critique can work very well in some circumstances but we also have to be careful about bringing in our own political commitments and personal values as conclusions to premises that have already been implicitly loaded with said commitments and values. I share the goal of solidarity but question the manner of arriving at it in this particular case. Many thanks. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 02 July 2008 04:35 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: To Phil, Ruth. (Despain, Hans G) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 23:35:56 -0400 From: "Despain, Hans G" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] To Phil, Ruth. To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Phil, You are in the context of "Dialectic of Truth." I would agree with Bhaskar that truth-talk performs an axilogical need for human beings. So the sentence just prior to your quote from p. 222 says "So every speech act [based on Truth-talk] must be regarded as making an axilogical commitment." This is a summary of the arugment for his theory of explanatory critique. Thus, if we accept his argument in SRHE pp. 169-211 for explanatory critique (or some amended version as suggested by Hugh Lacey) then we do necessarily move from facts to value, or from truth-talk to an axilogical commitment. The sentence you dislike is still problematic, and it seems overstated. However, it is not an argument itself, it is a more or less a theorem based on preceding discussion of "Dialectic of Truth." The discusion on Truth is itself being put forth as a type of basis or context for his theory of explanatory critique; which unfolds in summary on page 258 (His full argument is only found in SRHE pp. 169-211). And the sentence you dislike is not possible to defend until after an understanding of his theory of explanatory critique. And I wouldn't want to defend it even then ... however, I think there is an easier defense. I don't think the problem is the one Ruth identifies, i.e. a need for seperate arugments, because Bhaskar is not making an arugment. Thus, it seems to me the statement is much more Habermasian in form. If someone *is* making judgement statements, based on truth-talk, i.e. meant as "universalizable" corresponding to Bhaskar's "adequate theory of truth" in all of its four components (see DPF:217), hence meaning or implying all four aspects of the judgement form (see DPF:221), then "To say how the world is is implicitly to advice agents to act on that basis, therefore not to assist or empower them when it is in one's capacity to do so is to be guilty of a theory/practice inconsistency, ceteris paribus." p.222. That makes the statement much more humble. The statement is radically dependent on the fact of someone making very bold claims about 'what I would do if I were you, and in your circumstances; and these such and such is true of your circumstances'. If I am making those bold judgements, and then say "good luck with all that" and walk away, there is a very serious T/P inc. If I am serious with my judgement/advise I should say 'come on I will show you my seriousness by helping you do what I would do if I was you'. If I don't you should be worried about the degree of seriousness and truth of my judgment on you, and advise for you. Thus, this is a theorem to guide practical action of agent two, following the advise *and* *action* from agent one (who is claiming universalizablity of his judgement/advise). Bhaskar is not making an argument for action based on moral realism, because he has not yet developed that arugment either. Hence, he is not making an ethical judgement himself against agent 1. Rather it must be a very simply guide to follow when receiving judgement/advise from someone. A way to judge the degree to which agent 1 is engaging in truth-talk or bullshit. Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon [pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 5:56 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 Hi I note your point Ruth about judgment form in Aristotle. I just feel that RB's treatment of this in dialectic is vague; he doesn't situate the concept at all, or explicate it very thoroughly, although it seems to be doing a lot of work. In any case, it's the criterion of universalisability that I'm wondering about, and whether judgment (practical judgment in any case) need be universalising. You will correct me if I'm wrong but phronesis is a particularistic form of judgment and not universalising. Hans, I'm just trying to read sections of DPF at the moment. I'm not sure yet what to make of it. But what do you (others) make of this argument?: "To say how the world is is implicitly to advice agents to act on that basis, therefore not to assist or empower them when it is in one's capacity to do so is to be guilty of a theory/practice inconsistency, ceteris paribus." p.222. I find this to be specious. I don't think to say how the world is necessarily implies any *advice* about how one is to act, and if it did, I don't think that one is guilty of TP inconsistency if one fails to empower someone to act in that way. The whole section around p.222 seems very iffy to me. thanks Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 22:15 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) 3. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (gerard walmsely) 4. Re: Question for List (Despain, Hans G) 5. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 11:02:03 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <543992.37795.qm at web56103.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Hi Ruth, It doesn't make sense because I'm not sure what to ask! I am thinking specifically of the opposition of speculative philosophy of history - what does it all mean, reason and historicity, providence, are we getting somewhere - and critical philosophy of history - can history be objective, etc. I would say that although Hegel and Heidegger make impressive attempts to explain the metaphysics through reason or philosophical principles, the lack of empirical description makes them uninteresting (Hegel on Africa!). Bhaskar joins company with these thinkers but his dialectic is unlike previous thinkers, it presumes realism. So perhaps he permits us simultaneously to describe a phase in history as part of the story of human emancipation AND in recognizable empirical terms, sort of Hegel AND Marx together. My real perplexity is what to do with Hegel and Heidegger and ultimately the metaphysics of history. When is it interesting and when just some elaborated system with no chance to claim to describe reality? Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com --- On Tue, 7/1/08, Ruth Groff wrote: From: Ruth Groff Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Date: Tuesday, July 1, 2008, 1:35 PM Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism_______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 19:44:55 +0100 From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** ------------------------------ Message: 3 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:06:33 -0700 From: "gerard walmsely" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Yan If you ask me, your concept of metaphysical history needs to be clarified. Do you see an inherent meaning in history, or do you have anyone specific in mind with whom you contrast Bhaskar? IYou might find the works of RG COllingwood useful for a view on history from a philosophical perspective. GW On Tue, Jul 1, 2008 at 11:00 AM, < critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) > 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) > From: Ian Verstegen > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 > From: "Ruth Groff" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Hi Ian, > > Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not > in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you > say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining > it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't > have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will > appreciate it! > > Thanks, > Ruth > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian > Verstegen > Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 > *********************************************** > ------------------------------ Message: 4 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 16:31:24 -0400 From: "Despain, Hans G" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian, I would reject the premise of your question: "Bhaskar provides 'another' metaphysics of history in his dialectic." Most generally DCR is an elaboration of the theory of explanatory critique. The two broadest implications being that social science is not neutral, or social science has political implications. The political implications can be potentially emancipatory. In this sense, ultimately Bhaskar in DPF is sketching out a new theory of ethics. Geo-historical processes demonstrate DCR, but Bhaskar's DPF is far from a metaphysics of history. (I do believe that Bhaskar as complicated his DCR metaphysically with an over emphasis on the concept of absence, and dialectic as the absenting of absence; but this is not a problem of metaphysics of history). Chistopher Lloyd published a book "The Structures of History" (1993), drawing heavily from CR, he argues that society transforms more or less independent from beliefs and theories (perhaps a case of Kantian self-dout or hermeneutical circle). I think in light of Bhaskar's DPF (not to mention SRHE) DCR would not endorse such a position. And if it is possible to argue that history has proceded largely independent from beliefs and theories, Bhaskar's aim in DPF is to change that. sincerely Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ian Verstegen [ianverstegen at yahoo.com] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. ------------------------------ Message: 5 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 17:15:42 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hey Phil, This is interesting. I am (believe it or not) checking my e-mail at the gym (I kid you not) so I can't be long about it, but what you say is interesting: viz., that the difference between a "science" of history and a "metaphysics" of history is their proponents' differential affirmation of empiricism. I predict a Kantian intervention to come, to the effect that the difference is not that about how one knows (only by observation or not) but about what one knows. It's a slippery slope from Kant back into empiricism, but still, you get the point. Anyway what you say is interesting. I think of talk about "the judgment form" as being vaguely Kantian, but you could argue that even in Aristotle there are distinct forms of jugment, more or less conceived as such (no pun intended) -- phronesis vs. nous+episteme, say. r. ________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 2:44 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. 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Thank you. ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 7 *********************************************** From ianverstegen at yahoo.com Wed Jul 2 11:59:44 2008 From: ianverstegen at yahoo.com (Ian Verstegen) Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 10:59:44 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Critical-Realism] Metaphysics of History In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <575159.35078.qm@web56110.mail.re3.yahoo.com> The conversation has been ignited! I take Hans's point that Bhaskar's dialectic of history can't be merely metaphysical, that is, arrived at by purely philosophical reflection, because knowledge of the world entails explanatory critique. We can leave Bhaskar out of the 'metaphysical' camp if and only if his theory is based on reality (I agree it is better to leave 'empirical' out of it, because it begs the question of ontological depth beyond experience). What I think I've gotten out of this exchange is that metaphysical reflection on history is never just that. All categories potentially applicable to history have an existential pull that reflection must address. So I think it is still a good test of what is apparently a 'speculative' history (Hegel, Toynbee, etc) to apply it to distinct segments of human history and see how it can handle it. Likewise, one could do the same thing outside of the diachronic dimension and examine principles of how society hangs together. It is all 'speculative' but in this case acceptable. Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com --- On Wed, 7/2/08, Ruth Groff wrote: From: Ruth Groff Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Very small point To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Date: Wednesday, July 2, 2008, 11:35 AM Hi Dogan, I was mostly joking -- I don't know anything about the philosophy of history. But I suppose it does seem as though the mere fact of a philosophy of history containing such an ontology would be the sort of thing that would lead those who hold "scientific" theories to deem it a "metaphysical" one. I'm probably provisionally skeptical about the distinction in the first place. But really I was teasing, if provocatively, as it's not an area that I know about. r. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Dogan G??men Sent: Wed 02-Jul-08 6:58 AM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Very small point Ruth asserts: Interesting. I had meant to send a ps saying that in fact one could, in principle at least, imagine a way-that-things-are [to use the technical term - :)] being such that it compels action. That's how Plato thinks things are, I think. Viz., structured by goodness -- to which, if one apprehends it at least, one is helpless but to respond. No doubt when that kind of ontology is assumed, a theory of history into which it fits is deemed metaphysical rather than scientific. :) Dogan asks: Ruth, can you please say more about how you come to this conclusion? ---------------------- Dogan G??men Author of The Adam Smith Problem: Reconciling Human Nature and Society in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations, I. B. Tauris, London&New York 2007 -----Original Message----- From: Ruth Groff To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Sent: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 7:04 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Very small point Hi Hans, You wrote: Bhaskar is not making an argument for action based on moral realism, because he has not yet developed that argument either. Interesting. I had meant to send a ps saying that in fact one could, in principle at least, imagine a way-that-things-are [to use the technical term - :)] being such that it compels action. That's how Plato thinks things are, I think. Viz., structured by goodness -- to which, if one apprehends it at least, one is helpless but to respond. No doubt when that kind of ontology is assumed, a theory of history into which it fits is deemed metaphysical rather than scientific. :) r. _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ________________________________________________________________________ AOL Email goes Mobile! You can now read your AOL Emails whilst on the move. Sign up for a free AOL Email account with unlimited storage today. _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism_______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu Wed Jul 2 12:09:19 2008 From: RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 14:09:19 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Re. Very small point References: Message-ID: Hi Phil, I'm not a particularly big fan of DPF, so I'm an easy sell on your skepticism about it. Plato is, I think, weak on weakness of will. The way the categories line up with him, weakness of will can really only be a failure to love and desire (and by extension be moved by) knowledge of the Good. W of w shows up, then, as a cognitive - or perhaps, philosophical - failing. The closest you get are fallen philosophers, of the sort that the characters of Socrates and Adeimantus discuss in the Republic. But even with them it is a matter of coming to desire something other than knowledge of the Good, not a matter of having the knowledge but acting otherwise. Aristotle has a much better sense of that, of knowing but not acting accordingly. And yes, Iris Murdoch is good on Plato on this. She gets a lot of what she says from Simone Weil, who was nuts I think, but also very good on this aspect of Plato. Don't you think? r. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Wed 02-Jul-08 1:45 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [Critical-Realism] Re. Very small point Ruth I wanted to say about judgment form that RB should justify his use of specifically these 4 forms of judgment. I agree that Kant developed his own forms of judgment on the basis of the judgment forms appropriated from Aristotle, and one can see the connection and development. But I don't see any arguments justifying the use of these four judgment forms in dialectic; they just seem to appear from nowhere. However, I've yet to digest much more of DPF so it could be the case that I've just missed something. I must admit to being quite confused about the so-called ethical tetrapolity around p.262 of DPF. It seems to be a rather pedantic and obscure way of arriving at the basic Aristotelian idea that the good (conceived as universal human flourishing)is/ought to be the object of human desire. I'm sure there's a lot more going on there but it's not easy to unpack. Re. Plato and action, I think I remember that being the case through reading Iris Murdoch, where if one apprehends the nature of the world correctly, one cannot fail to act according to the apprehension. I always wondered where that leaves weakness of the will. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 02 July 2008 17:14 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 7 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Very small point (Ruth Groff) 2. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 11:35:02 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Very small point To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Dogan, I was mostly joking -- I don't know anything about the philosophy of history. But I suppose it does seem as though the mere fact of a philosophy of history containing such an ontology would be the sort of thing that would lead those who hold "scientific" theories to deem it a "metaphysical" one. I'm probably provisionally skeptical about the distinction in the first place. But really I was teasing, if provocatively, as it's not an area that I know about. r. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Dogan G??men Sent: Wed 02-Jul-08 6:58 AM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Very small point Ruth asserts: Interesting. I had meant to send a ps saying that in fact one could, in principle at least, imagine a way-that-things-are [to use the technical term - :)] being such that it compels action. That's how Plato thinks things are, I think. Viz., structured by goodness -- to which, if one apprehends it at least, one is helpless but to respond. No doubt when that kind of ontology is assumed, a theory of history into which it fits is deemed metaphysical rather than scientific. :) Dogan asks: Ruth, can you please say more about how you come to this conclusion? ---------------------- Dogan G??men Author of The Adam Smith Problem: Reconciling Human Nature and Society in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations, I. B. Tauris, London&New York 2007 -----Original Message----- From: Ruth Groff To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Sent: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 7:04 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Very small point Hi Hans, You wrote: Bhaskar is not making an argument for action based on moral realism, because he has not yet developed that argument either. Interesting. I had meant to send a ps saying that in fact one could, in principle at least, imagine a way-that-things-are [to use the technical term - :)] being such that it compels action. That's how Plato thinks things are, I think. Viz., structured by goodness -- to which, if one apprehends it at least, one is helpless but to respond. No doubt when that kind of ontology is assumed, a theory of history into which it fits is deemed metaphysical rather than scientific. :) r. _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ________________________________________________________________________ AOL Email goes Mobile! You can now read your AOL Emails whilst on the move. Sign up for a free AOL Email account with unlimited storage today. _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 12:14:31 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Phil, Hans, I'll need to read those sections more carefully -- I am not sure, for myself, what verb I'd want to use to describe the relationship between RB and Habermas. Minimally, we know that both of them have a record of proposing lynch-pin arguments that they take to be Kantian in structure. Beyond that I'm not sure. I personally think that there is an enormous debt to Aristotle in RB. Not in this "judgment form" thing, particularly, but absolutely in other ways. "What is the world like such that we can know it (viz., it's form)?" -- it's an oddly Kantian formulation of De Anima. r. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Wed 02-Jul-08 7:56 AM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 Hi Ruth, Hans thanks Ruth, I know you weren't necessarily defending Bhaskar, and your point about Aristotle is helpful. I guess I was trying to see if Bhaskar was developing his own particular account of judgment specifically out of e.g. Aristotle, Kant or someone else in the tradition because it seems quite idiosyncratic, using terms that I myself didn't recognise. Actually, I think Hans is right that it seems very Habermassian but framed in an idiosyncratic language all of Bhaskar's own which is more confusing than it needs to be as a result. It might have been better if Bhaskar had explicitly referred to Habermas here. Thanks for your very useful comments Hans. I agree with a lot of what you say there and I'm glad that you too have problems with the structure of the argument I noted. I agree that putting it in context makes it appear somewhat less bald but I still think there is a tendency more generally for using specious forms of argument in order to arrive at convenient conclusions. I think the "derivation" of solidarity on that same page is even more suspect, or just weird, but I might be missing something. I say this as someone who found many (not all) of the arguments of SRHE quite compelling and the account of explanatory critique that Bhaskar puts forward generally very attractive. I just think he is sometimes too hasty in his attempt to derive socialism (as he sees it) from science (as he sees it). I also agree with the view that truth-talk fulfils an axiological need and I think Bhaskar is trying to draw ethical universals from this in a practically identical manner to Habermas. Again, reference to Habermas might have been useful here as I think he is drawing on him heavily, and even if he weren't (which I doubt) he could still bring in Habermas for contrast and contextualisation given that the structure of the argument is so similar. In any case, I would moot the following: I think it is possible to make strong claims about how the world is and qualify those statements with "but that's just me and I wouldn't want you to base any of your own actions on that (personal) judgment". In that case I am not advising, but simply stating what I take the world to be like. I don't want you to base your actions on my judgment because I may be wrong and I don't want to take responsibility away from you for your own decisions etc. So I don't think we can get to advice from assertions about how the world is that easily. But even if I were advising, do you still think that that commits me necessarily to empowering the other to do the advised upon thing? Imagine X works in the field all day and makes 100 grains of corn from which he is able to feed himself and his family for a week. Y on the other hand prefers to spend his time in the hey with a local maid. Y complains to X that he cannot feed his family as well as X and X strongly advises Y to stop playing with the maid and start working in the field. In order to do so though Y will need proper tools of which X has plenty but Y has none. X could lend Y his tools thus empowering Y to act in accord with his advice. But he could also point out that last time he lent Y the tools he misused them and didn't bring them back/broke them or some other such thing. In this case X might be better to say to Y, "I have given you the advice of what I would do but if you really want to do it then you are going to have to find the means to do it yourse! lf". Generally, if I always empower another to do some advised thing then there is an issue of undermining the other's autonomy to do it him/herself. I think the T/P inc. and explanatory critique can work very well in some circumstances but we also have to be careful about bringing in our own political commitments and personal values as conclusions to premises that have already been implicitly loaded with said commitments and values. I share the goal of solidarity but question the manner of arriving at it in this particular case. Many thanks. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 02 July 2008 04:35 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: To Phil, Ruth. (Despain, Hans G) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 23:35:56 -0400 From: "Despain, Hans G" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] To Phil, Ruth. To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Phil, You are in the context of "Dialectic of Truth." I would agree with Bhaskar that truth-talk performs an axilogical need for human beings. So the sentence just prior to your quote from p. 222 says "So every speech act [based on Truth-talk] must be regarded as making an axilogical commitment." This is a summary of the arugment for his theory of explanatory critique. Thus, if we accept his argument in SRHE pp. 169-211 for explanatory critique (or some amended version as suggested by Hugh Lacey) then we do necessarily move from facts to value, or from truth-talk to an axilogical commitment. The sentence you dislike is still problematic, and it seems overstated. However, it is not an argument itself, it is a more or less a theorem based on preceding discussion of "Dialectic of Truth." The discusion on Truth is itself being put forth as a type of basis or context for his theory of explanatory critique; which unfolds in summary on page 258 (His full argument is only found in SRHE pp. 169-211). And the sentence you dislike is not possible to defend until after an understanding of his theory of explanatory critique. And I wouldn't want to defend it even then ... however, I think there is an easier defense. I don't think the problem is the one Ruth identifies, i.e. a need for seperate arugments, because Bhaskar is not making an arugment. Thus, it seems to me the statement is much more Habermasian in form. If someone *is* making judgement statements, based on truth-talk, i.e. meant as "universalizable" corresponding to Bhaskar's "adequate theory of truth" in all of its four components (see DPF:217), hence meaning or implying all four aspects of the judgement form (see DPF:221), then "To say how the world is is implicitly to advice agents to act on that basis, therefore not to assist or empower them when it is in one's capacity to do so is to be guilty of a theory/practice inconsistency, ceteris paribus." p.222. That makes the statement much more humble. The statement is radically dependent on the fact of someone making very bold claims about 'what I would do if I were you, and in your circumstances; and these such and such is true of your circumstances'. If I am making those bold judgements, and then say "good luck with all that" and walk away, there is a very serious T/P inc. If I am serious with my judgement/advise I should say 'come on I will show you my seriousness by helping you do what I would do if I was you'. If I don't you should be worried about the degree of seriousness and truth of my judgment on you, and advise for you. Thus, this is a theorem to guide practical action of agent two, following the advise *and* *action* from agent one (who is claiming universalizablity of his judgement/advise). Bhaskar is not making an argument for action based on moral realism, because he has not yet developed that arugment either. Hence, he is not making an ethical judgement himself against agent 1. Rather it must be a very simply guide to follow when receiving judgement/advise from someone. A way to judge the degree to which agent 1 is engaging in truth-talk or bullshit. Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon [pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 5:56 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 Hi I note your point Ruth about judgment form in Aristotle. I just feel that RB's treatment of this in dialectic is vague; he doesn't situate the concept at all, or explicate it very thoroughly, although it seems to be doing a lot of work. In any case, it's the criterion of universalisability that I'm wondering about, and whether judgment (practical judgment in any case) need be universalising. You will correct me if I'm wrong but phronesis is a particularistic form of judgment and not universalising. Hans, I'm just trying to read sections of DPF at the moment. I'm not sure yet what to make of it. But what do you (others) make of this argument?: "To say how the world is is implicitly to advice agents to act on that basis, therefore not to assist or empower them when it is in one's capacity to do so is to be guilty of a theory/practice inconsistency, ceteris paribus." p.222. I find this to be specious. I don't think to say how the world is necessarily implies any *advice* about how one is to act, and if it did, I don't think that one is guilty of TP inconsistency if one fails to empower someone to act in that way. The whole section around p.222 seems very iffy to me. thanks Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 22:15 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) 3. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (gerard walmsely) 4. Re: Question for List (Despain, Hans G) 5. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 11:02:03 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <543992.37795.qm at web56103.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Hi Ruth, It doesn't make sense because I'm not sure what to ask! I am thinking specifically of the opposition of speculative philosophy of history - what does it all mean, reason and historicity, providence, are we getting somewhere - and critical philosophy of history - can history be objective, etc. I would say that although Hegel and Heidegger make impressive attempts to explain the metaphysics through reason or philosophical principles, the lack of empirical description makes them uninteresting (Hegel on Africa!). Bhaskar joins company with these thinkers but his dialectic is unlike previous thinkers, it presumes realism. So perhaps he permits us simultaneously to describe a phase in history as part of the story of human emancipation AND in recognizable empirical terms, sort of Hegel AND Marx together. My real perplexity is what to do with Hegel and Heidegger and ultimately the metaphysics of history. When is it interesting and when just some elaborated system with no chance to claim to describe reality? Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com --- On Tue, 7/1/08, Ruth Groff wrote: From: Ruth Groff Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Date: Tuesday, July 1, 2008, 1:35 PM Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism_______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 19:44:55 +0100 From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** ------------------------------ Message: 3 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:06:33 -0700 From: "gerard walmsely" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Yan If you ask me, your concept of metaphysical history needs to be clarified. Do you see an inherent meaning in history, or do you have anyone specific in mind with whom you contrast Bhaskar? IYou might find the works of RG COllingwood useful for a view on history from a philosophical perspective. GW On Tue, Jul 1, 2008 at 11:00 AM, < critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) > 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) > From: Ian Verstegen > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 > From: "Ruth Groff" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Hi Ian, > > Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not > in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you > say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining > it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't > have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will > appreciate it! > > Thanks, > Ruth > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian > Verstegen > Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 > *********************************************** > ------------------------------ Message: 4 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 16:31:24 -0400 From: "Despain, Hans G" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian, I would reject the premise of your question: "Bhaskar provides 'another' metaphysics of history in his dialectic." Most generally DCR is an elaboration of the theory of explanatory critique. The two broadest implications being that social science is not neutral, or social science has political implications. The political implications can be potentially emancipatory. In this sense, ultimately Bhaskar in DPF is sketching out a new theory of ethics. Geo-historical processes demonstrate DCR, but Bhaskar's DPF is far from a metaphysics of history. (I do believe that Bhaskar as complicated his DCR metaphysically with an over emphasis on the concept of absence, and dialectic as the absenting of absence; but this is not a problem of metaphysics of history). Chistopher Lloyd published a book "The Structures of History" (1993), drawing heavily from CR, he argues that society transforms more or less independent from beliefs and theories (perhaps a case of Kantian self-dout or hermeneutical circle). I think in light of Bhaskar's DPF (not to mention SRHE) DCR would not endorse such a position. And if it is possible to argue that history has proceded largely independent from beliefs and theories, Bhaskar's aim in DPF is to change that. sincerely Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ian Verstegen [ianverstegen at yahoo.com] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. ------------------------------ Message: 5 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 17:15:42 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hey Phil, This is interesting. I am (believe it or not) checking my e-mail at the gym (I kid you not) so I can't be long about it, but what you say is interesting: viz., that the difference between a "science" of history and a "metaphysics" of history is their proponents' differential affirmation of empiricism. I predict a Kantian intervention to come, to the effect that the difference is not that about how one knows (only by observation or not) but about what one knows. It's a slippery slope from Kant back into empiricism, but still, you get the point. Anyway what you say is interesting. I think of talk about "the judgment form" as being vaguely Kantian, but you could argue that even in Aristotle there are distinct forms of jugment, more or less conceived as such (no pun intended) -- phronesis vs. nous+episteme, say. r. ________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 2:44 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 7 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk Wed Jul 2 12:38:22 2008 From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 19:38:22 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Small point Message-ID: Hi Ruth Agreed. Interesting that two major Platonist thinkers of our time were both "nuts". Murdoch was pretty nutty too. I think she has moments of genuine brilliance and originality but I also thought she suffered from intermittant consistency and coherence problems. Apropos Simone Weil, I have not read anything of hers but remember reading some blurb about the notion of absence in her thought and was wondering if that had been picked up by the theorists of absence within CR as I haven't seen her mentioned. Hans, thanks for interesting detailed comments. Will respond when had time to digest. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 02 July 2008 19:09 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 11 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Re. Very small point (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 14:09:19 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re. Very small point To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Phil, I'm not a particularly big fan of DPF, so I'm an easy sell on your skepticism about it. Plato is, I think, weak on weakness of will. The way the categories line up with him, weakness of will can really only be a failure to love and desire (and by extension be moved by) knowledge of the Good. W of w shows up, then, as a cognitive - or perhaps, philosophical - failing. The closest you get are fallen philosophers, of the sort that the characters of Socrates and Adeimantus discuss in the Republic. But even with them it is a matter of coming to desire something other than knowledge of the Good, not a matter of having the knowledge but acting otherwise. Aristotle has a much better sense of that, of knowing but not acting accordingly. And yes, Iris Murdoch is good on Plato on this. She gets a lot of what she says from Simone Weil, who was nuts I think, but also very good on this aspect of Plato. Don't you think? r. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Wed 02-Jul-08 1:45 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [Critical-Realism] Re. Very small point Ruth I wanted to say about judgment form that RB should justify his use of specifically these 4 forms of judgment. I agree that Kant developed his own forms of judgment on the basis of the judgment forms appropriated from Aristotle, and one can see the connection and development. But I don't see any arguments justifying the use of these four judgment forms in dialectic; they just seem to appear from nowhere. However, I've yet to digest much more of DPF so it could be the case that I've just missed something. I must admit to being quite confused about the so-called ethical tetrapolity around p.262 of DPF. It seems to be a rather pedantic and obscure way of arriving at the basic Aristotelian idea that the good (conceived as universal human flourishing)is/ought to be the object of human desire. I'm sure there's a lot more going on there but it's not easy to unpack. Re. Plato and action, I think I remember that being the case through reading Iris Murdoch, where if one apprehends the nature of the world correctly, one cannot fail to act according to the apprehension. I always wondered where that leaves weakness of the will. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 02 July 2008 17:14 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 7 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Very small point (Ruth Groff) 2. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 11:35:02 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Very small point To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Dogan, I was mostly joking -- I don't know anything about the philosophy of history. But I suppose it does seem as though the mere fact of a philosophy of history containing such an ontology would be the sort of thing that would lead those who hold "scientific" theories to deem it a "metaphysical" one. I'm probably provisionally skeptical about the distinction in the first place. But really I was teasing, if provocatively, as it's not an area that I know about. r. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Dogan G??men Sent: Wed 02-Jul-08 6:58 AM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Very small point Ruth asserts: Interesting. I had meant to send a ps saying that in fact one could, in principle at least, imagine a way-that-things-are [to use the technical term - :)] being such that it compels action. That's how Plato thinks things are, I think. Viz., structured by goodness -- to which, if one apprehends it at least, one is helpless but to respond. No doubt when that kind of ontology is assumed, a theory of history into which it fits is deemed metaphysical rather than scientific. :) Dogan asks: Ruth, can you please say more about how you come to this conclusion? ---------------------- Dogan G??men Author of The Adam Smith Problem: Reconciling Human Nature and Society in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations, I. B. Tauris, London&New York 2007 -----Original Message----- From: Ruth Groff To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Sent: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 7:04 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Very small point Hi Hans, You wrote: Bhaskar is not making an argument for action based on moral realism, because he has not yet developed that argument either. Interesting. I had meant to send a ps saying that in fact one could, in principle at least, imagine a way-that-things-are [to use the technical term - :)] being such that it compels action. That's how Plato thinks things are, I think. Viz., structured by goodness -- to which, if one apprehends it at least, one is helpless but to respond. No doubt when that kind of ontology is assumed, a theory of history into which it fits is deemed metaphysical rather than scientific. :) r. _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ________________________________________________________________________ AOL Email goes Mobile! You can now read your AOL Emails whilst on the move. Sign up for a free AOL Email account with unlimited storage today. _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 12:14:31 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Phil, Hans, I'll need to read those sections more carefully -- I am not sure, for myself, what verb I'd want to use to describe the relationship between RB and Habermas. Minimally, we know that both of them have a record of proposing lynch-pin arguments that they take to be Kantian in structure. Beyond that I'm not sure. I personally think that there is an enormous debt to Aristotle in RB. Not in this "judgment form" thing, particularly, but absolutely in other ways. "What is the world like such that we can know it (viz., it's form)?" -- it's an oddly Kantian formulation of De Anima. r. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Wed 02-Jul-08 7:56 AM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 Hi Ruth, Hans thanks Ruth, I know you weren't necessarily defending Bhaskar, and your point about Aristotle is helpful. I guess I was trying to see if Bhaskar was developing his own particular account of judgment specifically out of e.g. Aristotle, Kant or someone else in the tradition because it seems quite idiosyncratic, using terms that I myself didn't recognise. Actually, I think Hans is right that it seems very Habermassian but framed in an idiosyncratic language all of Bhaskar's own which is more confusing than it needs to be as a result. It might have been better if Bhaskar had explicitly referred to Habermas here. Thanks for your very useful comments Hans. I agree with a lot of what you say there and I'm glad that you too have problems with the structure of the argument I noted. I agree that putting it in context makes it appear somewhat less bald but I still think there is a tendency more generally for using specious forms of argument in order to arrive at convenient conclusions. I think the "derivation" of solidarity on that same page is even more suspect, or just weird, but I might be missing something. I say this as someone who found many (not all) of the arguments of SRHE quite compelling and the account of explanatory critique that Bhaskar puts forward generally very attractive. I just think he is sometimes too hasty in his attempt to derive socialism (as he sees it) from science (as he sees it). I also agree with the view that truth-talk fulfils an axiological need and I think Bhaskar is trying to draw ethical universals from this in a practically identical manner to Habermas. Again, reference to Habermas might have been useful here as I think he is drawing on him heavily, and even if he weren't (which I doubt) he could still bring in Habermas for contrast and contextualisation given that the structure of the argument is so similar. In any case, I would moot the following: I think it is possible to make strong claims about how the world is and qualify those statements with "but that's just me and I wouldn't want you to base any of your own actions on that (personal) judgment". In that case I am not advising, but simply stating what I take the world to be like. I don't want you to base your actions on my judgment because I may be wrong and I don't want to take responsibility away from you for your own decisions etc. So I don't think we can get to advice from assertions about how the world is that easily. But even if I were advising, do you still think that that commits me necessarily to empowering the other to do the advised upon thing? Imagine X works in the field all day and makes 100 grains of corn from which he is able to feed himself and his family for a week. Y on the other hand prefers to spend his time in the hey with a local maid. Y complains to X that he cannot feed his family as well as X and X strongly advises Y to stop playing with the maid and start working in the field. In order to do so though Y will need proper tools of which X has plenty but Y has none. X could lend Y his tools thus empowering Y to act in accord with his advice. But he could also point out that last time he lent Y the tools he misused them and didn't bring them back/broke them or some other such thing. In this case X might be better to say to Y, "I have given you the advice of what I would do but if you really want to do it then you are going to have to find the means to do it yourse! lf". Generally, if I always empower another to do some advised thing then there is an issue of undermining the other's autonomy to do it him/herself. I think the T/P inc. and explanatory critique can work very well in some circumstances but we also have to be careful about bringing in our own political commitments and personal values as conclusions to premises that have already been implicitly loaded with said commitments and values. I share the goal of solidarity but question the manner of arriving at it in this particular case. Many thanks. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 02 July 2008 04:35 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: To Phil, Ruth. (Despain, Hans G) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 23:35:56 -0400 From: "Despain, Hans G" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] To Phil, Ruth. To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Phil, You are in the context of "Dialectic of Truth." I would agree with Bhaskar that truth-talk performs an axilogical need for human beings. So the sentence just prior to your quote from p. 222 says "So every speech act [based on Truth-talk] must be regarded as making an axilogical commitment." This is a summary of the arugment for his theory of explanatory critique. Thus, if we accept his argument in SRHE pp. 169-211 for explanatory critique (or some amended version as suggested by Hugh Lacey) then we do necessarily move from facts to value, or from truth-talk to an axilogical commitment. The sentence you dislike is still problematic, and it seems overstated. However, it is not an argument itself, it is a more or less a theorem based on preceding discussion of "Dialectic of Truth." The discusion on Truth is itself being put forth as a type of basis or context for his theory of explanatory critique; which unfolds in summary on page 258 (His full argument is only found in SRHE pp. 169-211). And the sentence you dislike is not possible to defend until after an understanding of his theory of explanatory critique. And I wouldn't want to defend it even then ... however, I think there is an easier defense. I don't think the problem is the one Ruth identifies, i.e. a need for seperate arugments, because Bhaskar is not making an arugment. Thus, it seems to me the statement is much more Habermasian in form. If someone *is* making judgement statements, based on truth-talk, i.e. meant as "universalizable" corresponding to Bhaskar's "adequate theory of truth" in all of its four components (see DPF:217), hence meaning or implying all four aspects of the judgement form (see DPF:221), then "To say how the world is is implicitly to advice agents to act on that basis, therefore not to assist or empower them when it is in one's capacity to do so is to be guilty of a theory/practice inconsistency, ceteris paribus." p.222. That makes the statement much more humble. The statement is radically dependent on the fact of someone making very bold claims about 'what I would do if I were you, and in your circumstances; and these such and such is true of your circumstances'. If I am making those bold judgements, and then say "good luck with all that" and walk away, there is a very serious T/P inc. If I am serious with my judgement/advise I should say 'come on I will show you my seriousness by helping you do what I would do if I was you'. If I don't you should be worried about the degree of seriousness and truth of my judgment on you, and advise for you. Thus, this is a theorem to guide practical action of agent two, following the advise *and* *action* from agent one (who is claiming universalizablity of his judgement/advise). Bhaskar is not making an argument for action based on moral realism, because he has not yet developed that arugment either. Hence, he is not making an ethical judgement himself against agent 1. Rather it must be a very simply guide to follow when receiving judgement/advise from someone. A way to judge the degree to which agent 1 is engaging in truth-talk or bullshit. Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon [pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 5:56 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 Hi I note your point Ruth about judgment form in Aristotle. I just feel that RB's treatment of this in dialectic is vague; he doesn't situate the concept at all, or explicate it very thoroughly, although it seems to be doing a lot of work. In any case, it's the criterion of universalisability that I'm wondering about, and whether judgment (practical judgment in any case) need be universalising. You will correct me if I'm wrong but phronesis is a particularistic form of judgment and not universalising. Hans, I'm just trying to read sections of DPF at the moment. I'm not sure yet what to make of it. But what do you (others) make of this argument?: "To say how the world is is implicitly to advice agents to act on that basis, therefore not to assist or empower them when it is in one's capacity to do so is to be guilty of a theory/practice inconsistency, ceteris paribus." p.222. I find this to be specious. I don't think to say how the world is necessarily implies any *advice* about how one is to act, and if it did, I don't think that one is guilty of TP inconsistency if one fails to empower someone to act in that way. The whole section around p.222 seems very iffy to me. thanks Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 22:15 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) 3. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (gerard walmsely) 4. Re: Question for List (Despain, Hans G) 5. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 11:02:03 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <543992.37795.qm at web56103.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Hi Ruth, It doesn't make sense because I'm not sure what to ask! I am thinking specifically of the opposition of speculative philosophy of history - what does it all mean, reason and historicity, providence, are we getting somewhere - and critical philosophy of history - can history be objective, etc. I would say that although Hegel and Heidegger make impressive attempts to explain the metaphysics through reason or philosophical principles, the lack of empirical description makes them uninteresting (Hegel on Africa!). Bhaskar joins company with these thinkers but his dialectic is unlike previous thinkers, it presumes realism. So perhaps he permits us simultaneously to describe a phase in history as part of the story of human emancipation AND in recognizable empirical terms, sort of Hegel AND Marx together. My real perplexity is what to do with Hegel and Heidegger and ultimately the metaphysics of history. When is it interesting and when just some elaborated system with no chance to claim to describe reality? Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com --- On Tue, 7/1/08, Ruth Groff wrote: From: Ruth Groff Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Date: Tuesday, July 1, 2008, 1:35 PM Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism_______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 19:44:55 +0100 From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** ------------------------------ Message: 3 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:06:33 -0700 From: "gerard walmsely" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Yan If you ask me, your concept of metaphysical history needs to be clarified. Do you see an inherent meaning in history, or do you have anyone specific in mind with whom you contrast Bhaskar? IYou might find the works of RG COllingwood useful for a view on history from a philosophical perspective. GW On Tue, Jul 1, 2008 at 11:00 AM, < critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) > 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) > From: Ian Verstegen > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 > From: "Ruth Groff" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Hi Ian, > > Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not > in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you > say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining > it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't > have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will > appreciate it! > > Thanks, > Ruth > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian > Verstegen > Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 > *********************************************** > ------------------------------ Message: 4 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 16:31:24 -0400 From: "Despain, Hans G" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian, I would reject the premise of your question: "Bhaskar provides 'another' metaphysics of history in his dialectic." Most generally DCR is an elaboration of the theory of explanatory critique. The two broadest implications being that social science is not neutral, or social science has political implications. The political implications can be potentially emancipatory. In this sense, ultimately Bhaskar in DPF is sketching out a new theory of ethics. Geo-historical processes demonstrate DCR, but Bhaskar's DPF is far from a metaphysics of history. (I do believe that Bhaskar as complicated his DCR metaphysically with an over emphasis on the concept of absence, and dialectic as the absenting of absence; but this is not a problem of metaphysics of history). Chistopher Lloyd published a book "The Structures of History" (1993), drawing heavily from CR, he argues that society transforms more or less independent from beliefs and theories (perhaps a case of Kantian self-dout or hermeneutical circle). I think in light of Bhaskar's DPF (not to mention SRHE) DCR would not endorse such a position. And if it is possible to argue that history has proceded largely independent from beliefs and theories, Bhaskar's aim in DPF is to change that. sincerely Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ian Verstegen [ianverstegen at yahoo.com] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. ------------------------------ Message: 5 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 17:15:42 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hey Phil, This is interesting. I am (believe it or not) checking my e-mail at the gym (I kid you not) so I can't be long about it, but what you say is interesting: viz., that the difference between a "science" of history and a "metaphysics" of history is their proponents' differential affirmation of empiricism. I predict a Kantian intervention to come, to the effect that the difference is not that about how one knows (only by observation or not) but about what one knows. It's a slippery slope from Kant back into empiricism, but still, you get the point. Anyway what you say is interesting. I think of talk about "the judgment form" as being vaguely Kantian, but you could argue that even in Aristotle there are distinct forms of jugment, more or less conceived as such (no pun intended) -- phronesis vs. nous+episteme, say. r. ________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 2:44 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 7 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 11 ************************************************ From RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu Wed Jul 2 12:54:42 2008 From: RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 14:54:42 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Small point References: Message-ID: Hi Phil, Simone Weil was way more nuts than Iris Murdoch. I don't know of anyone who refers to her. Though not because of the being nuts thing. I've been reading Murdoch on Kant and art and the particular (my gloss, not hers), recently. I like her. I never read any of her novels though. r. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Wed 02-Jul-08 2:38 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Small point Hi Ruth Agreed. Interesting that two major Platonist thinkers of our time were both "nuts". Murdoch was pretty nutty too. I think she has moments of genuine brilliance and originality but I also thought she suffered from intermittant consistency and coherence problems. Apropos Simone Weil, I have not read anything of hers but remember reading some blurb about the notion of absence in her thought and was wondering if that had been picked up by the theorists of absence within CR as I haven't seen her mentioned. Hans, thanks for interesting detailed comments. Will respond when had time to digest. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 02 July 2008 19:09 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 11 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Re. Very small point (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 14:09:19 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re. Very small point To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Phil, I'm not a particularly big fan of DPF, so I'm an easy sell on your skepticism about it. Plato is, I think, weak on weakness of will. The way the categories line up with him, weakness of will can really only be a failure to love and desire (and by extension be moved by) knowledge of the Good. W of w shows up, then, as a cognitive - or perhaps, philosophical - failing. The closest you get are fallen philosophers, of the sort that the characters of Socrates and Adeimantus discuss in the Republic. But even with them it is a matter of coming to desire something other than knowledge of the Good, not a matter of having the knowledge but acting otherwise. Aristotle has a much better sense of that, of knowing but not acting accordingly. And yes, Iris Murdoch is good on Plato on this. She gets a lot of what she says from Simone Weil, who was nuts I think, but also very good on this aspect of Plato. Don't you think? r. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Wed 02-Jul-08 1:45 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [Critical-Realism] Re. Very small point Ruth I wanted to say about judgment form that RB should justify his use of specifically these 4 forms of judgment. I agree that Kant developed his own forms of judgment on the basis of the judgment forms appropriated from Aristotle, and one can see the connection and development. But I don't see any arguments justifying the use of these four judgment forms in dialectic; they just seem to appear from nowhere. However, I've yet to digest much more of DPF so it could be the case that I've just missed something. I must admit to being quite confused about the so-called ethical tetrapolity around p.262 of DPF. It seems to be a rather pedantic and obscure way of arriving at the basic Aristotelian idea that the good (conceived as universal human flourishing)is/ought to be the object of human desire. I'm sure there's a lot more going on there but it's not easy to unpack. Re. Plato and action, I think I remember that being the case through reading Iris Murdoch, where if one apprehends the nature of the world correctly, one cannot fail to act according to the apprehension. I always wondered where that leaves weakness of the will. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 02 July 2008 17:14 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 7 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Very small point (Ruth Groff) 2. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 11:35:02 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Very small point To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Dogan, I was mostly joking -- I don't know anything about the philosophy of history. But I suppose it does seem as though the mere fact of a philosophy of history containing such an ontology would be the sort of thing that would lead those who hold "scientific" theories to deem it a "metaphysical" one. I'm probably provisionally skeptical about the distinction in the first place. But really I was teasing, if provocatively, as it's not an area that I know about. r. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Dogan G??men Sent: Wed 02-Jul-08 6:58 AM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Very small point Ruth asserts: Interesting. I had meant to send a ps saying that in fact one could, in principle at least, imagine a way-that-things-are [to use the technical term - :)] being such that it compels action. That's how Plato thinks things are, I think. Viz., structured by goodness -- to which, if one apprehends it at least, one is helpless but to respond. No doubt when that kind of ontology is assumed, a theory of history into which it fits is deemed metaphysical rather than scientific. :) Dogan asks: Ruth, can you please say more about how you come to this conclusion? ---------------------- Dogan G??men Author of The Adam Smith Problem: Reconciling Human Nature and Society in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations, I. B. Tauris, London&New York 2007 -----Original Message----- From: Ruth Groff To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Sent: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 7:04 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Very small point Hi Hans, You wrote: Bhaskar is not making an argument for action based on moral realism, because he has not yet developed that argument either. Interesting. I had meant to send a ps saying that in fact one could, in principle at least, imagine a way-that-things-are [to use the technical term - :)] being such that it compels action. That's how Plato thinks things are, I think. Viz., structured by goodness -- to which, if one apprehends it at least, one is helpless but to respond. No doubt when that kind of ontology is assumed, a theory of history into which it fits is deemed metaphysical rather than scientific. :) r. _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ________________________________________________________________________ AOL Email goes Mobile! You can now read your AOL Emails whilst on the move. Sign up for a free AOL Email account with unlimited storage today. _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2008 12:14:31 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Phil, Hans, I'll need to read those sections more carefully -- I am not sure, for myself, what verb I'd want to use to describe the relationship between RB and Habermas. Minimally, we know that both of them have a record of proposing lynch-pin arguments that they take to be Kantian in structure. Beyond that I'm not sure. I personally think that there is an enormous debt to Aristotle in RB. Not in this "judgment form" thing, particularly, but absolutely in other ways. "What is the world like such that we can know it (viz., it's form)?" -- it's an oddly Kantian formulation of De Anima. r. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Wed 02-Jul-08 7:56 AM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 Hi Ruth, Hans thanks Ruth, I know you weren't necessarily defending Bhaskar, and your point about Aristotle is helpful. I guess I was trying to see if Bhaskar was developing his own particular account of judgment specifically out of e.g. Aristotle, Kant or someone else in the tradition because it seems quite idiosyncratic, using terms that I myself didn't recognise. Actually, I think Hans is right that it seems very Habermassian but framed in an idiosyncratic language all of Bhaskar's own which is more confusing than it needs to be as a result. It might have been better if Bhaskar had explicitly referred to Habermas here. Thanks for your very useful comments Hans. I agree with a lot of what you say there and I'm glad that you too have problems with the structure of the argument I noted. I agree that putting it in context makes it appear somewhat less bald but I still think there is a tendency more generally for using specious forms of argument in order to arrive at convenient conclusions. I think the "derivation" of solidarity on that same page is even more suspect, or just weird, but I might be missing something. I say this as someone who found many (not all) of the arguments of SRHE quite compelling and the account of explanatory critique that Bhaskar puts forward generally very attractive. I just think he is sometimes too hasty in his attempt to derive socialism (as he sees it) from science (as he sees it). I also agree with the view that truth-talk fulfils an axiological need and I think Bhaskar is trying to draw ethical universals from this in a practically identical manner to Habermas. Again, reference to Habermas might have been useful here as I think he is drawing on him heavily, and even if he weren't (which I doubt) he could still bring in Habermas for contrast and contextualisation given that the structure of the argument is so similar. In any case, I would moot the following: I think it is possible to make strong claims about how the world is and qualify those statements with "but that's just me and I wouldn't want you to base any of your own actions on that (personal) judgment". In that case I am not advising, but simply stating what I take the world to be like. I don't want you to base your actions on my judgment because I may be wrong and I don't want to take responsibility away from you for your own decisions etc. So I don't think we can get to advice from assertions about how the world is that easily. But even if I were advising, do you still think that that commits me necessarily to empowering the other to do the advised upon thing? Imagine X works in the field all day and makes 100 grains of corn from which he is able to feed himself and his family for a week. Y on the other hand prefers to spend his time in the hey with a local maid. Y complains to X that he cannot feed his family as well as X and X strongly advises Y to stop playing with the maid and start working in the field. In order to do so though Y will need proper tools of which X has plenty but Y has none. X could lend Y his tools thus empowering Y to act in accord with his advice. But he could also point out that last time he lent Y the tools he misused them and didn't bring them back/broke them or some other such thing. In this case X might be better to say to Y, "I have given you the advice of what I would do but if you really want to do it then you are going to have to find the means to do it yourse! lf". Generally, if I always empower another to do some advised thing then there is an issue of undermining the other's autonomy to do it him/herself. I think the T/P inc. and explanatory critique can work very well in some circumstances but we also have to be careful about bringing in our own political commitments and personal values as conclusions to premises that have already been implicitly loaded with said commitments and values. I share the goal of solidarity but question the manner of arriving at it in this particular case. Many thanks. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 02 July 2008 04:35 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: To Phil, Ruth. (Despain, Hans G) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 23:35:56 -0400 From: "Despain, Hans G" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] To Phil, Ruth. To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Phil, You are in the context of "Dialectic of Truth." I would agree with Bhaskar that truth-talk performs an axilogical need for human beings. So the sentence just prior to your quote from p. 222 says "So every speech act [based on Truth-talk] must be regarded as making an axilogical commitment." This is a summary of the arugment for his theory of explanatory critique. Thus, if we accept his argument in SRHE pp. 169-211 for explanatory critique (or some amended version as suggested by Hugh Lacey) then we do necessarily move from facts to value, or from truth-talk to an axilogical commitment. The sentence you dislike is still problematic, and it seems overstated. However, it is not an argument itself, it is a more or less a theorem based on preceding discussion of "Dialectic of Truth." The discusion on Truth is itself being put forth as a type of basis or context for his theory of explanatory critique; which unfolds in summary on page 258 (His full argument is only found in SRHE pp. 169-211). And the sentence you dislike is not possible to defend until after an understanding of his theory of explanatory critique. And I wouldn't want to defend it even then ... however, I think there is an easier defense. I don't think the problem is the one Ruth identifies, i.e. a need for seperate arugments, because Bhaskar is not making an arugment. Thus, it seems to me the statement is much more Habermasian in form. If someone *is* making judgement statements, based on truth-talk, i.e. meant as "universalizable" corresponding to Bhaskar's "adequate theory of truth" in all of its four components (see DPF:217), hence meaning or implying all four aspects of the judgement form (see DPF:221), then "To say how the world is is implicitly to advice agents to act on that basis, therefore not to assist or empower them when it is in one's capacity to do so is to be guilty of a theory/practice inconsistency, ceteris paribus." p.222. That makes the statement much more humble. The statement is radically dependent on the fact of someone making very bold claims about 'what I would do if I were you, and in your circumstances; and these such and such is true of your circumstances'. If I am making those bold judgements, and then say "good luck with all that" and walk away, there is a very serious T/P inc. If I am serious with my judgement/advise I should say 'come on I will show you my seriousness by helping you do what I would do if I was you'. If I don't you should be worried about the degree of seriousness and truth of my judgment on you, and advise for you. Thus, this is a theorem to guide practical action of agent two, following the advise *and* *action* from agent one (who is claiming universalizablity of his judgement/advise). Bhaskar is not making an argument for action based on moral realism, because he has not yet developed that arugment either. Hence, he is not making an ethical judgement himself against agent 1. Rather it must be a very simply guide to follow when receiving judgement/advise from someone. A way to judge the degree to which agent 1 is engaging in truth-talk or bullshit. Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon [pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 5:56 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 Hi I note your point Ruth about judgment form in Aristotle. I just feel that RB's treatment of this in dialectic is vague; he doesn't situate the concept at all, or explicate it very thoroughly, although it seems to be doing a lot of work. In any case, it's the criterion of universalisability that I'm wondering about, and whether judgment (practical judgment in any case) need be universalising. You will correct me if I'm wrong but phronesis is a particularistic form of judgment and not universalising. Hans, I'm just trying to read sections of DPF at the moment. I'm not sure yet what to make of it. But what do you (others) make of this argument?: "To say how the world is is implicitly to advice agents to act on that basis, therefore not to assist or empower them when it is in one's capacity to do so is to be guilty of a theory/practice inconsistency, ceteris paribus." p.222. I find this to be specious. I don't think to say how the world is necessarily implies any *advice* about how one is to act, and if it did, I don't think that one is guilty of TP inconsistency if one fails to empower someone to act in that way. The whole section around p.222 seems very iffy to me. thanks Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 22:15 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) 3. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (gerard walmsely) 4. Re: Question for List (Despain, Hans G) 5. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 11:02:03 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <543992.37795.qm at web56103.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Hi Ruth, It doesn't make sense because I'm not sure what to ask! I am thinking specifically of the opposition of speculative philosophy of history - what does it all mean, reason and historicity, providence, are we getting somewhere - and critical philosophy of history - can history be objective, etc. I would say that although Hegel and Heidegger make impressive attempts to explain the metaphysics through reason or philosophical principles, the lack of empirical description makes them uninteresting (Hegel on Africa!). Bhaskar joins company with these thinkers but his dialectic is unlike previous thinkers, it presumes realism. So perhaps he permits us simultaneously to describe a phase in history as part of the story of human emancipation AND in recognizable empirical terms, sort of Hegel AND Marx together. My real perplexity is what to do with Hegel and Heidegger and ultimately the metaphysics of history. When is it interesting and when just some elaborated system with no chance to claim to describe reality? Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com --- On Tue, 7/1/08, Ruth Groff wrote: From: Ruth Groff Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Date: Tuesday, July 1, 2008, 1:35 PM Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism_______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 19:44:55 +0100 From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** ------------------------------ Message: 3 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:06:33 -0700 From: "gerard walmsely" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Yan If you ask me, your concept of metaphysical history needs to be clarified. Do you see an inherent meaning in history, or do you have anyone specific in mind with whom you contrast Bhaskar? IYou might find the works of RG COllingwood useful for a view on history from a philosophical perspective. GW On Tue, Jul 1, 2008 at 11:00 AM, < critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) > 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) > From: Ian Verstegen > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 > From: "Ruth Groff" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > > Hi Ian, > > Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not > in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you > say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining > it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't > have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will > appreciate it! > > Thanks, > Ruth > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian > Verstegen > Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List > > Dear List, > I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on > a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science > of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand > Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in > his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, > the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side > of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the > antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? > Thanks, > Ian > > Ian Verstegen > http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 > *********************************************** > ------------------------------ Message: 4 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 16:31:24 -0400 From: "Despain, Hans G" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Ian, I would reject the premise of your question: "Bhaskar provides 'another' metaphysics of history in his dialectic." Most generally DCR is an elaboration of the theory of explanatory critique. The two broadest implications being that social science is not neutral, or social science has political implications. The political implications can be potentially emancipatory. In this sense, ultimately Bhaskar in DPF is sketching out a new theory of ethics. Geo-historical processes demonstrate DCR, but Bhaskar's DPF is far from a metaphysics of history. (I do believe that Bhaskar as complicated his DCR metaphysically with an over emphasis on the concept of absence, and dialectic as the absenting of absence; but this is not a problem of metaphysics of history). Chistopher Lloyd published a book "The Structures of History" (1993), drawing heavily from CR, he argues that society transforms more or less independent from beliefs and theories (perhaps a case of Kantian self-dout or hermeneutical circle). I think in light of Bhaskar's DPF (not to mention SRHE) DCR would not endorse such a position. And if it is possible to argue that history has proceded largely independent from beliefs and theories, Bhaskar's aim in DPF is to change that. sincerely Hans ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ian Verstegen [ianverstegen at yahoo.com] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. ------------------------------ Message: 5 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 17:15:42 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hey Phil, This is interesting. I am (believe it or not) checking my e-mail at the gym (I kid you not) so I can't be long about it, but what you say is interesting: viz., that the difference between a "science" of history and a "metaphysics" of history is their proponents' differential affirmation of empiricism. I predict a Kantian intervention to come, to the effect that the difference is not that about how one knows (only by observation or not) but about what one knows. It's a slippery slope from Kant back into empiricism, but still, you get the point. Anyway what you say is interesting. I think of talk about "the judgment form" as being vaguely Kantian, but you could argue that even in Aristotle there are distinct forms of jugment, more or less conceived as such (no pun intended) -- phronesis vs. nous+episteme, say. r. ________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 2:44 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 2 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism The information contained in this e-mail is confidential. Please do not cross-post. This communication is intended only for the use of the addressee(s) and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, reliance, disclosure, distribution or copying of this communication may be prohibited by law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it and all copies from your system. Thank you. ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 4 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 7 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 11 ************************************************ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From louisirwin9 at aol.com Sat Jul 5 22:25:07 2008 From: louisirwin9 at aol.com (Louis Irwin) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2008 00:25:07 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Phil, Just a quick comment on universalisability. The suggestion that the invocation of universalisability is a "Kantian prejudice" may have things backwards. You are picturing the universaliser as someone who by default is always required to justify the alleged generalization, as if universalisability is akin to a species of empirical induction. Maybe that is the wrong picture when we deal with moral and practical reasoning. Maybe the default position should rather be universalisation, and it is incumbent on deniers to justify their denial. Let's say that you and I perceive that a particular situation calls for A to perform a certain action. My position is that I am committed to holding that in relevantly similar circumstances a similarly situated agent B would be required to perform the same action. That is because such universalisability is part of the very meaning of engaging in the practice of moral and practical reasoning. I don't think that is a prejudice, Kantian or otherwise; it is simply to understand what it means to be involved with practical reason. It is part of socialization into our culture. Now someone who more or less agrees with the above paragraph might disagree with me over a specific case. That is, I might hold that C is similarly situated to A and therefore ought to do such and such, whereas you might argue that C is not, contrary to appearances, really similarly situated and hence not under an obligation to do such and such (maybe there are considerations of which I was unaware). So we can agree on universalisability and disagree over a particular application, but such disputes occur against a shared understanding of universalisability - an understanding whose absence would make the disputes meaningless. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 2:45 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk Sun Jul 6 17:32:25 2008 From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 00:32:25 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] universalisability Message-ID: Hi Louis thanks for comments. I'm not an expert on this but from what I have read the idea that universalisability is inherent to the meaning of morality as such is something that Hare popularised on the basis of an acceptance of Kant's universalism. Are there not credible alternative views of morality that do not rely on this criterion in all cases? What about existentialism, moral particularism? (Insidentally, I think that Adorno saw in universalism the dominance of Kantian determinate judgment, the impulse to subsume particulars under general rules, as opposed to reflective judgment which apprehends particulars in their uniqueness, linking universlisation, or the universalising attitude, to domination.) MacIntyre also argues against identifying morality per se with universalisability in "What Morality is Not", arguing that there exists more than one sense of the term "moral". He argues that the universalisability thesis conflicts with the fact that the features of many moral situations are simply unique. I agree though that this might not defeat moral universalism in principle, if it could be determined that at least two moral situations were identical in all morally relevant respects. But since this would mean having two identical people the possibility seems difficult to envisage. I don't think this provides grounds for rejecting general moral rules though, but only for the idea that such moral rules are ever singularly sufficient to fully determine action. You make a point about universalism generally and not about Bhaskar specifically, but just in the context of Bhaskar's argument, he seems to want to establish solidarity from the "expressively veracious judgment form". An expressively veracious judgment is of the kind "If I had to act in these circumstances I would do X", i.e. sincere advice. I think this is not plausible. The judgment form "If I had to act in these circumstances I would X" is supposed to yield an axiological commitment to assist the addresse of your judgment. But I don't think this follows as a matter of logic simply from this premise, without already presupposing solidarity, or a concern for the other. Therefore I don't believe their is a logical or indeed pragmatic contradiction in saying "I would do X in such and such circumstances" and "I will not help you if you do X", or "I think you should do X by yourself, even though I agree that that course of action would be the one I would take". The argument is possible only with an additional premise, such that "I have a commitment to helping people in these types of situation". Bhaskar seems to want to bypass this factor because he wants to provide a moral (realist) basis for solidarity independent of subjective desire. In any case, even if one could, that is, even if solidarity were implicit in the expressive judgment "if I were you I would X", the premise itself is only contingent. There is no necessary reason why I should perform this particular judgment in the first place, or why I should want to enter into an advisory relation vis-a-vis another, unless I already enough about it. I share an interest in trying to find arguments for solidarity but I don't think Bhaskar's argument here demonstrates it. Any thoughts welcome. Phil. ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 06 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 14 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Louis Irwin) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2008 00:25:07 -0400 From: "Louis Irwin" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Phil, Just a quick comment on universalisability. The suggestion that the invocation of universalisability is a "Kantian prejudice" may have things backwards. You are picturing the universaliser as someone who by default is always required to justify the alleged generalization, as if universalisability is akin to a species of empirical induction. Maybe that is the wrong picture when we deal with moral and practical reasoning. Maybe the default position should rather be universalisation, and it is incumbent on deniers to justify their denial. Let's say that you and I perceive that a particular situation calls for A to perform a certain action. My position is that I am committed to holding that in relevantly similar circumstances a similarly situated agent B would be required to perform the same action. That is because such universalisability is part of the very meaning of engaging in the practice of moral and practical reasoning. I don't think that is a prejudice, Kantian or otherwise; it is simply to understand what it means to be involved with practical reason. It is part of socialization into our culture. Now someone who more or less agrees with the above paragraph might disagree with me over a specific case. That is, I might hold that C is similarly situated to A and therefore ought to do such and such, whereas you might argue that C is not, contrary to appearances, really similarly situated and hence not under an obligation to do such and such (maybe there are considerations of which I was unaware). So we can agree on universalisability and disagree over a particular application, but such disputes occur against a shared understanding of universalisability - an understanding whose absence would make the disputes meaningless. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 2:45 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 14 ************************************************ From RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu Sun Jul 6 21:30:28 2008 From: RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2008 23:30:28 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] universalisability References: Message-ID: Hi Phil, Louis, all Phil, you write: Are there not credible alternative views of morality that do not rely on this criterion in all cases? Of COURSE there are! Even, as you say, ones that don't rely on it in any cases! I think that the neo-Aristotelians (like MacIntyre, whom you mention) have made enough headway now that within philosophy, anyway, the liberal framework is no longer taken to be something for which one does not even have to argue. And I agree with you completely about Adorno - JM Bernstein has a great book on his implicit moral theory, by the way, which I'm reading now; very dense, but crystal clear; really exciting if you're interested in Adorno - but I think that in general the Marxists have been less successful in developing a non-liberal moral theory than have the Aristotelians. But it might be that I say this only because I don't know the Marxist-existentialist literature at all. r. From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Mon Jul 7 04:26:52 2008 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 11:26:52 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] universalisability In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Phil wrote: 'The judgment form "If I had to act in these circumstances I would X" is supposed to yield an axiological commitment to assist the addresse of your judgment. But I don't think this follows as a matter of logic simply from this premise, without already presupposing solidarity, or a concern for the other. ' Very briefly, I don't think he presupposes solidarity, he argues for it: there is an objective moral alethia of the species -- the free development of each as a condition of the free development of all. No-one can be truly free unless everyone else is. NB: He rejects abstract universalisability in favour of dialectical universalisability that is context-sensitive. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: 07 July 2008 00:32 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] universalisability Hi Louis thanks for comments. I'm not an expert on this but from what I have read the idea that universalisability is inherent to the meaning of morality as such is something that Hare popularised on the basis of an acceptance of Kant's universalism. Are there not credible alternative views of morality that do not rely on this criterion in all cases? What about existentialism, moral particularism? (Insidentally, I think that Adorno saw in universalism the dominance of Kantian determinate judgment, the impulse to subsume particulars under general rules, as opposed to reflective judgment which apprehends particulars in their uniqueness, linking universlisation, or the universalising attitude, to domination.) MacIntyre also argues against identifying morality per se with universalisability in "What Morality is Not", arguing that there exists more than one sense of the term "moral". He argues that the universalisability thesis conflicts with the fact that the features of many moral situations are simply unique. I agree though that this might not defeat moral universalism in principle, if it could be determined that at least two moral situations were identical in all morally relevant respects. But since this would mean having two identical people the possibility seems difficult to envisage. I don't think this provides grounds for rejecting general moral rules though, but only for the idea that such moral rules are ever singularly sufficient to fully determine action. You make a point about universalism generally and not about Bhaskar specifically, but just in the context of Bhaskar's argument, he seems to want to establish solidarity from the "expressively veracious judgment form". An expressively veracious judgment is of the kind "If I had to act in these circumstances I would do X", i.e. sincere advice. I think this is not plausible. The judgment form "If I had to act in these circumstances I would X" is supposed to yield an axiological commitment to assist the addresse of your judgment. But I don't think this follows as a matter of logic simply from this premise, without already presupposing solidarity, or a concern for the other. Therefore I don't believe their is a logical or indeed pragmatic contradiction in saying "I would do X in such and such circumstances" and "I will not help you if you do X", or "I think you should do X by yourself, even though I agree that that course of action would be the one I would take". The argument is possible only with an additional premise, such that "I have a commitment to helping people in these types of situation". Bhaskar seems to want to bypass this factor because he wants to provide a moral (realist) basis for solidarity independent of subjective desire. In any case, even if one could, that is, even if solidarity were implicit in the expressive judgment "if I were you I would X", the premise itself is only contingent. There is no necessary reason why I should perform this particular judgment in the first place, or why I should want to enter into an advisory relation vis-a-vis another, unless I already enough about it. I share an interest in trying to find arguments for solidarity but I don't think Bhaskar's argument here demonstrates it. Any thoughts welcome. Phil. ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 06 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 14 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Louis Irwin) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2008 00:25:07 -0400 From: "Louis Irwin" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Phil, Just a quick comment on universalisability. The suggestion that the invocation of universalisability is a "Kantian prejudice" may have things backwards. You are picturing the universaliser as someone who by default is always required to justify the alleged generalization, as if universalisability is akin to a species of empirical induction. Maybe that is the wrong picture when we deal with moral and practical reasoning. Maybe the default position should rather be universalisation, and it is incumbent on deniers to justify their denial. Let's say that you and I perceive that a particular situation calls for A to perform a certain action. My position is that I am committed to holding that in relevantly similar circumstances a similarly situated agent B would be required to perform the same action. That is because such universalisability is part of the very meaning of engaging in the practice of moral and practical reasoning. I don't think that is a prejudice, Kantian or otherwise; it is simply to understand what it means to be involved with practical reason. It is part of socialization into our culture. Now someone who more or less agrees with the above paragraph might disagree with me over a specific case. That is, I might hold that C is similarly situated to A and therefore ought to do such and such, whereas you might argue that C is not, contrary to appearances, really similarly situated and hence not under an obligation to do such and such (maybe there are considerations of which I was unaware). So we can agree on universalisability and disagree over a particular application, but such disputes occur against a shared understanding of universalisability - an understanding whose absence would make the disputes meaningless. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 2:45 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 14 ************************************************ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3244 (20080705) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From J.Mariategui at lse.ac.uk Mon Jul 7 06:34:07 2008 From: J.Mariategui at lse.ac.uk (Jose-Carlos Mariategui) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 13:34:07 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical Realism and Management / Technology Message-ID: <01052252-CAA0-458B-AD9E-D8428BFB218C@lse.ac.uk> Dear colleagues: I am looking for an article that can be useful to discuss the Critical Realism perspective through the management of information technology and organization. As many perhaps know there is a book that has some articles on the subject: Realist perspectives on management and organisations. S. Ackroyd and S. Fleetwood. London ; New York, Routledge (2001) However, the article that talks specifically on technology (Costello, N. (2001). Routines, strategy and change in high-technology small firms. Realist perspectives on management and organisations. S. Ackroyd and S. Fleetwood. London ; New York, Routledge: 161-180.) is to my perspective not the best example of a critical realist perspective on IT and organizations (or management). I would be very grateful if any of you have some ideas of articles on the subject that might be interesting to take a look on. I am interested particularly in recent articles that address more recent discussions such as the internet. thanks, jose-carlos mariategui Please access the attached hyperlink for an important electronic communications disclaimer: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/secretariat/legal/disclaimer.htm From johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com Mon Jul 7 06:55:29 2008 From: johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com (Mark Johnson) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 13:55:29 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical Realism and Management / Technology In-Reply-To: <01052252-CAA0-458B-AD9E-D8428BFB218C@lse.ac.uk> References: <01052252-CAA0-458B-AD9E-D8428BFB218C@lse.ac.uk> Message-ID: I would recommend John Mingers work as a starting point in that he bridges the gap between Management systems thinking (i.e. Stafford Beer, Checkland, Enid Mumford, etc - all of whom are pretty important to get to grips with) and a critical realist ontology. Although not specifically about technology (and particularly the social technological explosion of recent years) this is in my opinion the best place to start. McCluhan's obviously very important, along with Illich (tools for conviviality). Don Idhe's work on Heidegger is also good, and Hubert Dreyfuss also significant in the same vein. Within the CR community, Clive Lawson presents a nice synthesis/critique of a lot of this stuff. On the computer technology side, although he's not (explicitly) a critical realist, I would recommend Fernando Flores work - particularly on workflow (which he invented). But this is an emerging field with distinct camps (philosophers, systems people, etc) talking different languages, but saying often not dissimilar things! Also don't ignore Douglas Hofstadter's recent "I am a strange loop" - his first book since Godel, Escher, Bach... a fascinating view on technology and the person... his thought experiment on the 'personal' where he considers people as twins.. i.e. a 'Pairson' (he's made a career out of puns!) raises very effectively the issues of constructivism vs. realism, always with an eye to our rapidly changing technological landscape. Mark On Mon, Jul 7, 2008 at 1:34 PM, Jose-Carlos Mariategui < J.Mariategui at lse.ac.uk> wrote: > Dear colleagues: > > I am looking for an article that can be useful to discuss the Critical > Realism perspective through the management of information technology > and organization. As many perhaps know there is a book that has some > articles on the subject: > > Realist perspectives on management and organisations. S. Ackroyd and > S. Fleetwood. London ; New York, Routledge (2001) > > However, the article that talks specifically on technology (Costello, > N. (2001). Routines, strategy and change in high-technology small > firms. Realist perspectives on management and organisations. S. > Ackroyd and S. Fleetwood. London ; New York, Routledge: 161-180.) is > to my perspective not the best example of a critical realist > perspective on IT and organizations (or management). > > I would be very grateful if any of you have some ideas of articles on > the subject that might be interesting to take a look on. I am > interested particularly in recent articles that address more recent > discussions such as the internet. > > thanks, > > jose-carlos mariategui > > Please access the attached hyperlink for an important electronic > communications disclaimer: > http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/secretariat/legal/disclaimer.htm > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com Mon Jul 7 07:00:34 2008 From: johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com (Mark Johnson) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 14:00:34 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical Realism and Management / Technology In-Reply-To: References: <01052252-CAA0-458B-AD9E-D8428BFB218C@lse.ac.uk> Message-ID: should have mentioned Andrew Feenberg too - very interesting... specifically on the internet. On Mon, Jul 7, 2008 at 1:55 PM, Mark Johnson wrote: > I would recommend John Mingers work as a starting point in that he bridges > the gap between Management systems thinking (i.e. Stafford Beer, Checkland, > Enid Mumford, etc - all of whom are pretty important to get to grips with) > and a critical realist ontology. Although not specifically about technology > (and particularly the social technological explosion of recent years) this > is in my opinion the best place to start. > > McCluhan's obviously very important, along with Illich (tools for > conviviality). Don Idhe's work on Heidegger is also good, and Hubert > Dreyfuss also significant in the same vein. Within the CR community, Clive > Lawson presents a nice synthesis/critique of a lot of this stuff. On the > computer technology side, although he's not (explicitly) a critical realist, > I would recommend Fernando Flores work - particularly on workflow (which he > invented). But this is an emerging field with distinct camps (philosophers, > systems people, etc) talking different languages, but saying often not > dissimilar things! Also don't ignore Douglas Hofstadter's recent "I am a > strange loop" - his first book since Godel, Escher, Bach... a fascinating > view on technology and the person... his thought experiment on the > 'personal' where he considers people as twins.. i.e. a 'Pairson' (he's made > a career out of puns!) raises very effectively the issues of constructivism > vs. realism, always with an eye to our rapidly changing technological > landscape. > > Mark > > > On Mon, Jul 7, 2008 at 1:34 PM, Jose-Carlos Mariategui < > J.Mariategui at lse.ac.uk> wrote: > >> Dear colleagues: >> >> I am looking for an article that can be useful to discuss the Critical >> Realism perspective through the management of information technology >> and organization. As many perhaps know there is a book that has some >> articles on the subject: >> >> Realist perspectives on management and organisations. S. Ackroyd and >> S. Fleetwood. London ; New York, Routledge (2001) >> >> However, the article that talks specifically on technology (Costello, >> N. (2001). Routines, strategy and change in high-technology small >> firms. Realist perspectives on management and organisations. S. >> Ackroyd and S. Fleetwood. London ; New York, Routledge: 161-180.) is >> to my perspective not the best example of a critical realist >> perspective on IT and organizations (or management). >> >> I would be very grateful if any of you have some ideas of articles on >> the subject that might be interesting to take a look on. I am >> interested particularly in recent articles that address more recent >> discussions such as the internet. >> >> thanks, >> >> jose-carlos mariategui >> >> Please access the attached hyperlink for an important electronic >> communications disclaimer: >> http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/secretariat/legal/disclaimer.htm >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Mon Jul 7 10:13:37 2008 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 17:13:37 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical Realism and Management / Technology In-Reply-To: <01052252-CAA0-458B-AD9E-D8428BFB218C@lse.ac.uk> Message-ID: Opderbeck, David W., "Deconstructing Jefferson's Candle: Towards a Critical Realist Approach to Cultural Environmentalism and Information Policy" (February 2008). Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 1091024 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1091024 You can download the paper at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1091024 An impressive critique of the existing problematic, together with a critical realist alternative. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Jose-Carlos Mariategui Sent: 07 July 2008 13:34 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical Realism and Management / Technology Dear colleagues: I am looking for an article that can be useful to discuss the Critical Realism perspective through the management of information technology and organization. As many perhaps know there is a book that has some articles on the subject: Realist perspectives on management and organisations. S. Ackroyd and S. Fleetwood. London ; New York, Routledge (2001) However, the article that talks specifically on technology (Costello, N. (2001). Routines, strategy and change in high-technology small firms. Realist perspectives on management and organisations. S. Ackroyd and S. Fleetwood. London ; New York, Routledge: 161-180.) is to my perspective not the best example of a critical realist perspective on IT and organizations (or management). I would be very grateful if any of you have some ideas of articles on the subject that might be interesting to take a look on. I am interested particularly in recent articles that address more recent discussions such as the internet. thanks, jose-carlos mariategui Please access the attached hyperlink for an important electronic communications disclaimer: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/secretariat/legal/disclaimer.htm _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3245 (20080707) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Mon Jul 7 11:55:03 2008 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 18:55:03 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] JCR disaster in USA Message-ID: Listers might be interested to know that there are now 17 full price instutitional subs to JCR as compared to 13 when Equinox took over from Brill. None of these are in the US and I believe that there is only one e-only sub in the US, at Yale. This compares with 5 full price subs in Canada. It is not as though critical realists are not quite strong on the ground in quite a few places in the US. I would be really grateful if critical realists everywhere but US colleagues in particular pushed hard to try and ensure that their local library subscribes. The figures do not reflect any Consortia Sales, which will start to come through this year and which will be the main way in which future growth in institutional subs will occur. Still, individual institutional subs remain important. Many thanks, Mervyn Hartwig General Editor Journal of Critical Realism ISSN: 1476-7430 (print) ISSN: 1572-5138 (online) http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR on behalf of the editorial team and IACR From seo_mingyu at hotmail.com Mon Jul 7 12:13:39 2008 From: seo_mingyu at hotmail.com (Seo,MinGyu) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 18:13:39 +0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] JCR disaster in USA In-Reply-To: <6tcecr$sofbi@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> References: <6tcecr$sofbi@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: Dear Mervyn, How are you? I requested JCR Subscription to my school library, but I am not sure it does. I could go JCR website through the library, but the journal contents could not be opened. In addition, would you know me which institutions in USA, and also Asia (including Korea) subscrib JCR? My job search was not so successful. So, I will stay at Buffalo, New York for the next school year as a part-time instructor. Thank you. MinGyu. > From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu> Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 18:55:03 +0100> Subject: [Critical-Realism] JCR disaster in USA> > Listers might be interested to know that there are now 17 full price> instutitional subs to JCR as compared to 13 when Equinox took over from> Brill.> > None of these are in the US and I believe that there is only one e-only sub> in the US, at Yale. This compares with 5 full price subs in Canada. It is> not as though critical realists are not quite strong on the ground in quite> a few places in the US.> > I would be really grateful if critical realists everywhere but US colleagues> in particular pushed hard to try and ensure that their local library> subscribes. The figures do not reflect any Consortia Sales, which will start> to come through this year and which will be the main way in which future> growth in institutional subs will occur. Still, individual institutional> subs remain important.> > Many thanks,> > Mervyn Hartwig> General Editor> Journal of Critical Realism> ISSN: 1476-7430 (print)> ISSN: 1572-5138 (online) > http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR> on behalf of the editorial team and IACR> > > > > _______________________________________________> Critical-Realism mailing list> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _________________________________________________________________ ? ??? MSN ????, ?? ?? ?????! http://www.msn.co.kr From seo_mingyu at hotmail.com Mon Jul 7 12:14:58 2008 From: seo_mingyu at hotmail.com (Seo,MinGyu) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 18:14:58 +0000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] JCR disaster in USA In-Reply-To: References: <6tcecr$sofbi@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: Woops, SORRY!!!> From: seo_mingyu at hotmail.com> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu> Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 18:13:39 +0000> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] JCR disaster in USA> > > Dear Mervyn,> > How are you?> I requested JCR Subscription to my school library, but I am not sure it does. > I could go JCR website through the library, but the journal contents could not be opened. > In addition, would you know me which institutions in USA, and also Asia (including Korea) subscrib JCR?> My job search was not so successful.> So, I will stay at Buffalo, New York for the next school year as a part-time instructor. > > Thank you.> > MinGyu. > From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu> Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 18:55:03 +0100> Subject: [Critical-Realism] JCR disaster in USA> > Listers might be interested to know that there are now 17 full price> instutitional subs to JCR as compared to 13 when Equinox took over from> Brill.> > None of these are in the US and I believe that there is only one e-only sub> in the US, at Yale. This compares with 5 full price subs in Canada. It is> not as though critical realists are not quite strong on the ground in quite> a few places in the US.> > I would be really grateful if critical realists everywhere but US colleagues> in particular pushed hard to try and ensure that their local library> subscribes. The figures do not reflect any Consortia Sales, which will start> to come through this year and which will be the main way in which future> growth in institutional subs will occur. Still, individual institutional> subs remain important.> > Many thanks,> > Mervyn Hartwig> General Editor> Journal of Critical Realism> ISSN: 1476-7430 (print)> ISSN: 1572-5138 (online) > http://www.equinoxjournals.com/ojs/index.php/JCR> on behalf of the editorial team and IACR> > > > > _______________________________________________> Critical-Realism mailing list> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism> _________________________________________________________________> ? ??? MSN ????, ?? ?? ?????!> http://www.msn.co.kr> _______________________________________________> Critical-Realism mailing list> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _________________________________________________________________ ? ??? MSN ????, ?? ?? ?????! http://www.msn.co.kr From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk Mon Jul 7 13:23:00 2008 From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 20:23:00 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Universalisability, solidarity Message-ID: Hi Ruth, Mervyn Ruth, I'm in agreement with you on that then. I know the Bernstein book you mention and agree it's a great Adorno resource. Mervyn, yes thanks for pointing that out. That argument seems much more credible as well as much simpler and clearer. I will skip the other stuff and just go directly to that. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 07 July 2008 11:26 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 15 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: universalisability (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) 2. Re: universalisability (Ruth Groff) 3. Re: universalisability (Mervyn Hartwig) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 00:32:25 +0100 From: Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] universalisability To: "critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Hi Louis thanks for comments. I'm not an expert on this but from what I have read the idea that universalisability is inherent to the meaning of morality as such is something that Hare popularised on the basis of an acceptance of Kant's universalism. Are there not credible alternative views of morality that do not rely on this criterion in all cases? What about existentialism, moral particularism? (Insidentally, I think that Adorno saw in universalism the dominance of Kantian determinate judgment, the impulse to subsume particulars under general rules, as opposed to reflective judgment which apprehends particulars in their uniqueness, linking universlisation, or the universalising attitude, to domination.) MacIntyre also argues against identifying morality per se with universalisability in "What Morality is Not", arguing that there exists more than one sense of the term "moral". He argues that the universalisability thesis conflicts with the fact that the features of many moral situations are simply unique. I agree though that this might not defeat moral universalism in principle, if it could be determined that at least two moral situations were identical in all morally relevant respects. But since this would mean having two identical people the possibility seems difficult to envisage. I don't think this provides grounds for rejecting general moral rules though, but only for the idea that such moral rules are ever singularly sufficient to fully determine action. You make a point about universalism generally and not about Bhaskar specifically, but just in the context of Bhaskar's argument, he seems to want to establish solidarity from the "expressively veracious judgment form". An expressively veracious judgment is of the kind "If I had to act in these circumstances I would do X", i.e. sincere advice. I think this is not plausible. The judgment form "If I had to act in these circumstances I would X" is supposed to yield an axiological commitment to assist the addresse of your judgment. But I don't think this follows as a matter of logic simply from this premise, without already presupposing solidarity, or a concern for the other. Therefore I don't believe their is a logical or indeed pragmatic contradiction in saying "I would do X in such and such circumstances" and "I will not help you if you do X", or "I think you should do X by yourself, even though I agree that that course of action would be the one I would take". The argument is possible only with an additional premise, such that "I have a commitment to helping people in these types of situation". Bhaskar seems to want to bypass this factor because he wants to provide a moral (realist) basis for solidarity independent of subjective desire. In any case, even if one could, that is, even if solidarity were implicit in the expressive judgment "if I were you I would X", the premise itself is only contingent. There is no necessary reason why I should perform this particular judgment in the first place, or why I should want to enter into an advisory relation vis-a-vis another, unless I already enough about it. I share an interest in trying to find arguments for solidarity but I don't think Bhaskar's argument here demonstrates it. Any thoughts welcome. Phil. ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 06 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 14 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Louis Irwin) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2008 00:25:07 -0400 From: "Louis Irwin" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Phil, Just a quick comment on universalisability. The suggestion that the invocation of universalisability is a "Kantian prejudice" may have things backwards. You are picturing the universaliser as someone who by default is always required to justify the alleged generalization, as if universalisability is akin to a species of empirical induction. Maybe that is the wrong picture when we deal with moral and practical reasoning. Maybe the default position should rather be universalisation, and it is incumbent on deniers to justify their denial. Let's say that you and I perceive that a particular situation calls for A to perform a certain action. My position is that I am committed to holding that in relevantly similar circumstances a similarly situated agent B would be required to perform the same action. That is because such universalisability is part of the very meaning of engaging in the practice of moral and practical reasoning. I don't think that is a prejudice, Kantian or otherwise; it is simply to understand what it means to be involved with practical reason. It is part of socialization into our culture. Now someone who more or less agrees with the above paragraph might disagree with me over a specific case. That is, I might hold that C is similarly situated to A and therefore ought to do such and such, whereas you might argue that C is not, contrary to appearances, really similarly situated and hence not under an obligation to do such and such (maybe there are considerations of which I was unaware). So we can agree on universalisability and disagree over a particular application, but such disputes occur against a shared understanding of universalisability - an understanding whose absence would make the disputes meaningless. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 2:45 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 14 ************************************************ ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2008 23:30:28 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] universalisability To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Phil, Louis, all Phil, you write: Are there not credible alternative views of morality that do not rely on this criterion in all cases? Of COURSE there are! Even, as you say, ones that don't rely on it in any cases! I think that the neo-Aristotelians (like MacIntyre, whom you mention) have made enough headway now that within philosophy, anyway, the liberal framework is no longer taken to be something for which one does not even have to argue. And I agree with you completely about Adorno - JM Bernstein has a great book on his implicit moral theory, by the way, which I'm reading now; very dense, but crystal clear; really exciting if you're interested in Adorno - but I think that in general the Marxists have been less successful in developing a non-liberal moral theory than have the Aristotelians. But it might be that I say this only because I don't know the Marxist-existentialist literature at all. r. ------------------------------ Message: 3 Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 11:26:52 +0100 From: "Mervyn Hartwig" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] universalisability To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Phil wrote: 'The judgment form "If I had to act in these circumstances I would X" is supposed to yield an axiological commitment to assist the addresse of your judgment. But I don't think this follows as a matter of logic simply from this premise, without already presupposing solidarity, or a concern for the other. ' Very briefly, I don't think he presupposes solidarity, he argues for it: there is an objective moral alethia of the species -- the free development of each as a condition of the free development of all. No-one can be truly free unless everyone else is. NB: He rejects abstract universalisability in favour of dialectical universalisability that is context-sensitive. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: 07 July 2008 00:32 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] universalisability Hi Louis thanks for comments. I'm not an expert on this but from what I have read the idea that universalisability is inherent to the meaning of morality as such is something that Hare popularised on the basis of an acceptance of Kant's universalism. Are there not credible alternative views of morality that do not rely on this criterion in all cases? What about existentialism, moral particularism? (Insidentally, I think that Adorno saw in universalism the dominance of Kantian determinate judgment, the impulse to subsume particulars under general rules, as opposed to reflective judgment which apprehends particulars in their uniqueness, linking universlisation, or the universalising attitude, to domination.) MacIntyre also argues against identifying morality per se with universalisability in "What Morality is Not", arguing that there exists more than one sense of the term "moral". He argues that the universalisability thesis conflicts with the fact that the features of many moral situations are simply unique. I agree though that this might not defeat moral universalism in principle, if it could be determined that at least two moral situations were identical in all morally relevant respects. But since this would mean having two identical people the possibility seems difficult to envisage. I don't think this provides grounds for rejecting general moral rules though, but only for the idea that such moral rules are ever singularly sufficient to fully determine action. You make a point about universalism generally and not about Bhaskar specifically, but just in the context of Bhaskar's argument, he seems to want to establish solidarity from the "expressively veracious judgment form". An expressively veracious judgment is of the kind "If I had to act in these circumstances I would do X", i.e. sincere advice. I think this is not plausible. The judgment form "If I had to act in these circumstances I would X" is supposed to yield an axiological commitment to assist the addresse of your judgment. But I don't think this follows as a matter of logic simply from this premise, without already presupposing solidarity, or a concern for the other. Therefore I don't believe their is a logical or indeed pragmatic contradiction in saying "I would do X in such and such circumstances" and "I will not help you if you do X", or "I think you should do X by yourself, even though I agree that that course of action would be the one I would take". The argument is possible only with an additional premise, such that "I have a commitment to helping people in these types of situation". Bhaskar seems to want to bypass this factor because he wants to provide a moral (realist) basis for solidarity independent of subjective desire. In any case, even if one could, that is, even if solidarity were implicit in the expressive judgment "if I were you I would X", the premise itself is only contingent. There is no necessary reason why I should perform this particular judgment in the first place, or why I should want to enter into an advisory relation vis-a-vis another, unless I already enough about it. I share an interest in trying to find arguments for solidarity but I don't think Bhaskar's argument here demonstrates it. Any thoughts welcome. Phil. ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 06 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 14 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Louis Irwin) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2008 00:25:07 -0400 From: "Louis Irwin" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Phil, Just a quick comment on universalisability. The suggestion that the invocation of universalisability is a "Kantian prejudice" may have things backwards. You are picturing the universaliser as someone who by default is always required to justify the alleged generalization, as if universalisability is akin to a species of empirical induction. Maybe that is the wrong picture when we deal with moral and practical reasoning. Maybe the default position should rather be universalisation, and it is incumbent on deniers to justify their denial. Let's say that you and I perceive that a particular situation calls for A to perform a certain action. My position is that I am committed to holding that in relevantly similar circumstances a similarly situated agent B would be required to perform the same action. That is because such universalisability is part of the very meaning of engaging in the practice of moral and practical reasoning. I don't think that is a prejudice, Kantian or otherwise; it is simply to understand what it means to be involved with practical reason. It is part of socialization into our culture. Now someone who more or less agrees with the above paragraph might disagree with me over a specific case. That is, I might hold that C is similarly situated to A and therefore ought to do such and such, whereas you might argue that C is not, contrary to appearances, really similarly situated and hence not under an obligation to do such and such (maybe there are considerations of which I was unaware). So we can agree on universalisability and disagree over a particular application, but such disputes occur against a shared understanding of universalisability - an understanding whose absence would make the disputes meaningless. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 2:45 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 14 ************************************************ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3244 (20080705) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 15 ************************************************ From louisirwin9 at aol.com Mon Jul 7 19:57:19 2008 From: louisirwin9 at aol.com (Louis Irwin) Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 21:57:19 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] universalisability In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Phil, My note was not intended to make a pitch for universalisability so much as to point out a bad reason to be against universalisability. The bad reason is based on picturing universalisability as being akin to empirical induction, with a skepticism about empirical induction being extended to universalisability. I wondered if your phrase "Kantian prejudice" was a skepticism along that line. There are indeed good reasons to be against universalisability, but I think one has to be careful not to conflate different positions. It is one thing to hold (A) that any moral judgment ought to be universalisable - that position merely views universalisability as a necessary condition of correct moral judgments, whatever might ground moral judgments. It is a much stronger position to hold (B) that universalisability is a sufficient as well as a necessary condition, providing a definition of what makes for correct moral judgments. My note really only was concerned with (A) - of course I'm not saying all that is implicit in my short note! I think it is very important not to identify universalisability with rule-following. Both Hare and MacIntyre make this conflation. In "After Virtue" MacIntyre persuasively attacks Hare's position as being "one according to which an agent can justify a particular judgment by referring to some universal rule from which it may be logically derived" (p. 18). Moreover of necessity this is combined with a reductionist foundationalism: "the process of justificatory reasoning must always terminate with the assertion of some rule or principle for which no further reason can be given...The terminus of justification is thus always, on this view, a not further to be justified choice, a choice unguided by criteria" (pp. 18-19) Hare's position is certainly a strong form of (B), and MacIntyre's attack is justified. However the view that MacIntyre attacks is clearly a rule-based universalisability, and I don't see why that particular understanding of universalisability is the only possible one. Universalisability may simply not be codified in a set of rules yet still be subject to rational standards of justification. Moreover, universalisability may only need to be a necessary, not sufficient, condition, as in (A). This brings us to moral particularism. The previous paragraph suggests that there are forms of universalisability that may not be codified in rules yet still be necessary for correct moral judgments. Since sufficiency has been dropped, such a view might be consonant with what otherwise would be thought of as a moral particularism. Perhaps moral socialization endows us with the ability to perceive, in specific situations, what the right thing to do is even though we can't justify by reference to a standard set of rules. At the same time, perhaps we also acquire the ability to see that if F is the right thing to do in specific situation A, then F is the right thing to do in "relevantly similar" specific situations. And we will argue amongst ourselves over "relevantly similar", which also cannot be codified in a set of rules. But it seems to me that a non-foundationalist universalisability is appropriate, albeit uncodified and messy. (I am following some views of McDowell on Aristotle and on rules in this paragraph.) I can't speak to how Adorno fits in. Finally, I share your qualms about the link between universalisability and solidarity. Still, there is something there. If I say to you "Ms. Smith says she won't give you the job" with the intent to deceive you, part of what I am saying is that if I were you I would act on what I just said - of course that is a lie and does not express my true psychological state, but it is part of what I expressed in my words to you. Even the liar claims solidarity with the goals of his audience. Is that all RB means? I don't know. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Sunday, July 06, 2008 7:32 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] universalisability Hi Louis thanks for comments. I'm not an expert on this but from what I have read the idea that universalisability is inherent to the meaning of morality as such is something that Hare popularised on the basis of an acceptance of Kant's universalism. Are there not credible alternative views of morality that do not rely on this criterion in all cases? What about existentialism, moral particularism? (Insidentally, I think that Adorno saw in universalism the dominance of Kantian determinate judgment, the impulse to subsume particulars under general rules, as opposed to reflective judgment which apprehends particulars in their uniqueness, linking universlisation, or the universalising attitude, to domination.) MacIntyre also argues against identifying morality per se with universalisability in "What Morality is Not", arguing that there exists more than one sense of the term "moral". He argues that the universalisability thesis conflicts with the fact that the features of many moral situations are simply unique. I agree though that this might not defeat moral universalism in principle, if it could be determined that at least two moral situations were identical in all morally relevant respects. But since this would mean having two identical people the possibility seems difficult to envisage. I don't think this provides grounds for rejecting general moral rules though, but only for the idea that such moral rules are ever singularly sufficient to fully determine action. You make a point about universalism generally and not about Bhaskar specifically, but just in the context of Bhaskar's argument, he seems to want to establish solidarity from the "expressively veracious judgment form". An expressively veracious judgment is of the kind "If I had to act in these circumstances I would do X", i.e. sincere advice. I think this is not plausible. The judgment form "If I had to act in these circumstances I would X" is supposed to yield an axiological commitment to assist the addresse of your judgment. But I don't think this follows as a matter of logic simply from this premise, without already presupposing solidarity, or a concern for the other. Therefore I don't believe their is a logical or indeed pragmatic contradiction in saying "I would do X in such and such circumstances" and "I will not help you if you do X", or "I think you should do X by yourself, even though I agree that that course of action would be the one I would take". The argument is possible only with an additional premise, such that "I have a commitment to helping people in these types of situation". Bhaskar seems to want to bypass this factor because he wants to provide a moral (realist) basis for solidarity independent of subjective desire. In any case, even if one could, that is, even if solidarity were implicit in the expressive judgment "if I were you I would X", the premise itself is only contingent. There is no necessary reason why I should perform this particular judgment in the first place, or why I should want to enter into an advisory relation vis-a-vis another, unless I already enough about it. I share an interest in trying to find arguments for solidarity but I don't think Bhaskar's argument here demonstrates it. Any thoughts welcome. Phil. ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 06 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 14 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Louis Irwin) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2008 00:25:07 -0400 From: "Louis Irwin" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Phil, Just a quick comment on universalisability. The suggestion that the invocation of universalisability is a "Kantian prejudice" may have things backwards. You are picturing the universaliser as someone who by default is always required to justify the alleged generalization, as if universalisability is akin to a species of empirical induction. Maybe that is the wrong picture when we deal with moral and practical reasoning. Maybe the default position should rather be universalisation, and it is incumbent on deniers to justify their denial. Let's say that you and I perceive that a particular situation calls for A to perform a certain action. My position is that I am committed to holding that in relevantly similar circumstances a similarly situated agent B would be required to perform the same action. That is because such universalisability is part of the very meaning of engaging in the practice of moral and practical reasoning. I don't think that is a prejudice, Kantian or otherwise; it is simply to understand what it means to be involved with practical reason. It is part of socialization into our culture. Now someone who more or less agrees with the above paragraph might disagree with me over a specific case. That is, I might hold that C is similarly situated to A and therefore ought to do such and such, whereas you might argue that C is not, contrary to appearances, really similarly situated and hence not under an obligation to do such and such (maybe there are considerations of which I was unaware). So we can agree on universalisability and disagree over a particular application, but such disputes occur against a shared understanding of universalisability - an understanding whose absence would make the disputes meaningless. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 2:45 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 14 ************************************************ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk Thu Jul 10 05:30:58 2008 From: pohanlon03 at qub.ac.uk (Philip Anthony O'Hanlon) Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2008 12:30:58 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Universalisability - Louis Message-ID: Louis great response! I appreciate your thoughts on that. I'm off to the CR conference in London tomorrow and will try to pick this up again when get back. cheers Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 08 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 18 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: universalisability (Louis Irwin) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 21:57:19 -0400 From: "Louis Irwin" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] universalisability To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Phil, My note was not intended to make a pitch for universalisability so much as to point out a bad reason to be against universalisability. The bad reason is based on picturing universalisability as being akin to empirical induction, with a skepticism about empirical induction being extended to universalisability. I wondered if your phrase "Kantian prejudice" was a skepticism along that line. There are indeed good reasons to be against universalisability, but I think one has to be careful not to conflate different positions. It is one thing to hold (A) that any moral judgment ought to be universalisable - that position merely views universalisability as a necessary condition of correct moral judgments, whatever might ground moral judgments. It is a much stronger position to hold (B) that universalisability is a sufficient as well as a necessary condition, providing a definition of what makes for correct moral judgments. My note really only was concerned with (A) - of course I'm not saying all that is implicit in my short note! I think it is very important not to identify universalisability with rule-following. Both Hare and MacIntyre make this conflation. In "After Virtue" MacIntyre persuasively attacks Hare's position as being "one according to which an agent can justify a particular judgment by referring to some universal rule from which it may be logically derived" (p. 18). Moreover of necessity this is combined with a reductionist foundationalism: "the process of justificatory reasoning must always terminate with the assertion of some rule or principle for which no further reason can be given...The terminus of justification is thus always, on this view, a not further to be justified choice, a choice unguided by criteria" (pp. 18-19) Hare's position is certainly a strong form of (B), and MacIntyre's attack is justified. However the view that MacIntyre attacks is clearly a rule-based universalisability, and I don't see why that particular understanding of universalisability is the only possible one. Universalisability may simply not be codified in a set of rules yet still be subject to rational standards of justification. Moreover, universalisability may only need to be a necessary, not sufficient, condition, as in (A). This brings us to moral particularism. The previous paragraph suggests that there are forms of universalisability that may not be codified in rules yet still be necessary for correct moral judgments. Since sufficiency has been dropped, such a view might be consonant with what otherwise would be thought of as a moral particularism. Perhaps moral socialization endows us with the ability to perceive, in specific situations, what the right thing to do is even though we can't justify by reference to a standard set of rules. At the same time, perhaps we also acquire the ability to see that if F is the right thing to do in specific situation A, then F is the right thing to do in "relevantly similar" specific situations. And we will argue amongst ourselves over "relevantly similar", which also cannot be codified in a set of rules. But it seems to me that a non-foundationalist universalisability is appropriate, albeit uncodified and messy. (I am following some views of McDowell on Aristotle and on rules in this paragraph.) I can't speak to how Adorno fits in. Finally, I share your qualms about the link between universalisability and solidarity. Still, there is something there. If I say to you "Ms. Smith says she won't give you the job" with the intent to deceive you, part of what I am saying is that if I were you I would act on what I just said - of course that is a lie and does not express my true psychological state, but it is part of what I expressed in my words to you. Even the liar claims solidarity with the goals of his audience. Is that all RB means? I don't know. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Sunday, July 06, 2008 7:32 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] universalisability Hi Louis thanks for comments. I'm not an expert on this but from what I have read the idea that universalisability is inherent to the meaning of morality as such is something that Hare popularised on the basis of an acceptance of Kant's universalism. Are there not credible alternative views of morality that do not rely on this criterion in all cases? What about existentialism, moral particularism? (Insidentally, I think that Adorno saw in universalism the dominance of Kantian determinate judgment, the impulse to subsume particulars under general rules, as opposed to reflective judgment which apprehends particulars in their uniqueness, linking universlisation, or the universalising attitude, to domination.) MacIntyre also argues against identifying morality per se with universalisability in "What Morality is Not", arguing that there exists more than one sense of the term "moral". He argues that the universalisability thesis conflicts with the fact that the features of many moral situations are simply unique. I agree though that this might not defeat moral universalism in principle, if it could be determined that at least two moral situations were identical in all morally relevant respects. But since this would mean having two identical people the possibility seems difficult to envisage. I don't think this provides grounds for rejecting general moral rules though, but only for the idea that such moral rules are ever singularly sufficient to fully determine action. You make a point about universalism generally and not about Bhaskar specifically, but just in the context of Bhaskar's argument, he seems to want to establish solidarity from the "expressively veracious judgment form". An expressively veracious judgment is of the kind "If I had to act in these circumstances I would do X", i.e. sincere advice. I think this is not plausible. The judgment form "If I had to act in these circumstances I would X" is supposed to yield an axiological commitment to assist the addresse of your judgment. But I don't think this follows as a matter of logic simply from this premise, without already presupposing solidarity, or a concern for the other. Therefore I don't believe their is a logical or indeed pragmatic contradiction in saying "I would do X in such and such circumstances" and "I will not help you if you do X", or "I think you should do X by yourself, even though I agree that that course of action would be the one I would take". The argument is possible only with an additional premise, such that "I have a commitment to helping people in these types of situation". Bhaskar seems to want to bypass this factor because he wants to provide a moral (realist) basis for solidarity independent of subjective desire. In any case, even if one could, that is, even if solidarity were implicit in the expressive judgment "if I were you I would X", the premise itself is only contingent. There is no necessary reason why I should perform this particular judgment in the first place, or why I should want to enter into an advisory relation vis-a-vis another, unless I already enough about it. I share an interest in trying to find arguments for solidarity but I don't think Bhaskar's argument here demonstrates it. Any thoughts welcome. Phil. ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 06 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 14 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 (Louis Irwin) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2008 00:25:07 -0400 From: "Louis Irwin" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Phil, Just a quick comment on universalisability. The suggestion that the invocation of universalisability is a "Kantian prejudice" may have things backwards. You are picturing the universaliser as someone who by default is always required to justify the alleged generalization, as if universalisability is akin to a species of empirical induction. Maybe that is the wrong picture when we deal with moral and practical reasoning. Maybe the default position should rather be universalisation, and it is incumbent on deniers to justify their denial. Let's say that you and I perceive that a particular situation calls for A to perform a certain action. My position is that I am committed to holding that in relevantly similar circumstances a similarly situated agent B would be required to perform the same action. That is because such universalisability is part of the very meaning of engaging in the practice of moral and practical reasoning. I don't think that is a prejudice, Kantian or otherwise; it is simply to understand what it means to be involved with practical reason. It is part of socialization into our culture. Now someone who more or less agrees with the above paragraph might disagree with me over a specific case. That is, I might hold that C is similarly situated to A and therefore ought to do such and such, whereas you might argue that C is not, contrary to appearances, really similarly situated and hence not under an obligation to do such and such (maybe there are considerations of which I was unaware). So we can agree on universalisability and disagree over a particular application, but such disputes occur against a shared understanding of universalisability - an understanding whose absence would make the disputes meaningless. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Philip Anthony O'Hanlon Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 2:45 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Ian I'm interested in this question and will be curious to hear what people might say in response. Going off the distinctions in RTS between the three domains of the real, wouldn't you say that the difference between "science" and "metaphysics" here is actually a distinction between a purely empirical history and realist history. The former is primarily inductive dealing with manifest phenomena while the latter is also abductive seeking out real generative mechanisms, etc. Do you attach more meaning to the distinction than this? I can't remember where RB deals with questions of history. I was thinking of something else. In Dialectic RB says that moral reasoning is universalisable in form. He also says that all aspects of the "judgment form" in theoretical and practical reasoning are universalisable. I would like to know if there is any intellectual background to the concept of the "judgment form", as it seems to be playing quite a large role in dialectical ethics. IS it purely his own construction or is it inspired from somewhere in particular? Also, why does RB think that moral/practical reasoning is universalisable? This seems to be a Kantian prejudice. Phil ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 01 July 2008 19:00 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Question for List (Ian Verstegen) 2. Re: Question for List (Ruth Groff) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 10:33:35 -0700 (PDT) From: Ian Verstegen Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: <764888.3113.qm at web56111.mail.re3.yahoo.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2008 13:35:32 -0400 From: "Ruth Groff" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Question for List To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Hi Ian, Nice to hear from you! I don't really understand what you're asking. Not in any fancy way -- I just really don't understand what you mean. Can you say the part about the dialectic breaking through mere metaphysics, joining it etc., in plainer language? It sounds interesting; I just don't don't have a clue what you mean! I bet that all of us kids in the back row will appreciate it! Thanks, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ian Verstegen Sent: Tue 01-Jul-08 1:33 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] Question for List Dear List, I don't see much activity so maybe no one will mind if I ask for insight on a broad question: the relation of a metaphysics of history versus a science of history vis a vis Bhaskar's contribution to philosophy. On one hand Bhaskar provides 'another' (meant in the best way) metaphysics of history in his dialectic, a worthy successor to Hegel or Heidegger. On the other hand, the dialectic breaks through mere metaphysics, or joins it as another side of the empirical question of history. Is this a breaking through of the antinomy? I guess this is central to the passage to DCR? Thanks, Ian Ian Verstegen http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 1 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 14 ************************************************ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 18 ************************************************ From bradrose1 at comcast.net Sun Jul 13 19:08:45 2008 From: bradrose1 at comcast.net (Brad Rose) Date: Sun, 13 Jul 2008 21:08:45 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? Message-ID: <004a01c8e54e$2a81f970$1f12fea9@IBMKCMA0M2> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He argues, I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless humans are present to hear it and to organize it into music. This idea intrigued me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a neuroscientist's clothing. Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about these observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say there is no taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color without eyes processing light's wave length? No music without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's fall in the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human perception, there is no color? Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have paint on them, of course, but color only occurs when they interact with my eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound? (The question was first posed by the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a mental image created by the brain in response to vibrating molecules. Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the tree falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." Brad Brad Rose, Ph.D. bradrose1 at comcast.net The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon this information by persons or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. From briandick51 at gmail.com Sun Jul 13 21:32:52 2008 From: briandick51 at gmail.com (Brian Dick) Date: Sun, 13 Jul 2008 20:32:52 -0700 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? Message-ID: <4a0badc00807132032s33e1ee13vcaaaf3a89a7faabc@mail.gmail.com> Hi Brad, I'll start off the discussion. Isn't Levitin's thesis just another form of empiricism (and its underlying anthropocentrism)? That is, the level of the real (the potential of taste/tasting), is collapsed into the actual (someone actually tasting something) and the empirical (the sensation of taste). Or, more to the point, doesn't an object, such as a white wall, continue to reflect light at the same wavelength, whether observed or not? However, I think that the question of music brings up some interesting hermeneutic questions. For example, what is the difference between music and noise? When a tree falls in the forest it does make a sound when no one is around, but it takes some sort of intelligent (cultural, etc.) being to interpret whether or not the sound constitutes music. Just some thoughts. Best, Brian From RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu Sun Jul 13 21:33:42 2008 From: RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Sun, 13 Jul 2008 23:33:42 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? References: <004a01c8e54e$2a81f970$1f12fea9@IBMKCMA0M2> Message-ID: Hi Brad, I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, so as not to generate confusion. What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in part or whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that kind, but they are close, I think. Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no "sound." But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at first metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have "being experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you excise the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. But it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone heard them. There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, perception, etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think about it really seriously would need to dip into that. Them's my 2 cents anyway. Warmly, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Brad Rose Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He argues, I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless humans are present to hear it and to organize it into music. This idea intrigued me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a neuroscientist's clothing. Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about these observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say there is no taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color without eyes processing light's wave length? No music without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's fall in the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human perception, there is no color? Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have paint on them, of course, but color only occurs when they interact with my eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound? (The question was first posed by the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a mental image created by the brain in response to vibrating molecules. Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the tree falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." Brad Brad Rose, Ph.D. bradrose1 at comcast.net The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon this information by persons or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com Mon Jul 14 03:49:09 2008 From: johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com (Mark Johnson) Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2008 10:49:09 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: <004a01c8e54e$2a81f970$1f12fea9@IBMKCMA0M2> References: <004a01c8e54e$2a81f970$1f12fea9@IBMKCMA0M2> Message-ID: Hi Brad, I had a look at that book - found it really irritating! it struck me as a very positivist view both on music and neuroscience. I'd be interested to know what a neuroscientist like Antonio Damasio would say about music... I notice he's done some work with Alfred Brendel at his creativity research institute in California. I think he'd be more careful in his distinction-making.. On 7/14/08, Brad Rose wrote: > I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a Human > Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In the > introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He argues, I think, > that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless humans are present to hear > it and to organize it into music. This idea intrigued me. I guess it is > Berkeley again, in a neuroscientist's clothing. Anyway, I was wondering > what would Critical Realists say about these observations about taste, > color, and sound. Would CR say there is no taste without the human tongue > tasting it? No color without eyes processing light's wave length? No music > without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's fall in > the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air about, > but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or recording > instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human perception, there > is no color? > > > > Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. > > > > "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it is in > contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, sitting in my > fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my kitchen are not > "white" when I leave the room. They still have paint on them, of course, > but color only occurs when they interact with my eyes.. If a tree falls in > the forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound? (The > question was first posed by the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, > "no"---sound is a mental image created by the brain in response to vibrating > molecules. Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, > Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the tree > falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." > > > > Brad > > > > Brad Rose, Ph.D. > bradrose1 at comcast.net > > > > > > The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to > which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged > material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, dissemination or other > use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon this information by persons > or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you received > this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any > computer. > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com Mon Jul 14 04:26:25 2008 From: johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com (Mark Johnson) Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2008 11:26:25 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: References: <004a01c8e54e$2a81f970$1f12fea9@IBMKCMA0M2> Message-ID: To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have been predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step outside music to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people would call an 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to merely contribute to its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't partly true of all critique... different discussion!!) More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take the various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what music does. On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: > Hi Brad, > > I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, so as > not to generate confusion. > > What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of concept-dependent > objects -- things that are what they are in part or whole because of beliefs > that people hold, individually or collectively. The examples that you give > aren't exactly of that kind, but they are close, I think. > > Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively constituted > kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* "vibrations when they are > heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no "sound." But to say this is not to say > as much as it might seem at first metaphysically dramatic blush. The > "things" in question have "being experienced by a subject" built into them, > so if you excise the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. But > it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with > "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone heard > them. > > There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of this, > though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, perception, etc. I think > anyone in cr who was going to think about it really seriously would need to > dip into that. > > Them's my 2 cents anyway. > > Warmly, > Ruth > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Brad Rose > Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > > I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a Human > Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In the > introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He argues, I think, > that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless humans are present to hear > it and to organize it into music. This idea intrigued me. I guess it is > Berkeley again, in a neuroscientist's clothing. Anyway, I was wondering > what would Critical Realists say about these observations about taste, > color, and sound. Would CR say there is no taste without the human tongue > tasting it? No color without eyes processing light's wave length? No music > without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's fall in > the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air about, > but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or recording > instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human perception, there > is no color? > > > > Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. > > > > "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it is in > contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, sitting in my > fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my kitchen are not > "white" when I leave the room. They still have paint on them, of course, > but color only occurs when they interact with my eyes.. If a tree falls in > the forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound? (The > question was first posed by the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, > "no"---sound is a mental image created by the brain in response to vibrating > molecules. Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, > Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the tree > falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." > > > > Brad > > > > Brad Rose, Ph.D. > bradrose1 at comcast.net > > > > > > The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to > which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged > material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, dissemination or other > use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon this information by persons > or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you received > this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any > computer. > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > From RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu Mon Jul 14 07:54:55 2008 From: RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2008 09:54:55 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? References: <004a01c8e54e$2a81f970$1f12fea9@IBMKCMA0M2> Message-ID: Hi Mark, Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible simply because the object is one that is shot through with subjectivity. To conclude as much is the flip side of the positivist coin. And I don't think that the pragmatists are right that you can duck fundamental ontological question by replacing them with the kind that you suggest (though in their own right such questions are great, perhaps even more informative in terms of quantity of info generated; it's just that they always already presuppose a metaphysics). Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a different conclusion. r. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark Johnson Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have been predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step outside music to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people would call an 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to merely contribute to its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't partly true of all critique... different discussion!!) More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take the various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what music does. On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: > Hi Brad, > > I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, so as > not to generate confusion. > > What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of concept-dependent > objects -- things that are what they are in part or whole because of beliefs > that people hold, individually or collectively. The examples that you give > aren't exactly of that kind, but they are close, I think. > > Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively constituted > kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* "vibrations when they are > heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no "sound." But to say this is not to say > as much as it might seem at first metaphysically dramatic blush. The > "things" in question have "being experienced by a subject" built into them, > so if you excise the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. But > it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with > "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone heard > them. > > There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of this, > though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, perception, etc. I think > anyone in cr who was going to think about it really seriously would need to > dip into that. > > Them's my 2 cents anyway. > > Warmly, > Ruth > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Brad Rose > Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > > I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a Human > Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In the > introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He argues, I think, > that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless humans are present to hear > it and to organize it into music. This idea intrigued me. I guess it is > Berkeley again, in a neuroscientist's clothing. Anyway, I was wondering > what would Critical Realists say about these observations about taste, > color, and sound. Would CR say there is no taste without the human tongue > tasting it? No color without eyes processing light's wave length? No music > without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's fall in > the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air about, > but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or recording > instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human perception, there > is no color? > > > > Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. > > > > "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it is in > contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, sitting in my > fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my kitchen are not > "white" when I leave the room. They still have paint on them, of course, > but color only occurs when they interact with my eyes.. If a tree falls in > the forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound? (The > question was first posed by the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, > "no"---sound is a mental image created by the brain in response to vibrating > molecules. Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, > Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the tree > falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." > > > > Brad > > > > Brad Rose, Ph.D. > bradrose1 at comcast.net > > > > > > The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to > which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged > material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, dissemination or other > use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon this information by persons > or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you received > this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any > computer. > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com Mon Jul 14 12:10:34 2008 From: johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com (Mark Johnson) Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2008 19:10:34 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: References: <004a01c8e54e$2a81f970$1f12fea9@IBMKCMA0M2> Message-ID: Hi Ruth, If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We are basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain distinctions are efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive from a transcendental theory of science and seek to include the phenomena of art within them. Whilst I see much value in these distinctions, I see problems in describing phenomena as complex as music. In my view music presents us with a fundamental existential question no less profound than the existence of science. Given that music exists, what must the world be like? This is a different but related transcendental movement (although we can agree about ID/TD). In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing critiqued is a positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the causality of transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent unpredictable. In the arts the effects of critique are more directly causal and the unpredictabilities are more obvious. My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour being more deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), and at the same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so dialectical description is problematic. I cannot explain the F-sharp in bar 29 .. I just felt like it! If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental argument for science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). Presupposing a metahysics is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's important to do is to surface the metaphysics in the retroductive process. My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy (I'm not alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B-flat on top, why does a resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but physics of the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. Atonal music in the 20th derived from an assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it. For classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism was closely associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the Greeks, modal music was linked to a different ontology (music of the spheres). I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. Mark On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: > Hi Mark, > > Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible simply > because the object is one that is shot through with subjectivity. To > conclude as much is the flip side of the positivist coin. And I don't think > that the pragmatists are right that you can duck fundamental ontological > question by replacing them with the kind that you suggest (though in their > own right such questions are great, perhaps even more informative in terms > of quantity of info generated; it's just that they always already presuppose > a metaphysics). Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a > re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a different > conclusion. > > r. > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark Johnson > Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > > To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself > problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking > about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have been > predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step outside music > to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people would call an > 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to merely contribute to > its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't partly true of all > critique... different discussion!!) > > More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that > might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take the > various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, > biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce > mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage > musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the > sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what > music does. > > On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >> Hi Brad, >> >> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, so as >> not to generate confusion. >> >> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >> concept-dependent >> objects -- things that are what they are in part or whole because of >> beliefs >> that people hold, individually or collectively. The examples that you >> give >> aren't exactly of that kind, but they are close, I think. >> >> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively constituted >> kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* "vibrations when they are >> heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no "sound." But to say this is not to say >> as much as it might seem at first metaphysically dramatic blush. The >> "things" in question have "being experienced by a subject" built into >> them, >> so if you excise the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. >> But >> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone heard >> them. >> >> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of this, >> though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, perception, etc. I >> think >> anyone in cr who was going to think about it really seriously would need >> to >> dip into that. >> >> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >> >> Warmly, >> Ruth >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Brad Rose >> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? >> >> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a Human >> Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In the >> introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He argues, I think, >> that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless humans are present to >> hear >> it and to organize it into music. This idea intrigued me. I guess it is >> Berkeley again, in a neuroscientist's clothing. Anyway, I was wondering >> what would Critical Realists say about these observations about taste, >> color, and sound. Would CR say there is no taste without the human tongue >> tasting it? No color without eyes processing light's wave length? No >> music >> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's fall >> in >> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air about, >> but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or recording >> instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human perception, >> there >> is no color? >> >> >> >> Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >> >> >> >> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it is in >> contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, sitting in my >> fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my kitchen are not >> "white" when I leave the room. They still have paint on them, of course, >> but color only occurs when they interact with my eyes.. If a tree falls in >> the forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound? (The >> question was first posed by the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, >> "no"---sound is a mental image created by the brain in response to >> vibrating >> molecules. Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, >> Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the tree >> falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." >> >> >> >> Brad >> >> >> >> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >> bradrose1 at comcast.net >> >> >> >> >> >> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to >> which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged >> material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, dissemination or >> other >> use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon this information by >> persons >> or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you >> received >> this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any >> computer. >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > From seanfischer at earthlink.net Mon Jul 14 12:15:10 2008 From: seanfischer at earthlink.net (Sean Fischer) Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2008 14:15:10 -0400 (EDT) Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? QUESTION Message-ID: <31750265.1216059310771.JavaMail.root@mswamui-blood.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Hi CR fellow List enthusiasts: I am a graduate student from California State University studying National Security Studies now working in my thesis. I have been a member of this list for the past 6 + months, and continue to try an get my hands around Critical Realism (CR) - with the emphasis on learning new concepts. I would like to be able to integrate and apply the same to my professional work, academic studies, and in general my day-to-day life. Critical Realism - with its focus on a philosophy of perception concerned with the accuracy of human sense-data. As compared to: Defense Realism - a theory that anarchy on the world stage causes states to increase their security, resulting in greater instability. Political Realism - a theory that the primary motivation of states is the desire for power or security, rather than ideals or ethics. Tactical Realism - a genre of combat simulations in computer gaming. Is 'anyone' willing to take a few minutes and provide me the simple description of CR, or suggest how I might be able to better frame the concepts? I thought Brad Rose poised some really good questions to the list that would help me incorporate / or better understand how I might apply CR theory. Unfortunately this has not been the case. I have been reading all your replies, yet still left a little unsure of the foundational differences between Critical Realism used on Philosophy vs. variations of Realism used in International Relations and strategy. Possibly this a bit of a stretch and a bridge to far.....and I am making some a cross level fallacy that I have not yet realized. Out of fairness over my question for you and to better understand how to structure your comments, offers of guidance, and replies - I should add that I have a background in computer science and systems engineering of real-time visual communications systems. These systems work in conjunction with electronic sensors used for acquiring the what seems to me as the same human sense-data discussed in this "Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest" thread. I'm looking forward to your comments. Sean Fischer - Southern California -----Original Message----- >From: Ruth Groff >Sent: Jul 14, 2008 9:54 AM >To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > >Hi Mark, > >Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible simply because the object is one that is shot through with subjectivity. To conclude as much is the flip side of the positivist coin. And I don't think that the pragmatists are right that you can duck fundamental ontological question by replacing them with the kind that you suggest (though in their own right such questions are great, perhaps even more informative in terms of quantity of info generated; it's just that they always already presuppose a metaphysics). Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a different conclusion. > >r. > > >-----Original Message----- >From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark Johnson >Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > >To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking >about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have been >predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step outside music >to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people would call an >'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to merely contribute to >its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't partly true of all >critique... different discussion!!) > >More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take the >various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage >musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >music does. > >On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >> Hi Brad, >> >> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, so as >> not to generate confusion. >> >> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of concept-dependent >> objects -- things that are what they are in part or whole because of beliefs >> that people hold, individually or collectively. The examples that you give >> aren't exactly of that kind, but they are close, I think. >> >> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively constituted >> kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* "vibrations when they are >> heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no "sound." But to say this is not to say >> as much as it might seem at first metaphysically dramatic blush. The >> "things" in question have "being experienced by a subject" built into them, >> so if you excise the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. But >> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone heard >> them. >> >> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of this, >> though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, perception, etc. I think >> anyone in cr who was going to think about it really seriously would need to >> dip into that. >> >> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >> >> Warmly, >> Ruth >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Brad Rose >> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? >> >> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a Human >> Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In the >> introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He argues, I think, >> that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless humans are present to hear >> it and to organize it into music. This idea intrigued me. I guess it is >> Berkeley again, in a neuroscientist's clothing. Anyway, I was wondering >> what would Critical Realists say about these observations about taste, >> color, and sound. Would CR say there is no taste without the human tongue >> tasting it? No color without eyes processing light's wave length? No music >> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's fall in >> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air about, >> but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or recording >> instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human perception, there >> is no color? >> >> >> >> Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >> >> >> >> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it is in >> contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, sitting in my >> fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my kitchen are not >> "white" when I leave the room. They still have paint on them, of course, >> but color only occurs when they interact with my eyes.. If a tree falls in >> the forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound? (The >> question was first posed by the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, >> "no"---sound is a mental image created by the brain in response to vibrating >> molecules. Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, >> Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the tree >> falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." >> >> >> >> Brad >> >> >> >> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >> bradrose1 at comcast.net >> >> >> >> >> >> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to >> which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged >> material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, dissemination or other >> use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon this information by persons >> or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you received >> this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any >> computer. >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> > >_______________________________________________ >Critical-Realism mailing list >Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu Mon Jul 14 12:53:03 2008 From: RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2008 14:53:03 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? QUESTION References: <31750265.1216059310771.JavaMail.root@mswamui-blood.atl.sa.earthlink.net> Message-ID: Hi Sean, The huge difference between any kind of philosophical realism and the political science realisms is that none of the latter are ... well, philosophical at all. They just use the word "realism," sort of to make us all crazy! I say this as a professor of political theory, who routinely has to ask students to forget their IR terminology. The very best intro to cr, in my opinion, is still Andrew Collier's. I forget the exact title, but it's Verso, 1994 -- easily identifiable. You should read it. And then you should read some Bhaskar. I'd recommend that you start with The Possibility of Naturalism, given your interests. There are also a number of fine books in political sceince/IR, from a cr perspective, now out from Routledge. Check the Critical Realism: Interventions series. Warmly, Ruth -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Sean Fischer Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 2:15 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? QUESTION Hi CR fellow List enthusiasts: I am a graduate student from California State University studying National Security Studies now working in my thesis. I have been a member of this list for the past 6 + months, and continue to try an get my hands around Critical Realism (CR) - with the emphasis on learning new concepts. I would like to be able to integrate and apply the same to my professional work, academic studies, and in general my day-to-day life. Critical Realism - with its focus on a philosophy of perception concerned with the accuracy of human sense-data. As compared to: Defense Realism - a theory that anarchy on the world stage causes states to increase their security, resulting in greater instability. Political Realism - a theory that the primary motivation of states is the desire for power or security, rather than ideals or ethics. Tactical Realism - a genre of combat simulations in computer gaming. Is 'anyone' willing to take a few minutes and provide me the simple description of CR, or suggest how I might be able to better frame the concepts? I thought Brad Rose poised some really good questions to the list that would help me incorporate / or better understand how I might apply CR theory. Unfortunately this has not been the case. I have been reading all your replies, yet still left a little unsure of the foundational differences between Critical Realism used on Philosophy vs. variations of Realism used in International Relations and strategy. Possibly this a bit of a stretch and a bridge to far.....and I am making some a cross level fallacy that I have not yet realized. Out of fairness over my question for you and to better understand how to structure your comments, offers of guidance, and replies - I should add that I have a background in computer science and systems engineering of real-time visual communications systems. These systems work in conjunction with electronic sensors used for acquiring the what seems to me as the same human sense-data discussed in this "Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest" thread. I'm looking forward to your comments. Sean Fischer - Southern California -----Original Message----- >From: Ruth Groff >Sent: Jul 14, 2008 9:54 AM >To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > >Hi Mark, > >Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible simply because the object is one that is shot through with subjectivity. To conclude as much is the flip side of the positivist coin. And I don't think that the pragmatists are right that you can duck fundamental ontological question by replacing them with the kind that you suggest (though in their own right such questions are great, perhaps even more informative in terms of quantity of info generated; it's just that they always already presuppose a metaphysics). Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a different conclusion. > >r. > > >-----Original Message----- >From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark Johnson >Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > >To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking >about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have been >predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step outside music >to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people would call an >'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to merely contribute to >its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't partly true of all >critique... different discussion!!) > >More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take the >various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage >musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >music does. > >On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >> Hi Brad, >> >> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, so as >> not to generate confusion. >> >> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of concept-dependent >> objects -- things that are what they are in part or whole because of beliefs >> that people hold, individually or collectively. The examples that you give >> aren't exactly of that kind, but they are close, I think. >> >> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively constituted >> kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* "vibrations when they are >> heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no "sound." But to say this is not to say >> as much as it might seem at first metaphysically dramatic blush. The >> "things" in question have "being experienced by a subject" built into them, >> so if you excise the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. But >> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone heard >> them. >> >> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of this, >> though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, perception, etc. I think >> anyone in cr who was going to think about it really seriously would need to >> dip into that. >> >> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >> >> Warmly, >> Ruth >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Brad Rose >> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? >> >> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a Human >> Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In the >> introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He argues, I think, >> that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless humans are present to hear >> it and to organize it into music. This idea intrigued me. I guess it is >> Berkeley again, in a neuroscientist's clothing. Anyway, I was wondering >> what would Critical Realists say about these observations about taste, >> color, and sound. Would CR say there is no taste without the human tongue >> tasting it? No color without eyes processing light's wave length? No music >> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's fall in >> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air about, >> but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or recording >> instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human perception, there >> is no color? >> >> >> >> Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >> >> >> >> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it is in >> contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, sitting in my >> fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my kitchen are not >> "white" when I leave the room. They still have paint on them, of course, >> but color only occurs when they interact with my eyes.. If a tree falls in >> the forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound? (The >> question was first posed by the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, >> "no"---sound is a mental image created by the brain in response to vibrating >> molecules. Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, >> Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the tree >> falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." >> >> >> >> Brad >> >> >> >> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >> bradrose1 at comcast.net >> >> >> >> >> >> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to >> which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged >> material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, dissemination or other >> use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon this information by persons >> or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you received >> this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any >> computer. >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> > >_______________________________________________ >Critical-Realism mailing list >Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk Mon Jul 14 17:34:28 2008 From: matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk (Karl Maton) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 09:34:28 +1000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: References: <004a01c8e54e$2a81f970$1f12fea9@IBMKCMA0M2> Message-ID: <487BE284.4030901@yahoo.co.uk> Just a quickie as I'm exhausted by nonstop travel for 4 weeks, can't sleep when travelling (so that's a month on almost no sleep), it's very late, etc and probably won't have email for days so won't be able to engage with replies ... but the tree falling is not the same as music .... as Ruth says, music is NOT 'sound'. The analogy is false. Without not only 'a subject' but more importantly the social (though I agree with the thrust of the reply below, I find the 'a subject' discordant, as it were) there is no 'music'. No social, no music. Music is organised sound. The question then is: what organisation, whose organisation, when, where and how? It's not irrealist to be sociological. I am against social constructionism, I'm a social realist (semiotics are social and real) but troubled by the occasional allergic reaction of philosophy to sociology. Probably put badly, but see caveats above. Best, Karl Ruth Groff wrote: >Hi Brad, > >I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, so as not to generate confusion. > >What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in part or whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that kind, but they are close, I think. > >Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no "sound." But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at first metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have "being experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you excise the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. But it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone heard them. > >There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, perception, etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think about it really seriously would need to dip into that. > >Them's my 2 cents anyway. > >Warmly, >Ruth > > > >-----Original Message----- >From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Brad Rose >Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > >I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He argues, I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless humans are present to hear it and to organize it into music. This idea intrigued me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a neuroscientist's clothing. Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about these observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say there is no taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color without eyes processing light's wave length? No music without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's fall in the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human perception, there is no color? > > > >Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. > > > >"A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have paint on them, of course, but color only occurs when they interact with my eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound? (The question was first posed by the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a mental image created by the brain in response to vibrating molecules. Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the tree falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." > > > >Brad > > > >Brad Rose, Ph.D. >bradrose1 at comcast.net > > > > > >The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon this information by persons or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. >_______________________________________________ >Critical-Realism mailing list >Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > >------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >_______________________________________________ >Critical-Realism mailing list >Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > -- With best wishes, Karl ---- Dr Karl Maton Department of Sociology & Social Policy Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney http://www.KarlMaton.com Editorial Board, Journal of Critical Realism General Secretary, Australasian Association for Critical Realism From matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk Mon Jul 14 17:36:36 2008 From: matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk (Karl Maton) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 09:36:36 +1000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: References: <004a01c8e54e$2a81f970$1f12fea9@IBMKCMA0M2> Message-ID: <487BE304.40604@yahoo.co.uk> p.s. this is probably disciplinary, but I do not see how the question must necessarily become only transcendental unless that embraces the questions I've asked before. But I think Mark is kind of pointing towards these here. Mark Johnson wrote: >Hi Ruth, > >If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We are >basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain distinctions >are efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive from a >transcendental theory of science and seek to include the phenomena of >art within them. Whilst I see much value in these distinctions, I see >problems in describing phenomena as complex as music. In my view music >presents us with a fundamental existential question no less profound >than the existence of science. Given that music exists, what must the >world be like? This is a different but related transcendental movement >(although we can agree about ID/TD). > >In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing critiqued is >a positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the causality >of transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent >unpredictable. In the arts the effects of critique are more directly >causal and the unpredictabilities are more obvious. > >My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour being >more deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), and >at the same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so >dialectical description is problematic. I cannot explain the F-sharp >in bar 29 .. I just felt like it! > >If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental argument >for science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). Presupposing a >metahysics is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's >important to do is to surface the metaphysics in the retroductive >process. > >My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy >(I'm not alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B-flat on >top, why does a resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? >After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but physics >of the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. Atonal music >in the 20th derived from an assertion of the normativity and (for >Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted against >it. For classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism was >closely associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the Greeks, >modal music was linked to a different ontology (music of the spheres). >I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. > >Mark > >On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: > > >>Hi Mark, >> >>Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible simply >>because the object is one that is shot through with subjectivity. To >>conclude as much is the flip side of the positivist coin. And I don't think >>that the pragmatists are right that you can duck fundamental ontological >>question by replacing them with the kind that you suggest (though in their >>own right such questions are great, perhaps even more informative in terms >>of quantity of info generated; it's just that they always already presuppose >>a metaphysics). Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a >>re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a different >>conclusion. >> >>r. >> >> >>-----Original Message----- >>From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark Johnson >>Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >>To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? >> >>To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >>problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking >>about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have been >>predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step outside music >>to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people would call an >>'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to merely contribute to >>its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't partly true of all >>critique... different discussion!!) >> >>More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >>might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take the >>various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >>biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >>mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage >>musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >>sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >>music does. >> >>On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >> >> >>>Hi Brad, >>> >>>I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, so as >>>not to generate confusion. >>> >>>What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >>>concept-dependent >>>objects -- things that are what they are in part or whole because of >>>beliefs >>>that people hold, individually or collectively. The examples that you >>>give >>>aren't exactly of that kind, but they are close, I think. >>> >>>Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively constituted >>>kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* "vibrations when they are >>>heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no "sound." But to say this is not to say >>>as much as it might seem at first metaphysically dramatic blush. The >>>"things" in question have "being experienced by a subject" built into >>>them, >>>so if you excise the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. >>>But >>>it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >>>"vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone heard >>>them. >>> >>>There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of this, >>>though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, perception, etc. I >>>think >>>anyone in cr who was going to think about it really seriously would need >>>to >>>dip into that. >>> >>>Them's my 2 cents anyway. >>> >>>Warmly, >>>Ruth >>> >>> >>> >>>-----Original Message----- >>>From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Brad Rose >>>Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >>>To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? >>> >>>I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a Human >>>Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In the >>>introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He argues, I think, >>>that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless humans are present to >>>hear >>>it and to organize it into music. This idea intrigued me. I guess it is >>>Berkeley again, in a neuroscientist's clothing. Anyway, I was wondering >>>what would Critical Realists say about these observations about taste, >>>color, and sound. Would CR say there is no taste without the human tongue >>>tasting it? No color without eyes processing light's wave length? No >>>music >>>without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's fall >>>in >>>the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air about, >>>but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or recording >>>instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human perception, >>>there >>>is no color? >>> >>> >>> >>>Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >>> >>> >>> >>>"A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it is in >>>contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, sitting in my >>>fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my kitchen are not >>>"white" when I leave the room. They still have paint on them, of course, >>>but color only occurs when they interact with my eyes.. If a tree falls in >>>the forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound? (The >>>question was first posed by the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, >>>"no"---sound is a mental image created by the brain in response to >>>vibrating >>>molecules. Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, >>>Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the tree >>>falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." >>> >>> >>> >>>Brad >>> >>> >>> >>>Brad Rose, Ph.D. >>>bradrose1 at comcast.net >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to >>>which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged >>>material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, dissemination or >>>other >>>use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon this information by >>>persons >>>or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you >>>received >>>this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any >>>computer. >>>_______________________________________________ >>>Critical-Realism mailing list >>>Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >>> >>> >>_______________________________________________ >>Critical-Realism mailing list >>Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> > >_______________________________________________ >Critical-Realism mailing list >Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > -- With best wishes, Karl ---- Dr Karl Maton Department of Sociology & Social Policy Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney http://www.KarlMaton.com Editorial Board, Journal of Critical Realism General Secretary, Australasian Association for Critical Realism From matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk Mon Jul 14 17:38:31 2008 From: matonianuk at yahoo.co.uk (Karl Maton) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 09:38:31 +1000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: <487BE304.40604@yahoo.co.uk> References: <004a01c8e54e$2a81f970$1f12fea9@IBMKCMA0M2> <487BE304.40604@yahoo.co.uk> Message-ID: <487BE377.3050506@yahoo.co.uk> Enough from me, I'm about to collapse ... see some of you in London this weekend! :) (My 3rd conference in under 10 days, so if I burble and dribble at you, don't be surprised). Karl Maton wrote: >p.s. this is probably disciplinary, but I do not see how the question >must necessarily become only transcendental unless that embraces the >questions I've asked before. But I think Mark is kind of pointing >towards these here. > >Mark Johnson wrote: > > > >>Hi Ruth, >> >>If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We are >>basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain distinctions >>are efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive from a >>transcendental theory of science and seek to include the phenomena of >>art within them. Whilst I see much value in these distinctions, I see >>problems in describing phenomena as complex as music. In my view music >>presents us with a fundamental existential question no less profound >>than the existence of science. Given that music exists, what must the >>world be like? This is a different but related transcendental movement >>(although we can agree about ID/TD). >> >>In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing critiqued is >>a positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the causality >>of transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent >>unpredictable. In the arts the effects of critique are more directly >>causal and the unpredictabilities are more obvious. >> >>My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour being >>more deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), and >>at the same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so >>dialectical description is problematic. I cannot explain the F-sharp >>in bar 29 .. I just felt like it! >> >>If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental argument >>for science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). Presupposing a >>metahysics is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's >>important to do is to surface the metaphysics in the retroductive >>process. >> >>My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy >>(I'm not alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B-flat on >>top, why does a resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? >>After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but physics >>of the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. Atonal music >>in the 20th derived from an assertion of the normativity and (for >>Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted against >>it. For classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism was >>closely associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the Greeks, >>modal music was linked to a different ontology (music of the spheres). >>I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. >> >>Mark >> >>On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >> >> >> >> >>>Hi Mark, >>> >>>Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible simply >>>because the object is one that is shot through with subjectivity. To >>>conclude as much is the flip side of the positivist coin. And I don't think >>>that the pragmatists are right that you can duck fundamental ontological >>>question by replacing them with the kind that you suggest (though in their >>>own right such questions are great, perhaps even more informative in terms >>>of quantity of info generated; it's just that they always already presuppose >>>a metaphysics). Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a >>>re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a different >>>conclusion. >>> >>>r. >>> >>> >>>-----Original Message----- >>>From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark Johnson >>>Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >>>To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>>Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? >>> >>>To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >>>problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking >>>about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have been >>>predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step outside music >>>to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people would call an >>>'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to merely contribute to >>>its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't partly true of all >>>critique... different discussion!!) >>> >>>More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >>>might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take the >>>various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >>>biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >>>mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage >>>musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >>>sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >>>music does. >>> >>>On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>>Hi Brad, >>>> >>>>I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, so as >>>>not to generate confusion. >>>> >>>>What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >>>>concept-dependent >>>>objects -- things that are what they are in part or whole because of >>>>beliefs >>>>that people hold, individually or collectively. The examples that you >>>>give >>>>aren't exactly of that kind, but they are close, I think. >>>> >>>>Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively constituted >>>>kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* "vibrations when they are >>>>heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no "sound." But to say this is not to say >>>>as much as it might seem at first metaphysically dramatic blush. The >>>>"things" in question have "being experienced by a subject" built into >>>>them, >>>>so if you excise the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. >>>>But >>>>it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >>>>"vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone heard >>>>them. >>>> >>>>There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of this, >>>>though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, perception, etc. I >>>>think >>>>anyone in cr who was going to think about it really seriously would need >>>>to >>>>dip into that. >>>> >>>>Them's my 2 cents anyway. >>>> >>>>Warmly, >>>>Ruth >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>-----Original Message----- >>>>From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Brad Rose >>>>Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >>>>To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? >>>> >>>>I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a Human >>>>Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In the >>>>introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He argues, I think, >>>>that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless humans are present to >>>>hear >>>>it and to organize it into music. This idea intrigued me. I guess it is >>>>Berkeley again, in a neuroscientist's clothing. Anyway, I was wondering >>>>what would Critical Realists say about these observations about taste, >>>>color, and sound. Would CR say there is no taste without the human tongue >>>>tasting it? No color without eyes processing light's wave length? No >>>>music >>>>without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's fall >>>>in >>>>the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air about, >>>>but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or recording >>>>instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human perception, >>>>there >>>>is no color? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>"A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it is in >>>>contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, sitting in my >>>>fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my kitchen are not >>>>"white" when I leave the room. They still have paint on them, of course, >>>>but color only occurs when they interact with my eyes.. If a tree falls in >>>>the forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound? (The >>>>question was first posed by the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, >>>>"no"---sound is a mental image created by the brain in response to >>>>vibrating >>>>molecules. Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, >>>>Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the tree >>>>falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>Brad >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>Brad Rose, Ph.D. >>>>bradrose1 at comcast.net >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to >>>>which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged >>>>material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, dissemination or >>>>other >>>>use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon this information by >>>>persons >>>>or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you >>>>received >>>>this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any >>>>computer. >>>>_______________________________________________ >>>>Critical-Realism mailing list >>>>Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>_______________________________________________ >>>Critical-Realism mailing list >>>Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>_______________________________________________ >>Critical-Realism mailing list >>Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> >> > > > -- With best wishes, Karl ---- Dr Karl Maton Department of Sociology & Social Policy Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney http://www.KarlMaton.com Editorial Board, Journal of Critical Realism General Secretary, Australasian Association for Critical Realism From louisirwin9 at aol.com Mon Jul 14 22:48:36 2008 From: louisirwin9 at aol.com (Louis Irwin) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 00:48:36 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: <004a01c8e54e$2a81f970$1f12fea9@IBMKCMA0M2> Message-ID: Brad, A good way to think about the tree falling in the forest is to note that the word "sound" is ambiguous between a physical phenomenon (sound waves) and a psychological phenomenon (the way we perceive sound waves). Once you notice this, the question whether the falling tree makes a sound when no one is there to hear it depends on whether "sound" is used to mean a physical phenomenon or a perception. Yes in the first case, No in the second. That's Philosophy 101, and there's no trace of Berkeley. Again, "color" can refer to a specific wavelength (or range) of electromagnetic vibrations, or it can be used to refer to the way we experience those vibrations; physicists focus on the one, psychologists on the other, but both exist. Apparently Levitan did not take Philosophy 101 - he only seems to acknowledge psychological uses of terms like "sound" etc. Turning to music, I think we should conceive of music as a cultural object, just like any work of art. I don't see how you can disengage human action and subjectivity from cultural objects, and this is the point of the "transitive dimension". Now when you perceive a piece of music, there is also a physical presence of sound waves; however it would be unwise to conceive of "music" as simply ambiguous between a physical and a psychological phenomenon, in analogy to the "sound" of a tree falling. A piece of music is something that can be performed in different places and times, and while a performance of a piece seems to have the physical/psychological duality, it is dubious to hold that the piece as such has that duality. Maybe you could identify the piece with the score construed as an abstract cultural object which codifies a loose set of rules that define the range of specific performances. Things get very messy at this point; moreover, other types of artworks like paintings and films don't have performances in the way music and plays do, so there is likely no one-size-fits-all theory of artworks. My point here is merely that a "music" (and art in general) is not simply something that possesses a physical/psychological duality like the sound of a tree falling - there is much more going on. Again, I see no trace of Berkeley. Levitan seems to identify a piece of music with its performance (which one?) with the understanding of a "performance" as a psychological experience. Louis Irwin -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Brad Rose Sent: Sunday, July 13, 2008 9:09 PM To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He argues, I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless humans are present to hear it and to organize it into music. This idea intrigued me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a neuroscientist's clothing. Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about these observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say there is no taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color without eyes processing light's wave length? No music without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's fall in the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human perception, there is no color? Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have paint on them, of course, but color only occurs when they interact with my eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound? (The question was first posed by the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a mental image created by the brain in response to vibrating molecules. Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the tree falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." Brad Brad Rose, Ph.D. bradrose1 at comcast.net The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon this information by persons or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From louisirwin9 at aol.com Mon Jul 14 23:36:07 2008 From: louisirwin9 at aol.com (Louis Irwin) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 01:36:07 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Mark, I question your assertion that "Atonal music in the 20th derived from an assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it." That presents the rise of atonal music as a subjective rejection on the part of 20th century composers against the aesthetic of their predecessors. Charles Rosen tells quite a different story in his monograph "Arnold Schoenberg", in which he describes how the evolution of tonal music led internally to the increasing undermining of tonal relations themselves - a very dialectical account in substance, and one I would think would be more in line with Adorno's thinking (though I don't know if it is - Rosen does not mention Adorno). I also question your suggestion that the "physics of the harmonic series" justifies traditional tonal harmony in an absolute way. That would make music of Bach and after 'unnatural', because it is based on equal temperaments rather than the rational ratios of the harmonic series. Equal temperament makes the interval between any two notes a multiple of the 12th root of 2 (an irrational number), so all tonal music from Bach onwards ought to sound out of tune. Interestingly, there is a modern school of "just intonation" that does base their music on the harmonic series - and guess what? It's their music which sounds out of tune. I also don't understand how Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were "closely associated with the ontology of rationalism". Rosen's story in "The Classical Style" is that they discovered that tonal harmonies could be used to set up musical dramas and tensions that could then be resolved in new ways. They weren't simply following the ontology of the harmonic series, or otherwise cloaking rational relations in musical form! Louis Irwin -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark Johnson Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 2:11 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? Hi Ruth, If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We are basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain distinctions are efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive from a transcendental theory of science and seek to include the phenomena of art within them. Whilst I see much value in these distinctions, I see problems in describing phenomena as complex as music. In my view music presents us with a fundamental existential question no less profound than the existence of science. Given that music exists, what must the world be like? This is a different but related transcendental movement (although we can agree about ID/TD). In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing critiqued is a positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the causality of transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent unpredictable. In the arts the effects of critique are more directly causal and the unpredictabilities are more obvious. My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour being more deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), and at the same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so dialectical description is problematic. I cannot explain the F-sharp in bar 29 .. I just felt like it! If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental argument for science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). Presupposing a metahysics is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's important to do is to surface the metaphysics in the retroductive process. My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy (I'm not alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B-flat on top, why does a resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but physics of the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. Atonal music in the 20th derived from an assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it. For classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism was closely associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the Greeks, modal music was linked to a different ontology (music of the spheres). I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. Mark On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: > Hi Mark, > > Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible simply > because the object is one that is shot through with subjectivity. To > conclude as much is the flip side of the positivist coin. And I don't > think that the pragmatists are right that you can duck fundamental > ontological question by replacing them with the kind that you suggest > (though in their own right such questions are great, perhaps even more > informative in terms of quantity of info generated; it's just that > they always already presuppose a metaphysics). Indeed, substantively > what you say below is more or less a re-statement of what I said, just > less pointed, and directed to a different conclusion. > > r. > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark > Johnson > Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > > To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself > problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking > about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have been > predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step outside music > to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people would call an > 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to merely contribute to > its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't partly true of all > critique... different discussion!!) > > More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that > might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take the > various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, > biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce > mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage > musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the > sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what > music does. > > On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >> Hi Brad, >> >> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, >> so as not to generate confusion. >> >> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >> concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in part or >> whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or >> collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that >> kind, but they are close, I think. >> >> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively >> constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* >> "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no "sound." >> But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at first >> metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have "being >> experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you excise the >> subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. >> But >> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone >> heard them. >> >> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of >> this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, perception, >> etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think about it really >> seriously would need to dip into that. >> >> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >> >> Warmly, >> Ruth >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Brad >> Rose >> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? >> >> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a >> Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In >> the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He argues, >> I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless humans are >> present to hear it and to organize it into music. This idea intrigued >> me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a neuroscientist's clothing. >> Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about these >> observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say there is no >> taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color without eyes >> processing light's wave length? No music >> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's fall >> in >> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air >> about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or >> recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human >> perception, there is no color? >> >> >> >> Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >> >> >> >> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it >> is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, >> sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my >> kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have paint >> on them, of course, but color only occurs when they interact with my >> eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to hear it, >> does it make a sound? (The question was first posed by the Irish >> philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a mental image >> created by the brain in response to vibrating molecules. Similarly >> there can be no pitch without a human animal present, Suitable >> measuring devices can register the frequency made by the tree >> falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." >> >> >> >> Brad >> >> >> >> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >> bradrose1 at comcast.net >> >> >> >> >> >> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity >> to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or >> privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, >> dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance >> upon this information by persons or entities other than the intended >> recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, please >> contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com Tue Jul 15 00:25:24 2008 From: johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com (Mark Johnson) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 07:25:24 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ok - this is the discusson - it oscillates between realism and idealism. Rosen is an out-and-out constructivist, though! His view that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR critique. It's true that Schoenberg's motivation was 'continuity' (there was a lot of german nationalism in Schoenberg) - but the point is, it was based on critique (see 'Style and Idea'). So you have a music, there is a critique, and there is a transformed music. But it's still music - and 'Erwartung' is in the same league as the 'Nelson mass' (say...). The critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is. Rationalism was in the air in the late 18th century, and the exuberance, confidence (think of the Nelson mass) and logic of the music reflects this. The doubts that arose in the 20th century made it more difficult to finish things with a perfect cadence (although there are plenty, but never as 'certain' as in the classical period). I suppose a different way of saying this is that with the category of 'music' defined by Rosen, it disappears with the social. My personal experience however tells me that there is music without the social, and that Rosen's 'music' is not the whole story (he is still God in most music departments, though but he's so boring!!). I can't quite say what that means.. it's almost like saying 'the earth will still go round the sun' - well, what's 'going round' independent of an observer? it is the action of a mechanism... but don't mistake the mechanism for its description. Moreover, with the reality of music, the fact that all these questions are asked of it, sustains and transforms it. Personally, music is where my thinking starts... so it's kind-of real for me! Mark On 7/15/08, Louis Irwin wrote: > Mark, > > I question your assertion that "Atonal music in the 20th derived from an > assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of > diatonic harmony. it reacted against it." That presents the rise of atonal > music as a subjective rejection on the part of 20th century composers > against the aesthetic of their predecessors. Charles Rosen tells quite a > different story in his monograph "Arnold Schoenberg", in which he describes > how the evolution of tonal music led internally to the increasing > undermining of tonal relations themselves - a very dialectical account in > substance, and one I would think would be more in line with Adorno's > thinking (though I don't know if it is - Rosen does not mention Adorno). > > I also question your suggestion that the "physics of the harmonic series" > justifies traditional tonal harmony in an absolute way. That would make > music of Bach and after 'unnatural', because it is based on equal > temperaments rather than the rational ratios of the harmonic series. Equal > temperament makes the interval between any two notes a multiple of the 12th > root of 2 (an irrational number), so all tonal music from Bach onwards ought > to sound out of tune. Interestingly, there is a modern school of "just > intonation" that does base their music on the harmonic series - and guess > what? It's their music which sounds out of tune. > > I also don't understand how Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were "closely > associated with the ontology of rationalism". Rosen's story in "The > Classical Style" is that they discovered that tonal harmonies could be used > to set up musical dramas and tensions that could then be resolved in new > ways. They weren't simply following the ontology of the harmonic series, or > otherwise cloaking rational relations in musical form! > > Louis Irwin > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark > Johnson > Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 2:11 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > > Hi Ruth, > > If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We are > basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain distinctions are > efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive from a transcendental theory > of science and seek to include the phenomena of art within them. Whilst I > see much value in these distinctions, I see problems in describing phenomena > as complex as music. In my view music presents us with a fundamental > existential question no less profound than the existence of science. Given > that music exists, what must the world be like? This is a different but > related transcendental movement (although we can agree about ID/TD). > > In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing critiqued is a > positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the causality of > transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent unpredictable. In > the arts the effects of critique are more directly causal and the > unpredictabilities are more obvious. > > My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour being more > deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), and at the > same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so dialectical > description is problematic. I cannot explain the F-sharp in bar 29 .. I just > felt like it! > > If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental argument for > science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). Presupposing a metahysics > is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's important to do is to > surface the metaphysics in the retroductive process. > > My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy (I'm not > alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B-flat on top, why does a > resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? > After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but physics of > the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. Atonal music in the > 20th derived from an assertion of the normativity and (for > Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it. For > classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism was closely > associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the Greeks, modal music was > linked to a different ontology (music of the spheres). > I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. > > Mark > > On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >> Hi Mark, >> >> Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible simply >> because the object is one that is shot through with subjectivity. To >> conclude as much is the flip side of the positivist coin. And I don't >> think that the pragmatists are right that you can duck fundamental >> ontological question by replacing them with the kind that you suggest >> (though in their own right such questions are great, perhaps even more >> informative in terms of quantity of info generated; it's just that >> they always already presuppose a metaphysics). Indeed, substantively >> what you say below is more or less a re-statement of what I said, just >> less pointed, and directed to a different conclusion. >> >> r. >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark >> Johnson >> Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? >> >> To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >> problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking >> about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have been >> predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step outside music >> to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people would call an >> 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to merely contribute to >> its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't partly true of all >> critique... different discussion!!) >> >> More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >> might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take the >> various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >> biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >> mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage >> musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >> sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >> music does. >> >> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>> Hi Brad, >>> >>> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, >>> so as not to generate confusion. >>> >>> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >>> concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in part or >>> whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or >>> collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that >>> kind, but they are close, I think. >>> >>> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively >>> constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* >>> "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no "sound." >>> But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at first >>> metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have "being >>> experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you excise the >>> subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. >>> But >>> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >>> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone >>> heard them. >>> >>> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of >>> this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, perception, >>> etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think about it really >>> seriously would need to dip into that. >>> >>> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >>> >>> Warmly, >>> Ruth >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Brad >>> Rose >>> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >>> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? >>> >>> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a >>> Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In >>> the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He argues, >>> I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless humans are >>> present to hear it and to organize it into music. This idea intrigued >>> me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a neuroscientist's clothing. >>> Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about these >>> observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say there is no >>> taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color without eyes >>> processing light's wave length? No music >>> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's fall >>> in >>> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air >>> about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or >>> recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human >>> perception, there is no color? >>> >>> >>> >>> Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >>> >>> >>> >>> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it >>> is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, >>> sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my >>> kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have paint >>> on them, of course, but color only occurs when they interact with my >>> eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to hear it, >>> does it make a sound? (The question was first posed by the Irish >>> philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a mental image >>> created by the brain in response to vibrating molecules. Similarly >>> there can be no pitch without a human animal present, Suitable >>> measuring devices can register the frequency made by the tree >>> falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." >>> >>> >>> >>> Brad >>> >>> >>> >>> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >>> bradrose1 at comcast.net >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity >>> to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or >>> privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, >>> dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance >>> upon this information by persons or entities other than the intended >>> recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, please >>> contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Tue Jul 15 01:56:13 2008 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 08:56:13 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Hi Mark, etc., I like your notion that music is 'an emergent reality' with 'biopsychosocial reality', and further that it embraces the TD/ID distinction -- by which I take it you are reminding us that epistemology is constellationally contained within ontology: 'the critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is'. A transcendental argument about music would thus give us knowledge of the world and would be part of the science of musicology. Music on such an account is, like language or philosophy, a new ontological dimension which we reproduce and critique/change, creatively 'translating [anew] an invisible surface into another dimension' (Proust) every time we engage in it. The view that music is 'sound of a certain subjectively constituted kind' or 'socially organised sound' doesn't as such incorporate these notions. It isn't necessarily incompatible with them, but imo would be greatly improved if it explicitly incorporated them. "there is music without the social" -- Can you explain a little more what you mean by this? Do you mean that we are musical beings before we are socialised, or that that other life-forms have music, or that music must be implicit in being as possibility prior to human being...? Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark Johnson Sent: 15 July 2008 07:25 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? ok - this is the discusson - it oscillates between realism and idealism. Rosen is an out-and-out constructivist, though! His view that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR critique. It's true that Schoenberg's motivation was 'continuity' (there was a lot of german nationalism in Schoenberg) - but the point is, it was based on critique (see 'Style and Idea'). So you have a music, there is a critique, and there is a transformed music. But it's still music - and 'Erwartung' is in the same league as the 'Nelson mass' (say...). The critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is. Rationalism was in the air in the late 18th century, and the exuberance, confidence (think of the Nelson mass) and logic of the music reflects this. The doubts that arose in the 20th century made it more difficult to finish things with a perfect cadence (although there are plenty, but never as 'certain' as in the classical period). I suppose a different way of saying this is that with the category of 'music' defined by Rosen, it disappears with the social. My personal experience however tells me that there is music without the social, and that Rosen's 'music' is not the whole story (he is still God in most music departments, though but he's so boring!!). I can't quite say what that means.. it's almost like saying 'the earth will still go round the sun' - well, what's 'going round' independent of an observer? it is the action of a mechanism... but don't mistake the mechanism for its description. Moreover, with the reality of music, the fact that all these questions are asked of it, sustains and transforms it. Personally, music is where my thinking starts... so it's kind-of real for me! Mark On 7/15/08, Louis Irwin wrote: > Mark, > > I question your assertion that "Atonal music in the 20th derived from an > assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of > diatonic harmony. it reacted against it." That presents the rise of atonal > music as a subjective rejection on the part of 20th century composers > against the aesthetic of their predecessors. Charles Rosen tells quite a > different story in his monograph "Arnold Schoenberg", in which he describes > how the evolution of tonal music led internally to the increasing > undermining of tonal relations themselves - a very dialectical account in > substance, and one I would think would be more in line with Adorno's > thinking (though I don't know if it is - Rosen does not mention Adorno). > > I also question your suggestion that the "physics of the harmonic series" > justifies traditional tonal harmony in an absolute way. That would make > music of Bach and after 'unnatural', because it is based on equal > temperaments rather than the rational ratios of the harmonic series. Equal > temperament makes the interval between any two notes a multiple of the 12th > root of 2 (an irrational number), so all tonal music from Bach onwards ought > to sound out of tune. Interestingly, there is a modern school of "just > intonation" that does base their music on the harmonic series - and guess > what? It's their music which sounds out of tune. > > I also don't understand how Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were "closely > associated with the ontology of rationalism". Rosen's story in "The > Classical Style" is that they discovered that tonal harmonies could be used > to set up musical dramas and tensions that could then be resolved in new > ways. They weren't simply following the ontology of the harmonic series, or > otherwise cloaking rational relations in musical form! > > Louis Irwin > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark > Johnson > Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 2:11 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > > Hi Ruth, > > If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We are > basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain distinctions are > efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive from a transcendental theory > of science and seek to include the phenomena of art within them. Whilst I > see much value in these distinctions, I see problems in describing phenomena > as complex as music. In my view music presents us with a fundamental > existential question no less profound than the existence of science. Given > that music exists, what must the world be like? This is a different but > related transcendental movement (although we can agree about ID/TD). > > In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing critiqued is a > positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the causality of > transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent unpredictable. In > the arts the effects of critique are more directly causal and the > unpredictabilities are more obvious. > > My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour being more > deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), and at the > same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so dialectical > description is problematic. I cannot explain the F-sharp in bar 29 .. I just > felt like it! > > If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental argument for > science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). Presupposing a metahysics > is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's important to do is to > surface the metaphysics in the retroductive process. > > My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy (I'm not > alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B-flat on top, why does a > resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? > After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but physics of > the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. Atonal music in the > 20th derived from an assertion of the normativity and (for > Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it. For > classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism was closely > associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the Greeks, modal music was > linked to a different ontology (music of the spheres). > I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. > > Mark > > On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >> Hi Mark, >> >> Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible simply >> because the object is one that is shot through with subjectivity. To >> conclude as much is the flip side of the positivist coin. And I don't >> think that the pragmatists are right that you can duck fundamental >> ontological question by replacing them with the kind that you suggest >> (though in their own right such questions are great, perhaps even more >> informative in terms of quantity of info generated; it's just that >> they always already presuppose a metaphysics). Indeed, substantively >> what you say below is more or less a re-statement of what I said, just >> less pointed, and directed to a different conclusion. >> >> r. >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark >> Johnson >> Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? >> >> To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >> problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking >> about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have been >> predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step outside music >> to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people would call an >> 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to merely contribute to >> its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't partly true of all >> critique... different discussion!!) >> >> More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >> might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take the >> various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >> biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >> mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage >> musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >> sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >> music does. >> >> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>> Hi Brad, >>> >>> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, >>> so as not to generate confusion. >>> >>> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >>> concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in part or >>> whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or >>> collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that >>> kind, but they are close, I think. >>> >>> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively >>> constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* >>> "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no "sound." >>> But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at first >>> metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have "being >>> experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you excise the >>> subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. >>> But >>> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >>> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone >>> heard them. >>> >>> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of >>> this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, perception, >>> etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think about it really >>> seriously would need to dip into that. >>> >>> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >>> >>> Warmly, >>> Ruth >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Brad >>> Rose >>> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >>> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? >>> >>> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a >>> Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In >>> the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He argues, >>> I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless humans are >>> present to hear it and to organize it into music. This idea intrigued >>> me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a neuroscientist's clothing. >>> Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about these >>> observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say there is no >>> taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color without eyes >>> processing light's wave length? No music >>> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's fall >>> in >>> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air >>> about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or >>> recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human >>> perception, there is no color? >>> >>> >>> >>> Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >>> >>> >>> >>> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it >>> is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, >>> sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my >>> kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have paint >>> on them, of course, but color only occurs when they interact with my >>> eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to hear it, >>> does it make a sound? (The question was first posed by the Irish >>> philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a mental image >>> created by the brain in response to vibrating molecules. Similarly >>> there can be no pitch without a human animal present, Suitable >>> measuring devices can register the frequency made by the tree >>> falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." >>> >>> >>> >>> Brad >>> >>> >>> >>> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >>> bradrose1 at comcast.net >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity >>> to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or >>> privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, >>> dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance >>> upon this information by persons or entities other than the intended >>> recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, please >>> contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3266 (20080714) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From J.A.Toynbee at open.ac.uk Tue Jul 15 04:26:27 2008 From: J.A.Toynbee at open.ac.uk (J.A.Toynbee) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 11:26:27 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? Message-ID: Agreed about the emergent and ID/TD dimensions of music. But I wanted to go back to some earlier comments of Louis: "A piece of music is something that can be performed in different places and times, and while a performance of a piece seems to have the physical/psychological duality, it is dubious to hold that the piece as such has that duality. Maybe you could identify the piece with the score construed as an abstract cultural object which codifies a loose set of rules that define the range of specific performances. Things get very messy at this point; moreover, other types of artworks like paintings and films don't have performances in the way music and plays do, so there is likely no one-size-fits-all theory of artworks." The issue of the messiness of musical artworks doesn't only appear through comparison with other symbolic genres. It is also revealed through comparison between kinds of music. So, whereas western art music is very much premised on the model of a written work and and then performances of it (historically these change, yet in each case they are supposed to be the most adequate possible instantiations of the work), in other musical traditions there is no such duality. In reggae for instance the key rhythmic and motivic elemements of a particular recording (known as a 'riddim') may become canonised and subject to re-use in other recordings. Each one involves the 'translation' of preceding ones. Meanwhile new riddims are constantly developed, each in effect being the candidate for a new series of translations. Most non-western musics raise similar problems for any ontology of music which is fixated on the work/performance duality - such as the aesthetics of music literature whose endless and repetitive discussion of work/performance is incredibly unproductive and annoying. How to go beyond it? Simply by recognising the cultural/historical relativity of the musical work and the fact that we don't need any such entity to ground a musical ontology - for all the reasons discussed in the thread so far. A quick point on the shift from functional tonality to atonality in the early 20th century. It was surely a matter both of trasgressive critique *and* internal development. The latter aspect, and its seems to me this is true of all processes of stylistic innovation, consisted of growing semiotic redundancy such that the possibility of significant aesthetic emergence via new functional tonal works began to decline sharply. Jason -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: 15 July 2008 08:56 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? Hi Mark, etc., I like your notion that music is 'an emergent reality' with 'biopsychosocial reality', and further that it embraces the TD/ID distinction -- by which I take it you are reminding us that epistemology is constellationally contained within ontology: 'the critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is'. A transcendental argument about music would thus give us knowledge of the world and would be part of the science of musicology. Music on such an account is, like language or philosophy, a new ontological dimension which we reproduce and critique/change, creatively 'translating [anew] an invisible surface into another dimension' (Proust) every time we engage in it. The view that music is 'sound of a certain subjectively constituted kind' or 'socially organised sound' doesn't as such incorporate these notions. It isn't necessarily incompatible with them, but imo would be greatly improved if it explicitly incorporated them. "there is music without the social" -- Can you explain a little more what you mean by this? Do you mean that we are musical beings before we are socialised, or that that other life-forms have music, or that music must be implicit in being as possibility prior to human being...? Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark Johnson Sent: 15 July 2008 07:25 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? ok - this is the discusson - it oscillates between realism and idealism. Rosen is an out-and-out constructivist, though! His view that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR critique. It's true that Schoenberg's motivation was 'continuity' (there was a lot of german nationalism in Schoenberg) - but the point is, it was based on critique (see 'Style and Idea'). So you have a music, there is a critique, and there is a transformed music. But it's still music - and 'Erwartung' is in the same league as the 'Nelson mass' (say...). The critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is. Rationalism was in the air in the late 18th century, and the exuberance, confidence (think of the Nelson mass) and logic of the music reflects this. The doubts that arose in the 20th century made it more difficult to finish things with a perfect cadence (although there are plenty, but never as 'certain' as in the classical period). I suppose a different way of saying this is that with the category of 'music' defined by Rosen, it disappears with the social. My personal experience however tells me that there is music without the social, and that Rosen's 'music' is not the whole story (he is still God in most music departments, though but he's so boring!!). I can't quite say what that means.. it's almost like saying 'the earth will still go round the sun' - well, what's 'going round' independent of an observer? it is the action of a mechanism... but don't mistake the mechanism for its description. Moreover, with the reality of music, the fact that all these questions are asked of it, sustains and transforms it. Personally, music is where my thinking starts... so it's kind-of real for me! Mark On 7/15/08, Louis Irwin wrote: > Mark, > > I question your assertion that "Atonal music in the 20th derived from > an assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' > of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it." That presents the rise > of atonal > music as a subjective rejection on the part of 20th century composers > against the aesthetic of their predecessors. Charles Rosen tells quite > a different story in his monograph "Arnold Schoenberg", in which he describes > how the evolution of tonal music led internally to the increasing > undermining of tonal relations themselves - a very dialectical account > in substance, and one I would think would be more in line with > Adorno's thinking (though I don't know if it is - Rosen does not > mention Adorno). > > I also question your suggestion that the "physics of the harmonic > series" justifies traditional tonal harmony in an absolute way. That > would make music of Bach and after 'unnatural', because it is based on > equal temperaments rather than the rational ratios of the harmonic > series. Equal > temperament makes the interval between any two notes a multiple of the 12th > root of 2 (an irrational number), so all tonal music from Bach onwards ought > to sound out of tune. Interestingly, there is a modern school of > "just intonation" that does base their music on the harmonic series - > and guess what? It's their music which sounds out of tune. > > I also don't understand how Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were "closely > associated with the ontology of rationalism". Rosen's story in "The > Classical Style" is that they discovered that tonal harmonies could be used > to set up musical dramas and tensions that could then be resolved in > new ways. They weren't simply following the ontology of the harmonic > series, or > otherwise cloaking rational relations in musical form! > > Louis Irwin > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mark Johnson > Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 2:11 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > > Hi Ruth, > > If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We are > basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain distinctions > are efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive from a > transcendental theory > of science and seek to include the phenomena of art within them. > Whilst I see much value in these distinctions, I see problems in > describing phenomena > as complex as music. In my view music presents us with a fundamental > existential question no less profound than the existence of science. > Given that music exists, what must the world be like? This is a > different but related transcendental movement (although we can agree > about ID/TD). > > In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing critiqued is > a positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the causality > of transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent > unpredictable. In > the arts the effects of critique are more directly causal and the > unpredictabilities are more obvious. > > My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour being > more deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), and > at the same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so > dialectical description is problematic. I cannot explain the F-sharp > in bar 29 .. I just > felt like it! > > If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental argument > for science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). Presupposing a metahysics > is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's important to do is > to surface the metaphysics in the retroductive process. > > My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy > (I'm not > alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B-flat on top, why > does a > resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? > After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but physics > of the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. Atonal music > in the 20th derived from an assertion of the normativity and (for > Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted against > it. For > classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism was closely > associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the Greeks, modal > music was > linked to a different ontology (music of the spheres). > I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. > > Mark > > On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >> Hi Mark, >> >> Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible simply >> because the object is one that is shot through with subjectivity. To >> conclude as much is the flip side of the positivist coin. And I >> don't think that the pragmatists are right that you can duck >> fundamental ontological question by replacing them with the kind that >> you suggest (though in their own right such questions are great, >> perhaps even more informative in terms of quantity of info generated; >> it's just that they always already presuppose a metaphysics). >> Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a >> re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a >> different conclusion. >> >> r. >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark >> Johnson >> Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? >> >> To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >> problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking >> about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have been >> predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step outside >> music to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people would call >> an 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to merely >> contribute to its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't partly >> true of all critique... different discussion!!) >> >> More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >> might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take the >> various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >> biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >> mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage >> musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >> sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >> music does. >> >> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>> Hi Brad, >>> >>> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, >>> so as not to generate confusion. >>> >>> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >>> concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in part >>> or whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or >>> collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that >>> kind, but they are close, I think. >>> >>> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively >>> constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* >>> "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no >>> "sound." But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at >>> first metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have >>> "being experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you excise >>> the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. But >>> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >>> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone >>> heard them. >>> >>> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of >>> this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, perception, >>> etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think about it really >>> seriously would need to dip into that. >>> >>> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >>> >>> Warmly, >>> Ruth >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Brad >>> Rose >>> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >>> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>> Forest?? >>> >>> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a >>> Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In >>> the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He >>> argues, I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless >>> humans are present to hear it and to organize it into music. This >>> idea intrigued me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a >>> neuroscientist's clothing. Anyway, I was wondering what would >>> Critical Realists say about these observations about taste, color, >>> and sound. Would CR say there is no taste without the human tongue >>> tasting it? No color without eyes processing light's wave length? No music >>> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's fall >>> in >>> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air >>> about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or >>> recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human >>> perception, there is no color? >>> >>> >>> >>> Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >>> >>> >>> >>> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it >>> is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, >>> sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my >>> kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have >>> paint on them, of course, but color only occurs when they interact >>> with my eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to >>> hear it, does it make a sound? (The question was first posed by the >>> Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a mental >>> image created by the brain in response to vibrating molecules. >>> Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, >>> Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the >>> tree falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is >>> heard." >>> >>> >>> >>> Brad >>> >>> >>> >>> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >>> bradrose1 at comcast.net >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or >>> entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or >>> privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, >>> dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance >>> upon this information by persons or entities other than the intended >>> recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, please >>> contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3266 (20080714) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism --------------------------------- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). From dogangoecmen at aol.com Tue Jul 15 05:05:43 2008 From: dogangoecmen at aol.com (=?utf-8?Q?Do=C4=9Fan_G=C3=B6=C3=A7men?=) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 07:05:43 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Lacan's "The Subversion of the Subject..." Message-ID: <8CAB481DC3D2601-A80-495@WEBMAIL-DF03.sysops.aol.com> Dear All, I am looking for an English online source for Lacan's "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious". Can anyone help with this? Thanks, Dogan ?---------------------- Do?an G??men Author of The Adam Smith Problem: Reconciling Human Nature and Society in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations, I. B. Tauris, London&New York 2007 ________________________________________________________________________ AOL Email goes Mobile! You can now read your AOL Emails whilst on the move. Sign up for a free AOL Email account with unlimited storage today. From steveash at soton.ac.uk Tue Jul 15 07:25:13 2008 From: steveash at soton.ac.uk (Ash S.R.) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 14:25:13 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 24 In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: please ignore this message it is just a test to see how to post ________________________________________ From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu [critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu] Sent: 15 July 2008 11:26 To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 24 Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? (Mervyn Hartwig) 2. Re: Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? (J.A.Toynbee) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 08:56:13 +0100 From: "Mervyn Hartwig" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Hi Mark, etc., I like your notion that music is 'an emergent reality' with 'biopsychosocial reality', and further that it embraces the TD/ID distinction -- by which I take it you are reminding us that epistemology is constellationally contained within ontology: 'the critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is'. A transcendental argument about music would thus give us knowledge of the world and would be part of the science of musicology. Music on such an account is, like language or philosophy, a new ontological dimension which we reproduce and critique/change, creatively 'translating [anew] an invisible surface into another dimension' (Proust) every time we engage in it. The view that music is 'sound of a certain subjectively constituted kind' or 'socially organised sound' doesn't as such incorporate these notions. It isn't necessarily incompatible with them, but imo would be greatly improved if it explicitly incorporated them. "there is music without the social" -- Can you explain a little more what you mean by this? Do you mean that we are musical beings before we are socialised, or that that other life-forms have music, or that music must be implicit in being as possibility prior to human being...? Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark Johnson Sent: 15 July 2008 07:25 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? ok - this is the discusson - it oscillates between realism and idealism. Rosen is an out-and-out constructivist, though! His view that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR critique. It's true that Schoenberg's motivation was 'continuity' (there was a lot of german nationalism in Schoenberg) - but the point is, it was based on critique (see 'Style and Idea'). So you have a music, there is a critique, and there is a transformed music. But it's still music - and 'Erwartung' is in the same league as the 'Nelson mass' (say...). The critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is. Rationalism was in the air in the late 18th century, and the exuberance, confidence (think of the Nelson mass) and logic of the music reflects this. The doubts that arose in the 20th century made it more difficult to finish things with a perfect cadence (although there are plenty, but never as 'certain' as in the classical period). I suppose a different way of saying this is that with the category of 'music' defined by Rosen, it disappears with the social. My personal experience however tells me that there is music without the social, and that Rosen's 'music' is not the whole story (he is still God in most music departments, though but he's so boring!!). I can't quite say what that means.. it's almost like saying 'the earth will still go round the sun' - well, what's 'going round' independent of an observer? it is the action of a mechanism... but don't mistake the mechanism for its description. Moreover, with the reality of music, the fact that all these questions are asked of it, sustains and transforms it. Personally, music is where my thinking starts... so it's kind-of real for me! Mark On 7/15/08, Louis Irwin wrote: > Mark, > > I question your assertion that "Atonal music in the 20th derived from an > assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of > diatonic harmony. it reacted against it." That presents the rise of atonal > music as a subjective rejection on the part of 20th century composers > against the aesthetic of their predecessors. Charles Rosen tells quite a > different story in his monograph "Arnold Schoenberg", in which he describes > how the evolution of tonal music led internally to the increasing > undermining of tonal relations themselves - a very dialectical account in > substance, and one I would think would be more in line with Adorno's > thinking (though I don't know if it is - Rosen does not mention Adorno). > > I also question your suggestion that the "physics of the harmonic series" > justifies traditional tonal harmony in an absolute way. That would make > music of Bach and after 'unnatural', because it is based on equal > temperaments rather than the rational ratios of the harmonic series. Equal > temperament makes the interval between any two notes a multiple of the 12th > root of 2 (an irrational number), so all tonal music from Bach onwards ought > to sound out of tune. Interestingly, there is a modern school of "just > intonation" that does base their music on the harmonic series - and guess > what? It's their music which sounds out of tune. > > I also don't understand how Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were "closely > associated with the ontology of rationalism". Rosen's story in "The > Classical Style" is that they discovered that tonal harmonies could be used > to set up musical dramas and tensions that could then be resolved in new > ways. They weren't simply following the ontology of the harmonic series, or > otherwise cloaking rational relations in musical form! > > Louis Irwin > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark > Johnson > Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 2:11 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > > Hi Ruth, > > If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We are > basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain distinctions are > efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive from a transcendental theory > of science and seek to include the phenomena of art within them. Whilst I > see much value in these distinctions, I see problems in describing phenomena > as complex as music. In my view music presents us with a fundamental > existential question no less profound than the existence of science. Given > that music exists, what must the world be like? This is a different but > related transcendental movement (although we can agree about ID/TD). > > In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing critiqued is a > positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the causality of > transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent unpredictable. In > the arts the effects of critique are more directly causal and the > unpredictabilities are more obvious. > > My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour being more > deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), and at the > same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so dialectical > description is problematic. I cannot explain the F-sharp in bar 29 .. I just > felt like it! > > If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental argument for > science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). Presupposing a metahysics > is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's important to do is to > surface the metaphysics in the retroductive process. > > My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy (I'm not > alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B-flat on top, why does a > resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? > After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but physics of > the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. Atonal music in the > 20th derived from an assertion of the normativity and (for > Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it. For > classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism was closely > associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the Greeks, modal music was > linked to a different ontology (music of the spheres). > I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. > > Mark > > On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >> Hi Mark, >> >> Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible simply >> because the object is one that is shot through with subjectivity. To >> conclude as much is the flip side of the positivist coin. And I don't >> think that the pragmatists are right that you can duck fundamental >> ontological question by replacing them with the kind that you suggest >> (though in their own right such questions are great, perhaps even more >> informative in terms of quantity of info generated; it's just that >> they always already presuppose a metaphysics). Indeed, substantively >> what you say below is more or less a re-statement of what I said, just >> less pointed, and directed to a different conclusion. >> >> r. >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark >> Johnson >> Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? >> >> To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >> problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking >> about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have been >> predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step outside music >> to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people would call an >> 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to merely contribute to >> its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't partly true of all >> critique... different discussion!!) >> >> More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >> might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take the >> various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >> biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >> mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage >> musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >> sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >> music does. >> >> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>> Hi Brad, >>> >>> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, >>> so as not to generate confusion. >>> >>> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >>> concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in part or >>> whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or >>> collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that >>> kind, but they are close, I think. >>> >>> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively >>> constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* >>> "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no "sound." >>> But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at first >>> metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have "being >>> experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you excise the >>> subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. >>> But >>> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >>> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone >>> heard them. >>> >>> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of >>> this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, perception, >>> etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think about it really >>> seriously would need to dip into that. >>> >>> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >>> >>> Warmly, >>> Ruth >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Brad >>> Rose >>> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >>> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? >>> >>> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a >>> Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In >>> the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He argues, >>> I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless humans are >>> present to hear it and to organize it into music. This idea intrigued >>> me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a neuroscientist's clothing. >>> Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about these >>> observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say there is no >>> taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color without eyes >>> processing light's wave length? No music >>> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's fall >>> in >>> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air >>> about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or >>> recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human >>> perception, there is no color? >>> >>> >>> >>> Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >>> >>> >>> >>> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it >>> is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, >>> sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my >>> kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have paint >>> on them, of course, but color only occurs when they interact with my >>> eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to hear it, >>> does it make a sound? (The question was first posed by the Irish >>> philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a mental image >>> created by the brain in response to vibrating molecules. Similarly >>> there can be no pitch without a human animal present, Suitable >>> measuring devices can register the frequency made by the tree >>> falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." >>> >>> >>> >>> Brad >>> >>> >>> >>> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >>> bradrose1 at comcast.net >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity >>> to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or >>> privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, >>> dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance >>> upon this information by persons or entities other than the intended >>> recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, please >>> contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3266 (20080714) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 11:26:27 +0100 From: "J.A.Toynbee" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Agreed about the emergent and ID/TD dimensions of music. But I wanted to go back to some earlier comments of Louis: "A piece of music is something that can be performed in different places and times, and while a performance of a piece seems to have the physical/psychological duality, it is dubious to hold that the piece as such has that duality. Maybe you could identify the piece with the score construed as an abstract cultural object which codifies a loose set of rules that define the range of specific performances. Things get very messy at this point; moreover, other types of artworks like paintings and films don't have performances in the way music and plays do, so there is likely no one-size-fits-all theory of artworks." The issue of the messiness of musical artworks doesn't only appear through comparison with other symbolic genres. It is also revealed through comparison between kinds of music. So, whereas western art music is very much premised on the model of a written work and and then performances of it (historically these change, yet in each case they are supposed to be the most adequate possible instantiations of the work), in other musical traditions there is no such duality. In reggae for instance the key rhythmic and motivic elemements of a particular recording (known as a 'riddim') may become canonised and subject to re-use in other recordings. Each one involves the 'translation' of preceding ones. Meanwhile new riddims are constantly developed, each in effect being the candidate for a new series of translations. Most non-western musics raise similar problems for any ontology of music which is fixated on the work/performance duality - such as the aesthetics of music literature whose endless and repetitive discussion of work/performance is incredibly unproductive and annoying. How to go beyond it? Simply by recognising the cultural/historical relativity of the musical work and the fact that we don't need any such entity to ground a musical ontology - for all the reasons discussed in the thread so far. A quick point on the shift from functional tonality to atonality in the early 20th century. It was surely a matter both of trasgressive critique *and* internal development. The latter aspect, and its seems to me this is true of all processes of stylistic innovation, consisted of growing semiotic redundancy such that the possibility of significant aesthetic emergence via new functional tonal works began to decline sharply. Jason -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn Hartwig Sent: 15 July 2008 08:56 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? Hi Mark, etc., I like your notion that music is 'an emergent reality' with 'biopsychosocial reality', and further that it embraces the TD/ID distinction -- by which I take it you are reminding us that epistemology is constellationally contained within ontology: 'the critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is'. A transcendental argument about music would thus give us knowledge of the world and would be part of the science of musicology. Music on such an account is, like language or philosophy, a new ontological dimension which we reproduce and critique/change, creatively 'translating [anew] an invisible surface into another dimension' (Proust) every time we engage in it. The view that music is 'sound of a certain subjectively constituted kind' or 'socially organised sound' doesn't as such incorporate these notions. It isn't necessarily incompatible with them, but imo would be greatly improved if it explicitly incorporated them. "there is music without the social" -- Can you explain a little more what you mean by this? Do you mean that we are musical beings before we are socialised, or that that other life-forms have music, or that music must be implicit in being as possibility prior to human being...? Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark Johnson Sent: 15 July 2008 07:25 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? ok - this is the discusson - it oscillates between realism and idealism. Rosen is an out-and-out constructivist, though! His view that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR critique. It's true that Schoenberg's motivation was 'continuity' (there was a lot of german nationalism in Schoenberg) - but the point is, it was based on critique (see 'Style and Idea'). So you have a music, there is a critique, and there is a transformed music. But it's still music - and 'Erwartung' is in the same league as the 'Nelson mass' (say...). The critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is. Rationalism was in the air in the late 18th century, and the exuberance, confidence (think of the Nelson mass) and logic of the music reflects this. The doubts that arose in the 20th century made it more difficult to finish things with a perfect cadence (although there are plenty, but never as 'certain' as in the classical period). I suppose a different way of saying this is that with the category of 'music' defined by Rosen, it disappears with the social. My personal experience however tells me that there is music without the social, and that Rosen's 'music' is not the whole story (he is still God in most music departments, though but he's so boring!!). I can't quite say what that means.. it's almost like saying 'the earth will still go round the sun' - well, what's 'going round' independent of an observer? it is the action of a mechanism... but don't mistake the mechanism for its description. Moreover, with the reality of music, the fact that all these questions are asked of it, sustains and transforms it. Personally, music is where my thinking starts... so it's kind-of real for me! Mark On 7/15/08, Louis Irwin wrote: > Mark, > > I question your assertion that "Atonal music in the 20th derived from > an assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' > of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it." That presents the rise > of atonal > music as a subjective rejection on the part of 20th century composers > against the aesthetic of their predecessors. Charles Rosen tells quite > a different story in his monograph "Arnold Schoenberg", in which he describes > how the evolution of tonal music led internally to the increasing > undermining of tonal relations themselves - a very dialectical account > in substance, and one I would think would be more in line with > Adorno's thinking (though I don't know if it is - Rosen does not > mention Adorno). > > I also question your suggestion that the "physics of the harmonic > series" justifies traditional tonal harmony in an absolute way. That > would make music of Bach and after 'unnatural', because it is based on > equal temperaments rather than the rational ratios of the harmonic > series. Equal > temperament makes the interval between any two notes a multiple of the 12th > root of 2 (an irrational number), so all tonal music from Bach onwards ought > to sound out of tune. Interestingly, there is a modern school of > "just intonation" that does base their music on the harmonic series - > and guess what? It's their music which sounds out of tune. > > I also don't understand how Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were "closely > associated with the ontology of rationalism". Rosen's story in "The > Classical Style" is that they discovered that tonal harmonies could be used > to set up musical dramas and tensions that could then be resolved in > new ways. They weren't simply following the ontology of the harmonic > series, or > otherwise cloaking rational relations in musical form! > > Louis Irwin > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mark Johnson > Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 2:11 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > > Hi Ruth, > > If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We are > basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain distinctions > are efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive from a > transcendental theory > of science and seek to include the phenomena of art within them. > Whilst I see much value in these distinctions, I see problems in > describing phenomena > as complex as music. In my view music presents us with a fundamental > existential question no less profound than the existence of science. > Given that music exists, what must the world be like? This is a > different but related transcendental movement (although we can agree > about ID/TD). > > In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing critiqued is > a positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the causality > of transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent > unpredictable. In > the arts the effects of critique are more directly causal and the > unpredictabilities are more obvious. > > My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour being > more deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), and > at the same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so > dialectical description is problematic. I cannot explain the F-sharp > in bar 29 .. I just > felt like it! > > If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental argument > for science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). Presupposing a metahysics > is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's important to do is > to surface the metaphysics in the retroductive process. > > My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy > (I'm not > alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B-flat on top, why > does a > resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? > After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but physics > of the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. Atonal music > in the 20th derived from an assertion of the normativity and (for > Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted against > it. For > classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism was closely > associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the Greeks, modal > music was > linked to a different ontology (music of the spheres). > I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. > > Mark > > On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >> Hi Mark, >> >> Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible simply >> because the object is one that is shot through with subjectivity. To >> conclude as much is the flip side of the positivist coin. And I >> don't think that the pragmatists are right that you can duck >> fundamental ontological question by replacing them with the kind that >> you suggest (though in their own right such questions are great, >> perhaps even more informative in terms of quantity of info generated; >> it's just that they always already presuppose a metaphysics). >> Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a >> re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a >> different conclusion. >> >> r. >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark >> Johnson >> Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? >> >> To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >> problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking >> about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have been >> predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step outside >> music to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people would call >> an 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to merely >> contribute to its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't partly >> true of all critique... different discussion!!) >> >> More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >> might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take the >> various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >> biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >> mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage >> musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >> sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >> music does. >> >> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>> Hi Brad, >>> >>> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, >>> so as not to generate confusion. >>> >>> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >>> concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in part >>> or whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or >>> collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that >>> kind, but they are close, I think. >>> >>> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively >>> constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* >>> "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no >>> "sound." But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at >>> first metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have >>> "being experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you excise >>> the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. But >>> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >>> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone >>> heard them. >>> >>> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of >>> this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, perception, >>> etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think about it really >>> seriously would need to dip into that. >>> >>> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >>> >>> Warmly, >>> Ruth >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Brad >>> Rose >>> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >>> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>> Forest?? >>> >>> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a >>> Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In >>> the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He >>> argues, I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless >>> humans are present to hear it and to organize it into music. This >>> idea intrigued me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a >>> neuroscientist's clothing. Anyway, I was wondering what would >>> Critical Realists say about these observations about taste, color, >>> and sound. Would CR say there is no taste without the human tongue >>> tasting it? No color without eyes processing light's wave length? No music >>> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's fall >>> in >>> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air >>> about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or >>> recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human >>> perception, there is no color? >>> >>> >>> >>> Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >>> >>> >>> >>> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it >>> is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, >>> sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my >>> kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have >>> paint on them, of course, but color only occurs when they interact >>> with my eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to >>> hear it, does it make a sound? (The question was first posed by the >>> Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a mental >>> image created by the brain in response to vibrating molecules. >>> Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, >>> Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the >>> tree falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is >>> heard." >>> >>> >>> >>> Brad >>> >>> >>> >>> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >>> bradrose1 at comcast.net >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or >>> entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or >>> privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, >>> dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance >>> upon this information by persons or entities other than the intended >>> recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, please >>> contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3266 (20080714) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism --------------------------------- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 45, Issue 24 ************************************************ From louisirwin9 at aol.com Tue Jul 15 17:07:36 2008 From: louisirwin9 at aol.com (Louis Irwin) Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 19:07:36 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Mark, I believe that on Rosen's view the move to atonality was an internal objective dialectical development that already started in the complex evolution of tonal music, and was not simply a subjective reaction of composers in the 20th century. Your view is: "you have a music, there is a critique, and there is a transformed music", which is to present music as an input to a new group of composers, who make a critique of the existing style and then transform the music. This is a highly subjectivistic picture of musical development. Obviously subjectivity is strongly present in the development of music, but only implausibly (imo) as the kind of subjective dialectic you propose. Whatever critiques Schoenberg et al. made were based on more that a reaction against the prevailing aesthetic. The decline of confidence in rationalism did not lead to a lack of confidence in cadence; rather, the very meaning of cadence underwent transformation with the development of music to the point that it became objectively impossible to compose cadences except by regressing to an earlier stage that had been superseded. You say that the "view that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR critique." I get the impression that you think that style is wrongly thought to be normative, and that CR will be able to expose that erroneous thought, as if normativity has no place in objective reality and that CR will show that. I smell a scientism that needs to expunge normativity and subjectivity from objective reality. I'm not saying you subscribe to such a reductionism, but I can't make much sense of your position without imputing that view to you. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark Johnson Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 2:25 AM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? ok - this is the discusson - it oscillates between realism and idealism. Rosen is an out-and-out constructivist, though! His view that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR critique. It's true that Schoenberg's motivation was 'continuity' (there was a lot of german nationalism in Schoenberg) - but the point is, it was based on critique (see 'Style and Idea'). So you have a music, there is a critique, and there is a transformed music. But it's still music - and 'Erwartung' is in the same league as the 'Nelson mass' (say...). The critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is. Rationalism was in the air in the late 18th century, and the exuberance, confidence (think of the Nelson mass) and logic of the music reflects this. The doubts that arose in the 20th century made it more difficult to finish things with a perfect cadence (although there are plenty, but never as 'certain' as in the classical period). I suppose a different way of saying this is that with the category of 'music' defined by Rosen, it disappears with the social. My personal experience however tells me that there is music without the social, and that Rosen's 'music' is not the whole story (he is still God in most music departments, though but he's so boring!!). I can't quite say what that means.. it's almost like saying 'the earth will still go round the sun' - well, what's 'going round' independent of an observer? it is the action of a mechanism... but don't mistake the mechanism for its description. Moreover, with the reality of music, the fact that all these questions are asked of it, sustains and transforms it. Personally, music is where my thinking starts... so it's kind-of real for me! Mark On 7/15/08, Louis Irwin wrote: > Mark, > > I question your assertion that "Atonal music in the 20th derived from > an assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' > of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it." That presents the rise > of atonal music as a subjective rejection on the part of 20th century > composers against the aesthetic of their predecessors. Charles Rosen > tells quite a different story in his monograph "Arnold Schoenberg", in > which he describes how the evolution of tonal music led internally to > the increasing undermining of tonal relations themselves - a very > dialectical account in substance, and one I would think would be more > in line with Adorno's thinking (though I don't know if it is - Rosen does not mention Adorno). > > I also question your suggestion that the "physics of the harmonic series" > justifies traditional tonal harmony in an absolute way. That would > make music of Bach and after 'unnatural', because it is based on equal > temperaments rather than the rational ratios of the harmonic series. > Equal temperament makes the interval between any two notes a multiple > of the 12th root of 2 (an irrational number), so all tonal music from > Bach onwards ought to sound out of tune. Interestingly, there is a > modern school of "just intonation" that does base their music on the > harmonic series - and guess what? It's their music which sounds out of tune. > > I also don't understand how Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were "closely > associated with the ontology of rationalism". Rosen's story in "The > Classical Style" is that they discovered that tonal harmonies could be > used to set up musical dramas and tensions that could then be resolved > in new ways. They weren't simply following the ontology of the > harmonic series, or otherwise cloaking rational relations in musical form! > > Louis Irwin > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mark Johnson > Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 2:11 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > > Hi Ruth, > > If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We are > basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain distinctions > are efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive from a > transcendental theory of science and seek to include the phenomena of > art within them. Whilst I see much value in these distinctions, I see > problems in describing phenomena as complex as music. In my view music > presents us with a fundamental existential question no less profound > than the existence of science. Given that music exists, what must the > world be like? This is a different but related transcendental movement (although we can agree about ID/TD). > > In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing critiqued is > a positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the causality > of transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent > unpredictable. In the arts the effects of critique are more directly > causal and the unpredictabilities are more obvious. > > My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour being > more deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), and > at the same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so > dialectical description is problematic. I cannot explain the F-sharp > in bar 29 .. I just felt like it! > > If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental argument > for science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). Presupposing a > metahysics is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's > important to do is to surface the metaphysics in the retroductive process. > > My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy > (I'm not alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B-flat on > top, why does a resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? > After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but physics > of the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. Atonal music > in the 20th derived from an assertion of the normativity and (for > Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted against > it. For classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism was > closely associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the Greeks, > modal music was linked to a different ontology (music of the spheres). > I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. > > Mark > > On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >> Hi Mark, >> >> Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible simply >> because the object is one that is shot through with subjectivity. To >> conclude as much is the flip side of the positivist coin. And I >> don't think that the pragmatists are right that you can duck >> fundamental ontological question by replacing them with the kind that >> you suggest (though in their own right such questions are great, >> perhaps even more informative in terms of quantity of info generated; >> it's just that they always already presuppose a metaphysics). >> Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a >> re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a different conclusion. >> >> r. >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark >> Johnson >> Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? >> >> To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >> problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking >> about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have been >> predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step outside >> music to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people would call >> an 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to merely >> contribute to its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't partly >> true of all critique... different discussion!!) >> >> More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >> might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take the >> various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >> biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >> mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage >> musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >> sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >> music does. >> >> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>> Hi Brad, >>> >>> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, >>> so as not to generate confusion. >>> >>> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >>> concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in part >>> or whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or >>> collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that >>> kind, but they are close, I think. >>> >>> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively >>> constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* >>> "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no "sound." >>> But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at first >>> metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have "being >>> experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you excise the >>> subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. >>> But >>> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >>> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone >>> heard them. >>> >>> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of >>> this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, perception, >>> etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think about it really >>> seriously would need to dip into that. >>> >>> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >>> >>> Warmly, >>> Ruth >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Brad >>> Rose >>> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >>> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? >>> >>> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a >>> Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In >>> the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He >>> argues, I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless >>> humans are present to hear it and to organize it into music. This >>> idea intrigued me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a neuroscientist's clothing. >>> Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about these >>> observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say there is >>> no taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color without eyes >>> processing light's wave length? No music >>> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's fall >>> in >>> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air >>> about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or >>> recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human >>> perception, there is no color? >>> >>> >>> >>> Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >>> >>> >>> >>> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it >>> is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, >>> sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my >>> kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have >>> paint on them, of course, but color only occurs when they interact >>> with my eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to >>> hear it, does it make a sound? (The question was first posed by the >>> Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a mental >>> image created by the brain in response to vibrating molecules. >>> Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, >>> Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the >>> tree falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." >>> >>> >>> >>> Brad >>> >>> >>> >>> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >>> bradrose1 at comcast.net >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or >>> entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or >>> privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, >>> dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance >>> upon this information by persons or entities other than the intended >>> recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, please >>> contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com Tue Jul 15 21:13:17 2008 From: johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com (Mark Johnson) Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2008 04:13:17 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Of course it's subjective (as we understand subjectivity)! But in fact composers deal with the ontology of subjectivity. You're right that Schoenberg's critique wasn't just of 'style' - he was more interested in 'idea', but even in asserting idea over style, he was making a critique (and attacking Stravinsky at the same time, who he disparagingly called 'modernsky'). But Stravinsky and Schoenberg are both great artists despite (because of?) their polemic. You misunderstand me when I talk of Rosen and the Classical Style. I'm referring to Rosen's book 'the Classical Style' - which is an analysis of the normative elements of the classical style. I've always profoundly disagreed with this. Sonata form (the key formal characteristic of classical style) I think has an intransitive aspect - a view which Rosen rejects. On 7/16/08, Louis Irwin wrote: > Mark, > > I believe that on Rosen's view the move to atonality was an internal > objective dialectical development that already started in the complex > evolution of tonal music, and was not simply a subjective reaction of > composers in the 20th century. Your view is: "you have a music, there is a > critique, and there is a transformed music", which is to present music as an > input to a new group of composers, who make a critique of the existing style > and then transform the music. This is a highly subjectivistic picture of > musical development. Obviously subjectivity is strongly present in the > development of music, but only implausibly (imo) as the kind of subjective > dialectic you propose. Whatever critiques Schoenberg et al. made were based > on more that a reaction against the prevailing aesthetic. The decline of > confidence in rationalism did not lead to a lack of confidence in cadence; > rather, the very meaning of cadence underwent transformation with the > development of music to the point that it became objectively impossible to > compose cadences except by regressing to an earlier stage that had been > superseded. > > You say that the "view that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR critique." > I get the impression that you think that style is wrongly thought to be > normative, and that CR will be able to expose that erroneous thought, as if > normativity has no place in objective reality and that CR will show that. I > smell a scientism that needs to expunge normativity and subjectivity from > objective reality. I'm not saying you subscribe to such a reductionism, but > I can't make much sense of your position without imputing that view to you. > > Louis > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark > Johnson > Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 2:25 AM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > > ok - this is the discusson - it oscillates between realism and idealism. > Rosen is an out-and-out constructivist, though! His view that 'style' is > normative is ripe for a CR critique. It's true that Schoenberg's motivation > was 'continuity' (there was a lot of german nationalism in Schoenberg) - but > the point is, it was based on critique (see 'Style and Idea'). So you have a > music, there is a critique, and there is a transformed music. But it's still > music - and 'Erwartung' is in the same league as the 'Nelson mass' (say...). > The critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is. > > Rationalism was in the air in the late 18th century, and the exuberance, > confidence (think of the Nelson mass) and logic of the music reflects this. > The doubts that arose in the 20th century made it more difficult to finish > things with a perfect cadence (although there are plenty, but never as > 'certain' as in the classical period). > > I suppose a different way of saying this is that with the category of > 'music' defined by Rosen, it disappears with the social. My personal > experience however tells me that there is music without the social, and that > Rosen's 'music' is not the whole story (he is still God in most music > departments, though but he's so boring!!). I can't quite say what that > means.. it's almost like saying 'the earth will still go round the sun' - > well, what's 'going round' independent of an observer? it is the action of a > mechanism... but don't mistake the mechanism for its description. Moreover, > with the reality of music, the fact that all these questions are asked of > it, sustains and transforms it. Personally, music is where my thinking > starts... so it's kind-of real for me! > > Mark > > On 7/15/08, Louis Irwin wrote: >> Mark, >> >> I question your assertion that "Atonal music in the 20th derived from >> an assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' >> of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it." That presents the rise >> of atonal music as a subjective rejection on the part of 20th century >> composers against the aesthetic of their predecessors. Charles Rosen >> tells quite a different story in his monograph "Arnold Schoenberg", in >> which he describes how the evolution of tonal music led internally to >> the increasing undermining of tonal relations themselves - a very >> dialectical account in substance, and one I would think would be more >> in line with Adorno's thinking (though I don't know if it is - Rosen does > not mention Adorno). >> >> I also question your suggestion that the "physics of the harmonic series" >> justifies traditional tonal harmony in an absolute way. That would >> make music of Bach and after 'unnatural', because it is based on equal >> temperaments rather than the rational ratios of the harmonic series. >> Equal temperament makes the interval between any two notes a multiple >> of the 12th root of 2 (an irrational number), so all tonal music from >> Bach onwards ought to sound out of tune. Interestingly, there is a >> modern school of "just intonation" that does base their music on the >> harmonic series - and guess what? It's their music which sounds out of > tune. >> >> I also don't understand how Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were "closely >> associated with the ontology of rationalism". Rosen's story in "The >> Classical Style" is that they discovered that tonal harmonies could be >> used to set up musical dramas and tensions that could then be resolved >> in new ways. They weren't simply following the ontology of the >> harmonic series, or otherwise cloaking rational relations in musical form! >> >> Louis Irwin >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >> Mark Johnson >> Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 2:11 PM >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? >> >> Hi Ruth, >> >> If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We are >> basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain distinctions >> are efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive from a >> transcendental theory of science and seek to include the phenomena of >> art within them. Whilst I see much value in these distinctions, I see >> problems in describing phenomena as complex as music. In my view music >> presents us with a fundamental existential question no less profound >> than the existence of science. Given that music exists, what must the >> world be like? This is a different but related transcendental movement > (although we can agree about ID/TD). >> >> In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing critiqued is >> a positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the causality >> of transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent >> unpredictable. In the arts the effects of critique are more directly >> causal and the unpredictabilities are more obvious. >> >> My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour being >> more deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), and >> at the same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so >> dialectical description is problematic. I cannot explain the F-sharp >> in bar 29 .. I just felt like it! >> >> If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental argument >> for science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). Presupposing a >> metahysics is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's >> important to do is to surface the metaphysics in the retroductive process. >> >> My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy >> (I'm not alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B-flat on >> top, why does a resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? >> After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but physics >> of the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. Atonal music >> in the 20th derived from an assertion of the normativity and (for >> Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted against >> it. For classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism was >> closely associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the Greeks, >> modal music was linked to a different ontology (music of the spheres). >> I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. >> >> Mark >> >> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>> Hi Mark, >>> >>> Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible simply >>> because the object is one that is shot through with subjectivity. To >>> conclude as much is the flip side of the positivist coin. And I >>> don't think that the pragmatists are right that you can duck >>> fundamental ontological question by replacing them with the kind that >>> you suggest (though in their own right such questions are great, >>> perhaps even more informative in terms of quantity of info generated; >>> it's just that they always already presuppose a metaphysics). >>> Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a >>> re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a > different conclusion. >>> >>> r. >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark >>> Johnson >>> Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >> Forest?? >>> >>> To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >>> problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking >>> about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have been >>> predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step outside >>> music to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people would call >>> an 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to merely >>> contribute to its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't partly >>> true of all critique... different discussion!!) >>> >>> More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >>> might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take the >>> various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >>> biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >>> mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage >>> musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >>> sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >>> music does. >>> >>> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>>> Hi Brad, >>>> >>>> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, >>>> so as not to generate confusion. >>>> >>>> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >>>> concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in part >>>> or whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or >>>> collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that >>>> kind, but they are close, I think. >>>> >>>> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively >>>> constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* >>>> "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no "sound." >>>> But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at first >>>> metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have "being >>>> experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you excise the >>>> subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. >>>> But >>>> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >>>> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone >>>> heard them. >>>> >>>> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of >>>> this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, perception, >>>> etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think about it really >>>> seriously would need to dip into that. >>>> >>>> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >>>> >>>> Warmly, >>>> Ruth >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Brad >>>> Rose >>>> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >>>> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? >>>> >>>> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a >>>> Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In >>>> the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He >>>> argues, I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless >>>> humans are present to hear it and to organize it into music. This >>>> idea intrigued me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a neuroscientist's > clothing. >>>> Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about these >>>> observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say there is >>>> no taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color without eyes >>>> processing light's wave length? No music >>>> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's > fall >>>> in >>>> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air >>>> about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or >>>> recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without human >>>> perception, there is no color? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it >>>> is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, >>>> sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my >>>> kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have >>>> paint on them, of course, but color only occurs when they interact >>>> with my eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to >>>> hear it, does it make a sound? (The question was first posed by the >>>> Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a mental >>>> image created by the brain in response to vibrating molecules. >>>> Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, >>>> Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the >>>> tree falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Brad >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >>>> bradrose1 at comcast.net >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or >>>> entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or >>>> privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, >>>> dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance >>>> upon this information by persons or entities other than the intended >>>> recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, please >>>> contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>> >>>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From louisirwin9 at aol.com Wed Jul 16 15:02:21 2008 From: louisirwin9 at aol.com (Louis Irwin) Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2008 17:02:21 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Mark, I think you missed my point. I was attacking the notion that musical development proceeds by means of composers' developing critiques of their predecessors, whether those critiques are of style or of idea. Of course music is a subjective enterprise in general, just like any cultural production, but it does not proceed by developing new subjective ideas out of old ones. (Perhaps our understanding of musical history proceeds this way, but not musical development itself.) On my view composers are concerned with discovering real musical relations as they evolve over periods of time, and this is not simply a matter of forming ideas in one's heads about how earlier composers created works and coming up with 'better' methods. Of course, composers often develop critiques after the fact as a way to explain what they have done, but I believe it is a distortion to hold that those ex post critiques were efficient causes of what they did. Your last sentence seems to suggest that rejecting an intransitive aspect for sonata form (as you say Rosen does) explains why Rosen's view is normative, as if the rejection of intransitivity automatically requires normativity. In other words, your view seems to be that if some enterprise were entirely in the transitive dimension, its basis would have to be normative. So you think we need some objective entity in the intransitive dimension to rescue music from the stain of mere normativity - is that it?? As if normativity is already and forevermore extruded from the intransitive? Or, even if normativity is irretrievably transitive, we still need an entity in the intransitive dimension to rescue music from the stain of the merely social and cultural??. As I said before, I'm not saying you subscribe to such reductions, but I can't make much sense of your position without imputing them to you. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark Johnson Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 11:13 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? Of course it's subjective (as we understand subjectivity)! But in fact composers deal with the ontology of subjectivity. You're right that Schoenberg's critique wasn't just of 'style' - he was more interested in 'idea', but even in asserting idea over style, he was making a critique (and attacking Stravinsky at the same time, who he disparagingly called 'modernsky'). But Stravinsky and Schoenberg are both great artists despite (because of?) their polemic. You misunderstand me when I talk of Rosen and the Classical Style. I'm referring to Rosen's book 'the Classical Style' - which is an analysis of the normative elements of the classical style. I've always profoundly disagreed with this. Sonata form (the key formal characteristic of classical style) I think has an intransitive aspect - a view which Rosen rejects. On 7/16/08, Louis Irwin wrote: > Mark, > > I believe that on Rosen's view the move to atonality was an internal > objective dialectical development that already started in the complex > evolution of tonal music, and was not simply a subjective reaction of > composers in the 20th century. Your view is: "you have a music, there > is a critique, and there is a transformed music", which is to present > music as an input to a new group of composers, who make a critique of > the existing style and then transform the music. This is a highly > subjectivistic picture of musical development. Obviously subjectivity > is strongly present in the development of music, but only implausibly > (imo) as the kind of subjective dialectic you propose. Whatever > critiques Schoenberg et al. made were based on more that a reaction > against the prevailing aesthetic. The decline of confidence in > rationalism did not lead to a lack of confidence in cadence; rather, > the very meaning of cadence underwent transformation with the > development of music to the point that it became objectively > impossible to compose cadences except by regressing to an earlier stage that had been superseded. > > You say that the "view that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR critique." > I get the impression that you think that style is wrongly thought to > be normative, and that CR will be able to expose that erroneous > thought, as if normativity has no place in objective reality and that > CR will show that. I smell a scientism that needs to expunge > normativity and subjectivity from objective reality. I'm not saying > you subscribe to such a reductionism, but I can't make much sense of your position without imputing that view to you. > > Louis > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mark Johnson > Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 2:25 AM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > > ok - this is the discusson - it oscillates between realism and idealism. > Rosen is an out-and-out constructivist, though! His view that 'style' > is normative is ripe for a CR critique. It's true that Schoenberg's > motivation was 'continuity' (there was a lot of german nationalism in > Schoenberg) - but the point is, it was based on critique (see 'Style > and Idea'). So you have a music, there is a critique, and there is a > transformed music. But it's still music - and 'Erwartung' is in the same league as the 'Nelson mass' (say...). > The critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is. > > Rationalism was in the air in the late 18th century, and the > exuberance, confidence (think of the Nelson mass) and logic of the music reflects this. > The doubts that arose in the 20th century made it more difficult to > finish things with a perfect cadence (although there are plenty, but > never as 'certain' as in the classical period). > > I suppose a different way of saying this is that with the category of > 'music' defined by Rosen, it disappears with the social. My personal > experience however tells me that there is music without the social, > and that Rosen's 'music' is not the whole story (he is still God in > most music departments, though but he's so boring!!). I can't quite > say what that means.. it's almost like saying 'the earth will still go > round the sun' - well, what's 'going round' independent of an > observer? it is the action of a mechanism... but don't mistake the > mechanism for its description. Moreover, with the reality of music, > the fact that all these questions are asked of it, sustains and > transforms it. Personally, music is where my thinking starts... so it's kind-of real for me! > > Mark > > On 7/15/08, Louis Irwin wrote: >> Mark, >> >> I question your assertion that "Atonal music in the 20th derived from >> an assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' >> of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it." That presents the rise >> of atonal music as a subjective rejection on the part of 20th century >> composers against the aesthetic of their predecessors. Charles Rosen >> tells quite a different story in his monograph "Arnold Schoenberg", >> in which he describes how the evolution of tonal music led internally >> to the increasing undermining of tonal relations themselves - a very >> dialectical account in substance, and one I would think would be more >> in line with Adorno's thinking (though I don't know if it is - Rosen >> does > not mention Adorno). >> >> I also question your suggestion that the "physics of the harmonic series" >> justifies traditional tonal harmony in an absolute way. That would >> make music of Bach and after 'unnatural', because it is based on >> equal temperaments rather than the rational ratios of the harmonic series. >> Equal temperament makes the interval between any two notes a multiple >> of the 12th root of 2 (an irrational number), so all tonal music from >> Bach onwards ought to sound out of tune. Interestingly, there is a >> modern school of "just intonation" that does base their music on the >> harmonic series - and guess what? It's their music which sounds out >> of > tune. >> >> I also don't understand how Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were >> "closely associated with the ontology of rationalism". Rosen's story >> in "The Classical Style" is that they discovered that tonal harmonies >> could be used to set up musical dramas and tensions that could then >> be resolved in new ways. They weren't simply following the ontology >> of the harmonic series, or otherwise cloaking rational relations in musical form! >> >> Louis Irwin >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >> Mark Johnson >> Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 2:11 PM >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? >> >> Hi Ruth, >> >> If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We are >> basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain >> distinctions are efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive from >> a transcendental theory of science and seek to include the phenomena >> of art within them. Whilst I see much value in these distinctions, I >> see problems in describing phenomena as complex as music. In my view >> music presents us with a fundamental existential question no less >> profound than the existence of science. Given that music exists, what >> must the world be like? This is a different but related >> transcendental movement > (although we can agree about ID/TD). >> >> In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing critiqued is >> a positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the causality >> of transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent >> unpredictable. In the arts the effects of critique are more directly >> causal and the unpredictabilities are more obvious. >> >> My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour being >> more deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), >> and at the same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so >> dialectical description is problematic. I cannot explain the F-sharp >> in bar 29 .. I just felt like it! >> >> If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental argument >> for science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). Presupposing a >> metahysics is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's >> important to do is to surface the metaphysics in the retroductive process. >> >> My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy >> (I'm not alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B-flat on >> top, why does a resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? >> After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but >> physics of the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. >> Atonal music in the 20th derived from an assertion of the normativity >> and (for >> Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted against >> it. For classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism >> was closely associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the >> Greeks, modal music was linked to a different ontology (music of the spheres). >> I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. >> >> Mark >> >> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>> Hi Mark, >>> >>> Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible >>> simply because the object is one that is shot through with >>> subjectivity. To conclude as much is the flip side of the >>> positivist coin. And I don't think that the pragmatists are right >>> that you can duck fundamental ontological question by replacing them >>> with the kind that you suggest (though in their own right such >>> questions are great, perhaps even more informative in terms of >>> quantity of info generated; it's just that they always already presuppose a metaphysics). >>> Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a >>> re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a > different conclusion. >>> >>> r. >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark >>> Johnson >>> Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >> Forest?? >>> >>> To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >>> problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking >>> about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have >>> been predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step >>> outside music to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people >>> would call an 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to >>> merely contribute to its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't >>> partly true of all critique... different discussion!!) >>> >>> More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >>> might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take >>> the various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >>> biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >>> mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage >>> musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >>> sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >>> music does. >>> >>> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>>> Hi Brad, >>>> >>>> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, >>>> so as not to generate confusion. >>>> >>>> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >>>> concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in part >>>> or whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or >>>> collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that >>>> kind, but they are close, I think. >>>> >>>> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively >>>> constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* >>>> "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no "sound." >>>> But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at first >>>> metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have >>>> "being experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you excise >>>> the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. >>>> But >>>> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >>>> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone >>>> heard them. >>>> >>>> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of >>>> this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, >>>> perception, etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think about >>>> it really seriously would need to dip into that. >>>> >>>> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >>>> >>>> Warmly, >>>> Ruth >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of >>>> Brad Rose >>>> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >>>> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? >>>> >>>> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a >>>> Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In >>>> the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He >>>> argues, I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless >>>> humans are present to hear it and to organize it into music. This >>>> idea intrigued me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a >>>> neuroscientist's > clothing. >>>> Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about >>>> these observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say >>>> there is no taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color >>>> without eyes processing light's wave length? No music >>>> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's > fall >>>> in >>>> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air >>>> about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or >>>> recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without >>>> human perception, there is no color? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it >>>> is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, >>>> sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my >>>> kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have >>>> paint on them, of course, but color only occurs when they interact >>>> with my eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there >>>> to hear it, does it make a sound? (The question was first posed by >>>> the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a >>>> mental image created by the brain in response to vibrating molecules. >>>> Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, >>>> Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the >>>> tree falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Brad >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >>>> bradrose1 at comcast.net >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or >>>> entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or >>>> privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, >>>> dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance >>>> upon this information by persons or entities other than the >>>> intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, >>>> please contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>> >>>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com Wed Jul 16 16:07:31 2008 From: johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com (Mark Johnson) Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2008 23:07:31 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I think I'll come back to my reply to Ruth - we are arguing about distinctions, and the efficacy of different descriptions. There's a lot of hot water to get into regarding categories like 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity' - even 'transitive' and 'intransitive' don't fully survive the transition to talking about music, as you ably demonstrate. These are, after all, categories arrived from a transcendental argument for science. I think it requires a different transcendental turn. What does music do? Well, to start with, it gives me a lot of pleasure (which arguing about it doesn't). What's the mechanism? On 7/16/08, Louis Irwin wrote: > Mark, > > I think you missed my point. I was attacking the notion that musical > development proceeds by means of composers' developing critiques of their > predecessors, whether those critiques are of style or of idea. Of course > music is a subjective enterprise in general, just like any cultural > production, but it does not proceed by developing new subjective ideas out > of old ones. (Perhaps our understanding of musical history proceeds this > way, but not musical development itself.) On my view composers are > concerned with discovering real musical relations as they evolve over > periods of time, and this is not simply a matter of forming ideas in one's > heads about how earlier composers created works and coming up with 'better' > methods. Of course, composers often develop critiques after the fact as a > way to explain what they have done, but I believe it is a distortion to hold > that those ex post critiques were efficient causes of what they did. > > Your last sentence seems to suggest that rejecting an intransitive aspect > for sonata form (as you say Rosen does) explains why Rosen's view is > normative, as if the rejection of intransitivity automatically requires > normativity. In other words, your view seems to be that if some enterprise > were entirely in the transitive dimension, its basis would have to be > normative. So you think we need some objective entity in the intransitive > dimension to rescue music from the stain of mere normativity - is that it?? > As if normativity is already and forevermore extruded from the intransitive? > Or, even if normativity is irretrievably transitive, we still need an entity > in the intransitive dimension to rescue music from the stain of the merely > social and cultural??. As I said before, I'm not saying you subscribe to > such reductions, but I can't make much sense of your position without > imputing them to you. > > Louis > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark > Johnson > Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 11:13 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > > Of course it's subjective (as we understand subjectivity)! But in fact > composers deal with the ontology of subjectivity. You're right that > Schoenberg's critique wasn't just of 'style' - he was more interested in > 'idea', but even in asserting idea over style, he was making a critique (and > attacking Stravinsky at the same time, who he disparagingly called > 'modernsky'). But Stravinsky and Schoenberg are both great artists despite > (because of?) their polemic. > > You misunderstand me when I talk of Rosen and the Classical Style. I'm > referring to Rosen's book 'the Classical Style' - which is an analysis of > the normative elements of the classical style. I've always profoundly > disagreed with this. Sonata form (the key formal characteristic of classical > style) I think has an intransitive aspect > - a view which Rosen rejects. > > On 7/16/08, Louis Irwin wrote: >> Mark, >> >> I believe that on Rosen's view the move to atonality was an internal >> objective dialectical development that already started in the complex >> evolution of tonal music, and was not simply a subjective reaction of >> composers in the 20th century. Your view is: "you have a music, there >> is a critique, and there is a transformed music", which is to present >> music as an input to a new group of composers, who make a critique of >> the existing style and then transform the music. This is a highly >> subjectivistic picture of musical development. Obviously subjectivity >> is strongly present in the development of music, but only implausibly >> (imo) as the kind of subjective dialectic you propose. Whatever >> critiques Schoenberg et al. made were based on more that a reaction >> against the prevailing aesthetic. The decline of confidence in >> rationalism did not lead to a lack of confidence in cadence; rather, >> the very meaning of cadence underwent transformation with the >> development of music to the point that it became objectively >> impossible to compose cadences except by regressing to an earlier stage > that had been superseded. >> >> You say that the "view that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR > critique." >> I get the impression that you think that style is wrongly thought to >> be normative, and that CR will be able to expose that erroneous >> thought, as if normativity has no place in objective reality and that >> CR will show that. I smell a scientism that needs to expunge >> normativity and subjectivity from objective reality. I'm not saying >> you subscribe to such a reductionism, but I can't make much sense of your > position without imputing that view to you. >> >> Louis >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >> Mark Johnson >> Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 2:25 AM >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? >> >> ok - this is the discusson - it oscillates between realism and idealism. >> Rosen is an out-and-out constructivist, though! His view that 'style' >> is normative is ripe for a CR critique. It's true that Schoenberg's >> motivation was 'continuity' (there was a lot of german nationalism in >> Schoenberg) - but the point is, it was based on critique (see 'Style >> and Idea'). So you have a music, there is a critique, and there is a >> transformed music. But it's still music - and 'Erwartung' is in the same > league as the 'Nelson mass' (say...). >> The critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is. >> >> Rationalism was in the air in the late 18th century, and the >> exuberance, confidence (think of the Nelson mass) and logic of the music > reflects this. >> The doubts that arose in the 20th century made it more difficult to >> finish things with a perfect cadence (although there are plenty, but >> never as 'certain' as in the classical period). >> >> I suppose a different way of saying this is that with the category of >> 'music' defined by Rosen, it disappears with the social. My personal >> experience however tells me that there is music without the social, >> and that Rosen's 'music' is not the whole story (he is still God in >> most music departments, though but he's so boring!!). I can't quite >> say what that means.. it's almost like saying 'the earth will still go >> round the sun' - well, what's 'going round' independent of an >> observer? it is the action of a mechanism... but don't mistake the >> mechanism for its description. Moreover, with the reality of music, >> the fact that all these questions are asked of it, sustains and >> transforms it. Personally, music is where my thinking starts... so it's > kind-of real for me! >> >> Mark >> >> On 7/15/08, Louis Irwin wrote: >>> Mark, >>> >>> I question your assertion that "Atonal music in the 20th derived from >>> an assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' >>> of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it." That presents the rise >>> of atonal music as a subjective rejection on the part of 20th century >>> composers against the aesthetic of their predecessors. Charles Rosen >>> tells quite a different story in his monograph "Arnold Schoenberg", >>> in which he describes how the evolution of tonal music led internally >>> to the increasing undermining of tonal relations themselves - a very >>> dialectical account in substance, and one I would think would be more >>> in line with Adorno's thinking (though I don't know if it is - Rosen >>> does >> not mention Adorno). >>> >>> I also question your suggestion that the "physics of the harmonic series" >>> justifies traditional tonal harmony in an absolute way. That would >>> make music of Bach and after 'unnatural', because it is based on >>> equal temperaments rather than the rational ratios of the harmonic > series. >>> Equal temperament makes the interval between any two notes a multiple >>> of the 12th root of 2 (an irrational number), so all tonal music from >>> Bach onwards ought to sound out of tune. Interestingly, there is a >>> modern school of "just intonation" that does base their music on the >>> harmonic series - and guess what? It's their music which sounds out >>> of >> tune. >>> >>> I also don't understand how Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were >>> "closely associated with the ontology of rationalism". Rosen's story >>> in "The Classical Style" is that they discovered that tonal harmonies >>> could be used to set up musical dramas and tensions that could then >>> be resolved in new ways. They weren't simply following the ontology >>> of the harmonic series, or otherwise cloaking rational relations in > musical form! >>> >>> Louis Irwin >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >>> Mark Johnson >>> Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 2:11 PM >>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >> Forest?? >>> >>> Hi Ruth, >>> >>> If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We are >>> basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain >>> distinctions are efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive from >>> a transcendental theory of science and seek to include the phenomena >>> of art within them. Whilst I see much value in these distinctions, I >>> see problems in describing phenomena as complex as music. In my view >>> music presents us with a fundamental existential question no less >>> profound than the existence of science. Given that music exists, what >>> must the world be like? This is a different but related >>> transcendental movement >> (although we can agree about ID/TD). >>> >>> In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing critiqued is >>> a positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the causality >>> of transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent >>> unpredictable. In the arts the effects of critique are more directly >>> causal and the unpredictabilities are more obvious. >>> >>> My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour being >>> more deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), >>> and at the same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so >>> dialectical description is problematic. I cannot explain the F-sharp >>> in bar 29 .. I just felt like it! >>> >>> If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental argument >>> for science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). Presupposing a >>> metahysics is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's >>> important to do is to surface the metaphysics in the retroductive > process. >>> >>> My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy >>> (I'm not alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B-flat on >>> top, why does a resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? >>> After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but >>> physics of the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. >>> Atonal music in the 20th derived from an assertion of the normativity >>> and (for >>> Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted against >>> it. For classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism >>> was closely associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the >>> Greeks, modal music was linked to a different ontology (music of the > spheres). >>> I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. >>> >>> Mark >>> >>> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>>> Hi Mark, >>>> >>>> Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible >>>> simply because the object is one that is shot through with >>>> subjectivity. To conclude as much is the flip side of the >>>> positivist coin. And I don't think that the pragmatists are right >>>> that you can duck fundamental ontological question by replacing them >>>> with the kind that you suggest (though in their own right such >>>> questions are great, perhaps even more informative in terms of >>>> quantity of info generated; it's just that they always already > presuppose a metaphysics). >>>> Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a >>>> re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a >> different conclusion. >>>> >>>> r. >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark >>>> Johnson >>>> Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >>>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>> Forest?? >>>> >>>> To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >>>> problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking >>>> about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have >>>> been predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step >>>> outside music to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people >>>> would call an 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to >>>> merely contribute to its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't >>>> partly true of all critique... different discussion!!) >>>> >>>> More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >>>> might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take >>>> the various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >>>> biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >>>> mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage >>>> musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >>>> sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >>>> music does. >>>> >>>> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>>>> Hi Brad, >>>>> >>>>> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, >>>>> so as not to generate confusion. >>>>> >>>>> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >>>>> concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in part >>>>> or whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or >>>>> collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that >>>>> kind, but they are close, I think. >>>>> >>>>> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively >>>>> constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* >>>>> "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no "sound." >>>>> But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at first >>>>> metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have >>>>> "being experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you excise >>>>> the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. >>>>> But >>>>> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >>>>> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone >>>>> heard them. >>>>> >>>>> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of >>>>> this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, >>>>> perception, etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think about >>>>> it really seriously would need to dip into that. >>>>> >>>>> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >>>>> >>>>> Warmly, >>>>> Ruth >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of >>>>> Brad Rose >>>>> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >>>>> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? >>>>> >>>>> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a >>>>> Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In >>>>> the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He >>>>> argues, I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless >>>>> humans are present to hear it and to organize it into music. This >>>>> idea intrigued me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a >>>>> neuroscientist's >> clothing. >>>>> Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about >>>>> these observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say >>>>> there is no taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color >>>>> without eyes processing light's wave length? No music >>>>> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's >> fall >>>>> in >>>>> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air >>>>> about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or >>>>> recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without >>>>> human perception, there is no color? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it >>>>> is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, >>>>> sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my >>>>> kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have >>>>> paint on them, of course, but color only occurs when they interact >>>>> with my eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there >>>>> to hear it, does it make a sound? (The question was first posed by >>>>> the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a >>>>> mental image created by the brain in response to vibrating molecules. >>>>> Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, >>>>> Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the >>>>> tree falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Brad >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >>>>> bradrose1 at comcast.net >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or >>>>> entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or >>>>> privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, >>>>> dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance >>>>> upon this information by persons or entities other than the >>>>> intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, >>>>> please contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>> >>>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From J.A.Toynbee at open.ac.uk Thu Jul 17 02:15:41 2008 From: J.A.Toynbee at open.ac.uk (J.A.Toynbee) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2008 09:15:41 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? Message-ID: Louis and Mark, In the western art music tradition, which seems to be standing in for music in this discussion, *both* ways of making new (discovery of new musical relations and programmatic revision of existing modes) are surely at stake. What's more both have a strongly objective thrust in that they involve movement towards musical materials, from the concrete - scoring a French horn just here - to the abstract - using X tone row say. Both ways are combined in most cases. So, a composer who sets out to push beyond the existing musical order characterised in a certain way, always has to deal with the problem of real musical relations. Jason -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis Irwin Sent: 16 July 2008 22:02 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? Mark, I think you missed my point. I was attacking the notion that musical development proceeds by means of composers' developing critiques of their predecessors, whether those critiques are of style or of idea. Of course music is a subjective enterprise in general, just like any cultural production, but it does not proceed by developing new subjective ideas out of old ones. (Perhaps our understanding of musical history proceeds this way, but not musical development itself.) On my view composers are concerned with discovering real musical relations as they evolve over periods of time, and this is not simply a matter of forming ideas in one's heads about how earlier composers created works and coming up with 'better' methods. Of course, composers often develop critiques after the fact as a way to explain what they have done, but I believe it is a distortion to hold that those ex post critiques were efficient causes of what they did. Your last sentence seems to suggest that rejecting an intransitive aspect for sonata form (as you say Rosen does) explains why Rosen's view is normative, as if the rejection of intransitivity automatically requires normativity. In other words, your view seems to be that if some enterprise were entirely in the transitive dimension, its basis would have to be normative. So you think we need some objective entity in the intransitive dimension to rescue music from the stain of mere normativity - is that it?? As if normativity is already and forevermore extruded from the intransitive? Or, even if normativity is irretrievably transitive, we still need an entity in the intransitive dimension to rescue music from the stain of the merely social and cultural??. As I said before, I'm not saying you subscribe to such reductions, but I can't make much sense of your position without imputing them to you. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark Johnson Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 11:13 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? Of course it's subjective (as we understand subjectivity)! But in fact composers deal with the ontology of subjectivity. You're right that Schoenberg's critique wasn't just of 'style' - he was more interested in 'idea', but even in asserting idea over style, he was making a critique (and attacking Stravinsky at the same time, who he disparagingly called 'modernsky'). But Stravinsky and Schoenberg are both great artists despite (because of?) their polemic. You misunderstand me when I talk of Rosen and the Classical Style. I'm referring to Rosen's book 'the Classical Style' - which is an analysis of the normative elements of the classical style. I've always profoundly disagreed with this. Sonata form (the key formal characteristic of classical style) I think has an intransitive aspect - a view which Rosen rejects. On 7/16/08, Louis Irwin wrote: > Mark, > > I believe that on Rosen's view the move to atonality was an internal > objective dialectical development that already started in the complex > evolution of tonal music, and was not simply a subjective reaction of > composers in the 20th century. Your view is: "you have a music, there > is a critique, and there is a transformed music", which is to present > music as an input to a new group of composers, who make a critique of > the existing style and then transform the music. This is a highly > subjectivistic picture of musical development. Obviously subjectivity > is strongly present in the development of music, but only implausibly > (imo) as the kind of subjective dialectic you propose. Whatever > critiques Schoenberg et al. made were based on more that a reaction > against the prevailing aesthetic. The decline of confidence in > rationalism did not lead to a lack of confidence in cadence; rather, > the very meaning of cadence underwent transformation with the > development of music to the point that it became objectively > impossible to compose cadences except by regressing to an earlier stage that had been superseded. > > You say that the "view that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR critique." > I get the impression that you think that style is wrongly thought to > be normative, and that CR will be able to expose that erroneous > thought, as if normativity has no place in objective reality and that > CR will show that. I smell a scientism that needs to expunge > normativity and subjectivity from objective reality. I'm not saying > you subscribe to such a reductionism, but I can't make much sense of your position without imputing that view to you. > > Louis > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mark Johnson > Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 2:25 AM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > > ok - this is the discusson - it oscillates between realism and > idealism. Rosen is an out-and-out constructivist, though! His view > that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR critique. It's true that > Schoenberg's motivation was 'continuity' (there was a lot of german > nationalism in > Schoenberg) - but the point is, it was based on critique (see 'Style > and Idea'). So you have a music, there is a critique, and there is a > transformed music. But it's still music - and 'Erwartung' is in the same league as the 'Nelson mass' (say...). > The critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is. > > Rationalism was in the air in the late 18th century, and the > exuberance, confidence (think of the Nelson mass) and logic of the music reflects this. > The doubts that arose in the 20th century made it more difficult to > finish things with a perfect cadence (although there are plenty, but > never as 'certain' as in the classical period). > > I suppose a different way of saying this is that with the category of > 'music' defined by Rosen, it disappears with the social. My personal > experience however tells me that there is music without the social, > and that Rosen's 'music' is not the whole story (he is still God in > most music departments, though but he's so boring!!). I can't quite > say what that means.. it's almost like saying 'the earth will still go > round the sun' - well, what's 'going round' independent of an > observer? it is the action of a mechanism... but don't mistake the > mechanism for its description. Moreover, with the reality of music, > the fact that all these questions are asked of it, sustains and > transforms it. Personally, music is where my thinking starts... so it's kind-of real for me! > > Mark > > On 7/15/08, Louis Irwin wrote: >> Mark, >> >> I question your assertion that "Atonal music in the 20th derived from >> an assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' >> of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it." That presents the rise >> of atonal music as a subjective rejection on the part of 20th century >> composers against the aesthetic of their predecessors. Charles Rosen >> tells quite a different story in his monograph "Arnold Schoenberg", >> in which he describes how the evolution of tonal music led internally >> to the increasing undermining of tonal relations themselves - a very >> dialectical account in substance, and one I would think would be more >> in line with Adorno's thinking (though I don't know if it is - Rosen >> does > not mention Adorno). >> >> I also question your suggestion that the "physics of the harmonic >> series" justifies traditional tonal harmony in an absolute way. That >> would make music of Bach and after 'unnatural', because it is based >> on equal temperaments rather than the rational ratios of the harmonic series. >> Equal temperament makes the interval between any two notes a multiple >> of the 12th root of 2 (an irrational number), so all tonal music from >> Bach onwards ought to sound out of tune. Interestingly, there is a >> modern school of "just intonation" that does base their music on the >> harmonic series - and guess what? It's their music which sounds out >> of > tune. >> >> I also don't understand how Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were >> "closely associated with the ontology of rationalism". Rosen's story >> in "The Classical Style" is that they discovered that tonal harmonies >> could be used to set up musical dramas and tensions that could then >> be resolved in new ways. They weren't simply following the ontology >> of the harmonic series, or otherwise cloaking rational relations in musical form! >> >> Louis Irwin >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >> Mark Johnson >> Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 2:11 PM >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? >> >> Hi Ruth, >> >> If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We are >> basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain >> distinctions are efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive from >> a transcendental theory of science and seek to include the phenomena >> of art within them. Whilst I see much value in these distinctions, I >> see problems in describing phenomena as complex as music. In my view >> music presents us with a fundamental existential question no less >> profound than the existence of science. Given that music exists, what >> must the world be like? This is a different but related >> transcendental movement > (although we can agree about ID/TD). >> >> In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing critiqued is >> a positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the causality >> of transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent >> unpredictable. In the arts the effects of critique are more directly >> causal and the unpredictabilities are more obvious. >> >> My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour being >> more deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), >> and at the same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so >> dialectical description is problematic. I cannot explain the F-sharp >> in bar 29 .. I just felt like it! >> >> If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental argument >> for science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). Presupposing a >> metahysics is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's >> important to do is to surface the metaphysics in the retroductive process. >> >> My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy >> (I'm not alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B-flat on >> top, why does a resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? >> After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but >> physics of the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. >> Atonal music in the 20th derived from an assertion of the normativity >> and (for >> Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted against >> it. For classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism >> was closely associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the >> Greeks, modal music was linked to a different ontology (music of the spheres). >> I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. >> >> Mark >> >> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>> Hi Mark, >>> >>> Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible >>> simply because the object is one that is shot through with >>> subjectivity. To conclude as much is the flip side of the >>> positivist coin. And I don't think that the pragmatists are right >>> that you can duck fundamental ontological question by replacing them >>> with the kind that you suggest (though in their own right such >>> questions are great, perhaps even more informative in terms of >>> quantity of info generated; it's just that they always already presuppose a metaphysics). >>> Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a >>> re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a > different conclusion. >>> >>> r. >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark >>> Johnson >>> Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >> Forest?? >>> >>> To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >>> problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking >>> about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have >>> been predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step >>> outside music to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people >>> would call an 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to >>> merely contribute to its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't >>> partly true of all critique... different discussion!!) >>> >>> More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >>> might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take >>> the various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >>> biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >>> mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage >>> musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >>> sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >>> music does. >>> >>> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>>> Hi Brad, >>>> >>>> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, >>>> so as not to generate confusion. >>>> >>>> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >>>> concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in part >>>> or whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or >>>> collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that >>>> kind, but they are close, I think. >>>> >>>> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively >>>> constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* >>>> "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no "sound." >>>> But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at first >>>> metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have >>>> "being experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you excise >>>> the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. >>>> But >>>> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >>>> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone >>>> heard them. >>>> >>>> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of >>>> this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, >>>> perception, etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think about >>>> it really seriously would need to dip into that. >>>> >>>> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >>>> >>>> Warmly, >>>> Ruth >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of >>>> Brad Rose >>>> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >>>> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? >>>> >>>> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a >>>> Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In >>>> the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He >>>> argues, I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless >>>> humans are present to hear it and to organize it into music. This >>>> idea intrigued me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a >>>> neuroscientist's > clothing. >>>> Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about >>>> these observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say >>>> there is no taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color >>>> without eyes processing light's wave length? No music >>>> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's > fall >>>> in >>>> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air >>>> about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or >>>> recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without >>>> human perception, there is no color? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it >>>> is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, >>>> sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my >>>> kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have >>>> paint on them, of course, but color only occurs when they interact >>>> with my eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there >>>> to hear it, does it make a sound? (The question was first posed by >>>> the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a >>>> mental image created by the brain in response to vibrating molecules. >>>> Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, >>>> Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the >>>> tree falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Brad >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >>>> bradrose1 at comcast.net >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or >>>> entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or >>>> privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, >>>> dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance >>>> upon this information by persons or entities other than the >>>> intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, >>>> please contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>> >>>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism --------------------------------- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Thu Jul 17 06:44:13 2008 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2008 13:44:13 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: Message-ID: In which case, to speak of music developing by critique is spot on, and unexceptional. More precisely, what we have is a logic of musical discovery or epistemological dialectic, which always involves discovery of new relations/levels in the ID and the refashioning of materials in the TD in the light of this. It would be good to have an article on this for JCR. It's been a really good thread. Mervyn -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of J.A.Toynbee Sent: 17 July 2008 09:16 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? Louis and Mark, In the western art music tradition, which seems to be standing in for music in this discussion, *both* ways of making new (discovery of new musical relations and programmatic revision of existing modes) are surely at stake. What's more both have a strongly objective thrust in that they involve movement towards musical materials, from the concrete - scoring a French horn just here - to the abstract - using X tone row say. Both ways are combined in most cases. So, a composer who sets out to push beyond the existing musical order characterised in a certain way, always has to deal with the problem of real musical relations. Jason -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis Irwin Sent: 16 July 2008 22:02 To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? Mark, I think you missed my point. I was attacking the notion that musical development proceeds by means of composers' developing critiques of their predecessors, whether those critiques are of style or of idea. Of course music is a subjective enterprise in general, just like any cultural production, but it does not proceed by developing new subjective ideas out of old ones. (Perhaps our understanding of musical history proceeds this way, but not musical development itself.) On my view composers are concerned with discovering real musical relations as they evolve over periods of time, and this is not simply a matter of forming ideas in one's heads about how earlier composers created works and coming up with 'better' methods. Of course, composers often develop critiques after the fact as a way to explain what they have done, but I believe it is a distortion to hold that those ex post critiques were efficient causes of what they did. Your last sentence seems to suggest that rejecting an intransitive aspect for sonata form (as you say Rosen does) explains why Rosen's view is normative, as if the rejection of intransitivity automatically requires normativity. In other words, your view seems to be that if some enterprise were entirely in the transitive dimension, its basis would have to be normative. So you think we need some objective entity in the intransitive dimension to rescue music from the stain of mere normativity - is that it?? As if normativity is already and forevermore extruded from the intransitive? Or, even if normativity is irretrievably transitive, we still need an entity in the intransitive dimension to rescue music from the stain of the merely social and cultural??. As I said before, I'm not saying you subscribe to such reductions, but I can't make much sense of your position without imputing them to you. Louis -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark Johnson Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 11:13 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? Of course it's subjective (as we understand subjectivity)! But in fact composers deal with the ontology of subjectivity. You're right that Schoenberg's critique wasn't just of 'style' - he was more interested in 'idea', but even in asserting idea over style, he was making a critique (and attacking Stravinsky at the same time, who he disparagingly called 'modernsky'). But Stravinsky and Schoenberg are both great artists despite (because of?) their polemic. You misunderstand me when I talk of Rosen and the Classical Style. I'm referring to Rosen's book 'the Classical Style' - which is an analysis of the normative elements of the classical style. I've always profoundly disagreed with this. Sonata form (the key formal characteristic of classical style) I think has an intransitive aspect - a view which Rosen rejects. On 7/16/08, Louis Irwin wrote: > Mark, > > I believe that on Rosen's view the move to atonality was an internal > objective dialectical development that already started in the complex > evolution of tonal music, and was not simply a subjective reaction of > composers in the 20th century. Your view is: "you have a music, there > is a critique, and there is a transformed music", which is to present > music as an input to a new group of composers, who make a critique of > the existing style and then transform the music. This is a highly > subjectivistic picture of musical development. Obviously subjectivity > is strongly present in the development of music, but only implausibly > (imo) as the kind of subjective dialectic you propose. Whatever > critiques Schoenberg et al. made were based on more that a reaction > against the prevailing aesthetic. The decline of confidence in > rationalism did not lead to a lack of confidence in cadence; rather, > the very meaning of cadence underwent transformation with the > development of music to the point that it became objectively > impossible to compose cadences except by regressing to an earlier stage that had been superseded. > > You say that the "view that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR critique." > I get the impression that you think that style is wrongly thought to > be normative, and that CR will be able to expose that erroneous > thought, as if normativity has no place in objective reality and that > CR will show that. I smell a scientism that needs to expunge > normativity and subjectivity from objective reality. I'm not saying > you subscribe to such a reductionism, but I can't make much sense of your position without imputing that view to you. > > Louis > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mark Johnson > Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 2:25 AM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > > ok - this is the discusson - it oscillates between realism and > idealism. Rosen is an out-and-out constructivist, though! His view > that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR critique. It's true that > Schoenberg's motivation was 'continuity' (there was a lot of german > nationalism in > Schoenberg) - but the point is, it was based on critique (see 'Style > and Idea'). So you have a music, there is a critique, and there is a > transformed music. But it's still music - and 'Erwartung' is in the same league as the 'Nelson mass' (say...). > The critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is. > > Rationalism was in the air in the late 18th century, and the > exuberance, confidence (think of the Nelson mass) and logic of the music reflects this. > The doubts that arose in the 20th century made it more difficult to > finish things with a perfect cadence (although there are plenty, but > never as 'certain' as in the classical period). > > I suppose a different way of saying this is that with the category of > 'music' defined by Rosen, it disappears with the social. My personal > experience however tells me that there is music without the social, > and that Rosen's 'music' is not the whole story (he is still God in > most music departments, though but he's so boring!!). I can't quite > say what that means.. it's almost like saying 'the earth will still go > round the sun' - well, what's 'going round' independent of an > observer? it is the action of a mechanism... but don't mistake the > mechanism for its description. Moreover, with the reality of music, > the fact that all these questions are asked of it, sustains and > transforms it. Personally, music is where my thinking starts... so it's kind-of real for me! > > Mark > > On 7/15/08, Louis Irwin wrote: >> Mark, >> >> I question your assertion that "Atonal music in the 20th derived from >> an assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' >> of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it." That presents the rise >> of atonal music as a subjective rejection on the part of 20th century >> composers against the aesthetic of their predecessors. Charles Rosen >> tells quite a different story in his monograph "Arnold Schoenberg", >> in which he describes how the evolution of tonal music led internally >> to the increasing undermining of tonal relations themselves - a very >> dialectical account in substance, and one I would think would be more >> in line with Adorno's thinking (though I don't know if it is - Rosen >> does > not mention Adorno). >> >> I also question your suggestion that the "physics of the harmonic >> series" justifies traditional tonal harmony in an absolute way. That >> would make music of Bach and after 'unnatural', because it is based >> on equal temperaments rather than the rational ratios of the harmonic series. >> Equal temperament makes the interval between any two notes a multiple >> of the 12th root of 2 (an irrational number), so all tonal music from >> Bach onwards ought to sound out of tune. Interestingly, there is a >> modern school of "just intonation" that does base their music on the >> harmonic series - and guess what? It's their music which sounds out >> of > tune. >> >> I also don't understand how Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were >> "closely associated with the ontology of rationalism". Rosen's story >> in "The Classical Style" is that they discovered that tonal harmonies >> could be used to set up musical dramas and tensions that could then >> be resolved in new ways. They weren't simply following the ontology >> of the harmonic series, or otherwise cloaking rational relations in musical form! >> >> Louis Irwin >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >> Mark Johnson >> Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 2:11 PM >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? >> >> Hi Ruth, >> >> If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We are >> basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain >> distinctions are efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive from >> a transcendental theory of science and seek to include the phenomena >> of art within them. Whilst I see much value in these distinctions, I >> see problems in describing phenomena as complex as music. In my view >> music presents us with a fundamental existential question no less >> profound than the existence of science. Given that music exists, what >> must the world be like? This is a different but related >> transcendental movement > (although we can agree about ID/TD). >> >> In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing critiqued is >> a positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the causality >> of transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent >> unpredictable. In the arts the effects of critique are more directly >> causal and the unpredictabilities are more obvious. >> >> My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour being >> more deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), >> and at the same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so >> dialectical description is problematic. I cannot explain the F-sharp >> in bar 29 .. I just felt like it! >> >> If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental argument >> for science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). Presupposing a >> metahysics is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's >> important to do is to surface the metaphysics in the retroductive process. >> >> My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy >> (I'm not alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B-flat on >> top, why does a resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? >> After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but >> physics of the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. >> Atonal music in the 20th derived from an assertion of the normativity >> and (for >> Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted against >> it. For classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism >> was closely associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the >> Greeks, modal music was linked to a different ontology (music of the spheres). >> I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. >> >> Mark >> >> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>> Hi Mark, >>> >>> Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible >>> simply because the object is one that is shot through with >>> subjectivity. To conclude as much is the flip side of the >>> positivist coin. And I don't think that the pragmatists are right >>> that you can duck fundamental ontological question by replacing them >>> with the kind that you suggest (though in their own right such >>> questions are great, perhaps even more informative in terms of >>> quantity of info generated; it's just that they always already presuppose a metaphysics). >>> Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a >>> re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a > different conclusion. >>> >>> r. >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark >>> Johnson >>> Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >> Forest?? >>> >>> To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >>> problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking >>> about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have >>> been predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step >>> outside music to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people >>> would call an 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to >>> merely contribute to its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't >>> partly true of all critique... different discussion!!) >>> >>> More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >>> might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take >>> the various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >>> biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >>> mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage >>> musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >>> sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >>> music does. >>> >>> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>>> Hi Brad, >>>> >>>> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, >>>> so as not to generate confusion. >>>> >>>> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >>>> concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in part >>>> or whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or >>>> collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that >>>> kind, but they are close, I think. >>>> >>>> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively >>>> constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* >>>> "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no "sound." >>>> But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at first >>>> metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have >>>> "being experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you excise >>>> the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. >>>> But >>>> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >>>> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone >>>> heard them. >>>> >>>> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of >>>> this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, >>>> perception, etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think about >>>> it really seriously would need to dip into that. >>>> >>>> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >>>> >>>> Warmly, >>>> Ruth >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of >>>> Brad Rose >>>> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >>>> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? >>>> >>>> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a >>>> Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In >>>> the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He >>>> argues, I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless >>>> humans are present to hear it and to organize it into music. This >>>> idea intrigued me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a >>>> neuroscientist's > clothing. >>>> Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about >>>> these observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say >>>> there is no taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color >>>> without eyes processing light's wave length? No music >>>> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a tree's > fall >>>> in >>>> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air >>>> about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or >>>> recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without >>>> human perception, there is no color? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it >>>> is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, >>>> sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my >>>> kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have >>>> paint on them, of course, but color only occurs when they interact >>>> with my eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there >>>> to hear it, does it make a sound? (The question was first posed by >>>> the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a >>>> mental image created by the brain in response to vibrating molecules. >>>> Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, >>>> Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the >>>> tree falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is heard." >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Brad >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >>>> bradrose1 at comcast.net >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or >>>> entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or >>>> privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, >>>> dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance >>>> upon this information by persons or entities other than the >>>> intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, >>>> please contact the sender and delete the material from any computer. >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>> >>>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism --------------------------------- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3274 (20080716) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com Thu Jul 17 08:36:18 2008 From: johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com (Mark Johnson) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2008 15:36:18 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: <6tcecr$107cq2@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> References: <6tcecr$107cq2@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: Nicely put Mervyn. I think an article is on its way! On 7/17/08, Mervyn Hartwig wrote: > In which case, to speak of music developing by critique is spot on, and > unexceptional. More precisely, what we have is a logic of musical discovery > or epistemological dialectic, which always involves discovery of new > relations/levels in the ID and the refashioning of materials in the TD in > the light of this. > > It would be good to have an article on this for JCR. It's been a really good > thread. > > Mervyn > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > J.A.Toynbee > Sent: 17 July 2008 09:16 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > > Louis and Mark, > > In the western art music tradition, which seems to be standing in for > music in this discussion, *both* ways of making new (discovery of new > musical relations and programmatic revision of existing modes) are > surely at stake. What's more both have a strongly objective thrust in > that they involve movement towards musical materials, from the concrete > - scoring a French horn just here - to the abstract - using X tone row > say. > > Both ways are combined in most cases. So, a composer who sets out to > push beyond the existing musical order characterised in a certain way, > always has to deal with the problem of real musical relations. > > Jason > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis > Irwin > Sent: 16 July 2008 22:02 > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? > > > Mark, > > I think you missed my point. I was attacking the notion that musical > development proceeds by means of composers' developing critiques of > their predecessors, whether those critiques are of style or of idea. Of > course music is a subjective enterprise in general, just like any > cultural production, but it does not proceed by developing new > subjective ideas out of old ones. (Perhaps our understanding of musical > history proceeds this way, but not musical development itself.) On my > view composers are concerned with discovering real musical relations as > they evolve over periods of time, and this is not simply a matter of > forming ideas in one's heads about how earlier composers created works > and coming up with 'better' methods. Of course, composers often develop > critiques after the fact as a way to explain what they have done, but I > believe it is a distortion to hold that those ex post critiques were > efficient causes of what they did. > > Your last sentence seems to suggest that rejecting an intransitive > aspect for sonata form (as you say Rosen does) explains why Rosen's view > is normative, as if the rejection of intransitivity automatically > requires normativity. In other words, your view seems to be that if > some enterprise were entirely in the transitive dimension, its basis > would have to be normative. So you think we need some objective entity > in the intransitive dimension to rescue music from the stain of mere > normativity - is that it?? As if normativity is already and forevermore > extruded from the intransitive? Or, even if normativity is irretrievably > transitive, we still need an entity in the intransitive dimension to > rescue music from the stain of the merely social and cultural??. As I > said before, I'm not saying you subscribe to such reductions, but I > can't make much sense of your position without imputing them to you. > > Louis > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark > Johnson > Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 11:13 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? > > Of course it's subjective (as we understand subjectivity)! But in fact > composers deal with the ontology of subjectivity. You're right that > Schoenberg's critique wasn't just of 'style' - he was more interested in > 'idea', but even in asserting idea over style, he was making a critique > (and attacking Stravinsky at the same time, who he disparagingly called > 'modernsky'). But Stravinsky and Schoenberg are both great artists > despite (because of?) their polemic. > > You misunderstand me when I talk of Rosen and the Classical Style. I'm > referring to Rosen's book 'the Classical Style' - which is an analysis > of the normative elements of the classical style. I've always profoundly > disagreed with this. Sonata form (the key formal characteristic of > classical > style) I think has an intransitive aspect > - a view which Rosen rejects. > > On 7/16/08, Louis Irwin wrote: >> Mark, >> >> I believe that on Rosen's view the move to atonality was an internal >> objective dialectical development that already started in the complex >> evolution of tonal music, and was not simply a subjective reaction of >> composers in the 20th century. Your view is: "you have a music, there > >> is a critique, and there is a transformed music", which is to present >> music as an input to a new group of composers, who make a critique of >> the existing style and then transform the music. This is a highly >> subjectivistic picture of musical development. Obviously subjectivity > >> is strongly present in the development of music, but only implausibly >> (imo) as the kind of subjective dialectic you propose. Whatever >> critiques Schoenberg et al. made were based on more that a reaction >> against the prevailing aesthetic. The decline of confidence in >> rationalism did not lead to a lack of confidence in cadence; rather, >> the very meaning of cadence underwent transformation with the >> development of music to the point that it became objectively >> impossible to compose cadences except by regressing to an earlier > stage > that had been superseded. >> >> You say that the "view that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR > critique." >> I get the impression that you think that style is wrongly thought to >> be normative, and that CR will be able to expose that erroneous >> thought, as if normativity has no place in objective reality and that >> CR will show that. I smell a scientism that needs to expunge >> normativity and subjectivity from objective reality. I'm not saying >> you subscribe to such a reductionism, but I can't make much sense of > your > position without imputing that view to you. >> >> Louis >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >> Mark Johnson >> Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 2:25 AM >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? >> >> ok - this is the discusson - it oscillates between realism and >> idealism. Rosen is an out-and-out constructivist, though! His view >> that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR critique. It's true that >> Schoenberg's motivation was 'continuity' (there was a lot of german >> nationalism in >> Schoenberg) - but the point is, it was based on critique (see 'Style >> and Idea'). So you have a music, there is a critique, and there is a >> transformed music. But it's still music - and 'Erwartung' is in the > same > league as the 'Nelson mass' (say...). >> The critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is. >> >> Rationalism was in the air in the late 18th century, and the >> exuberance, confidence (think of the Nelson mass) and logic of the > music > reflects this. >> The doubts that arose in the 20th century made it more difficult to >> finish things with a perfect cadence (although there are plenty, but >> never as 'certain' as in the classical period). >> >> I suppose a different way of saying this is that with the category of >> 'music' defined by Rosen, it disappears with the social. My personal >> experience however tells me that there is music without the social, >> and that Rosen's 'music' is not the whole story (he is still God in >> most music departments, though but he's so boring!!). I can't quite >> say what that means.. it's almost like saying 'the earth will still go > >> round the sun' - well, what's 'going round' independent of an >> observer? it is the action of a mechanism... but don't mistake the >> mechanism for its description. Moreover, with the reality of music, >> the fact that all these questions are asked of it, sustains and >> transforms it. Personally, music is where my thinking starts... so > it's > kind-of real for me! >> >> Mark >> >> On 7/15/08, Louis Irwin wrote: >>> Mark, >>> >>> I question your assertion that "Atonal music in the 20th derived from >>> an assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' >>> of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it." That presents the rise >>> of atonal music as a subjective rejection on the part of 20th century > >>> composers against the aesthetic of their predecessors. Charles Rosen >>> tells quite a different story in his monograph "Arnold Schoenberg", >>> in which he describes how the evolution of tonal music led internally > >>> to the increasing undermining of tonal relations themselves - a very >>> dialectical account in substance, and one I would think would be more > >>> in line with Adorno's thinking (though I don't know if it is - Rosen >>> does >> not mention Adorno). >>> >>> I also question your suggestion that the "physics of the harmonic >>> series" justifies traditional tonal harmony in an absolute way. That > >>> would make music of Bach and after 'unnatural', because it is based >>> on equal temperaments rather than the rational ratios of the harmonic > series. >>> Equal temperament makes the interval between any two notes a multiple >>> of the 12th root of 2 (an irrational number), so all tonal music from > >>> Bach onwards ought to sound out of tune. Interestingly, there is a >>> modern school of "just intonation" that does base their music on the >>> harmonic series - and guess what? It's their music which sounds out >>> of >> tune. >>> >>> I also don't understand how Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were >>> "closely associated with the ontology of rationalism". Rosen's story > >>> in "The Classical Style" is that they discovered that tonal harmonies > >>> could be used to set up musical dramas and tensions that could then >>> be resolved in new ways. They weren't simply following the ontology >>> of the harmonic series, or otherwise cloaking rational relations in > musical form! >>> >>> Louis Irwin >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >>> Mark Johnson >>> Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 2:11 PM >>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >> Forest?? >>> >>> Hi Ruth, >>> >>> If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We are >>> basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain >>> distinctions are efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive from > >>> a transcendental theory of science and seek to include the phenomena >>> of art within them. Whilst I see much value in these distinctions, I >>> see problems in describing phenomena as complex as music. In my view >>> music presents us with a fundamental existential question no less >>> profound than the existence of science. Given that music exists, what > >>> must the world be like? This is a different but related >>> transcendental movement >> (although we can agree about ID/TD). >>> >>> In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing critiqued is >>> a positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the causality > >>> of transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent >>> unpredictable. In the arts the effects of critique are more directly >>> causal and the unpredictabilities are more obvious. >>> >>> My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour being >>> more deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), >>> and at the same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so >>> dialectical description is problematic. I cannot explain the F-sharp >>> in bar 29 .. I just felt like it! >>> >>> If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental argument >>> for science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). Presupposing a >>> metahysics is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's >>> important to do is to surface the metaphysics in the retroductive > process. >>> >>> My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy >>> (I'm not alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B-flat on > >>> top, why does a resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? >>> After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but >>> physics of the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. >>> Atonal music in the 20th derived from an assertion of the normativity > >>> and (for >>> Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted against >>> it. For classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism >>> was closely associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the >>> Greeks, modal music was linked to a different ontology (music of the > spheres). >>> I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. >>> >>> Mark >>> >>> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>>> Hi Mark, >>>> >>>> Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible >>>> simply because the object is one that is shot through with >>>> subjectivity. To conclude as much is the flip side of the >>>> positivist coin. And I don't think that the pragmatists are right >>>> that you can duck fundamental ontological question by replacing them > >>>> with the kind that you suggest (though in their own right such >>>> questions are great, perhaps even more informative in terms of >>>> quantity of info generated; it's just that they always already > presuppose a metaphysics). >>>> Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a >>>> re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a >> different conclusion. >>>> >>>> r. >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark >>>> Johnson >>>> Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >>>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>> Forest?? >>>> >>>> To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >>>> problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking >>>> about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have >>>> been predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step >>>> outside music to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people >>>> would call an 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to >>>> merely contribute to its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't >>>> partly true of all critique... different discussion!!) >>>> >>>> More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >>>> might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take >>>> the various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >>>> biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >>>> mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage > >>>> musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >>>> sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >>>> music does. >>>> >>>> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>>>> Hi Brad, >>>>> >>>>> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, >>>>> so as not to generate confusion. >>>>> >>>>> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >>>>> concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in part >>>>> or whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or >>>>> collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that >>>>> kind, but they are close, I think. >>>>> >>>>> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively >>>>> constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* >>>>> "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no > "sound." >>>>> But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at first >>>>> metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have >>>>> "being experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you excise >>>>> the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. >>>>> But >>>>> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >>>>> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone > >>>>> heard them. >>>>> >>>>> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of >>>>> this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, >>>>> perception, etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think about > >>>>> it really seriously would need to dip into that. >>>>> >>>>> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >>>>> >>>>> Warmly, >>>>> Ruth >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of >>>>> Brad Rose >>>>> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >>>>> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? >>>>> >>>>> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a >>>>> Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In >>>>> the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He >>>>> argues, I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless >>>>> humans are present to hear it and to organize it into music. This >>>>> idea intrigued me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a >>>>> neuroscientist's >> clothing. >>>>> Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about >>>>> these observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say >>>>> there is no taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color >>>>> without eyes processing light's wave length? No music >>>>> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a > tree's >> fall >>>>> in >>>>> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air >>>>> about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or >>>>> recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without >>>>> human perception, there is no color? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it >>>>> is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, >>>>> sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my > >>>>> kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have >>>>> paint on them, of course, but color only occurs when they interact >>>>> with my eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there >>>>> to hear it, does it make a sound? (The question was first posed by >>>>> the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a >>>>> mental image created by the brain in response to vibrating > molecules. >>>>> Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, >>>>> Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the >>>>> tree falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is > heard." >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Brad >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >>>>> bradrose1 at comcast.net >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or >>>>> entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or > >>>>> privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, >>>>> dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance >>>>> upon this information by persons or entities other than the >>>>> intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, >>>>> please contact the sender and delete the material from any > computer. >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>> >>>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > --------------------------------- > The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt > charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3274 (20080716) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com Thu Jul 17 08:42:22 2008 From: johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com (Mark Johnson) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2008 15:42:22 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: <6tcecr$107cq2@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> References: <6tcecr$107cq2@ipo3smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: p.s. anyone for dance? Now there's an intersting one...! On 7/17/08, Mervyn Hartwig wrote: > In which case, to speak of music developing by critique is spot on, and > unexceptional. More precisely, what we have is a logic of musical discovery > or epistemological dialectic, which always involves discovery of new > relations/levels in the ID and the refashioning of materials in the TD in > the light of this. > > It would be good to have an article on this for JCR. It's been a really good > thread. > > Mervyn > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > J.A.Toynbee > Sent: 17 July 2008 09:16 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > > Louis and Mark, > > In the western art music tradition, which seems to be standing in for > music in this discussion, *both* ways of making new (discovery of new > musical relations and programmatic revision of existing modes) are > surely at stake. What's more both have a strongly objective thrust in > that they involve movement towards musical materials, from the concrete > - scoring a French horn just here - to the abstract - using X tone row > say. > > Both ways are combined in most cases. So, a composer who sets out to > push beyond the existing musical order characterised in a certain way, > always has to deal with the problem of real musical relations. > > Jason > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis > Irwin > Sent: 16 July 2008 22:02 > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? > > > Mark, > > I think you missed my point. I was attacking the notion that musical > development proceeds by means of composers' developing critiques of > their predecessors, whether those critiques are of style or of idea. Of > course music is a subjective enterprise in general, just like any > cultural production, but it does not proceed by developing new > subjective ideas out of old ones. (Perhaps our understanding of musical > history proceeds this way, but not musical development itself.) On my > view composers are concerned with discovering real musical relations as > they evolve over periods of time, and this is not simply a matter of > forming ideas in one's heads about how earlier composers created works > and coming up with 'better' methods. Of course, composers often develop > critiques after the fact as a way to explain what they have done, but I > believe it is a distortion to hold that those ex post critiques were > efficient causes of what they did. > > Your last sentence seems to suggest that rejecting an intransitive > aspect for sonata form (as you say Rosen does) explains why Rosen's view > is normative, as if the rejection of intransitivity automatically > requires normativity. In other words, your view seems to be that if > some enterprise were entirely in the transitive dimension, its basis > would have to be normative. So you think we need some objective entity > in the intransitive dimension to rescue music from the stain of mere > normativity - is that it?? As if normativity is already and forevermore > extruded from the intransitive? Or, even if normativity is irretrievably > transitive, we still need an entity in the intransitive dimension to > rescue music from the stain of the merely social and cultural??. As I > said before, I'm not saying you subscribe to such reductions, but I > can't make much sense of your position without imputing them to you. > > Louis > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark > Johnson > Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 11:13 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? > > Of course it's subjective (as we understand subjectivity)! But in fact > composers deal with the ontology of subjectivity. You're right that > Schoenberg's critique wasn't just of 'style' - he was more interested in > 'idea', but even in asserting idea over style, he was making a critique > (and attacking Stravinsky at the same time, who he disparagingly called > 'modernsky'). But Stravinsky and Schoenberg are both great artists > despite (because of?) their polemic. > > You misunderstand me when I talk of Rosen and the Classical Style. I'm > referring to Rosen's book 'the Classical Style' - which is an analysis > of the normative elements of the classical style. I've always profoundly > disagreed with this. Sonata form (the key formal characteristic of > classical > style) I think has an intransitive aspect > - a view which Rosen rejects. > > On 7/16/08, Louis Irwin wrote: >> Mark, >> >> I believe that on Rosen's view the move to atonality was an internal >> objective dialectical development that already started in the complex >> evolution of tonal music, and was not simply a subjective reaction of >> composers in the 20th century. Your view is: "you have a music, there > >> is a critique, and there is a transformed music", which is to present >> music as an input to a new group of composers, who make a critique of >> the existing style and then transform the music. This is a highly >> subjectivistic picture of musical development. Obviously subjectivity > >> is strongly present in the development of music, but only implausibly >> (imo) as the kind of subjective dialectic you propose. Whatever >> critiques Schoenberg et al. made were based on more that a reaction >> against the prevailing aesthetic. The decline of confidence in >> rationalism did not lead to a lack of confidence in cadence; rather, >> the very meaning of cadence underwent transformation with the >> development of music to the point that it became objectively >> impossible to compose cadences except by regressing to an earlier > stage > that had been superseded. >> >> You say that the "view that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR > critique." >> I get the impression that you think that style is wrongly thought to >> be normative, and that CR will be able to expose that erroneous >> thought, as if normativity has no place in objective reality and that >> CR will show that. I smell a scientism that needs to expunge >> normativity and subjectivity from objective reality. I'm not saying >> you subscribe to such a reductionism, but I can't make much sense of > your > position without imputing that view to you. >> >> Louis >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >> Mark Johnson >> Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 2:25 AM >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? >> >> ok - this is the discusson - it oscillates between realism and >> idealism. Rosen is an out-and-out constructivist, though! His view >> that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR critique. It's true that >> Schoenberg's motivation was 'continuity' (there was a lot of german >> nationalism in >> Schoenberg) - but the point is, it was based on critique (see 'Style >> and Idea'). So you have a music, there is a critique, and there is a >> transformed music. But it's still music - and 'Erwartung' is in the > same > league as the 'Nelson mass' (say...). >> The critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is. >> >> Rationalism was in the air in the late 18th century, and the >> exuberance, confidence (think of the Nelson mass) and logic of the > music > reflects this. >> The doubts that arose in the 20th century made it more difficult to >> finish things with a perfect cadence (although there are plenty, but >> never as 'certain' as in the classical period). >> >> I suppose a different way of saying this is that with the category of >> 'music' defined by Rosen, it disappears with the social. My personal >> experience however tells me that there is music without the social, >> and that Rosen's 'music' is not the whole story (he is still God in >> most music departments, though but he's so boring!!). I can't quite >> say what that means.. it's almost like saying 'the earth will still go > >> round the sun' - well, what's 'going round' independent of an >> observer? it is the action of a mechanism... but don't mistake the >> mechanism for its description. Moreover, with the reality of music, >> the fact that all these questions are asked of it, sustains and >> transforms it. Personally, music is where my thinking starts... so > it's > kind-of real for me! >> >> Mark >> >> On 7/15/08, Louis Irwin wrote: >>> Mark, >>> >>> I question your assertion that "Atonal music in the 20th derived from >>> an assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' >>> of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it." That presents the rise >>> of atonal music as a subjective rejection on the part of 20th century > >>> composers against the aesthetic of their predecessors. Charles Rosen >>> tells quite a different story in his monograph "Arnold Schoenberg", >>> in which he describes how the evolution of tonal music led internally > >>> to the increasing undermining of tonal relations themselves - a very >>> dialectical account in substance, and one I would think would be more > >>> in line with Adorno's thinking (though I don't know if it is - Rosen >>> does >> not mention Adorno). >>> >>> I also question your suggestion that the "physics of the harmonic >>> series" justifies traditional tonal harmony in an absolute way. That > >>> would make music of Bach and after 'unnatural', because it is based >>> on equal temperaments rather than the rational ratios of the harmonic > series. >>> Equal temperament makes the interval between any two notes a multiple >>> of the 12th root of 2 (an irrational number), so all tonal music from > >>> Bach onwards ought to sound out of tune. Interestingly, there is a >>> modern school of "just intonation" that does base their music on the >>> harmonic series - and guess what? It's their music which sounds out >>> of >> tune. >>> >>> I also don't understand how Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were >>> "closely associated with the ontology of rationalism". Rosen's story > >>> in "The Classical Style" is that they discovered that tonal harmonies > >>> could be used to set up musical dramas and tensions that could then >>> be resolved in new ways. They weren't simply following the ontology >>> of the harmonic series, or otherwise cloaking rational relations in > musical form! >>> >>> Louis Irwin >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >>> Mark Johnson >>> Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 2:11 PM >>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >> Forest?? >>> >>> Hi Ruth, >>> >>> If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We are >>> basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain >>> distinctions are efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive from > >>> a transcendental theory of science and seek to include the phenomena >>> of art within them. Whilst I see much value in these distinctions, I >>> see problems in describing phenomena as complex as music. In my view >>> music presents us with a fundamental existential question no less >>> profound than the existence of science. Given that music exists, what > >>> must the world be like? This is a different but related >>> transcendental movement >> (although we can agree about ID/TD). >>> >>> In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing critiqued is >>> a positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the causality > >>> of transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent >>> unpredictable. In the arts the effects of critique are more directly >>> causal and the unpredictabilities are more obvious. >>> >>> My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour being >>> more deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), >>> and at the same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so >>> dialectical description is problematic. I cannot explain the F-sharp >>> in bar 29 .. I just felt like it! >>> >>> If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental argument >>> for science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). Presupposing a >>> metahysics is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's >>> important to do is to surface the metaphysics in the retroductive > process. >>> >>> My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy >>> (I'm not alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B-flat on > >>> top, why does a resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? >>> After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but >>> physics of the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. >>> Atonal music in the 20th derived from an assertion of the normativity > >>> and (for >>> Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted against >>> it. For classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism >>> was closely associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the >>> Greeks, modal music was linked to a different ontology (music of the > spheres). >>> I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. >>> >>> Mark >>> >>> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>>> Hi Mark, >>>> >>>> Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible >>>> simply because the object is one that is shot through with >>>> subjectivity. To conclude as much is the flip side of the >>>> positivist coin. And I don't think that the pragmatists are right >>>> that you can duck fundamental ontological question by replacing them > >>>> with the kind that you suggest (though in their own right such >>>> questions are great, perhaps even more informative in terms of >>>> quantity of info generated; it's just that they always already > presuppose a metaphysics). >>>> Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a >>>> re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a >> different conclusion. >>>> >>>> r. >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark >>>> Johnson >>>> Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >>>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>> Forest?? >>>> >>>> To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >>>> problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking >>>> about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have >>>> been predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step >>>> outside music to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people >>>> would call an 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to >>>> merely contribute to its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't >>>> partly true of all critique... different discussion!!) >>>> >>>> More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >>>> might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take >>>> the various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >>>> biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >>>> mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage > >>>> musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >>>> sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >>>> music does. >>>> >>>> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>>>> Hi Brad, >>>>> >>>>> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, >>>>> so as not to generate confusion. >>>>> >>>>> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >>>>> concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in part >>>>> or whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or >>>>> collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that >>>>> kind, but they are close, I think. >>>>> >>>>> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively >>>>> constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* >>>>> "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no > "sound." >>>>> But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at first >>>>> metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have >>>>> "being experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you excise >>>>> the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. >>>>> But >>>>> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >>>>> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone > >>>>> heard them. >>>>> >>>>> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of >>>>> this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, >>>>> perception, etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think about > >>>>> it really seriously would need to dip into that. >>>>> >>>>> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >>>>> >>>>> Warmly, >>>>> Ruth >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of >>>>> Brad Rose >>>>> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >>>>> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? >>>>> >>>>> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a >>>>> Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In >>>>> the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He >>>>> argues, I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless >>>>> humans are present to hear it and to organize it into music. This >>>>> idea intrigued me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a >>>>> neuroscientist's >> clothing. >>>>> Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about >>>>> these observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say >>>>> there is no taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color >>>>> without eyes processing light's wave length? No music >>>>> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a > tree's >> fall >>>>> in >>>>> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air >>>>> about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or >>>>> recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without >>>>> human perception, there is no color? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it >>>>> is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, >>>>> sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my > >>>>> kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have >>>>> paint on them, of course, but color only occurs when they interact >>>>> with my eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there >>>>> to hear it, does it make a sound? (The question was first posed by >>>>> the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a >>>>> mental image created by the brain in response to vibrating > molecules. >>>>> Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, >>>>> Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the >>>>> tree falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is > heard." >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Brad >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >>>>> bradrose1 at comcast.net >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or >>>>> entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or > >>>>> privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, >>>>> dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance >>>>> upon this information by persons or entities other than the >>>>> intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, >>>>> please contact the sender and delete the material from any > computer. >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>> >>>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > --------------------------------- > The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt > charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3274 (20080716) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk Thu Jul 17 10:22:45 2008 From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2008 17:22:45 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Why not? Note that this dialectical view of the matter does not reject analytics. On the contrary, it builds on and incorporates the analytical distinctions nicely made in this case by Ruth and Karl. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark Johnson Sent: 17 July 2008 15:42 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? p.s. anyone for dance? Now there's an intersting one...! On 7/17/08, Mervyn Hartwig wrote: > In which case, to speak of music developing by critique is spot on, and > unexceptional. More precisely, what we have is a logic of musical discovery > or epistemological dialectic, which always involves discovery of new > relations/levels in the ID and the refashioning of materials in the TD in > the light of this. > > It would be good to have an article on this for JCR. It's been a really good > thread. > > Mervyn > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > J.A.Toynbee > Sent: 17 July 2008 09:16 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? > > Louis and Mark, > > In the western art music tradition, which seems to be standing in for > music in this discussion, *both* ways of making new (discovery of new > musical relations and programmatic revision of existing modes) are > surely at stake. What's more both have a strongly objective thrust in > that they involve movement towards musical materials, from the concrete > - scoring a French horn just here - to the abstract - using X tone row > say. > > Both ways are combined in most cases. So, a composer who sets out to > push beyond the existing musical order characterised in a certain way, > always has to deal with the problem of real musical relations. > > Jason > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis > Irwin > Sent: 16 July 2008 22:02 > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? > > > Mark, > > I think you missed my point. I was attacking the notion that musical > development proceeds by means of composers' developing critiques of > their predecessors, whether those critiques are of style or of idea. Of > course music is a subjective enterprise in general, just like any > cultural production, but it does not proceed by developing new > subjective ideas out of old ones. (Perhaps our understanding of musical > history proceeds this way, but not musical development itself.) On my > view composers are concerned with discovering real musical relations as > they evolve over periods of time, and this is not simply a matter of > forming ideas in one's heads about how earlier composers created works > and coming up with 'better' methods. Of course, composers often develop > critiques after the fact as a way to explain what they have done, but I > believe it is a distortion to hold that those ex post critiques were > efficient causes of what they did. > > Your last sentence seems to suggest that rejecting an intransitive > aspect for sonata form (as you say Rosen does) explains why Rosen's view > is normative, as if the rejection of intransitivity automatically > requires normativity. In other words, your view seems to be that if > some enterprise were entirely in the transitive dimension, its basis > would have to be normative. So you think we need some objective entity > in the intransitive dimension to rescue music from the stain of mere > normativity - is that it?? As if normativity is already and forevermore > extruded from the intransitive? Or, even if normativity is irretrievably > transitive, we still need an entity in the intransitive dimension to > rescue music from the stain of the merely social and cultural??. As I > said before, I'm not saying you subscribe to such reductions, but I > can't make much sense of your position without imputing them to you. > > Louis > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mark > Johnson > Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 11:13 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? > > Of course it's subjective (as we understand subjectivity)! But in fact > composers deal with the ontology of subjectivity. You're right that > Schoenberg's critique wasn't just of 'style' - he was more interested in > 'idea', but even in asserting idea over style, he was making a critique > (and attacking Stravinsky at the same time, who he disparagingly called > 'modernsky'). But Stravinsky and Schoenberg are both great artists > despite (because of?) their polemic. > > You misunderstand me when I talk of Rosen and the Classical Style. I'm > referring to Rosen's book 'the Classical Style' - which is an analysis > of the normative elements of the classical style. I've always profoundly > disagreed with this. Sonata form (the key formal characteristic of > classical > style) I think has an intransitive aspect > - a view which Rosen rejects. > > On 7/16/08, Louis Irwin wrote: >> Mark, >> >> I believe that on Rosen's view the move to atonality was an internal >> objective dialectical development that already started in the complex >> evolution of tonal music, and was not simply a subjective reaction of >> composers in the 20th century. Your view is: "you have a music, there > >> is a critique, and there is a transformed music", which is to present >> music as an input to a new group of composers, who make a critique of >> the existing style and then transform the music. This is a highly >> subjectivistic picture of musical development. Obviously subjectivity > >> is strongly present in the development of music, but only implausibly >> (imo) as the kind of subjective dialectic you propose. Whatever >> critiques Schoenberg et al. made were based on more that a reaction >> against the prevailing aesthetic. The decline of confidence in >> rationalism did not lead to a lack of confidence in cadence; rather, >> the very meaning of cadence underwent transformation with the >> development of music to the point that it became objectively >> impossible to compose cadences except by regressing to an earlier > stage > that had been superseded. >> >> You say that the "view that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR > critique." >> I get the impression that you think that style is wrongly thought to >> be normative, and that CR will be able to expose that erroneous >> thought, as if normativity has no place in objective reality and that >> CR will show that. I smell a scientism that needs to expunge >> normativity and subjectivity from objective reality. I'm not saying >> you subscribe to such a reductionism, but I can't make much sense of > your > position without imputing that view to you. >> >> Louis >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >> Mark Johnson >> Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 2:25 AM >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? >> >> ok - this is the discusson - it oscillates between realism and >> idealism. Rosen is an out-and-out constructivist, though! His view >> that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR critique. It's true that >> Schoenberg's motivation was 'continuity' (there was a lot of german >> nationalism in >> Schoenberg) - but the point is, it was based on critique (see 'Style >> and Idea'). So you have a music, there is a critique, and there is a >> transformed music. But it's still music - and 'Erwartung' is in the > same > league as the 'Nelson mass' (say...). >> The critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is. >> >> Rationalism was in the air in the late 18th century, and the >> exuberance, confidence (think of the Nelson mass) and logic of the > music > reflects this. >> The doubts that arose in the 20th century made it more difficult to >> finish things with a perfect cadence (although there are plenty, but >> never as 'certain' as in the classical period). >> >> I suppose a different way of saying this is that with the category of >> 'music' defined by Rosen, it disappears with the social. My personal >> experience however tells me that there is music without the social, >> and that Rosen's 'music' is not the whole story (he is still God in >> most music departments, though but he's so boring!!). I can't quite >> say what that means.. it's almost like saying 'the earth will still go > >> round the sun' - well, what's 'going round' independent of an >> observer? it is the action of a mechanism... but don't mistake the >> mechanism for its description. Moreover, with the reality of music, >> the fact that all these questions are asked of it, sustains and >> transforms it. Personally, music is where my thinking starts... so > it's > kind-of real for me! >> >> Mark >> >> On 7/15/08, Louis Irwin wrote: >>> Mark, >>> >>> I question your assertion that "Atonal music in the 20th derived from >>> an assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' >>> of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it." That presents the rise >>> of atonal music as a subjective rejection on the part of 20th century > >>> composers against the aesthetic of their predecessors. Charles Rosen >>> tells quite a different story in his monograph "Arnold Schoenberg", >>> in which he describes how the evolution of tonal music led internally > >>> to the increasing undermining of tonal relations themselves - a very >>> dialectical account in substance, and one I would think would be more > >>> in line with Adorno's thinking (though I don't know if it is - Rosen >>> does >> not mention Adorno). >>> >>> I also question your suggestion that the "physics of the harmonic >>> series" justifies traditional tonal harmony in an absolute way. That > >>> would make music of Bach and after 'unnatural', because it is based >>> on equal temperaments rather than the rational ratios of the harmonic > series. >>> Equal temperament makes the interval between any two notes a multiple >>> of the 12th root of 2 (an irrational number), so all tonal music from > >>> Bach onwards ought to sound out of tune. Interestingly, there is a >>> modern school of "just intonation" that does base their music on the >>> harmonic series - and guess what? It's their music which sounds out >>> of >> tune. >>> >>> I also don't understand how Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were >>> "closely associated with the ontology of rationalism". Rosen's story > >>> in "The Classical Style" is that they discovered that tonal harmonies > >>> could be used to set up musical dramas and tensions that could then >>> be resolved in new ways. They weren't simply following the ontology >>> of the harmonic series, or otherwise cloaking rational relations in > musical form! >>> >>> Louis Irwin >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >>> Mark Johnson >>> Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 2:11 PM >>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >> Forest?? >>> >>> Hi Ruth, >>> >>> If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We are >>> basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain >>> distinctions are efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive from > >>> a transcendental theory of science and seek to include the phenomena >>> of art within them. Whilst I see much value in these distinctions, I >>> see problems in describing phenomena as complex as music. In my view >>> music presents us with a fundamental existential question no less >>> profound than the existence of science. Given that music exists, what > >>> must the world be like? This is a different but related >>> transcendental movement >> (although we can agree about ID/TD). >>> >>> In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing critiqued is >>> a positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the causality > >>> of transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent >>> unpredictable. In the arts the effects of critique are more directly >>> causal and the unpredictabilities are more obvious. >>> >>> My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour being >>> more deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), >>> and at the same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so >>> dialectical description is problematic. I cannot explain the F-sharp >>> in bar 29 .. I just felt like it! >>> >>> If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental argument >>> for science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). Presupposing a >>> metahysics is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's >>> important to do is to surface the metaphysics in the retroductive > process. >>> >>> My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy >>> (I'm not alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B-flat on > >>> top, why does a resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? >>> After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but >>> physics of the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. >>> Atonal music in the 20th derived from an assertion of the normativity > >>> and (for >>> Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted against >>> it. For classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism >>> was closely associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the >>> Greeks, modal music was linked to a different ontology (music of the > spheres). >>> I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. >>> >>> Mark >>> >>> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>>> Hi Mark, >>>> >>>> Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible >>>> simply because the object is one that is shot through with >>>> subjectivity. To conclude as much is the flip side of the >>>> positivist coin. And I don't think that the pragmatists are right >>>> that you can duck fundamental ontological question by replacing them > >>>> with the kind that you suggest (though in their own right such >>>> questions are great, perhaps even more informative in terms of >>>> quantity of info generated; it's just that they always already > presuppose a metaphysics). >>>> Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a >>>> re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a >> different conclusion. >>>> >>>> r. >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark >>>> Johnson >>>> Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >>>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>> Forest?? >>>> >>>> To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >>>> problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in talking >>>> about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have >>>> been predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step >>>> outside music to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people >>>> would call an 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to >>>> merely contribute to its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't >>>> partly true of all critique... different discussion!!) >>>> >>>> More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >>>> might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take >>>> the various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >>>> biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >>>> mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to engage > >>>> musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >>>> sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >>>> music does. >>>> >>>> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>>>> Hi Brad, >>>>> >>>>> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision here, >>>>> so as not to generate confusion. >>>>> >>>>> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >>>>> concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in part >>>>> or whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or >>>>> collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that >>>>> kind, but they are close, I think. >>>>> >>>>> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively >>>>> constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* >>>>> "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no > "sound." >>>>> But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at first >>>>> metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have >>>>> "being experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you excise >>>>> the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. >>>>> But >>>>> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >>>>> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if anyone > >>>>> heard them. >>>>> >>>>> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on all of >>>>> this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, >>>>> perception, etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think about > >>>>> it really seriously would need to dip into that. >>>>> >>>>> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >>>>> >>>>> Warmly, >>>>> Ruth >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of >>>>> Brad Rose >>>>> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >>>>> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? >>>>> >>>>> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a >>>>> Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. In >>>>> the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He >>>>> argues, I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, unless >>>>> humans are present to hear it and to organize it into music. This >>>>> idea intrigued me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a >>>>> neuroscientist's >> clothing. >>>>> Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about >>>>> these observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say >>>>> there is no taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color >>>>> without eyes processing light's wave length? No music >>>>> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a > tree's >> fall >>>>> in >>>>> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of air >>>>> about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or >>>>> recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without >>>>> human perception, there is no color? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Comments and observations about these questions are much welcomed. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth-when it >>>>> is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, >>>>> sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls in my > >>>>> kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have >>>>> paint on them, of course, but color only occurs when they interact >>>>> with my eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there >>>>> to hear it, does it make a sound? (The question was first posed by >>>>> the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a >>>>> mental image created by the brain in response to vibrating > molecules. >>>>> Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, >>>>> Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by the >>>>> tree falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is > heard." >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Brad >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >>>>> bradrose1 at comcast.net >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or >>>>> entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or > >>>>> privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, >>>>> dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance >>>>> upon this information by persons or entities other than the >>>>> intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, >>>>> please contact the sender and delete the material from any > computer. >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>> >>>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > --------------------------------- > The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt > charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3274 (20080716) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism __________ NOD32 3274 (20080716) Information __________ This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. http://www.eset.com From gbrown at uow.edu.au Thu Jul 17 14:43:59 2008 From: gbrown at uow.edu.au (Gordon Brown) Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2008 06:43:59 +1000 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: <6tceqh$10c48j@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> References: <6tceqh$10c48j@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> Message-ID: <23E11EB3-6C7D-4841-8311-0A497F742834@uow.edu.au> As another addition of nuance to the argument is the matter of musical preference. This is both in a broader cultural sense, that there are broad cultural styles (using characteristic modal patterns - scales - instruments and rhythms) as in music that is recognisably western (and all the styles that implies), arabic, asian, African, Australian Aboriginal, etc , and in the narrower sense that my musical tastes largely hark back to the 50s, 60s of my youth, whereas my father harks back to the 30s and 40s of his youth, and so on. I don't have the reference for it, but there is the thesis that we tend to form our musical tastes (preferences) in childhood and adolescence. Hence the baby boomers bemoan the current state of popular music, just as my father's cohort bemoaned the rise of rock and roll in the 50s. Oh, and earlier there was a phrase (can't find it at the mo) about the psycho-sociocultural nature of music, to which we could add physical, as in the physical nature of the wave forms that produce different tonal qualities perceived and interpreted by people. Just a thought. Gordon On Jul 18, 2008, at 2:22 AM, Mervyn Hartwig wrote: > Why not? > > Note that this dialectical view of the matter does not reject > analytics. On > the contrary, it builds on and incorporates the analytical > distinctions > nicely made in this case by Ruth and Karl. > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of > Mark > Johnson > Sent: 17 July 2008 15:42 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? > > p.s. anyone for dance? Now there's an intersting one...! > > On 7/17/08, Mervyn Hartwig wrote: >> In which case, to speak of music developing by critique is spot on, >> and >> unexceptional. More precisely, what we have is a logic of musical > discovery >> or epistemological dialectic, which always involves discovery of new >> relations/levels in the ID and the refashioning of materials in the >> TD in >> the light of this. >> >> It would be good to have an article on this for JCR. It's been a >> really > good >> thread. >> >> Mervyn >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >> J.A.Toynbee >> Sent: 17 July 2008 09:16 >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the > Forest?? >> >> Louis and Mark, >> >> In the western art music tradition, which seems to be standing in for >> music in this discussion, *both* ways of making new (discovery of new >> musical relations and programmatic revision of existing modes) are >> surely at stake. What's more both have a strongly objective thrust in >> that they involve movement towards musical materials, from the >> concrete >> - scoring a French horn just here - to the abstract - using X tone >> row >> say. >> >> Both ways are combined in most cases. So, a composer who sets out to >> push beyond the existing musical order characterised in a certain >> way, >> always has to deal with the problem of real musical relations. >> >> Jason >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >> Louis >> Irwin >> Sent: 16 July 2008 22:02 >> To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >> Forest?? >> >> >> Mark, >> >> I think you missed my point. I was attacking the notion that musical >> development proceeds by means of composers' developing critiques of >> their predecessors, whether those critiques are of style or of >> idea. Of >> course music is a subjective enterprise in general, just like any >> cultural production, but it does not proceed by developing new >> subjective ideas out of old ones. (Perhaps our understanding of >> musical >> history proceeds this way, but not musical development itself.) On >> my >> view composers are concerned with discovering real musical >> relations as >> they evolve over periods of time, and this is not simply a matter of >> forming ideas in one's heads about how earlier composers created >> works >> and coming up with 'better' methods. Of course, composers often >> develop >> critiques after the fact as a way to explain what they have done, >> but I >> believe it is a distortion to hold that those ex post critiques were >> efficient causes of what they did. >> >> Your last sentence seems to suggest that rejecting an intransitive >> aspect for sonata form (as you say Rosen does) explains why Rosen's >> view >> is normative, as if the rejection of intransitivity automatically >> requires normativity. In other words, your view seems to be that if >> some enterprise were entirely in the transitive dimension, its basis >> would have to be normative. So you think we need some objective >> entity >> in the intransitive dimension to rescue music from the stain of mere >> normativity - is that it?? As if normativity is already and >> forevermore >> extruded from the intransitive? Or, even if normativity is >> irretrievably >> transitive, we still need an entity in the intransitive dimension to >> rescue music from the stain of the merely social and cultural??. >> As I >> said before, I'm not saying you subscribe to such reductions, but I >> can't make much sense of your position without imputing them to you. >> >> Louis >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >> Mark >> Johnson >> Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 11:13 PM >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >> Forest?? >> >> Of course it's subjective (as we understand subjectivity)! But in >> fact >> composers deal with the ontology of subjectivity. You're right that >> Schoenberg's critique wasn't just of 'style' - he was more >> interested in >> 'idea', but even in asserting idea over style, he was making a >> critique >> (and attacking Stravinsky at the same time, who he disparagingly >> called >> 'modernsky'). But Stravinsky and Schoenberg are both great artists >> despite (because of?) their polemic. >> >> You misunderstand me when I talk of Rosen and the Classical Style. >> I'm >> referring to Rosen's book 'the Classical Style' - which is an >> analysis >> of the normative elements of the classical style. I've always >> profoundly >> disagreed with this. Sonata form (the key formal characteristic of >> classical >> style) I think has an intransitive aspect >> - a view which Rosen rejects. >> >> On 7/16/08, Louis Irwin wrote: >>> Mark, >>> >>> I believe that on Rosen's view the move to atonality was an internal >>> objective dialectical development that already started in the >>> complex >>> evolution of tonal music, and was not simply a subjective reaction >>> of >>> composers in the 20th century. Your view is: "you have a music, >>> there >> >>> is a critique, and there is a transformed music", which is to >>> present >>> music as an input to a new group of composers, who make a critique >>> of >>> the existing style and then transform the music. This is a highly >>> subjectivistic picture of musical development. Obviously >>> subjectivity >> >>> is strongly present in the development of music, but only >>> implausibly >>> (imo) as the kind of subjective dialectic you propose. Whatever >>> critiques Schoenberg et al. made were based on more that a reaction >>> against the prevailing aesthetic. The decline of confidence in >>> rationalism did not lead to a lack of confidence in cadence; rather, >>> the very meaning of cadence underwent transformation with the >>> development of music to the point that it became objectively >>> impossible to compose cadences except by regressing to an earlier >> stage >> that had been superseded. >>> >>> You say that the "view that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR >> critique." >>> I get the impression that you think that style is wrongly thought to >>> be normative, and that CR will be able to expose that erroneous >>> thought, as if normativity has no place in objective reality and >>> that >>> CR will show that. I smell a scientism that needs to expunge >>> normativity and subjectivity from objective reality. I'm not saying >>> you subscribe to such a reductionism, but I can't make much sense of >> your >> position without imputing that view to you. >>> >>> Louis >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >>> Mark Johnson >>> Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 2:25 AM >>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >> Forest?? >>> >>> ok - this is the discusson - it oscillates between realism and >>> idealism. Rosen is an out-and-out constructivist, though! His view >>> that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR critique. It's true that >>> Schoenberg's motivation was 'continuity' (there was a lot of german >>> nationalism in >>> Schoenberg) - but the point is, it was based on critique (see 'Style >>> and Idea'). So you have a music, there is a critique, and there is a >>> transformed music. But it's still music - and 'Erwartung' is in the >> same >> league as the 'Nelson mass' (say...). >>> The critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is. >>> >>> Rationalism was in the air in the late 18th century, and the >>> exuberance, confidence (think of the Nelson mass) and logic of the >> music >> reflects this. >>> The doubts that arose in the 20th century made it more difficult to >>> finish things with a perfect cadence (although there are plenty, but >>> never as 'certain' as in the classical period). >>> >>> I suppose a different way of saying this is that with the category >>> of >>> 'music' defined by Rosen, it disappears with the social. My personal >>> experience however tells me that there is music without the social, >>> and that Rosen's 'music' is not the whole story (he is still God in >>> most music departments, though but he's so boring!!). I can't quite >>> say what that means.. it's almost like saying 'the earth will >>> still go >> >>> round the sun' - well, what's 'going round' independent of an >>> observer? it is the action of a mechanism... but don't mistake the >>> mechanism for its description. Moreover, with the reality of music, >>> the fact that all these questions are asked of it, sustains and >>> transforms it. Personally, music is where my thinking starts... so >> it's >> kind-of real for me! >>> >>> Mark >>> >>> On 7/15/08, Louis Irwin wrote: >>>> Mark, >>>> >>>> I question your assertion that "Atonal music in the 20th derived >>>> from >>>> an assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois- >>>> ness' >>>> of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it." That presents the >>>> rise >>>> of atonal music as a subjective rejection on the part of 20th >>>> century >> >>>> composers against the aesthetic of their predecessors. Charles >>>> Rosen >>>> tells quite a different story in his monograph "Arnold Schoenberg", >>>> in which he describes how the evolution of tonal music led >>>> internally >> >>>> to the increasing undermining of tonal relations themselves - a >>>> very >>>> dialectical account in substance, and one I would think would be >>>> more >> >>>> in line with Adorno's thinking (though I don't know if it is - >>>> Rosen >>>> does >>> not mention Adorno). >>>> >>>> I also question your suggestion that the "physics of the harmonic >>>> series" justifies traditional tonal harmony in an absolute way. >>>> That >> >>>> would make music of Bach and after 'unnatural', because it is based >>>> on equal temperaments rather than the rational ratios of the >>>> harmonic >> series. >>>> Equal temperament makes the interval between any two notes a >>>> multiple >>>> of the 12th root of 2 (an irrational number), so all tonal music >>>> from >> >>>> Bach onwards ought to sound out of tune. Interestingly, there is a >>>> modern school of "just intonation" that does base their music on >>>> the >>>> harmonic series - and guess what? It's their music which sounds out >>>> of >>> tune. >>>> >>>> I also don't understand how Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were >>>> "closely associated with the ontology of rationalism". Rosen's >>>> story >> >>>> in "The Classical Style" is that they discovered that tonal >>>> harmonies >> >>>> could be used to set up musical dramas and tensions that could then >>>> be resolved in new ways. They weren't simply following the >>>> ontology >>>> of the harmonic series, or otherwise cloaking rational relations in >> musical form! >>>> >>>> Louis Irwin >>>> >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >>>> Mark Johnson >>>> Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 2:11 PM >>>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>> Forest?? >>>> >>>> Hi Ruth, >>>> >>>> If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We >>>> are >>>> basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain >>>> distinctions are efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive >>>> from >> >>>> a transcendental theory of science and seek to include the >>>> phenomena >>>> of art within them. Whilst I see much value in these >>>> distinctions, I >>>> see problems in describing phenomena as complex as music. In my >>>> view >>>> music presents us with a fundamental existential question no less >>>> profound than the existence of science. Given that music exists, >>>> what >> >>>> must the world be like? This is a different but related >>>> transcendental movement >>> (although we can agree about ID/TD). >>>> >>>> In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing >>>> critiqued is >>>> a positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the >>>> causality >> >>>> of transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent >>>> unpredictable. In the arts the effects of critique are more >>>> directly >>>> causal and the unpredictabilities are more obvious. >>>> >>>> My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour >>>> being >>>> more deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), >>>> and at the same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so >>>> dialectical description is problematic. I cannot explain the F- >>>> sharp >>>> in bar 29 .. I just felt like it! >>>> >>>> If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental >>>> argument >>>> for science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). >>>> Presupposing a >>>> metahysics is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's >>>> important to do is to surface the metaphysics in the retroductive >> process. >>>> >>>> My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy >>>> (I'm not alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B- >>>> flat on >> >>>> top, why does a resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? >>>> After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but >>>> physics of the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. >>>> Atonal music in the 20th derived from an assertion of the >>>> normativity >> >>>> and (for >>>> Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted >>>> against >>>> it. For classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism >>>> was closely associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the >>>> Greeks, modal music was linked to a different ontology (music of >>>> the >> spheres). >>>> I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. >>>> >>>> Mark >>>> >>>> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>>>> Hi Mark, >>>>> >>>>> Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible >>>>> simply because the object is one that is shot through with >>>>> subjectivity. To conclude as much is the flip side of the >>>>> positivist coin. And I don't think that the pragmatists are right >>>>> that you can duck fundamental ontological question by replacing >>>>> them >> >>>>> with the kind that you suggest (though in their own right such >>>>> questions are great, perhaps even more informative in terms of >>>>> quantity of info generated; it's just that they always already >> presuppose a metaphysics). >>>>> Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a >>>>> re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a >>> different conclusion. >>>>> >>>>> r. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of >>>>> Mark >>>>> Johnson >>>>> Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >>>>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>>>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>>> Forest?? >>>>> >>>>> To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >>>>> problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in >>>>> talking >>>>> about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have >>>>> been predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step >>>>> outside music to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people >>>>> would call an 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to >>>>> merely contribute to its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't >>>>> partly true of all critique... different discussion!!) >>>>> >>>>> More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >>>>> might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take >>>>> the various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >>>>> biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >>>>> mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to >>>>> engage >> >>>>> musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >>>>> sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >>>>> music does. >>>>> >>>>> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>>>>> Hi Brad, >>>>>> >>>>>> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision >>>>>> here, >>>>>> so as not to generate confusion. >>>>>> >>>>>> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >>>>>> concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in >>>>>> part >>>>>> or whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or >>>>>> collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that >>>>>> kind, but they are close, I think. >>>>>> >>>>>> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively >>>>>> constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* >>>>>> "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no >> "sound." >>>>>> But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at first >>>>>> metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have >>>>>> "being experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you >>>>>> excise >>>>>> the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. >>>>>> But >>>>>> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >>>>>> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if >>>>>> anyone >> >>>>>> heard them. >>>>>> >>>>>> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on >>>>>> all of >>>>>> this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, >>>>>> perception, etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think >>>>>> about >> >>>>>> it really seriously would need to dip into that. >>>>>> >>>>>> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >>>>>> >>>>>> Warmly, >>>>>> Ruth >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of >>>>>> Brad Rose >>>>>> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >>>>>> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>>> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >> Forest?? >>>>>> >>>>>> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a >>>>>> Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. >>>>>> In >>>>>> the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He >>>>>> argues, I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, >>>>>> unless >>>>>> humans are present to hear it and to organize it into music. This >>>>>> idea intrigued me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a >>>>>> neuroscientist's >>> clothing. >>>>>> Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about >>>>>> these observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say >>>>>> there is no taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color >>>>>> without eyes processing light's wave length? No music >>>>>> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a >> tree's >>> fall >>>>>> in >>>>>> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of >>>>>> air >>>>>> about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or >>>>>> recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without >>>>>> human perception, there is no color? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Comments and observations about these questions are much >>>>>> welcomed. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth- >>>>>> when it >>>>>> is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, >>>>>> sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls >>>>>> in my >> >>>>>> kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have >>>>>> paint on them, of course, but color only occurs when they >>>>>> interact >>>>>> with my eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there >>>>>> to hear it, does it make a sound? (The question was first posed >>>>>> by >>>>>> the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a >>>>>> mental image created by the brain in response to vibrating >> molecules. >>>>>> Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, >>>>>> Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by >>>>>> the >>>>>> tree falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is >> heard." >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Brad >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >>>>>> bradrose1 at comcast.net >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or >>>>>> entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential >>>>>> and/or >> >>>>>> privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, >>>>>> dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in >>>>>> reliance >>>>>> upon this information by persons or entities other than the >>>>>> intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, >>>>>> please contact the sender and delete the material from any >> computer. >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> --------------------------------- >> The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an > exempt >> charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC > 038302). >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> __________ NOD32 3274 (20080716) Information __________ >> >> This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. >> http://www.eset.com >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > __________ NOD32 3274 (20080716) Information __________ > > This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. > http://www.eset.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism Dr Gordon Brown Senior Lecturer, Curriculum and Teacher Education Director, BMathsEd and BScienceEd, Loftus Campus Coordinator, Curriculum and Pedagogy Faculty of Education University of Wollongong Wollongong NSW 2522 Australia Phone (work) 61 2 4221 3792 Fax (work) 61 2 4221 3892 From johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com Fri Jul 18 10:18:22 2008 From: johnsonmwj1 at googlemail.com (Mark Johnson) Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2008 17:18:22 +0100 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? In-Reply-To: <23E11EB3-6C7D-4841-8311-0A497F742834@uow.edu.au> References: <6tceqh$10c48j@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu> <23E11EB3-6C7D-4841-8311-0A497F742834@uow.edu.au> Message-ID: yes.. the bottom line is people 'like' (or 'love') 'music' - but the musics that they feel that way about are highly diverse. What's in the 'liking'? (and if anyone's wondering how I'm replying to this when I'm at the CR education conference, it's because I've ducked -out and gone to the Proms!) On 7/17/08, Gordon Brown wrote: > As another addition of nuance to the argument is the matter of musical > preference. This is both in a broader cultural sense, that there are > broad cultural styles (using characteristic modal patterns - scales - > instruments and rhythms) as in music that is recognisably western (and > all the styles that implies), arabic, asian, African, Australian > Aboriginal, etc , and in the narrower sense that my musical tastes > largely hark back to the 50s, 60s of my youth, whereas my father harks > back to the 30s and 40s of his youth, and so on. I don't have the > reference for it, but there is the thesis that we tend to form our > musical tastes (preferences) in childhood and adolescence. Hence the > baby boomers bemoan the current state of popular music, just as my > father's cohort bemoaned the rise of rock and roll in the 50s. > > Oh, and earlier there was a phrase (can't find it at the mo) about the > psycho-sociocultural nature of music, to which we could add physical, > as in the physical nature of the wave forms that produce different > tonal qualities perceived and interpreted by people. > > Just a thought. > > Gordon > > On Jul 18, 2008, at 2:22 AM, Mervyn Hartwig wrote: > >> Why not? >> >> Note that this dialectical view of the matter does not reject >> analytics. On >> the contrary, it builds on and incorporates the analytical >> distinctions >> nicely made in this case by Ruth and Karl. >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >> Mark >> Johnson >> Sent: 17 July 2008 15:42 >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >> Forest?? >> >> p.s. anyone for dance? Now there's an intersting one...! >> >> On 7/17/08, Mervyn Hartwig wrote: >>> In which case, to speak of music developing by critique is spot on, >>> and >>> unexceptional. More precisely, what we have is a logic of musical >> discovery >>> or epistemological dialectic, which always involves discovery of new >>> relations/levels in the ID and the refashioning of materials in the >>> TD in >>> the light of this. >>> >>> It would be good to have an article on this for JCR. It's been a >>> really >> good >>> thread. >>> >>> Mervyn >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >>> J.A.Toynbee >>> Sent: 17 July 2008 09:16 >>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >> Forest?? >>> >>> Louis and Mark, >>> >>> In the western art music tradition, which seems to be standing in for >>> music in this discussion, *both* ways of making new (discovery of new >>> musical relations and programmatic revision of existing modes) are >>> surely at stake. What's more both have a strongly objective thrust in >>> that they involve movement towards musical materials, from the >>> concrete >>> - scoring a French horn just here - to the abstract - using X tone >>> row >>> say. >>> >>> Both ways are combined in most cases. So, a composer who sets out to >>> push beyond the existing musical order characterised in a certain >>> way, >>> always has to deal with the problem of real musical relations. >>> >>> Jason >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >>> Louis >>> Irwin >>> Sent: 16 July 2008 22:02 >>> To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' >>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>> Forest?? >>> >>> >>> Mark, >>> >>> I think you missed my point. I was attacking the notion that musical >>> development proceeds by means of composers' developing critiques of >>> their predecessors, whether those critiques are of style or of >>> idea. Of >>> course music is a subjective enterprise in general, just like any >>> cultural production, but it does not proceed by developing new >>> subjective ideas out of old ones. (Perhaps our understanding of >>> musical >>> history proceeds this way, but not musical development itself.) On >>> my >>> view composers are concerned with discovering real musical >>> relations as >>> they evolve over periods of time, and this is not simply a matter of >>> forming ideas in one's heads about how earlier composers created >>> works >>> and coming up with 'better' methods. Of course, composers often >>> develop >>> critiques after the fact as a way to explain what they have done, >>> but I >>> believe it is a distortion to hold that those ex post critiques were >>> efficient causes of what they did. >>> >>> Your last sentence seems to suggest that rejecting an intransitive >>> aspect for sonata form (as you say Rosen does) explains why Rosen's >>> view >>> is normative, as if the rejection of intransitivity automatically >>> requires normativity. In other words, your view seems to be that if >>> some enterprise were entirely in the transitive dimension, its basis >>> would have to be normative. So you think we need some objective >>> entity >>> in the intransitive dimension to rescue music from the stain of mere >>> normativity - is that it?? As if normativity is already and >>> forevermore >>> extruded from the intransitive? Or, even if normativity is >>> irretrievably >>> transitive, we still need an entity in the intransitive dimension to >>> rescue music from the stain of the merely social and cultural??. >>> As I >>> said before, I'm not saying you subscribe to such reductions, but I >>> can't make much sense of your position without imputing them to you. >>> >>> Louis >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >>> Mark >>> Johnson >>> Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 11:13 PM >>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>> Forest?? >>> >>> Of course it's subjective (as we understand subjectivity)! But in >>> fact >>> composers deal with the ontology of subjectivity. You're right that >>> Schoenberg's critique wasn't just of 'style' - he was more >>> interested in >>> 'idea', but even in asserting idea over style, he was making a >>> critique >>> (and attacking Stravinsky at the same time, who he disparagingly >>> called >>> 'modernsky'). But Stravinsky and Schoenberg are both great artists >>> despite (because of?) their polemic. >>> >>> You misunderstand me when I talk of Rosen and the Classical Style. >>> I'm >>> referring to Rosen's book 'the Classical Style' - which is an >>> analysis >>> of the normative elements of the classical style. I've always >>> profoundly >>> disagreed with this. Sonata form (the key formal characteristic of >>> classical >>> style) I think has an intransitive aspect >>> - a view which Rosen rejects. >>> >>> On 7/16/08, Louis Irwin wrote: >>>> Mark, >>>> >>>> I believe that on Rosen's view the move to atonality was an internal >>>> objective dialectical development that already started in the >>>> complex >>>> evolution of tonal music, and was not simply a subjective reaction >>>> of >>>> composers in the 20th century. Your view is: "you have a music, >>>> there >>> >>>> is a critique, and there is a transformed music", which is to >>>> present >>>> music as an input to a new group of composers, who make a critique >>>> of >>>> the existing style and then transform the music. This is a highly >>>> subjectivistic picture of musical development. Obviously >>>> subjectivity >>> >>>> is strongly present in the development of music, but only >>>> implausibly >>>> (imo) as the kind of subjective dialectic you propose. Whatever >>>> critiques Schoenberg et al. made were based on more that a reaction >>>> against the prevailing aesthetic. The decline of confidence in >>>> rationalism did not lead to a lack of confidence in cadence; rather, >>>> the very meaning of cadence underwent transformation with the >>>> development of music to the point that it became objectively >>>> impossible to compose cadences except by regressing to an earlier >>> stage >>> that had been superseded. >>>> >>>> You say that the "view that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR >>> critique." >>>> I get the impression that you think that style is wrongly thought to >>>> be normative, and that CR will be able to expose that erroneous >>>> thought, as if normativity has no place in objective reality and >>>> that >>>> CR will show that. I smell a scientism that needs to expunge >>>> normativity and subjectivity from objective reality. I'm not saying >>>> you subscribe to such a reductionism, but I can't make much sense of >>> your >>> position without imputing that view to you. >>>> >>>> Louis >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >>>> Mark Johnson >>>> Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 2:25 AM >>>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>> Forest?? >>>> >>>> ok - this is the discusson - it oscillates between realism and >>>> idealism. Rosen is an out-and-out constructivist, though! His view >>>> that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR critique. It's true that >>>> Schoenberg's motivation was 'continuity' (there was a lot of german >>>> nationalism in >>>> Schoenberg) - but the point is, it was based on critique (see 'Style >>>> and Idea'). So you have a music, there is a critique, and there is a >>>> transformed music. But it's still music - and 'Erwartung' is in the >>> same >>> league as the 'Nelson mass' (say...). >>>> The critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is. >>>> >>>> Rationalism was in the air in the late 18th century, and the >>>> exuberance, confidence (think of the Nelson mass) and logic of the >>> music >>> reflects this. >>>> The doubts that arose in the 20th century made it more difficult to >>>> finish things with a perfect cadence (although there are plenty, but >>>> never as 'certain' as in the classical period). >>>> >>>> I suppose a different way of saying this is that with the category >>>> of >>>> 'music' defined by Rosen, it disappears with the social. My personal >>>> experience however tells me that there is music without the social, >>>> and that Rosen's 'music' is not the whole story (he is still God in >>>> most music departments, though but he's so boring!!). I can't quite >>>> say what that means.. it's almost like saying 'the earth will >>>> still go >>> >>>> round the sun' - well, what's 'going round' independent of an >>>> observer? it is the action of a mechanism... but don't mistake the >>>> mechanism for its description. Moreover, with the reality of music, >>>> the fact that all these questions are asked of it, sustains and >>>> transforms it. Personally, music is where my thinking starts... so >>> it's >>> kind-of real for me! >>>> >>>> Mark >>>> >>>> On 7/15/08, Louis Irwin wrote: >>>>> Mark, >>>>> >>>>> I question your assertion that "Atonal music in the 20th derived >>>>> from >>>>> an assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois- >>>>> ness' >>>>> of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it." That presents the >>>>> rise >>>>> of atonal music as a subjective rejection on the part of 20th >>>>> century >>> >>>>> composers against the aesthetic of their predecessors. Charles >>>>> Rosen >>>>> tells quite a different story in his monograph "Arnold Schoenberg", >>>>> in which he describes how the evolution of tonal music led >>>>> internally >>> >>>>> to the increasing undermining of tonal relations themselves - a >>>>> very >>>>> dialectical account in substance, and one I would think would be >>>>> more >>> >>>>> in line with Adorno's thinking (though I don't know if it is - >>>>> Rosen >>>>> does >>>> not mention Adorno). >>>>> >>>>> I also question your suggestion that the "physics of the harmonic >>>>> series" justifies traditional tonal harmony in an absolute way. >>>>> That >>> >>>>> would make music of Bach and after 'unnatural', because it is based >>>>> on equal temperaments rather than the rational ratios of the >>>>> harmonic >>> series. >>>>> Equal temperament makes the interval between any two notes a >>>>> multiple >>>>> of the 12th root of 2 (an irrational number), so all tonal music >>>>> from >>> >>>>> Bach onwards ought to sound out of tune. Interestingly, there is a >>>>> modern school of "just intonation" that does base their music on >>>>> the >>>>> harmonic series - and guess what? It's their music which sounds out >>>>> of >>>> tune. >>>>> >>>>> I also don't understand how Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were >>>>> "closely associated with the ontology of rationalism". Rosen's >>>>> story >>> >>>>> in "The Classical Style" is that they discovered that tonal >>>>> harmonies >>> >>>>> could be used to set up musical dramas and tensions that could then >>>>> be resolved in new ways. They weren't simply following the >>>>> ontology >>>>> of the harmonic series, or otherwise cloaking rational relations in >>> musical form! >>>>> >>>>> Louis Irwin >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >>>>> Mark Johnson >>>>> Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 2:11 PM >>>>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>>>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>>> Forest?? >>>>> >>>>> Hi Ruth, >>>>> >>>>> If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We >>>>> are >>>>> basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain >>>>> distinctions are efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive >>>>> from >>> >>>>> a transcendental theory of science and seek to include the >>>>> phenomena >>>>> of art within them. Whilst I see much value in these >>>>> distinctions, I >>>>> see problems in describing phenomena as complex as music. In my >>>>> view >>>>> music presents us with a fundamental existential question no less >>>>> profound than the existence of science. Given that music exists, >>>>> what >>> >>>>> must the world be like? This is a different but related >>>>> transcendental movement >>>> (although we can agree about ID/TD). >>>>> >>>>> In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing >>>>> critiqued is >>>>> a positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the >>>>> causality >>> >>>>> of transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent >>>>> unpredictable. In the arts the effects of critique are more >>>>> directly >>>>> causal and the unpredictabilities are more obvious. >>>>> >>>>> My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour >>>>> being >>>>> more deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), >>>>> and at the same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so >>>>> dialectical description is problematic. I cannot explain the F- >>>>> sharp >>>>> in bar 29 .. I just felt like it! >>>>> >>>>> If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental >>>>> argument >>>>> for science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). >>>>> Presupposing a >>>>> metahysics is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's >>>>> important to do is to surface the metaphysics in the retroductive >>> process. >>>>> >>>>> My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy >>>>> (I'm not alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B- >>>>> flat on >>> >>>>> top, why does a resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? >>>>> After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but >>>>> physics of the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. >>>>> Atonal music in the 20th derived from an assertion of the >>>>> normativity >>> >>>>> and (for >>>>> Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted >>>>> against >>>>> it. For classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism >>>>> was closely associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the >>>>> Greeks, modal music was linked to a different ontology (music of >>>>> the >>> spheres). >>>>> I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. >>>>> >>>>> Mark >>>>> >>>>> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>>>>> Hi Mark, >>>>>> >>>>>> Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible >>>>>> simply because the object is one that is shot through with >>>>>> subjectivity. To conclude as much is the flip side of the >>>>>> positivist coin. And I don't think that the pragmatists are right >>>>>> that you can duck fundamental ontological question by replacing >>>>>> them >>> >>>>>> with the kind that you suggest (though in their own right such >>>>>> questions are great, perhaps even more informative in terms of >>>>>> quantity of info generated; it's just that they always already >>> presuppose a metaphysics). >>>>>> Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a >>>>>> re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a >>>> different conclusion. >>>>>> >>>>>> r. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of >>>>>> Mark >>>>>> Johnson >>>>>> Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >>>>>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>>>>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>>>> Forest?? >>>>>> >>>>>> To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >>>>>> problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in >>>>>> talking >>>>>> about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have >>>>>> been predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step >>>>>> outside music to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people >>>>>> would call an 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to >>>>>> merely contribute to its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't >>>>>> partly true of all critique... different discussion!!) >>>>>> >>>>>> More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >>>>>> might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take >>>>>> the various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >>>>>> biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >>>>>> mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to >>>>>> engage >>> >>>>>> musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >>>>>> sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >>>>>> music does. >>>>>> >>>>>> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>>>>>> Hi Brad, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision >>>>>>> here, >>>>>>> so as not to generate confusion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >>>>>>> concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in >>>>>>> part >>>>>>> or whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or >>>>>>> collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that >>>>>>> kind, but they are close, I think. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively >>>>>>> constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* >>>>>>> "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no >>> "sound." >>>>>>> But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at first >>>>>>> metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have >>>>>>> "being experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you >>>>>>> excise >>>>>>> the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. >>>>>>> But >>>>>>> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >>>>>>> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if >>>>>>> anyone >>> >>>>>>> heard them. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on >>>>>>> all of >>>>>>> this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, >>>>>>> perception, etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think >>>>>>> about >>> >>>>>>> it really seriously would need to dip into that. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Warmly, >>>>>>> Ruth >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of >>>>>>> Brad Rose >>>>>>> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >>>>>>> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>>>> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>> Forest?? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a >>>>>>> Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. >>>>>>> In >>>>>>> the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He >>>>>>> argues, I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, >>>>>>> unless >>>>>>> humans are present to hear it and to organize it into music. This >>>>>>> idea intrigued me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a >>>>>>> neuroscientist's >>>> clothing. >>>>>>> Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about >>>>>>> these observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say >>>>>>> there is no taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color >>>>>>> without eyes processing light's wave length? No music >>>>>>> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a >>> tree's >>>> fall >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of >>>>>>> air >>>>>>> about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or >>>>>>> recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without >>>>>>> human perception, there is no color? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Comments and observations about these questions are much >>>>>>> welcomed. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth- >>>>>>> when it >>>>>>> is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, >>>>>>> sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls >>>>>>> in my >>> >>>>>>> kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have >>>>>>> paint on them, of course, but color only occurs when they >>>>>>> interact >>>>>>> with my eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there >>>>>>> to hear it, does it make a sound? (The question was first posed >>>>>>> by >>>>>>> the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a >>>>>>> mental image created by the brain in response to vibrating >>> molecules. >>>>>>> Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, >>>>>>> Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> tree falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is >>> heard." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Brad >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >>>>>>> bradrose1 at comcast.net >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or >>>>>>> entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential >>>>>>> and/or >>> >>>>>>> privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, >>>>>>> dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in >>>>>>> reliance >>>>>>> upon this information by persons or entities other than the >>>>>>> intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, >>>>>>> please contact the sender and delete the material from any >>> computer. >>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>>>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> --------------------------------- >>> The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an >> exempt >>> charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC >> 038302). >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> __________ NOD32 3274 (20080716) Information __________ >>> >>> This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. >>> http://www.eset.com >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> __________ NOD32 3274 (20080716) Information __________ >> >> This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. >> http://www.eset.com >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > Dr Gordon Brown > Senior Lecturer, Curriculum and Teacher Education > Director, BMathsEd and BScienceEd, Loftus Campus > Coordinator, Curriculum and Pedagogy > Faculty of Education > University of Wollongong > Wollongong NSW 2522 Australia > Phone (work) 61 2 4221 3792 > Fax (work) 61 2 4221 3892 > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu Fri Jul 18 10:58:18 2008 From: RGroff1 at uamail.albany.edu (Ruth Groff) Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2008 12:58:18 -0400 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? References: <6tceqh$10c48j@ipo4smtp.cc.utah.edu><23E11EB3-6C7D-4841-8311-0A497F742834@uow.edu.au> Message-ID: Christopher Norris has a new book out on this topic -- might be of interest. r. -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Mark Johnson Sent: Fri 18-Jul-08 12:18 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the Forest?? yes.. the bottom line is people 'like' (or 'love') 'music' - but the musics that they feel that way about are highly diverse. What's in the 'liking'? (and if anyone's wondering how I'm replying to this when I'm at the CR education conference, it's because I've ducked -out and gone to the Proms!) On 7/17/08, Gordon Brown wrote: > As another addition of nuance to the argument is the matter of musical > preference. This is both in a broader cultural sense, that there are > broad cultural styles (using characteristic modal patterns - scales - > instruments and rhythms) as in music that is recognisably western (and > all the styles that implies), arabic, asian, African, Australian > Aboriginal, etc , and in the narrower sense that my musical tastes > largely hark back to the 50s, 60s of my youth, whereas my father harks > back to the 30s and 40s of his youth, and so on. I don't have the > reference for it, but there is the thesis that we tend to form our > musical tastes (preferences) in childhood and adolescence. Hence the > baby boomers bemoan the current state of popular music, just as my > father's cohort bemoaned the rise of rock and roll in the 50s. > > Oh, and earlier there was a phrase (can't find it at the mo) about the > psycho-sociocultural nature of music, to which we could add physical, > as in the physical nature of the wave forms that produce different > tonal qualities perceived and interpreted by people. > > Just a thought. > > Gordon > > On Jul 18, 2008, at 2:22 AM, Mervyn Hartwig wrote: > >> Why not? >> >> Note that this dialectical view of the matter does not reject >> analytics. On >> the contrary, it builds on and incorporates the analytical >> distinctions >> nicely made in this case by Ruth and Karl. >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >> Mark >> Johnson >> Sent: 17 July 2008 15:42 >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >> Forest?? >> >> p.s. anyone for dance? Now there's an intersting one...! >> >> On 7/17/08, Mervyn Hartwig wrote: >>> In which case, to speak of music developing by critique is spot on, >>> and >>> unexceptional. More precisely, what we have is a logic of musical >> discovery >>> or epistemological dialectic, which always involves discovery of new >>> relations/levels in the ID and the refashioning of materials in the >>> TD in >>> the light of this. >>> >>> It would be good to have an article on this for JCR. It's been a >>> really >> good >>> thread. >>> >>> Mervyn >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >>> J.A.Toynbee >>> Sent: 17 July 2008 09:16 >>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >> Forest?? >>> >>> Louis and Mark, >>> >>> In the western art music tradition, which seems to be standing in for >>> music in this discussion, *both* ways of making new (discovery of new >>> musical relations and programmatic revision of existing modes) are >>> surely at stake. What's more both have a strongly objective thrust in >>> that they involve movement towards musical materials, from the >>> concrete >>> - scoring a French horn just here - to the abstract - using X tone >>> row >>> say. >>> >>> Both ways are combined in most cases. So, a composer who sets out to >>> push beyond the existing musical order characterised in a certain >>> way, >>> always has to deal with the problem of real musical relations. >>> >>> Jason >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >>> Louis >>> Irwin >>> Sent: 16 July 2008 22:02 >>> To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List' >>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>> Forest?? >>> >>> >>> Mark, >>> >>> I think you missed my point. I was attacking the notion that musical >>> development proceeds by means of composers' developing critiques of >>> their predecessors, whether those critiques are of style or of >>> idea. Of >>> course music is a subjective enterprise in general, just like any >>> cultural production, but it does not proceed by developing new >>> subjective ideas out of old ones. (Perhaps our understanding of >>> musical >>> history proceeds this way, but not musical development itself.) On >>> my >>> view composers are concerned with discovering real musical >>> relations as >>> they evolve over periods of time, and this is not simply a matter of >>> forming ideas in one's heads about how earlier composers created >>> works >>> and coming up with 'better' methods. Of course, composers often >>> develop >>> critiques after the fact as a way to explain what they have done, >>> but I >>> believe it is a distortion to hold that those ex post critiques were >>> efficient causes of what they did. >>> >>> Your last sentence seems to suggest that rejecting an intransitive >>> aspect for sonata form (as you say Rosen does) explains why Rosen's >>> view >>> is normative, as if the rejection of intransitivity automatically >>> requires normativity. In other words, your view seems to be that if >>> some enterprise were entirely in the transitive dimension, its basis >>> would have to be normative. So you think we need some objective >>> entity >>> in the intransitive dimension to rescue music from the stain of mere >>> normativity - is that it?? As if normativity is already and >>> forevermore >>> extruded from the intransitive? Or, even if normativity is >>> irretrievably >>> transitive, we still need an entity in the intransitive dimension to >>> rescue music from the stain of the merely social and cultural??. >>> As I >>> said before, I'm not saying you subscribe to such reductions, but I >>> can't make much sense of your position without imputing them to you. >>> >>> Louis >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >>> Mark >>> Johnson >>> Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 11:13 PM >>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>> Forest?? >>> >>> Of course it's subjective (as we understand subjectivity)! But in >>> fact >>> composers deal with the ontology of subjectivity. You're right that >>> Schoenberg's critique wasn't just of 'style' - he was more >>> interested in >>> 'idea', but even in asserting idea over style, he was making a >>> critique >>> (and attacking Stravinsky at the same time, who he disparagingly >>> called >>> 'modernsky'). But Stravinsky and Schoenberg are both great artists >>> despite (because of?) their polemic. >>> >>> You misunderstand me when I talk of Rosen and the Classical Style. >>> I'm >>> referring to Rosen's book 'the Classical Style' - which is an >>> analysis >>> of the normative elements of the classical style. I've always >>> profoundly >>> disagreed with this. Sonata form (the key formal characteristic of >>> classical >>> style) I think has an intransitive aspect >>> - a view which Rosen rejects. >>> >>> On 7/16/08, Louis Irwin wrote: >>>> Mark, >>>> >>>> I believe that on Rosen's view the move to atonality was an internal >>>> objective dialectical development that already started in the >>>> complex >>>> evolution of tonal music, and was not simply a subjective reaction >>>> of >>>> composers in the 20th century. Your view is: "you have a music, >>>> there >>> >>>> is a critique, and there is a transformed music", which is to >>>> present >>>> music as an input to a new group of composers, who make a critique >>>> of >>>> the existing style and then transform the music. This is a highly >>>> subjectivistic picture of musical development. Obviously >>>> subjectivity >>> >>>> is strongly present in the development of music, but only >>>> implausibly >>>> (imo) as the kind of subjective dialectic you propose. Whatever >>>> critiques Schoenberg et al. made were based on more that a reaction >>>> against the prevailing aesthetic. The decline of confidence in >>>> rationalism did not lead to a lack of confidence in cadence; rather, >>>> the very meaning of cadence underwent transformation with the >>>> development of music to the point that it became objectively >>>> impossible to compose cadences except by regressing to an earlier >>> stage >>> that had been superseded. >>>> >>>> You say that the "view that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR >>> critique." >>>> I get the impression that you think that style is wrongly thought to >>>> be normative, and that CR will be able to expose that erroneous >>>> thought, as if normativity has no place in objective reality and >>>> that >>>> CR will show that. I smell a scientism that needs to expunge >>>> normativity and subjectivity from objective reality. I'm not saying >>>> you subscribe to such a reductionism, but I can't make much sense of >>> your >>> position without imputing that view to you. >>>> >>>> Louis >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >>>> Mark Johnson >>>> Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 2:25 AM >>>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>> Forest?? >>>> >>>> ok - this is the discusson - it oscillates between realism and >>>> idealism. Rosen is an out-and-out constructivist, though! His view >>>> that 'style' is normative is ripe for a CR critique. It's true that >>>> Schoenberg's motivation was 'continuity' (there was a lot of german >>>> nationalism in >>>> Schoenberg) - but the point is, it was based on critique (see 'Style >>>> and Idea'). So you have a music, there is a critique, and there is a >>>> transformed music. But it's still music - and 'Erwartung' is in the >>> same >>> league as the 'Nelson mass' (say...). >>>> The critique does not stand outside. It is part of what music is. >>>> >>>> Rationalism was in the air in the late 18th century, and the >>>> exuberance, confidence (think of the Nelson mass) and logic of the >>> music >>> reflects this. >>>> The doubts that arose in the 20th century made it more difficult to >>>> finish things with a perfect cadence (although there are plenty, but >>>> never as 'certain' as in the classical period). >>>> >>>> I suppose a different way of saying this is that with the category >>>> of >>>> 'music' defined by Rosen, it disappears with the social. My personal >>>> experience however tells me that there is music without the social, >>>> and that Rosen's 'music' is not the whole story (he is still God in >>>> most music departments, though but he's so boring!!). I can't quite >>>> say what that means.. it's almost like saying 'the earth will >>>> still go >>> >>>> round the sun' - well, what's 'going round' independent of an >>>> observer? it is the action of a mechanism... but don't mistake the >>>> mechanism for its description. Moreover, with the reality of music, >>>> the fact that all these questions are asked of it, sustains and >>>> transforms it. Personally, music is where my thinking starts... so >>> it's >>> kind-of real for me! >>>> >>>> Mark >>>> >>>> On 7/15/08, Louis Irwin wrote: >>>>> Mark, >>>>> >>>>> I question your assertion that "Atonal music in the 20th derived >>>>> from >>>>> an assertion of the normativity and (for Adorno) the 'bourgeois- >>>>> ness' >>>>> of diatonic harmony. it reacted against it." That presents the >>>>> rise >>>>> of atonal music as a subjective rejection on the part of 20th >>>>> century >>> >>>>> composers against the aesthetic of their predecessors. Charles >>>>> Rosen >>>>> tells quite a different story in his monograph "Arnold Schoenberg", >>>>> in which he describes how the evolution of tonal music led >>>>> internally >>> >>>>> to the increasing undermining of tonal relations themselves - a >>>>> very >>>>> dialectical account in substance, and one I would think would be >>>>> more >>> >>>>> in line with Adorno's thinking (though I don't know if it is - >>>>> Rosen >>>>> does >>>> not mention Adorno). >>>>> >>>>> I also question your suggestion that the "physics of the harmonic >>>>> series" justifies traditional tonal harmony in an absolute way. >>>>> That >>> >>>>> would make music of Bach and after 'unnatural', because it is based >>>>> on equal temperaments rather than the rational ratios of the >>>>> harmonic >>> series. >>>>> Equal temperament makes the interval between any two notes a >>>>> multiple >>>>> of the 12th root of 2 (an irrational number), so all tonal music >>>>> from >>> >>>>> Bach onwards ought to sound out of tune. Interestingly, there is a >>>>> modern school of "just intonation" that does base their music on >>>>> the >>>>> harmonic series - and guess what? It's their music which sounds out >>>>> of >>>> tune. >>>>> >>>>> I also don't understand how Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were >>>>> "closely associated with the ontology of rationalism". Rosen's >>>>> story >>> >>>>> in "The Classical Style" is that they discovered that tonal >>>>> harmonies >>> >>>>> could be used to set up musical dramas and tensions that could then >>>>> be resolved in new ways. They weren't simply following the >>>>> ontology >>>>> of the harmonic series, or otherwise cloaking rational relations in >>> musical form! >>>>> >>>>> Louis Irwin >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of >>>>> Mark Johnson >>>>> Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 2:11 PM >>>>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>>>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>>> Forest?? >>>>> >>>>> Hi Ruth, >>>>> >>>>> If I can begin by reframing the issue between us as I see it. We >>>>> are >>>>> basically arguing about distinctions, and whether certain >>>>> distinctions are efficacious. The distinctions you prefer derive >>>>> from >>> >>>>> a transcendental theory of science and seek to include the >>>>> phenomena >>>>> of art within them. Whilst I see much value in these >>>>> distinctions, I >>>>> see problems in describing phenomena as complex as music. In my >>>>> view >>>>> music presents us with a fundamental existential question no less >>>>> profound than the existence of science. Given that music exists, >>>>> what >>> >>>>> must the world be like? This is a different but related >>>>> transcendental movement >>>> (although we can agree about ID/TD). >>>>> >>>>> In CR the transformative effect of critique on the thing >>>>> critiqued is >>>>> a positive argument for critique, but at the same time, the >>>>> causality >>> >>>>> of transformation is still highly complex, and to some extent >>>>> unpredictable. In the arts the effects of critique are more >>>>> directly >>>>> causal and the unpredictabilities are more obvious. >>>>> >>>>> My view on this is that it is partly due to artistic endeavour >>>>> being >>>>> more deeply ontologically grounded (with biopsychosocial reality), >>>>> and at the same time less rational (Plato's divine madnesses) - so >>>>> dialectical description is problematic. I cannot explain the F- >>>>> sharp >>>>> in bar 29 .. I just felt like it! >>>>> >>>>> If I'm being pragmatic then so was Roy in his transcendental >>>>> argument >>>>> for science (I don't think he was, and neither am I). >>>>> Presupposing a >>>>> metahysics is unavoidable with any distinction-making. What's >>>>> important to do is to surface the metaphysics in the retroductive >>> process. >>>>> >>>>> My fascination with music lies behind my engagement with philosophy >>>>> (I'm not alone in this!) If you play a C-major triad with a B- >>>>> flat on >>> >>>>> top, why does a resolution to F-major feel right? Is it normative? >>>>> After all only Western music makes such a big deal of it.. but >>>>> physics of the harmonic series suggests it might be intransitive. >>>>> Atonal music in the 20th derived from an assertion of the >>>>> normativity >>> >>>>> and (for >>>>> Adorno) the 'bourgeois-ness' of diatonic harmony. it reacted >>>>> against >>>>> it. For classical composers (Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn) diatonicism >>>>> was closely associated with the ontology of rationalism; for the >>>>> Greeks, modal music was linked to a different ontology (music of >>>>> the >>> spheres). >>>>> I don't consider myself a rationalist, but I still love Beethoven. >>>>> >>>>> Mark >>>>> >>>>> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>>>>> Hi Mark, >>>>>> >>>>>> Nah. I don't think the ontological question is unintelligible >>>>>> simply because the object is one that is shot through with >>>>>> subjectivity. To conclude as much is the flip side of the >>>>>> positivist coin. And I don't think that the pragmatists are right >>>>>> that you can duck fundamental ontological question by replacing >>>>>> them >>> >>>>>> with the kind that you suggest (though in their own right such >>>>>> questions are great, perhaps even more informative in terms of >>>>>> quantity of info generated; it's just that they always already >>> presuppose a metaphysics). >>>>>> Indeed, substantively what you say below is more or less a >>>>>> re-statement of what I said, just less pointed, and directed to a >>>> different conclusion. >>>>>> >>>>>> r. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of >>>>>> Mark >>>>>> Johnson >>>>>> Sent: Mon 14-Jul-08 6:26 AM >>>>>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>>>>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>>>> Forest?? >>>>>> >>>>>> To inquire into the is-ness of something like music is itself >>>>>> problematic. It clearly embraces the TD/ID distinction - in >>>>>> talking >>>>>> about it, we transform it (think how many 'styles' of music have >>>>>> been predicated on a critique...). It is as if we cannot step >>>>>> outside music to ask what it is. This is what autopoiesis people >>>>>> would call an 'observer problem'. So to ask about is-ness is to >>>>>> merely contribute to its emergent reality (I wonder if this isn't >>>>>> partly true of all critique... different discussion!!) >>>>>> >>>>>> More useful might be to articulate what we think music DOES. that >>>>>> might give us a clearer insight into the mechanisms at work. Take >>>>>> the various phenomena of music as outcomes (psychological, social, >>>>>> biological), surface the context of observers, and retroduce >>>>>> mechanisms to explain them. That's a project I'm very keen to >>>>>> engage >>> >>>>>> musicologists in... but they're very wedded to 'the notes', 'the >>>>>> sound', 'the affect', etc - all of which are only aspects of what >>>>>> music does. >>>>>> >>>>>> On 7/14/08, Ruth Groff wrote: >>>>>>> Hi Brad, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think one has to proceed with the utmost care and precision >>>>>>> here, >>>>>>> so as not to generate confusion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What I'd say is this: critical realism has the category of >>>>>>> concept-dependent objects -- things that are what they are in >>>>>>> part >>>>>>> or whole because of beliefs that people hold, individually or >>>>>>> collectively. The examples that you give aren't exactly of that >>>>>>> kind, but they are close, I think. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Music, I would say, just *IS* sound of a certain subjectively >>>>>>> constituted kind. "Sound," in turn, as you note, just *IS* >>>>>>> "vibrations when they are heard." So, sure -- no hearer, no >>> "sound." >>>>>>> But to say this is not to say as much as it might seem at first >>>>>>> metaphysically dramatic blush. The "things" in question have >>>>>>> "being experienced by a subject" built into them, so if you >>>>>>> excise >>>>>>> the subjectivity, you don't have the "thing" any more. >>>>>>> But >>>>>>> it's not as though you are left with nothing. You are left with >>>>>>> "vibrations" -- which aren't "sound," but which would be, if >>>>>>> anyone >>> >>>>>>> heard them. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> There's an enormous contemporary philosophical literature on >>>>>>> all of >>>>>>> this, though it's not one I know at all. Sound, colour, >>>>>>> perception, etc. I think anyone in cr who was going to think >>>>>>> about >>> >>>>>>> it really seriously would need to dip into that. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Them's my 2 cents anyway. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Warmly, >>>>>>> Ruth >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>>> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of >>>>>>> Brad Rose >>>>>>> Sent: Sun 13-Jul-08 9:08 PM >>>>>>> To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>>>> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Falling Trees, But No Sound in the >>> Forest?? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I'm reading a book, This is Your Brain on Music: the Science of a >>>>>>> Human Obsession, by Daniel J Levitin. I quote a passage below. >>>>>>> In >>>>>>> the introduction, Levitin makes observations about music. He >>>>>>> argues, I think, that music is not "there" as music anyway, >>>>>>> unless >>>>>>> humans are present to hear it and to organize it into music. This >>>>>>> idea intrigued me. I guess it is Berkeley again, in a >>>>>>> neuroscientist's >>>> clothing. >>>>>>> Anyway, I was wondering what would Critical Realists say about >>>>>>> these observations about taste, color, and sound. Would CR say >>>>>>> there is no taste without the human tongue tasting it? No color >>>>>>> without eyes processing light's wave length? No music >>>>>>> without humans hearing it? Would CR say for example, that a >>> tree's >>>> fall >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> the forest-pulled to the ground by gravity-- moves molecules of >>>>>>> air >>>>>>> about, but without the presence of human or animal hearing, or >>>>>>> recording instruments, no sound occurs? And similarly, without >>>>>>> human perception, there is no color? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Comments and observations about these questions are much >>>>>>> welcomed. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "A bowl of pudding only has taste when I put it in my mouth- >>>>>>> when it >>>>>>> is in contact with my tongue. It doesn't have taste or flavor, >>>>>>> sitting in my fridge, only the potential. Similarly the walls >>>>>>> in my >>> >>>>>>> kitchen are not "white" when I leave the room. They still have >>>>>>> paint on them, of course, but color only occurs when they >>>>>>> interact >>>>>>> with my eyes.. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there >>>>>>> to hear it, does it make a sound? (The question was first posed >>>>>>> by >>>>>>> the Irish philosopher George Berkeley) Simply, "no"---sound is a >>>>>>> mental image created by the brain in response to vibrating >>> molecules. >>>>>>> Similarly there can be no pitch without a human animal present, >>>>>>> Suitable measuring devices can register the frequency made by >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> tree falling, but truly it is not pitch unless an until it is >>> heard." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Brad >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Brad Rose, Ph.D. >>>>>>> bradrose1 at comcast.net >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or >>>>>>> entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential >>>>>>> and/or >>> >>>>>>> privileged material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, >>>>>>> dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in >>>>>>> reliance >>>>>>> upon this information by persons or entities other than the >>>>>>> intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, >>>>>>> please contact the sender and delete the material from any >>> computer. >>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>>>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> --------------------------------- >>> The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an >> exempt >>> charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC >> 038302). >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> __________ NOD32 3274 (20080716) Information __________ >>> >>> This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. >>> http://www.eset.com >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> __________ NOD32 3274 (20080716) Information __________ >> >> This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system. >> http://www.eset.com >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > Dr Gordon Brown > Senior Lecturer, Curriculum and Teacher Education > Director, BMathsEd and BScienceEd, Loftus Campus > Coordinator, Curriculum and Pedagogy > Faculty of Education > University of Wollongong > Wollongong NSW 2522 Australia > Phone (work) 61 2 4221 3792 > Fax (work) 61 2 4221 3892 > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism