From shivahemmati at gmail.com  Tue Dec  2 00:50:45 2008
From: shivahemmati at gmail.com (shiva hemmati)
Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2008 11:20:45 +0330
Subject: [Critical-Realism] question from a student of philosophy of
	education
Message-ID: <adf9704b0812012350w62951f1agb0068e430846c8d4@mail.gmail.com>

Dear Sirs
I want to know about critical realism approach to constructivism esp.
social constructivism.
If it has any critique about it or any suggestions?
How do thy differ in foundation?
What are their implications for education?
How do they differ in their educational outcomes?
Can they gather together?

-- 
best wishes
Shiva Hemati


From d.eldervass at ntlworld.com  Tue Dec  2 02:04:07 2008
From: d.eldervass at ntlworld.com (Dave Elder-Vass)
Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2008 09:04:07 -0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] question from a student of philosophy
	ofeducation
References: <adf9704b0812012350w62951f1agb0068e430846c8d4@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <6ABFD5D3209F424392CFC84CEB322637@Presario>

Dear Shiva

A good place to start is chapter 4 'Essentialism, social constructionism, 
and beyond' in Andrew Sayer's book 'Realism and Social Science' (Sage, 
2000). An earlier version of this appeared in 'Sociological Review' in 1997 
(pp. 453-487).

Best,

Dave Elder-Vass

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "shiva hemmati" <shivahemmati at gmail.com>
To: <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: 02 December 2008 07:50
Subject: [Critical-Realism] question from a student of philosophy 
ofeducation


> Dear Sirs
> I want to know about critical realism approach to constructivism esp.
> social constructivism.
> If it has any critique about it or any suggestions?
> How do thy differ in foundation?
> What are their implications for education?
> How do they differ in their educational outcomes?
> Can they gather together?
>
> -- 
> best wishes
> Shiva Hemati
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> 



From dogangoecmen at aol.com  Thu Dec  4 08:52:15 2008
From: dogangoecmen at aol.com (dogangoecmen at aol.com)
Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2008 10:52:15 -0500
Subject: [Critical-Realism] enviroment ethics
Message-ID: <8CB243F69EF9F79-12B0-674@MBLK-M07.sysops.aol.com>

Dear All,

my friend Dr Orgen Ugurlu and I are planing to publish in Turkish a
book of collection of essays on various aspects of enviroment and
ethics. If you can think of any essay of yours which you would like to
publish or if you can think of any one else who my be contacted in that
regard please contact me off-list. I thank you very much in advance.



Cheers, Dogan
________________________________________________________________________
AOL Email goes Mobile! You can now read your AOL Emails whilst on the move. Sign up for a free AOL Email account with unlimited storage today.

From alperaslan79 at gmail.com  Fri Dec  5 03:00:12 2008
From: alperaslan79 at gmail.com (Alper Aslan)
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2008 12:00:12 +0200
Subject: [Critical-Realism] objectivity and critical realism
Message-ID: <b34825280812050200p24cdf0aegd2adc8fec2a08966@mail.gmail.com>

Dear All,

I want to know what critical realism thinks about "objectivity in social
sciences"?

Is there any difference (about objectivity in social sciences) in
theoretical and methodological issues?

Regards.

From d.eldervass at ntlworld.com  Fri Dec  5 06:10:34 2008
From: d.eldervass at ntlworld.com (Dave Elder-Vass)
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2008 13:10:34 -0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] objectivity and critical realism
References: <b34825280812050200p24cdf0aegd2adc8fec2a08966@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <5096D051954B457C90AEDFA342666113@Presario>

Again, Andrew Sayer's work offers a good introduction to this question. I'd 
recommend looking at chapters 1 and 2 of his 'Method in Social Science' (2nd 
edition, Routledge, 1992).

Best,

Dave Elder-Vass

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Alper Aslan" <alperaslan79 at gmail.com>
To: <Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: 05 December 2008 10:00
Subject: [Critical-Realism] objectivity and critical realism


> Dear All,
>
> I want to know what critical realism thinks about "objectivity in social
> sciences"?
>
> Is there any difference (about objectivity in social sciences) in
> theoretical and methodological issues?
>
> Regards.
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> 



From dogangoecmen at aol.com  Tue Dec  9 11:40:25 2008
From: dogangoecmen at aol.com (dogangoecmen at aol.com)
Date: Tue, 09 Dec 2008 13:40:25 -0500
Subject: [Critical-Realism] =?utf-8?q?Bayku=C5=9F=3A_Turkish_Journal_for_P?=
	=?utf-8?q?hilosophical_Writings?=
In-Reply-To: <8CB279051E1915E-E00-5AF@WEBMAIL-MB03.sysops.aol.com>
References: <8CB279051E1915E-E00-5AF@WEBMAIL-MB03.sysops.aol.com>
Message-ID: <8CB2844BBDD280F-974-52E@Webmail-mg11.sim.aol.com>



De?erli Arkada?lar, Bayku?: Felsefe Yaz?lar? Dergisinin ?zne kuram?n? konu edinen ???nc? say?s? ??kt?. A?a??da i?indekilerin listesi bulunmaktad?r. L?tfen yayiniz.
Dear Friends,??The third issue of Bayku?: Turkish Journal for Philosophical Writings is published. Below you find the list of contents. You are welcome to forward.
Liebe Freundinnen und Freunde, die dritte Nummer der Bayku?: Zeitschrift f?r philosophische Schriften ist herausgekommen. Unten findet sich das Inhaltsverzeichnis. Bitte leiten Sie weiter.

Do?an G??men
---------------------------

??indekiler
Contents
?nhaltverzeichnis

Bayku??tan...

From dogangoecmen at aol.com  Wed Dec 10 01:30:27 2008
From: dogangoecmen at aol.com (dogangoecmen at aol.com)
Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2008 03:30:27 -0500
Subject: [Critical-Realism] =?utf-8?q?Bayku=C5=9F=3A_Turkish_Journal_for_P?=
	=?utf-8?q?hilosophical_Writings?=
Message-ID: <8CB28B8B067E0C3-1758-1C9D@WEBMAIL-DF07.sysops.aol.com>

Dear All, I am sorry about the corruption in the previous email. Below the intended email again. 
Cheers, Do?an G??men


De?erli
Arkada?lar, Bayku?: Felsefe Yaz?lar? Dergisinin ?zne kuram?n? konu
edinen ???nc? say?s? ??kt?. A?a??da i?indekilerin listesi
bulunmaktad?r. L?tfen yayiniz.

Dear Friends,??The third issue of Bayku?: Turkish
Journal for Philosophical Writings is published. Below you find the
list of contents. You are welcome to forward.

Liebe Freundinnen und Freunde,
die dritte Nummer der Bayku?: Zeitschrift f?r philosophische Schriften
ist herausgekommen. Unten findet sich das Inhaltsverzeichnis. Bitte
leiten Sie weiter.





---------------------------



??indekiler

Contents

?nhaltverzeichnis



Bayku??tan...


From F.Rab at gmx.net  Tue Dec 16 11:05:13 2008
From: F.Rab at gmx.net (F.Rab at gmx.net)
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2008 19:05:13 +0100
Subject: [Critical-Realism] question regarding gramsci and critical realism
Message-ID: <20081216180513.292970@gmx.net>

Hello everyone!

I just discovered this list yesterday and immediately subscribed because I am fairly interested in critical realism, although I am just getting started with it, so I hope I do not offend anyone with my incompetence. The reason I am writing is, I am currently writing a proposal for a phd project, which shall be using neo-gramscianism and parts of the strategic-relational approach as a theoretical backbone. But I am pretty unsure about the underlying philosophy of science, especially if it is actually possible to combine a neo-gramscian analysis with critical realism. Well, Gramsci is a post-positivist for sure, but I could not find any sources regarding his relationship to CR. Maybe I am just confusing the terms, but as far as I know, CR is a variant of post-positivism. But could anyone more knowledgeable than myself tell me, whether this combination actually makes sense? Or are there significant differences between Gramsci?s philosphy of science and CR? 

Well, thank you for your time, and as soon as I become more familiar with CR, I am looking forward to discussions with you.

Florian
-- 
Psssst! Schon vom neuen GMX MultiMessenger geh?rt? Der kann`s mit allen: http://www.gmx.net/de/go/multimessenger


From ianverstegen at yahoo.com  Tue Dec 16 11:16:11 2008
From: ianverstegen at yahoo.com (Ian Verstegen)
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2008 10:16:11 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [Critical-Realism] question regarding gramsci and critical
	realism
References: <20081216180513.292970@gmx.net>
Message-ID: <435548.72271.qm@web56101.mail.re3.yahoo.com>

Florian
I am not an expert on Gramsci, but Jonathan Joseph discusses Bhaskar and Gramsci in his Hegemony (available partially on google books: http://books.google.com/books?id=GO5D3jfO19AC&pg=PA19&dq=gramsci+bhaskar#PPA21,M1).
Ian

 Ian Verstegen
http://ianverstegen.googlepages.com




________________________________
From: "F.Rab at gmx.net" <F.Rab at gmx.net>
To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2008 1:05:13 PM
Subject: [Critical-Realism] question regarding gramsci and critical realism

Hello everyone!

I just discovered this list yesterday and immediately subscribed because I am fairly interested in critical realism, although I am just getting started with it, so I hope I do not offend anyone with my incompetence. The reason I am writing is, I am currently writing a proposal for a phd project, which shall be using neo-gramscianism and parts of the strategic-relational approach as a theoretical backbone. But I am pretty unsure about the underlying philosophy of science, especially if it is actually possible to combine a neo-gramscian analysis with critical realism. Well, Gramsci is a post-positivist for sure, but I could not find any sources regarding his relationship to CR. Maybe I am just confusing the terms, but as far as I know, CR is a variant of post-positivism. But could anyone more knowledgeable than myself tell me, whether this combination actually makes sense? Or are there significant differences between Gramsci?s philosphy of science and CR? 

Well, thank you for your time, and as soon as I become more familiar with CR, I am looking forward to discussions with you.

Florian
-- 
Psssst! Schon vom neuen GMX MultiMessenger geh?rt? Der kann`s mit allen: http://www.gmx.net/de/go/multimessenger

_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism



      

From rgroff at slu.edu  Tue Dec 16 15:23:24 2008
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2008 16:23:24 -0600
Subject: [Critical-Realism] question regarding gramsci and critical
	realism
In-Reply-To: <20081216180513.292970@gmx.net>
References: <20081216180513.292970@gmx.net>
Message-ID: <6ad241360812161423h69cb7a50j34c3678bd08d280c@mail.gmail.com>

HI Florian,

I'm useless on Gramsci, but the best introductions to cr, in my opinion,
continue to be Andrew Collier's CRITICAL REALISM (Verso, 1984) and a volume
called EXPLAINING SOCIETY (Routledge) -- I am just blanking out on the
authors and am too lazy to go check.  I'd start with Collier, though.  Then
you can move on.

Warmly,
Ruth



On Tue, Dec 16, 2008 at 12:05 PM, <F.Rab at gmx.net> wrote:

> Hello everyone!
>
> I just discovered this list yesterday and immediately subscribed because I
> am fairly interested in critical realism, although I am just getting started
> with it, so I hope I do not offend anyone with my incompetence. The reason I
> am writing is, I am currently writing a proposal for a phd project, which
> shall be using neo-gramscianism and parts of the strategic-relational
> approach as a theoretical backbone. But I am pretty unsure about the
> underlying philosophy of science, especially if it is actually possible to
> combine a neo-gramscian analysis with critical realism. Well, Gramsci is a
> post-positivist for sure, but I could not find any sources regarding his
> relationship to CR. Maybe I am just confusing the terms, but as far as I
> know, CR is a variant of post-positivism. But could anyone more
> knowledgeable than myself tell me, whether this combination actually makes
> sense? Or are there significant differences between Gramsci?s philosphy of
> science and CR?
>
> Well, thank you for your time, and as soon as I become more familiar with
> CR, I am looking forward to discussions with you.
>
> Florian
> --
> Psssst! Schon vom neuen GMX MultiMessenger geh?rt? Der kann`s mit allen:
> http://www.gmx.net/de/go/multimessenger
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>

From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk  Wed Dec 17 02:57:05 2008
From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig)
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2008 09:57:05 -0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] question regarding gramsci and
	criticalrealism
In-Reply-To: <6ad241360812161423h69cb7a50j34c3678bd08d280c@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <mailman.876.1229507837.2556.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>

Yes, Collier deals only with what is coming to be referred to as original or
basic or first-level critical realism. You will need to move on to
dialectical critical realism - it's here that Bhaskar first deploys a
Gramscian concept of hegemony. There's  a brief entry on it by Joseph in
Dictionary of CR (Routledge 2007), and also introductory essays by a range
of scholars on transcendental or scientific realism, critical naturalism,
explanatory critiques and dialectical critical realism. I think the
combination makes a lot of sense. CR arguably has a special affinity with
Marxism, including Gramscianism.

Mervyn 


 

-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth
Groff
Sent: 16 December 2008 22:23
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] question regarding gramsci and
criticalrealism

HI Florian,

I'm useless on Gramsci, but the best introductions to cr, in my opinion,
continue to be Andrew Collier's CRITICAL REALISM (Verso, 1984) and a volume
called EXPLAINING SOCIETY (Routledge) -- I am just blanking out on the
authors and am too lazy to go check.  I'd start with Collier, though.  Then
you can move on.

Warmly,
Ruth



On Tue, Dec 16, 2008 at 12:05 PM, <F.Rab at gmx.net> wrote:

> Hello everyone!
>
> I just discovered this list yesterday and immediately subscribed 
> because I am fairly interested in critical realism, although I am just 
> getting started with it, so I hope I do not offend anyone with my 
> incompetence. The reason I am writing is, I am currently writing a 
> proposal for a phd project, which shall be using neo-gramscianism and 
> parts of the strategic-relational approach as a theoretical backbone. 
> But I am pretty unsure about the underlying philosophy of science, 
> especially if it is actually possible to combine a neo-gramscian 
> analysis with critical realism. Well, Gramsci is a post-positivist for 
> sure, but I could not find any sources regarding his relationship to 
> CR. Maybe I am just confusing the terms, but as far as I know, CR is a 
> variant of post-positivism. But could anyone more knowledgeable than 
> myself tell me, whether this combination actually makes sense? Or are 
> there significant differences between Gramsci?s philosphy of science and
CR?
>
> Well, thank you for your time, and as soon as I become more familiar 
> with CR, I am looking forward to discussions with you.
>
> Florian
> --
> Psssst! Schon vom neuen GMX MultiMessenger geh?rt? Der kann`s mit allen:
> http://www.gmx.net/de/go/multimessenger
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism

__________ NOD32 3697 (20081217) Information __________

This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system.
http://www.eset.com




From benjamin.opratko at gmx.at  Wed Dec 17 14:23:32 2008
From: benjamin.opratko at gmx.at (Benjamin Opratko)
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2008 22:23:32 +0100
Subject: [Critical-Realism] question regarding gramsci and critical
	realism
Message-ID: <20081217212332.71320@gmx.net>

hi florian,

as has been mentioned before, jonathan josephs work is a quite useful starting point. he attempts to combine of gramscian and cr theories, or, rather, to ground gramscian notions, especially "hegemony", in a cr ontological framework - thereby revising those notions quite a bit. apart from his book, there are some shorter articles by joseph in the Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, where he explains his theoretical framework:
Joseph, Jonathan (2000): "A Realist Theory of Hegemony", in: Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, Vol. 30, Nr. 2: 179-202
Joseph, Jonathan (2001): "Hegemony in the Fourth Dimension", in: Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, Vol 31, Nr. 3: 261-277

personally, i find josephs approach an inspiring starting point, but all together a rather problematic theory that easily leads to a static, mechanical and economistic conception of hegemony. this has been pointed out by bob jessop in an exchange on the pages of the Journal of Critical Realism:
Jessop, Bob (2003a): "Critical Realism and Hegemony: Hic Rhodus, Hic Saltus", in: Journal of Critical Realism, Vol. 1, Nr. 2: 183-194
Joseph, Jonathan (2003): "Re-stating Hegemonic Theory", in: Journal of Critical Realism, Vol. 2, Nr. 1: 127-137
Jessop, Bob (2003b): "Putting Hegemony in Its Place", in: Journal of Critical Realism, Vol. 2, Nr. 1: 138-148

concerning "neo-gramscian" approaches, i think adam morton has some affinities to cr, although he has never, to my knowledge, described his work as critical realist.

also, another interesting author for your purpose should be esteve morera. he has written a short paper on the question of whether it is legitimate to read and interpret gramsci not as a historicist, but from a (philosophically) realist point of view. (his answer, unsurprinsingly, is yes.) it can be found in one of the "critical assessments" volumes on gramsci:
Morera, Esteve (2002 [1989]): "Gramsci?s Realism", in: Martin, James (Hg.): Antonio Gramsci. Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers, Vol. II: Marxism, Philosophy and Politics, London, New York: Routledge 2002, 216-225

he also has written a book apparently on this topic, that i unfortunately could not get a hold of yet. i think it's called "gramsci's historicism. a realist interpretation".

as for general introductions to cr, there is also andrew sayer's book that i found immensely useful:
Sayer, Andrew (2000): Realism and Social Science, London: Routledge

best,
benjamin

p.s. i'm reading this list for quite a while now, but i've never introduced myself: i'm a student of political science in vienna, austria. i'm currently trying to finish (haha) my "diplomarbeit" - akin to a master's thesis - on post-gramscian theories of hegemony.


-- 
Psssst! Schon vom neuen GMX MultiMessenger geh?rt? Der kann`s mit allen: http://www.gmx.net/de/go/multimessenger


From rgroff at slu.edu  Wed Dec 17 14:57:54 2008
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2008 15:57:54 -0600
Subject: [Critical-Realism] question regarding gramsci and critical
	realism
In-Reply-To: <20081217212332.71320@gmx.net>
References: <20081217212332.71320@gmx.net>
Message-ID: <6ad241360812171357y53f422f5k85ac0f4a23a7281f@mail.gmail.com>

Insignificant personal anecdote: Esteve was the "Internal external examiner"
for my dissertation on critical realism, written in the politics department,
at York.  (Esteve counted as external because he's cross-appointed in
philosophy.)

Florian -- in my view, Sayer's work is great.  What's distinctive about
Collier's book is that it is an introduction to critical realism
specifically, especially useful for that specific purpose -- a narrow one,
admittedly, but one a person might have.

r.



On Wed, Dec 17, 2008 at 3:23 PM, Benjamin Opratko
<benjamin.opratko at gmx.at>wrote:

> hi florian,
>
> as has been mentioned before, jonathan josephs work is a quite useful
> starting point. he attempts to combine of gramscian and cr theories, or,
> rather, to ground gramscian notions, especially "hegemony", in a cr
> ontological framework - thereby revising those notions quite a bit. apart
> from his book, there are some shorter articles by joseph in the Journal for
> the Theory of Social Behaviour, where he explains his theoretical framework:
> Joseph, Jonathan (2000): "A Realist Theory of Hegemony", in: Journal for
> the Theory of Social Behaviour, Vol. 30, Nr. 2: 179-202
> Joseph, Jonathan (2001): "Hegemony in the Fourth Dimension", in: Journal
> for the Theory of Social Behaviour, Vol 31, Nr. 3: 261-277
>
> personally, i find josephs approach an inspiring starting point, but all
> together a rather problematic theory that easily leads to a static,
> mechanical and economistic conception of hegemony. this has been pointed out
> by bob jessop in an exchange on the pages of the Journal of Critical
> Realism:
> Jessop, Bob (2003a): "Critical Realism and Hegemony: Hic Rhodus, Hic
> Saltus", in: Journal of Critical Realism, Vol. 1, Nr. 2: 183-194
> Joseph, Jonathan (2003): "Re-stating Hegemonic Theory", in: Journal of
> Critical Realism, Vol. 2, Nr. 1: 127-137
> Jessop, Bob (2003b): "Putting Hegemony in Its Place", in: Journal of
> Critical Realism, Vol. 2, Nr. 1: 138-148
>
> concerning "neo-gramscian" approaches, i think adam morton has some
> affinities to cr, although he has never, to my knowledge, described his work
> as critical realist.
>
> also, another interesting author for your purpose should be esteve morera.
> he has written a short paper on the question of whether it is legitimate to
> read and interpret gramsci not as a historicist, but from a
> (philosophically) realist point of view. (his answer, unsurprinsingly, is
> yes.) it can be found in one of the "critical assessments" volumes on
> gramsci:
> Morera, Esteve (2002 [1989]): "Gramsci's Realism", in: Martin, James (Hg.):
> Antonio Gramsci. Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers,
> Vol. II: Marxism, Philosophy and Politics, London, New York: Routledge 2002,
> 216-225
>
> he also has written a book apparently on this topic, that i unfortunately
> could not get a hold of yet. i think it's called "gramsci's historicism. a
> realist interpretation".
>
> as for general introductions to cr, there is also andrew sayer's book that
> i found immensely useful:
> Sayer, Andrew (2000): Realism and Social Science, London: Routledge
>
> best,
> benjamin
>
> p.s. i'm reading this list for quite a while now, but i've never introduced
> myself: i'm a student of political science in vienna, austria. i'm currently
> trying to finish (haha) my "diplomarbeit" - akin to a master's thesis - on
> post-gramscian theories of hegemony.
>
>
> --
> Psssst! Schon vom neuen GMX MultiMessenger geh?rt? Der kann`s mit allen:
> http://www.gmx.net/de/go/multimessenger
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>

From ozgurelibol at ttmail.com  Wed Dec 24 15:35:10 2008
From: ozgurelibol at ttmail.com (ozgurelibol at ttmail.com)
Date: Thu, 25 Dec 2008 00:35:10 +0200
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar
Message-ID: <1230158110.22281.28.camel@ozgur-laptop>

Hi All,

Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps Althusser's
discrimination; object of knowledge and object of real. And Althusser's
Generalities 
(..This point is essential to dialectical materialism, and Marx
discusses an illustration of it in the Introduction when he demonstrates
that although the use of general concepts ? for example, ?production?,
?labour?, ?exchange?, etc. ? is indispensable to a scientific
theoretical practice, this first generality does not coincide with the
product of the scientific labour: it is not its achievement, it is its
prior condition. This first generality (which I shall call Generality I)
constitutes the raw material that the science?s theoretical practice
will transform into specified ?concepts?, that is, into that other
?concrete? generality (which I shall call Generality III) which is a
knowledge... from for Marx) 
concept is similar to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. What's your
opinions?

What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" and
"determination in the last instance"?

Hope to read your ideas

best regards

ozgur



From Clive.Lawson at econ.cam.ac.uk  Wed Dec 24 15:35:41 2008
From: Clive.Lawson at econ.cam.ac.uk (Clive.Lawson at econ.cam.ac.uk)
Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2008 22:35:41 +0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism]  Althusser and Bhaskar
Message-ID: <9FA591C43@econ.cam.ac.uk>

I am now away until 2nd January and unable to read mail.
Apologies, but I'll get back to you as soon as I can after I return.

Clive


From rgroff at slu.edu  Thu Dec 25 10:43:46 2008
From: rgroff at slu.edu (Ruth Groff)
Date: Thu, 25 Dec 2008 11:43:46 -0600
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar
In-Reply-To: <1230158110.22281.28.camel@ozgur-laptop>
References: <1230158110.22281.28.camel@ozgur-laptop>
Message-ID: <6ad241360812250943t1c9b2451p45b2a8135421ba44@mail.gmail.com>

Yes, similar.  I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished though; probably
other people have written on it too.

My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for how science
works.  My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it!   For the
nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and social and
productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. Marxists better than
Althusser, myself.  And some  non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians.

Happy holidays!

Ruth



Merry Christmas!

On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com <
ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote:

> Hi All,
>
> Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps Althusser's
> discrimination; object of knowledge and object of real. And Althusser's
> Generalities
> (..This point is essential to dialectical materialism, and Marx
> discusses an illustration of it in the Introduction when he demonstrates
> that although the use of general concepts ? for example, 'production',
> 'labour', 'exchange', etc. ? is indispensable to a scientific
> theoretical practice, this first generality does not coincide with the
> product of the scientific labour: it is not its achievement, it is its
> prior condition. This first generality (which I shall call Generality I)
> constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical practice
> will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, into that other
> 'concrete' generality (which I shall call Generality III) which is a
> knowledge... from for Marx)
> concept is similar to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. What's your
> opinions?
>
> What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" and
> "determination in the last instance"?
>
> Hope to read your ideas
>
> best regards
>
> ozgur
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>

From ozgurelibol at ttmail.com  Thu Dec 25 22:58:30 2008
From: ozgurelibol at ttmail.com (ozgurelibol at ttmail.com)
Date: Fri, 26 Dec 2008 07:58:30 +0200
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar
In-Reply-To: <6ad241360812250943t1c9b2451p45b2a8135421ba44@mail.gmail.com>
References: <1230158110.22281.28.camel@ozgur-laptop>
	<6ad241360812250943t1c9b2451p45b2a8135421ba44@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <1230271110.9297.12.camel@ozgur-laptop>

Thank you Ruth,

You are right, regards to philosopy of science Bhaskar is better.
Is it possible to share your works about this issue?
And could you be so kind as say your views about my last questions: 
What's the CR approach about to Althusser's "over-determination"
and"determination in the last instance"?

By the way I've just asked to Versobooks Turkey office to translate RToS
into Turkish. Is there any attempt do you (list) know?

Happy holidays

ozgur

On Thu, 2008-12-25 at 11:43 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote:
> Yes, similar.  I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished though; probably
> other people have written on it too.
> 
> My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for how science
> works.  My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it!   For the
> nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and social and
> productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. Marxists better than
> Althusser, myself.  And some  non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians.
> 
> Happy holidays!
> 
> Ruth
> 
> 
> 
> Merry Christmas!
> 
> On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com <
> ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote:
> 
> > Hi All,
> >
> > Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps Althusser's
> > discrimination; object of knowledge and object of real. And Althusser's
> > Generalities
> > (..This point is essential to dialectical materialism, and Marx
> > discusses an illustration of it in the Introduction when he demonstrates
> > that although the use of general concepts ? for example, 'production',
> > 'labour', 'exchange', etc. ? is indispensable to a scientific
> > theoretical practice, this first generality does not coincide with the
> > product of the scientific labour: it is not its achievement, it is its
> > prior condition. This first generality (which I shall call Generality I)
> > constitutes the raw material that the science's theoretical practice
> > will transform into specified 'concepts', that is, into that other
> > 'concrete' generality (which I shall call Generality III) which is a
> > knowledge... from for Marx)
> > concept is similar to Bhaskar's intransitive dimensions. What's your
> > opinions?
> >
> > What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" and
> > "determination in the last instance"?
> >
> > Hope to read your ideas
> >
> > best regards
> >
> > ozgur
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism



From Clive.Lawson at econ.cam.ac.uk  Thu Dec 25 23:00:43 2008
From: Clive.Lawson at econ.cam.ac.uk (Clive.Lawson at econ.cam.ac.uk)
Date: Fri, 26 Dec 2008 6:00:43 +0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar
Message-ID: <2965743F24@econ.cam.ac.uk>

I am now away until 2nd January and unable to read mail.
Apologies, but I'll get back to you as soon as I can after I return.

Clive


From mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk  Fri Dec 26 03:49:42 2008
From: mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk (Mervyn Hartwig)
Date: Fri, 26 Dec 2008 10:49:42 -0000
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar
In-Reply-To: <1230271110.9297.12.camel@ozgur-laptop>
Message-ID: <mailman.9.1230288593.2553.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>

Hi Ozgur

Bhaskar's own assessment of Althusser may be found inter alia in Reclaiming
Reality and Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom, Appendix 2

Verso no longer holds the publishing rights for RTS, Routeldge does. You
should write to Alan Jarvis at Routledge: alan.jarvis at tandf.co.uk

Mervyn 



-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
ozgurelibol at ttmail.com
Sent: 26 December 2008 05:59
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Althusser and Bhaskar

Thank you Ruth,

You are right, regards to philosopy of science Bhaskar is better.
Is it possible to share your works about this issue?
And could you be so kind as say your views about my last questions: 
What's the CR approach about to Althusser's "over-determination"
and"determination in the last instance"?

By the way I've just asked to Versobooks Turkey office to translate RToS
into Turkish. Is there any attempt do you (list) know?

Happy holidays

ozgur

On Thu, 2008-12-25 at 11:43 -0600, Ruth Groff wrote:
> Yes, similar.  I wrote a paper about it once, unpublished though; 
> probably other people have written on it too.
> 
> My view, for what it's worth, is that Bhaskar is better, for how science
> works.  My recommendation is just to trade up and be done with it!   For
the
> nature(s) of the relationships between widely held beliefs and social 
> and productive relations as a whole, I like some of the W. Marxists 
> better than Althusser, myself.  And some  non-Marxist quasi-Hegelians.
> 
> Happy holidays!
> 
> Ruth
> 
> 
> 
> Merry Christmas!
> 
> On Wed, Dec 24, 2008 at 4:35 PM, ozgurelibol at ttmail.com < 
> ozgurelibol at ttmail.com> wrote:
> 
> > Hi All,
> >
> > Bhaskar's approach of two sides of knowledge overlaps Althusser's 
> > discrimination; object of knowledge and object of real. And 
> > Althusser's Generalities (..This point is essential to dialectical 
> > materialism, and Marx discusses an illustration of it in the 
> > Introduction when he demonstrates that although the use of general 
> > concepts - for example, 'production', 'labour', 'exchange', etc. - 
> > is indispensable to a scientific theoretical practice, this first 
> > generality does not coincide with the product of the scientific 
> > labour: it is not its achievement, it is its prior condition. This 
> > first generality (which I shall call Generality I) constitutes the 
> > raw material that the science's theoretical practice will transform 
> > into specified 'concepts', that is, into that other 'concrete' 
> > generality (which I shall call Generality III) which is a 
> > knowledge... from for Marx) concept is similar to Bhaskar's 
> > intransitive dimensions. What's your opinions?
> >
> > What's the CR approach to Althusser's "over-determination" and 
> > "determination in the last instance"?
> >
> > Hope to read your ideas
> >
> > best regards
> >
> > ozgur
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism


_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism



From bogus@does.not.exist.com  Wed Dec 24 23:54:36 2008
From: bogus@does.not.exist.com ()
Date: Thu, 25 Dec 2008 06:54:36 -0000
Subject: No subject
Message-ID: <mailman.234.1232970152.2553.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>

thought.  He is an intelligent thinker by what we can see.  You should not
say he doesnt get it.  Or say he is too underneath Humean assumptions - come
on this is patronising.  of course he getrs it.  analyse the arguments in a
disinterested manner, and see where the truth will lead you; dont prejudice
what is the truth and if it goes to inconvenient places then say a person
doesnt get it.  Don't let people get away with it Lewis.  i notice a pattern
with this.  A friend from another listserve - george demitrios - used to
beliong here and is an intelligent guy.  He writes about education and
pragmatism.  But he left because he showed the ability to think
independently and challenge things and was insulted for it.  Beware: this
will lead to Stalinism

GW






On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 3:58 AM, <
critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote:

> Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
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>   1. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Louis Irwin)
>   2. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 23 (Louis Irwin)
>   3. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Ruth Groff)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 22:51:54 -0500
> From: "Louis Irwin" <louisirwin9 at aol.com>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical
>        Realism
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <c20.4edbc6ca.36ae8c63 at aol.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="us-ascii"
>
> Hi Mervyn,
>
> Yes, I gathered all that in your first paragraph. I did not make my
> complaint specific enough. What I found non-responsive was the absence of
> any comments like "Your step X fails to follow from any of the preceding
> steps because...", or "Your step Y tacitly imports such-and-such a value
> commitment because...", or "Your step Z is incoherent because...", etc.
>
> Louis
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn
> Hartwig
> Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2009 9:02 AM
> To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism
>
> Hi Louis,
>
> I said very clearly what I think the main defect in your 7 steps is. They
> treat truth-seeking as a personal preference when in fact  it is intrinsic
> to what a fact is, i.e. the result of a social process, embodying
> commitment
> to deploy strictly cognitive criteria. (It can't be objected that this
> makes
> a fact 'normative' without destroying the distinction between facts and
> values, which the Humean wants to uphold. -Sorry to repeat a mantra, but
> what can else can one do if folks don't get it?). 'It is a fact that your
> opinion is false, therefore you ought to change it' cannot therefore be
> parsed as 'If you want to remain a truth-seeker.' etc.
>
> Re lying, I accept that it presupposes the commitment to truth embodied in
> discourse and praxis and as I think I've made clear I certainly don't want
> to give up on transcendental critique. But the act of lying and what is
> presupposed by it are hardly the same thing, and if lying transcendentally
> presupposes commitment to truth so does not-lying (communicating truth in
> your second sense) - one can't just split one off from the other, as in
> your
> Humean argument.  As I implied, the difference between us here seems to me
> to come down to this: you are operating with an exclusively propositional
> understanding of truth, whereas for me truth is also and ultimately
> ontological and alethic.  I can accept that the liar is committed to truth
> in a propositional sense in so far as he wants his false statement to be
> regarded as true, but this presupposes both a context of truth-seeking in
> your second sense and the falsity of the proposition in an ontological/
> alethic sense.
>
>
> Mervyn
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis
> Irwin
> Sent: 25 January 2009 02:29
> To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism
>
>
> Mervyn,
>
> I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to
> cheap
> shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions
> that you just don't get it." Oh please!!
>
> You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of argument,
> that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a
> truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that someone (in this
> case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) for the sake of
> argument in order to see if the position holds up or falls apart shows that
> he/she just doesn't get the correct position. Is that the way your
> philosophy works? That would be to say that negative critiques do not work.
> My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the steps
> 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can criticize an
> opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have not identified any
> specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a negative critique.
> Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over.
>
> I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to truth",
> because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if we have to
> give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a "commitment to
> truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth is accompanied by a
> subjective intention to communicate truths. Otherwise, liars would be
> exempted from the transcendental commitment.
>
> Louis
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Mervyn
> Hartwig
> Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM
> To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism
>
> Hi Louis,
>
> Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other hand, it
> could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't
> get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes of argument, that
> values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you want to remain a
> truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with empirical
> realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing between (1) lying
> propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content (what they are
> 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of mass destruction"
> is
> designed to conceal  (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an absence of
> weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to inducing  people
> to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to either the
> communication
> or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is held to account socially,
> legally etc., that is an altogether different matter from his commitment -
> he wants to get away with it, and often does. Lying has a social context
> and
> truth-seeking as its condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to
> truth.
>
> The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it allows,
> with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to what a fact
> is
> - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not
> necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow this -
> facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the distinction
> between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point Bhaskar made in
> PON).
> Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of
> truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor without
> clothes -  because facts are the result of a social process of
> truth-seeking.
>
> There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me that it
> falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X is a fact;
> you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves commmitted to this?
> Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing truth-seeking
> can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary personal preference and
> instrumental reason.
>
> Mervyn
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Louis
> Irwin
> Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59
> To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism
>
> Hi Mervyn,
>
> The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how a
> Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to values, in
> contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at it, there are no
> transitions from facts to values. I did note that Humeans allow a
> transition
> from empirically given desires (including a desire for truth) to what one
> 'ought' to do in order to (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this
> in no way goes outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say
> that
> Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to
> achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value
> distinction
> surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another post you stated
> that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth."
> Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based on
> instrumental values.
>
> You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, to a
> fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a truth, and
> in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the same with
> promising:
> if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made a
> promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such
> promises
> are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. A commitment
> is
> not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an objective grounding in
> social circumstances. It is in that sense that a liar has a "commitment to
> truth" in my second sense; no matter what his intentions are, the social
> nature of language ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying
> could not succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that
> commitment).
>
> Louis
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
> __________ NOD32 3795 (20090123) Information __________
>
> This message was checked by NOD32 antivirus system.
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>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
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> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 23:01:58 -0500
> From: "Louis Irwin" <louisirwin9 at aol.com>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue
>        23
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <bbc.3a3a056e.36ae8ebe at aol.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="us-ascii"
>
> Hi Ruth, Foo Keong, Phil, Tobin,
>
> Thanks for understanding what I was trying to get at!
>
> Louis
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth
> Groff
> Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2009 2:05 PM
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 23
>
> Hi Mervyn, everybody,
>
> I don't understand why you say that Louis "just doesn't get it."  I mean,
> at
> most he simply disagrees with Bhaskar on this point, as Hugh does, and
> perhaps Phil, and no doubt others who aren't particularly attached to Hume,
> to empiricism and/or to non-dialectical philosophy!  In which case it would
> be that he "disagrees, for well-articulated reasons that you regard as
> flawed."  But he didn't even say that.  He just said that he wasn't sure
> that the Humean is defeated by the particular argument that RB advances.
>
> It's such an important thing, as Foo Kyong suggests, to be able to think as
> critically as possible about the views that one believes to be correct.  I
> say it gently, but I think that in context it was actually Louis who was
> stirring the pot/rattling the bars!
>
> Warmly,
> Ruth
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 12:41 PM, Mervyn Hartwig
> <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>wrote:
>
> > I'd be inclined to say it doesn't need a Devil's advocate because the
> > Devil himself supports it! Can one convince the Devil?
> >
> > M
> >
> > PS. You could say, to switch metaphors, I myself am stirring the pot
> > or rattling the bars a bit.
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ng
> > Foo Keong
> > Sent: 25 January 2009 15:55
> > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue
> > 23
> >
> > Mervyn:
> >
> > I think Louis is just playing the devil's advocate by considering the
> > Humean critique.  if a position (such as the thesis that we can derive
> > values from
> > facts) is solid indeed, it should be able to withstand the fiercest
> > criticism.  your argument should not be like preaching to the choir,
> > but you should be able to convince the enemy (who may not share your
> > assumptions).
> > In fact, i think we should take the bull by the horns.  Assume Hume
> > was right -- then find a way for him to contradict himself.  Can we?
> >
> > regards,
> > F.K.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > Message: 1
> > > Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 14:01:48 -0000
> > > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
> > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical
> > >        Realism
> > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
> > >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > Message-ID:
> > >        <
> > mailman.5367.1232896549.2556.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="us-ascii"
> > >
> > > Hi Louis,
> > >
> > > I said very clearly what I think the main defect in your 7 steps is.
> > > They treat truth-seeking as a personal preference when in fact  it
> > > is intrinsic to what a fact is, i.e. the result of a social process,
> > > embodying commitment to deploy strictly cognitive criteria. (It
> > > can't be objected that this makes a fact 'normative' without
> > > destroying the distinction between facts and values, which the
> > > Humean wants to uphold. -Sorry to repeat a mantra, but what can else
> > > can one do if folks don't get it?). 'It is a fact that your opinion
> > > is false, therefore you ought to change it' cannot therefore be
> > > parsed as 'If you
> > want to remain a truth-seeker.' etc.
> > >
> > > Re lying, I accept that it presupposes the commitment to truth
> > > embodied in discourse and praxis and as I think I've made clear I
> > > certainly don't want to give up on transcendental critique. But the
> > > act of lying and what is presupposed by it are hardly the same
> > > thing, and if lying transcendentally presupposes commitment to truth
> > > so does not-lying (communicating truth in your second sense) - one
> > > can't just split one off from the other, as in your Humean argument.
> > > As I implied, the difference between us here seems to me to come
> > > down to
> > > this: you are operating with an exclusively propositional
> > > understanding of truth, whereas for me truth is also and ultimately
> > > ontological and alethic.  I can accept that the liar is committed to
> > > truth in a propositional sense in so far as he wants his false
> > > statement to be regarded as true, but this presupposes both a
> > > context of truth-seeking in your second sense and the falsity of the
> > > proposition
> > in an ontological/ alethic sense.
> > >
> > >
> > > Mervyn
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
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> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
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> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
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>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 21:58:39 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical
>        Realism
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <6ad241360901251958q4e8e04aamc00fb8b0263311d5 at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hey, thanks for that reference.  I want to read it now.  I will have to
> think about it.  The immediate thought that comes to mind is that it might
> be inherent in the definition of the word, as a matter of
> language-analysis,
> but not be inherent in the act.  I don't know if I think that, but it's a
> really interesting example.  I had had in mind "facts" like encountering a
> sad, lost child in the mall or something -- that just seems to me to be an
> is that self-evidently generate some oughts, though the implication is not
> a
> logical one!  Or coming across a hurt animal.  Or responding to a loved
> one.  I'm pretty sure that I think that logical necessity is over-rated by
> empiricists, anyhow.  I mean, it's big for them because they don't have any
> other kind.   The Kantians let in some synthetic a prioris, but even there
> there is a kind of pressure put on the thing, I think, that is the result
> of
> having dispensed with natural necessity.  (Itself different, I think I
> think, from the necessity associated with the kind of moral realism that
> I'm
> defending.)
>
> I love it when you post things.
>
> r.
>
>
> On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 9:39 PM, Louis Irwin <louisirwin9 at aol.com> wrote:
>
> > Hi Ruth.
> >
> > You read me correctly. Just one comment on the need for moral realism.
> You
> > suggest that "to get LOGICAL implication from statements of fact to
> > non-heteronomous normative statements...you need "facts" that are
> > inherently
> > normative." I believe that you and Mervyn are in agreement on that (and I
> > don't disagree), but Searle argued as long ago as 1964 that one can
> > logically derive a genuine 'ought' from nothing but 'is' statements. He
> > considered, for example, that it is part of the MEANING of "X made a
> > promise" that "X is under an obligation to keep the promise" (other
> things
> > being equal), so one does not have to refer to separately real moral
> > premisses - the moral parts are real but they are internal to meanings.
> You
> > can read this as transcendental argument. Maybe these are just two ways
> of
> > saying the same thing.
> >
> > BTW, the Searle essay was reprinted in a 1969 collection entitled "The
> > Is/Ought Question" with arguments for and against the divide, and clearly
> > there were back then many prominent English-speaking philosophers who
> > opposed the divide. I remember at the time several philosophers thought
> the
> > volume was old hat because it was then widely accepted that there was an
> > intrinsic link between facts and values. So RB was definitely following
> up
> > on a strand that had already been around since 1958.
> >
> > Louis
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of Ruth
> > Groff
> > Sent: Saturday, January 24, 2009 10:10 PM
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical Realism
> >
> > Hi Louis,
> >
> > Yes, I think you are right that a Humean can say that, given his/her
> desire
> > truth, s/he "ought" to reject p, upon being shown that it is false, and
> > still not have gone from is to ought in the sense precluded by Hume.
>  S/he
> > could probably even deal with the transcendental/Habermas argument about
> > language, too.  At the transcendental level, I mean.  The use of language
> > in
> > its primary mode doesn't imply that one *ought* be be a truth-seeker (in
> > the
> > relevant, transcendental sense); it implies that one is one, whether one
> > likes it or not.  It's all is's.  The is-to-ought sell, there, is to say
> > that the fact of being a language user logically implies that one ought
> not
> > tell lies.
> >
> > My hunch is that what you need, in order to get LOGICAL implication from
> > statements of fact to non-heteronomous normative statements, to use the
> > Kantian parlance, is to be a particular kind of moral realist.  I think
> to
> > do it you need "facts" that are inherently normative.
> >
> > No?
> >
> > r.
> >
> >
> >
> > On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 8:29 PM, Louis Irwin <louisirwin9 at aol.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > Mervyn,
> > >
> > > I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to
> > > cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean
> > > assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh please!!
> > >
> > > You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of
> > > argument, that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want
> > > to remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that
> > > someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's)
> > > for the sake of argument in order to see if the position holds up or
> > > falls apart shows that he/she just doesn't get the correct position.
> > > Is that the way your philosophy works? That would be to say that
> negative
> > critiques do not work.
> > > My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the
> > > steps 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can
> > > criticize an opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have
> > > not identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of
> a
> > negative critique.
> > > Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over.
> > >
> > > I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to
> > > truth", because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if
> > > we have to give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a
> > > "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth
> > > is accompanied by a subjective intention to communicate truths.
> > > Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental commitment.
> > >
> > > Louis
> > >
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> > > Mervyn Hartwig
> > > Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM
> > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
> > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical
> > > Realism
> > >
> > > Hi Louis,
> > >
> > > Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other
> > > hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that
> > > you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes
> > > of argument, that values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you
> > > want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with
> > > empirical realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing
> > > between (1) lying propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content
> > > (what they are 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of
> > mass destruction"
> > > is
> > > designed to conceal  (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an
> > > absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to
> > > inducing  people to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to
> > > either the communication or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is
> > > held to account socially, legally etc., that is an altogether
> > > different matter from his commitment - he wants to get away with it,
> > > and often does. Lying has a social context and truth-seeking as its
> > > condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to truth.
> > >
> > > The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it
> > > allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to
> > > what a fact is
> > > - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not
> > > necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow
> > > this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the
> > > distinction between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point
> > > Bhaskar made in PON).
> > > Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of
> > > truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor
> > > without clothes -  because facts are the result of a social process of
> > > truth-seeking.
> > >
> > > There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me
> > > that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X
> > > is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves
> > commmitted to this?
> > > Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing
> > > truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary
> > > personal preference and instrumental reason.
> > >
> > > Mervyn
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of
> > > Louis Irwin
> > > Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59
> > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
> > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical
> > > Realism
> > >
> > > Hi Mervyn,
> > >
> > > The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how
> > > a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to
> > > values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at
> > > it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that
> > > Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a
> > > desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to
> > > (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes
> > > outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans
> > > thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to
> > > achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value
> > > distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another
> > > post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the
> > > sole norm of truth."
> > > Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based
> > > on instrumental values.
> > >
> > > You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth,
> > > to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a
> > > truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the
> > > same with
> > > promising:
> > > if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made
> > > a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such
> > > promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were.
> > > A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an
> > > objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that
> > > a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what
> > > his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the
> > > liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the
> > > liar was aware that he was making that commitment).
> > >
> > > Louis
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 26
> ************************************************
>

From bogus@does.not.exist.com  Wed Dec 24 23:54:36 2008
From: bogus@does.not.exist.com ()
Date: Thu, 25 Dec 2008 06:54:36 -0000
Subject: No subject
Message-ID: <mailman.237.1232978413.2553.critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu>

thought.  He is an intelligent thinker by what we can see.  You should not
say he doesnt get it.  Or say he is too underneath Humean assumptions - come
on this is patronising.  of course he getrs it.  analyse the arguments in a
disinterested manner, and see where the truth will lead you; dont prejudice
what is the truth and if it goes to inconvenient places then say a person
doesnt get it.  Don't let people get away with it Lewis.  i notice a pattern
with this.  A friend from another listserve - george demitrios - used to
beliong here and is an intelligent guy.  He writes about education and
pragmatism.  But he left because he showed the ability to think
independently and challenge things and was insulted for it.  Beware: this
will lead to Stalinism

GW






On Mon, Jan 26, 2009 at 3:58 AM, <
critical-realism-request at lists.econ.utah.edu> wrote:

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>   1. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Louis Irwin)
>   2. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 23 (Louis Irwin)
>   3. Re: Practical Application of Critical Realism (Ruth Groff)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 22:51:54 -0500
> From: "Louis Irwin" <louisirwin9 at aol.com>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical
>        Realism
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <c20.4edbc6ca.36ae8c63 at aol.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="us-ascii"
>
> Hi Mervyn,
>
> Yes, I gathered all that in your first paragraph. I did not make my 
> complaint specific enough. What I found non-responsive was the absence 
> of any comments like "Your step X fails to follow from any of the 
> preceding steps because...", or "Your step Y tacitly imports 
> such-and-such a value commitment because...", or "Your step Z is
incoherent because...", etc.
>
> Louis
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of 
> Mervyn Hartwig
> Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2009 9:02 AM
> To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical 
> Realism
>
> Hi Louis,
>
> I said very clearly what I think the main defect in your 7 steps is. 
> They treat truth-seeking as a personal preference when in fact  it is 
> intrinsic to what a fact is, i.e. the result of a social process, 
> embodying commitment to deploy strictly cognitive criteria. (It can't 
> be objected that this makes a fact 'normative' without destroying the 
> distinction between facts and values, which the Humean wants to 
> uphold. -Sorry to repeat a mantra, but what can else can one do if 
> folks don't get it?). 'It is a fact that your opinion is false, 
> therefore you ought to change it' cannot therefore be parsed as 'If 
> you want to remain a truth-seeker.' etc.
>
> Re lying, I accept that it presupposes the commitment to truth 
> embodied in discourse and praxis and as I think I've made clear I 
> certainly don't want to give up on transcendental critique. But the 
> act of lying and what is presupposed by it are hardly the same thing, 
> and if lying transcendentally presupposes commitment to truth so does 
> not-lying (communicating truth in your second sense) - one can't just 
> split one off from the other, as in your Humean argument.  As I 
> implied, the difference between us here seems to me to come down to 
> this: you are operating with an exclusively propositional 
> understanding of truth, whereas for me truth is also and ultimately 
> ontological and alethic.  I can accept that the liar is committed to 
> truth in a propositional sense in so far as he wants his false 
> statement to be regarded as true, but this presupposes both a context 
> of truth-seeking in your second sense and the falsity of the 
> proposition in an ontological/ alethic sense.
>
>
> Mervyn
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of 
> Louis Irwin
> Sent: 25 January 2009 02:29
> To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical 
> Realism
>
>
> Mervyn,
>
> I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are resorting to 
> cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so imbued with Humean 
> assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh please!!
>
> You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of 
> argument, that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you want 
> to remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying that 
> someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position (here, Hume's) 
> for the sake of argument in order to see if the position holds up or 
> falls apart shows that he/she just doesn't get the correct position. 
> Is that the way your philosophy works? That would be to say that negative
critiques do not work.
> My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of the 
> steps 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how one can 
> criticize an opinion and get a person to change it. So far you have 
> not identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be the basis of a
negative critique.
> Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over.
>
> I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to 
> truth", because I think transcendental critiques go out the window if 
> we have to give up the idea that the very use of language exhibits a 
> "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that commitment to truth 
> is accompanied by a subjective intention to communicate truths. 
> Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental commitment.
>
> Louis
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of 
> Mervyn Hartwig
> Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM
> To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical 
> Realism
>
> Hi Louis,
>
> Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other 
> hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions that 
> you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the purposes 
> of argument, that values are abitrary personal perferences ('if you 
> want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to me you're operating with 
> empirical realist/actualist assumptions - you're not distinguishing 
> between (1) lying propositions and (2) their ontic or de-ontic content 
> (what they are 'about'). E.g. the statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of
mass destruction"
> is
> designed to conceal  (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an 
> absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed to 
> inducing  people to believe that (1) is true is hardly commitment to 
> either the communication or the discovery of the truth (2)! If he is 
> held to account socially, legally etc., that is an altogether 
> different matter from his commitment - he wants to get away with it, 
> and often does. Lying has a social context and truth-seeking as its 
> condition, but that hardly makes it a commitment to truth.
>
> The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it 
> allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic to 
> what a fact is
> - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and not 
> necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't allow 
> this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does allow it the 
> distinction between (Humean) facts and values collapses (the point 
> Bhaskar made in PON).
> Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out of 
> truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an Emperor 
> without clothes -  because facts are the result of a social process of 
> truth-seeking.
>
> There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to me 
> that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, argument: 'X 
> is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't Humeans themselves
commmitted to this?
> Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing 
> truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary 
> personal preference and instrumental reason.
>
> Mervyn
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of 
> Louis Irwin
> Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59
> To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical 
> Realism
>
> Hi Mervyn,
>
> The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show how 
> a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts to 
> values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look closely at 
> it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I did note that 
> Humeans allow a transition from empirically given desires (including a 
> desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do in order to 
> (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes 
> outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that Humeans 
> thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you want to 
> achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the fact/value 
> distinction surely has to be much stronger. Incidentally, in another 
> post you stated that RB's "whole philosophical system is driven by the 
> sole norm of truth."
> Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is based 
> on instrumental values.
>
> You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of truth, 
> to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as stating a 
> truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to truth. It's the 
> same with
> promising:
> if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby made 
> a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing so. Such 
> promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my intentions were. 
> A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has an 
> objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that sense that 
> a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; no matter what 
> his intentions are, the social nature of language ensures that the 
> liar has made a commitment (and lying could not succeed unless the 
> liar was aware that he was making that commitment).
>
> Louis
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
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> Message: 2
> Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 23:01:58 -0500
> From: "Louis Irwin" <louisirwin9 at aol.com>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue
>        23
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID: <bbc.3a3a056e.36ae8ebe at aol.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="us-ascii"
>
> Hi Ruth, Foo Keong, Phil, Tobin,
>
> Thanks for understanding what I was trying to get at!
>
> Louis
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of 
> Ruth Groff
> Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2009 2:05 PM
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, Issue 
> 23
>
> Hi Mervyn, everybody,
>
> I don't understand why you say that Louis "just doesn't get it."  I 
> mean, at most he simply disagrees with Bhaskar on this point, as Hugh 
> does, and perhaps Phil, and no doubt others who aren't particularly 
> attached to Hume, to empiricism and/or to non-dialectical philosophy!  
> In which case it would be that he "disagrees, for well-articulated 
> reasons that you regard as flawed."  But he didn't even say that.  He 
> just said that he wasn't sure that the Humean is defeated by the 
> particular argument that RB advances.
>
> It's such an important thing, as Foo Kyong suggests, to be able to 
> think as critically as possible about the views that one believes to 
> be correct.  I say it gently, but I think that in context it was 
> actually Louis who was stirring the pot/rattling the bars!
>
> Warmly,
> Ruth
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 12:41 PM, Mervyn Hartwig
> <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>wrote:
>
> > I'd be inclined to say it doesn't need a Devil's advocate because 
> > the Devil himself supports it! Can one convince the Devil?
> >
> > M
> >
> > PS. You could say, to switch metaphors, I myself am stirring the pot 
> > or rattling the bars a bit.
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of 
> > Ng Foo Keong
> > Sent: 25 January 2009 15:55
> > To: critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 50, 
> > Issue
> > 23
> >
> > Mervyn:
> >
> > I think Louis is just playing the devil's advocate by considering 
> > the Humean critique.  if a position (such as the thesis that we can 
> > derive values from
> > facts) is solid indeed, it should be able to withstand the fiercest 
> > criticism.  your argument should not be like preaching to the choir, 
> > but you should be able to convince the enemy (who may not share your 
> > assumptions).
> > In fact, i think we should take the bull by the horns.  Assume Hume 
> > was right -- then find a way for him to contradict himself.  Can we?
> >
> > regards,
> > F.K.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > Message: 1
> > > Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 14:01:48 -0000
> > > From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh at jaspere7.demon.co.uk>
> > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical
> > >        Realism
> > > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
> > >        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > Message-ID:
> > >        <
> > mailman.5367.1232896549.2556.critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> > > Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="us-ascii"
> > >
> > > Hi Louis,
> > >
> > > I said very clearly what I think the main defect in your 7 steps is.
> > > They treat truth-seeking as a personal preference when in fact  it 
> > > is intrinsic to what a fact is, i.e. the result of a social 
> > > process, embodying commitment to deploy strictly cognitive 
> > > criteria. (It can't be objected that this makes a fact 'normative' 
> > > without destroying the distinction between facts and values, which 
> > > the Humean wants to uphold. -Sorry to repeat a mantra, but what 
> > > can else can one do if folks don't get it?). 'It is a fact that 
> > > your opinion is false, therefore you ought to change it' cannot 
> > > therefore be parsed as 'If you
> > want to remain a truth-seeker.' etc.
> > >
> > > Re lying, I accept that it presupposes the commitment to truth 
> > > embodied in discourse and praxis and as I think I've made clear I 
> > > certainly don't want to give up on transcendental critique. But 
> > > the act of lying and what is presupposed by it are hardly the same 
> > > thing, and if lying transcendentally presupposes commitment to 
> > > truth so does not-lying (communicating truth in your second sense) 
> > > - one can't just split one off from the other, as in your Humean
argument.
> > > As I implied, the difference between us here seems to me to come 
> > > down to
> > > this: you are operating with an exclusively propositional 
> > > understanding of truth, whereas for me truth is also and 
> > > ultimately ontological and alethic.  I can accept that the liar is 
> > > committed to truth in a propositional sense in so far as he wants 
> > > his false statement to be regarded as true, but this presupposes 
> > > both a context of truth-seeking in your second sense and the 
> > > falsity of the proposition
> > in an ontological/ alethic sense.
> > >
> > >
> > > Mervyn
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
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>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 21:58:39 -0600
> From: Ruth Groff <rgroff at slu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical
>        Realism
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>        <critical-realism at lists.econ.utah.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <6ad241360901251958q4e8e04aamc00fb8b0263311d5 at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Hey, thanks for that reference.  I want to read it now.  I will have 
> to think about it.  The immediate thought that comes to mind is that 
> it might be inherent in the definition of the word, as a matter of 
> language-analysis, but not be inherent in the act.  I don't know if I 
> think that, but it's a really interesting example.  I had had in mind 
> "facts" like encountering a sad, lost child in the mall or something 
> -- that just seems to me to be an is that self-evidently generate some 
> oughts, though the implication is not a logical one!  Or coming across 
> a hurt animal.  Or responding to a loved one.  I'm pretty sure that I 
> think that logical necessity is over-rated by empiricists, anyhow.  I 
> mean, it's big for them because they don't have any
> other kind.   The Kantians let in some synthetic a prioris, but even there
> there is a kind of pressure put on the thing, I think, that is the 
> result of having dispensed with natural necessity.  (Itself different, 
> I think I think, from the necessity associated with the kind of moral 
> realism that I'm
> defending.)
>
> I love it when you post things.
>
> r.
>
>
> On Sun, Jan 25, 2009 at 9:39 PM, Louis Irwin <louisirwin9 at aol.com> wrote:
>
> > Hi Ruth.
> >
> > You read me correctly. Just one comment on the need for moral realism.
> You
> > suggest that "to get LOGICAL implication from statements of fact to 
> > non-heteronomous normative statements...you need "facts" that are 
> > inherently normative." I believe that you and Mervyn are in 
> > agreement on that (and I don't disagree), but Searle argued as long 
> > ago as 1964 that one can logically derive a genuine 'ought' from 
> > nothing but 'is' statements. He considered, for example, that it is 
> > part of the MEANING of "X made a promise" that "X is under an 
> > obligation to keep the promise" (other
> things
> > being equal), so one does not have to refer to separately real moral 
> > premisses - the moral parts are real but they are internal to meanings.
> You
> > can read this as transcendental argument. Maybe these are just two 
> > ways
> of
> > saying the same thing.
> >
> > BTW, the Searle essay was reprinted in a 1969 collection entitled 
> > "The Is/Ought Question" with arguments for and against the divide, 
> > and clearly there were back then many prominent English-speaking 
> > philosophers who opposed the divide. I remember at the time several 
> > philosophers thought
> the
> > volume was old hat because it was then widely accepted that there 
> > was an intrinsic link between facts and values. So RB was definitely 
> > following
> up
> > on a strand that had already been around since 1958.
> >
> > Louis
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of 
> > Ruth Groff
> > Sent: Saturday, January 24, 2009 10:10 PM
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical 
> > Realism
> >
> > Hi Louis,
> >
> > Yes, I think you are right that a Humean can say that, given his/her
> desire
> > truth, s/he "ought" to reject p, upon being shown that it is false, 
> > and still not have gone from is to ought in the sense precluded by Hume.
>  S/he
> > could probably even deal with the transcendental/Habermas argument 
> > about language, too.  At the transcendental level, I mean.  The use 
> > of language in its primary mode doesn't imply that one *ought* be be 
> > a truth-seeker (in the relevant, transcendental sense); it implies 
> > that one is one, whether one likes it or not.  It's all is's.  The 
> > is-to-ought sell, there, is to say that the fact of being a language 
> > user logically implies that one ought
> not
> > tell lies.
> >
> > My hunch is that what you need, in order to get LOGICAL implication 
> > from statements of fact to non-heteronomous normative statements, to 
> > use the Kantian parlance, is to be a particular kind of moral 
> > realist.  I think
> to
> > do it you need "facts" that are inherently normative.
> >
> > No?
> >
> > r.
> >
> >
> >
> > On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 8:29 PM, Louis Irwin <louisirwin9 at aol.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > Mervyn,
> > >
> > > I take it that my arguments hit home, because now you are 
> > > resorting to cheap shots, as in: "it could be that you're so 
> > > imbued with Humean assumptions that you just don't get it." Oh
please!!
> > >
> > > You suggested that I was "assuming, at least for the purposes of 
> > > argument, that values are arbitrary personal perferences ('if you 
> > > want to remain a truth-seeker')". This sounds as if you are saying 
> > > that someone (in this case, me) who assumes a false position 
> > > (here, Hume's) for the sake of argument in order to see if the 
> > > position holds up or falls apart shows that he/she just doesn't get
the correct position.
> > > Is that the way your philosophy works? That would be to say that
> negative
> > critiques do not work.
> > > My thought was to see if you were able to find a defect in any of 
> > > the steps 1-7, which purports to show, in a Humean context, how 
> > > one can criticize an opinion and get a person to change it. So far 
> > > you have not identified any specific faults with 1-7 that would be 
> > > the basis of
> a
> > negative critique.
> > > Instead you just repeat the same mantras over and over.
> > >
> > > I stand by my distinction between the two senses of "commitment to 
> > > truth", because I think transcendental critiques go out the window 
> > > if we have to give up the idea that the very use of language 
> > > exhibits a "commitment to truth" regardless of whether that 
> > > commitment to truth is accompanied by a subjective intention to
communicate truths.
> > > Otherwise, liars would be exempted from the transcendental commitment.
> > >
> > > Louis
> > >
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of 
> > > Mervyn Hartwig
> > > Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2009 5:25 PM
> > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
> > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical 
> > > Realism
> > >
> > > Hi Louis,
> > >
> > > Thanks for clarifying. You say the case is weak, but on the other 
> > > hand, it could be that you're so imbued with Humean assumptions 
> > > that you just don't get it. Apart from assuming, at least for the 
> > > purposes of argument, that values are abitrary personal 
> > > perferences ('if you want to remain a truth-seeker'), it seems to 
> > > me you're operating with empirical realist/actualist assumptions - 
> > > you're not distinguishing between (1) lying propositions and (2) 
> > > their ontic or de-ontic content (what they are 'about'). E.g. the 
> > > statement (1) "Saddam has weapons of
> > mass destruction"
> > > is
> > > designed to conceal  (2) the real or true state of affairs -- an 
> > > absence of weapons of mass destruction. That the liar is committed 
> > > to inducing  people to believe that (1) is true is hardly 
> > > commitment to either the communication or the discovery of the 
> > > truth (2)! If he is held to account socially, legally etc., that 
> > > is an altogether different matter from his commitment - he wants 
> > > to get away with it, and often does. Lying has a social context 
> > > and truth-seeking as its condition, but that hardly makes it a
commitment to truth.
> > >
> > > The fundamental weakness of your 'Humean critique' imo is that it 
> > > allows, with critical realism, that the norm of truth is intrinsic 
> > > to what a fact is
> > > - analytic to the 'seeking' of truth is its positive valuation and 
> > > not necessarily just in an instrumental way. But your Humean can't 
> > > allow this - facts are supposed to be value-free - if he does 
> > > allow it the distinction between (Humean) facts and values 
> > > collapses (the point Bhaskar made in PON).
> > > Of course your Humean can always decide for some reason to opt out 
> > > of truth-seeking, but then he's left without any facts! - an 
> > > Emperor without clothes -  because facts are the result of a 
> > > social process of truth-seeking.
> > >
> > > There's much more to be said against Hume's law, but it seems to 
> > > me that it falls at the first hurdle - criticism of beliefs, 
> > > argument: 'X is a fact; you ought to believe X, cp'. Aren't 
> > > Humeans themselves
> > commmitted to this?
> > > Ought I not believe in 'Hume's law', cp? On your own showing 
> > > truth-seeking can't just be reduced to a question of arbitrary 
> > > personal preference and instrumental reason.
> > >
> > > Mervyn
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces at lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of 
> > > Louis Irwin
> > > Sent: 21 January 2009 16:59
> > > To: 'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'
> > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Practical Application of Critical 
> > > Realism
> > >
> > > Hi Mervyn,
> > >
> > > The point of my reconstruction of a 'Humean critique' was to show 
> > > how a Humean could criticize an opinion without going from facts 
> > > to values, in contrast to what you had asserted. If you look 
> > > closely at it, there are no transitions from facts to values. I 
> > > did note that Humeans allow a transition from empirically given 
> > > desires (including a desire for truth) to what one 'ought' to do 
> > > in order to
> > > (instrumentally) achieve those desires, but this in no way goes 
> > > outside the Humean fact/value distinction. One might say that 
> > > Humeans thereby do go from facts to 'instrumental values' (if you 
> > > want to achieve X, then you ought to do Y). The attack on the 
> > > fact/value distinction surely has to be much stronger. 
> > > Incidentally, in another post you stated that RB's "whole 
> > > philosophical system is driven by the sole norm of truth."
> > > Hmmm. This sure sounds like RB's system - on your reading - is 
> > > based on instrumental values.
> > >
> > > You suggest the liar only has a "commitment to the pretense of 
> > > truth, to a fraud". But if I lie to you I am presenting myself as 
> > > stating a truth, and in that sense I do have a commitment to 
> > > truth. It's the same with
> > > promising:
> > > if I say that I will repay a loan you made to me, I have thereby 
> > > made a promise, even if I was lying and had no intention of doing 
> > > so. Such promises are enforceable in court, no matter what my
intentions were.
> > > A commitment is not just a subjective state of mind, it also has 
> > > an objective grounding in social circumstances. It is in that 
> > > sense that a liar has a "commitment to truth" in my second sense; 
> > > no matter what his intentions are, the social nature of language 
> > > ensures that the liar has made a commitment (and lying could not 
> > > succeed unless the liar was aware that he was making that commitment).
> > >
> > > Louis
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > > Critical-Realism at lists.econ.utah.edu
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> > >
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> >
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> >
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