From matonianuk@yahoo.co.uk Wed Jul 22 23:06:11 2009 Received: from mail02.syd.optusnet.com.au ([211.29.132.183]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MTqVP-0000RM-8Y for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Wed, 22 Jul 2009 23:06:11 -0600 Received: from [10.1.1.4] (d122-111-38-76.mas16.nsw.optusnet.com.au [122.111.38.76]) (authenticated sender kmaton) by mail02.syd.optusnet.com.au (8.13.1/8.13.1) with ESMTP id n6N55xi7008327 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Thu, 23 Jul 2009 15:06:01 +1000 Message-ID: <4A67EFB8.3020509@yahoo.co.uk> Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2009 15:06:00 +1000 From: Karl Maton User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X Mach-O; en-US; rv:1.7.2) Gecko/20040804 Netscape/7.2 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Bernstein Listserv , Bourdieu@googlegroups.com, Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.9 Subject: [Critical-Realism] New Critical Realism Seminar X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2009 05:06:11 -0000 Getting Real: AACR Seminars and Discussions The Australasian Association for Critical Realism (AACR)is pleased to announce the latest in a new series of seminars, to be held at the University of Sydney. Tuesday 4th August 6.30pm Room 148 (downstairs) R.C. Mills Building, University of Sydney Nitasha Kaul Nitasha Kaul holds a joint doctorate in Economics and Philosophy. Currently based at the University of Westminster in London, her publications are in areas of identity, political economy, democracy, social theory -- for more see http://www.wmin.ac.uk/sshl/page-3011. She chose to leave her permanent post in Economics at the University of the West of England in Bristol in 2006 to pursue interdisciplinary scholarly research and writing in freer forms. Her recent book is 'Imagining Economics Otherwise: enounters with identity/difference' (2008). At the moment, she is visiting the Humanities Research Centre at the Australia National University (ANU) as a Fellow completing her next book on Bhutan. Getting Real is a new series of seminars and discussions of readings organised by the AACR. They are open to anyone interested in coming and engaging with realist ideas. Neither speakers nor other participants need be 'critical realists' - the aim is to open up and encourage debate and discussion. We adjourn to the pub afterwards as well. PLEASE send this on to anyone in your Dept or Faculty you think might be interested! Thanks. -- With best wishes, Karl ---- Dr Karl Maton Department of Sociology & Social Policy Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney http://www.KarlMaton.com Editorial Board, Journal of Critical Realism President, Australasian Association for Critical Realism From bwanika@yahoo.com Sun Jul 26 23:26:16 2009 Received: from web58403.mail.re3.yahoo.com ([68.142.236.171]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with smtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MVIj1-00029N-TA for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Sun, 26 Jul 2009 23:26:16 -0600 Received: (qmail 18355 invoked by uid 60001); 27 Jul 2009 05:26:10 -0000 Message-ID: <198946.18163.qm@web58403.mail.re3.yahoo.com> X-YMail-OSG: 7T003qsVM1n0o13ZpFEqQsoRw7XuHu5MyWymkW7GFR_ZIUDvzC9EE39sHNHjlwkqEvx4TpvOXVxSdslCiqkKEITmYKDR7n33HX5SsPDwhy9z8RBh63iUSdi9xBFHX4tGRs7HUyYlwpnU3Xh6K2p7NWSzeOtv3H1ffKmqtlEZ.gTdyA2wFUmH.Tz7oLqJhqGRSfXLVoToJZhTYkG8O89SLIShdY6R0qL8yx.a5D21TFdurhdgjgX.ofeNGe9NPMnKmsxsoFzmHnL0n9Ym2dNKDIKSPBiMEnrLJkEg0rLliksGrQo- Received: from [196.0.6.161] by web58403.mail.re3.yahoo.com via HTTP; Sun, 26 Jul 2009 22:26:09 PDT X-Mailer: YahooMailClassic/5.4.17 YahooMailWebService/0.7.289.15 Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2009 22:26:09 -0700 (PDT) From: bwanika@yahoo.com To: Critical Realism MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.9 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Interested in Research Projects X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2009 05:26:16 -0000 CR Listers! =0A=0AYou can=0Ainitiate and work on your own research with the support of= =A0Kampala=0AUniversity in Uganda. http://www.ku.ac.ug/Academic_Research_Pr= ojects.htm=0A=0A=A0=0A=0AJust write=0Ato the Vice Chancellor at vc@ku.ac.ug= =0A=0ACopy to=0Adirector for planning and development at dpd@ku.ac.ug=0Aand= deputy vice chancellor academics dvc@ku.ac.ug=0A=0A=0A=A0=0A=0A =0A=0ADan. =0A=0A =0A=0A=0A From Dogangoecmen@aol.com Sat Aug 01 05:35:21 2009 Received: from omr-m32.mx.aol.com ([64.12.143.152]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MXCrx-00074g-HB for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Sat, 01 Aug 2009 05:35:21 -0600 Received: from imo-da02.mx.aol.com (imo-da02.mx.aol.com [205.188.169.200]) by omr-m32.mx.aol.com (8.14.1/8.14.1) with ESMTP id n71BZF1H003895 for ; Sat, 1 Aug 2009 07:35:15 -0400 Received: from Dogangoecmen@aol.com by imo-da02.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v40_r1.5.) id w.cf0.5f59f97f (34909) for ; Sat, 1 Aug 2009 07:35:10 -0400 (EDT) Received: from smtprly-mb03.mx.aol.com (smtprly-mb03.mx.aol.com [64.12.207.150]) by cia-da02.mx.aol.com (v124.15) with ESMTP id MAILCIADA026-5c774a74286a3dd; Sat, 01 Aug 2009 07:35:10 -0400 Received: from webmail-dx10 (webmail-dx10.sim.aol.com [205.188.104.103]) by smtprly-mb03.mx.aol.com (v124.15) with ESMTP id MAILSMTPRLYMB036-5c774a74286a3dd; Sat, 01 Aug 2009 07:35:06 -0400 To: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu Date: Sat, 01 Aug 2009 07:35:06 -0400 X-MB-Message-Source: WebUI X-AOL-IP: 78.54.120.90 X-MB-Message-Type: User MIME-Version: 1.0 From: "=?utf-8?Q?DG=C3=B6=C3=A7men?=" X-Mailer: AOL Webmail 43792-STANDARD Received: from 78.54.120.90 by webmail-dx10.sysops.aol.com (205.188.104.103) with HTTP (WebMailUI); Sat, 01 Aug 2009 07:35:06 -0400 Message-Id: <8CBE0B340B22C5B-EC8-2780@webmail-dx10.sysops.aol.com> X-Spam-Flag: YES Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.9 Subject: [Critical-Realism] My papers are available now! X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 01 Aug 2009 11:35:21 -0000 Dear Friends and Colleagues, some of my papers in English, German and Turkish are now available at www.= dogangocmen.wordpress.com. Others will be uploaded soon, I hope. You are very welcome to visit the we= b site and make comments and formulate critique if you wish. Best wishes, D.G=C3=B6=C3=A7men http://dogangocmen.wordpress.com/ From matonianuk@yahoo.co.uk Sun Aug 02 22:00:25 2009 Received: from mail01.syd.optusnet.com.au ([211.29.132.182]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MXoim-0001e3-Ik for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Sun, 02 Aug 2009 22:00:25 -0600 Received: from [10.1.1.4] (110.33.97.41.optusnet.com.au [110.33.97.41] (may be forged)) (authenticated sender kmaton) by mail01.syd.optusnet.com.au (8.13.1/8.13.1) with ESMTP id n73405Vl021474 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 3 Aug 2009 14:00:07 +1000 Message-ID: <4A7660C5.1040901@yahoo.co.uk> Date: Mon, 03 Aug 2009 14:00:05 +1000 From: Karl Maton User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X Mach-O; en-US; rv:1.7.2) Gecko/20040804 Netscape/7.2 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: AACRCommittee@yahoogroups.com, A-A-C-R@yahoogroups.com, Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List , sys-func Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.9 Subject: [Critical-Realism] [Fwd: New Critical Realism Seminar] X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 03 Aug 2009 04:00:25 -0000 Getting Real: AACR Seminars and Discussions The Australasian Association for Critical Realism (AACR)is pleased to announce the latest in a new series of seminars, to be held at the University of Sydney. Tuesday 4th August 6.30pm Room 148 (downstairs) R.C. Mills Building, University of Sydney Nitasha Kaul Nitasha Kaul holds a joint doctorate in Economics and Philosophy. Currently based at the University of Westminster in London, her publications are in areas of identity, political economy, democracy, social theory -- for more see http://www.wmin.ac.uk/sshl/page-3011. She chose to leave her permanent post in Economics at the University of the West of England in Bristol in 2006 to pursue interdisciplinary scholarly research and writing in freer forms. Her recent book is 'Imagining Economics Otherwise: enounters with identity/difference' (2008). At the moment, she is visiting the Humanities Research Centre at the Australia National University (ANU) as a Fellow completing her next book on Bhutan. Getting Real is a new series of seminars and discussions of readings organised by the AACR. They are open to anyone interested in coming and engaging with realist ideas. Neither speakers nor other participants need be 'critical realists' - the aim is to open up and encourage debate and discussion. We adjourn to the pub afterwards as well. PLEASE send this on to anyone in your Dept or Faculty you think might be interested! Thanks. -- With best wishes, Karl ---- Dr Karl Maton Department of Sociology & Social Policy Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney http://www.KarlMaton.com Editorial Board, Journal of Critical Realism President, Australasian Association for Critical Realism -- With best wishes, Karl ---- Dr Karl Maton Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney http://www.KarlMaton.com President, Australasian Association for Critical Realism Editorial Board, Journal of Critical Realism 'This is your life, and it's ending one minute at a time' 'The greatest pleasure in life is doing what people say you cannot do' From mh@jaspere7.demon.co.uk Tue Aug 11 04:08:12 2009 Received: from anchor-post-3.mail.demon.net ([195.173.77.134]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MaoH6-0003lk-04 for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Tue, 11 Aug 2009 04:08:12 -0600 Received: from jaspere7.demon.co.uk ([80.176.90.74] helo=LENOVOCC8E4CAC) by anchor-post-3.mail.demon.net with esmtp (Exim 4.69) id 1MaoH4-0006EB-pa for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Tue, 11 Aug 2009 10:08:11 +0000 From: "Mervyn Hartwig" To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2009 11:08:08 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook, Build 11.0.5510 Thread-Index: AcoaavjqhiAhXKKqQ4mPeyGSzuNoqQ== X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.5579 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Rio conference X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2009 10:08:12 -0000 Just to report that imo the 12th annual IACR conference around the theme 'Realism and Human Emancipation: Is Another World Possible' in Rio, 23-25 July, was a great success. Some 80 people at the workshop (a record, I think) and 200 at the main conference. Brilliantly organised by Mario Duayer and Joao Medeiros et al., with amazingly good translators (who do work for Lula, apparently). The usual CR friendliness, warmth, etc, but with a great deal of special Brazilian zest. The highlights for me were the bringing together of (1) CR and the dynamism of the Marxist tradition in Brazil and Argentina (represented at the conference mainly by the Lukacians); and (2) CR and Moishe Postone's reinterpretation of Marx's critical theory. Postone gave a plenary address, and it was a great pleasure to get to know him a little personally. And then there was Rio itself, which the organisers made a great job of ensuring that we caught the flavour of. Shortly after our conference, there was a related one in Florianopolis, attended by many of our plenary speakers, that also went swimmingly I'm told (I didn't attend). It's all part of growing evidence that CR is very much on the up worldwide in a wide range of subject areas. One thing I hadn't fully registered before the conference is that Lukacs called his aesthetic theory 'critical realism', and I've since discovered that there is a lively (Lukacsian) critical realist scene in art and aesthetic theory in various places around the world. I'm sure there could be much mutual benefit from dialogue. Mervyn From echna@gmx.net Sun Aug 16 12:03:10 2009 Received: from mail.gmx.net ([213.165.64.20]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with smtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1Mck4U-0000Xj-6l for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Sun, 16 Aug 2009 12:03:10 -0600 Received: (qmail invoked by alias); 16 Aug 2009 18:03:03 -0000 Received: from 85-127-115-142.dynamic.xdsl-line.inode.at (EHLO [192.168.1.33]) [85.127.115.142] by mail.gmx.net (mp003) with SMTP; 16 Aug 2009 20:03:03 +0200 X-Authenticated: #24065550 X-Provags-ID: V01U2FsdGVkX1+V7Rhd4kCV/VNz+tU7E2i2fbm23Cicwj3k1jsKwo E2nlIS0XI8nfBM Message-ID: <4A8849E2.8080305@gmx.net> Date: Sun, 16 Aug 2009 20:03:14 +0200 From: echna User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.22 (Windows/20090605) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Y-GMX-Trusted: 0 X-FuHaFi: 0.68 Subject: [Critical-Realism] CR and STS X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 16 Aug 2009 18:03:10 -0000 Hi all, I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don´t have an overview over the whole field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the list). best wishes, e From matthewlongshore@yahoo.com Sun Aug 16 12:51:45 2009 Received: from web33505.mail.mud.yahoo.com ([68.142.206.154]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with smtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MckpV-0000dv-FZ for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Sun, 16 Aug 2009 12:51:45 -0600 Received: (qmail 8041 invoked by uid 60001); 16 Aug 2009 18:51:40 -0000 Message-ID: <992332.6361.qm@web33505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> X-YMail-OSG: 58hzMYAVM1lncEynA9sJeT2nIKGmVLo42EERMiJQHhyMzUkWVHuElRBdcINBE..kA7MtOYXT4h4CT0x1vXS.a_ShbONYiDoJ62QXzmXFdOF6QdjdDfI06ugPPEPYNZH_S4TegSA_5mIfQziwQBKzQewYP5k6V0J1xMpxMXWgZze1IG1tAuZ9aU8oyTyDJ5bYcY.dZSqiQxbQl_WQabgCntdSz_YvhtJuGjwc0K.QEh2hs1LzfHcKy8ylHLMPhXEE9I5jn44k0Z65r15hxFO.2Xv6EnCX8ale1K83Y_fR4et6br.mRRXE.kL6ju3k211nP2USkhH86WgAJ.QVn8nJWb2FzHuaCtSBr4.tY9n5NJWq Received: from [196.3.140.194] by web33505.mail.mud.yahoo.com via HTTP; Sun, 16 Aug 2009 11:51:39 PDT X-Mailer: YahooMailRC/1358.27 YahooMailWebService/0.7.338.2 References: <4A8849E2.8080305@gmx.net> Date: Sun, 16 Aug 2009 11:51:39 -0700 (PDT) From: Matthew Smith To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List In-Reply-To: <4A8849E2.8080305@gmx.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Subject: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 16 Aug 2009 18:51:45 -0000 Hi Echna,=0A=0AThere is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of t= he main theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: htt= p://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-theo= .pdf). I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization wh= ich touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from th= e perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literatur= e (here: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=3DArticleURL&_udi=3DB6W7M= -4JWFH1P-1&_user=3D10&_rdoc=3D1&_fmt=3D&_orig=3Dsearch&_sort=3Dd&_docanchor= =3D&view=3Dc&_searchStrId=3D981817881&_rerunOrigin=3Dscholar.google&_acct= =3DC000050221&_version=3D1&_urlVersion=3D0&_userid=3D10&md5=3D67a7cdfdd26aa= 90032f2792438e3ab4d). If you need a copy of that paper, just write me direc= tly - I currently don't have it online or accessible from where I currently= am.=0A=0A=0ABest,=0AMatthew=0A=0A=0A----- Message initial ----=0ADe : echn= a =0A=C0 : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List =0AEnvoy=E9 le : dimanche 16 ao=FBt 2009, 14 h = 03 min 14 s=0AObjet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS=0A=0AHi all,=0A=0AI was= wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from =0Acritica= l realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) =0Astudies= . They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can =0Aoverlook t= he field the STS are based on a relativistic and =0Aconstructivist ontology= that talks about being fully in epistemological =0Aterms. In general they = tacitly substitute the theory of science by the =0Asociology of science and= consequently any conceptualisation of ontology =0Ais left out. Theoretical= ly they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik =0AFleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. = Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno =0ALatour in France or John Law= in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even =0Arefers to CR as an "essentia= list" theory). Maybe my short description of =0Athe STS is (partly) mistake= n, as I don=B4t have an overview over the whole =0Afield (if so, please cor= rect me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of =0Acontention about the ST= S (either in the form of texts written by either =0Aof the sides so as to c= ritize the other, or in comments here on the list).=0A=0Abest wishes,=0Ae= =0A=0A_______________________________________________=0ACritical-Realism ma= iling list=0ACritical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu=0Ahttp://lists.econ.utah.= edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism=0A=0A=0A=0A Devenez un meilleur = amigo gr=E2ce =E0 Yahoo! Courriel=0Ahttp://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/vis= iteguidee2/ From b86102052@ntu.edu.tw Sun Aug 16 13:23:09 2009 Received: from wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw ([140.112.2.161]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MclJs-0000ia-Pv for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Sun, 16 Aug 2009 13:23:09 -0600 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw (Postfix) with ESMTP id 26C5F1F4585 for ; Mon, 17 Aug 2009 03:23:02 +0800 (CST) Received: from 61-229-31-229.dynamic.hinet.net (61-229-31-229.dynamic.hinet.net [61.229.31.229]) by wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw (Horde MIME library) with HTTP; Mon, 17 Aug 2009 03:23:02 +0800 Message-ID: <20090817032302.h3nu5gev6ok44oog@wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw> Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2009 03:23:02 +0800 From: b86102052@ntu.edu.tw To: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu References: <4A8849E2.8080305@gmx.net> <992332.6361.qm@web33505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> In-Reply-To: <992332.6361.qm@web33505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; DelSp="Yes"; format="flowed" Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable User-Agent: Internet Messaging Program (IMP) H3 (4.1.5) Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 16 Aug 2009 19:23:09 -0000 Hi Echna, The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may =20 be helpful too. Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. =E2=80=9CSearching for Realism, Structure and Agency= =20 in Actor Network Theory,=E2=80=9D The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): = =20 455-73. Best wishes, Poe Poe Yu-ze Wan Department of Sociology National Taiwan University =E5=BC=95=E8=BF=B0 Matthew Smith : > Hi Echna, > > There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main =20 > theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: =20 > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-= theo.pdf). I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization= which touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from = the perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literatu= re (here: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=3DArticleURL&_udi=3DB6W7M= -4JWFH1P-1&_user=3D10&_rdoc=3D1&_fmt=3D&_orig=3Dsearch&_sort=3Dd&_docanchor= =3D&view=3Dc&_searchStrId=3D981817881&_rerunOrigin=3Dscholar.google&_acct=3D= C000050221&_version=3D1&_urlVersion=3D0&_userid=3D10&md5=3D67a7cdfdd26aa9003= 2f2792438e3ab4d). If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly -= I currently don't have it online or accessible from where I currently =20 > am. > > > Best, > Matthew > > > ----- Message initial ---- > De : echna > =C3=80 : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List =20 > > Envoy=C3=A9 le : dimanche 16 ao=C3=BBt 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > > Hi all, > > I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from > critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) > studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can > overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological > terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the > sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology > is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik > Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno > Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even > refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of > the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don=C2=B4t have an overview over the wh= ole > field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of > contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either > of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the list). > > best wishes, > e > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > Devenez un meilleur amigo gr=C3=A2ce =C3=A0 Yahoo! Courriel > http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From echna@gmx.net Mon Aug 17 05:43:24 2009 Received: from mail.gmx.net ([213.165.64.20]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with smtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1Md0cW-0001pS-4Z for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Mon, 17 Aug 2009 05:43:24 -0600 Received: (qmail invoked by alias); 17 Aug 2009 11:43:17 -0000 Received: from 85-127-115-142.dynamic.xdsl-line.inode.at (EHLO [192.168.1.33]) [85.127.115.142] by mail.gmx.net (mp069) with SMTP; 17 Aug 2009 13:43:17 +0200 X-Authenticated: #24065550 X-Provags-ID: V01U2FsdGVkX19HZl8W+HlHCqTJT8/oJbhMcpPcL7pmAqmaVNw/LE fadLyEjwCgttEJ Message-ID: <4A894260.4060308@gmx.net> Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2009 13:43:28 +0200 From: echna User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.22 (Windows/20090605) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List References: <4A8849E2.8080305@gmx.net> <992332.6361.qm@web33505.mail.mud.yahoo.com> <20090817032302.h3nu5gev6ok44oog@wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw> In-Reply-To: <20090817032302.h3nu5gev6ok44oog@wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Y-GMX-Trusted: 0 X-FuHaFi: 0.46 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2009 11:43:24 -0000 Hi again, thank you very much, Poe and Matthew. I will try to get hold of the mentioned texts. If anybody has some more suggestions, please let me know. Best, e b86102052@ntu.edu.tw schrieb: > Hi Echna, > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may > be helpful too. > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. “Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency > in Actor Network Theory,” The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): > 455-73. > > Best wishes, > Poe > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > Department of Sociology > National Taiwan University > > > 引述 Matthew Smith : > > >> Hi Echna, >> >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: >> http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net-theo.pdf). I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literature (here: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=981817881&_rerunOrigin=scholar.google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently don't have it online or accessible from where I currently >> am. >> >> >> Best, >> Matthew >> >> >> ----- Message initial ---- >> De : echna >> À : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> >> Envoyé le : dimanche 16 août 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS >> >> Hi all, >> >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don´t have an overview over the whole >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the list). >> >> best wishes, >> e >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> Devenez un meilleur amigo grâce à Yahoo! Courriel >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From leigh@totalpc.co.zw Mon Aug 17 08:04:34 2009 Received: from panadol.yoafrica.com ([196.44.176.14]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1Md2p7-0002Lr-As for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Mon, 17 Aug 2009 08:04:34 -0600 Received: from smtp.yoafrica.com ([196.44.176.8]) by panadol.yoafrica.com with esmtp (Exim 4.68 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from ) id 1Md2nm-0005FW-TR for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Mon, 17 Aug 2009 16:03:11 +0200 Received: from [196.44.188.61] (helo=leighlaptop) by smtp.yoafrica.com with esmtp (Exim 4.68 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from ) id 1Md2nL-0002CX-Fw for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Mon, 17 Aug 2009 16:03:10 +0200 From: "Leigh Price" To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" References: <4A8849E2.8080305@gmx.net> Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2009 16:02:38 +0200 Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11 Thread-Index: Acoem/TXhmygDhUXSwCdDHHsaXfsMAApEmaw In-Reply-To: <4A8849E2.8080305@gmx.net> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.5579 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] CR and STS X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2009 14:04:35 -0000 Hi echna You may want to read Latour's "Pandora's Hope" (1999) in which he = addressed the issue of whether or not he believed in reality. I felt he lands resoundingly on the side of realism, and that in this book he espouses a weak social constructivism. He called for a 'realistic realism' based on = a fallibilism which embraces relative, rather than absolute, certainty. = He gave a plausible explanation of the reason behind the mainstream = attachment to irrealism, namely that it is based on the 'fear of mob rule'. He = wrote that "we do not lack certainty because we never dreamed of dominating = the people". He also wrote, "When we say there is no outside world, that = does not mean we deny its existence, but, on the contrary, that we refuse to grant it the ahistorical, isolated, inhuman, cold, objective existence = that it was given only to combat the crowd".=20 An American writer influenced by Latour is Donna Haraway. Although she identifies her self as an anti-realist, Andrew Sayer has acknowledged (Realism and Social Science, 1999: 103, n.13): =93...despite Haraway=92s professed rejection of her realism, her discussion of objectivity and = the situated and perspectival nature of knowledge is compatible with = critical realism, and indeed helps develop it.=94 Hope this is helpful, Leigh -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna Sent: 16 August 2009 20:03 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: [Critical-Realism] CR and STS Hi all, I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from=20 critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS)=20 studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can=20 overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and=20 constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological=20 terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the=20 sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology=20 is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik=20 Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno=20 Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even=20 refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of = the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don=B4t have an overview over the = whole=20 field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of = contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either=20 of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the = list). best wishes, e _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From d.eldervass@ntlworld.com Fri Aug 21 08:49:01 2009 Received: from mtaout03-winn.ispmail.ntl.com ([81.103.221.49]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MeVQK-0003UW-Re for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Fri, 21 Aug 2009 08:49:01 -0600 Received: from aamtaout02-winn.ispmail.ntl.com ([81.103.221.35]) by mtaout03-winn.ispmail.ntl.com (InterMail vM.7.08.04.00 201-2186-134-20080326) with ESMTP id <20090821144853.ZZCO5579.mtaout03-winn.ispmail.ntl.com@aamtaout02-winn.ispmail.ntl.com>; Fri, 21 Aug 2009 15:48:53 +0100 Received: from web07-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com ([81.103.221.25]) by aamtaout02-winn.ispmail.ntl.com (InterMail vG.2.02.00.01 201-2161-120-102-20060912) with ESMTP id <20090821144853.QUYP21638.aamtaout02-winn.ispmail.ntl.com@web07-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com>; Fri, 21 Aug 2009 15:48:53 +0100 Message-ID: <20090821154853.TECVX.851901.root@web07-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 15:48:53 +0100 From: To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Priority: 3 (Normal) Sensitivity: Normal X-Originating-IP: from 82.152.40.36 by webmail.ntlworld.com; Fri, 21 Aug 2009 15:48:51 +0100 X-Mailer: 4.2.8 X-Cloudmark-Analysis: v=1.0 c=1 a=W8ezAla_EfwA:10 a=CjxXgO3LAAAA:8 a=VPW9pYw8AAAA:8 a=FvihCYj8AAAA:8 a=VVlED5B4AAAA:8 a=ViQw65xAAAAA:8 a=0p7SsCOpRBjT4eaSAfAA:9 a=kgNd-YWCf0yhxS0x7JQA:7 a=Vqb53SdINZO6brmYBgEPODDeyd4A:4 a=rC2wZJ5BpNYA:10 a=BFDKbZatV3MA:10 a=_RNxDkzMYtPqj-OH:21 a=b5e7dseKqZQevQa8:21 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 14:49:01 -0000 Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper.=20 Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different sort= of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different from t= he common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existing extern= al world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't have any ac= cess to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that science do= es describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other hand he and = his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe did not exist= until they described them. At first sight this is difficult to make sense = of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. He seems to b= e committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinction is drawn = between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the world-as-we-e= xperience-it (perhaps =3D 'the phenomenal world' thought interprerations of= this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because Latour and many oth= er constructivists these days effectively carry on as if the world-in-itsel= f does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they only world we can kn= ow is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no piont in discussing any = other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed to depend on concep= ts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as our cognition. So,= when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at the world, that= way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of the world-as-we-ex= perience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in that world.=20 My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that (a) = makes sense; (and (b) helps! best Dave ---- b86102052@ntu.edu.tw wrote:=20 > Hi Echna, The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may =20 be helpful too. Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. =E2=80=9CSearching for Realism, Structure and Agenc= y =20 in Actor Network Theory,=E2=80=9D The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): = =20 455-73. Best wishes, Poe Poe Yu-ze Wan Department of Sociology National Taiwan University =E5=BC=95=E8=BF=B0 Matthew Smith : > Hi Echna, > > There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main =20 > theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: =20 > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net= -theo.pdf). I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organizati= on which touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR fr= om the perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems lite= rature (here: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=3DArticleURL&_udi=3D= B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=3D10&_rdoc=3D1&_fmt=3D&_orig=3Dsearch&_sort=3Dd&_doca= nchor=3D&view=3Dc&_searchStrId=3D981817881&_rerunOrigin=3Dscholar.google&_a= cct=3DC000050221&_version=3D1&_urlVersion=3D0&_userid=3D10&md5=3D67a7cdfdd2= 6aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). If you need a copy of that paper, just write me di= rectly - I currently don't have it online or accessible from where I curren= tly =20 > am. > > > Best, > Matthew > > > ----- Message initial ---- > De : echna > =C3=80 : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List =20 > > Envoy=C3=A9 le : dimanche 16 ao=C3=BBt 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > > Hi all, > > I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from > critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) > studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can > overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological > terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the > sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology > is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik > Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno > Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even > refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of > the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don=C2=B4t have an overview over the w= hole > field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of > contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either > of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the list)= . > > best wishes, > e > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > Devenez un meilleur amigo gr=C3=A2ce =C3=A0 Yahoo! Courriel > http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From kate_303@hotmail.co.uk Fri Aug 21 09:13:58 2009 Received: from blu0-omc1-s34.blu0.hotmail.com ([65.55.116.45]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MeVoU-0003ZU-6n for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Fri, 21 Aug 2009 09:13:58 -0600 Received: from BLU117-W7 ([65.55.116.8]) by blu0-omc1-s34.blu0.hotmail.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Fri, 21 Aug 2009 08:13:52 -0700 Message-ID: X-Originating-IP: [82.71.201.193] From: kate martin To: Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 15:13:52 +0000 Importance: Normal MIME-Version: 1.0 X-OriginalArrivalTime: 21 Aug 2009 15:13:52.0637 (UTC) FILETIME=[FE49AAD0:01CA2271] Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.9 Subject: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 15:13:58 -0000 Hi=2C =20 I'm a PhD student and am about to begin exploring Critical Realism... I was= wondering whether anyone could recommend any articles/texts that would a g= ood introduction? =20 Thanks in advance Kate _________________________________________________________________ Windows Live Messenger: Thanks for 10 great years=97enjoy free winks and em= oticons. http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/157562755/direct/01/= From b86102052@ntu.edu.tw Fri Aug 21 09:38:02 2009 Received: from wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw ([140.112.2.161]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MeWBm-0003b1-Ni for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Fri, 21 Aug 2009 09:38:02 -0600 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw (Postfix) with ESMTP id 409E61F52C4 for ; Fri, 21 Aug 2009 23:37:56 +0800 (CST) Received: from 61-229-25-207.dynamic.hinet.net (61-229-25-207.dynamic.hinet.net [61.229.25.207]) by wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw (Horde MIME library) with HTTP; Fri, 21 Aug 2009 23:37:56 +0800 Message-ID: <20090821233756.vi5swt4fk8ssc404@wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw> Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 23:37:56 +0800 From: b86102052@ntu.edu.tw To: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu References: In-Reply-To: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; DelSp="Yes"; format="flowed" Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable User-Agent: Internet Messaging Program (IMP) H3 (4.1.5) Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 15:38:03 -0000 Hi Kate, I personally recommend the following texts: Sayer, Andrew. 1992. Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach. 2nd =20 ed. London: Routledge. Sayer, Andrew. 2000. Realism and Social Science. London: Sage. Manicas, Peter T. 2006. Realist Philosophy of Social Science: =20 Explanation and Understanding. New York: Cambridge University Press. Collier, Andrew. 1994. Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy =20 Bhaskar's Philosophy. London: Verso. Danermark, Berth, Mats Ekstr=C3=B6m, Liselotte Jakobsen, and Jan Ch. =20 Karlsson. 2002. Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social =20 Sciences. London: Routledge. Potter, Garry. 2000. The Philosophy of Social Science: New =20 Perspectives. New York: Longman. And if you are a sociology major or take some interest in historical =20 sociology, the following articles will be of particualr use: Steinmetz, George. 1998. "Critical Realism and Historical Sociology," =20 Comparative Studies in Society and History, 40(1): 170-86. Gorski, Philip. 2009. "Social 'Mechanisms' and Comparative-Historical =20 Sociology: A Critical Realist Proposal," in Bj=C3=B6rn Wittrock and Peter = =20 Hedstr=C3=B6m (eds) The Frontiers of Sociology. Leiden: Brill. (Of course, these are not a substitute for reading the original works by such authors as Rom Harr=C3=A9, Roy Bhaskar, and Margaret Archer.) Best, Poe Poe Yu-ze Wan Department of Sociology National Taiwan University =E5=BC=95=E8=BF=B0 kate martin : > > Hi, > > > > I'm a PhD student and am about to begin exploring Critical =20 > Realism... I was wondering whether anyone could recommend any =20 > articles/texts that would a good introduction? > > > > Thanks in advance > > Kate > > _________________________________________________________________ > Windows Live Messenger: Thanks for 10 great years=E2=80=94enjoy free winks= =20 > and emoticons. > http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/157562755/direct/01/ > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From rgroff@slu.edu Fri Aug 21 17:01:57 2009 Received: from exprod7og125.obsmtp.com ([64.18.2.28]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1Med7N-0004MC-CB for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Fri, 21 Aug 2009 17:01:57 -0600 Received: from source ([209.85.217.214]) (using TLSv1) by exprod7ob125.postini.com ([64.18.6.12]) with SMTP ID DSNKSo8nZKEw2YgeJ1M5wkLysz02hb8ehUNS@postini.com; Fri, 21 Aug 2009 16:01:57 PDT Received: by gxk10 with SMTP id 10so1630857gxk.21 for ; Fri, 21 Aug 2009 16:01:55 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.150.235.3 with SMTP id i3mr3221890ybh.264.1250895715903; Fri, 21 Aug 2009 16:01:55 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <20090821233756.vi5swt4fk8ssc404@wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw> References: <20090821233756.vi5swt4fk8ssc404@wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw> Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 18:01:55 -0500 Message-ID: <6ad241360908211601n6c4207dboee80e0bd7fbe7d2a@mail.gmail.com> From: Ruth Groff To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.9 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 23:01:57 -0000 Hi Kate, My vote for the single best intro is the Collier, referenced by Poe. After that, you should just read A Realist Theory of Science and then The Possibility of Naturalism, both by Roy Bhaskar. After THAT, you're good to go to read however widely in CR you want! Warmly, Ruth On Fri, Aug 21, 2009 at 10:37 AM, wrote: > Hi Kate, > > I personally recommend the following texts: > > Sayer, Andrew. 1992. Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach. 2nd > ed. London: Routledge. > > Sayer, Andrew. 2000. Realism and Social Science. London: Sage. > > Manicas, Peter T. 2006. Realist Philosophy of Social Science: > Explanation and Understanding. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > Collier, Andrew. 1994. Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy > Bhaskar's Philosophy. London: Verso. > > Danermark, Berth, Mats Ekstr=C3=B6m, Liselotte Jakobsen, and Jan Ch. > Karlsson. 2002. Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social > Sciences. London: Routledge. > > Potter, Garry. 2000. The Philosophy of Social Science: New > Perspectives. New York: Longman. > > And if you are a sociology major or take some interest in historical > sociology, > the following articles will be of particualr use: > > Steinmetz, George. 1998. "Critical Realism and Historical Sociology," > Comparative Studies in Society and History, 40(1): 170-86. > > Gorski, Philip. 2009. "Social 'Mechanisms' and Comparative-Historical > Sociology: A Critical Realist Proposal," in Bj=C3=B6rn Wittrock and Peter > Hedstr=C3=B6m (eds) The Frontiers of Sociology. Leiden: Brill. > > > (Of course, these are not a substitute for reading the original works by > such authors as Rom Harr=C3=A9, Roy Bhaskar, and Margaret Archer.) > > Best, > > Poe > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > Department of Sociology > National Taiwan University > > > =E5=BC=95=E8=BF=B0 kate martin : > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > > > I'm a PhD student and am about to begin exploring Critical > > Realism... I was wondering whether anyone could recommend any > > articles/texts that would a good introduction? > > > > > > > > Thanks in advance > > > > Kate > > > > _________________________________________________________________ > > Windows Live Messenger: Thanks for 10 great years=E2=80=94enjoy free wi= nks > > and emoticons. > > http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/157562755/direct/01/ > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From alex.clark@ualberta.ca Fri Aug 21 17:49:06 2009 Received: from nsg19.nurs.ualberta.ca ([129.128.42.19]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1Medr0-0004QU-5u for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Fri, 21 Aug 2009 17:49:06 -0600 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5 Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 17:47:46 -0600 Message-ID: X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts Thread-Index: Acois2QNwKJJqZjdS7mcsMIttPcSxQABmSdg References: <20090821233756.vi5swt4fk8ssc404@wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw> <6ad241360908211601n6c4207dboee80e0bd7fbe7d2a@mail.gmail.com> From: "Alex Clark" To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.9 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 23:49:06 -0000 Collier's book has been re-printed I think and is available for a good = price (circa 17 UK pounds) after being out of print for a while A -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ruth = Groff Sent: Fri 8/21/2009 5:01 PM To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts =20 Hi Kate, My vote for the single best intro is the Collier, referenced by Poe. After that, you should just read A Realist Theory of Science and then = The Possibility of Naturalism, both by Roy Bhaskar. After THAT, you're good = to go to read however widely in CR you want! Warmly, Ruth On Fri, Aug 21, 2009 at 10:37 AM, wrote: > Hi Kate, > > I personally recommend the following texts: > > Sayer, Andrew. 1992. Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach. 2nd > ed. London: Routledge. > > Sayer, Andrew. 2000. Realism and Social Science. London: Sage. > > Manicas, Peter T. 2006. Realist Philosophy of Social Science: > Explanation and Understanding. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > Collier, Andrew. 1994. Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy > Bhaskar's Philosophy. London: Verso. > > Danermark, Berth, Mats Ekstr=F6m, Liselotte Jakobsen, and Jan Ch. > Karlsson. 2002. Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social > Sciences. London: Routledge. > > Potter, Garry. 2000. The Philosophy of Social Science: New > Perspectives. New York: Longman. > > And if you are a sociology major or take some interest in historical > sociology, > the following articles will be of particualr use: > > Steinmetz, George. 1998. "Critical Realism and Historical Sociology," > Comparative Studies in Society and History, 40(1): 170-86. > > Gorski, Philip. 2009. "Social 'Mechanisms' and Comparative-Historical > Sociology: A Critical Realist Proposal," in Bj=F6rn Wittrock and Peter > Hedstr=F6m (eds) The Frontiers of Sociology. Leiden: Brill. > > > (Of course, these are not a substitute for reading the original works = by > such authors as Rom Harr=E9, Roy Bhaskar, and Margaret Archer.) > > Best, > > Poe > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > Department of Sociology > National Taiwan University > > > ?? kate martin : > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > > > I'm a PhD student and am about to begin exploring Critical > > Realism... I was wondering whether anyone could recommend any > > articles/texts that would a good introduction? > > > > > > > > Thanks in advance > > > > Kate > > > > _________________________________________________________________ > > Windows Live Messenger: Thanks for 10 great years-enjoy free winks > > and emoticons. > > http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/157562755/direct/01/ > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From kate_303@hotmail.co.uk Sat Aug 22 04:01:33 2009 Received: from blu0-omc1-s24.blu0.hotmail.com ([65.55.116.35]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MenPh-00057D-9N for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Sat, 22 Aug 2009 04:01:33 -0600 Received: from BLU117-W22 ([65.55.116.8]) by blu0-omc1-s24.blu0.hotmail.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Sat, 22 Aug 2009 03:01:27 -0700 Message-ID: X-Originating-IP: [86.3.150.202] From: kate martin To: Date: Sat, 22 Aug 2009 10:01:27 +0000 Importance: Normal In-Reply-To: References: <20090821233756.vi5swt4fk8ssc404@wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw> <6ad241360908211601n6c4207dboee80e0bd7fbe7d2a@mail.gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-OriginalArrivalTime: 22 Aug 2009 10:01:27.0521 (UTC) FILETIME=[83BDB510:01CA230F] Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.9 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 22 Aug 2009 10:01:33 -0000 Thank you for all of your suggestions - that's a great help and will certai= nly keep me busy for a while!!! warm wishes kate > Date: Fri=2C 21 Aug 2009 17:47:46 -0600 > From: alex.clark@ualberta.ca > To: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts >=20 > Collier's book has been re-printed I think and is available for a good pr= ice (circa 17 UK pounds) > after being out of print for a while >=20 > A >=20 > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ruth Grof= f > Sent: Fri 8/21/2009 5:01 PM > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts > =20 > Hi Kate=2C >=20 > My vote for the single best intro is the Collier=2C referenced by Poe. >=20 > After that=2C you should just read A Realist Theory of Science and then T= he > Possibility of Naturalism=2C both by Roy Bhaskar. After THAT=2C you're g= ood to > go to read however widely in CR you want! >=20 > Warmly=2C > Ruth >=20 >=20 >=20 >=20 >=20 > On Fri=2C Aug 21=2C 2009 at 10:37 AM=2C wrote: >=20 > > Hi Kate=2C > > > > I personally recommend the following texts: > > > > Sayer=2C Andrew. 1992. Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach. 2n= d > > ed. London: Routledge. > > > > Sayer=2C Andrew. 2000. Realism and Social Science. London: Sage. > > > > Manicas=2C Peter T. 2006. Realist Philosophy of Social Science: > > Explanation and Understanding. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > > > Collier=2C Andrew. 1994. Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy > > Bhaskar's Philosophy. London: Verso. > > > > Danermark=2C Berth=2C Mats Ekstr=F6m=2C Liselotte Jakobsen=2C and Jan C= h. > > Karlsson. 2002. Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social > > Sciences. London: Routledge. > > > > Potter=2C Garry. 2000. The Philosophy of Social Science: New > > Perspectives. New York: Longman. > > > > And if you are a sociology major or take some interest in historical > > sociology=2C > > the following articles will be of particualr use: > > > > Steinmetz=2C George. 1998. "Critical Realism and Historical Sociology= =2C" > > Comparative Studies in Society and History=2C 40(1): 170-86. > > > > Gorski=2C Philip. 2009. "Social 'Mechanisms' and Comparative-Historical > > Sociology: A Critical Realist Proposal=2C" in Bj=F6rn Wittrock and Pete= r > > Hedstr=F6m (eds) The Frontiers of Sociology. Leiden: Brill. > > > > > > (Of course=2C these are not a substitute for reading the original works= by > > such authors as Rom Harr=E9=2C Roy Bhaskar=2C and Margaret Archer.) > > > > Best=2C > > > > Poe > > > > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > > Department of Sociology > > National Taiwan University > > > > > > ?? kate martin : > > > > > > > > Hi=2C > > > > > > > > > > > > I'm a PhD student and am about to begin exploring Critical > > > Realism... I was wondering whether anyone could recommend any > > > articles/texts that would a good introduction? > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks in advance > > > > > > Kate > > > > > > _________________________________________________________________ > > > Windows Live Messenger: Thanks for 10 great years-enjoy free winks > > > and emoticons. > > > http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/157562755/direct/01/ > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >=20 >=20 > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _________________________________________________________________ Windows Live Messenger: Happy 10-Year Anniversary=97get free winks and emot= icons. http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/157562755/direct/01/= From rgroff@slu.edu Sat Aug 22 07:09:46 2009 Received: from exprod7og103.obsmtp.com ([64.18.2.159]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MeqLq-0005eq-01 for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Sat, 22 Aug 2009 07:09:46 -0600 Received: from source ([209.85.210.182]) (using TLSv1) by exprod7ob103.postini.com ([64.18.6.12]) with SMTP ID DSNKSo/uGJSQkSlegjbxgiaNZCElLlLipY5H@postini.com; Sat, 22 Aug 2009 06:09:45 PDT Received: by yxe12 with SMTP id 12so778732yxe.1 for ; Sat, 22 Aug 2009 06:09:44 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.150.169.18 with SMTP id r18mr4246491ybe.111.1250946196268; Sat, 22 Aug 2009 06:03:16 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <20090821233756.vi5swt4fk8ssc404@wmail1.cc.ntu.edu.tw> <6ad241360908211601n6c4207dboee80e0bd7fbe7d2a@mail.gmail.com> Date: Sat, 22 Aug 2009 08:03:16 -0500 Message-ID: <6ad241360908220603n1bdca517m2d4869b34aa02ab2@mail.gmail.com> From: Ruth Groff To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.9 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 22 Aug 2009 13:09:46 -0000 Hi Kate, Don't feel daunted. Collier's book is extremely clear and well written, an= d he really follows the contours of Bhaskar's first two books. RTS and PON (the first two books) are *not* especially easy, but if you've already read the Collier, you should be ok. As I said before, once you've got a handle on that material, you will be in a fine position to read further if you like, be it Bhaskar's later thinking or the work of others. Feel free to post any questions you may have to the list. Years ago, we read some of these works together on-line. Warmly, Ruth On Sat, Aug 22, 2009 at 5:01 AM, kate martin wrote= : > > Thank you for all of your suggestions - that's a great help and will > certainly keep me busy for a while!!! > warm wishes > kate > > > Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 17:47:46 -0600 > > From: alex.clark@ualberta.ca > > To: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts > > > > Collier's book has been re-printed I think and is available for a good > price (circa 17 UK pounds) > > after being out of print for a while > > > > A > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu on behalf of Ruth > Groff > > Sent: Fri 8/21/2009 5:01 PM > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Suggestions for articles/texts > > > > Hi Kate, > > > > My vote for the single best intro is the Collier, referenced by Poe. > > > > After that, you should just read A Realist Theory of Science and then T= he > > Possibility of Naturalism, both by Roy Bhaskar. After THAT, you're goo= d > to > > go to read however widely in CR you want! > > > > Warmly, > > Ruth > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Aug 21, 2009 at 10:37 AM, wrote: > > > > > Hi Kate, > > > > > > I personally recommend the following texts: > > > > > > Sayer, Andrew. 1992. Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach. 2n= d > > > ed. London: Routledge. > > > > > > Sayer, Andrew. 2000. Realism and Social Science. London: Sage. > > > > > > Manicas, Peter T. 2006. Realist Philosophy of Social Science: > > > Explanation and Understanding. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > > > > > Collier, Andrew. 1994. Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy > > > Bhaskar's Philosophy. London: Verso. > > > > > > Danermark, Berth, Mats Ekstr=F6m, Liselotte Jakobsen, and Jan Ch. > > > Karlsson. 2002. Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social > > > Sciences. London: Routledge. > > > > > > Potter, Garry. 2000. The Philosophy of Social Science: New > > > Perspectives. New York: Longman. > > > > > > And if you are a sociology major or take some interest in historical > > > sociology, > > > the following articles will be of particualr use: > > > > > > Steinmetz, George. 1998. "Critical Realism and Historical Sociology," > > > Comparative Studies in Society and History, 40(1): 170-86. > > > > > > Gorski, Philip. 2009. "Social 'Mechanisms' and Comparative-Historical > > > Sociology: A Critical Realist Proposal," in Bj=F6rn Wittrock and Pete= r > > > Hedstr=F6m (eds) The Frontiers of Sociology. Leiden: Brill. > > > > > > > > > (Of course, these are not a substitute for reading the original works > by > > > such authors as Rom Harr=E9, Roy Bhaskar, and Margaret Archer.) > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > Poe > > > > > > > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > > > Department of Sociology > > > National Taiwan University > > > > > > > > > ?? kate martin : > > > > > > > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I'm a PhD student and am about to begin exploring Critical > > > > Realism... I was wondering whether anyone could recommend any > > > > articles/texts that would a good introduction? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks in advance > > > > > > > > Kate > > > > > > > > _________________________________________________________________ > > > > Windows Live Messenger: Thanks for 10 great years-enjoy free winks > > > > and emoticons. > > > > http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/157562755/direct/01/ > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > _________________________________________________________________ > Windows Live Messenger: Happy 10-Year Anniversary=97get free winks and > emoticons. > http://clk.atdmt.com/UKM/go/157562755/direct/01/ > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From d.eldervass@ntlworld.com Mon Aug 24 12:34:49 2009 Received: from mtaout02-winn.ispmail.ntl.com ([81.103.221.48]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MfeNV-0001ov-7w for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Mon, 24 Aug 2009 12:34:49 -0600 Received: from aamtaout02-winn.ispmail.ntl.com ([81.103.221.35]) by mtaout02-winn.ispmail.ntl.com (InterMail vM.7.08.04.00 201-2186-134-20080326) with ESMTP id <20090824183442.KXNW6611.mtaout02-winn.ispmail.ntl.com@aamtaout02-winn.ispmail.ntl.com> for ; Mon, 24 Aug 2009 19:34:42 +0100 Received: from web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com ([81.103.221.25]) by aamtaout02-winn.ispmail.ntl.com (InterMail vG.2.02.00.01 201-2161-120-102-20060912) with ESMTP id <20090824183442.XGTB21638.aamtaout02-winn.ispmail.ntl.com@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> for ; Mon, 24 Aug 2009 19:34:42 +0100 Message-ID: <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2009 19:34:42 +0100 From: To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List In-Reply-To: <20090821154853.TECVX.851901.root@web07-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Priority: 3 (Normal) Sensitivity: Normal X-Originating-IP: from 212.183.134.130 by webmail.ntlworld.com; Mon, 24 Aug 2009 19:34:34 +0100 X-Mailer: 4.2.8 X-Cloudmark-Analysis: v=1.0 c=1 a=W8ezAla_EfwA:10 a=NLZqzBF-AAAA:8 a=CjxXgO3LAAAA:8 a=VPW9pYw8AAAA:8 a=FvihCYj8AAAA:8 a=VVlED5B4AAAA:8 a=ViQw65xAAAAA:8 a=tWDYeiyF3CnKQpaJlT8A:9 a=2QWMRPZKvMR8sGMVzpYA:7 a=nAzwA1FkxfnXF2wDr6yHxmfIXzgA:4 a=_dQi-Dcv4p4A:10 a=rC2wZJ5BpNYA:10 a=BFDKbZatV3MA:10 a=8c6C9vxf6s1us2vM:21 a=i4v3dYVOFcE3FEe_:21 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2009 18:34:49 -0000 Hi Echna, and listers! Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a tou= ch more coherently.=20 I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say her= e adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour acknowledges = the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empirical' (those even= ts that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not actual' - the = mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's 'actual but not emp= irical' - those things that occur but are not observed by human agents. For= example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon known as the 'phases o= f Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theorised by scientists - = and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and common-sense realists = would argue that the phenomenon existed before it was observed, but we just= didn't know about it. What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this contrib= ution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm offering her= e is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered explicitly, but it s= eems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong constructivist thinkin= g that he has emerged from (though later I'll suggest some difficulties wit= h taking this as a reading of Latour's position).=20 This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how acc= urately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an authority o= n this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructivism= in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour t= akes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of constructioni= st thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanities) has little i= n common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in philosophy. I'm not = sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on reflection. So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a very od= d belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scientists = observe and theorise them? First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the world-in-itself = and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on the categories of = perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, space, and caus= ality) through which we make sense of our experience. We can never perceive= the world-in-itself because our experience is always filtered through thes= e categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we can know is the= world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the world-in-itself is impl= icitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, when they talk about the= world or what exists 'out there' they are not referring to the world-in-it= self, as common-sense realists might assume, but to the world-as-we-experie= nce-it. Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience depends = not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on concepts, theo= ries, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) positively shape our= perception of the things we experience. Social constructionists argue that= these are social products, and although Latour rejects references to the s= ocial, he continues to be a kind of constructionist, arguing that these con= cepts and theories come to be taken as true as the result of historical pro= cesses in which scientists employ rhetorical strategies to persuade others = of their merit. Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our categories, = which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical work, then the rad= ical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientists change our c= ategories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of Venus, they alt= er the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world about which we ca= n talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong constructivists fin= d coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us of the truth of some n= ew theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out there'. The phases of V= enus, or any other phenomenon explained by science, therefore only exist on= ce they have been explained, but the consequence of this process is that th= ey become just as real as anything else in our 'world'. Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not aware= of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for sure whe= ther Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way of ma= king sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made within = the constructivist tradition. This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the contrary= , I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excellent book '= Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge') that t= he idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply wrong. O= ur perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but they are never= theless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have enough access= to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our categories are misle= ading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the actual world and our = perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enable us to survive because= they give us generally accurate information about our environment (at leas= t in situations that are relevantly similar to those in which our perceptua= l abilities developed). Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influence o= n the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on our = perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between real= ity and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is diffic= ult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the world-in-it= self. Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that the d= escriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves strongly= influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite of= the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories imp= licit in the constructivist argument I have described. Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, I ha= ve focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainly mis= represented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his account= of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the inanimate, o= r at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to behave as the = scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view that this extern= al reality is conjured into existence by scientists' theories. So we need t= o recognise that even if Latour's position is motivated in part by the Kant= -influenced argument above there is also some recognition of an external re= ality that is not produced by science. This is arguably consistent with a v= ersion of Kant's thinking in which the undescribable world-in-itself impact= s upon scientists even though their perception of it is inevitably mediated= by previous theory. This starts to approach Latour's model of networks of = various actors, including inanimate objects, theories, scientific devices, = etc, interacting with each other to produce outcomes such as the beliefs of= scientists.=20 Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about the= phases of Venus. This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome views o= n how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to make = sense of Latour's ontology. Best, Dave ---- d.eldervass@ntlworld.com wrote:=20 > Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper.=20 Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different sort= of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different from t= he common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existing extern= al world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't have any ac= cess to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that science do= es describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other hand he and = his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe did not exist= until they described them. At first sight this is difficult to make sense = of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. He seems to b= e committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinction is drawn = between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the world-as-we-e= xperience-it (perhaps =3D 'the phenomenal world' thought interprerations of= this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because Latour and many oth= er constructivists these days effectively carry on as if the world-in-itsel= f does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they only world we can kn= ow is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no piont in discussing any = other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed to depend on concep= ts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as our cognition. So,= when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at the world, that= way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of the world-as-we-ex= perience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in that world.=20 My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that (a) = makes sense; (and (b) helps! best Dave ---- b86102052@ntu.edu.tw wrote:=20 > Hi Echna, The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may =20 be helpful too. Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. =E2=80=9CSearching for Realism, Structure and Agenc= y =20 in Actor Network Theory,=E2=80=9D The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): = =20 455-73. Best wishes, Poe Poe Yu-ze Wan Department of Sociology National Taiwan University =E5=BC=95=E8=BF=B0 Matthew Smith : > Hi Echna, > > There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main =20 > theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: =20 > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net= -theo.pdf). I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organizati= on which touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR fr= om the perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems lite= rature (here: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=3DArticleURL&_udi=3D= B6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=3D10&_rdoc=3D1&_fmt=3D&_orig=3Dsearch&_sort=3Dd&_doca= nchor=3D&view=3Dc&_searchStrId=3D981817881&_rerunOrigin=3Dscholar.google&_a= cct=3DC000050221&_version=3D1&_urlVersion=3D0&_userid=3D10&md5=3D67a7cdfdd2= 6aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). If you need a copy of that paper, just write me di= rectly - I currently don't have it online or accessible from where I curren= tly =20 > am. > > > Best, > Matthew > > > ----- Message initial ---- > De : echna > =C3=80 : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List =20 > > Envoy=C3=A9 le : dimanche 16 ao=C3=BBt 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > > Hi all, > > I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from > critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) > studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can > overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological > terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the > sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology > is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik > Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno > Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even > refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description of > the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don=C2=B4t have an overview over the w= hole > field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind of > contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either > of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the list)= . > > best wishes, > e > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > Devenez un meilleur amigo gr=C3=A2ce =C3=A0 Yahoo! Courriel > http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From johnsonmwj1@googlemail.com Tue Aug 25 01:50:09 2009 Received: from mail-fx0-f212.google.com ([209.85.220.212]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MfqnA-0002yL-4I for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Tue, 25 Aug 2009 01:50:08 -0600 Received: by fxm8 with SMTP id 8so1804932fxm.23 for ; Tue, 25 Aug 2009 00:50:01 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: johnsonmwj1@googlemail.com Received: by 10.204.156.24 with SMTP id u24mr2168214bkw.172.1251186601495; Tue, 25 Aug 2009 00:50:01 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> References: <20090821154853.TECVX.851901.root@web07-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2009 08:50:01 +0100 X-Google-Sender-Auth: c748751d2fe5d713 Message-ID: From: Mark Johnson To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.9 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2009 07:50:09 -0000 Hi Dave, Thanks for this =E2=80=93 very thought-provoking! These issues are quite = =E2=80=98hot=E2=80=99 in the educational technology work I=E2=80=99m doing at the moment, but I must= confess I=E2=80=99m now not sure how much the arguments between realists and constr= uctivists matter =E2=80=93 or indeed, ought to matter. Why does it help constructivists to see the world as construct? I was struc= k by an interview with Heinz von Foerster on Youtube where, right at the end of his life (and he was quite ill), he insisted on the absence of reality ( http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DPcPtl-vuGbI =E2=80=93 in German). His =E2= =80=98explanatory principle=E2=80=99 had served him well through a rich and productive life u= p to the moment of his death. Similarly, Ernst Von Glasersfeld=E2=80=99s (a follower= of Piaget, and founder of Radical Constructivism) justification of constructivism similarly strikes me as deeply humane ( http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DzTsY3TosVX0). No doubt realists will insis= t at the end of their lives on the reality of the world. But is it any more than one set of distinctions against another, each serving their purpose, each probing the conscience of the individual making them as they seek to =E2=80=98act well=E2=80=99 in the world? If you believe there are discoverable real mechanisms, there are more difficult questions to ask. Are they worth arguing for? Are they worth falling-out with people for (or being rude to one another for)? Are they worth fighting for? Dying for? The more extreme our actions in the cause of an idea, the closer we risk becoming fundamentalist =E2=80=93 where actions= and ideas become separated from personal conscience. It=E2=80=99s a slippery sl= ope to fundamentalism! Of course constructivists too can become fundamentalists = =E2=80=93 and it=E2=80=99s no less pathological, but insistence on =E2=80=98reality= =E2=80=99 certainly (in my view) makes one more susceptible to it. History is littered with examples of where particular distinctions are made and shared, action taken in response to them, and then it is realised that they were wrong (I often think of the distinctions that must have been made when the library at Alexandria was destroyed, but there are many other wors= e examples of course). The idea that there are discoverable =E2=80=98right=E2= =80=99 or =E2=80=98real=E2=80=99 distinctions doesn=E2=80=99t (in my view) help avoid these problems (indeed= , it may exacerbate them). However, the idea that there are better methodologies for making distinctions (which is what I value from CR) may be very valuable to us: particularly if methodologies can dispel the =E2=80=98rightness=E2=80= =99 or =E2=80=98wrongness=E2=80=99 of particular distinctions but rather help people to work and live with eac= h other more peacefully. On this point, I don=E2=80=99t think any constructiv= ist would disagree. Mark On Mon, Aug 24, 2009 at 7:34 PM, wrote: > Hi Echna, and listers! > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a > touch more coherently. > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say > here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour > acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empiric= al' > (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not > actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's > 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observed= by > human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon kno= wn > as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theorise= d > by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and > common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it w= as > observed, but we just didn't know about it. > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this > contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm > offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered > explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong > constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll sugge= st > some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how > accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an author= ity > on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructiv= ism > in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour > takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of > constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanitie= s) > has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in > philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on > reflection. > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a very > odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scienti= sts > observe and theorise them? > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the world-in-itsel= f > and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on the categories o= f > perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, space, and > causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We can never > perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filtered > through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we c= an > know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the > world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, > when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not > referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, = but > to the world-as-we-experience-it. > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience depend= s > not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on concepts, > theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) positively sha= pe > our perception of the things we experience. Social constructionists argue > that these are social products, and although Latour rejects references to > the social, he continues to be a kind of constructionist, arguing that th= ese > concepts and theories come to be taken as true as the result of historica= l > processes in which scientists employ rhetorical strategies to persuade > others of their merit. > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our categories= , > which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical work, then the > radical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientists change = our > categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of Venus, they > alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world about which = we > can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong constructivists > find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us of the truth of s= ome > new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out there'. The phases o= f > Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by science, therefore only exist > once they have been explained, but the consequence of this process is tha= t > they become just as real as anything else in our 'world'. > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not awa= re > of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for sure > whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way = of > making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made wit= hin > the constructivist tradition. > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the > contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excell= ent > book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge'= ) > that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply > wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but they > are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have > enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our > categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the > actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enabl= e > us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about o= ur > environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those = in > which our perceptual abilities developed). > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influence > on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on o= ur > perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between > reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is > difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the > world-in-itself. > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that the > descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves stron= gly > influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite o= f > the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories > implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, I > have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainly > misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his > account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the > inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to > behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view > that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' > theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is > motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also som= e > recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This = is > arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the > undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their > perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts t= o > approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including inanimat= e > objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other t= o > produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about t= he > phases of Venus. > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome views > on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to ma= ke > sense of Latour's ontology. > > Best, > > Dave > > > > ---- d.eldervass@ntlworld.com wrote: > > Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different so= rt > of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different from = the > common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existing externa= l > world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't have any acc= ess > to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that science does > describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other hand he and h= is > followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe did not exist > until they described them. At first sight this is difficult to make sense= of > for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. He seems to be > committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinction is drawn > between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the > world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps =3D 'the phenomenal world' thought > interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because > Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as = if > the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they > only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no pi= ont > in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed= to > depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as = our > cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at > the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of t= he > world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in > that world. > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that (a= ) > makes sense; (and (b) helps! > > best > > Dave > > > > ---- b86102052@ntu.edu.tw wrote: > > Hi Echna, > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may > be helpful too. > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. =E2=80=9CSearching for Realism, Structure and Age= ncy > in Actor Network Theory,=E2=80=9D The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3)= : > 455-73. > > Best wishes, > Poe > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > Department of Sociology > National Taiwan University > > > =E5=BC=95=E8=BF=B0 Matthew Smith : > > > Hi Echna, > > > > There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main > > theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: > > > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net= -theo.pdf). > I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which > touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the > perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literatur= e > (here: > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=3DArticleURL&_udi=3DB6W7M-4JWFH1= P-1&_user=3D10&_rdoc=3D1&_fmt=3D&_orig=3Dsearch&_sort=3Dd&_docanchor=3D&vie= w=3Dc&_searchStrId=3D981817881&_rerunOrigin=3Dscholar.google&_acct=3DC00005= 0221&_version=3D1&_urlVersion=3D0&_userid=3D10&md5=3D67a7cdfdd26aa90032f279= 2438e3ab4d). > If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently do= n't > have it online or accessible from where I currently > > am. > > > > > > Best, > > Matthew > > > > > > ----- Message initial ---- > > De : echna > > =C3=80 : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > > > Envoy=C3=A9 le : dimanche 16 ao=C3=BBt 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > > Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > > > > Hi all, > > > > I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from > > critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) > > studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can > > overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > > constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological > > terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the > > sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology > > is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik > > Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno > > Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even > > refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description o= f > > the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don=C2=B4t have an overview over the= whole > > field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind o= f > > contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either > > of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the > list). > > > > best wishes, > > e > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > Devenez un meilleur amigo gr=C3=A2ce =C3=A0 Yahoo! Courriel > > http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > --=20 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------= ------ Mark Johnson Institute for Educational Cybernetics University of Bolton BL3 5AB Tel. 01204 903567 Mob. 0778 6064505 From echna@gmx.net Tue Aug 25 06:01:51 2009 Received: from mail.gmx.net ([213.165.64.20]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with smtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1Mfuil-0003Kk-6O for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Tue, 25 Aug 2009 06:01:51 -0600 Received: (qmail invoked by alias); 25 Aug 2009 12:01:44 -0000 Received: from 85-127-115-142.dynamic.xdsl-line.inode.at (EHLO [192.168.1.33]) [85.127.115.142] by mail.gmx.net (mp056) with SMTP; 25 Aug 2009 14:01:44 +0200 X-Authenticated: #24065550 X-Provags-ID: V01U2FsdGVkX19DGAYRp3hDzAzdxf8AwbMIKsN7WCVZVc+gx8/LmC dcQLVDbjDf4NbP Message-ID: <4A93D2B7.3090303@gmx.net> Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2009 14:01:59 +0200 From: echna User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.23 (Windows/20090812) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List References: <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> In-Reply-To: <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Y-GMX-Trusted: 0 X-FuHaFi: 0.54 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2009 12:01:52 -0000 Hi David, hi all, first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really=20 insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your=20 mail when you state that Latour=C2=B4s position can=C2=B4t be reconciled = - it is=20 just contradictory. I don=C2=B4t know all of Latour=C2=B4s work, but for = example=20 in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his=20 "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong=20 constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout=20 the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn=C2=B4s contradictory sentence that=20 scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don=C2=B4= t=20 do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts,=20 like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just=20 constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real=20 formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common=20 cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an = "ontological tension", as one can=C2=B4t talk about ontology in purely=20 epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are=20 then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments = in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be=20 rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour=20 and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all=20 the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and=20 that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it = has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others = is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, = as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by = scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing = of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability=20 unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in = general. The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as=20 Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things.=20 When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not=20 much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes=20 structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then=20 suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be=20 contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I=20 don=C2=B4t know all of Latour=C2=B4s work (or I am misstaken about his th= eory -=20 but one last thing: Latour=C2=B4s very essayistic and loose style is not = really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more=20 confusion) best, e d.eldervass@ntlworld.com schrieb: > Hi Echna, and listers! > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a= touch more coherently.=20 > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say= here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour acknowl= edges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empirical' (th= ose events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not actu= al' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's 'actual= but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observed by hum= an agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon known = as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theorise= d by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and co= mmon-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it was= observed, but we just didn't know about it. > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this con= tribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm offeri= ng here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered explicitly, = but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong constructivi= st thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll suggest some diff= iculties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position).=20 > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how= accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an autho= rity on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constr= uctivism in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't thin= k Latour takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of c= onstructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanities= ) has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in phil= osophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on refle= ction. > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a ver= y odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scien= tists observe and theorise them? > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the world-in-its= elf and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on the categori= es of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, space, = and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We can neve= r perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filtered = through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we c= an know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the world-i= n-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, when t= hey talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not referrin= g to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, but to t= he world-as-we-experience-it. > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience depe= nds not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on concepts= , theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) positively s= hape our perception of the things we experience. Social constructionists = argue that these are social products, and although Latour rejects referen= ces to the social, he continues to be a kind of constructionist, arguing = that these concepts and theories come to be taken as true as the result o= f historical processes in which scientists employ rhetorical strategies t= o persuade others of their merit. > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our categori= es, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical work, then t= he radical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientists chan= ge our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of Venus= , they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world about= which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong const= ructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us of the= truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out there= '. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by science, the= refore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence of t= his process is that they become just as real as anything else in our 'wor= ld'. > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not a= ware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for su= re whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a w= ay of making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims ma= de within the constructivist tradition. > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the cont= rary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excellent = book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge'= ) that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simpl= y wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but th= ey are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have= enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our cate= gories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the act= ual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enable u= s to survive because they give us generally accurate information about ou= r environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to thos= e in which our perceptual abilities developed). > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influen= ce on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even o= n our perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction betw= een reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that= is difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the= world-in-itself. > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that t= he descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves st= rongly influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opp= osite of the causal relation between the external world and scientific th= eories implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, = I have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certain= ly misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his= account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the in= animate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to be= have as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view th= at this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' theori= es. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is motivated i= n part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also some recogniti= on of an external reality that is not produced by science. This is arguab= ly consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the undescribabl= e world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their perception of= it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts to approach La= tour's model of networks of various actors, including inanimate objects, = theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other to produce= outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists.=20 > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about= the phases of Venus. > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome vie= ws on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to= make sense of Latour's ontology. > > Best, > > Dave > > > > ---- d.eldervass@ntlworld.com wrote:=20 > =20 >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper.=20 >> =20 > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different = sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different = from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existin= g external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't h= ave any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues tha= t science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the othe= r hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists descri= be did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is diffic= ult to make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense re= alism. He seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a= distinction is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never kno= w, and the world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps =3D 'the phenomenal world' = thought interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo'= because Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively car= ry on as if the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to b= e that they only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so th= ere is no piont in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our expe= rience is deemed to depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our pe= rception as well as our cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a c= ertain way of looking at the world, that way of looking at the world come= s to shape our sense of the world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, th= inkgs pop into existence in that world.=20 > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that = (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! > > best > > Dave > > > > ---- b86102052@ntu.edu.tw wrote:=20 > =20 >> Hi Echna, >> =20 > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may = =20 > be helpful too. > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. =E2=80=9CSearching for Realism, Structure and A= gency =20 > in Actor Network Theory,=E2=80=9D The British Journal of Sociology, 59(= 3): =20 > 455-73. > > Best wishes, > Poe > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > Department of Sociology > National Taiwan University > > > =E5=BC=95=E8=BF=B0 Matthew Smith : > > =20 >> Hi Echna, >> >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main = >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: =20 >> http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-= net-theo.pdf). I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organ= ization which touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considerin= g CR from the perspective of philosophical debates in the information sys= tems literature (here: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=3DArticle= URL&_udi=3DB6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=3D10&_rdoc=3D1&_fmt=3D&_orig=3Dsearch&_s= ort=3Dd&_docanchor=3D&view=3Dc&_searchStrId=3D981817881&_rerunOrigin=3Dsc= holar.google&_acct=3DC000050221&_version=3D1&_urlVersion=3D0&_userid=3D10= &md5=3D67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). If you need a copy of that pape= r, just write me directly - I currently don't have it online or accessibl= e from where I currently =20 >> am. >> >> >> Best, >> Matthew >> >> >> ----- Message initial ---- >> De : echna >> =C3=80 : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List =20 >> >> Envoy=C3=A9 le : dimanche 16 ao=C3=BBt 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS >> >> Hi all, >> >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS= ) >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemologica= l >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the= >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontolog= y >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law eve= n >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description = of >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don=C2=B4t have an overview over th= e whole >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind = of >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by eithe= r >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the li= st). >> >> best wishes, >> e >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr=C3=A2ce =C3=A0 Yahoo! Courriel >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> =20 > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > =20 From dsouzar@westminster.ac.uk Wed Aug 26 07:09:34 2009 Received: from isls-mx10.wmin.ac.uk ([161.74.14.112]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MgIFp-0006CF-LB for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Wed, 26 Aug 2009 07:09:34 -0600 Received: from [161.74.14.1] (helo=isls-exch-be-1.intranet.wmin.ac.uk) by isls-mx10.wmin.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 4.60) (envelope-from ) id 1MgIFi-0000EZ-LH for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Wed, 26 Aug 2009 14:09:26 +0100 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5 Content-class: urn:content-classes:message MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2009 14:09:19 +0100 Message-ID: <999A7C2B264EA640B183B790D772DE769381BE@isls-exch-be-1.intranet.wmin.ac.uk> In-Reply-To: <4A93D2B7.3090303@gmx.net> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: Thread-Topic: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS Thread-Index: Acole9gzKm1ah5t9TiaT2tiwkiDZxAAxnetg References: <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> <4A93D2B7.3090303@gmx.net> From: "Radha D'Souza" To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2009 13:09:34 -0000 RGVhciBEYXZpZCwgRWNobmEsIGFsbCwNClRoYW5rcyBmb3IgeW91ciBjb250cmlidXRpb25zLCBhIHZl cnkgaW50ZXJlc3RpbmcgZGlzY3Vzc2lvbiBpbmRlZWQuDQpFY2huYSwgeW91ciBwb2ludCBhYm91dCB0 aGUgJ29udG9sb2dpY2FsIHRlbnNpb24nIGlzIGltcG9ydGFudC4gTGF0b3VyIGlkZW50aWZpZXMgKGNv cnJlY3RseSkgYSBwcm9ibGVtIGluIHRoZSBlbXBpcmljYWwgd29ybGQgLXRoYXQgb2YgcmVsYXRpb25z IGJldHdlZW4gb2JqZWN0cyBhbmQgcGVvcGxlIChhY3RvcnMpIGluIHRoZSBmYWNlIG9mIGFwcGFyZW50 bHkgaW5jcmVhc2luZyBkb21pbmF0aW9uIG9mIG9iamVjdHMgb3ZlciBwZW9wbGUgaW4gYSB0ZWNobm9s b2d5IGRvbWluYXRlZCB3b3JsZC4gSGUgZ29lcyB0aGUgbmV4dCBzdGVwIGFuZCBmaWd1cmVzIChyaWdo 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bSBtYWlsaW5nIGxpc3QNCj4gQ3JpdGljYWwtUmVhbGlzbUBsaXN0cy5lY29uLnV0YWguZWR1DQo+IGh0 dHA6Ly9saXN0cy5lY29uLnV0YWguZWR1L21haWxtYW4vbGlzdGluZm8vY3JpdGljYWwtcmVhbGlzbQ0K PiAgIA0KDQoNCg0KX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX18N CkNyaXRpY2FsLVJlYWxpc20gbWFpbGluZyBsaXN0DQpDcml0aWNhbC1SZWFsaXNtQGxpc3RzLmVjb24u dXRhaC5lZHUNCmh0dHA6Ly9saXN0cy5lY29uLnV0YWguZWR1L21haWxtYW4vbGlzdGluZm8vY3JpdGlj YWwtcmVhbGlzbQ0KCgotLSAKVGhlIFVuaXZlcnNpdHkgb2YgV2VzdG1pbnN0ZXIgaXMgYSBjaGFyaXR5 IGFuZCBhIGNvbXBhbnkgbGltaXRlZCBieQpndWFyYW50ZWUuICBSZWdpc3RyYXRpb24gbnVtYmVyOiA5 Nzc4MTggRW5nbGFuZC4gIFJlZ2lzdGVyZWQgT2ZmaWNlOgozMDkgUmVnZW50IFN0cmVldCwgTG9uZG9u IFcxQiAyVVcsIFVL From johnsonmwj1@googlemail.com Wed Aug 26 08:11:34 2009 Received: from mail-bw0-f226.google.com ([209.85.218.226]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MgJDp-0006Kz-Fn for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Wed, 26 Aug 2009 08:11:34 -0600 Received: by bwz26 with SMTP id 26so153925bwz.23 for ; Wed, 26 Aug 2009 07:11:27 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: johnsonmwj1@googlemail.com Received: by 10.204.25.152 with SMTP id z24mr3711147bkb.44.1251295886632; Wed, 26 Aug 2009 07:11:26 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <999A7C2B264EA640B183B790D772DE769381BE@isls-exch-be-1.intranet.wmin.ac.uk> References: <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> <4A93D2B7.3090303@gmx.net> <999A7C2B264EA640B183B790D772DE769381BE@isls-exch-be-1.intranet.wmin.ac.uk> Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2009 15:11:26 +0100 X-Google-Sender-Auth: e6c669e4f3c73d33 Message-ID: From: Mark Johnson To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.9 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2009 14:11:34 -0000 Hi everyone, The fact that "We are a long way away from bringing ontological, dialectica= l and non-dualist approaches to bear on the way we actually address problems of the world around us and that leaves us with a gap between philosophy and its effectiveness in changing the world" tells me something about the ontology of the world. In particular, it tells me that the issues that relate technologies to actors and institutions and society are rhetorical a= s much as dialectical. This is where ANT is quite strong (although there are many ways of describing a 'rhetoric of technological intervention' - and AN= T clearly has weaknesses). I don't understand how Latour can be seen to adopt a "purely individualisti= c stance towards society". Is it because it's not a dialectical conception that he describes? It strikes me that a "purely individualistic stance" is inconceivable anyway (perhaps like a private language). It itself is a construct - here with the explicit purpose of making an apparent distinctio= n between CR ontology and ANT; between one set of distinctions and another; perhaps most importantly, between the identity of one group and another. Bu= t does the distinction stick? I suspect only in a rather procrustean way! On the necessity of experiment, 'necessity' (like 'instinct') can be seen a= s an 'explanatory principle': it helps us explain what we do, have done and intend to do. Is there really anything to be gained from arguing that it's real? This is why I worry that the arguments between realists and constructivists become a bit specious. It's easy to lose sight of the point of it all. Paraphrasing Marx: "The philosophers have made distinctions about technolog= y in various ways - but that is not the point; the point is how we organise ourselves with it." I would say that rhetoric and dialectic are both important in getting to grips with this. Mark On Wed, Aug 26, 2009 at 2:09 PM, Radha D'Souza wrote: > Dear David, Echna, all, > Thanks for your contributions, a very interesting discussion indeed. > Echna, your point about the 'ontological tension' is important. Latour > identifies (correctly) a problem in the empirical world -that of relation= s > between objects and people (actors) in the face of apparently increasing > domination of objects over people in a technology dominated world. He goe= s > the next step and figures (rightly) that this has to do with the divide > between nature and society - but then stops short of interrogating that > relationship by devising 'hybrids' as the third category - as mediators > between nature/ society divide (which is hardly a category)- it is here t= hat > the ontological tension is most palpable - but the problem, in my view, i= s > also to do with absence of dialectics which could have shifted his focus = to > the RELATIONSHIP between nature-society, society-individuals (actors) and > individuals-nature and to locate the problem of technological interventio= ns- > his main concern - as one of specific conjunctures of the > nature-society-people relationship in a geo-historical context. By focusi= ng > on objects and actors mechanically and in reductionist ways, instead of > their dialectical relations, he objectifies actors, 'activates' objects a= nd > has no way of explaining the relationships between the two. > The political ramifications of Latour are equally interesting - because A= NT > mirrors contemporary 'network' society including new ways of social > engineering behind the facade of technology. > What I find more difficult is this: if we are to be ontologically aware i= n > our understanding of the world, and understand nature-society-people as > ontologically distinct yet dialectically related (following RB), and real= ity > as multi-tiered (following RB) then, whatever the problematic we are > investigating, whether in the field of nature or culture or psyche, we > cannot separate the nature/society/people dialectic of the problematic, > because Being itself comprises the three dimensions in tension. That > requires not only a completely non-disciplinary way of addressing a probl= em > in any field - but equally, developing a non-dualist methodology for > investigating problems. Latour's anthropological analogy of the pre-moder= n > man points to the fact that the anthropologist's pre-modern man was much > more ontologically grounded (even if less articulate) and therefore much > more focused on policing the boundaries of relationships between > nature/society/people. It is marginalising ontology that has caused the > nature/society rift and the problem of objects and actors and their > relationships in the first place. > We are a long way away from bringing ontological, dialectical and > non-dualist approaches to bear on the way we actually address problems of > the world around us and that leaves us with a gap between philosophy and = its > effectiveness in changing the world. In case you have not already seen it > already, Uberoi's 'The other mind of Europe: Goethe as a scientist' and h= is > 'European Modernity: science, truth and method' could be a good anti-dote= to > Latour, and perhaps useful for STS studies. > Sorry for the ramble, I am a lurker usually, but couldn't resist throwing > my two cents worth... > Radha > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto: > critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna > Sent: 25 August 2009 13:02 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > > Hi David, hi all, > > first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really > insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your > mail when you state that Latour=C2=B4s position can=C2=B4t be reconciled = - it is > just contradictory. I don=C2=B4t know all of Latour=C2=B4s work, but for = example > in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his > "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong > constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout > the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn=C2=B4s contradictory sentence that > scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don=C2= =B4t > do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, > like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just > constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real > formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common > cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). > Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an > "ontological tension", as one can=C2=B4t talk about ontology in purely > epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are > then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments > in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be > rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? > Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour > and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all > the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and > that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it > has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others > is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, > as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by > scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing > of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability > unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in > general. > The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as > Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. > When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not > much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes > structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then > suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be > contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I > don=C2=B4t know all of Latour=C2=B4s work (or I am misstaken about his th= eory - > but one last thing: Latour=C2=B4s very essayistic and loose style is not > really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more > confusion) > > best, > e > > d.eldervass@ntlworld.com schrieb: > > Hi Echna, and listers! > > > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a > touch more coherently. > > > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say > here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour > acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empiric= al' > (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not > actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's > 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observed= by > human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon kno= wn > as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theorise= d > by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and > common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it w= as > observed, but we just didn't know about it. > > > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this > contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm > offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered > explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong > constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll sugge= st > some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). > > > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how > accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an author= ity > on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructiv= ism > in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour > takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of > constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanitie= s) > has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in > philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on > reflection. > > > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a ver= y > odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scienti= sts > observe and theorise them? > > > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the > world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on = the > categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, > space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We c= an > never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filte= red > through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we c= an > know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the > world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, > when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not > referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, = but > to the world-as-we-experience-it. > > > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience > depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on > concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) > positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social > constructionists argue that these are social products, and although Latou= r > rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of > constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be take= n > as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists employ > rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. > > > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our > categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical work= , > then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientist= s > change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of > Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world > about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong > constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us o= f > the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out > there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by science= , > therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence o= f > this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our > 'world'. > > > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not > aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for s= ure > whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way = of > making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made wit= hin > the constructivist tradition. > > > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the > contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excell= ent > book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge'= ) > that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply > wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but they > are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have > enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our > categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the > actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enabl= e > us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about o= ur > environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those = in > which our perceptual abilities developed). > > > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influen= ce > on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on o= ur > perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between > reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is > difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the > world-in-itself. > > > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that t= he > descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves stron= gly > influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite o= f > the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories > implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. > > > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, = I > have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainly > misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his > account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the > inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to > behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view > that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' > theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is > motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also som= e > recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This = is > arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the > undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their > perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts t= o > approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including inanimat= e > objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other t= o > produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. > > > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about > the phases of Venus. > > > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome vie= ws > on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to ma= ke > sense of Latour's ontology. > > > > Best, > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- d.eldervass@ntlworld.com wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. > >> > > > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different > sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different > from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existin= g > external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't hav= e > any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that > science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other > hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe > did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is difficult= to > make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. = He > seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distincti= on > is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the > world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps =3D 'the phenomenal world' thought > interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because > Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as = if > the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they > only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no pi= ont > in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed= to > depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as = our > cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at > the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of t= he > world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in > that world. > > > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that > (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! > > > > best > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- b86102052@ntu.edu.tw wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > > > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may > > be helpful too. > > > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. =E2=80=9CSearching for Realism, Structure and A= gency > > in Actor Network Theory,=E2=80=9D The British Journal of Sociology, 59(= 3): > > 455-73. > > > > Best wishes, > > Poe > > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > > Department of Sociology > > National Taiwan University > > > > > > =E5=BC=95=E8=BF=B0 Matthew Smith : > > > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main > >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: > >> > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net= -theo.pdf). > I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which > touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the > perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literatur= e > (here: > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=3DArticleURL&_udi=3DB6W7M-4JWFH1= P-1&_user=3D10&_rdoc=3D1&_fmt=3D&_orig=3Dsearch&_sort=3Dd&_docanchor=3D&vie= w=3Dc&_searchStrId=3D981817881&_rerunOrigin=3Dscholar.google&_acct=3DC00005= 0221&_version=3D1&_urlVersion=3D0&_userid=3D10&md5=3D67a7cdfdd26aa90032f279= 2438e3ab4d). > If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently do= n't > have it online or accessible from where I currently > >> am. > >> > >> > >> Best, > >> Matthew > >> > >> > >> ----- Message initial ---- > >> De : echna > >> =C3=80 : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > >> > >> Envoy=C3=A9 le : dimanche 16 ao=C3=BBt 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > >> > >> Hi all, > >> > >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from > >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS= ) > >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can > >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemologica= l > >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the > >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontolog= y > >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik > >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno > >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law eve= n > >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description = of > >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don=C2=B4t have an overview over th= e whole > >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind = of > >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by eithe= r > >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the > list). > >> > >> best wishes, > >> e > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > >> > >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr=C3=A2ce =C3=A0 Yahoo! Courriel > >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > -- > The University of Westminster is a charity and a company limited by > guarantee. Registration number: 977818 England. Registered Office: > 309 Regent Street, London W1B 2UW, UK > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > --=20 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------= ------ Mark Johnson Institute for Educational Cybernetics University of Bolton BL3 5AB Tel. 01204 903567 Mob. 0778 6064505 From lefouque@gmail.com Wed Aug 26 11:04:48 2009 Received: from mail-px0-f198.google.com ([209.85.216.198]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MgLvU-0006iP-0l for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Wed, 26 Aug 2009 11:04:48 -0600 Received: by pxi36 with SMTP id 36so293681pxi.7 for ; Wed, 26 Aug 2009 10:04:42 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.115.29.9 with SMTP id g9mr11152772waj.163.1251306282272; Wed, 26 Aug 2009 10:04:42 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2009 01:04:42 +0800 Message-ID: <14a6419f0908261004y7515acbdt309ba1a2527200ab@mail.gmail.com> From: Ng Foo Keong To: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 57, Issue 9 X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2009 17:04:48 -0000 hi all, i'm a CR neophyte here. first, i do agree with constructivists that in a s= ense, scientific knowledge is socially constructed, and that our "observations" a= re reported via our pre-conceived categories. however, i believe that there a= re real limits to what can be "constructed". proving this, however, is not an easy task. i was wondering: has Latour and/or Roy Bhaskar addressed the paradoxes in Quantum Mechanics (e.g. Schrodinger's Cat, Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, Copenh= agen vs Multi-verse or other interpretations, the Einstein-Bohr debates viz. Particle-Wave duality and the difficulty of separating the observer and the observed ... ). because it is this that i feel is the really gets into the heart of the debate. the phases of Venus example seems (to me) to be a case of nominalism -- i agree with Shakespeare that a rose by another name smells as sweet. but in Quantum Mechanical paradoxes, IMHO, you really have to deal with the tension between ontology and epistemology and you can't run away from them. Physicists have not come to a consensus about this (as if consensus matters). anyway, it w= ould appear that one's answer to these paradoxes betray's one's ontological and epistemological beliefs beyond just naming of categories. so i would appreciate comments from enlightened members, please. Ng, FK 2009/8/26 : > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request@lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner@lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Re : CR and STS (Radha D'Souza) > 2. Re: Re : CR and STS (Mark Johnson) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2009 14:09:19 +0100 > From: "Radha D'Souza" > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" > > Message-ID: > <999A7C2B264EA640B183B790D772DE769381BE@isls-exch-be-1.intranet.wm= in.ac.uk> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=3D"utf-8" > > Dear David, Echna, all, > Thanks for your contributions, a very interesting discussion indeed. > Echna, your point about the 'ontological tension' is important. Latour id= entifies (correctly) a problem in the empirical world -that of relations be= tween objects and people (actors) in the face of apparently increasing domi= nation of objects over people in a technology dominated world. He goes the = next step and figures (rightly) that this has to do with the divide between= nature and society - but then stops short of interrogating that relationsh= ip by devising 'hybrids' as the third category - as mediators between natur= e/ society divide (which is hardly a category)- it is here that the ontolog= ical tension is most palpable - but the problem, in my view, is also to do = with absence of dialectics which could have shifted his focus to the RELATI= ONSHIP between nature-society, society-individuals (actors) and individuals= -nature and to locate the problem of technological interventions- his main = concern - as one of specific conjunctures of the nature-society-people rela= tionship in a geo-historical context. By focusing on objects and actors mec= hanically and in reductionist ways, instead of their dialectical relations,= he objectifies actors, 'activates' objects and has no way of explaining th= e relationships between the two. > The political ramifications of Latour are equally interesting - because A= NT mirrors contemporary 'network' society including new ways of social engi= neering behind the facade of technology. > What I find more difficult is this: if we are to be ontologically aware i= n our understanding of the world, and understand nature-society-people as o= ntologically distinct yet dialectically related (following RB), and reality= as multi-tiered (following RB) then, whatever the problematic we are inves= tigating, whether in the field of nature or culture or psyche, we cannot se= parate the nature/society/people dialectic of the problematic, because Bein= g itself comprises the three dimensions in tension. That requires not only = a completely non-disciplinary way of addressing a problem in any field - bu= t equally, developing a non-dualist methodology for investigating problems.= Latour's anthropological analogy of the pre-modern man points to the fact = that the anthropologist's pre-modern man was much more ontologically ground= ed (even if less articulate) and therefore much more focused on policing th= e boundaries of relationships between nature/society/people. It is marginal= ising ontology that has caused the nature/society rift and the problem of o= bjects and actors and their relationships in the first place. > We are a long way away from bringing ontological, dialectical and non-dua= list approaches to bear on the way we actually address problems of the worl= d around us and that leaves us with a gap between philosophy and its effect= iveness in changing the world. In case you have not already seen it already= , Uberoi's 'The other mind of Europe: Goethe as a scientist' and his 'Europ= ean Modernity: science, truth and method' could be a good anti-dote to Lato= ur, and perhaps useful for STS studies. > Sorry for the ramble, I am a lurker usually, but couldn't resist throwing= my two cents worth... > Radha > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-reali= sm-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna > Sent: 25 August 2009 13:02 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > > Hi David, hi all, > > first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really > insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your > mail when you state that Latour?s position can?t be reconciled - it is > just contradictory. I don?t know all of Latour?s work, but for example > in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his > "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong > constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout > the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn?s contradictory sentence that > scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don?t > do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, > like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just > constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real > formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common > cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). > Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an > "ontological tension", as one can?t talk about ontology in purely > epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are > then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments > in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be > rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? > Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour > and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all > the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and > that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it > has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others > is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, > as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by > scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing > of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability > unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in > general. > The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as > Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. > When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not > much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes > structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then > suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be > contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I > don?t know all of Latour?s work (or I am misstaken about his theory - > but one last thing: Latour?s very essayistic and loose style is not > really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more > confusion) > > best, > e > > d.eldervass@ntlworld.com schrieb: >> Hi Echna, and listers! >> >> Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a = touch more coherently. >> >> I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say = here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour acknowledg= es the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empirical' (those e= vents that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not actual' - t= he mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's 'actual but not = empirical' - those things that occur but are not observed by human agents. = For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon known as the 'phase= s of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theorised by scientists= - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and common-sense realis= ts would argue that the phenomenon existed before it was observed, but we j= ust didn't know about it. >> >> What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this cont= ribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm offering = here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered explicitly, but i= t seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong constructivist thin= king that he has emerged from (though later I'll suggest some difficulties = with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). >> >> This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how = accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an authorit= y on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructiv= ism in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latou= r takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of constructi= onist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanities) has littl= e in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in philosophy. I'm n= ot sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on reflection. >> >> So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a very= odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scientis= ts observe and theorise them? >> >> First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the world-in-itse= lf and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on the categories = of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, space, and c= ausality) through which we make sense of our experience. We can never perce= ive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filtered through t= hese categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we can know is = the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the world-in-itself is i= mplicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, when they talk about = the world or what exists 'out there' they are not referring to the world-in= -itself, as common-sense realists might assume, but to the world-as-we-expe= rience-it. >> >> Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience depen= ds not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on concepts, t= heories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) positively shape = our perception of the things we experience. Social constructionists argue t= hat these are social products, and although Latour rejects references to th= e social, he continues to be a kind of constructionist, arguing that these = concepts and theories come to be taken as true as the result of historical = processes in which scientists employ rhetorical strategies to persuade othe= rs of their merit. >> >> Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our categorie= s, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical work, then the = radical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientists change ou= r categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of Venus, they = alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world about which we= can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong constructivists = find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us of the truth of som= e new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out there'. The phases o= f Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by science, therefore only exist= once they have been explained, but the consequence of this process is that= they become just as real as anything else in our 'world'. >> >> Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not aw= are of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for sure = whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way of= making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made with= in the constructivist tradition. >> >> This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the contr= ary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excellent boo= k 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge') tha= t the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply wrong= . Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but they are ne= vertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have enough acc= ess to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our categories are mi= sleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the actual world and o= ur perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enable us to survive beca= use they give us generally accurate information about our environment (at l= east in situations that are relevantly similar to those in which our percep= tual abilities developed). >> >> Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influenc= e on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on o= ur perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between r= eality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is dif= ficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the world-in= -itself. >> >> Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that th= e descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves stron= gly influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite= of the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories = implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. >> >> Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, I= have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainly = misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his acco= unt of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the inanimate= , or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to behave as t= he scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view that this ext= ernal reality is conjured into existence by scientists' theories. So we nee= d to recognise that even if Latour's position is motivated in part by the K= ant-influenced argument above there is also some recognition of an external= reality that is not produced by science. This is arguably consistent with = a version of Kant's thinking in which the undescribable world-in-itself imp= acts upon scientists even though their perception of it is inevitably media= ted by previous theory. This starts to approach Latour's model of networks = of various actors, including inanimate objects, theories, scientific device= s, etc, interacting with each other to produce outcomes such as the beliefs= of scientists. >> >> Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about = the phases of Venus. >> >> This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome view= s on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to ma= ke sense of Latour's ontology. >> >> Best, >> >> Dave >> >> >> >> ---- d.eldervass@ntlworld.com wrote: >> >>> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. >>> >> >> Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different s= ort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different fro= m the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existing ext= ernal world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't have any= access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that science= does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other hand he a= nd his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe did not ex= ist until they described them. At first sight this is difficult to make sen= se of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. He seems t= o be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinction is dra= wn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the world-as-w= e-experience-it (perhaps =3D 'the phenomenal world' thought interprerations= of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because Latour and many = other constructivists these days effectively carry on as if the world-in-it= self does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they only world we can= know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no piont in discussing a= ny other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed to depend on con= cepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as our cognition. = So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at the world, t= hat way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of the world-as-we= -experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in that world. >> >> My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that (= a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! >> >> best >> >> Dave >> >> >> >> ---- b86102052@ntu.edu.tw wrote: >> >>> Hi Echna, >>> >> >> The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may >> be helpful too. >> >> Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency >> in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): >> 455-73. >> >> Best wishes, >> Poe >> >> Poe Yu-ze Wan >> Department of Sociology >> National Taiwan University >> >> >> ?? Matthew Smith : >> >> >>> Hi Echna, >>> >>> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main >>> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: >>> http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-n= et-theo.pdf). I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organiza= tion which touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR = from the perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems li= terature (here: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=3DArticleURL&_udi= =3DB6W7M-4JWFH1P-1&_user=3D10&_rdoc=3D1&_fmt=3D&_orig=3Dsearch&_sort=3Dd&_d= ocanchor=3D&view=3Dc&_searchStrId=3D981817881&_rerunOrigin=3Dscholar.google= &_acct=3DC000050221&_version=3D1&_urlVersion=3D0&_userid=3D10&md5=3D67a7cdf= dd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). If you need a copy of that paper, just write me= directly - I currently don't have it online or accessible from where I cur= rently >>> am. >>> >>> >>> Best, >>> Matthew >>> >>> >>> ----- Message initial ---- >>> De : echna >>> ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >>> >>> Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s >>> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS >>> >>> Hi all, >>> >>> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from >>> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS) >>> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can >>> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and >>> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemological >>> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the >>> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontology >>> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik >>> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno >>> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law even >>> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description o= f >>> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whol= e >>> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind o= f >>> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by either >>> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the lis= t). >>> >>> best wishes, >>> e >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >>> >>> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel >>> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Critical-Realism mailing list >>> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >>> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > -- > The University of Westminster is a charity and a company limited by > guarantee. Registration number: 977818 England. Registered Office: > 309 Regent Street, London W1B 2UW, UK > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2009 15:11:26 +0100 > From: Mark Johnson > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=3DUTF-8 > > Hi everyone, > > The fact that "We are a long way away from bringing ontological, dialecti= cal > and non-dualist approaches to bear on the way we actually address problem= s > of the world around us and that leaves us with a gap between philosophy a= nd > its effectiveness in changing the world" tells me something about the > ontology of the world. In particular, it tells me that the issues that > relate technologies to actors and institutions and society are rhetorical= as > much as dialectical. This is where ANT is quite strong (although there ar= e > many ways of describing a 'rhetoric of technological intervention' - and = ANT > clearly has weaknesses). > I don't understand how Latour can be seen to adopt a "purely individualis= tic > stance towards society". Is it because it's not a dialectical conception > that he describes? It strikes me that a "purely individualistic stance" = is > inconceivable anyway (perhaps like a private language). It itself is a > construct - here with the explicit purpose of making an apparent distinct= ion > between CR ontology and ANT; between one set of distinctions and another; > perhaps most importantly, between the identity of one group and another. = But > does the distinction stick? I suspect only in a rather procrustean way! > > On the necessity of experiment, 'necessity' (like 'instinct') can be seen= as > an 'explanatory principle': it helps us explain what we do, have done and > intend to do. Is there really anything to be gained from arguing that it'= s > real? > > This is why I worry that the arguments between realists and constructivis= ts > become a bit specious. It's easy to lose sight of the point of it all. > Paraphrasing Marx: "The philosophers have made distinctions about technol= ogy > in various ways - but that is not the point; the point is how we organise > ourselves with it." I would say that rhetoric and dialectic are both > important in getting to grips with this. > > Mark > > > > On Wed, Aug 26, 2009 at 2:09 PM, Radha D'Souza > wrote: > >> Dear David, Echna, all, >> Thanks for your contributions, a very interesting discussion indeed. >> Echna, your point about the 'ontological tension' is important. Latour >> identifies (correctly) a problem in the empirical world -that of relatio= ns >> between objects and people (actors) in the face of apparently increasing >> domination of objects over people in a technology dominated world. He go= es >> the next step and figures (rightly) that this has to do with the divide >> between nature and society - but then stops short of interrogating that >> relationship by devising 'hybrids' as the third category - as mediators >> between nature/ society divide (which is hardly a category)- it is here = that >> the ontological tension is most palpable - but the problem, in my view, = is >> also to do with absence of dialectics which could have shifted his focus= to >> the RELATIONSHIP between nature-society, society-individuals (actors) an= d >> individuals-nature and to locate the problem of technological interventi= ons- >> his main concern - as one of specific conjunctures of the >> nature-society-people relationship in a geo-historical context. By focus= ing >> on objects and actors mechanically and in reductionist ways, instead of >> their dialectical relations, he objectifies actors, 'activates' objects = and >> has no way of explaining the relationships between the two. >> The political ramifications of Latour are equally interesting - because = ANT >> mirrors contemporary 'network' society including new ways of social >> engineering behind the facade of technology. >> What I find more difficult is this: if we are to be ontologically aware = in >> our understanding of the world, and understand nature-society-people as >> ontologically distinct yet dialectically related (following RB), and rea= lity >> as multi-tiered (following RB) then, whatever the problematic we are >> investigating, whether in the field of nature or culture or psyche, we >> cannot separate the nature/society/people dialectic of the problematic, >> because Being itself comprises the three dimensions in tension. That >> requires not only a completely non-disciplinary way of addressing a prob= lem >> in any field - but equally, developing a non-dualist methodology for >> investigating problems. Latour's anthropological analogy of the pre-mode= rn >> man points to the fact that the anthropologist's pre-modern man was much >> more ontologically grounded (even if less articulate) and therefore much >> more focused on policing the boundaries of relationships between >> nature/society/people. It is marginalising ontology that has caused the >> nature/society rift and the problem of objects and actors and their >> relationships in the first place. >> We are a long way away from bringing ontological, dialectical and >> non-dualist approaches to bear on the way we actually address problems o= f >> the world around us and that leaves us with a gap between philosophy and= its >> effectiveness in changing the world. In case you have not already seen i= t >> already, Uberoi's 'The other mind of Europe: Goethe as a scientist' and = his >> 'European Modernity: science, truth and method' could be a good anti-dot= e to >> Latour, and perhaps useful for STS studies. >> Sorry for the ramble, I am a lurker usually, but couldn't resist throwin= g >> my two cents worth... >> Radha >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto: >> critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna >> Sent: 25 August 2009 13:02 >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS >> >> Hi David, hi all, >> >> first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really >> insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your >> mail when you state that Latour?s position can?t be reconciled - it is >> just contradictory. I don?t know all of Latour?s work, but for example >> in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his >> "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong >> constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout >> the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn?s contradictory sentence that >> scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don?t >> do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, >> like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just >> constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real >> formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common >> cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). >> Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an >> "ontological tension", as one can?t talk about ontology in purely >> epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are >> then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments >> in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be >> rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? >> Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour >> and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all >> the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and >> that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it >> has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others >> is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, >> as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by >> scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing >> of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability >> unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in >> general. >> The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as >> Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. >> When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not >> much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes >> structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then >> suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be >> contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I >> don?t know all of Latour?s work (or I am misstaken about his theory - >> but one last thing: Latour?s very essayistic and loose style is not >> really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more >> confusion) >> >> best, >> e >> >> d.eldervass@ntlworld.com schrieb: >> > Hi Echna, and listers! >> > >> > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this = a >> touch more coherently. >> > >> > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to sa= y >> here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour >> acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empiri= cal' >> (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not >> actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's >> 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observe= d by >> human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon kn= own >> as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theoris= ed >> by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and >> common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it = was >> observed, but we just didn't know about it. >> > >> > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this >> contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm >> offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered >> explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong >> constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll sugg= est >> some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). >> > >> > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious ho= w >> accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an autho= rity >> on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructi= vism >> in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour >> takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of >> constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humaniti= es) >> has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in >> philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on >> reflection. >> > >> > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a ve= ry >> odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scient= ists >> observe and theorise them? >> > >> > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the >> world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on= the >> categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time= , >> space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We = can >> never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filt= ered >> through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we = can >> know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the >> world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So= , >> when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not >> referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume,= but >> to the world-as-we-experience-it. >> > >> > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience >> depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on >> concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) >> positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social >> constructionists argue that these are social products, and although Lato= ur >> rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of >> constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be tak= en >> as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists employ >> rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. >> > >> > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our >> categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical wor= k, >> then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientis= ts >> change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of >> Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world >> about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong >> constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us = of >> the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out >> there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by scienc= e, >> therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence = of >> this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our >> 'world'. >> > >> > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not >> aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for = sure >> whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way= of >> making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made wi= thin >> the constructivist tradition. >> > >> > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the >> contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excel= lent >> book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge= ') >> that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply >> wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but the= y >> are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have >> enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our >> categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of th= e >> actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enab= le >> us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about = our >> environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those= in >> which our perceptual abilities developed). >> > >> > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influe= nce >> on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on = our >> perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between >> reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is >> difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the >> world-in-itself. >> > >> > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that = the >> descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves stro= ngly >> influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite = of >> the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories >> implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. >> > >> > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument,= I >> have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainl= y >> misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his >> account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the >> inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to >> behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view >> that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' >> theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is >> motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also so= me >> recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This= is >> arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the >> undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their >> perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts = to >> approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including inanima= te >> objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other = to >> produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. >> > >> > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim abou= t >> the phases of Venus. >> > >> > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome vi= ews >> on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to m= ake >> sense of Latour's ontology. >> > >> > Best, >> > >> > Dave >> > >> > >> > >> > ---- d.eldervass@ntlworld.com wrote: >> > >> >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. >> >> >> > >> > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different >> sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different >> from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existi= ng >> external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't ha= ve >> any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that >> science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other >> hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describ= e >> did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is difficul= t to >> make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism.= He >> seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinct= ion >> is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the >> world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps =3D 'the phenomenal world' thought >> interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' becaus= e >> Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as= if >> the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they >> only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no p= iont >> in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deeme= d to >> depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as= our >> cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking a= t >> the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of = the >> world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in >> that world. >> > >> > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that >> (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! >> > >> > best >> > >> > Dave >> > >> > >> > >> > ---- b86102052@ntu.edu.tw wrote: >> > >> >> Hi Echna, >> >> >> > >> > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may >> > be helpful too. >> > >> > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency >> > in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): >> > 455-73. >> > >> > Best wishes, >> > Poe >> > >> > Poe Yu-ze Wan >> > Department of Sociology >> > National Taiwan University >> > >> > >> > ?? Matthew Smith : >> > >> > >> >> Hi Echna, >> >> >> >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main >> >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: >> >> >> http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-ne= t-theo.pdf). >> I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which >> touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the >> perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literatu= re >> (here: >> http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=3DArticleURL&_udi=3DB6W7M-4JWFH= 1P-1&_user=3D10&_rdoc=3D1&_fmt=3D&_orig=3Dsearch&_sort=3Dd&_docanchor=3D&vi= ew=3Dc&_searchStrId=3D981817881&_rerunOrigin=3Dscholar.google&_acct=3DC0000= 50221&_version=3D1&_urlVersion=3D0&_userid=3D10&md5=3D67a7cdfdd26aa90032f27= 92438e3ab4d). >> If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently d= on't >> have it online or accessible from where I currently >> >> am. >> >> >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Matthew >> >> >> >> >> >> ----- Message initial ---- >> >> De : echna >> >> ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> >> >> >> Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s >> >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS >> >> >> >> Hi all, >> >> >> >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from >> >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (ST= S) >> >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can >> >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and >> >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemologic= al >> >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by th= e >> >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontolo= gy >> >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik >> >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno >> >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law ev= en >> >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description= of >> >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the wh= ole >> >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind= of >> >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by eith= er >> >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the >> list). >> >> >> >> best wishes, >> >> e >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel >> >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> > >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> > >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> -- >> The University of Westminster is a charity and a company limited by >> guarantee. Registration number: 977818 England. Registered Office: >> 309 Regent Street, London W1B 2UW, UK >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > > > -- > -------------------------------------------------------------------------= -------- > Mark Johnson > Institute for Educational Cybernetics > University of Bolton > BL3 5AB > Tel. 01204 903567 > Mob. 0778 6064505 > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 57, Issue 9 > *********************************************** > From nellhaus@mail.com Wed Aug 26 15:09:16 2009 Received: from smtp110.sbc.mail.re2.yahoo.com ([68.142.229.95]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with smtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MgPk4-00019z-Hz for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Wed, 26 Aug 2009 15:09:16 -0600 Received: (qmail 97924 invoked from network); 26 Aug 2009 21:09:10 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO Godiva) (nellhaus@76.250.229.4 with login) by smtp110.sbc.mail.re2.yahoo.com with SMTP; 26 Aug 2009 21:09:10 -0000 X-YMail-OSG: fO.AzhIVM1lUPZw745If_IFOTT0ugj.IzUK37I7aSmKByCDHGSLbIWtY.2KLKC_cPUnKhMbuiUtO8YwdA66RcSBqtDJfDp1i1cm58QT2IZeuY2AUO9tOo6Bm80Ra8.pU.UO6nTX5vVLRL5sKr.wbpZO16xAW9DsMPpnI_dzIvlQXqhidAsi4hI6rl4Py8AZP8.u1z4k.mDed6IuZZvUBdHZeaOi8arFhSxK1RMdl_jHmlsUUimbw9zeI0T3NxwXME9lUNQ5oWeG1soYFH2bKTWPkqUbzOTrx2OmFnwaSgnxvYgH_LXTGU13ll1HnT5xu4_PWoZZqyUO7xE75VTI- X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3 Message-ID: <571246140E2E4FEF86497B1DDF0D8CD3@Godiva> From: "Tobin Nellhaus" To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" References: <14a6419f0908261004y7515acbdt309ba1a2527200ab@mail.gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <14a6419f0908261004y7515acbdt309ba1a2527200ab@mail.gmail.com> Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2009 17:08:50 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; reply-type=original Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Mail 6.0.6002.18005 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.0.6002.18005 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 57, Issue 9 X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2009 21:09:16 -0000 Hi Ng, Welcome to the CR list! I don't think Bhaskar has said anything about quantum mechanics except that one shouldn't derive philosophy from the current state of a science. However, you may find it useful to read "The shaky game: Einstein, realism, and the quantum theory" by Arthur Fine. Fine makes a cogent argument (supported by the letters they wrote each other) that Bohr and Heisenberg were determined to preserve a positivist conception of the world, whereas Einstein and Schroedinger upheld realism and were willing to jettison positivist notions. (It is not well known that Schrodinger came up with his "cat" in order to *satirize* the Copenhagen Interpretation. Obviously Bohr and Heisenberg adopted the cat as their pet.) Fine isn't to my knowledge a critical realist, but certainly he's a realist, more or less along the lines of Bhaskar's "Realist theory of science." Christopher Norris *is* a critical realist, so you'll also want to see his "Quantum theory and the flight from realism: philosophical responses to quantum mechanics." Of course this is not to say that all of the puzzles that quantum mechanics discovered have a realist solution already at hand. But these books should give you some idea of how critical realism approaches the issues. Best, Tobin ----- Original Message ----- From: "Ng Foo Keong" To: Sent: Wednesday, August 26, 2009 1:04 PM Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 57, Issue 9 > hi all, > > i'm a CR neophyte here. first, i do agree with constructivists that in a > sense, > scientific knowledge is socially constructed, and that our "observations" > are > reported via our pre-conceived categories. however, i believe that there > are > real limits to what can be "constructed". proving this, however, is not > an > easy task. > > i was wondering: has Latour and/or Roy Bhaskar addressed the paradoxes > in Quantum > Mechanics (e.g. Schrodinger's Cat, Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, > Copenhagen > vs Multi-verse or other interpretations, the Einstein-Bohr debates viz. > Particle-Wave duality and the difficulty of separating the observer and > the > observed ... ). because it is this that i feel is the really gets into > the heart of the debate. the phases of Venus example seems (to me) to > be a case of > nominalism -- i agree with Shakespeare that a rose by another name > smells as sweet. > but in Quantum Mechanical paradoxes, IMHO, you really have to deal > with the tension > between ontology and epistemology and you can't run away from them. > Physicists have > not come to a consensus about this (as if consensus matters). anyway, it > would > appear that one's answer to these paradoxes betray's one's ontological and > epistemological beliefs beyond just naming of categories. > > so i would appreciate comments from enlightened members, please. > > Ng, FK > > From nellhaus@mail.com Thu Aug 27 18:28:31 2009 Received: from smtp116.sbc.mail.re3.yahoo.com ([66.196.96.89]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with smtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MgpKR-0003m9-FY for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Thu, 27 Aug 2009 18:28:31 -0600 Received: (qmail 64898 invoked from network); 28 Aug 2009 00:28:25 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO Godiva) (nellhaus@76.250.229.4 with login) by smtp116.sbc.mail.re3.yahoo.com with SMTP; 28 Aug 2009 00:28:24 -0000 X-YMail-OSG: M85yEmEVM1lABBgWEKpvyLEdMWN4jTexacfnVzlhNJK.cYcWw_aFSp3VeHkSuC9MHR66Jl5sbZwHoC_8V9_blzvhdMYwII_nNbh_VdJaTvAYXyYdD21phKC2lFagGPGHij.nJTqE5uxUMuCNQ7fFp8pMn6549Wzfam9T_F6xSmeovWGZfRWjyeemunnHKqqgpvofmpzGXKEyN52Yz7nZ0y_dz.AvDTfUt32h0S3ZnuIaiaDTB02HlupdWZlPmwO4sidu31Q2wa94id6VVN.DiuhrIImgFgLm9w8krbk8zp.NRv3wcBIoBsu8CDU3P4Om3DT_3mA2TjcfKpRkxw-- X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3 Message-ID: <7F97E4BF97F24A95B790FFB78BCF91CE@Godiva> From: "Tobin Nellhaus" To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" References: <14a6419f0908261004y7515acbdt309ba1a2527200ab@mail.gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <14a6419f0908261004y7515acbdt309ba1a2527200ab@mail.gmail.com> Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2009 20:28:21 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1"; reply-type=original Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Windows Mail 6.0.6002.18005 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.0.6002.18005 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 57, Issue 9 X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 28 Aug 2009 00:28:31 -0000 I noticed that Fine published a second edition of "The shaky game," and so I thought I'd take a look since it's been 15-20 years since I read it. I'll have to qualify my statement that he's realist. In fact he criticizes both realism and anti-realism (in his definitions of them), and instead espouses what he calls the "natural ontological attitude." However, the latter has some similarities to CR, enough to give it a charitable reading. In any case, his account of the early debates about quantum mechanics is fascinating. Thanks, T. --- Tobin Nellhaus nellhaus@mail.com "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce From leigh@totalpc.co.zw Thu Sep 03 05:16:34 2009 Received: from ipo4hsc.utah.edu ([155.97.131.100]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MjAIs-00021l-64 for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Thu, 03 Sep 2009 05:16:34 -0600 X-SBRS: 3.3 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AhQCAItCn0opviAChWdsb2JhbACLGoR2iywBAQEKCwoFFa5ZCJAGgigFGAiBTgWEQ4Ye X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.44,324,1249279200"; d="scan'208";a="193914786" Received: from smtp4.yoafrica.com (HELO asprin.yoafrica.com) ([41.190.32.2]) by ipo4.cc.utah.edu with ESMTP; 03 Sep 2009 05:15:47 -0600 Received: from smtp.yoafrica.com ([196.44.176.8]) by asprin.yoafrica.com with esmtp (Exim 4.69 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from ) id 1MjAHm-000H6x-7Q for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Thu, 03 Sep 2009 13:15:28 +0200 Received: from [196.44.188.61] (helo=leighlaptop) by smtp.yoafrica.com with esmtp (Exim 4.68 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from ) id 1MjAHm-000DWm-BY for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Thu, 03 Sep 2009 13:15:28 +0200 From: "Leigh Price" To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" References: <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> <4A93D2B7.3090303@gmx.net> Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 13:15:23 +0200 Message-ID: <14D7108B324C4E0DB407347A3305FA25@leighlaptop> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11 Thread-Index: AcolfH0wmHpcD0gPT6Ku5TPkWRtbGQG7AEQA In-Reply-To: <4A93D2B7.3090303@gmx.net> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.5579 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Sep 2009 11:16:34 -0000 Hello again, and many thanks for everyone's contributions Sorry to take so long to reply but I live in Zimbabwe where email can be = erratic and only yesterday managed to get back online.=20 Echna was careful to say that he had not read all of Latour. His = critique of Latour's earlier work is quite justifiable. However, = Latour's more recent work was surprisingly unsympathetic towards the = constructivist turn. For example, you may be interested to know that Latour gave a keynote = address at Keele University in 1997 entitled "On Recalling ANT", in = which he describes ANT as 'managerial, engineering, Machiavellian, = demiurgic'. Basically, he felt that ANT, as it was being largely = interpreted, was susceptible to the critique of being demiurgic on the = one hand and resulting in the death of man on the other. By this I = assume he means the oscillation between voluntarism (demiurgic tendency) = and determinism (death of man tendency) that Bhaskar described in his = lead up to giving his Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA). = Latour was concerned that 'actor' was being given the role of agency and = 'network' that of structure, magically turning one into the other like = the social construction theory of Berger and Luckman. I agree that = Bhaskar's TMSA conception is clearer and better justified that Latour's = circulating actor network, but they do seem similar to me. As did = Giddens and Bhaskar, Latour sees the actors and the networks = (individuals and society?) as both being connected and influencing each = other, but unlike Giddens and similar to Bhaskar, Latour insists on the = historicity of the process. Also, Latour describes the way that the = social can 'travel endlessly without encountering the micro-level' = (individuals?), which seems similar to Bhaskar's TMSA diagram in which = society and individuals are on parallel tracks. They are distinct, = autonomously causally efficacious, yet closely related, transforming and = reproducing each other. By definition, parallel lines can travel = endlessly but never encounter each other. Diagrammatically, then, = Bhaskar has used a similar metaphor to Latour's verbal metaphor of = 'travelling endlessly without encountering each other' (but nevertheless = aeffecting each other).=20 Despite this similarity, what then throws the realist is Latour's = statement that the social 'is turned from a province of reality to a = circulation'. I understand why he says this, he wants to avoid social = determinism, however, it is an undeniably uncritical realist statement. = But this paper was written in 1997 and by 2004, Latour was to critique = himself and his followers even further and to revindicate reality. He = wrote a paper 'Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of fact = to matters of concern' (Critical Inquiry 30, 2004). I hope the quote = that follows is not too long, but I wanted to give you an idea of how = worried Latour was by the way his work was being used...worried enough = to admit he perhaps he 'did not mean what he said' (Bhaskar has also = said of Derrida, that he probably 'did not mean what he said'). "While we spend years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind = the appearance of objective statements, do we now have to reveal the = real objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of = prejudices? And yet entire Ph.D programs are still running to make sure = that good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up = (...) that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak = from a standpoint and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the = very same argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence = that could save our lives. Was I wrong to participate in this invention = of this field known as science studies? Is it enough to say that we did = not really mean what we said? Why does it burn my tongue to say that = global warming is a fact whether you like it or not? Why can't I simply = say that the argument is closed for good? Should I reassure myself by simply saying that the bad guys can use any = weapon at hand, naturalized facts when it suits them and social = construction when it suits them? Should we apologise for having been = wrong all the time? (...) Or should we do a bit of soul-searching here: = what were we really after when we were so intent on showing the = scientific construction of facts?" Later Latour also writes: "My argument is that a certain form of = critical spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight = the wrong enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the = wrong sort of allies because of a little mistake in the definition of = its main target. The question was never to get away from facts, but = closer to them, not fighting empiricism but renewing empiricism". Latour = also argues that we need to "cultivate a stubbornly realist attitude". = He says that "The mistake we made, the mistake I made, was to believe = there was no efficient way to criticise matters of fact except by moving = away from them and directing attention toward the conditions that made = them possible". The reason I have gone to this trouble to show Latour's move from = irrealism to realism (but not the na=C3=AFve realism of typical = scientistic empiricism) is because I would like to encourage critical = realists not to quickly throw out the baby with the bathwater, so to = speak, when they decide to disregard Latour's work. The reason we might = want to engage with the work of Latour or Donna Haraway (also a = professed non realist) is because they have spent years trying to = understand how language can be used in a Machiavellian way to oppress = people. Bhaskar talks about oppressive demi-reality, and I suspect that = it is this demi-reality that these thinkers are engaging with, albeit = they say it is unreal. It is demi-reality which most needs our attention = right now, if we are to facilitate a move towards the flourishing of = humankind.=20 There are other similarities between Latour and Critical Realism, such = as his objection to polemical debate and his talk about the oscillation = between naturalised facts and social construction (which reminds me of = Sayer's concept of the pomo flips). I think his humility in being able = to adjust his ideas in the face of contradictions, and his attempt to = try and make his ideas more inclusive (of totality), is a brilliant = model of Critical Realist praxis. We may not agree with everything = Latour says, but we can learn a lot from his humble academic process = which, in allowing for the possibility of mistake, gets him closer to an = adequate conception. His ability to admit the inadequacy of his early = writing also shows that Khun was wrong about how tightly academics cling = to their theories... Mark Johnson was interested in the way that constructivism seems to be = quite humane, as it seems to avoid strong arguments about rightness and = wrongness. However, as Latour shows, even extremists/fundamentalists can = now make use of constructivism (e.g. we have fundamentalist Capitalists = arguing that global warming is just a construct). I have written too = much already, but Latour offers a way to be critical without being = polemical. As far as our efforts to bring credibility to CR goes, to have a main = architect of the extreme social constructivist movement provide such = critique of that discipline, and to have that critique include a = revindication of realism, lends powerful support to our realist = position. However, this is not to say that Latour's position is as = complete as Bhaskar's (for example, as someone wrote earlier, it does = not have a conception of the stratification of reality).=20 Again, apologies that my contribution has taken so long to be returned. Best wishes, Leigh -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu = [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna Sent: 25 August 2009 14:02 To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS Hi David, hi all, first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really=20 insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your=20 mail when you state that Latour=C2=B4s position can=C2=B4t be reconciled = - it is=20 just contradictory. I don=C2=B4t know all of Latour=C2=B4s work, but for = example=20 in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his=20 "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong=20 constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout=20 the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn=C2=B4s contradictory sentence that=20 scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and = don=C2=B4t=20 do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts,=20 like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just=20 constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real=20 formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common=20 cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an = "ontological tension", as one can=C2=B4t talk about ontology in purely=20 epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are=20 then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments = in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be=20 rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour=20 and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all=20 the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and=20 that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it = has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others = is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, = as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by = scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing = of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability=20 unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in = general. The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as=20 Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things.=20 When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not=20 much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes=20 structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then=20 suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be=20 contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I=20 don=C2=B4t know all of Latour=C2=B4s work (or I am misstaken about his = theory -=20 but one last thing: Latour=C2=B4s very essayistic and loose style is not = really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more=20 confusion) best, e d.eldervass@ntlworld.com schrieb: > Hi Echna, and listers! > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this = a touch more coherently.=20 > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to = say here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour = acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the = empirical' (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's = 'real but not actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or = even of B's 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are = not observed by human agents. For example, he argues that the = astronomical phenonenon known as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist = until it was observed and theorised by scientists - and he cites this as = an exemplary case. Critical and common-sense realists would argue that = the phenomenon existed before it was observed, but we just didn't know = about it. > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this = contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm = offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered = explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong = constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll = suggest some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's = position).=20 > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious = how accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an = authority on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian = constructivism in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he = doesn't think Latour takes this approach. But it may well be that this = tradition of constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some = other humanities) has little in common with the tradition known as = neo-Kantianism in philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' = is any better, on reflection. > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a = very odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until = scientists observe and theorise them? > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the = world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on = the categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of = time, space, and causality) through which we make sense of our = experience. We can never perceive the world-in-itself because our = experience is always filtered through these categories. Hence, for = constructivists, the only world we can know is the = world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the world-in-itself is = implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, when they talk = about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not referring to the = world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, but to the = world-as-we-experience-it. > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience = depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on = concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) = positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social = constructionists argue that these are social products, and although = Latour rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of = constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be = taken as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists = employ rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our = categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical = work, then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when = scientists change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the = phases of Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the = only world about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' = that strong constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in = persuading us of the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to = alter what is 'out there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon = explained by science, therefore only exist once they have been = explained, but the consequence of this process is that they become just = as real as anything else in our 'world'. > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not = aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for = sure whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me = a way of making sense of his argument that is consistent with many = claims made within the constructivist tradition. > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the = contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her = excellent book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of = knowledge') that the idea that we don't have access to the = world-in-itself is simply wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected = by our categories, but they are nevertheless perceptions of the actual = external world, and we have enough access to that world to (sometimes) = be able to tell when our categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we = ourselves are a part of the actual world and our perceptual abilities = have evolved in ways that enable us to survive because they give us = generally accurate information about our environment (at least in = situations that are relevantly similar to those in which our perceptual = abilities developed). > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an = influence on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps = sometimes even on our perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm = distinction between reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a = distinction that is difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial = of access to the world-in-itself. > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that = the descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves = strongly influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the = opposite of the causal relation between the external world and = scientific theories implicit in the constructivist argument I have = described. > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, = I have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost = certainly misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is = striking in his account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that = sometimes the inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by = scientists refuse to behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to = reconcile with the view that this external reality is conjured into = existence by scientists' theories. So we need to recognise that even if = Latour's position is motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument = above there is also some recognition of an external reality that is not = produced by science. This is arguably consistent with a version of = Kant's thinking in which the undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon = scientists even though their perception of it is inevitably mediated by = previous theory. This starts to approach Latour's model of networks of = various actors, including inanimate objects, theories, scientific = devices, etc, interacting with each other to produce outcomes such as = the beliefs of scientists.=20 > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim = about the phases of Venus. > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome = views on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent = way to make sense of Latour's ontology. > > Best, > > Dave > > > > ---- d.eldervass@ntlworld.com wrote:=20 > =20 >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper.=20 >> =20 > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different = sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different = from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a = pre-existing external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a = cybercafe so don't have any access to my books and notes, but as I = remember it, he argues that science does describe a real world that is = 'out there', but on the other hand he and his followers maintain that = the phenomena scientists describe did not exist until they described = them. At first sight this is difficult to make sense of for anyone = committed to a variety of common sense realism. He seems to be committed = to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinction is drawn between = the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the = world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps =3D 'the phenomenal world' thought = interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' = because Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively = carry on as if the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming = to be that they only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it = so there is no piont in discussing any other sort of world. And then, = our experience is deemed to depend on concepts, theories, etc, which = shape our perception as well as our cognition. So, when scientists = persuade us of a certain way of looking at the world, that way of = looking at the world comes to shape our sense of the = world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in = that world.=20 > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that = (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! > > best > > Dave > > > > ---- b86102052@ntu.edu.tw wrote:=20 > =20 >> Hi Echna, >> =20 > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may = =20 > be helpful too. > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. =E2=80=9CSearching for Realism, Structure and = Agency =20 > in Actor Network Theory,=E2=80=9D The British Journal of Sociology, = 59(3): =20 > 455-73. > > Best wishes, > Poe > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > Department of Sociology > National Taiwan University > > > =E5=BC=95=E8=BF=B0 Matthew Smith : > > =20 >> Hi Echna, >> >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main = >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: =20 >> = http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net= -theo.pdf). I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and = Organization which touches on some of the issues you raise as I was = considering CR from the perspective of philosophical debates in the = information systems literature (here: = http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=3DArticleURL&_udi=3DB6W7M-4JWFH1= P-1&_user=3D10&_rdoc=3D1&_fmt=3D&_orig=3Dsearch&_sort=3Dd&_docanchor=3D&v= iew=3Dc&_searchStrId=3D981817881&_rerunOrigin=3Dscholar.google&_acct=3DC0= 00050221&_version=3D1&_urlVersion=3D0&_userid=3D10&md5=3D67a7cdfdd26aa900= 32f2792438e3ab4d). If you need a copy of that paper, just write me = directly - I currently don't have it online or accessible from where I = currently =20 >> am. >> >> >> Best, >> Matthew >> >> >> ----- Message initial ---- >> De : echna >> =C3=80 : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List =20 >> >> Envoy=C3=A9 le : dimanche 16 ao=C3=BBt 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS >> >> Hi all, >> >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" = (STS) >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in = epistemological >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by = the >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of = ontology >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law = even >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description = of >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don=C2=B4t have an overview over = the whole >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind = of >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by = either >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the = list). >> >> best wishes, >> e >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr=C3=A2ce =C3=A0 Yahoo! Courriel >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> =20 > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > =20 _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From postmaster@econ.cam.ac.uk Thu Sep 03 05:17:08 2009 Received: from ipo4hsc.utah.edu ([155.97.131.100]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MjAJQ-00022A-1d for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Thu, 03 Sep 2009 05:17:08 -0600 X-SBRS: 4.8 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AkcBAItCn0qDbwiClGdsb2JhbACQNQGLBgEBAQEJCwgJEwU8viaEGwWKYQ X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.44,324,1249279200"; d="scan'208";a="193915073" Received: from ppsw-0.csi.cam.ac.uk ([131.111.8.130]) by ipo4.cc.utah.edu with ESMTP; 03 Sep 2009 05:17:02 -0600 X-Cam-AntiVirus: no malware found X-Cam-SpamDetails: not scanned X-Cam-ScannerInfo: http://www.cam.ac.uk/cs/email/scanner/ Received: from econ-1.econ.cam.ac.uk ([131.111.165.100]:17632 helo=econ.cam.ac.uk) by ppsw-0.csi.cam.ac.uk (ppsw.cam.ac.uk [131.111.8.129]:25) with esmtp id 1MjAJJ-0005EN-0n (Exim 4.70) for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu (return-path ); Thu, 03 Sep 2009 12:17:01 +0100 Received: from ECON-1/SpoolDir by econ.cam.ac.uk (Mercury 1.48); 3 Sep 09 12:17:01 +0000 Received: from SpoolDir by ECON-1 (Mercury 1.48); 3 Sep 09 12:16:51 +0000 X-Autoreply-From: To: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu From: Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 12:16:51 +0000 Message-ID: <3BEE2011430@econ.cam.ac.uk> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Sep 2009 11:17:08 -0000 I am now away until early September. I will try to read mail when I can, but many apologies for long delays in replying. Clive From rgroff@slu.edu Thu Sep 03 06:26:15 2009 Received: from ipo4hsc.utah.edu ([155.97.131.100]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MjBOI-000283-9K for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Thu, 03 Sep 2009 06:26:14 -0600 X-SBRS: 4.5 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: Aq4BAPNSn0pAEgKjkWdsb2JhbACCJDKNOooLYj8BAQEBCQsKBxMFrmEFBgKHN4hKgigFGAiBTgWEQ4Ye X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.44,325,1249279200"; d="scan'208";a="193935867" Received: from exprod7og105.obsmtp.com ([64.18.2.163]) by ipo4.cc.utah.edu with ESMTP; 03 Sep 2009 06:26:06 -0600 Received: from source ([209.85.211.187]) (using TLSv1) by exprod7ob105.postini.com ([64.18.6.12]) with SMTP ID DSNKSp+13YYDOS8oGdR9gqt4g7krwbLdpDKI@postini.com; Thu, 03 Sep 2009 05:26:06 PDT Received: by ywh17 with SMTP id 17so2748207ywh.3 for ; Thu, 03 Sep 2009 05:26:05 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.150.45.34 with SMTP id s34mr14381524ybs.274.1251980764713; Thu, 03 Sep 2009 05:26:04 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <14D7108B324C4E0DB407347A3305FA25@leighlaptop> References: <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> <4A93D2B7.3090303@gmx.net> <14D7108B324C4E0DB407347A3305FA25@leighlaptop> Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 07:26:04 -0500 Message-ID: <6ad241360909030526q137430fdweb30fafafb0eb3f2@mail.gmail.com> From: Ruth Groff To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.9 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Sep 2009 12:26:17 -0000 Hi all, Leigh thanks for this latest thoughtful post. I have only a small thing to say, but I think it's important. It's something like this: Latour may or may not be an important intellectual resource, but even assuming that he is, it seems to me that more generally critical realists should be wary about equating thinkers too quickly, * merely* on the basis of being a fallibilist, say, or being a realist of som= e sort. I mean LOTS of people in the history of philosophy fit into those categories. They're too big, I think, those categories. I haven't read any Latour but I met him once when he came and gave a talk and then there was a little dinner for him after. He was talking about Aristotle and about rhetoric, and perhaps even friendship (as Aristotle does), and about forms of reason -- but not a word about *phronesis*, Aristotle's term for the kind of reason involved in making (non-apodeictic) moral judgments about what to do. It was such a curious thing, given what he was trying to say. He seemed intrigued, when I asked him why. Ok, back to lurking. r. On Thu, Sep 3, 2009 at 6:15 AM, Leigh Price wrote: > Hello again, and many thanks for everyone's contributions > > Sorry to take so long to reply but I live in Zimbabwe where email can be > erratic and only yesterday managed to get back online. > > Echna was careful to say that he had not read all of Latour. His critique > of Latour's earlier work is quite justifiable. However, Latour's more rec= ent > work was surprisingly unsympathetic towards the constructivist turn. > > For example, you may be interested to know that Latour gave a keynote > address at Keele University in 1997 entitled "On Recalling ANT", in which= he > describes ANT as 'managerial, engineering, Machiavellian, demiurgic'. > Basically, he felt that ANT, as it was being largely interpreted, was > susceptible to the critique of being demiurgic on the one hand and result= ing > in the death of man on the other. By this I assume he means the oscillati= on > between voluntarism (demiurgic tendency) and determinism (death of man > tendency) that Bhaskar described in his lead up to giving his > Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA). Latour was concerned th= at > 'actor' was being given the role of agency and 'network' that of structur= e, > magically turning one into the other like the social construction theory = of > Berger and Luckman. I agree that Bhaskar's TMSA conception is clearer and > better justified that Latour's circulating actor network, but they do see= m > similar to me. As did Giddens and Bhaskar, Latour sees the actors and the > networks (individuals and society?) as both being connected and influenci= ng > each other, but unlike Giddens and similar to Bhaskar, Latour insists on = the > historicity of the process. Also, Latour describes the way that the socia= l > can 'travel endlessly without encountering the micro-level' (individuals?= ), > which seems similar to Bhaskar's TMSA diagram in which society and > individuals are on parallel tracks. They are distinct, autonomously causa= lly > efficacious, yet closely related, transforming and reproducing each other= . > By definition, parallel lines can travel endlessly but never encounter ea= ch > other. Diagrammatically, then, Bhaskar has used a similar metaphor to > Latour's verbal metaphor of 'travelling endlessly without encountering ea= ch > other' (but nevertheless aeffecting each other). > > Despite this similarity, what then throws the realist is Latour's stateme= nt > that the social 'is turned from a province of reality to a circulation'. = I > understand why he says this, he wants to avoid social determinism, howeve= r, > it is an undeniably uncritical realist statement. But this paper was writ= ten > in 1997 and by 2004, Latour was to critique himself and his followers eve= n > further and to revindicate reality. He wrote a paper 'Why has critique ru= n > out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern' (Critical Inqui= ry > 30, 2004). I hope the quote that follows is not too long, but I wanted to > give you an idea of how worried Latour was by the way his work was being > used...worried enough to admit he perhaps he 'did not mean what he said' > (Bhaskar has also said of Derrida, that he probably 'did not mean what he > said'). > > "While we spend years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind > the appearance of objective statements, do we now have to reveal the real > objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of > prejudices? And yet entire Ph.D programs are still running to make sure t= hat > good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up (...) > that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak from a > standpoint and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very same > argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could s= ave > our lives. Was I wrong to participate in this invention of this field kno= wn > as science studies? Is it enough to say that we did not really mean what = we > said? Why does it burn my tongue to say that global warming is a fact > whether you like it or not? Why can't I simply say that the argument is > closed for good? > Should I reassure myself by simply saying that the bad guys can use any > weapon at hand, naturalized facts when it suits them and social construct= ion > when it suits them? Should we apologise for having been wrong all the tim= e? > (...) Or should we do a bit of soul-searching here: what were we really > after when we were so intent on showing the scientific construction of > facts?" > > Later Latour also writes: "My argument is that a certain form of critical > spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the wrong > enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong sort = of > allies because of a little mistake in the definition of its main target. = The > question was never to get away from facts, but closer to them, not fighti= ng > empiricism but renewing empiricism". Latour also argues that we need to > "cultivate a stubbornly realist attitude". He says that "The mistake we > made, the mistake I made, was to believe there was no efficient way to > criticise matters of fact except by moving away from them and directing > attention toward the conditions that made them possible". > > The reason I have gone to this trouble to show Latour's move from irreali= sm > to realism (but not the na=C3=AFve realism of typical scientistic empiric= ism) is > because I would like to encourage critical realists not to quickly throw = out > the baby with the bathwater, so to speak, when they decide to disregard > Latour's work. The reason we might want to engage with the work of Latour= or > Donna Haraway (also a professed non realist) is because they have spent > years trying to understand how language can be used in a Machiavellian wa= y > to oppress people. Bhaskar talks about oppressive demi-reality, and I > suspect that it is this demi-reality that these thinkers are engaging wit= h, > albeit they say it is unreal. It is demi-reality which most needs our > attention right now, if we are to facilitate a move towards the flourishi= ng > of humankind. > > There are other similarities between Latour and Critical Realism, such as > his objection to polemical debate and his talk about the oscillation betw= een > naturalised facts and social construction (which reminds me of Sayer's > concept of the pomo flips). I think his humility in being able to adjust = his > ideas in the face of contradictions, and his attempt to try and make his > ideas more inclusive (of totality), is a brilliant model of Critical Real= ist > praxis. We may not agree with everything Latour says, but we can learn a = lot > from his humble academic process which, in allowing for the possibility o= f > mistake, gets him closer to an adequate conception. His ability to admit > the inadequacy of his early writing also shows that Khun was wrong about = how > tightly academics cling to their theories... > > Mark Johnson was interested in the way that constructivism seems to be > quite humane, as it seems to avoid strong arguments about rightness and > wrongness. However, as Latour shows, even extremists/fundamentalists can = now > make use of constructivism (e.g. we have fundamentalist Capitalists argui= ng > that global warming is just a construct). I have written too much already= , > but Latour offers a way to be critical without being polemical. > > As far as our efforts to bring credibility to CR goes, to have a main > architect of the extreme social constructivist movement provide such > critique of that discipline, and to have that critique include a > revindication of realism, lends powerful support to our realist position. > However, this is not to say that Latour's position is as complete as > Bhaskar's (for example, as someone wrote earlier, it does not have a > conception of the stratification of reality). > > Again, apologies that my contribution has taken so long to be returned. > > Best wishes, > > Leigh > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto: > critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna > Sent: 25 August 2009 14:02 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > > Hi David, hi all, > > first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really > insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your > mail when you state that Latour=C2=B4s position can=C2=B4t be reconciled = - it is > just contradictory. I don=C2=B4t know all of Latour=C2=B4s work, but for = example > in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his > "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong > constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout > the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn=C2=B4s contradictory sentence that > scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don=C2= =B4t > do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, > like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just > constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real > formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common > cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). > Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an > "ontological tension", as one can=C2=B4t talk about ontology in purely > epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are > then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments > in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be > rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? > Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour > and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all > the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and > that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it > has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others > is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, > as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by > scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing > of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability > unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in > general. > The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as > Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. > When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not > much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes > structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then > suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be > contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I > don=C2=B4t know all of Latour=C2=B4s work (or I am misstaken about his th= eory - > but one last thing: Latour=C2=B4s very essayistic and loose style is not > really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more > confusion) > > best, > e > > d.eldervass@ntlworld.com schrieb: > > Hi Echna, and listers! > > > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a > touch more coherently. > > > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say > here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour > acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empiric= al' > (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not > actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's > 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observed= by > human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon kno= wn > as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theorise= d > by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and > common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it w= as > observed, but we just didn't know about it. > > > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this > contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm > offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered > explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong > constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll sugge= st > some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). > > > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how > accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an author= ity > on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructiv= ism > in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour > takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of > constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanitie= s) > has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in > philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on > reflection. > > > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a ver= y > odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scienti= sts > observe and theorise them? > > > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the > world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on = the > categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, > space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We c= an > never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filte= red > through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we c= an > know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the > world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, > when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not > referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, = but > to the world-as-we-experience-it. > > > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience > depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on > concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) > positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social > constructionists argue that these are social products, and although Latou= r > rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of > constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be take= n > as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists employ > rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. > > > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our > categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical work= , > then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientist= s > change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of > Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world > about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong > constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us o= f > the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out > there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by science= , > therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence o= f > this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our > 'world'. > > > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not > aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for s= ure > whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way = of > making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made wit= hin > the constructivist tradition. > > > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the > contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excell= ent > book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge'= ) > that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply > wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but they > are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have > enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our > categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the > actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enabl= e > us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about o= ur > environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those = in > which our perceptual abilities developed). > > > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influen= ce > on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on o= ur > perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between > reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is > difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the > world-in-itself. > > > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that t= he > descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves stron= gly > influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite o= f > the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories > implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. > > > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, = I > have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainly > misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his > account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the > inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to > behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view > that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' > theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is > motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also som= e > recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This = is > arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the > undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their > perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts t= o > approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including inanimat= e > objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other t= o > produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. > > > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about > the phases of Venus. > > > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome vie= ws > on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to ma= ke > sense of Latour's ontology. > > > > Best, > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- d.eldervass@ntlworld.com wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. > >> > > > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different > sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different > from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existin= g > external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't hav= e > any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that > science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other > hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe > did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is difficult= to > make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. = He > seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distincti= on > is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the > world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps =3D 'the phenomenal world' thought > interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because > Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as = if > the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they > only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no pi= ont > in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed= to > depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as = our > cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at > the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of t= he > world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in > that world. > > > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that > (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! > > > > best > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- b86102052@ntu.edu.tw wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > > > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may > > be helpful too. > > > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. =E2=80=9CSearching for Realism, Structure and A= gency > > in Actor Network Theory,=E2=80=9D The British Journal of Sociology, 59(= 3): > > 455-73. > > > > Best wishes, > > Poe > > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > > Department of Sociology > > National Taiwan University > > > > > > =E5=BC=95=E8=BF=B0 Matthew Smith : > > > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main > >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: > >> > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net= -theo.pdf). > I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which > touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the > perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literatur= e > (here: > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=3DArticleURL&_udi=3DB6W7M-4JWFH1= P-1&_user=3D10&_rdoc=3D1&_fmt=3D&_orig=3Dsearch&_sort=3Dd&_docanchor=3D&vie= w=3Dc&_searchStrId=3D981817881&_rerunOrigin=3Dscholar.google&_acct=3DC00005= 0221&_version=3D1&_urlVersion=3D0&_userid=3D10&md5=3D67a7cdfdd26aa90032f279= 2438e3ab4d). > If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently do= n't > have it online or accessible from where I currently > >> am. > >> > >> > >> Best, > >> Matthew > >> > >> > >> ----- Message initial ---- > >> De : echna > >> =C3=80 : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > >> > >> Envoy=C3=A9 le : dimanche 16 ao=C3=BBt 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > >> > >> Hi all, > >> > >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from > >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS= ) > >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can > >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemologica= l > >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the > >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontolog= y > >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik > >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno > >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law eve= n > >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description = of > >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don=C2=B4t have an overview over th= e whole > >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind = of > >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by eithe= r > >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the > list). > >> > >> best wishes, > >> e > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > >> > >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr=C3=A2ce =C3=A0 Yahoo! Courriel > >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From johnsonmwj1@googlemail.com Thu Sep 03 06:27:41 2009 Received: from ipo3.cc.utah.edu ([155.97.131.71]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MjBPf-00028d-4H for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Thu, 03 Sep 2009 06:27:39 -0600 X-SBRS: 4.4 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AtACAGtTn0rRVdrikGdsb2JhbACCJDKNOooLYj8BAQEBCQkMBxMDrj0BBSAFCI97AQWCKAUGEgiBToRIhDuBYw X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.44,325,1249279200"; d="scan'208";a="24382956" Received: from mail-bw0-f226.google.com ([209.85.218.226]) by ipo3.cc.utah.edu with ESMTP; 03 Sep 2009 06:27:14 -0600 Received: by bwz26 with SMTP id 26so1422162bwz.23 for ; Thu, 03 Sep 2009 05:27:13 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: johnsonmwj1@googlemail.com Received: by 10.204.163.11 with SMTP id y11mr7900782bkx.89.1251980832689; Thu, 03 Sep 2009 05:27:12 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <14D7108B324C4E0DB407347A3305FA25@leighlaptop> References: <20090824193442.GN9HF.486838.root@web01-winn.ispmail.private.ntl.com> <4A93D2B7.3090303@gmx.net> <14D7108B324C4E0DB407347A3305FA25@leighlaptop> Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 13:27:12 +0100 X-Google-Sender-Auth: cde615a3e13ebacc Message-ID: From: Mark Johnson To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.9 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Sep 2009 12:27:50 -0000 Hi Leigh, Thanks very much for the Latour quote - personally I found it quite moving: it is a classic example of an 'inspection of conscience'. Such shifts of position are personally hard for people because it involves a shift in personal identity. You're right that constructivists are not immune from fundamentalism... I would only suggest that insistence on 'reality' can mak= e one more susceptible to it (even, as is common in constructivism, it is the implicit ontology of the 'reality' of constructivism). Personally, I don't think we can escape the fact that our identities (critical realists, constructivists, jedi...) are tied to positions and assertions of what's real and what isn't. But how do we move forward? It strikes me that this must be a methodologica= l development.. and more particularly one which takes account of diverse perspectives and diverse identities which are nonetheless 'real' (or at least part of a personal identity) to those who possess them (even the climate change deniers!). Establishing real mechanisms in it all must surel= y be a participative and appreciative exercise and not one where one set of distinctions (Roy's, Latour's or anyone else's) holds sway. If Roy is right and the reality behind individual perspectives can be revealed, the process of revealing it collaboratively can itself be transformative ("if you think climate change is not happening, what's your theory for what's going on whe= n the ice-caps are melting?"... "what if you're wrong?"... etc.). But I think to make that work, an understanding of a real world must coexist with an understanding of ourselves as passionate, identity-seeking, distinction-making entities. Mark On Thu, Sep 3, 2009 at 12:15 PM, Leigh Price wrote: > Hello again, and many thanks for everyone's contributions > > Sorry to take so long to reply but I live in Zimbabwe where email can be > erratic and only yesterday managed to get back online. > > Echna was careful to say that he had not read all of Latour. His critique > of Latour's earlier work is quite justifiable. However, Latour's more rec= ent > work was surprisingly unsympathetic towards the constructivist turn. > > For example, you may be interested to know that Latour gave a keynote > address at Keele University in 1997 entitled "On Recalling ANT", in which= he > describes ANT as 'managerial, engineering, Machiavellian, demiurgic'. > Basically, he felt that ANT, as it was being largely interpreted, was > susceptible to the critique of being demiurgic on the one hand and result= ing > in the death of man on the other. By this I assume he means the oscillati= on > between voluntarism (demiurgic tendency) and determinism (death of man > tendency) that Bhaskar described in his lead up to giving his > Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA). Latour was concerned th= at > 'actor' was being given the role of agency and 'network' that of structur= e, > magically turning one into the other like the social construction theory = of > Berger and Luckman. I agree that Bhaskar's TMSA conception is clearer and > better justified that Latour's circulating actor network, but they do see= m > similar to me. As did Giddens and Bhaskar, Latour sees the actors and the > networks (individuals and society?) as both being connected and influenci= ng > each other, but unlike Giddens and similar to Bhaskar, Latour insists on = the > historicity of the process. Also, Latour describes the way that the socia= l > can 'travel endlessly without encountering the micro-level' (individuals?= ), > which seems similar to Bhaskar's TMSA diagram in which society and > individuals are on parallel tracks. They are distinct, autonomously causa= lly > efficacious, yet closely related, transforming and reproducing each other= . > By definition, parallel lines can travel endlessly but never encounter ea= ch > other. Diagrammatically, then, Bhaskar has used a similar metaphor to > Latour's verbal metaphor of 'travelling endlessly without encountering ea= ch > other' (but nevertheless aeffecting each other). > > Despite this similarity, what then throws the realist is Latour's stateme= nt > that the social 'is turned from a province of reality to a circulation'. = I > understand why he says this, he wants to avoid social determinism, howeve= r, > it is an undeniably uncritical realist statement. But this paper was writ= ten > in 1997 and by 2004, Latour was to critique himself and his followers eve= n > further and to revindicate reality. He wrote a paper 'Why has critique ru= n > out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern' (Critical Inqui= ry > 30, 2004). I hope the quote that follows is not too long, but I wanted to > give you an idea of how worried Latour was by the way his work was being > used...worried enough to admit he perhaps he 'did not mean what he said' > (Bhaskar has also said of Derrida, that he probably 'did not mean what he > said'). > > "While we spend years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind > the appearance of objective statements, do we now have to reveal the real > objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of > prejudices? And yet entire Ph.D programs are still running to make sure t= hat > good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up (...) > that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak from a > standpoint and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very same > argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could s= ave > our lives. Was I wrong to participate in this invention of this field kno= wn > as science studies? Is it enough to say that we did not really mean what = we > said? Why does it burn my tongue to say that global warming is a fact > whether you like it or not? Why can't I simply say that the argument is > closed for good? > Should I reassure myself by simply saying that the bad guys can use any > weapon at hand, naturalized facts when it suits them and social construct= ion > when it suits them? Should we apologise for having been wrong all the tim= e? > (...) Or should we do a bit of soul-searching here: what were we really > after when we were so intent on showing the scientific construction of > facts?" > > Later Latour also writes: "My argument is that a certain form of critical > spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the wrong > enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong sort = of > allies because of a little mistake in the definition of its main target. = The > question was never to get away from facts, but closer to them, not fighti= ng > empiricism but renewing empiricism". Latour also argues that we need to > "cultivate a stubbornly realist attitude". He says that "The mistake we > made, the mistake I made, was to believe there was no efficient way to > criticise matters of fact except by moving away from them and directing > attention toward the conditions that made them possible". > > The reason I have gone to this trouble to show Latour's move from irreali= sm > to realism (but not the na=C3=AFve realism of typical scientistic empiric= ism) is > because I would like to encourage critical realists not to quickly throw = out > the baby with the bathwater, so to speak, when they decide to disregard > Latour's work. The reason we might want to engage with the work of Latour= or > Donna Haraway (also a professed non realist) is because they have spent > years trying to understand how language can be used in a Machiavellian wa= y > to oppress people. Bhaskar talks about oppressive demi-reality, and I > suspect that it is this demi-reality that these thinkers are engaging wit= h, > albeit they say it is unreal. It is demi-reality which most needs our > attention right now, if we are to facilitate a move towards the flourishi= ng > of humankind. > > There are other similarities between Latour and Critical Realism, such as > his objection to polemical debate and his talk about the oscillation betw= een > naturalised facts and social construction (which reminds me of Sayer's > concept of the pomo flips). I think his humility in being able to adjust = his > ideas in the face of contradictions, and his attempt to try and make his > ideas more inclusive (of totality), is a brilliant model of Critical Real= ist > praxis. We may not agree with everything Latour says, but we can learn a = lot > from his humble academic process which, in allowing for the possibility o= f > mistake, gets him closer to an adequate conception. His ability to admit > the inadequacy of his early writing also shows that Khun was wrong about = how > tightly academics cling to their theories... > > Mark Johnson was interested in the way that constructivism seems to be > quite humane, as it seems to avoid strong arguments about rightness and > wrongness. However, as Latour shows, even extremists/fundamentalists can = now > make use of constructivism (e.g. we have fundamentalist Capitalists argui= ng > that global warming is just a construct). I have written too much already= , > but Latour offers a way to be critical without being polemical. > > As far as our efforts to bring credibility to CR goes, to have a main > architect of the extreme social constructivist movement provide such > critique of that discipline, and to have that critique include a > revindication of realism, lends powerful support to our realist position. > However, this is not to say that Latour's position is as complete as > Bhaskar's (for example, as someone wrote earlier, it does not have a > conception of the stratification of reality). > > Again, apologies that my contribution has taken so long to be returned. > > Best wishes, > > Leigh > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto: > critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna > Sent: 25 August 2009 14:02 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > > Hi David, hi all, > > first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really > insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your > mail when you state that Latour=C2=B4s position can=C2=B4t be reconciled = - it is > just contradictory. I don=C2=B4t know all of Latour=C2=B4s work, but for = example > in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his > "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong > constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout > the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn=C2=B4s contradictory sentence that > scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don=C2= =B4t > do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, > like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just > constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real > formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common > cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). > Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an > "ontological tension", as one can=C2=B4t talk about ontology in purely > epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are > then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments > in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be > rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? > Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour > and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all > the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and > that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it > has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others > is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, > as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by > scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing > of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability > unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in > general. > The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as > Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. > When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not > much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes > structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then > suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be > contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I > don=C2=B4t know all of Latour=C2=B4s work (or I am misstaken about his th= eory - > but one last thing: Latour=C2=B4s very essayistic and loose style is not > really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more > confusion) > > best, > e > > d.eldervass@ntlworld.com schrieb: > > Hi Echna, and listers! > > > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this a > touch more coherently. > > > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to say > here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour > acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empiric= al' > (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not > actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's > 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observed= by > human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon kno= wn > as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and theorise= d > by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and > common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it w= as > observed, but we just didn't know about it. > > > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this > contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm > offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered > explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong > constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll sugge= st > some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). > > > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious how > accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an author= ity > on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructiv= ism > in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour > takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of > constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanitie= s) > has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in > philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on > reflection. > > > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a ver= y > odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scienti= sts > observe and theorise them? > > > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the > world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on = the > categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of time, > space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We c= an > never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filte= red > through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we c= an > know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the > world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. So, > when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not > referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, = but > to the world-as-we-experience-it. > > > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience > depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on > concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) > positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social > constructionists argue that these are social products, and although Latou= r > rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of > constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be take= n > as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists employ > rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. > > > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our > categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical work= , > then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when scientist= s > change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of > Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world > about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong > constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us o= f > the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out > there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by science= , > therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence o= f > this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our > 'world'. > > > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not > aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for s= ure > whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way = of > making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made wit= hin > the constructivist tradition. > > > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the > contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excell= ent > book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge'= ) > that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply > wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but they > are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have > enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our > categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of the > actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that enabl= e > us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about o= ur > environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those = in > which our perceptual abilities developed). > > > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influen= ce > on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on o= ur > perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between > reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is > difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the > world-in-itself. > > > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that t= he > descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves stron= gly > influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite o= f > the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories > implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. > > > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, = I > have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certainly > misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his > account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the > inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to > behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view > that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' > theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is > motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also som= e > recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This = is > arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the > undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their > perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts t= o > approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including inanimat= e > objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other t= o > produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. > > > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim about > the phases of Venus. > > > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome vie= ws > on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to ma= ke > sense of Latour's ontology. > > > > Best, > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- d.eldervass@ntlworld.com wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. > >> > > > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different > sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different > from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existin= g > external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't hav= e > any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that > science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other > hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists describe > did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is difficult= to > make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. = He > seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distincti= on > is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the > world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps =3D 'the phenomenal world' thought > interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' because > Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as = if > the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they > only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no pi= ont > in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deemed= to > depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as = our > cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking at > the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of t= he > world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in > that world. > > > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that > (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! > > > > best > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- b86102052@ntu.edu.tw wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > > > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may > > be helpful too. > > > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. =E2=80=9CSearching for Realism, Structure and A= gency > > in Actor Network Theory,=E2=80=9D The British Journal of Sociology, 59(= 3): > > 455-73. > > > > Best wishes, > > Poe > > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > > Department of Sociology > > National Taiwan University > > > > > > =E5=BC=95=E8=BF=B0 Matthew Smith : > > > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main > >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: > >> > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net= -theo.pdf). > I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which > touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the > perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems literatur= e > (here: > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=3DArticleURL&_udi=3DB6W7M-4JWFH1= P-1&_user=3D10&_rdoc=3D1&_fmt=3D&_orig=3Dsearch&_sort=3Dd&_docanchor=3D&vie= w=3Dc&_searchStrId=3D981817881&_rerunOrigin=3Dscholar.google&_acct=3DC00005= 0221&_version=3D1&_urlVersion=3D0&_userid=3D10&md5=3D67a7cdfdd26aa90032f279= 2438e3ab4d). > If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently do= n't > have it online or accessible from where I currently > >> am. > >> > >> > >> Best, > >> Matthew > >> > >> > >> ----- Message initial ---- > >> De : echna > >> =C3=80 : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > >> > >> Envoy=C3=A9 le : dimanche 16 ao=C3=BBt 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > >> > >> Hi all, > >> > >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from > >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" (STS= ) > >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can > >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemologica= l > >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by the > >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of ontolog= y > >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik > >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno > >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law eve= n > >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description = of > >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don=C2=B4t have an overview over th= e whole > >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind = of > >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by eithe= r > >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the > list). > >> > >> best wishes, > >> e > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > >> > >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr=C3=A2ce =C3=A0 Yahoo! Courriel > >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > --=20 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------= ------ Mark Johnson Institute for Educational Cybernetics University of Bolton BL3 5AB Tel. 01204 903567 Mob. 0778 6064505 From dpilgrim@uclan.ac.uk Thu Sep 03 13:01:38 2009 Received: from ipo4hsc.utah.edu ([155.97.131.100]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MjHYw-00039Z-Ns; Thu, 03 Sep 2009 13:01:38 -0600 X-SBRS: -0.1 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AvsDAFavn0rBPf8SY2dsb2JhbACQEYsiFwsICRSvRAiPfIIoBQYSCIFOBYFYgmyGHic X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.44,326,1249279200"; d="scan'208";a="194122160" Received: from mail3.uclan.ac.uk ([193.61.255.18]) by ipo4.cc.utah.edu with ESMTP; 03 Sep 2009 13:01:31 -0600 Received: from lmia-021.ntds.uclan.ac.uk ([172.31.2.113] helo=gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk) by mail3.uclan.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1MjHYm-0004Xp-Fm; Thu, 03 Sep 2009 20:01:28 +0100 Received: from DI21-MTA by gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk with Novell_GroupWise; Thu, 03 Sep 2009 20:01:28 +0100 Message-Id: <4AA0207D020000EB000B3699@gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk> X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise Internet Agent 7.0.2 Date: Thu, 03 Sep 2009 20:01:01 +0100 From: "David Pilgrim" To: , Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: inline Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Sep 2009 19:01:39 -0000 Thanks to Mark and Leigh for this illuminating exchange. Any references to = the objections of RB and Latour to 'polemical debate' would be gratefully = received. Dave David Pilgrim Professor of Mental Health Policy Department of Social Work Faculty of Health University of Central Lancashire Preston PR1 2HE Tel +44 (0)1772 893458 Fax +44 (0)1772 892974 Email DPilgrim@uclan.ac.uk >>> 03/09/09 7:00 PM >>> Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request@lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner@lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Re : CR and STS (Mark Johnson) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 13:27:12 +0100 From: Mark Johnson Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=3DUTF-8 Hi Leigh, Thanks very much for the Latour quote - personally I found it quite = moving: it is a classic example of an 'inspection of conscience'. Such shifts of position are personally hard for people because it involves a shift in personal identity. You're right that constructivists are not immune from fundamentalism... I would only suggest that insistence on 'reality' can = make one more susceptible to it (even, as is common in constructivism, it is = the implicit ontology of the 'reality' of constructivism). Personally, I don't think we can escape the fact that our identities (critical realists, constructivists, jedi...) are tied to positions and assertions of what's real and what isn't. But how do we move forward? It strikes me that this must be a methodologica= l development.. and more particularly one which takes account of diverse perspectives and diverse identities which are nonetheless 'real' (or at least part of a personal identity) to those who possess them (even the climate change deniers!). Establishing real mechanisms in it all must = surely be a participative and appreciative exercise and not one where one set of distinctions (Roy's, Latour's or anyone else's) holds sway. If Roy is = right and the reality behind individual perspectives can be revealed, the = process of revealing it collaboratively can itself be transformative ("if you = think climate change is not happening, what's your theory for what's going on = when the ice-caps are melting?"... "what if you're wrong?"... etc.). But I = think to make that work, an understanding of a real world must coexist with an understanding of ourselves as passionate, identity-seeking, distinction-making entities. Mark On Thu, Sep 3, 2009 at 12:15 PM, Leigh Price wrote: > Hello again, and many thanks for everyone's contributions > > Sorry to take so long to reply but I live in Zimbabwe where email can be > erratic and only yesterday managed to get back online. > > Echna was careful to say that he had not read all of Latour. His = critique > of Latour's earlier work is quite justifiable. However, Latour's more = recent > work was surprisingly unsympathetic towards the constructivist turn. > > For example, you may be interested to know that Latour gave a keynote > address at Keele University in 1997 entitled "On Recalling ANT", in = which he > describes ANT as 'managerial, engineering, Machiavellian, demiurgic'. > Basically, he felt that ANT, as it was being largely interpreted, was > susceptible to the critique of being demiurgic on the one hand and = resulting > in the death of man on the other. By this I assume he means the = oscillation > between voluntarism (demiurgic tendency) and determinism (death of man > tendency) that Bhaskar described in his lead up to giving his > Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA). Latour was concerned = that > 'actor' was being given the role of agency and 'network' that of = structure, > magically turning one into the other like the social construction theory = of > Berger and Luckman. I agree that Bhaskar's TMSA conception is clearer = and > better justified that Latour's circulating actor network, but they do = seem > similar to me. As did Giddens and Bhaskar, Latour sees the actors and = the > networks (individuals and society?) as both being connected and = influencing > each other, but unlike Giddens and similar to Bhaskar, Latour insists on = the > historicity of the process. Also, Latour describes the way that the = social > can 'travel endlessly without encountering the micro-level' (individuals?= ), > which seems similar to Bhaskar's TMSA diagram in which society and > individuals are on parallel tracks. They are distinct, autonomously = causally > efficacious, yet closely related, transforming and reproducing each = other. > By definition, parallel lines can travel endlessly but never encounter = each > other. Diagrammatically, then, Bhaskar has used a similar metaphor to > Latour's verbal metaphor of 'travelling endlessly without encountering = each > other' (but nevertheless aeffecting each other). > > Despite this similarity, what then throws the realist is Latour's = statement > that the social 'is turned from a province of reality to a circulation'. = I > understand why he says this, he wants to avoid social determinism, = however, > it is an undeniably uncritical realist statement. But this paper was = written > in 1997 and by 2004, Latour was to critique himself and his followers = even > further and to revindicate reality. He wrote a paper 'Why has critique = run > out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern' (Critical = Inquiry > 30, 2004). I hope the quote that follows is not too long, but I wanted = to > give you an idea of how worried Latour was by the way his work was being > used...worried enough to admit he perhaps he 'did not mean what he said' > (Bhaskar has also said of Derrida, that he probably 'did not mean what = he > said'). > > "While we spend years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind > the appearance of objective statements, do we now have to reveal the = real > objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of > prejudices? And yet entire Ph.D programs are still running to make sure = that > good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up = (...) > that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak from a > standpoint and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very same > argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could = save > our lives. Was I wrong to participate in this invention of this field = known > as science studies? Is it enough to say that we did not really mean what = we > said? Why does it burn my tongue to say that global warming is a fact > whether you like it or not? Why can't I simply say that the argument is > closed for good? > Should I reassure myself by simply saying that the bad guys can use any > weapon at hand, naturalized facts when it suits them and social = construction > when it suits them? Should we apologise for having been wrong all the = time? > (...) Or should we do a bit of soul-searching here: what were we really > after when we were so intent on showing the scientific construction of > facts?" > > Later Latour also writes: "My argument is that a certain form of = critical > spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the = wrong > enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong sort = of > allies because of a little mistake in the definition of its main target. = The > question was never to get away from facts, but closer to them, not = fighting > empiricism but renewing empiricism". Latour also argues that we need to > "cultivate a stubbornly realist attitude". He says that "The mistake we > made, the mistake I made, was to believe there was no efficient way to > criticise matters of fact except by moving away from them and directing > attention toward the conditions that made them possible". > > The reason I have gone to this trouble to show Latour's move from = irrealism > to realism (but not the na?ve realism of typical scientistic empiricism) = is > because I would like to encourage critical realists not to quickly throw = out > the baby with the bathwater, so to speak, when they decide to disregard > Latour's work. The reason we might want to engage with the work of = Latour or > Donna Haraway (also a professed non realist) is because they have spent > years trying to understand how language can be used in a Machiavellian = way > to oppress people. Bhaskar talks about oppressive demi-reality, and I > suspect that it is this demi-reality that these thinkers are engaging = with, > albeit they say it is unreal. It is demi-reality which most needs our > attention right now, if we are to facilitate a move towards the = flourishing > of humankind. > > There are other similarities between Latour and Critical Realism, such = as > his objection to polemical debate and his talk about the oscillation = between > naturalised facts and social construction (which reminds me of Sayer's > concept of the pomo flips). I think his humility in being able to adjust = his > ideas in the face of contradictions, and his attempt to try and make his > ideas more inclusive (of totality), is a brilliant model of Critical = Realist > praxis. We may not agree with everything Latour says, but we can learn a = lot > from his humble academic process which, in allowing for the possibility = of > mistake, gets him closer to an adequate conception. His ability to = admit > the inadequacy of his early writing also shows that Khun was wrong about = how > tightly academics cling to their theories... > > Mark Johnson was interested in the way that constructivism seems to be > quite humane, as it seems to avoid strong arguments about rightness and > wrongness. However, as Latour shows, even extremists/fundamentalists can = now > make use of constructivism (e.g. we have fundamentalist Capitalists = arguing > that global warming is just a construct). I have written too much = already, > but Latour offers a way to be critical without being polemical. > > As far as our efforts to bring credibility to CR goes, to have a main > architect of the extreme social constructivist movement provide such > critique of that discipline, and to have that critique include a > revindication of realism, lends powerful support to our realist = position. > However, this is not to say that Latour's position is as complete as > Bhaskar's (for example, as someone wrote earlier, it does not have a > conception of the stratification of reality). > > Again, apologies that my contribution has taken so long to be returned. > > Best wishes, > > Leigh > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto: > critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna > Sent: 25 August 2009 14:02 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > > Hi David, hi all, > > first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really > insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your > mail when you state that Latour?s position can?t be reconciled - it is > just contradictory. I don?t know all of Latour?s work, but for example > in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his > "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong > constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout > the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn?s contradictory sentence that > scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don?t > do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, > like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just > constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real > formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common > cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). > Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to an > "ontological tension", as one can?t talk about ontology in purely > epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are > then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiments > in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be > rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? > Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour > and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all > the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and > that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties it > has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at others > is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society, > as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely by > scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousing > of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability > unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour in > general. > The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as > Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. > When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not > much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes > structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then > suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be > contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I > don?t know all of Latour?s work (or I am misstaken about his theory - > but one last thing: Latour?s very essayistic and loose style is not > really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more > confusion) > > best, > e > > d.eldervass@ntlworld.com schrieb: > > Hi Echna, and listers! > > > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this = a > touch more coherently. > > > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to = say > here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour > acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the = empirical' > (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not > actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's > 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not = observed by > human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon = known > as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and = theorised > by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and > common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it = was > observed, but we just didn't know about it. > > > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this > contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm > offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered > explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of strong > constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll = suggest > some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). > > > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious = how > accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an = authority > on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructiv= ism > in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latour > takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of > constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other = humanities) > has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in > philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on > reflection. > > > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a = very > odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until = scientists > observe and theorise them? > > > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the > world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends on = the > categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of = time, > space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We = can > never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always = filtered > through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we = can > know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the > world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. = So, > when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not > referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume, = but > to the world-as-we-experience-it. > > > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience > depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on > concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) > positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social > constructionists argue that these are social products, and although = Latour > rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of > constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be = taken > as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists employ > rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. > > > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our > categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical = work, > then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when = scientists > change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of > Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only world > about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that strong > constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us = of > the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out > there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by = science, > therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence = of > this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our > 'world'. > > > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not > aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for = sure > whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a way = of > making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made = within > the constructivist tradition. > > > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the > contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her = excellent > book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of knowledge'= ) > that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simply > wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but = they > are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have > enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our > categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of = the > actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that = enable > us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about = our > environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to those = in > which our perceptual abilities developed). > > > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an = influence > on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on = our > perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between > reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that is > difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the > world-in-itself. > > > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that = the > descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves = strongly > influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite = of > the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories > implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. > > > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument, = I > have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost = certainly > misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his > account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the > inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse to > behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the view > that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' > theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is > motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also = some > recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. This = is > arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the > undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their > perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts = to > approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including = inanimate > objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other = to > produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. > > > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim = about > the phases of Venus. > > > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome = views > on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to = make > sense of Latour's ontology. > > > > Best, > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- d.eldervass@ntlworld.com wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. > >> > > > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a different > sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite different > from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a pre-existin= g > external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't = have > any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that > science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the other > hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists = describe > did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is = difficult to > make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism. = He > seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a = distinction > is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the > world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps =3D 'the phenomenal world' thought > interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' = because > Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on as = if > the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that they > only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no = piont > in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is = deemed to > depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well as = our > cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking = at > the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of = the > world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence in > that world. > > > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope that > (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! > > > > best > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- b86102052@ntu.edu.tw wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > > > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, may > > be helpful too. > > > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency > > in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): > > 455-73. > > > > Best wishes, > > Poe > > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > > Department of Sociology > > National Taiwan University > > > > > > ?? Matthew Smith : > > > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main > >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: > >> > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net= -theo.pdf). > I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which > touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from the > perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems = literature > (here: > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=3DArticleURL&_udi=3DB6W7M-4JWFH1= P-1&_user=3D10&_rdoc=3D1&_fmt=3D&_orig=3Dsearch&_sort=3Dd&_docanchor=3D&vie= w=3Dc&_searchStrId=3D981817881&_rerunOrigin=3Dscholar.google&_acct=3DC00005= 0221&_version=3D1&_urlVersion=3D0&_userid=3D10&md5=3D67a7cdfdd26aa90032f279= 2438e3ab4d). > If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently = don't > have it online or accessible from where I currently > >> am. > >> > >> > >> Best, > >> Matthew > >> > >> > >> ----- Message initial ---- > >> De : echna > >> ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > >> > >> Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > >> > >> Hi all, > >> > >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement from > >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" = (STS) > >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can > >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in epistemologica= l > >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by = the > >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of = ontology > >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwik > >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bruno > >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law = even > >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short description = of > >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the = whole > >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kind = of > >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by = either > >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the > list). > >> > >> best wishes, > >> e > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > >> > >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel > >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > --=20 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------= ------ Mark Johnson Institute for Educational Cybernetics University of Bolton BL3 5AB Tel. 01204 903567 Mob. 0778 6064505 ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 *********************************************** From briandick51@gmail.com Thu Sep 03 20:30:47 2009 Received: from ipo4hsc.utah.edu ([155.97.131.100]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MjOZb-0003ay-9Q for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Thu, 03 Sep 2009 20:30:47 -0600 X-SBRS: 4.4 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AgICAAAZoErRVdOxkGdsb2JhbACCIzOPLYh8PwEBAQEJCQwHEwOtRoEnkCsBAwIEgimBbgWBWIkK X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.44,329,1249279200"; d="scan'208";a="194283917" Received: from mail-yw0-f177.google.com ([209.85.211.177]) by ipo4.cc.utah.edu with ESMTP; 03 Sep 2009 20:30:41 -0600 Received: by ywh7 with SMTP id 7so994140ywh.21 for ; Thu, 03 Sep 2009 19:30:41 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.231.124.166 with SMTP id u38mr9704711ibr.17.1252031440844; Thu, 03 Sep 2009 19:30:40 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 19:30:40 -0700 Message-ID: <4a0badc00909031930vcad9bbejb5ead3cf0687e408@mail.gmail.com> From: Brian Dick To: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.9 Subject: [Critical-Realism] =?utf-8?b?UmUgOiBDUiBhbmQgU1RT4oCP?= X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 04 Sep 2009 02:30:47 -0000 Hi all, Thanks for the informative discussion of STS and CR. I know that Peter Manicas has discussed CR in relation to David Bloor's strong programme, but I haven't come across much else. Peter T. Manicas and Alan Rosenberg. 1985. "Naturalism, Epistemological Individualism and "The Strong Programme" in the Sociology of Knowledge." Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior. 15(1): 76-101. http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/120031188/abstract I haven't seen Bhaskar referenced in the STS literature, although its been a few years since I've explicitly looked, with the exception of a footnote in Harry Collins' book Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, 1985, p. 25 (footnote 11). Here is the entire footnote: "Bhaskar (1975) erects a whole philosophy upon the distinction between open and closed systems. Unfortunately he draws the dividing line in the wrong place. He accounts for the apparent success of science by its ability to develop theories which work within closed systems; these are experiments conducted within the walls of the laboratory. He believes that the environment of experiments can be controlled so that experimental situations are usefully thought of as closed. As the descriptions of experimental practice to be found in Chapters Three to Six will show, he is wrong in thinking of th experiemnt as a closed system. The internal workings of a developed computer are probably the nearest thing we have to a closed system in practical terms. This may be because it resembles a theoretical system as near can be, and these are the only really closed systems." For Collins, the problem of induction, like what he terms the "experimenter's regress," requires a sociological resolution. Best, Brian From ruth@ruthnaylor.com Sat Sep 05 06:43:27 2009 Received: from ipo3.cc.utah.edu ([155.97.131.71]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1Mjuc3-00064u-Jv for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Sat, 05 Sep 2009 06:43:27 -0600 X-SBRS: 4.1 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: Aq8BALT5oUrUnwdkjWdsb2JhbACQDYsvAQEBAQkJCgkRBrxBhBcFhECGGA X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.44,337,1249279200"; d="scan'208";a="25237245" Received: from relay.pcl-ipout02.plus.net ([212.159.7.100]) by ipo3.cc.utah.edu with ESMTP; 05 Sep 2009 06:43:21 -0600 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: ApsEAID5oUrUnw4U/2dsb2JhbACQDcgwhBcFhECGGA Received: from pih-relay08.plus.net ([212.159.14.20]) by relay.pcl-ipout02.plus.net with ESMTP; 05 Sep 2009 13:43:20 +0100 Received: from [87.115.2.32] (helo=[192.168.1.2]) by pih-relay08.plus.net with esmtpa (Exim) id 1Mjubv-0001DR-Pf for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Sat, 05 Sep 2009 13:43:20 +0100 Message-ID: <4AA25CE4.6020607@ruthnaylor.com> Date: Sat, 05 Sep 2009 13:43:16 +0100 From: Ruth T Naylor User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.23 (Windows/20090812) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu References: In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Plusnet-Relay: 6b99240c4d579285f4b816bbd6906c52 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Weblink on this volume is reported as an attack site when I try to open it - X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 05 Sep 2009 12:43:28 -0000 Yes, I am behind in my reading! Do we have an updated, safe site to look at for this opportunity? Thanks, Ruth critical-realism-request@lists.econ.utah.edu wrote: > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request@lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner@lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Interested in Research Projects (bwanika@yahoo.com) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2009 22:26:09 -0700 (PDT) > From: bwanika@yahoo.com > Subject: [Critical-Realism] Interested in Research Projects > To: Critical Realism > Message-ID: <198946.18163.qm@web58403.mail.re3.yahoo.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 > > CR Listers! > > > You can > initiate and work on your own research with the support of?Kampala > University in Uganda. http://www.ku.ac.ug/Academic_Research_Projects.htm > > ? > > Just write > to the Vice Chancellor at vc@ku.ac.ug > > Copy to > director for planning and development at dpd@ku.ac.ug > and deputy vice chancellor academics dvc@ku.ac.ug > > > ? > > > > > Dan. > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 56, Issue 4 > *********************************************** > > From postmaster@econ.cam.ac.uk Sat Sep 05 06:44:13 2009 Received: from ipo3.cc.utah.edu ([155.97.131.71]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1Mjucn-00065B-Ql for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Sat, 05 Sep 2009 06:44:13 -0600 X-SBRS: 4.5 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: At4AALT5oUqDbwiCkWdsb2JhbACQMgGLCQEBAQEJCwoHEwU8vASEFwWKWA X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.44,337,1249279200"; d="scan'208";a="25237374" Received: from ppsw-0.csi.cam.ac.uk ([131.111.8.130]) by ipo3.cc.utah.edu with ESMTP; 05 Sep 2009 06:44:08 -0600 X-Cam-AntiVirus: no malware found X-Cam-SpamDetails: not scanned X-Cam-ScannerInfo: http://www.cam.ac.uk/cs/email/scanner/ Received: from econ-1.econ.cam.ac.uk ([131.111.165.100]:21242 helo=econ.cam.ac.uk) by ppsw-0.csi.cam.ac.uk (ppsw.cam.ac.uk [131.111.8.129]:25) with esmtp id 1Mjuch-0008Ob-1B (Exim 4.70) for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu (return-path ); Sat, 05 Sep 2009 13:44:07 +0100 Received: from ECON-1/SpoolDir by econ.cam.ac.uk (Mercury 1.48); 5 Sep 09 13:44:07 +0000 Received: from SpoolDir by ECON-1 (Mercury 1.48); 5 Sep 09 13:43:41 +0000 X-Autoreply-From: To: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu From: Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2009 13:43:41 +0000 Message-ID: <3F054CE7833@econ.cam.ac.uk> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Weblink on this volume is reported as an attack site when I try to open it - X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 05 Sep 2009 12:44:14 -0000 I am now away until early September. I will try to read mail when I can, but many apologies for long delays in replying. Clive From alperaslan79@gmail.com Sat Sep 05 09:57:25 2009 Received: from ipo4hsc.utah.edu ([155.97.131.100]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1Mjxdl-0006Mp-6l for Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Sat, 05 Sep 2009 09:57:25 -0600 X-SBRS: 4.4 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AjsBAConokrRVdrikGdsb2JhbACCIzOPKIh/PwEBAQEJCQwHEwOrCIEnj3sBAwIEhBQFgjaIIg X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.44,337,1249279200"; d="scan'208";a="194852953" Received: from mail-bw0-f226.google.com ([209.85.218.226]) by ipo4.cc.utah.edu with ESMTP; 05 Sep 2009 09:57:19 -0600 Received: by bwz26 with SMTP id 26so1223532bwz.23 for ; Sat, 05 Sep 2009 08:57:18 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.223.74.91 with SMTP id t27mr4926271faj.62.1252166238384; Sat, 05 Sep 2009 08:57:18 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2009 18:57:18 +0300 Message-ID: From: Alper Aslan To: Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.9 Subject: [Critical-Realism] epistemological relativism - subjectivism X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 05 Sep 2009 15:57:25 -0000 Hi all, I want to get some information about the difference between epistemological relativism vs epistemological subjectivism. Is there any article dealing with this issue. Regards. From rgroff@slu.edu Sat Sep 05 10:11:01 2009 Received: from ipo3.cc.utah.edu ([155.97.131.71]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1Mjxqv-0006NI-0y for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Sat, 05 Sep 2009 10:11:01 -0600 X-SBRS: 4.5 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: Ao4AADcqokpAEgLXkWdsb2JhbACCJTGYJz8BAQEBCQsKBxMFrFyHCYhJhBgFhECGGA X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.44,337,1249279200"; d="scan'208";a="25284706" Received: from exprod7og114.obsmtp.com ([64.18.2.215]) by ipo3.cc.utah.edu with ESMTP; 05 Sep 2009 10:10:47 -0600 Received: from source ([209.85.211.179]) (using TLSv1) by exprod7ob114.postini.com ([64.18.6.12]) with SMTP ID DSNKSqKNhpzLhymzuvH22FWGQ7zexWvX7MAB@postini.com; Sat, 05 Sep 2009 09:10:47 PDT Received: by mail-yw0-f179.google.com with SMTP id 9so1072286ywh.32 for ; Sat, 05 Sep 2009 09:10:46 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.150.8.4 with SMTP id 4mr19471469ybh.330.1252167046328; Sat, 05 Sep 2009 09:10:46 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2009 11:10:46 -0500 Message-ID: <6ad241360909050910n44915d55hcd6f3551ceab0db5@mail.gmail.com> From: Ruth Groff To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.9 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] epistemological relativism - subjectivism X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 05 Sep 2009 16:11:01 -0000 Within critical realism, the term "epistemological relativism" is used as a term of art in an idiosyncratic way (relative to how it is used in philosophy), to mean only that ideas are thought up by people, people living in particular times and places, and so are social products. Standardly, by contrast, the term refers to the view that there is no universal truth-maker(s) for any given claim about the world, no common standard in relation to which a claim is either well-founded or not. This (what is called by philosophers an) technically "epistemic" meaning of the term, having to do with justification, is not part of the meaning for those critical realists who follow Bhaskar's early use of the term. I'm not entirely sure what you mean by "epistemological subjectivism," but you should just do a search for it on Standford Encylopedia of Phil. If you want to read further, Chris Norris has a nice, no doubt cr-friendly book out just called Epistemology. May be useful. Ruth On Sat, Sep 5, 2009 at 10:57 AM, Alper Aslan wrote: > Hi all, > > I want to get some information about the difference between epistemological > relativism vs epistemological subjectivism. Is there any article dealing > with this issue. > Regards. > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From shivahemmati@gmail.com Sun Sep 06 01:31:52 2009 Received: from ipo3.cc.utah.edu ([155.97.131.71]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MkCE4-00072H-Sl for Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Sun, 06 Sep 2009 01:31:52 -0600 X-SBRS: 4.4 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: ArABANYBo0pKfU4bkGdsb2JhbACRfoghXj8BAQEBCQkMBxMDqmKBJ455AQMCBIQUBYpY X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.44,341,1249279200"; d="scan'208";a="25425335" Received: from ey-out-2122.google.com ([74.125.78.27]) by ipo3.cc.utah.edu with ESMTP; 06 Sep 2009 01:31:47 -0600 Received: by ey-out-2122.google.com with SMTP id 22so797053eye.31 for ; Sun, 06 Sep 2009 00:31:46 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.216.18.17 with SMTP id k17mr1287947wek.218.1252222306055; Sun, 06 Sep 2009 00:31:46 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2009 23:31:45 -0800 Message-ID: From: shiva hemmati To: Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Subject: [Critical-Realism] (no subject) X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 06 Sep 2009 07:31:53 -0000 Hello I want to have Bhaskar's email if possible. Is there any body who tried to see what the impelications of critical realism are in education? -- best wishes Shiva Hemati From leigh@totalpc.co.zw Sun Sep 06 16:27:30 2009 Received: from ipo3.cc.utah.edu ([155.97.131.71]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MkQCo-000841-Ix for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Sun, 06 Sep 2009 16:27:30 -0600 X-SBRS: -0.4 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AkAMAJrTo0rELLAOYGdsb2JhbACDA4gXhHaLJiElrF0FCI4HgiMFBhIIgVAFgVSCbIYYJw X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.44,343,1249279200"; d="scan'208";a="25593630" Received: from panadol.yoafrica.com ([196.44.176.14]) by ipo3.cc.utah.edu with ESMTP; 06 Sep 2009 16:27:19 -0600 Received: from smtp.yoafrica.com ([196.44.176.8]) by panadol.yoafrica.com with esmtp (Exim 4.68 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from ) id 1MkQCU-0006Qz-04 for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Mon, 07 Sep 2009 00:27:12 +0200 Received: from [196.44.188.61] (helo=leighlaptop) by smtp.yoafrica.com with esmtp (Exim 4.68 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from ) id 1MkQCR-00089y-JO for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Mon, 07 Sep 2009 00:27:09 +0200 From: "Leigh Price" To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" References: <4AA0207D020000EB000B3699@gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk> Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2009 00:27:02 +0200 Message-ID: <9004CD1FDD24450285528BF5449437DA@leighlaptop> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11 Thread-Index: AcosyT0unAlLElz4QwytKycRs8hAXgCZGsJQ In-Reply-To: <4AA0207D020000EB000B3699@gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.5579 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 06 Sep 2009 22:27:30 -0000 Hi David Before we can engage in a discussion of critical realism's relationship = to polemics, we first have to recognise that there can be two definitions = of polemics. For example, according to the Merriam-Webster online = dictionary, polemics is: a : an aggressive attack on or refutation of the opinions or principles = of another=20 b : the art or practice of disputation or controversy Etymology: French pol=E9mique, from Middle French, from polemique controversial, from Greek polemikos warlike, hostile, from polemos war Critical realism is polemical in that it engages in disputation and it = is certainly controversial. Bhaskar frequently uses the word 'polemic' in = this sense. However, CR is not, I believe, polemical in the sense of being aggressive or warlike in its manner of disputation. One of the reasons = that I assume critical realism avoids aggressive polemics is its method of arguing that Bhaskar calls immanent critique. In this method, according = to Bhaskar, you don=92t argue against a position from your own position, = but rather argue against a position from the point of view of the position itself. Therefore, if I believe X and you Y, to argue for my position, I have to show that something in totality is inconsistent with Y. I would = say that aggressive polemics is fuelled by the dichotomy of setting one's = self up against an opposite position. Hartwig (2009) has suggested that such academic attacks (polemics) that are "hostile and ungenerous, philistine = and shrill" ...systematically breach the cardinal principle of immanent = critique "that the critic operate on the terrain of the account being criticised = to demonstrate that it is beset with problems that can be resolved on its = own terms. And that it is at odds with the logic of the 'critical realist' embrace: the fundamental drive of the system to transcend and heal = division and split...". For example, Bhaskar does not set himself up against Kant and Hume. = Rather he tries to embrace their insights whilst nevertheless addressing the absences in their work. From my notes, that I took when attending a CR seminar last year, Bhaskar asked, "So, were Hume and Kant were = completely wrong? No, because there is something that would imply that ontology = should collapse into epistemology=85the 'natural attitude'=85when we talk about = the world, actually we talk about our knowledge about the world. We only = really need to disambiguate ontology and epistemology when there is conflict = and when we are researching." Similarly, we should aim not to set ourselves = up against Latour, but to embrace his insights whilst addressing the = problems in his work. The quote I have found for Latour (2004:246) that refers, I think, to = his being against polemics of the aggressive sort, is: "The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from under the feet of na=EFve believers, but the one who offers the participants arenas in which to gather." Specifically, Latour is here referring to the critic as a = reformed deconstructionist, but I think the quote is relevant. I would have to = say that Latour's general tone in this paper is one against 'debunking'. He links this debunking attitude to those critics who alternate = "haphazardly between antifetishism and positivism like the drunk iconoclast drawn by Goya". If you are interested in people's quotes against aggressive polemics, = you might also like this one by Foucault (1984) - apologies for its length: "Questions and answers depend on a game=97a game that is at once = pleasant and difficult=97in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only = the rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of dialogue. The polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a = just undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner in search for the truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is armful, and whose = very existence constitutes a threat. For him, then the game consists not of recognizing this person as a subject having the right to speak but of abolishing him as interlocutor, from any possible dialogue; and his = final objective will be not to come as close as possible to a difficult truth = but to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has been manifestly upholding from the beginning. The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that = his adversary is by definition denied. Perhaps, someday, a long history will have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic figure on = discussion and an obstacle to the search for the truth." Best regards, Leigh References Foucault, M (1984). Polemics, Politics and Problematizations Interview conducted by Paul Rabinow. Translation by Lydia Davis, volume = 1 =93Ethics=94 of =93Essential Works of Foucault=94, The New Press 1997. http://foucault.info/foucault/interview.html Hartwig, M (2009). 'Orthodox' critical realism and the critical realist embrace. JCR, 8.2: 233-257. Latour,B (2004). Why has critique run out of steam/ From matters of fact = to matters of concern. Critical Inquiry 30 (winter): 225-248.=20 -----Original Message----- From: critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of David Pilgrim Sent: 03 September 2009 21:01 To: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; critical-realism-request@lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 Thanks to Mark and Leigh for this illuminating exchange. Any references = to the objections of RB and Latour to 'polemical debate' would be = gratefully received. Dave David Pilgrim Professor of Mental Health Policy Department of Social Work Faculty of Health University of Central Lancashire Preston PR1 2HE Tel +44 (0)1772 893458 Fax +44 (0)1772 892974 Email DPilgrim@uclan.ac.uk >>> 03/09/09 7:00 PM >>> Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to critical-realism-request@lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at critical-realism-owner@lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Re : CR and STS (Mark Johnson) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 13:27:12 +0100 From: Mark Johnson Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Message-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=3DUTF-8 Hi Leigh, Thanks very much for the Latour quote - personally I found it quite = moving: it is a classic example of an 'inspection of conscience'. Such shifts of position are personally hard for people because it involves a shift in personal identity. You're right that constructivists are not immune from fundamentalism... I would only suggest that insistence on 'reality' can = make one more susceptible to it (even, as is common in constructivism, it is = the implicit ontology of the 'reality' of constructivism). Personally, I = don't think we can escape the fact that our identities (critical realists, constructivists, jedi...) are tied to positions and assertions of what's real and what isn't. But how do we move forward? It strikes me that this must be a = methodological development.. and more particularly one which takes account of diverse perspectives and diverse identities which are nonetheless 'real' (or at least part of a personal identity) to those who possess them (even the climate change deniers!). Establishing real mechanisms in it all must = surely be a participative and appreciative exercise and not one where one set = of distinctions (Roy's, Latour's or anyone else's) holds sway. If Roy is = right and the reality behind individual perspectives can be revealed, the = process of revealing it collaboratively can itself be transformative ("if you = think climate change is not happening, what's your theory for what's going on = when the ice-caps are melting?"... "what if you're wrong?"... etc.). But I = think to make that work, an understanding of a real world must coexist with an understanding of ourselves as passionate, identity-seeking, distinction-making entities. Mark On Thu, Sep 3, 2009 at 12:15 PM, Leigh Price = wrote: > Hello again, and many thanks for everyone's contributions > > Sorry to take so long to reply but I live in Zimbabwe where email can = be > erratic and only yesterday managed to get back online. > > Echna was careful to say that he had not read all of Latour. His = critique > of Latour's earlier work is quite justifiable. However, Latour's more recent > work was surprisingly unsympathetic towards the constructivist turn. > > For example, you may be interested to know that Latour gave a keynote > address at Keele University in 1997 entitled "On Recalling ANT", in = which he > describes ANT as 'managerial, engineering, Machiavellian, demiurgic'. > Basically, he felt that ANT, as it was being largely interpreted, was > susceptible to the critique of being demiurgic on the one hand and resulting > in the death of man on the other. By this I assume he means the oscillation > between voluntarism (demiurgic tendency) and determinism (death of man > tendency) that Bhaskar described in his lead up to giving his > Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA). Latour was concerned that > 'actor' was being given the role of agency and 'network' that of structure, > magically turning one into the other like the social construction = theory of > Berger and Luckman. I agree that Bhaskar's TMSA conception is clearer = and > better justified that Latour's circulating actor network, but they do = seem > similar to me. As did Giddens and Bhaskar, Latour sees the actors and = the > networks (individuals and society?) as both being connected and influencing > each other, but unlike Giddens and similar to Bhaskar, Latour insists = on the > historicity of the process. Also, Latour describes the way that the = social > can 'travel endlessly without encountering the micro-level' (individuals?), > which seems similar to Bhaskar's TMSA diagram in which society and > individuals are on parallel tracks. They are distinct, autonomously causally > efficacious, yet closely related, transforming and reproducing each = other. > By definition, parallel lines can travel endlessly but never encounter each > other. Diagrammatically, then, Bhaskar has used a similar metaphor to > Latour's verbal metaphor of 'travelling endlessly without encountering each > other' (but nevertheless aeffecting each other). > > Despite this similarity, what then throws the realist is Latour's statement > that the social 'is turned from a province of reality to a = circulation'. I > understand why he says this, he wants to avoid social determinism, however, > it is an undeniably uncritical realist statement. But this paper was written > in 1997 and by 2004, Latour was to critique himself and his followers = even > further and to revindicate reality. He wrote a paper 'Why has critique = run > out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern' (Critical Inquiry > 30, 2004). I hope the quote that follows is not too long, but I wanted = to > give you an idea of how worried Latour was by the way his work was = being > used...worried enough to admit he perhaps he 'did not mean what he = said' > (Bhaskar has also said of Derrida, that he probably 'did not mean what = he > said'). > > "While we spend years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden = behind > the appearance of objective statements, do we now have to reveal the = real > objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of > prejudices? And yet entire Ph.D programs are still running to make = sure that > good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up = (...) > that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak from a > standpoint and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very = same > argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that = could save > our lives. Was I wrong to participate in this invention of this field known > as science studies? Is it enough to say that we did not really mean = what we > said? Why does it burn my tongue to say that global warming is a fact > whether you like it or not? Why can't I simply say that the argument = is > closed for good? > Should I reassure myself by simply saying that the bad guys can use = any > weapon at hand, naturalized facts when it suits them and social construction > when it suits them? Should we apologise for having been wrong all the time? > (...) Or should we do a bit of soul-searching here: what were we = really > after when we were so intent on showing the scientific construction of > facts?" > > Later Latour also writes: "My argument is that a certain form of = critical > spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the = wrong > enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong = sort of > allies because of a little mistake in the definition of its main = target. The > question was never to get away from facts, but closer to them, not fighting > empiricism but renewing empiricism". Latour also argues that we need = to > "cultivate a stubbornly realist attitude". He says that "The mistake = we > made, the mistake I made, was to believe there was no efficient way to > criticise matters of fact except by moving away from them and = directing > attention toward the conditions that made them possible". > > The reason I have gone to this trouble to show Latour's move from irrealism > to realism (but not the na?ve realism of typical scientistic = empiricism) is > because I would like to encourage critical realists not to quickly = throw out > the baby with the bathwater, so to speak, when they decide to = disregard > Latour's work. The reason we might want to engage with the work of = Latour or > Donna Haraway (also a professed non realist) is because they have = spent > years trying to understand how language can be used in a Machiavellian = way > to oppress people. Bhaskar talks about oppressive demi-reality, and I > suspect that it is this demi-reality that these thinkers are engaging with, > albeit they say it is unreal. It is demi-reality which most needs our > attention right now, if we are to facilitate a move towards the flourishing > of humankind. > > There are other similarities between Latour and Critical Realism, such = as > his objection to polemical debate and his talk about the oscillation between > naturalised facts and social construction (which reminds me of Sayer's > concept of the pomo flips). I think his humility in being able to = adjust his > ideas in the face of contradictions, and his attempt to try and make = his > ideas more inclusive (of totality), is a brilliant model of Critical Realist > praxis. We may not agree with everything Latour says, but we can learn = a lot > from his humble academic process which, in allowing for the = possibility of > mistake, gets him closer to an adequate conception. His ability to = admit > the inadequacy of his early writing also shows that Khun was wrong = about how > tightly academics cling to their theories... > > Mark Johnson was interested in the way that constructivism seems to be > quite humane, as it seems to avoid strong arguments about rightness = and > wrongness. However, as Latour shows, even extremists/fundamentalists = can now > make use of constructivism (e.g. we have fundamentalist Capitalists arguing > that global warming is just a construct). I have written too much = already, > but Latour offers a way to be critical without being polemical. > > As far as our efforts to bring credibility to CR goes, to have a main > architect of the extreme social constructivist movement provide such > critique of that discipline, and to have that critique include a > revindication of realism, lends powerful support to our realist = position. > However, this is not to say that Latour's position is as complete as > Bhaskar's (for example, as someone wrote earlier, it does not have a > conception of the stratification of reality). > > Again, apologies that my contribution has taken so long to be = returned. > > Best wishes, > > Leigh > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto: > critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna > Sent: 25 August 2009 14:02 > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > > Hi David, hi all, > > first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are = really > insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your > mail when you state that Latour?s position can?t be reconciled - it is > just contradictory. I don?t know all of Latour?s work, but for example > in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his > "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong > constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed = thorughout > the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn?s contradictory sentence that > scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and = don?t > do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, > like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just > constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the = real > formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common > cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). > Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to = an > "ontological tension", as one can?t talk about ontology in purely > epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are > then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of = experiments > in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be > rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? > Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour > and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all > the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and > that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties = it > has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at = others > is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards = society, > as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely = by > scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any = espousing > of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability > unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour = in > general. > The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", = as > Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. > When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is = not > much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes > structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then > suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be > contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I > don?t know all of Latour?s work (or I am misstaken about his theory - > but one last thing: Latour?s very essayistic and loose style is not > really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more > confusion) > > best, > e > > d.eldervass@ntlworld.com schrieb: > > Hi Echna, and listers! > > > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say = this a > touch more coherently. > > > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to = say > here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour > acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the empirical' > (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but = not > actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's > 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not = observed by > human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon known > as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and = theorised > by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and > common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before = it was > observed, but we just didn't know about it. > > > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this > contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm > offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered > explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of = strong > constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll suggest > some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). > > > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious = how > accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an authority > on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian constructivism > in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think = Latour > takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of > constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other humanities) > has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in > philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, = on > reflection. > > > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a = very > odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until scientists > observe and theorise them? > > > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the > world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends = on the > categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of = time, > space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. = We can > never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always filtered > through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world = we can > know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the > world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. = So, > when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not > referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might = assume, but > to the world-as-we-experience-it. > > > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience > depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on > concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) > positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social > constructionists argue that these are social products, and although = Latour > rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of > constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be = taken > as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists = employ > rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. > > > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our > categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical = work, > then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when = scientists > change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases = of > Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only = world > about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that = strong > constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading = us of > the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out > there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by = science, > therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the = consequence of > this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our > 'world'. > > > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm = not > aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say = for sure > whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a = way of > making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made within > the constructivist tradition. > > > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the > contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her excellent > book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of = knowledge') > that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is = simply > wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but = they > are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have > enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our > categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of = the > actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that = enable > us to survive because they give us generally accurate information = about our > environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to = those in > which our perceptual abilities developed). > > > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an influence > on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even = on our > perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between > reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that = is > difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the > world-in-itself. > > > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view = that the > descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves strongly > influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the = opposite of > the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories > implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. > > > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's = argument, I > have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost = certainly > misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his > account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the > inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse = to > behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the = view > that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' > theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is > motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also = some > recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. = This is > arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the > undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though = their > perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This = starts to > approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including = inanimate > objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each = other to > produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. > > > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim = about > the phases of Venus. > > > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome views > on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to make > sense of Latour's ontology. > > > > Best, > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- d.eldervass@ntlworld.com wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. > >> > > > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a = different > sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite = different > from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a = pre-existing > external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't = have > any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that > science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the = other > hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists = describe > did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is = difficult to > make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense = realism. He > seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a distinction > is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the > world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps =3D 'the phenomenal world' thought > interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' = because > Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on = as if > the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that = they > only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no piont > in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is = deemed to > depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well = as our > cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking = at > the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense = of the > world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence = in > that world. > > > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope = that > (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! > > > > best > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > ---- b86102052@ntu.edu.tw wrote: > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > > > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, = may > > be helpful too. > > > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency > > in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): > > 455-73. > > > > Best wishes, > > Poe > > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > > Department of Sociology > > National Taiwan University > > > > > > ?? Matthew Smith : > > > > > >> Hi Echna, > >> > >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main > >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: > >> > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net= -th eo.pdf). > I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization = which > touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from = the > perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems = literature > (here: > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=3DArticleURL&_udi=3DB6W7M-4JWFH1= P-1&_us er=3D10&_rdoc=3D1&_fmt=3D&_orig=3Dsearch&_sort=3Dd&_docanchor=3D&view=3Dc= &_searchStrId=3D981 817881&_rerunOrigin=3Dscholar.google&_acct=3DC000050221&_version=3D1&_url= Version=3D0 &_userid=3D10&md5=3D67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d). > If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently don't > have it online or accessible from where I currently > >> am. > >> > >> > >> Best, > >> Matthew > >> > >> > >> ----- Message initial ---- > >> De : echna > >> ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > >> > >> Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > >> > >> Hi all, > >> > >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement = from > >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" = (STS) > >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I = can > >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in = epistemological > >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by = the > >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of = ontology > >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on = Ludwik > >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example = Bruno > >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law = even > >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short = description of > >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the whole > >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any = kind of > >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by = either > >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the > list). > >> > >> best wishes, > >> e > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > >> > >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel > >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > --=20 -------------------------------------------------------------------------= --- ----- Mark Johnson Institute for Educational Cybernetics University of Bolton BL3 5AB Tel. 01204 903567 Mob. 0778 6064505 ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 *********************************************** _______________________________________________ Critical-Realism mailing list Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism From rgroff@slu.edu Sun Sep 06 17:29:14 2009 Received: from ipo4hsc.utah.edu ([155.97.131.100]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MkRAY-00088c-2e for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Sun, 06 Sep 2009 17:29:14 -0600 X-SBRS: 4.8 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AlsBAC3io0pAEgLXlGdsb2JhbACCJDEtjQ2KDGQ/AQEBAQkLCAkTBaxUBQYChTWISYIjBQYSCIFQBYFUgmyGGA X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.44,343,1249279200"; d="scan'208";a="195177927" Received: from exprod7og114.obsmtp.com ([64.18.2.215]) by ipo4.cc.utah.edu with ESMTP; 06 Sep 2009 17:29:05 -0600 Received: from source ([209.85.211.182]) (using TLSv1) by exprod7ob114.postini.com ([64.18.6.12]) with SMTP ID DSNKSqRFwGJ+HW7kOsrspiU1lNnS40lfIRIS@postini.com; Sun, 06 Sep 2009 16:29:06 PDT Received: by ywh12 with SMTP id 12so3307129ywh.12 for ; Sun, 06 Sep 2009 16:29:04 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.150.48.42 with SMTP id v42mr22791928ybv.65.1252279743341; Sun, 06 Sep 2009 16:29:03 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <9004CD1FDD24450285528BF5449437DA@leighlaptop> References: <4AA0207D020000EB000B3699@gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk> <9004CD1FDD24450285528BF5449437DA@leighlaptop> Date: Sun, 6 Sep 2009 18:29:03 -0500 Message-ID: <6ad241360909061629p62622acfhb4ea03adebf48c5e@mail.gmail.com> From: Ruth Groff To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.9 Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 06 Sep 2009 23:29:14 -0000 Hi Leigh, all, This is a small but important point I think: immanent critique is not reall= y well-defined as when you say "You're a little bit right" or even "That's wrong, but I can see why you might have thought it." Nor is it a matter of being generous, necessarily -- though one's position is always made stronge= r by being so, it seems to me. And plus it's good for the soul. Rather, immanent (versus external) critique is when you say "If you really think (this one part of) what you say you think, then you can't actually think (this other part of) what you say you think." Thus the critique of Hume an= d Kant is immanent in a different, and more precise, sense than that which yo= u suggest: viz., RTS is an argument directed to Humean and Kantian philosophers of science, to the effect that if they want to hold to what they - and everyone else - understands experiments to be, which they do wan= t to do, then they have to give up their Humeanism and/or Kantianism, because it can't account for experimentation so conceived. (Whether the argument i= s successful or not is a different question. Indeed, one might even want to say that it really only shows up as a genuinely internal, or immanent, critique to the extent that it is.) I think you're intuition is a reasonable one, though -- that someone who is interested in arguing via internal critique is perhaps especially likely to be interested in actually making an argument. I think of a polemic as the rhetorical expression of dogmatism as a (non)argument-form; it's when there is no actual argument, only tone and effect. Warmly, r. On Sun, Sep 6, 2009 at 5:27 PM, Leigh Price wrote: > Hi David > > Before we can engage in a discussion of critical realism's relationship t= o > polemics, we first have to recognise that there can be two definitions of > polemics. For example, according to the Merriam-Webster online dictionary= , > polemics is: > a : an aggressive attack on or refutation of the opinions or principles o= f > another > b : the art or practice of disputation or controversy > Etymology: French pol=E9mique, from Middle French, from polemique > controversial, from Greek polemikos warlike, hostile, from polemos war > > Critical realism is polemical in that it engages in disputation and it is > certainly controversial. Bhaskar frequently uses the word 'polemic' in th= is > sense. However, CR is not, I believe, polemical in the sense of being > aggressive or warlike in its manner of disputation. One of the reasons th= at > I assume critical realism avoids aggressive polemics is its method of > arguing that Bhaskar calls immanent critique. In this method, according t= o > Bhaskar, you don=92t argue against a position from your own position, but > rather argue against a position from the point of view of the position > itself. Therefore, if I believe X and you Y, to argue for my position, I > have to show that something in totality is inconsistent with Y. I would s= ay > that aggressive polemics is fuelled by the dichotomy of setting one's sel= f > up against an opposite position. Hartwig (2009) has suggested that such > academic attacks (polemics) that are "hostile and ungenerous, philistine > and > shrill" ...systematically breach the cardinal principle of immanent > critique > "that the critic operate on the terrain of the account being criticised t= o > demonstrate that it is beset with problems that can be resolved on its ow= n > terms. And that it is at odds with the logic of the 'critical realist' > embrace: the fundamental drive of the system to transcend and heal divisi= on > and split...". > > For example, Bhaskar does not set himself up against Kant and Hume. Rathe= r > he tries to embrace their insights whilst nevertheless addressing the > absences in their work. From my notes, that I took when attending a CR > seminar last year, Bhaskar asked, "So, were Hume and Kant were completely > wrong? No, because there is something that would imply that ontology shou= ld > collapse into epistemology=85the 'natural attitude'=85when we talk about = the > world, actually we talk about our knowledge about the world. We only real= ly > need to disambiguate ontology and epistemology when there is conflict and > when we are researching." Similarly, we should aim not to set ourselves u= p > against Latour, but to embrace his insights whilst addressing the problem= s > in his work. > > The quote I have found for Latour (2004:246) that refers, I think, to his > being against polemics of the aggressive sort, is: > > "The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The > critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from under the feet of na=EFve > believers, but the one who offers the participants arenas in which to > gather." Specifically, Latour is here referring to the critic as a reform= ed > deconstructionist, but I think the quote is relevant. I would have to say > that Latour's general tone in this paper is one against 'debunking'. He > links this debunking attitude to those critics who alternate "haphazardly > between antifetishism and positivism like the drunk iconoclast drawn by > Goya". > > If you are interested in people's quotes against aggressive polemics, you > might also like this one by Foucault (1984) - apologies for its length: > > "Questions and answers depend on a game=97a game that is at once pleasant= and > difficult=97in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the > rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of dialogue. The > polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he > possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he > possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a > just > undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner in search for the > truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is armful, and whose > very > existence constitutes a threat. For him, then the game consists not of > recognizing this person as a subject having the right to speak but of > abolishing him as interlocutor, from any possible dialogue; and his final > objective will be not to come as close as possible to a difficult truth b= ut > to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has been manifestly > upholding from the beginning. The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that > his > adversary is by definition denied. Perhaps, someday, a long history will > have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic figure on > discussion > and an obstacle to the search for the truth." > > > Best regards, > > Leigh > > > References > > Foucault, M (1984). Polemics, Politics and Problematizations > Interview conducted by Paul Rabinow. Translation by Lydia Davis, volume 1 > =93Ethics=94 of =93Essential Works of Foucault=94, The New Press 1997. > http://foucault.info/foucault/interview.html > > Hartwig, M (2009). 'Orthodox' critical realism and the critical realist > embrace. JCR, 8.2: 233-257. > > Latour,B (2004). Why has critique run out of steam/ From matters of fact = to > matters of concern. Critical Inquiry 30 (winter): 225-248. > > -----Original Message----- > From: critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of David > Pilgrim > Sent: 03 September 2009 21:01 > To: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; > critical-realism-request@lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 > > Thanks to Mark and Leigh for this illuminating exchange. Any references t= o > the objections of RB and Latour to 'polemical debate' would be gratefully > received. Dave > > David Pilgrim > Professor of Mental Health Policy > > Department of Social Work > Faculty of Health > University of Central Lancashire > Preston > PR1 2HE > > Tel +44 (0)1772 893458 > Fax +44 (0)1772 892974 > Email DPilgrim@uclan.ac.uk > >>> 03/09/09 7:00 PM >>> > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to > critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > critical-realism-request@lists.econ.utah.edu > > You can reach the person managing the list at > critical-realism-owner@lists.econ.utah.edu > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Re : CR and STS (Mark Johnson) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 13:27:12 +0100 > From: Mark Johnson > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Message-ID: > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=3DUTF-8 > > Hi Leigh, > Thanks very much for the Latour quote - personally I found it quite movin= g: > it is a classic example of an 'inspection of conscience'. Such shifts of > position are personally hard for people because it involves a shift in > personal identity. You're right that constructivists are not immune from > fundamentalism... I would only suggest that insistence on 'reality' can > make > one more susceptible to it (even, as is common in constructivism, it is t= he > implicit ontology of the 'reality' of constructivism). Personally, I don'= t > think we can escape the fact that our identities (critical realists, > constructivists, jedi...) are tied to positions and assertions of what's > real and what isn't. > > But how do we move forward? It strikes me that this must be a > methodological > development.. and more particularly one which takes account of diverse > perspectives and diverse identities which are nonetheless 'real' (or at > least part of a personal identity) to those who possess them (even the > climate change deniers!). Establishing real mechanisms in it all must > surely > be a participative and appreciative exercise and not one where one set of > distinctions (Roy's, Latour's or anyone else's) holds sway. If Roy is rig= ht > and the reality behind individual perspectives can be revealed, the proce= ss > of revealing it collaboratively can itself be transformative ("if you thi= nk > climate change is not happening, what's your theory for what's going on > when > the ice-caps are melting?"... "what if you're wrong?"... etc.). But I thi= nk > to make that work, an understanding of a real world must coexist with an > understanding of ourselves > as passionate, identity-seeking, distinction-making entities. > > Mark > > On Thu, Sep 3, 2009 at 12:15 PM, Leigh Price wrote: > > > Hello again, and many thanks for everyone's contributions > > > > Sorry to take so long to reply but I live in Zimbabwe where email can b= e > > erratic and only yesterday managed to get back online. > > > > Echna was careful to say that he had not read all of Latour. His critiq= ue > > of Latour's earlier work is quite justifiable. However, Latour's more > recent > > work was surprisingly unsympathetic towards the constructivist turn. > > > > For example, you may be interested to know that Latour gave a keynote > > address at Keele University in 1997 entitled "On Recalling ANT", in whi= ch > he > > describes ANT as 'managerial, engineering, Machiavellian, demiurgic'. > > Basically, he felt that ANT, as it was being largely interpreted, was > > susceptible to the critique of being demiurgic on the one hand and > resulting > > in the death of man on the other. By this I assume he means the > oscillation > > between voluntarism (demiurgic tendency) and determinism (death of man > > tendency) that Bhaskar described in his lead up to giving his > > Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA). Latour was concerned > that > > 'actor' was being given the role of agency and 'network' that of > structure, > > magically turning one into the other like the social construction theor= y > of > > Berger and Luckman. I agree that Bhaskar's TMSA conception is clearer a= nd > > better justified that Latour's circulating actor network, but they do > seem > > similar to me. As did Giddens and Bhaskar, Latour sees the actors and t= he > > networks (individuals and society?) as both being connected and > influencing > > each other, but unlike Giddens and similar to Bhaskar, Latour insists o= n > the > > historicity of the process. Also, Latour describes the way that the > social > > can 'travel endlessly without encountering the micro-level' > (individuals?), > > which seems similar to Bhaskar's TMSA diagram in which society and > > individuals are on parallel tracks. They are distinct, autonomously > causally > > efficacious, yet closely related, transforming and reproducing each > other. > > By definition, parallel lines can travel endlessly but never encounter > each > > other. Diagrammatically, then, Bhaskar has used a similar metaphor to > > Latour's verbal metaphor of 'travelling endlessly without encountering > each > > other' (but nevertheless aeffecting each other). > > > > Despite this similarity, what then throws the realist is Latour's > statement > > that the social 'is turned from a province of reality to a circulation'= . > I > > understand why he says this, he wants to avoid social determinism, > however, > > it is an undeniably uncritical realist statement. But this paper was > written > > in 1997 and by 2004, Latour was to critique himself and his followers > even > > further and to revindicate reality. He wrote a paper 'Why has critique > run > > out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern' (Critical > Inquiry > > 30, 2004). I hope the quote that follows is not too long, but I wanted = to > > give you an idea of how worried Latour was by the way his work was bein= g > > used...worried enough to admit he perhaps he 'did not mean what he said= ' > > (Bhaskar has also said of Derrida, that he probably 'did not mean what = he > > said'). > > > > "While we spend years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behin= d > > the appearance of objective statements, do we now have to reveal the re= al > > objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of > > prejudices? And yet entire Ph.D programs are still running to make sure > that > > good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up (..= .) > > that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak from a > > standpoint and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very sam= e > > argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could > save > > our lives. Was I wrong to participate in this invention of this field > known > > as science studies? Is it enough to say that we did not really mean wha= t > we > > said? Why does it burn my tongue to say that global warming is a fact > > whether you like it or not? Why can't I simply say that the argument is > > closed for good? > > Should I reassure myself by simply saying that the bad guys can use any > > weapon at hand, naturalized facts when it suits them and social > construction > > when it suits them? Should we apologise for having been wrong all the > time? > > (...) Or should we do a bit of soul-searching here: what were we really > > after when we were so intent on showing the scientific construction of > > facts?" > > > > Later Latour also writes: "My argument is that a certain form of critic= al > > spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the wro= ng > > enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong sor= t > of > > allies because of a little mistake in the definition of its main target= . > The > > question was never to get away from facts, but closer to them, not > fighting > > empiricism but renewing empiricism". Latour also argues that we need to > > "cultivate a stubbornly realist attitude". He says that "The mistake we > > made, the mistake I made, was to believe there was no efficient way to > > criticise matters of fact except by moving away from them and directing > > attention toward the conditions that made them possible". > > > > The reason I have gone to this trouble to show Latour's move from > irrealism > > to realism (but not the na?ve realism of typical scientistic empiricism= ) > is > > because I would like to encourage critical realists not to quickly thro= w > out > > the baby with the bathwater, so to speak, when they decide to disregard > > Latour's work. The reason we might want to engage with the work of Lato= ur > or > > Donna Haraway (also a professed non realist) is because they have spent > > years trying to understand how language can be used in a Machiavellian > way > > to oppress people. Bhaskar talks about oppressive demi-reality, and I > > suspect that it is this demi-reality that these thinkers are engaging > with, > > albeit they say it is unreal. It is demi-reality which most needs our > > attention right now, if we are to facilitate a move towards the > flourishing > > of humankind. > > > > There are other similarities between Latour and Critical Realism, such = as > > his objection to polemical debate and his talk about the oscillation > between > > naturalised facts and social construction (which reminds me of Sayer's > > concept of the pomo flips). I think his humility in being able to adjus= t > his > > ideas in the face of contradictions, and his attempt to try and make hi= s > > ideas more inclusive (of totality), is a brilliant model of Critical > Realist > > praxis. We may not agree with everything Latour says, but we can learn = a > lot > > from his humble academic process which, in allowing for the possibility > of > > mistake, gets him closer to an adequate conception. His ability to adm= it > > the inadequacy of his early writing also shows that Khun was wrong abou= t > how > > tightly academics cling to their theories... > > > > Mark Johnson was interested in the way that constructivism seems to be > > quite humane, as it seems to avoid strong arguments about rightness and > > wrongness. However, as Latour shows, even extremists/fundamentalists ca= n > now > > make use of constructivism (e.g. we have fundamentalist Capitalists > arguing > > that global warming is just a construct). I have written too much > already, > > but Latour offers a way to be critical without being polemical. > > > > As far as our efforts to bring credibility to CR goes, to have a main > > architect of the extreme social constructivist movement provide such > > critique of that discipline, and to have that critique include a > > revindication of realism, lends powerful support to our realist positio= n. > > However, this is not to say that Latour's position is as complete as > > Bhaskar's (for example, as someone wrote earlier, it does not have a > > conception of the stratification of reality). > > > > Again, apologies that my contribution has taken so long to be returned. > > > > Best wishes, > > > > Leigh > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto: > > critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna > > Sent: 25 August 2009 14:02 > > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS > > > > Hi David, hi all, > > > > first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are really > > insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your > > mail when you state that Latour?s position can?t be reconciled - it is > > just contradictory. I don?t know all of Latour?s work, but for example > > in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his > > "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong > > constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughout > > the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn?s contradictory sentence that > > scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don?t > > do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, > > like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just > > constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the real > > formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common > > cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). > > Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to a= n > > "ontological tension", as one can?t talk about ontology in purely > > epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are > > then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experiment= s > > in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be > > rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? > > Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour > > and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all > > the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and > > that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties i= t > > has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at other= s > > is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards society= , > > as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely b= y > > scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousin= g > > of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability > > unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour i= n > > general. > > The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", as > > Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. > > When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is not > > much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes > > structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then > > suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be > > contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I > > don?t know all of Latour?s work (or I am misstaken about his theory - > > but one last thing: Latour?s very essayistic and loose style is not > > really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more > > confusion) > > > > best, > > e > > > > d.eldervass@ntlworld.com schrieb: > > > Hi Echna, and listers! > > > > > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say this= a > > touch more coherently. > > > > > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to s= ay > > here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour > > acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the > empirical' > > (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but not > > actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's > > 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not observ= ed > by > > human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon > known > > as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and > theorised > > by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and > > common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before it > was > > observed, but we just didn't know about it. > > > > > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this > > contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm > > offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered > > explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of stron= g > > constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll > suggest > > some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). > > > > > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious h= ow > > accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an > authority > > on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian > constructivism > > in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Latou= r > > takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of > > constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other > humanities) > > has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in > > philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, on > > reflection. > > > > > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a > very > > odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until > scientists > > observe and theorise them? > > > > > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the > > world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends o= n > the > > categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of tim= e, > > space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. We > can > > never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always > filtered > > through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world we > can > > know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the > > world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. S= o, > > when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not > > referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assume= , > but > > to the world-as-we-experience-it. > > > > > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience > > depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on > > concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) > > positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social > > constructionists argue that these are social products, and although > Latour > > rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of > > constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be > taken > > as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists emplo= y > > rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. > > > > > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our > > categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical > work, > > then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when > scientists > > change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases of > > Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only worl= d > > about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that stron= g > > constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading us > of > > the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out > > there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by > science, > > therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequence > of > > this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our > > 'world'. > > > > > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm not > > aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say for > sure > > whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a wa= y > of > > making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made > within > > the constructivist tradition. > > > > > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the > > contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her > excellent > > book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of > knowledge') > > that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simpl= y > > wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but th= ey > > are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have > > enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our > > categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of t= he > > actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that > enable > > us to survive because they give us generally accurate information about > our > > environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to thos= e > in > > which our perceptual abilities developed). > > > > > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an > influence > > on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even on > our > > perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between > > reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that i= s > > difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the > > world-in-itself. > > > > > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view that > the > > descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves > strongly > > influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposite > of > > the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories > > implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. > > > > > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argument= , > I > > have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost certain= ly > > misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his > > account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the > > inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse t= o > > behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the vie= w > > that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' > > theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is > > motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also > some > > recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. Thi= s > is > > arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the > > undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though their > > perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This starts > to > > approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including > inanimate > > objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each other > to > > produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. > > > > > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim abo= ut > > the phases of Venus. > > > > > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome > views > > on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to > make > > sense of Latour's ontology. > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > > > > > ---- d.eldervass@ntlworld.com wrote: > > > > > >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. > > >> > > > > > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a differen= t > > sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite differen= t > > from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a > pre-existing > > external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't > have > > any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that > > science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the othe= r > > hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists descri= be > > did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is difficu= lt > to > > make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realism= . > He > > seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a > distinction > > is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the > > world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps =3D 'the phenomenal world' thought > > interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' becau= se > > Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on a= s > if > > the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that the= y > > only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no > piont > > in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is deem= ed > to > > depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well a= s > our > > cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking = at > > the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense of > the > > world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence i= n > > that world. > > > > > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope tha= t > > (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! > > > > > > best > > > > > > Dave > > > > > > > > > > > > ---- b86102052@ntu.edu.tw wrote: > > > > > >> Hi Echna, > > >> > > > > > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, ma= y > > > be helpful too. > > > > > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency > > > in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): > > > 455-73. > > > > > > Best wishes, > > > Poe > > > > > > Poe Yu-ze Wan > > > Department of Sociology > > > National Taiwan University > > > > > > > > > ?? Matthew Smith : > > > > > > > > >> Hi Echna, > > >> > > >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main > > >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: > > >> > > > > http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-net= -th > eo.pdf > ). > > I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization which > > touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from th= e > > perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems > literature > > (here: > > > > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=3DArticleURL&_udi=3DB6W7M-4JWFH1= P-1&_us > > er=3D10&_rdoc=3D1&_fmt=3D&_orig=3Dsearch&_sort=3Dd&_docanchor=3D&view=3Dc= &_searchStrId=3D981 > > 817881&_rerunOrigin=3Dscholar.google&_acct=3DC000050221&_version=3D1&_url= Version=3D0 > &_userid=3D10&md5=3D67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d > ). > > If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently > don't > > have it online or accessible from where I currently > > >> am. > > >> > > >> > > >> Best, > > >> Matthew > > >> > > >> > > >> ----- Message initial ---- > > >> De : echna > > >> ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List > > >> > > >> Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s > > >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS > > >> > > >> Hi all, > > >> > > >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement fro= m > > >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" > (STS) > > >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I can > > >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and > > >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in > epistemological > > >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by t= he > > >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of > ontology > > >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludwi= k > > >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Brun= o > > >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law > even > > >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short descriptio= n > of > > >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the > whole > > >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any kin= d > of > > >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by > either > > >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the > > list). > > >> > > >> best wishes, > > >> e > > >> > > >> _______________________________________________ > > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > > >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel > > >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ > > >> > > >> _______________________________________________ > > >> Critical-Realism mailing list > > >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Critical-Realism mailing list > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > > > > -- > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------= --- > ----- > Mark Johnson > Institute for Educational Cybernetics > University of Bolton > BL3 5AB > Tel. 01204 903567 > Mob. 0778 6064505 > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 > *********************************************** > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism > From rgroff@slu.edu Sun Sep 06 17:31:13 2009 Received: from ipo4hsc.utah.edu ([155.97.131.100]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MkRCT-00089P-NM for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Sun, 06 Sep 2009 17:31:13 -0600 X-SBRS: 4.8 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AuwBAE/jo0pAEgKvlGdsb2JhbACCJDEtjQ0lAYlmZD8BAQEBCQsICRMFrFQFBgKFNYhJgiMFBhIIgVAFgVSCbIYY X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.44,343,1249279200"; d="scan'208";a="195178582" Received: from exprod7og111.obsmtp.com ([64.18.2.175]) by ipo4.cc.utah.edu with ESMTP; 06 Sep 2009 17:31:04 -0600 Received: from source ([209.85.211.188]) (using TLSv1) by exprod7ob111.postini.com ([64.18.6.12]) with SMTP ID DSNKSqRGOILlI/EVhKWCNjuKvpscxX/aGmLw@postini.com; Sun, 06 Sep 2009 16:31:05 PDT Received: by ywh26 with SMTP id 26so3496139ywh.5 for ; Sun, 06 Sep 2009 16:31:03 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.150.48.42 with SMTP id v42mr22793599ybv.65.1252279862643; Sun, 06 Sep 2009 16:31:02 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sun, 6 Sep 2009 18:31:02 -0500 Message-ID: <6ad241360909061631n4cec617ej3d88dc027b043b03@mail.gmail.com> From: Ruth Groff To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.9 Subject: [Critical-Realism] You're? X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 06 Sep 2009 23:31:13 -0000 Sorry -- I mean "your." I'm blind from line editing all day. On Sun, Sep 6, 2009 at 6:29 PM, Ruth Groff wrote: > Hi Leigh, all, > > This is a small but important point I think: immanent critique is not > really well-defined as when you say "You're a little bit right" or even > "That's wrong, but I can see why you might have thought it." Nor is it a > matter of being generous, necessarily -- though one's position is always > made stronger by being so, it seems to me. And plus it's good for the > soul. Rather, immanent (versus external) critique is when you say "If yo= u > really think (this one part of) what you say you think, then you can't > actually think (this other part of) what you say you think." Thus the > critique of Hume and Kant is immanent in a different, and more precise, > sense than that which you suggest: viz., RTS is an argument directed to > Humean and Kantian philosophers of science, to the effect that if they wa= nt > to hold to what they - and everyone else - understands experiments to be, > which they do want to do, then they have to give up their Humeanism and/o= r > Kantianism, because it can't account for experimentation so conceived. > (Whether the argument is successful or not is a different question. Inde= ed, > one might even want to say that it really only shows up as a genuinely > internal, or immanent, critique to the extent that it is.) > > I think you're intuition is a reasonable one, though -- that someone who = is > interested in arguing via internal critique is perhaps especially likely = to > be interested in actually making an argument. I think of a polemic as th= e > rhetorical expression of dogmatism as a (non)argument-form; it's when the= re > is no actual argument, only tone and effect. > > Warmly, > r. > > > > > > > On Sun, Sep 6, 2009 at 5:27 PM, Leigh Price wrote: > >> Hi David >> >> Before we can engage in a discussion of critical realism's relationship = to >> polemics, we first have to recognise that there can be two definitions o= f >> polemics. For example, according to the Merriam-Webster online dictionar= y, >> polemics is: >> a : an aggressive attack on or refutation of the opinions or principles = of >> another >> b : the art or practice of disputation or controversy >> Etymology: French pol=E9mique, from Middle French, from polemique >> controversial, from Greek polemikos warlike, hostile, from polemos war >> >> Critical realism is polemical in that it engages in disputation and it i= s >> certainly controversial. Bhaskar frequently uses the word 'polemic' in >> this >> sense. However, CR is not, I believe, polemical in the sense of being >> aggressive or warlike in its manner of disputation. One of the reasons >> that >> I assume critical realism avoids aggressive polemics is its method of >> arguing that Bhaskar calls immanent critique. In this method, according = to >> Bhaskar, you don=92t argue against a position from your own position, bu= t >> rather argue against a position from the point of view of the position >> itself. Therefore, if I believe X and you Y, to argue for my position, I >> have to show that something in totality is inconsistent with Y. I would >> say >> that aggressive polemics is fuelled by the dichotomy of setting one's se= lf >> up against an opposite position. Hartwig (2009) has suggested that such >> academic attacks (polemics) that are "hostile and ungenerous, philistine >> and >> shrill" ...systematically breach the cardinal principle of immanent >> critique >> "that the critic operate on the terrain of the account being criticised = to >> demonstrate that it is beset with problems that can be resolved on its o= wn >> terms. And that it is at odds with the logic of the 'critical realist' >> embrace: the fundamental drive of the system to transcend and heal >> division >> and split...". >> >> For example, Bhaskar does not set himself up against Kant and Hume. Rath= er >> he tries to embrace their insights whilst nevertheless addressing the >> absences in their work. From my notes, that I took when attending a CR >> seminar last year, Bhaskar asked, "So, were Hume and Kant were completel= y >> wrong? No, because there is something that would imply that ontology >> should >> collapse into epistemology=85the 'natural attitude'=85when we talk about= the >> world, actually we talk about our knowledge about the world. We only >> really >> need to disambiguate ontology and epistemology when there is conflict an= d >> when we are researching." Similarly, we should aim not to set ourselves = up >> against Latour, but to embrace his insights whilst addressing the proble= ms >> in his work. >> >> The quote I have found for Latour (2004:246) that refers, I think, to hi= s >> being against polemics of the aggressive sort, is: >> >> "The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The >> critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from under the feet of na=EFve >> believers, but the one who offers the participants arenas in which to >> gather." Specifically, Latour is here referring to the critic as a >> reformed >> deconstructionist, but I think the quote is relevant. I would have to sa= y >> that Latour's general tone in this paper is one against 'debunking'. He >> links this debunking attitude to those critics who alternate "haphazardl= y >> between antifetishism and positivism like the drunk iconoclast drawn by >> Goya". >> >> If you are interested in people's quotes against aggressive polemics, yo= u >> might also like this one by Foucault (1984) - apologies for its length: >> >> "Questions and answers depend on a game=97a game that is at once pleasan= t >> and >> difficult=97in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only th= e >> rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of dialogue. The >> polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he >> possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he >> possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a >> just >> undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner in search for the >> truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is armful, and whose >> very >> existence constitutes a threat. For him, then the game consists not of >> recognizing this person as a subject having the right to speak but of >> abolishing him as interlocutor, from any possible dialogue; and his fina= l >> objective will be not to come as close as possible to a difficult truth >> but >> to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has been manifestly >> upholding from the beginning. The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that >> his >> adversary is by definition denied. Perhaps, someday, a long history will >> have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic figure on >> discussion >> and an obstacle to the search for the truth." >> >> >> Best regards, >> >> Leigh >> >> >> References >> >> Foucault, M (1984). Polemics, Politics and Problematizations >> Interview conducted by Paul Rabinow. Translation by Lydia Davis, volume = 1 >> =93Ethics=94 of =93Essential Works of Foucault=94, The New Press 1997. >> http://foucault.info/foucault/interview.html >> >> Hartwig, M (2009). 'Orthodox' critical realism and the critical realist >> embrace. JCR, 8.2: 233-257. >> >> Latour,B (2004). Why has critique run out of steam/ From matters of fact >> to >> matters of concern. Critical Inquiry 30 (winter): 225-248. >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu >> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of David >> Pilgrim >> Sent: 03 September 2009 21:01 >> To: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; >> critical-realism-request@lists.econ.utah.edu >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 >> >> Thanks to Mark and Leigh for this illuminating exchange. Any references = to >> the objections of RB and Latour to 'polemical debate' would be gratefull= y >> received. Dave >> >> David Pilgrim >> Professor of Mental Health Policy >> >> Department of Social Work >> Faculty of Health >> University of Central Lancashire >> Preston >> PR1 2HE >> >> Tel +44 (0)1772 893458 >> Fax +44 (0)1772 892974 >> Email DPilgrim@uclan.ac.uk >> >>> 03/09/09 7:00 PM >>> >> Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to >> critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> >> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >> critical-realism-request@lists.econ.utah.edu >> >> You can reach the person managing the list at >> critical-realism-owner@lists.econ.utah.edu >> >> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >> than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." >> >> >> Today's Topics: >> >> 1. Re: Re : CR and STS (Mark Johnson) >> >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >> Message: 1 >> Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 13:27:12 +0100 >> From: Mark Johnson >> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS >> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> >> Message-ID: >> >> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=3DUTF-8 >> >> Hi Leigh, >> Thanks very much for the Latour quote - personally I found it quite >> moving: >> it is a classic example of an 'inspection of conscience'. Such shifts of >> position are personally hard for people because it involves a shift in >> personal identity. You're right that constructivists are not immune from >> fundamentalism... I would only suggest that insistence on 'reality' can >> make >> one more susceptible to it (even, as is common in constructivism, it is >> the >> implicit ontology of the 'reality' of constructivism). Personally, I don= 't >> think we can escape the fact that our identities (critical realists, >> constructivists, jedi...) are tied to positions and assertions of what's >> real and what isn't. >> >> But how do we move forward? It strikes me that this must be a >> methodological >> development.. and more particularly one which takes account of diverse >> perspectives and diverse identities which are nonetheless 'real' (or at >> least part of a personal identity) to those who possess them (even the >> climate change deniers!). Establishing real mechanisms in it all must >> surely >> be a participative and appreciative exercise and not one where one set o= f >> distinctions (Roy's, Latour's or anyone else's) holds sway. If Roy is >> right >> and the reality behind individual perspectives can be revealed, the >> process >> of revealing it collaboratively can itself be transformative ("if you >> think >> climate change is not happening, what's your theory for what's going on >> when >> the ice-caps are melting?"... "what if you're wrong?"... etc.). But I >> think >> to make that work, an understanding of a real world must coexist with an >> understanding of ourselves >> as passionate, identity-seeking, distinction-making entities. >> >> Mark >> >> On Thu, Sep 3, 2009 at 12:15 PM, Leigh Price wrote= : >> >> > Hello again, and many thanks for everyone's contributions >> > >> > Sorry to take so long to reply but I live in Zimbabwe where email can = be >> > erratic and only yesterday managed to get back online. >> > >> > Echna was careful to say that he had not read all of Latour. His >> critique >> > of Latour's earlier work is quite justifiable. However, Latour's more >> recent >> > work was surprisingly unsympathetic towards the constructivist turn. >> > >> > For example, you may be interested to know that Latour gave a keynote >> > address at Keele University in 1997 entitled "On Recalling ANT", in >> which >> he >> > describes ANT as 'managerial, engineering, Machiavellian, demiurgic'. >> > Basically, he felt that ANT, as it was being largely interpreted, was >> > susceptible to the critique of being demiurgic on the one hand and >> resulting >> > in the death of man on the other. By this I assume he means the >> oscillation >> > between voluntarism (demiurgic tendency) and determinism (death of man >> > tendency) that Bhaskar described in his lead up to giving his >> > Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA). Latour was concerned >> that >> > 'actor' was being given the role of agency and 'network' that of >> structure, >> > magically turning one into the other like the social construction theo= ry >> of >> > Berger and Luckman. I agree that Bhaskar's TMSA conception is clearer >> and >> > better justified that Latour's circulating actor network, but they do >> seem >> > similar to me. As did Giddens and Bhaskar, Latour sees the actors and >> the >> > networks (individuals and society?) as both being connected and >> influencing >> > each other, but unlike Giddens and similar to Bhaskar, Latour insists = on >> the >> > historicity of the process. Also, Latour describes the way that the >> social >> > can 'travel endlessly without encountering the micro-level' >> (individuals?), >> > which seems similar to Bhaskar's TMSA diagram in which society and >> > individuals are on parallel tracks. They are distinct, autonomously >> causally >> > efficacious, yet closely related, transforming and reproducing each >> other. >> > By definition, parallel lines can travel endlessly but never encounter >> each >> > other. Diagrammatically, then, Bhaskar has used a similar metaphor to >> > Latour's verbal metaphor of 'travelling endlessly without encountering >> each >> > other' (but nevertheless aeffecting each other). >> > >> > Despite this similarity, what then throws the realist is Latour's >> statement >> > that the social 'is turned from a province of reality to a circulation= '. >> I >> > understand why he says this, he wants to avoid social determinism, >> however, >> > it is an undeniably uncritical realist statement. But this paper was >> written >> > in 1997 and by 2004, Latour was to critique himself and his followers >> even >> > further and to revindicate reality. He wrote a paper 'Why has critique >> run >> > out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern' (Critical >> Inquiry >> > 30, 2004). I hope the quote that follows is not too long, but I wanted >> to >> > give you an idea of how worried Latour was by the way his work was bei= ng >> > used...worried enough to admit he perhaps he 'did not mean what he sai= d' >> > (Bhaskar has also said of Derrida, that he probably 'did not mean what >> he >> > said'). >> > >> > "While we spend years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behi= nd >> > the appearance of objective statements, do we now have to reveal the >> real >> > objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of >> > prejudices? And yet entire Ph.D programs are still running to make sur= e >> that >> > good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up >> (...) >> > that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak from a >> > standpoint and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very sa= me >> > argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that coul= d >> save >> > our lives. Was I wrong to participate in this invention of this field >> known >> > as science studies? Is it enough to say that we did not really mean wh= at >> we >> > said? Why does it burn my tongue to say that global warming is a fact >> > whether you like it or not? Why can't I simply say that the argument i= s >> > closed for good? >> > Should I reassure myself by simply saying that the bad guys can use an= y >> > weapon at hand, naturalized facts when it suits them and social >> construction >> > when it suits them? Should we apologise for having been wrong all the >> time? >> > (...) Or should we do a bit of soul-searching here: what were we reall= y >> > after when we were so intent on showing the scientific construction of >> > facts?" >> > >> > Later Latour also writes: "My argument is that a certain form of >> critical >> > spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the >> wrong >> > enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong so= rt >> of >> > allies because of a little mistake in the definition of its main targe= t. >> The >> > question was never to get away from facts, but closer to them, not >> fighting >> > empiricism but renewing empiricism". Latour also argues that we need t= o >> > "cultivate a stubbornly realist attitude". He says that "The mistake w= e >> > made, the mistake I made, was to believe there was no efficient way to >> > criticise matters of fact except by moving away from them and directin= g >> > attention toward the conditions that made them possible". >> > >> > The reason I have gone to this trouble to show Latour's move from >> irrealism >> > to realism (but not the na?ve realism of typical scientistic empiricis= m) >> is >> > because I would like to encourage critical realists not to quickly thr= ow >> out >> > the baby with the bathwater, so to speak, when they decide to disregar= d >> > Latour's work. The reason we might want to engage with the work of >> Latour >> or >> > Donna Haraway (also a professed non realist) is because they have spen= t >> > years trying to understand how language can be used in a Machiavellian >> way >> > to oppress people. Bhaskar talks about oppressive demi-reality, and I >> > suspect that it is this demi-reality that these thinkers are engaging >> with, >> > albeit they say it is unreal. It is demi-reality which most needs our >> > attention right now, if we are to facilitate a move towards the >> flourishing >> > of humankind. >> > >> > There are other similarities between Latour and Critical Realism, such >> as >> > his objection to polemical debate and his talk about the oscillation >> between >> > naturalised facts and social construction (which reminds me of Sayer's >> > concept of the pomo flips). I think his humility in being able to adju= st >> his >> > ideas in the face of contradictions, and his attempt to try and make h= is >> > ideas more inclusive (of totality), is a brilliant model of Critical >> Realist >> > praxis. We may not agree with everything Latour says, but we can learn= a >> lot >> > from his humble academic process which, in allowing for the possibilit= y >> of >> > mistake, gets him closer to an adequate conception. His ability to >> admit >> > the inadequacy of his early writing also shows that Khun was wrong abo= ut >> how >> > tightly academics cling to their theories... >> > >> > Mark Johnson was interested in the way that constructivism seems to be >> > quite humane, as it seems to avoid strong arguments about rightness an= d >> > wrongness. However, as Latour shows, even extremists/fundamentalists c= an >> now >> > make use of constructivism (e.g. we have fundamentalist Capitalists >> arguing >> > that global warming is just a construct). I have written too much >> already, >> > but Latour offers a way to be critical without being polemical. >> > >> > As far as our efforts to bring credibility to CR goes, to have a main >> > architect of the extreme social constructivist movement provide such >> > critique of that discipline, and to have that critique include a >> > revindication of realism, lends powerful support to our realist >> position. >> > However, this is not to say that Latour's position is as complete as >> > Bhaskar's (for example, as someone wrote earlier, it does not have a >> > conception of the stratification of reality). >> > >> > Again, apologies that my contribution has taken so long to be returned= . >> > >> > Best wishes, >> > >> > Leigh >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto: >> > critical-realism-bounces@lists.econ.utah.edu] On Behalf Of echna >> > Sent: 25 August 2009 14:02 >> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Re : CR and STS >> > >> > Hi David, hi all, >> > >> > first of all thank you very much for your elaborations, they are reall= y >> > insightful. I would say that you are plainly right in the end of your >> > mail when you state that Latour?s position can?t be reconciled - it is >> > just contradictory. I don?t know all of Latour?s work, but for example >> > in "We have never been modern", a book where he tries to develop his >> > "symmetrical anthropology", this oscillating between a strong >> > constructivist position and a abstract realist can be sensed thorughou= t >> > the whole (this reminds me of Kuhn?s contradictory sentence that >> > scientists after a scientific revolution life in a new world, and don?= t >> > do so at the same time). In shorter texts and more essayistic texts, >> > like his tale about the discovery of dinosaurs Latour is just >> > constructivistic (he states for example that the "Realosaurus" the rea= l >> > formerly existing dinosaur is an image of the "Popsaurus" the common >> > cultural notion of this or that dinosaur). >> > Anyhow, in the words of Roy Bhaskar a position like this must lead to = an >> > "ontological tension", as one can?t talk about ontology in purely >> > epistemological terms. I am also wondering how Latour and others are >> > then in their framework are making sense of the necessity of experimen= ts >> > in certain fields of the natural science. How can this necessity be >> > rendered intelligible in purely constructivist terms? >> > Rather vaguely and conjecturally I would also say that the way Latour >> > and Co. are coceptualising "society" is very misleading. They talk all >> > the time of our or the scientists "societal" constructions of this and >> > that, but they can never say what society is like and what properties = it >> > has. What I want to say is, that the constructionism of Latour at othe= rs >> > is joined together with a purely individualistic stance towards societ= y, >> > as constructing in this sense is always something that is done solely = by >> > scattered individuals and not "by means of constructions" (any espousi= ng >> > of the second position would make the notion of incommensurability >> > unintelligible). But I am not sure, whether this is true about Latour = in >> > general. >> > The same problem also seems to pop up in the "actor-network theory", a= s >> > Latour seems to conflate the properties of different kind of things. >> > When everything is somehow bound up in an ominous network, there is no= t >> > much to say about the properties of different things; agency becomes >> > structure or both are not discernible anymore. So do things then >> > suddenly have agency in an emphatic sense. All in all this seems to be >> > contradictory and chaotic to me. Still, maybe there is a solution as I >> > don?t know all of Latour?s work (or I am misstaken about his theory - >> > but one last thing: Latour?s very essayistic and loose style is not >> > really helping to solve things in any sense, it is just spreading more >> > confusion) >> > >> > best, >> > e >> > >> > d.eldervass@ntlworld.com schrieb: >> > > Hi Echna, and listers! >> > > >> > > Apologies for my previous rather rushed reply. Let me try to say thi= s >> a >> > touch more coherently. >> > > >> > > I should start by saying that what I'm trying (very tentatively) to >> say >> > here adds something to my BJS paper. There I suggest that Latour >> > acknowledges the existence 'out there' of what Bhaskar calls 'the >> empirical' >> > (those events that are observed by humans) but not of B's 'real but no= t >> > actual' - the mechanisms that underpin causal powers - or even of B's >> > 'actual but not empirical' - those things that occur but are not >> observed >> by >> > human agents. For example, he argues that the astronomical phenonenon >> known >> > as the 'phases of Venus' did not exist until it was observed and >> theorised >> > by scientists - and he cites this as an exemplary case. Critical and >> > common-sense realists would argue that the phenomenon existed before i= t >> was >> > observed, but we just didn't know about it. >> > > >> > > What I didn't consider in the paper, which I try to address in this >> > contribution, is how to make sense of such a belief. The argument I'm >> > offering here is not one that I'm aware Latour himself has offered >> > explicitly, but it seems broadly consistent with the tradition of stro= ng >> > constructivist thinking that he has emerged from (though later I'll >> suggest >> > some difficulties with taking this as a reading of Latour's position). >> > > >> > > This tradition draws on Kant's philosophy, though it is contentious >> how >> > accurately they represent it, and I certainly don't claim to be an >> authority >> > on this myself. Sismondo calls a similar approach neo-Kantian >> constructivism >> > in his useful book 'Science without Myth' though he doesn't think Lato= ur >> > takes this approach. But it may well be that this tradition of >> > constructionist thinking in the social sciences (and some other >> humanities) >> > has little in common with the tradition known as neo-Kantianism in >> > philosophy. I'm not sure my label 'pseudo-Kantianism' is any better, o= n >> > reflection. >> > > >> > > So, how could thinkers in this tradition justify what seems to me a >> very >> > odd belief that things like the phases of Venus don't exist until >> scientists >> > observe and theorise them? >> > > >> > > First, drawing on Kant, a distinction is drawn between the >> > world-in-itself and the world-as-we-experience-it. The latter depends = on >> the >> > categories of perception and cognition (such as our innate sense of >> time, >> > space, and causality) through which we make sense of our experience. W= e >> can >> > never perceive the world-in-itself because our experience is always >> filtered >> > through these categories. Hence, for constructivists, the only world w= e >> can >> > know is the world-as-we-experience-it so any discussion of the >> > world-in-itself is implicitly ruled out as unjustifiable speculation. >> So, >> > when they talk about the world or what exists 'out there' they are not >> > referring to the world-in-itself, as common-sense realists might assum= e, >> but >> > to the world-as-we-experience-it. >> > > >> > > Second, since Kant, other thinkers have argued that our experience >> > depends not just on our innate categories and capacities but also on >> > concepts, theories, etc, which (a) are historically variable and (b) >> > positively shape our perception of the things we experience. Social >> > constructionists argue that these are social products, and although >> Latour >> > rejects references to the social, he continues to be a kind of >> > constructionist, arguing that these concepts and theories come to be >> taken >> > as true as the result of historical processes in which scientists empl= oy >> > rhetorical strategies to persuade others of their merit. >> > > >> > > Now, if the only world we can perceive is filtered through our >> > categories, which are themselves a product of scientists' rhetorical >> work, >> > then the radical constructivist argument is in effect that when >> scientists >> > change our categories, e.g. by labelling and 'explaining' the phases o= f >> > Venus, they alter the world-as-we-experience-it, and thus the only wor= ld >> > about which we can talk. So in the only sense of 'out there' that stro= ng >> > constructivists find coherent, when scientists succeed in persuading u= s >> of >> > the truth of some new theory, the consequence is to alter what is 'out >> > there'. The phases of Venus, or any other phenomenon explained by >> science, >> > therefore only exist once they have been explained, but the consequenc= e >> of >> > this process is that they become just as real as anything else in our >> > 'world'. >> > > >> > > Although constructivists often invoke parts of this argument, I'm no= t >> > aware of anywhere where they put them all together, and I can't say fo= r >> sure >> > whether Latour actually assumes this logic, but it does seem to me a w= ay >> of >> > making sense of his argument that is consistent with many claims made >> within >> > the constructivist tradition. >> > > >> > > This does not, of course, mean that I accept this argument. On the >> > contrary, I would claim (and I think Ruth Groff argues this in her >> excellent >> > book 'Critical Realism, post-positivism and the possibility of >> knowledge') >> > that the idea that we don't have access to the world-in-itself is simp= ly >> > wrong. Our perceptions may indeed be affected by our categories, but >> they >> > are nevertheless perceptions of the actual external world, and we have >> > enough access to that world to (sometimes) be able to tell when our >> > categories are misleading us. Furthermore, we ourselves are a part of >> the >> > actual world and our perceptual abilities have evolved in ways that >> enable >> > us to survive because they give us generally accurate information abou= t >> our >> > environment (at least in situations that are relevantly similar to tho= se >> in >> > which our perceptual abilities developed). >> > > >> > > Of course, critical realists also recognise that science has an >> influence >> > on the way we think about our experiences and perhaps sometimes even o= n >> our >> > perception itself. But we insist on keeping a firm distinction between >> > reality and our knowledge of that reality. This is a distinction that = is >> > difficult to sustain if we accept the Kantian denial of access to the >> > world-in-itself. >> > > >> > > Secondly, critical and other common-sense realists take the view tha= t >> the >> > descriptions and explanations produced by scientists are themselves >> strongly >> > influenced by the world that is already out there. This is the opposit= e >> of >> > the causal relation between the external world and scientific theories >> > implicit in the constructivist argument I have described. >> > > >> > > Finally, let me say that in trying to make sense of Latour's argumen= t, >> I >> > have focused on one aspect of it, and in doing so I have almost >> certainly >> > misrepresented his overall position. One thing that is striking in his >> > account of science (and his colleague Callon's) is that sometimes the >> > inanimate, or at least non-human, things studied by scientists refuse = to >> > behave as the scientists expect. This is hard to reconcile with the vi= ew >> > that this external reality is conjured into existence by scientists' >> > theories. So we need to recognise that even if Latour's position is >> > motivated in part by the Kant-influenced argument above there is also >> some >> > recognition of an external reality that is not produced by science. Th= is >> is >> > arguably consistent with a version of Kant's thinking in which the >> > undescribable world-in-itself impacts upon scientists even though thei= r >> > perception of it is inevitably mediated by previous theory. This start= s >> to >> > approach Latour's model of networks of various actors, including >> inanimate >> > objects, theories, scientific devices, etc, interacting with each othe= r >> to >> > produce outcomes such as the beliefs of scientists. >> > > >> > > Still, it's hard to see how this can be reconciled with his claim >> about >> > the phases of Venus. >> > > >> > > This is all a little speculative at the moment, and I would welcome >> views >> > on how plausible it is - or whether there is some more coherent way to >> make >> > sense of Latour's ontology. >> > > >> > > Best, >> > > >> > > Dave >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > ---- d.eldervass@ntlworld.com wrote: >> > > >> > >> Hi Echna - and thankyou Poe for recommending my paper. >> > >> >> > > >> > > Latour does claim to be a realist of sorts, but it's quite a differe= nt >> > sort of realism than critical realists subscribe to, and quite differe= nt >> > from the common sense version of realism in which we occupy a >> pre-existing >> > external world. I'm writing this on holiday from a cybercafe so don't >> have >> > any access to my books and notes, but as I remember it, he argues that >> > science does describe a real world that is 'out there', but on the oth= er >> > hand he and his followers maintain that the phenomena scientists >> describe >> > did not exist until they described them. At first sight this is >> difficult >> to >> > make sense of for anyone committed to a variety of common sense realis= m. >> He >> > seems to be committed to a kind of pseudo-Kantianism in which a >> distinction >> > is drawn between the world-in-itself, which we can never know, and the >> > world-as-we-experience-it (perhaps =3D 'the phenomenal world' thought >> > interprerations of this in Kant vary). The Kantianisn is 'pseudo' >> because >> > Latour and many other constructivists these days effectively carry on = as >> if >> > the world-in-itself does not exist, the argument seeming to be that th= ey >> > only world we can know is the world-as-we-experience-it so there is no >> piont >> > in discussing any other sort of world. And then, our experience is >> deemed >> to >> > depend on concepts, theories, etc, which shape our perception as well = as >> our >> > cognition. So, when scientists persuade us of a certain way of looking >> at >> > the world, that way of looking at the world comes to shape our sense o= f >> the >> > world-as-we-experience-it, and hey presto, thinkgs pop into existence = in >> > that world. >> > > >> > > My session's about to run out so I can't say more now, but I hope th= at >> > (a) makes sense; (and (b) helps! >> > > >> > > best >> > > >> > > Dave >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > ---- b86102052@ntu.edu.tw wrote: >> > > >> > >> Hi Echna, >> > >> >> > > >> > > The following article, written by Dave Elder-Vass on this list, m= ay >> > > be helpful too. >> > > >> > > Elder-Vass, Dave. 2008. ?Searching for Realism, Structure and Agency >> > > in Actor Network Theory,? The British Journal of Sociology, 59(3): >> > > 455-73. >> > > >> > > Best wishes, >> > > Poe >> > > >> > > Poe Yu-ze Wan >> > > Department of Sociology >> > > National Taiwan University >> > > >> > > >> > > ?? Matthew Smith : >> > > >> > > >> > >> Hi Echna, >> > >> >> > >> There is a paper that looks at CR and ANT, which is one of the main >> > >> theories that STS (especially Latour and co) use (article here: >> > >> >> > >> >> http://www.slis.indiana.edu/faculty/hrosenba/www/l574/pdf/mutch_actor-ne= t-th >> eo.pdf >> ). >> > I also wrote a piece a while back in Information and Organization whic= h >> > touches on some of the issues you raise as I was considering CR from t= he >> > perspective of philosophical debates in the information systems >> literature >> > (here: >> > >> >> http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=3DArticleURL&_udi=3DB6W7M-4JWFH= 1P-1&_us >> >> er=3D10&_rdoc=3D1&_fmt=3D&_orig=3Dsearch&_sort=3Dd&_docanchor=3D&view=3D= c&_searchStrId=3D981 >> >> 817881&_rerunOrigin=3Dscholar.google&_acct=3DC000050221&_version=3D1&_ur= lVersion=3D0 >> &_userid=3D10&md5=3D67a7cdfdd26aa90032f2792438e3ab4d >> ). >> > If you need a copy of that paper, just write me directly - I currently >> don't >> > have it online or accessible from where I currently >> > >> am. >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> Best, >> > >> Matthew >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> ----- Message initial ---- >> > >> De : echna >> > >> ? : Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List >> > >> >> > >> Envoy? le : dimanche 16 ao?t 2009, 14 h 03 min 14 s >> > >> Objet : [Critical-Realism] CR and STS >> > >> >> > >> Hi all, >> > >> >> > >> I was wondering, if anybody can point my attention to engagement fr= om >> > >> critical realist side with the so-called "Science and Technology" >> (STS) >> > >> studies. They seem to be a fairly new discipline and as far as I ca= n >> > >> overlook the field the STS are based on a relativistic and >> > >> constructivist ontology that talks about being fully in >> epistemological >> > >> terms. In general they tacitly substitute the theory of science by >> the >> > >> sociology of science and consequently any conceptualisation of >> ontology >> > >> is left out. Theoretically they draw heavily amongst others on Ludw= ik >> > >> Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Famous STS-researcher are for example Bru= no >> > >> Latour in France or John Law in GB (in his book "After Method" Law >> even >> > >> refers to CR as an "essentialist" theory). Maybe my short descripti= on >> of >> > >> the STS is (partly) mistaken, as I don?t have an overview over the >> whole >> > >> field (if so, please correct me). Anyhow, I am interested in any ki= nd >> of >> > >> contention about the STS (either in the form of texts written by >> either >> > >> of the sides so as to critize the other, or in comments here on the >> > list). >> > >> >> > >> best wishes, >> > >> e >> > >> >> > >> _______________________________________________ >> > >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> > >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> Devenez un meilleur amigo gr?ce ? Yahoo! Courriel >> > >> http://cf.promos.yahoo.com/courriel/visiteguidee2/ >> > >> >> > >> _______________________________________________ >> > >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> > >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> > >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> >> > >> >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > _______________________________________________ >> > > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > _______________________________________________ >> > > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > _______________________________________________ >> > > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> > > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > Critical-Realism mailing list >> > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > >> >> >> >> -- >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------= ---- >> ----- >> Mark Johnson >> Institute for Educational Cybernetics >> University of Bolton >> BL3 5AB >> Tel. 01204 903567 >> Mob. 0778 6064505 >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 >> *********************************************** >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Critical-Realism mailing list >> Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism >> > > From gbrown@uow.edu.au Sun Sep 06 19:17:56 2009 Received: from ipo4hsc.utah.edu ([155.97.131.100]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MkSrk-0008EN-Ex for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Sun, 06 Sep 2009 19:17:56 -0600 X-SBRS: 5.3 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AjECAOv7o0qCgkQfmWdsb2JhbACbPgEBAQEBCAsKBxOsa4UiiEmEGAWEQIYY X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.44,343,1249279200"; d="scan'208";a="195192680" Received: from beru.its.uow.edu.au ([130.130.68.31]) by ipo4.cc.utah.edu with ESMTP; 06 Sep 2009 19:17:50 -0600 Received: from jinn-nat.its.uow.edu.au ([130.130.68.211] helo=jinn.its.uow.edu.au) by beru.its.uow.edu.au with esmtp (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1MkSrc-0005Rc-Se for critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu; Mon, 07 Sep 2009 11:17:48 +1000 Received: from educ101-23.educ.uow.edu.au (educ101-23.educ.uow.edu.au [130.130.78.101]) by jinn.its.uow.edu.au (MOS 3.10.3-GA) with ESMTP id EWG14269; Mon, 7 Sep 2009 11:17:48 +1000 (EST) Message-Id: <324738CE-89E0-4CA6-80F8-2AAF2159C9C2@uow.edu.au> From: Gordon Brown To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed; delsp=yes Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v930.3) Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2009 11:17:48 +1000 References: X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.930.3) Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] (no subject) X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 Sep 2009 01:17:56 -0000 Hello Shiva, The Journal Of Critical Realism Vol 8.1 (2009) pp.5-34 has an article I have written making a case for a CR understanding of ontology as the basis for considering the learning environment as a starting point in education. In the article I mention a range of papers, chapters and books that have tackled education issues from a CR framework. This would be a good start for you. CR in education is starting to take off, and strangely a number of them are in Australia (I say strangely because of all the critical realists in Australia, a good many of them are working in education). Regards, Gordon On Sep 6, 2009, at 5:31 PM, shiva hemmati wrote: > Hello > I want to have Bhaskar's email if possible. > Is there any body who tried to see what the impelications of critical > realism are in education? > -- > best wishes > Shiva Hemati > > _______________________________________________ > Critical-Realism mailing list > Critical-Realism@lists.econ.utah.edu > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism Dr Gordon Brown Senior Lecturer, Curriculum and Teacher Education Director, BMathsEd and BScienceEd, Loftus Campus Coordinator, Curriculum and Pedagogy Faculty of Education University of Wollongong Wollongong NSW 2522 Australia Phone (work) 61 2 4221 3792 Fax (work) 61 2 4221 3892 From dpilgrim@uclan.ac.uk Mon Sep 07 01:27:28 2009 Received: from ipo4hsc.utah.edu ([155.97.131.100]) by lists.econ.utah.edu with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1MkYdM-0008W5-0D; Mon, 07 Sep 2009 01:27:28 -0600 X-SBRS: -0.2 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AvYEAKNSpErBPf8SYmdsb2JhbACDA5gwFwsKB64WCI1kgkAIgVAFhECGGA X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.44,345,1249279200"; d="scan'208";a="195256731" Received: from mail3.uclan.ac.uk ([193.61.255.18]) by ipo4.cc.utah.edu with ESMTP; 07 Sep 2009 01:27:26 -0600 Received: from lmia-021.ntds.uclan.ac.uk ([172.31.2.113] helo=gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk) by mail3.uclan.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1MkYdI-0001JK-Ky; Mon, 07 Sep 2009 08:27:24 +0100 Received: from DI21-MTA by gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk with Novell_GroupWise; Mon, 07 Sep 2009 08:27:24 +0100 Message-Id: <4AA4C3DF020000EB000B3E98@gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk> X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise Internet Agent 7.0.2 Date: Mon, 07 Sep 2009 08:27:11 +0100 From: "David Pilgrim" To: , Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: inline Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Bhaskar, Latour and polemics X-BeenThere: critical-realism@lists.econ.utah.edu X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Id: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 Sep 2009 07:27:28 -0000 Dear Leigh, This is very clear and very helpful (about both Bhaskar and = Latour). With regard to the immanent critique, there is much intellectual = and ethical sense in this. Pursued properly it gets the best out of the = critique and the attempt to empathise with the target of the critique. It = also increases the chances of an open and respectful debate with those = defending that target. However, in practice, given that viewpoints are = often if, not invariably, bound up with interests and thus the passions = these arouse, is it not common for an aggressive version of polemics to = define the tone of most disputes? Those encouraging rhetorical inquiry = (like Toulmin and Adler) maybe simply accept this as being inevitable to = some degree and therefore suggest that we analyse disputes in relation to = how the parties disagree in relation to conceptual, normative and = ontological assumptions. (I find Toulmin's distinction in rhetorical = inquiry between codified-law and common-law forms of argumentation useful, = with the latter dominating 'hot' disputes.) As an onlooker to disputes and = when I have been party to them at times, it strikes me that the worthy = aspiration of Bhaskar and Latour has already failed most of the time. The = only protection we usually have (in academic circles at least but not in = politics) is the taboo on ad hominem ways of reasoning. Other than that = (even in academic circles) commuinities of interest often simply talk past = each other in a spirit of failed mutual empathy and Bhaskar's and Latour's = aspiration is stillborn. Does this sound cynical? Have I had an atypically = bad experience in the academy? Thanks for your thoughts on this. Dave When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 (Leigh Price) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2009 00:27:02 +0200 From: "Leigh Price" Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 58, Issue 2 To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" Message-ID: <9004CD1FDD24450285528BF5449437DA@leighlaptop> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=3D"iso-8859-1" Hi David Before we can engage in a discussion of critical realism's relationship to polemics, we first have to recognise that there can be two definitions of polemics. For example, according to the Merriam-Webster online dictionary, polemics is: a : an aggressive attack on or refutation of the opinions or principles of another=20 b : the art or practice of disputation or controversy Etymology: French pol?mique, from Middle French, from polemique controversial, from Greek polemikos warlike, hostile, from polemos war Critical realism is polemical in that it engages in disputation and it is certainly controversial. Bhaskar frequently uses the word 'polemic' in = this sense. However, CR is not, I believe, polemical in the sense of being aggressive or warlike in its manner of disputation. One of the reasons = that I assume critical realism avoids aggressive polemics is its method of arguing that Bhaskar calls immanent critique. In this method, according to Bhaskar, you don?t argue against a position from your own position, but rather argue against a position from the point of view of the position itself. Therefore, if I believe X and you Y, to argue for my position, I have to show that something in totality is inconsistent with Y. I would = say that aggressive polemics is fuelled by the dichotomy of setting one's self up against an opposite position. Hartwig (2009) has suggested that such academic attacks (polemics) that are "hostile and ungenerous, philistine = and shrill" ...systematically breach the cardinal principle of immanent = critique "that the critic operate on the terrain of the account being criticised to demonstrate that it is beset with problems that can be resolved on its own terms. And that it is at odds with the logic of the 'critical realist' embrace: the fundamental drive of the system to transcend and heal = division and split...". For example, Bhaskar does not set himself up against Kant and Hume. Rather he tries to embrace their insights whilst nevertheless addressing the absences in their work. From my notes, that I took when attending a CR seminar last year, Bhaskar asked, "So, were Hume and Kant were completely wrong? No, because there is something that would imply that ontology = should collapse into epistemology?the 'natural attitude'?when we talk about the world, actually we talk about our knowledge about the world. We only = really need to disambiguate ontology and epistemology when there is conflict and when we are researching." Similarly, we should aim not to set ourselves up against Latour, but to embrace his insights whilst addressing the problems in his work. The quote I have found for Latour (2004:246) that refers, I think, to his being against polemics of the aggressive sort, is: "The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from under the feet of na?ve believers, but the one who offers the participants arenas in which to gather." Specifically, Latour is here referring to the critic as a = reformed deconstructionist, but I think the quote is relevant. I would have to say that Latour's general tone in this paper is one against 'debunking'. He links this debunking attitude to those critics who alternate "haphazardly between antifetishism and positivism like the drunk iconoclast drawn by Goya". If you are interested in people's quotes against aggressive polemics, you might also like this one by Foucault (1984) - apologies for its length: "Questions and answers depend on a game?a game that is at once pleasant = and difficult?in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of dialogue. The polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a = just undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner in search for the truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is armful, and whose = very existence constitutes a threat. For him, then the game consists not of recognizing this person as a subject having the right to speak but of abolishing him as interlocutor, from any possible dialogue; and his final objective will be not to come as close as possible to a difficult truth = but to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has been manifestly upholding f