[A-List] Fwd: Cutting Through the Media's Bogus Bomb-Iran Debate

[Suzanne de Kuyper]

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From: Sid Shniad <shniad at gmail.com>
Date: Wed, Aug 25, 2010 at 9:08 PM
Subject: Cutting Through the Media's Bogus Bomb-Iran Debate
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http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175289/tomgram:_tony_karon,_the_bomb-iran_debate_from_hell/

Two Minutes to Midnight?

Cutting Through the Media's Bogus Bomb-Iran Debate

To suggest that Iran's present nuclear program represents the security
equivalent of a clock ticking down to midnight is calculated hysteria
that bears no relation to reality.

By Tony Karon

America's march to a disastrous war in Iraq began in the media, where
an unprovoked U.S. invasion of an Arab country was introduced as a
legitimate policy option, then debated as a prudent and necessary one.
Now, a similarly flawed media conversation on Iran is gaining
momentum.

Last month, TIME's Joe Klein warned that Obama administration sources
had told him bombing Iran's nuclear facilities was "back on the
table."  In an interview with CNN, former CIA director Admiral Mike
Hayden next spoke of an "inexorable" dynamic toward confrontation,
claiming that bombing was a more viable option for the Obama
administration than it had been for George W. Bush. The pièce de
résistance in the most recent drum roll of bomb-Iran alerts, however,
came from Jeffrey Goldberg in the Atlantic Monthly.  A journalist
influential in U.S. pro-Israeli circles, he also has access to
Israel’s corridors of power. Because sanctions were unlikely to force
Iran to back down on its uranium enrichment project, Goldberg invited
readers to believe that there was a more than even chance Israel would
launch a military strike on the country by next summer.

His piece, which sparked considerable debate in both the blogosphere
and the traditional media, was certainly an odd one.  After all,
despite the dramatics he deployed, including vivid descriptions of the
Israeli battle plan, and his tendency to paint Iran as a new
Auschwitz, he also made clear that many of his top Israeli sources
simply didn’t believe Iran would launch nuclear weapons against
Israel, even if it acquired them.

Nonetheless, Goldberg warned, absent an Iranian white flag soon,
Israel would indeed launch that war in summer 2011, and it, in turn,
was guaranteed to plunge the region into chaos. The message: the Obama
administration better do more to confront Iran or Israel will act
crazy.

It's not lost on many of his progressive critics that, when it came to
supporting a prospective invasion of Iraq back in 2002, Goldberg
proved effective in lobbying liberal America, especially through his
reports of "evidence" linking Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. Then and
now, he presents himself as an interlocutor who has no point of view.
In his most recent Atlantic piece, he professed a "profound,
paralyzing ambivalence" on the question of a military strike on Iran
and subsequently, in radio interviews, claimed to be "personally
opposed" to military action.

His piece, however, conveniently skipped over the obvious
inconsistencies in what his Israeli sources were telling him.  In
addition, he excluded perspectives from Israeli leaders that might
have challenged his narrative in which an embattled Jewish state feels
it has no alternative but to launch a quixotic military strike.  Such
an attack, as he presented it, would have limited hope of doing more
than briefly setting back the Iranian nuclear program, perhaps at
catastrophic cost, and so Israeli leaders would act only because they
believe the "goyim" won't stop another Auschwitz. Or as my friend Paul
Woodward, editor of the War in Context website, so brilliantly summed
up the Israeli message to America: "You must do what we can’t, because
if you don’t, we will."

Goldberg insists that he is merely initiating a debate about how to
tackle Iran and that debate is already underway on his terms -- that
is, like its Iraq War predecessor, based on a fabricated sense of
crisis and arbitrary deadlines.

Last Friday, the New York Times reported that the Obama administration
had convinced Israel that there was no need to rush on the issue.
Should Iran decide to build a nuclear weapon (which it has not done),
it would, administration officials pointed out, quickly make its
intentions clear by expelling the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) inspectors who routinely monitor its nuclear work, and breaking
out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  After that, it would still
need another year or more to assemble its first weapon.

In other words, despite Goldberg's breathless two-minutes-to-midnight
schedule, there's no urgency whatsoever about debating military action
against Iran. And then, of course, there’s the question of the very
premises of the to-bomb-or-not-to-bomb “debate.”  Perhaps, after all
these years of obsessive Iran nuclear mania, it’s too much to request
a moment of sanity on the issue of Iran and the bomb.  If, however, we
really have a couple of years to think this over, what about starting
by asking three crucial questions, each of which our debaters would
prefer to avoid or ignore?

1. Does the U.S. have a right to launch wars of aggression without
provocation, in defiance of international law and an international
consensus, simply on the basis of its own suspicions about another
country's future intentions?

Or to put it bluntly, as former National Security Council staffers
Flint Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett have: Does the U.S. have the
right to attack Iran because it is enriching uranium?

The idea that the U.S. has the right to take such a catastrophic step
based on the fevered imaginations of Biblically inspired Israeli
extremists -- Goldberg has previously suggested that Prime Minister
Netanyahu believes Iran to be the reincarnation of the Biblical
Amalekites, mortal enemies the ancient Hebrews were to smite -- or
simply to preserve an Israeli monopoly on nuclear force in the Middle
East is as bizarre as it is reckless. Even debating the possibility of
launching a military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities as a matter
of rational policy, absent any Iranian aggression or even solid
evidence that the Iranian leadership intends to wage its own version
of aggressive war, gives an undeserved respectability to what would
otherwise be considered steps beyond the bounds of rational foreign
policy discussion.

Perhaps someone in our media hothouse could take just a moment to ask
why, outside of the United States and Israel, there is no support --
nada, zero, zip -- for military action against Iran. In Goldberg's
world, this may be nothing more than the eternal beast of
anti-Semitism rearing its ugly head in the form of disdain for the
rise of yet another Amalek/Haman/Torquemada/Hitler. A more sober
reading of the international situation would, however, suggest that
most of the international community simply doesn't share an alarmist
view of what Iran's nuclear program represents.

Indeed, it is notable that, in Goldberg's world, Arabs and Iranians
never get to speak. The Arabs, we are told, secretly want Israel or
the U.S. to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities out of fear that the
acquisition of nuclear weapons would embolden their Persian rivals.
They are, so the story goes, just not able to say so in public. Of
course, when Arab leaders do publicly express their opposition to the
idea of another war being launched in the Middle East, they are
ignored in the Goldberg-led debate.

Similarly, their rejection of Washington’s long-held premise that
Israel's special security must be exempted from any discussion of the
creation of a nuclear-free Middle East remains outside the bounds of
the Iran-debate story. And don't expect to see any mention of the
authoritative University of Maryland annual survey of Arab public
opinion either.  After all, it recently reported that, contrary to
claims of an Arab world cowering under the threat of Iranian nukes,
57% of the Arab public actually believe a nuclear-armed Iran would be
good for the Middle East!

The idea that Iran's regime might exist for any purpose other than to
destroy Israel is largely ignored as well. Bizarrely enough, Iranians
don’t actually feature much in the American “debate” at all (beyond
citations of Mad-Mullah-like pronouncements by some Iranian leaders
who wish Israel would disappear). The long, nuanced relationship
between Israel and the Islamic Republic, as explained by Trita Parsi,
author of Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran,
and the United States, is simply ignored. So, too, is every indication
Iran's leaders have given that they have no intention of attacking
Israel or any other country. In fact, in the Goldberg debate, domestic
politics in both the U.S. and Israel is understood as an important
factor in future decisions; Iran, with the Green Movement presently
suppressed, is considered to have no domestic politics at all, just
those Mad Mullahs.

2. Even if Iran were to acquire the means to build a nuclear weapon,
would that be a legitimate or prudent reason for launching a war?

If Iran is actually pursuing the capability to build nuclear weapons,
its leaders would be doing so in response to a strategic environment
in which two of its key adversaries, the U.S. and Israel, and two of
its sometime friends/sometime adversaries, Russia and Pakistan, have
substantial nuclear arsenals. By all sober accounts, Iran's security
posture is primarily focused on the survival of its regime. Some
Israeli military and intelligence officials have been quoted in
Israel's media as saying that Iran's motivation in seeking a nuclear
weapon would be primarily to head off a threat of U.S. intervention
aimed at regime change.

Most states do not pursue weapons systems as ends in themselves, and
most states are hardwired to prioritize their own survival. It is to
that end that they acquire weapons systems -- to protect, enhance, or
advance their own strategic position, or up the odds against more
powerful rivals. In other words, the conflicts that fuel the drive for
nuclear weapons are more dangerous than the weapons themselves, and
the problem of those weapons can’t be addressed separately from those
conflicts.

An Iran that had been bombed to destroy its nuclear power program
would likely emerge from the experience far more dangerous to the U.S.
and its allies over the decades to come than an Iran that had nuclear
weapons within reach. The only way to diminish the danger of an
escalating confrontation with Iran is to address the conflict between
Tehran and its rivals directly, and seek a modus vivendi that would
manage their conflicting interests.

Unfortunately, such a dialogue between Washington and Tehran has
scarcely begun, even as, amid alarmist warnings, Goldberg and others
insist it must be curtailed so as to avoid the Iranians “playing for
time.”

3. Is Iran actually developing nuclear weapons?

No, it is not. That's the conclusion of the CIA, the IAEA, whose
inspectors are inside Iran's nuclear facilities, and most of the
world's intelligence agencies, including the Israelis.  U.S.
intelligence believes that Iran is using a civilian nuclear energy
program to assemble much of the infrastructure that could, in the
future, be used to build a bomb, and that Iran may also be continuing
theoretical work on designing such a weapon.

Washington's spooks and its defense establishment do not, however,
believe Iran is currently developing nuclear weapons, nor that its
leadership has made the ultimate decision to do so. In fact, the
consensus appears to be that Iran will not weaponize nuclear material,
but will stop short at "breakout capacity" -- the ability, also
available, for instance, to Japan, to move relatively quickly to build
such a weapon. Currently, as the New York Times reported, the time
frame for “breakout,” if all went well (and it might not), would be
about a year, after which Iran would have enough fissile material for
one bomb.  (The Israelis, by comparison, are believed to have 200 to
400 nuclear weapons in their undeclared program, the Pakistanis
between 70 and 90, and the United States more than 5,000.)  In
addition, a credible nuclear deterrent would require the production of
not one or two bombs, but a number of them, which would allow for
testing.

For ex-CIA Director Hayden, such a breakout capacity would be "as
destabilizing as their actually having a weapon."  His is a logical
leap that’s hard to sustain, unless you believe that it’s worth
launching a war to prevent Iran from, at worst, acquiring a defensive
trump card that might prevent it from being attacked.

Iran's enrichment activities are, of course, a violation of U.N.
Security Council resolutions backed by sanctions. Those were imposed
to demand that Iran suspend its enrichment program until it satisfied
concerns raised by IAEA inspectors over its compliance with the
disclosure and transparency requirements of the NPT -- especially when
it came to aspects of its program which have been developed in secret,
raising suspicions over their future use.

Three years before North Korea was in a position to test a nuclear
weapon, it had to withdraw from the NPT and kick out IAEA inspectors.
Iran remains within the treaty. Even as the standoff over its nuclear
program continues, renewed efforts are underway to broker a
confidence-building deal to exchange Iranian enriched uranium for fuel
rods produced outside the country to power a Tehran reactor that
produces medical isotopes.

None of this will be easy, of course. The two main parties are trying
to impose their own, mutually exclusive terms on any deal: Washington
wants Iran to forego its treaty-guaranteed right to enrich its own
uranium because that also gives it the potential means to produce bomb
materiel; Iran has no intention of foregoing that right. Such
longstanding pillars of foreign policy sobriety as Senator John Kerry
and Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
Secretary of State, have publicly deemed the U.S. position untenable.

To suggest that Iran's present nuclear program represents the security
equivalent of a clock ticking down to midnight is calculated hysteria
that bears no relation to reality. Ah, says Goldberg, but the point is
that the Israelis believe it to be so. Yes, replies former National
Security Council Iran analyst Gary Sick, now at Columbia University,
but the Israelis and some Americans have been claiming Iran is just a
few years away from a nuclear weapon since 1992.

The premises of the debate just initiated by Goldberg's piece are
palpably false.  More important, they are remarkably dangerous, since
they leap-frog over the three basic questions laid out above and move
straight on to arguing the case for war amid visions of annihilation.
This campaign of panic is not Goldberg's invention.  It’s been with us
for a long time now.  Goldberg is just the present vehicle for an
American conversation initiated by others, among them those known in
the Bush years as neocons, who have long been dreaming of war with
Iran and  are already, as Juan Cole recently indicated, planning for
such a war under a future Republican administration, if not sooner.

Similarly, among Israelis, Prime Minister Netanyahu, in particular,
believes that Americans are politically feeble-minded; he said as much
to a group of Israeli settlers in a video that surfaced recently: "I
know what America is. America is a thing you can move very easily,
move it in the right direction. They won’t get in [our] way.”

Through Goldberg, the Israeli leader and his aides are seeking to
"move America in the right direction" with dark tales of Auschwitz and
Amalekites, and of Netanyahu himself as a hostage, in the Freudian
sense, to a fierce and unforgiving father who won't tolerate any show
of weakness in the face of perceived threats to the Jews. Goldberg's
sources, including Netanyahu, make it perfectly clear that they don't
believe Iran would attack Israel. Instead, they warn that an Iranian
nuclear weapon would embolden Hamas and Hizballah, although the logic
there is flimsy indeed.  After all, if Iran would not attack Israel on
its own with a nuclear weapon, why would it do so to defend its
insurgent allies?

Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak has suggested that a nuclear-armed
Iran would prompt the best and brightest Israelis to emigrate, because
they are clever people who can make a good life for themselves
anywhere in the world. Indeed, and they have been doing exactly that
for many years now.  Some 750,000 Israeli Jews now live abroad -- one
in every six Israelis -- precisely because anti-Semitism is no longer
a threat to Jewish life in most of the industrialized world. None of
this has anything to do with an Iranian bomb. It has to do with the
frustration of Israel’s leadership that 63% of the world's Jews have
chosen to live elsewhere.

Despite Goldberg’s panic-inducing prediction, there are plenty of
reasons to believe that, for all its bluster and threat, Israel won't,
in fact, bomb Iran next year -- or any time soon. But would the
Israelis like to see the United States take on their prime regional
enemy? You bet they would. Indeed, Netanyahu continually insists that
the U.S. has an obligation to take the lead in confronting Iran.

It's patently clear in Goldberg’s piece that the Israelis are trying
to create a climate in which the U.S. is pressed onto the path of
escalation, adding more and more sanctions, and keeping "all options
on the table" in case those don't work.

In an excellent commentary that dismantles the logic of Goldberg's
argument, David Kay -- the American who served as an UNSCOM arms
inspector in search of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq after the
U.S. invasion -- suggests that:

"Israel is engaged in psychological warfare with the Obama
administration -- and it only partly concerns Iran… [B]eyond Iran, of
probably greater importance to the current Israeli government is
avoiding the Obama administration pushing it into a choice between
settlements and territorial arrangements with the Palestinians that it
is unwilling to make and permanent damage to its relationship with the
U.S. Hyping the Iranian nuclear program and the need for early
military action is a nice bargaining counter... if the U.S. wants to
avoid an imminent Israeli strike, it must make concessions to Israel
on the Palestinian issues."

Creating a sense of crisis on the Iran front, narrowing U.S. options
in the public mind, and precluding a real discussion of U.S. policy
towards Iran may serve multiple purposes for various interested
groups. Taken together, however, they reduce all discussion to one
issue: when to exercise that military option kept "on the table,"
given the unlikeliness of an Iranian surrender. The debate’s ultimate
purpose is to plant in the public mind the idea that a march to war
with Iran, as Admiral Hayden put it on CNN, "seems inexorable, doesn't
it?"

Inexorable -- only if the media allows itself to be fooled twice.

Tony Karon is a senior editor at TIME.com where he analyzes Middle
Eastern and other conflicts. He also blogs on his own website Rootless
Cosmopolitan.