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The Pentagon's Cyber Command: Formidable Infrastructure arrayed
against the American People


 By Tom Burghardt

 URL of this article: www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=13354

 Global Research, April 26, 2009
 Antifascist Calling...


 The Wall Street Journal revealed April 24 that current National
Security Agency (NSA) director Lt. General Keith Alexander will "head
the Pentagon's new Cyber Command."

 Friday's report follows an April 22 piece published by the Journal
announcing the proposed reorganization. The Obama administration's
cybersecurity initiative will, according to reports, "reshape the
military's efforts to protect its networks from attacks by hackers,
especially those from countries such as China and Russia."

 When he was a presidential candidate, Obama had pledged to elevate
cybersecurity as a national security issue, "equating it in
significance with nuclear and biological weapons," the Journal
reported.

 The new Pentagon command, according to The Washington Post, "would
affect U.S. Strategic Command, whose mission includes ensuring U.S.
'freedom of action' in space and cyberspace, and the National Security
Agency, which shares Pentagon cybersecurity responsibilities with the
Defense Information Systems Agency."

 How Cyber Command's launch would effect civilian computer networks is
unclear. However, situating the new agency at Ft. Meade, under the
watchful eyes of National Security Agency snoops, should set alarm
bells ringing.

 Charged with coordinating military cybersecurity programs, including
computer network defense as well as a top secret mission to launch
cyber attack operations against any and all "adversaries," the new
command has been mired in controversy ever since the U.S. Air Force
declared it would be the lead agency overseeing Cyber Command with the
release of its "Strategic Vision" last year.

 Since that self-promotional disclosure however, multiple scandals
have rocked the Air Force. In 2007, a B-52 Stratofortress bomber flew
some 1,500 miles from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to
Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana with six live nuclear-tipped
cruise missiles affixed to its wings. For nearly six hours, the Air
Force was unable to account for the missing weapons. While the scandal
elicited scarcely a yawn from the corporate media, physicist Pavel
Podvig wrote,

 The point is that the nuclear warheads were allowed to leave Minot
and that it was surprised airmen at Barksdale who discovered them, not
an accounting system that's supposed to track the warheads' every
movement (maybe even in real time). We simply don't know how long it
would've taken to discover the warheads had they actually left the air
force's custody and been diverted into the proverbial "wrong hands."
Of course, it could be argued that the probability of this kind of
diversion is very low, but anyone who knows anything about how the
United States handles its nuclear weapons has said that the
probability of what happened at Minot was also essentially zero.
("U.S. loose nukes," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 12 September
2007)

 As a result of the affair and numerous procurement scandals, Air
Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Mosley and Air Force Secretary
Michael Wynne were fired by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates for
incompetence. Numerous defense analysts believe this was a major
reason why the Air Force was supplanted as the lead Cyber agency.

 While one can reasonably support government efforts to protect
critical infrastructure such as electrical grids, chemical plants,
nuclear power stations or the nation's air traffic control system from
potentially devastating attacks that would endanger the health and
safety of millions of Americans, these goals can be achieved by
writing better programs. Yet from its inception, Cyber Command has
been theorized as a nodal point for launching crippling attacks
against the civilian and military infrastructure of imperialism's
enemies.

 As I reported last July, Air Force Cyber Command (AFCYBER) is
centered at the secretive Barksdale Air Force Base. At the time,
AFCYBER had a unified command structure and a $2 billion budget
through the first year of its operations.

 The Air Force Times reported last year that AFCYBER "has established
17 new enlisted and officer Air Force Specialty Codes--creating major
changes in the career paths of more than 32,000 airmen." Whether or
not the command structure already in place will transfer to NSA is
unknown as of this writing. Nor is it clear whether AFCYBER's
offensive capability--real or imagined--will transfer to NSA. But with
billions of dollars already spent on a score of top secret
initiatives, included those hidden within Pentagon Special Access
(SAP) or black programs, its a safe bet they will.

 Defense analyst William M. Arkin points out in Code Names, that these
programs fall under the rubric of Special Technical Operations (STO).
Arkin defines these as,

 Classified SAPs and other programs, weapons and operations associated
with the CIA and "other government agencies." Entire separate channels
of communication and clearances exist to compartment these military
versions of clandestine and covert operations involving special
operations, paramilitary activity, covert action, and cyber-warfare. A
STO "cell" exists in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and at most operational
military commands to segregate STO activity from normal operational
activity, even highly classified activity. (Code Names: Deciphering
U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in the 9/11 World,
Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2005, p. 20)

 Specific cyber-warfare programs identified by Arkin include the
following: Adversary: an Air Force information warfare targeting
system; Arena: an "object-based" simulation program to create "country
studies of electronic infrastructure characteristics, targeting
analyses, operational information warfare plans" as well as nearly
three dozen other cyber-war programs and/or exercises.

 Many of the Pentagon's cyber-warfare initiatives flow directly from
research conducted by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA). For example, the agency's Information Processing Techniques
Office (IPTO) has a brief to "create the advanced information
processing and exploitation science, technologies, and systems for
revolutionary improvements in capability across the spectrum of
national security needs."

 As can be seen from the brief survey above, the vast majority of
Pentagon programs concern Cyber Command's offensive capability of
which denial of service and other attacks against "adversaries" in the
heimat are a distinct possibility. The Journal reports,

 The Department of Homeland Security is charged with securing the
government's nonmilitary networks, and cybersecurity experts said the
Obama administration will have to better define the extent of this
military support to Homeland Security. "It's a fine line" between
providing needed technical expertise to support federal agencies
improving their own security and deeper, more invasive programs, said
Amit Yoran, a former senior cybersecurity official at the Homeland
Security Department. (Siobhan Gorman, "Gates to Nominate NSA Chief to
Head New Cyber Command," The Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2009)

 The Obama administration is expected to announce the the new agency's
launch next week, after completing what it terms a "comprehensive
review" in addition to recommendations for cybersecurity policy.

 Geoff Morrell, a Pentagon spokesperson, told the Journal that Gates
is "planning to make changes to our command structure to better
reflect the increasing threat posed by cyber warfare," but "we have
nothing to announce at this time." Morrell said the Department of
Defense's 2010 budget proposal "calls for hiring hundreds more
cybersecurity experts."

 Aside from lining the pockets of enterprising grifters in the shadowy
world populated by intelligence corporations, where top secret
clearances are traded like highly-prized baseball cards, the potential
for abuse by NSA given that agency's key role in illegal domestic
surveillance raise the prospect of further entrenching the agency in
our lives.

 While Alexander sought to allay fears that NSA was out to run the
nation's cybersecurity programs, he hastened to add that the agency's
"tremendous technical capabilities" would be used to "assist" DHS in
securing the government's civilian networks. But given AFCYBER's brief
for offensive operations, what does this mean for civil liberties?

 As The New York Times reported April 17, with NSA leading the charge
to control "the government's rapidly growing cybersecurity programs,"
critics within the national security apparatus fear the move by Gates
"could give the spy agency too much control over government computer
networks." The Times avers,

 Rod Beckstrom, who resigned in March as director of the National
Cyber Security Center at the Homeland Security Department, said in an
interview that he feared that the N.S.A.'s push for a greater role in
guarding the government's computer systems could give it the power to
collect and analyze every e-mail message, text message and Google
search conducted by every employee in every federal agency. (James
Risen and Eric Lichtblau, "Control of Cybersecurity Becomes Divisive
Issue," The New York Times, April 17, 2009)

 This is hardly an issue that should only concern government insiders
or those who engage in bureaucratic in-fighting as if it were a blood
sport. As a Pentagon agency, NSA has positioned itself to seize near
total control over the country's electronic infrastructure, thereby
exerting an intolerable influence--and chilling effect--over the
nation's political life.

 As we have seen in our recent history, NSA and their partners at CIA,
FBI, et. al., have targeted political dissidents: to varying degrees,
antiwar organizers, socialist, anarchist and environmental activists
have fallen under NSA's electronic driftnet, most recently during last
year's Republican National Convention.

 As I reported last November, during the RNC conclave in St. Paul,
Minnesota, local, state, federal officials as well as private security
and telecommunications corporations conspired to target activists,
journalists and concerned citizens during the so-called National
Special Security Event.

 The whistleblowing website Wikileaks published a leaked planning
document which outlined the close coordination across multiple
agencies, including the FBI, NSA, U.S. Northern Command and the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). Cell-phones and other
electronic communications were routinely monitored in real-time and
NGA provided detailed analysis derived from military spy satellites.

 A "Strategic Vision" in the Service of Repression

 Although the Air Force has lost out to NSA over control of Cyber
Command, AFCYBER's planning document still provides a valuable glimpse
into the formidable infrastructure arrayed against the American
people.

 In the view of Air Force theorists, the strategic environment
confronting imperialism is described as "unpredictable and extremely
dangerous," characterized "by the confluence of globalization,
economic disparities, and competition for scarce resources."

 And as "economic disparities" grow, particularly during a period of
profound capitalist economic meltdown, newer and more effective
measures to ensure compliance are required by the ruling class and its
state. This is underscored by Cyber Command's goal "to achieve
situational dominance at a time and place of our choosing." [emphasis
added] According to the Air Force,

 Global vigilance requires the ability to sense and signal across the
electromagnetic spectrum. Global reach requires the ability to connect
and transmit, using a wide array of communications networks to move
data across the earth nearly instantaneously. Global power is the
ability to hold at risk or strike any target with electromagnetic
energy and ultimately deliver kinetic and non-kinetic effects across
all domains. These cyberspace capabilities will allow us to secure our
infrastructure, conduct military operations whenever necessary, and
degrade or eliminate the military capabilities of our adversaries.
(Air Force Cyber Command, "Strategic Vision," no date)

 As Wired defense analyst Noah Shachtman wrote last year,

 The Air Force wants a suite of hacker tools, to give it "access"
to--and "full control" of--any kind of computer there is. And once the
info warriors are in, the Air Force wants them to keep tabs on their
"adversaries' information infrastructure completely undetected." ...

 Traditionally, the military has been extremely reluctant to talk much
about offensive operations online. Instead, the focus has normally
been on protecting against electronic attacks. But in the last year or
so, the tone has changed--and become more bellicose. "Cyber, as a
warfighting domain . . . like air, favors the offense," said Lani
Kass, a special assistant to the Air Force Chief of Staff who
previously headed up the service's Cyberspace Task Force. ("Air Force
Aims for 'Full Control' of 'Any and All' Computers," Wired, May 13,
2008)

 While the cut and color of the uniform may have changed under the
Obama administration, placing Cyber Command under NSA's wing will
almost certainly transform "cybersecurity" into a euphemism for
keeping the rabble in line. Indeed, cybersecurity operations are fully
theorized as a means of achieving "full-spectrum dominance" via
"Cyberspace Offensive Counter-Operations,"

 Cyberspace favors offensive operations. These operations will deny,
degrade, disrupt, destroy, or deceive an adversary. Cyberspace
offensive operations ensure friendly freedom of action in cyberspace
while denying that same freedom to our adversaries. We will enhance
our capabilities to conduct electronic systems attack, electromagnetic
systems interdiction and attack, network attack, and infrastructure
attack operations. Targets include the adversary's terrestrial,
airborne, and space networks, electronic attack and network attack
systems, and the adversary itself. As an adversary becomes more
dependent on cyberspace, cyberspace offensive operations have the
potential to produce greater effects. ("Strategic Vision," op. cit.)
[emphasis added]

 And when those "greater effects" are directed against American
citizens theorized as "adversaries" by U.S. militarists and
well-heeled corporate grifters, the problems posed by a panoptic
surveillance state for a functioning democracy increase
astronomically.

 The already slim protections allegedly afforded by the shameful FISA
Amendments Act have already been breeched by NSA. As The New York
Times reported April 16, NSA interception of the private e-mail
messages and phone calls of Americans have escalated "in recent months
on a scale that went beyond the broad legal limits established by
Congress last year."

 As Wired reported April 17, the NSA isn't the only agency conducting
cyber operations against American citizens. One of the FBI's
International Terrorism Operations Sections requested an assist from
the Bureau's Cryptographic and Electronic Analysis Unit, CEAU,
according to documents obtained by the magazine under the Freedom of
Information Act. The FBI "geek squad" was in a position to conduct a
"remote computer attack" against the target, and that "they could
assist with a wireless hack to obtain a file tree, but not the hard
drive content."

 This followed an April 16 report published by Wired that a
"sophisticated FBI-produced spyware program has played a crucial
behind-the-scenes role in federal investigations into extortion plots,
terrorist threats and hacker attacks in cases stretching back at least
seven years, newly declassified documents show."

 But as I documented last year in a case involving activists targeted
during anti-RNC protests, with "preemptive policing" all the rage in
Washington, the same suite of hacking tools and spyware used to target
criminals and terrorists are just as easily deployed against political
activists, particularly socialists, anarchists and environmental
critics who challenge capitalism's free market paradigm.

 Despite these revelations, the Obama administration is poised to hand
control of the nation's electronic infrastructure over to an
out-of-control agency riddled with corporate grifters and militarists
whose bottom-line is not the security of the American people but
rather, the preservation of an economically and morally bankrupt
system of private profit fueled by wars of aggression and conquest.

 Tom Burghardt is a researcher and activist based in the San Francisco
Bay Area. In addition to publishing in Covert Action Quarterly and
Global Research, an independent research and media group of writers,
scholars, journalists and activists based in Montreal, his articles
can be read on Dissident Voice, The Intelligence Daily, Pacific Free
Press and the whistleblowing website Wikileaks. He is the editor of
Police State America: U.S. Military "Civil Disturbance" Planning,
distributed by AK Press.



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