[A-List] Zimbabwe : hidden history, hidden agenda

[tony black]

HTML Message....for discussion.
T.

http://www.michelcollon.info/mailinglist_en.php

Many reactions after Gowans's first article about Zimbabwe. 
A few very critical. To answer, Stephen Gowans reminds the History of Zimbabwe 
and its place in the colonial game. Which interests behind Mugabe's demonization ?
MC

Zimbabwe's Lonely Fight for Justice
Stephen Gowans

March 30, 2007

Ever since veterans of the guerrilla war against apartheid Rhodesia 
violently seized white-owned farms in Zimbabwe, the country?s president, 
Robert Mugabe, has been demonized by politicians, human rights organizations 
and the media in the West. 
His crimes, according to right-wing sources, are 
numerous: human rights abuses, election rigging, repression of political 
opponents, corruption, and mismanagement of the economy. Leftist detractors 
say Mugabe talks left and walks right, and that his anti-imperialist 
rhetoric is pure demagogy.

I?m going to argue that the basis for Mugabe?s demonization is the desire of 
Western powers to change the economic and land redistribution policies 
Mugabe?s government has pursued; that his lapses from liberal democratic 
rectitude are, in themselves, of little moment to decision makers in 
Washington and London; and that the ultimate aim of regime change is to 
replace Mugabe with someone who can be counted on to reliably look after 
Western interests, and particularly British investments, in Zimbabwe.

I am also going to argue that the Zanu-PF government?s abridgment of formal 
liberties (including freedom of assembly and freedom to travel outside the 
country) are warranted restraints, justified by the need to protect the 
political program of the elected government from hostile outside 
interference. In making this argument I am challenging a widely held, and 
often unexamined, view that civil and political liberties are senior to all 
other liberties, including rights related to economic sovereignty and 
freedom from oppression and exploitation.

Before 1980 Zimbabwe was a white-supremacist British colony named after the 
British financier Cecil Rhodes, whose company, the British South Africa 
Company, stole the land from the indigenous Matabele and Mashona people in 
the 1890s. British soldiers, who laid claim to the land by force of arms on 
behalf of Rhodes, were each rewarded with nine square miles of territory. 
The Matabele and Mashona -- those who weren't killed in the British land 
grab -- were rewarded with dispossession, grinding poverty, misery and 
subjugation. By the turn of this century, in a country of 13 million, almost 
70 percent of the country's arable agricultural land was owned by some 4,500 
mostly white farmers, many descendant from the original British settlers.

After a long campaign for national liberation, independence talks were held 
in 1979. Talks almost broke down over the land question, but Washington and 
London, eager for a settlement, agreed to ante up and provide financial 
support for a comprehensive land reform program. This, however, was to be 
short-lived. Britain found a way to wriggle out of its commitment, blocking 
the march toward the national liberation struggle?s principal goal.

George Shire?s grandfather Mhepo Mavakire used to farm land in Zimbabwe, 
before it was handed to a white man after the Second World War. Shire argues 
that "The unequal distribution of land in Zimbabwe was one of the major 
factors that inspired the rural-based liberation war against white rule and 
has been a source of continual popular agitation ever since." (1)

"The government," says Shire, "struggled to find a consensual way to 
transfer land," but with inadequate funds and insufficient assistance from 
London, land reform made little headway. (2) Frustrated, and under pressure 
from war veterans who had grown tired of waiting for the land reform they'd 
fought for, Mugabe embarked on a course that would lead him headlong into 
collision with Western governments. He passed legislation enabling the 
government to seize nearly 1,500 farms owned by white Zimbabweans, without 
compensation. As Zimbabwe's Foreign Affairs Minister from 1995 to 2005, Stan 
Mudenge put it, at that point "all hell broke loose." (3) Having held free 
and fair elections on time, and having won them, Mugabe now became an 
international pariah. Overnight, he was transformed into a dictator, a 
stealer of elections and a thug.

Displeased with Mugabe?s fast track land reform program and irritated by 
other economic policies the Mugabe government was pursuing, the EU concluded 
that Mugabe would have to go, and that he would have to be forced out by 
civil society, the union movement or NGO's, uprisings in the street, or a 
military coup. On 24 January, 1999, a meeting was convened at the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs to discuss the EU?s conclusion. The theme 
of the meeting, led by Richard Dowden, now the executive director of the 
pro-imperialist Royal African Society, was "Zimbabwe - Time for Mugabe to 
Go?" Mugabe's "confiscating" of white-held land compelled an unequivocal yes 
to the conference's rhetorical question. Dowden presented four options:

1) a military coup;

2) buying the opposition;

3) insurrection;

4) subverting Mugabe's ZANU-PF party.

A few months later, Washington weighed in. The US State Department held a 
seminar to discuss a strategy for dealing with the "Zimbabwe crisis." Civil 
society and the opposition would be strengthened to foment discontent and 
dissent. The opposition would be brought together under a single banner to 
enhance its chances of success at the polls and funding would be funnelled 
to the opposition through Western backed NGO's. Dissident groups could be 
strengthened and encouraged to take to the streets. (4)

The Milosevic Treatment

The program the US State Department prescribed to rid Zimbabwe of Mugabe and 
his land reform politics had been used successfully to oust Yugoslavia?s 
president Slobodan Milosevic in 2000. The basis of the program is to 
pressure the civilian population through a program of bombing, sanctions or 
military threat, in order to galvanize the population to rise up against its 
government, the proximal cause of its discomfort. (In Zimbabwe, the hoped 
for response is: If only Mugabe hadn?t antagonized the West, we wouldn?t be 
under this pressure.) This was illustrated by US Air Force General, Michael 
Short, who explained the purpose of the NATO?s 1999 bombing campaign against 
Yugoslavia was to create disaffection with Milosevic. "If you wake up in the 
morning,? explained Short, ?and you have no power to your house and no gas 
to your stove and the bridge you take to work is down and will be lying in 
the Danube for the next 20 years, I think you begin to ask, 'Hey, Slobo, 
what's this all about? How much more of this do we have to withstand?'" (5)

Paired with outside pressure is the enlistment of a political opposition and 
grassroots movement to discipline and organize the population?s disaffection 
so that it?s channelled in the direction of forcing the government to step 
down. Western powers create the pain, and inject a fifth column of 
?democracy? activists and a ?democratic? opposition to offer the removal of 
the current government as the cure. In the end, the people administer the 
cure themselves. Because the Milosevic treatment is typically deployed 
against the leaders of revolutionary societies (though the revolution may 
have happened some time ago), the opposition can be thought of as a 
counter-revolutionary vanguard. The vanguard has two components: a formal 
political opposition, whose job it is to contest elections and cry foul when 
it doesn?t win, and an underground grassroots movement, mandated to carry 
out extra-parliamentary agitation and to take to the streets in planned 
?spontaneous? uprisings, using allegations of electoral fraud as a pretext 
for pursuing insurrectionary politics.

In Yugoslavia, the underground movement, known as Otpor, was established, 
funded, trained and organized by the US State Department, USAID, the US 
Congress-funded National Endowment for Democracy (which is said to do 
overtly what the CIA used to do covertly) and through various NGO?s like 
Freedom House, whose board of directors has included a rogues? gallery of US 
ruling class activists: Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Otto Reich, Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Steve Forbes.

Otpor has been the inspiration for similar groups elsewhere: Zubr in 
Belarus, Khmara in Georgia, Pora in the Ukraine. Otpor?s Zimbabwean progeny 
include Zvakwana, ?an underground movement that aims to . undermine? the 
Mugabe government and Sokwanele, whose ?members specialize in anonymous acts 
of civil disobedience.? (6) Both groups receive generous financing from 
Western sources. (7) While the original, Otpor, was largely a youth-oriented 
anarchist-leaning movement, at least one member of Sokwanele is ?A 
conservative white businessman expressing a passion for freedom, tradition, 
polite manners and the British Royals.? (8)

Members of Zvakwana say their movement is homegrown and free of foreign 
control. (9) It may be homegrown, and its operatives may sincerely believe 
they chart their own course, but the group is almost certainly not free of 
foreign funding. The US Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, signed 
into law by US President George W. Bush in December 2001, empowers the 
president under the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to ?support democratic 
institutions, the free press and independent media? in Zimbabwe. It?s 
doubtful Zvakwana has not been showered with Washington?s largesse.

Zvakwana?s denial that it?s under foreign control doesn?t amount to a denial 
of foreign funding. Movements, political parties and media elsewhere have 
knowingly accepted funding from Western governments, their agencies and 
pro-imperialist foundations, while proclaiming their complete independence. 
(10) Members of these groups may genuinely believe they remain aloof from 
their backer?s aims (and in the West it is often the very groups that claim 
not to take sides that are the favored recipients of this lucre), but 
self-deception is an insidious thing ^ and the promise of oodles of cash is 
hard to resist.

There?s no doubt Zvakwana is well-financed. It distributes flashy stickers, 
condoms bearing the movement?s Z logo, phone cards, audiotapes and packages 
of seeds bearing anti-Mugabe messages, en masse. These things don?t come 
cheap. What?s more, its operatives study ?videotapes on resistance movements 
in Poland, Chile, India and Serbia, as well as studying civil rights tactics 
used in Nashville.? (11) This betrays a level of funding and organization 
that goes well beyond what the meager self-financing of true grassroots 
movements -- even in the far more affluent West ^ are able to scrape 
together.

If Zvakwana denies its links to the US, other elements of the Western-backed 
anti-Mugabe apparatus are less secretive. Studio 7, an anti-ZANU-PF radio 
program carries programming by the Voice of America, an agency whose 
existence can hardly be said to be independent of promoting the aims of US 
capital around the world. The radio station SW Radio Africa, the self-styled 
?independent voice of Zimbabwe,? broadcasts from the UK by short-wave radio. 
It may call itself independent, but the broadcaster is as independent as the 
British Foreign Office is, which, one suspects, is one of the principal 
backers of the ?international pro-democracy groups? that fill the station?s 
coffers with the cash that allow it to operate. (12) The radio station?s 
website evinces a fondness for British Prime Minister Tony Blair?s take on 
Zimbabwe, which happens to be more or less equivalent to that of the formal 
political opposition in Zimbabwe, which also happens to be more or less 
equivalent to that of foreign investors, banks, and shareholders. That the 
station operates out of studios in London -- and it seems, if it had its 
druthers, would not only put an end to Harare?s crackdown on foreign 
meddling in Zimbabwe?s internal affairs, but see to it that policies 
friendly to the rent, profits and interest of foreign owners and investors 
were allowed to flourish -- should leave little doubt as to who?s behind the 
?international pro-democracy groups? that have put SW Radio Africa on the 
air.

In late March 2007, Robert from SW Radio Africa contacted me by e-mail to 
find out if I had been hired by the Mugabe government to write an article 
that appeared on the Counterpunch website, titled What?s Really Going On in 
Zimbabwe? (13)

Stephen,

Do you promise (cross your heart) that you received no money from Zimbabwe's 
Ministry of Information (or any group acting on their behalf) to write this 
piece?

The rhetoric does sound awfully familiar.

Richard

Richard,

>From your e-mail address I take it you work for UK-based SW Radio Africa, 
which broadcasts Studio 7, the Zimbabwe program of the Voice of America, 
funded by the US government.

I don't receive money, support, assistance -- not even foot massages -- from 
anyone in Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwean government or any of its agents or 
representatives.

Now, do you promise (cross your heart) that you receive no money from the US 
or British governments or from the US Ministry of Truth, viz., the Voice of 
America, (or any group acting on their behalf)?

Your rhetoric sounds awfully familiar.

Steve

Robert replied with assurances that ?We are, in truth, totally independent, 
sponsored by a variety of groups that support democracy and freedom of 
expression,? but didn?t explain how Radio SW Africa could be ?totally 
independent? and at the same time dependent on its sponsors. When I asked 
who the station?s sponsors were, he declined to tell me.

An equally important component of the counter-revolutionary vanguard is the 
formal political opposition. This to be comprised of a single party which 
unites all the opposition parties under a single banner, to maximize the 
strength of the formal political forces arrayed against the government, and 
therefore to increase the probability of the anti-government forces making a 
respectable showing at the polls. The united opposition is to have one goal: 
deposing the government. In order that it is invested with moral gravitas, 
its name must emphasize the word ?democracy.? In Serbia, the anti-Milosevic 
opposition united under the banner, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia. In 
Zimbabwe, the opposition calls itself the Movement for Democratic Change. 
This serves the additional function of calling the government?s commitment 
to democracy into question. If the opposition is ?the democratic opposition? 
then what must the government be? The answer, of course, is undemocratic.

Integral to the Milosevic treatment is accusing the government of electoral 
fraud to justify a transition from electoral to insurrectionary politics. 
The accusations build and build as the day of the vote approaches, until, by 
sheer repetition, they are accepted as a matter of indisputable truth. This 
has a heads I win, tails you lose character. If the opposition loses the 
election, the vote is confirmed to be illegitimate, as all the pre-election 
warnings predicted it would be, unleashing a torrent of people onto the 
streets to demand the government step down. If the opposition wins the 
election, the accusations are forgotten.

The US, the European Union and international human rights organizations 
denounced the last election in Zimbabwe as tilted in favour of the governing 
party. The evidence for this was that the state controls the state-owned 
media, the military, the police and the electoral mechanisms. Since the 
state of every country controls the military, the police and the electoral 
mechanisms, and the state-owned media if it has one, this implies elections 
in all countries are titled in favour of the governing party, a manifestly 
absurd point of view.

So far the Milosevic treatment has failed to achieve its desired end in 
Zimbabwe. One of the reasons why is that the formal political opposition has 
failed to execute the plan to a tee. The lapse centers around what is know 
as Plan B. The Los Angeles Times describes Plan B this way: ?Insiders are 
asking what happened to the opposition?s OEPlan B? that they had designed to 
put into operation the day after the March (2005) elections. The plan called 
for (the MDC leader, Morgan) Tsvangirai to claim a confident victory, with 
masses of his jubilant supporters flooding the streets for a spontaneous 
victory party -- banking on the idea that with observers from neighbouring 
African countries and the international media present, Mugabe?s security 
forces would hesitate to unleash violence.? (14) (Note the reference to the 
planned ?spontaneous? victory party.) That Plan B wasn?t executed may be the 
reason Tsvangirai is no longer in control of a unified MDC, and is vying 
with Arthur Mutambara, an Oxford educated robotics engineer who worked as a 
management consultant, to lead the opposition.

Countering the Milosevic Treatment

The problem, from the perspective of the US State Department planners who 
formulated the Milosevic treatment, is that if you do it too often, the next 
victim becomes wise to what you?re up to, and can manoeuvre to stop it. With 
successes in Yugoslavia, Georgia and Ukraine, but failure so far in Belarus, 
the element of surprise is lost, and the blatancy of what the US government 
is up to becomes counter-productive. So obvious has the Milosevic treatment 
become, US government officials now express surprise when the leaders 
they?ve targeted for regime change put up with it. (15)

Mugabe, however, hasn?t put up with it, and has imposed a number of 
restrictions on civil liberties to thwart destabilization efforts. One 
measure is to ban NGOs that act as instruments of US or British foreign 
policy. NGOs that want to operate in Zimbabwe cannot receive foreign funding 
and must disclose their sources of financial support. This stops Washington 
and Britain from working within the country, through proxy, to meddle in the 
country?s internal affairs. For the same reason, legislation was put forward 
in Russia in 2005 to require the 450,000 NGOs operating there to re-register 
with the state, to prevent foreign-funded political activity. The 
legislation?s sponsors characterized ?internationally financed NGOs as a 
OEfifth column? doing the bidding of foreigners.? (16)

In a similar vein, foreign journalists whose reporting appears to be 
motivated by the goal of promoting the foreign policy objectives of hostile 
nations, like the US and UK, are banned. CNN reporters are prohibited from 
reporting from Zimbabwe because the government regards them, with 
justification, as a tool of US foreign policy. What reasonable person of an 
unprejudiced mind would dispute CNN?s chauvinism? Given that one of the 
objects of US foreign policy is to intervene in Zimbabwe?s affairs to change 
the government, the ban is a warranted restraint on press freedom.

Limitations on press freedom are not unique to Zimbabwe, although those 
imposed by Mugabe are a good deal more justifiable than those imposed by the 
West. In the wake of the March 2006 re-election of Belarus president 
Aleksandr Lukashenko, the US planned to sanction 14 Belarus journalists it 
labelled ?key figures in the propaganda, distortion of facts and attacks on 
the democracies (i.e., the US and Britain) and their representatives in 
Belarus.? (17) In 1999, NATO bombed the Serb Radio-TV building, because it 
said Serb Radio-TV was broadcasting propaganda.

Laws ?sharply curbing freedoms of the press and public assembly, citing 
national security? were enacted during the 2002 elections. (18) Mugabe 
justified the restrictions as necessary to counter Western plans to 
re-impose domination of Zimbabwe. ?They want our gold, our platinum, our 
land,? he argues. ?These are ours forever. I will stand and fight for our 
rights of sovereignty. We fought for our country to be free. These resources 
will remain ours forever. Let this be understood to those in London.? (19)

Mugabe?s warning about the danger of re-colonization ?underpins the 
crackdown on the nation?s most formidable independent forces, pro-democracy 
groups and the Movement for Democratic Change, both of which have broad 
Western support, and, often, financing,? as the New York Times put it. (20) 
(Note the reference to the opposition being independent even though it?s 
dependent on broad Western support and financing.)

This ?fortress-Zimbabwe strategy has been strikingly effective. According to 
a poll of 1,200 Zimbabweans published in August (2004) by South African and 
American researchers, the level of public trust in Mr. Mugabe?s leadership 
has more than doubled since 1999, to 46 percent ^ even as the economy has 
fallen into ruinand anger over economic and living conditions is 
pervasive.? (21)

Mugabe, his detractors allege, secures his support by focusing the public?s 
anger on outside forces to keep the public from focusing its anger on him 
(the same argument the US government and anti-Castro forces have been making 
about Castro for years.) If this is true, the groundswell of opposition to 
Mugabe?s government that we?re led to believe threatens to topple Mugabe 
from power any moment, doesn?t exist; it?s directed at outside forces. 
Consistent with this is the reality that the US-based Save Zimbabwe Campaign 
?does nothave widespread grassroots support.? (22)

Implicit in the argument that Mugabe uses anti-imperialist rhetoric to stay 
in power is the view that (a) outside forces aren?t responsible for the 
country?s deep economic crisis and that (b) Mugabe is. This is the view of 
US ambassador to Zimbabwe Christopher Dell, and many of Mugabe?s leftist 
detractors. ?Neither drought nor sanctions are at the root of Zimbabwe?s 
decline. The Zimbabwe government?s own gross mismanagement of the economy 
and corrupt rule has brought on the crisis.? (23)

Yet, in a country whose economy is mainly based on agriculture, the idea 
that drought hasn?t caused serious economic trouble, is absurd. Drought is a 
regional phenomenon, whittling away at populations in Mali, Ethiopia, 
Malawi, Mauritania, Eritrea, southern Sudan and Zimbabwe. Land 
redistribution hasn?t destroyed agriculture in Zimbabwe; it has destroyed 
white commercial, cash-crop farming, which is centred on the production of 
tobacco for export.

Equally absurd is the notion that sanctions are economically neutral. 
Sanctions imposed by the US, EU and other countries deny Zimbabwe 
international economic and humanitarian assistance and disrupt trade and 
investment flows. Surgical or targeted sanctions are like surgical or 
targeted bombing: not as surgical as their champions allege and the cause of 
a good deal of collateral damage and suffering.

Left critics of Mugabe ape the argument of the US ambassador, adding that 
Mugabe?s anti-imperialist and leftist rhetoric is, in truth, insincere. He 
is actually right-wing and reactionary -- a master at talking left while 
walking right. (24) But if Mugabe is really the crypto-reactionary, secret 
pro-imperialist some people say he is, why are the openly reactionary, 
pro-imperialists in Washington and London so agitated?

Finally, if Mugabe uses outside interference as an excuse to keep tight 
control, why not stop interfering and deny him the excuse?

Mugabe?s government also denies passports to any person believed to be 
travelling abroad to campaign for sanctions against Zimbabwe, or military 
intervention in Zimbabwe. The justification for this is the opposition?s 
fondness for inviting its backers in Washington and London to ratchet up 
punitive measures against the country.

No country has ever provided unqualified public advocacy rights, rights of 
association, and freedom of travel, for all people, at all times. Always 
there has been the idea of warranted restraint. And the conditions under 
which warranted restraint have been imposed are conditions in which the 
state is threatened. There?s no question the ZANU-PF government, and the 
movement for national liberation it champions, is under threat.

Archbishop Pius Ncube tells a gathering that ?we must be ready to stand, 
even in front of blazing guns, that ?this dictatorship must be brought down 
right now, and that ?if we can get 30,000 people together Mugabe will just 
come down. I am ready to lead it.? (25) Arthur Mutambara boasts that he is 
?going to remove Robert Mugabe, I promise you, with every tool at my 
disposal? and that he?s not ?going to rule out or in anything ^ the sky?s 
the limit.? (26) If I declared an intention to remove Tony Blair with every 
tool at my disposal, that no tool was ruled out, and I did so with the 
backing of hostile foreign powers, it wouldn?t be long before the police 
paid me a visit.

Why the West wants Mugabe gone

It?s not Mugabe per se that Washington and London and white commercial 
farmers in Zimbabwe want to overthrow. It?s his policies they want to be rid 
of, and they want to replace his policies with their own, very different, 
policies. There are at least five reasons why Washington and London want to 
oust Mugabe, none of which have anything to do with human rights.

The first reason to chase Mugabe from power is that in the late 90?s his 
government abandoned IMF-mandated structural adjustment programs ^ programs 
of bleeding people dry to pay interest on international debt. These are 
policies of currency devaluation, severe social program cuts ^ anything to 
free up money to pay down debt, no matter what the human consequences.

The second is that Mugabe sent troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo to 
bolster the Kabila government. This interfered with Western designs in the 
region.

The third is that many of Mugabe?s economic policies are not congenial to 
the current neo-liberal orthodoxy. For example, Mugabe recently announced 
the nationalization of a diamond mine, which seems to be, in the current 
climate, an anachronism. If you nationalize anything these days, you?re 
called radical and out of date. The MDC ^ which promotes the neo-liberal 
tyranny -- wants to privatize everything. It is for this reason that Mugabe 
talks about the opposition wanting to sell off Zimbabwe?s resources. The 
state continues to operate state-owned enterprises. And the government 
imposes performance requirements on foreign investors. For example, you may 
be required to invest part of your profits in government bonds. Or you may 
be required to take on a local partner. Foreign investors, or governments 
that represent them, bristle at these conditions.

The fourth is that British companies dominate the Zimbabwean economy and the 
British government would like to protect the investments of British banks, 
investors and corporations. If you read the British press you?ll find a 
fixation on Zimbabwe, one you won?t find elsewhere. Why does Britain take 
such a keen interest in the internal affairs of Zimbabwe? The usual answer 
is that Britain has an especial interest in Zimbabwe because it is the 
country?s former colonial master, but why should Britain?s former colonial 
domination of Zimbabwe heighten its interest in the country? The answer is 
that colonization paved the way for an economic domination of the country by 
British corporations, investors and banks ^ and the domination carries on as 
a legacy of Britain?s former colonial rule. If you?re part of the British 
ruling class or one of its representatives, what you want in a country in 
which you have enormous investments is a trustworthy local ruler who will 
look after them. Mutambara, who was educated in Britain and lived there, 
and has absorbed the imperialist point of view, is, from the perspective of 
the British ruling class, far more attractive than Mugabe as a steward of 
its interests.

Finally, Western powers would like to see Mugabe replaced by a trustworthy 
steward who will abandon the fast track land reform program, which apart 
from violating sacrosanct principles of the capitalist church, if allowed to 
thrive, becomes a model to inspire the indigenous rural populations of 
neighbouring countries. Governments in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand 
also look askance at Mugabe?s land reform policy, and wish to see it 
overturned, for fear it will inspire their own aboriginal populations.

Mugabe?s government accelerated its land redistribution program in the late 
90s, breaking with the completely unworkable, willing buyer, willing seller 
policy that only allowed the government to redistribute the country?s arable 
land after the descendants of the former colonial settlers, absentee 
landlords and some members of the British House of Lords were done using it, 
and therefore willing to sell. Britain, which had pledged financial 
assistance to its former colony to help buy the land, reneged, leaving 
Harare without the means to expropriate with compensation the vast farms 
dominated by the tiny minority of white descendants of British colonists.

?Zimbabwe finally abandoned the OEwilling buyer, willing seller? formula in 
1997. The formula was crippled from the start by parsimonious British 
funding, and it was a clear that the program?s modest goals were more than 
Great Britain was willing to countenance. In a letter to the Zimbabwean 
Minister of Agriculture in November of that year, British Secretary of State 
for International Development Clare Short wrote, OEI should make it clear 
that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the 
costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe.? Referring to earlier British assistance 
funding, Short curtly stated, OEI am told that there were discussions in 1989 
and 1996 to explore the possibility of further assistance. However that is 
all in the past.? Short complained of OEunresolved? issues, such as OEthe way 
in which land would be acquired and compensation paid ^ clearly it would not 
help the poor of Zimbabwe if it was done in a way which undermined investor 
confidence.? Short was concerned about the interests of corporate investors, 
then. In closing, Short wrote that OEa program of rapid land acquisition as 
you now seem to envisage would be impossible for us to support,? as it would 
damage the OEprospects for attracting investment?? (27)

It was only after Mugabe embarked on this accelerated land reform program 
that Washington and London initiated their campaign of regime change, 
pressuring Mugabe?s government with sanctions, expulsion from the 
Commonwealth, assistance to the opposition, and the usual Manichean 
demonization of the target government and angelization of the Western backed 
opposition.
The MDC, by comparison, favours a return to the unworkable willing seller, 
willing buyer regimen. The policy is unworkable because Harare hasn?t the 
money to buy the farms, Britain is no longer willing to finance the program, 
and even if the money were available, the owners have to agree to sell their 
farms before the land can be redistributed. Land reform under this program 
will necessarily proceed at a snail?s pace. The national liberation movement 
always balked at the idea of having to buy land that had been stolen from 
the indigenous population. It?s like someone stealing your car, and when you 
demand it back, being told you?re going to have to buy it back, and only 
when the thief is willing to sell.

Conclusion

One thing opponents and supporters of Mugabe?s government agree on is that 
the opposition is trying to oust the president (illegally and 
unconstitutionally if you acknowledge the plan isn?t limited to victory at 
the polls.) So which came first? Attempts to overthrow Zimbabwe?s ZANU-PF 
government, or the government?s harsh crackdown on opposition?

According to the Western media spin, the answer is the government?s harsh 
crackdown on opposition. Mugabe?s government is accused of being inherently 
authoritarian, greedy for power for power?s sake, and willing do anything ^ 
from stealing elections to cracking skulls -- to hang on to its privileged 
position. This is the typical slander levelled at the heads of governments 
the US and UK have trouble with, from Milosevic in his day, to Kim Jong Il, 
to Castro.

Another view is that the government?s authoritarianism is an inevitable 
reaction to circumstances that are unfavorable to the attainment of its 
political (not its leaders? personal) goals. Mugabe?s government came to 
power at the head of a movement that not only sought political independence, 
but aspired to reverse the historical theft of land by white settlers. That 
the opposition would be fierce and merciless ^ has been so ^ was inevitable. 
Reaction to the opposition, if the government and its anti-colonial agenda 
were to survive, would need to be equally fierce and merciless.

At the core of the conflict is a clash of right against right: the right of 
white settlers to enjoy whatever benefits stolen land yields in profits and 
rent against the right of the original owners to reclaim their land. Allied 
to this is a broader struggle for economic independence, which sets the 
rights of investors and corporations abroad to profit from untrammelled 
access to Zimbabwe?s labor, land and resources and the right of Zimbabweans 
to restrict access on their own terms to facilitate their own economic 
development.

The dichotomy of personal versus political motivation as the basis for the 
actions of maligned governments recurs in debates over whether this or that 
leader or movement ought to be supported or reviled. The personal view says 
that all leaders are corrupt, chase after personal glory, power and wealth, 
and dishonestly manipulate the people they profess to champion. The 
political view doesn?t deny the personal view as a possibility, but holds 
that the behavior of leaders is constrained by political goals.

?Even George Bush who rigs elections and manipulates news in order to stay 
in office and who clearly enjoys being OEthe War President,? wants the 
presidency in order to carry out a particular program with messianic 
fervor,? points out Richard Levins. ?He would never protect the environment, 
provide healthcare, guarantee universal free education, or separate church 
and state, just to stay in office.? (28)

Mugabe is sometimes criticized for being pushed into accelerating land 
reform by a restive population impatient with the glacial pace of 
redistribution allowed under the Lancaster House agreement. His detractors 
allege, implausibly, that he has no real commitment to land reforms. This 
intersects with Patrick Bond?s view. According to Bond, ?Mugabe talks 
radical -- especially nationalist and anti-imperialist~(to hang on to power) 
but acts reactionary.? He only does what?s necessary to preserve his rule.

If we accept this as true, then we?re saying that the behavior of the 
government is constrained by one of the original goals of the liberation 
movement (land reform) and that the personal view is irrelevant. No matter 
what the motivations of the government?s leaders, the course the government 
follows is conditioned by the goals of the larger movement of national 
liberation.

There?s no question Mugabe reacted harshly to recent provocations by 
factions of the MDC, or that his government was deliberately provoked. But 
the germane question isn?t whether beating Morgan Tsvangirai over the head 
was too much, but whether the ban on political rallies in Harare, which the 
opposition deliberately violated, is justified. That depends on whose side 
you?re on, and whether you think Tsvangirai and his associates are earnest 
citizens trying to freely express their views or are proxies for imperialist 
governments bent on establishing (restoring in Britain?s case) hegemony over 
Zimbabwe.

There?s no question either that Mugabe?s government is in a precarious 
position. The economy is in a shambles, due in part to drought, to the 
disruptions caused by land reform, and to sanctions. White farmers want 
Mugabe gone (to slow land redistribution, or to stop it altogether), London 
and Washington want him gone (to ensure neo-liberal ?reforms? are 
implemented), and it?s likely that some members of his own party also want 
him to step down.

On top of acting to sabotage Zimbabwe economically through sanctions, London 
and Washington have been funnelling financial, diplomatic and organizational 
assistance to groups and individuals who are committed to bringing about a 
color revolution (i.e., extra-constitutional regime change) in Zimbabwe. 
That includes Tsvangirai and the MDC factions, among others.

For the Mugabe government, the options are two-fold: Capitulate (and 
surrender any chance of maintaining what independence Zimbabwe has managed 
to secure at considerable cost) or fight back. Some people might deplore the 
methods used, but considering the actions and objectives of the opposition ^ 
and what?s at stake ^ the crackdown has been both measured and necessary.

http://gowans.wordpress.com/2007/03/30/zimbabwe%e2%80%99s-lonely-fight-for-justice/

More about Zimbabwe and Demonization in general (in French) : 
:

1. The Guardian (January 24, 2002)
2. Ibid.
3. Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme (The Reversal of Colonial Land 
Occupation and Domination): Its Impact on the country's regional and 
international relations. Paper presented by Dr I.S.G. Mudenge, Zimbabwe 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Conference 'The Struggle Continues', 
held in Harare, 18-22 April 2004.
4. http://www.zimfa.gov.zw/speeches/minister/min014.htm
5. Globe and Mail (May 26, 1999)
6. ?Grass-Roots Effort Aims to Upend Mugabe in Zimbabwe,? The New York 
Times, (March 28, 2005)
7. Los Angeles Times (July 8, 2005)
8. Ibid.
9. New York Times (March 27, 2005)
10. See Frances Stonor Saunders, ?The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the 
World of Arts and Letters,? New Press, April 2000; and ?The Economics and 
Politics or the World Social Forum,? Aspects of India?s Economy, No. 35, 
September 2003, http://www.rupe-india.org/35/contents.html
11. New York Times (March 27, 2005)
12. Globe and Mail (March 26, 2005)
13. ?What?s Really Going on in Zimbabwe? Mugabe Gets the Milosevic 
Treatment,? Counterpunch.com. March 23, 2007, 
http://www.counterpunch.org/gowans03232007.html
14. Los Angeles Times (July 8, 2005)
15. New York Times, (December 4, 2005)
16. Washington Post (November 18, 2005)
17. New York Times (March 29, 2006)
18. New York Times (December 24, 2004)
19. Globe and Mail (March 23, 2007)
20. New York Times (December 24, 2004)
21. Ibid.
22. Globe and Mail (March 22, 2007)
23. The Herald (November 7, 2005)
24. Patrick Bond, ?Mugabe: Talks Radical, Acts Like a Reactionary: 
Zimbabwe?s Descent,? Counterpunch.com, March 27, 2007, 
http://www.counterpunch.org/bond03272007.html
25. Globe and Mail (March 23, 2007)
26. Times Online (March 5, 2006)
27. Gregory Elich, ?Zimbabwe?s Fight for Justice,? Center for Research on 
Globalisation, May 6, 2005, globalresearch.ca/articles/ELI505A.html
28. ?Progressive Cuba Bashing,? Socialism and Democracy, Vol. 19, No. 1, 
March 2005.















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