[A-List] US destabilization via Color revolutions

[Michael Hudson]

Izvestia
June 20, 2007
HONESTY AS POLICY
How the West will try to discredit Russia's elections
Author: Sergei Markov, political analyst
[The techniques for engineering "color revolutions" focus on the
legitimacy of elections. They aim to demonstrate that the
electoral process is invalid, and seize power. It seems likely
that there will be attempts to apply these "Orange techniques" to
the Russian electoral process in 2007-08.]

      The forthcoming electoral cycle - the presidential election
of 2008, preceded by the parliamentary election of 2007 - is very
important for Russia.
      The first reason is the need to develop the positive economic
and social trends which have emerged during Vladimir Putin's time
as president. Political life has stabilized, and political
institutions have grown stronger. But the consequences of the
profound systemic crisis of the 1990s still haven't been
completely overcome.
      The second reason is that Russian politics lacks an
established positive tradition of transferring power. When power
passed from Gorbachev to Yeltsin, the country fell apart. This is
a very important task for the authorities and the elite: to ensure
a smooth transition of power in 2008, maintaining overall
continuity in the policy course, while allowing for some
modifications of it. The legitimacy of the electoral process is
highly significant here.
      The techniques for engineering "color revolutions" focus on
the legitimacy of elections. They aim to demonstrate that the
electoral process is invalid, and seize power. It seems likely
that there will be attempts to apply these "Orange techniques" to
the Russian electoral process in 2007-08. I would identify two
strategies here: a Birch Revolution and weakening the future
president.
      The Birch Revolution strategy, now being developed by teams
working for opposition oligarchs, involves provoking a social and
political crisis, then promoting a puppet candidate of their own.
In contrast, the strategy pursued by the political forces loyal to
Uncle Sam does not involve overthrowing Vladimir Putin's team;
rather, it aims to weaken the next president and Putin's team - by
announcing that although he is the president, the election that
brought him to power was not entirely fair and involved some law-
breaking. An extensive media campaign has been launched already to
promote the idea that our elections can't possibly be free and
fair, because Russia lacks democracy. The presidential election is
being declared undemocratic months before campaigning actually
starts.
      Another political strategy maneuver stresses a negative
interpretation of Vladimir Putin's role in the electoral process:
claiming that since the choice made by voters seems likely to
depend on his recommendations, the presidential election will
reflect Putin's will rather than the will of the people. This
ignores the fact that Putin's high popularity isn't the only
factor here; his role is substantial because voters want his
policies to be continued by the new president. Naturally, if a
candidate is endorsed by Putin, voters will see this as the main
argument guaranteeing that this candidate will carry on with
Putin's policies.
      Another technique that will be used involves the system of
foreign observers who monitor elections. Foreign observers are not
neutral; they are politically biased. They are selected and funded
within the framework of major political projects. As a rule, they
arrive in any particular country with their minds already made up
about the political situation there; and their decision about
whether an election is free and fair is determined long before the
election takes place. This was clearly demonstrated at elections
in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. During the Orange
Revolution in Ukraine, election observers in eastern Ukraine
greatly outnumbered those in western Ukraine. OSCE observers
simply turned a blind eye to blatant election fraud on the part of
the Orange forces.
      The system of international election monitoring these days is
more fraudulent than most of the elections being observed. The
outcome of any "fairness test" largely depends on whether the
winner has the approval of those countries which dominate the
international organizations doing the election monitoring. The
most important of these are the OSCE and its special department
for elections - the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights, which has practically become an independent international
non-governmental organization with the right to pass judgement in
the name of the European community. Russia, like many other
countries, has long been calling for reforms to the OSCE and the
ODIHR - but it still hasn't been sufficiently active in insisting
on reforms.
      Denying access to international observers would be perceived
by international public opinion as proof that elections are
rigged. In order to enhance the legitimacy of Russia's elections,
I think it's important to ensure participation by numerous
observers who take a positive view of Russia: observers from
Kazakhstan, southern and eastern regions of Ukraine, Italy,
Austria, Germany, China, India, Brazil, Serbia, Kyrgyzstan, Egypt,
the CIS, the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
      The next technique involves acts of provocation by the quasi-
opposition. At the peak of the electoral process, we can expect
that certain fringe groups will attempt to arrange clashes with
police and political opponents - in order to ensure that pictures
of their "Dissenter Marches" being dispersed are seen on
television all over the world. These marches will be organized for
only one purpose: in order to be dispersed. Certain opposition
politicians, whose popularity ratings are minimal, will run for
president - not with the aim of really participating in the
election, but in order to declare that they weren't allowed to
register, or to withdraw at the last moment, branding the election
as "unfree and unfair."
      The battle over the legitimacy of Russia's elections will
extend beyond Russia, to international organizations and the
media. The process has been launched already: journalists are
being worked over with large quantities of information, and
preparations are being made for appropriate demarches in the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and
various parliaments. These projects, which aim to damage Russia's
political system, have to be resisted by Russian counter-projects.
We need to work intensively with the Western media, providing
information about the competition developing in Russia within the
election framework. These days, it's not enough to be honest - we
need to be skilled in proving our honesty to public opinion,
including critical opinion.
      Efforts to undermine the legitimacy of Russia's elections
serve a simple purpose: to weaken the next president and take
advantage of his weakness to secure numerous concessions from
Russia on a broad range of issues. What's at stake in the election
legitimacy question is Russia's reputation, the power of the
Russian government, and tens of billions of dollars in the Russian
economy.
      Translated by Elena Leonova