[A-List] Why African countries are banking on China
Patrick Bond
pbond at mail.ngo.za
Mon Dec 25 06:15:01 MST 2006
PAMBAZUKA NEWS 282: AFRICAN PERPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA - PART 2
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CONTENTS: 1. Highlights from this issue,
3. Comment and analysis, 4. Podcasts, 5. Letters, 6. Blogging Africa
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1 Highlights from this issue
FEATURED THIS WEEK
IN PART TWO of this special issue
- Moreblessings Chidaushe cautions that while China might assist Africa
to a certain degree, it is not, will not and should not be expected to
solve all of Africa’s problems.
- Michelle Chan-Fishel points out that the Chinese low-price development
model comes at a very high cost. “The untold story of China’s rapid
economic growth is one characterised by vast levels of income disparity,
unfair treatment of workers and lost livelihoods, especially in the
rural areas.”
- The question of whether China can ‘prosper where others have failed’
could be inverted: “can Africa benefit in longer term, more sustainable
and more representative ways from China’s enhanced attention and links
with Africa in ways that departure from established patterns with
external powers?,” writes Daniel Large.
- Ndubisi Obiorah points out that while China's rapidly expanding
engagement in Africa is enthusiastically welcomed by African governments
and some African intellectuals, “China's relations with Africa's
governments is often perceived among human rights NGOs and Western
commentators as increasingly problematic for governance and human rights
in Africa.”
- Kwesi Kwaa Prah speaks to Pambazuka News about the history of Chinese
engagement in Africa. You can also hear the interview in a special
Pambazuka News Podcast.
- BLOGGING AFRICA: Sokari Ekine reports that the South African Chinese
community is going to court to demand that they be racially reclassified
as either as a so-called “coloured” or black.
AND IN PART ONE (yesterday)
FEATURES:
- Firoze Manji explains why this special issue of China has been
launched as a taster to a forthcoming book.
-Stephen Marks asks what is the true nature of Chinese involvement in
Africa? Is it colonialism revisited?
COMMENT AND ANALYSIS:
- John Rocha examines some of the implications for Africa related to
both positive and negative aspects and the meaning of China’s
involvement for Nepad’s African Peer Review Mechanism.
- Anabela Lemos and Daniel Ribeiro write, after so many years of being
colonised by the Portuguese, “are we now being colonised again, in the
name of development but under the new flag of ‘economic partnerships
with China’?”
- Ali Askouri argues that China's presence in Sudan ought to be
challenged on all fronts. “China must be made aware that its
opportunistic involvement with dictatorship carries a price for trade
and investment inside China”
- John Karumbidza writes that the benefits that Zimbabwe has gained for
trading with China include the political preservation of Mugabe reign
and personal aggrandizement through corruption and kickbacks by his ZANU
PF cronies.
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CHINA’S GRAND RE-ENTRANCE INTO AFRICA
Moreblessings Chidaushe
Moreblessings Chidaushe tackles the issue of development aid to Africa,
comparing the approach of the West and the new player, China. What is
significantly different, she states, is that instead of the top-down
language used by the West, China has instead used language that speaks
of partnership and friendship. The West should not see China as a threat
to its hold over Africa. Africa should be left to decide who it wants to
engage with, she concludes.
This article interrogates China’s new approach to Africa in the specific
context of development aid (grants, loans, technical experts). The
rationale is to compare the Chinese approach to the traditional western
donor approach and analyze the extent to which Africa may or may not
benefit from this new approach. Some of the questions it tries to
explore are; is China necessarily offering Africa a better development
aid option than the west? Where is the new relationship taking Africa?
Will Chinese aid move Africa towards achieving the MDGs? Is China a new
friend or a new imperialist? What will be the west’s role in this new
paradigm? And most importantly is this engagement not just a case of
whose turn it is to colonize a continent up for grabs anyway?
Background/context
Chinese-African relations date back to 50 years ago when in 1956, China
first established diplomatic relations with Egypt, since then, China has
not looked back in advancing its relationship with the continent. To
date, it has established co-corporation with 48 African countries
(supporting the One China Policy). Africa and China share common
historical experiences which have significantly contributed to cementing
of what is now described as an “unshakable friendship”. Fifty years of
engagement has borne more than 720 Chinese projects in Africa, huge
infrastructural projects (TAZARA railway, major highways, stadiums,
mining, energy ventures, oil in Angola and Nigeria) 18,000 governmental
scholarships, 800 Chinese enterprises, 15,000 medical personnel and much
more. Trade between the two parties has risen from an estimated 4
billion in 1995 to 40 billion in 2005 and still growing, trade
agreements brokered during the Nov 2006 Sino- Africa Summit point to
$100 billion by 2010.
China’s cooperation with Africa has previously not been particularly
outstanding. We however begin to note some significant changes taking
place around 2000 with the hosting of the first Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation – Ministerial Conference in Beijing which received massive
participation from the African partners. The Forum principle was based
on “carrying out consultation on an equal footing, enhancing
understanding, increasing consensus, promoting friendship and furthering
cooperation”. China’s gentle and appealing attitude coupled with growing
concerns and restlessness about a largely unproductive engagement with
the west contributed to a stronger desire by both parties to strengthen
the relationship. Furthermore, China’s growing superpower ambitions have
resulted in more aggressive efforts to strengthen this relationship
especially around the strategic resource endowments in Africa. The
climax of these efforts culminated in the development of a policy that
was announced in January 2006.
China’s policy on Africa
In January, 2006, China unveiled its new policy on Africa, an all-round,
coherent roadmap articulating China’s objectives and strategies in
Africa in areas ranging from high-level exchange visits, consultation
mechanisms, trade, investment, financial, agricultural, resources,
tourism cooperation, infrastructure, debt relief and cooperation in
human resources development, science and technology and cultural
exchanges and many more.
One of the most striking features of the China-Africa policy document is
the language in which it is coined. China uses friendly language and its
soft power to appeal to Africa’s hand. The document is coined in a
language that provides a gentle, friendly, caring attitude one to which
Africa has been wholly enticed. Exploitation, heavy hand top-down
relationship has been typical of Africa’s relationship with the west,
one approach China has deliberately opted to reverse – presenting itself
as a potentially better friend to Africa.
While China has a clear policy to engage with Africa as a block, on its
part, Africa’s approach to China still remains largely ad hoc. Although
several countries have adopted the “Look East” policies, these are still
at individual national levels with each country pursuing maximum benefit
for its own best interests and specific needs.
One can’t help wondering if, without a comprehensive and structured
policy, African countries are individually smart enough to deal with
this growing force of a friend without being shortchanged. Although the
relationship is supposedly based on an “equal” partnership – the level
of equality in the partnership is questionable given the different
contexts of the two parties.
Both simple logic and experience tells that it is impossible to engage
on an equal footing as long as the parties are not on the same level.
China is coming in as a donor and Africa as a recipient much like it has
been with the west. The departure platform is thus already tipped in
China’s favor making it difficult for Africa to bargain a genuine
partnership – some kind of domination is likely to take place between
the two.
A way out would be the development of a comprehensive African policy on
China. This would result in more structured, secure and beneficial
engagement and indeed potentially create the platform for a win-win
situation as is the intention of the relationship.
An African policy on China would have to be developed through a
continental body like the African Union with multi-stakeholder
collaboration at all levels beginning at grassroots and feeding into
regional blocks like SADC, EAC, ECOWAS etc. Such a policy would increase
African countries security and benefits in dealing with the superpower
wannabe rather than individual approaches easily susceptible to
manipulation. Others might argue that different national interests would
call for different policies and engagement mechanisms with China. Under
such circumstances, individual countries could well be encouraged to
develop national policies on China but these should be anchored within
the framework of a continental policy, in other words, the various
national and the regional policy should be complimentary.
Judging from the African leadership enthusiasm towards the strengthening
of Chinese relations, it would seem China is the ultimate solution to
the continent’s problems. It is crucial to note that while China might
assist Africa to a certain degree, it is not, will not and should not be
expected to solve all of Africa’s problems. It remains the
responsibility of Africans to craft a way out of their quagmire. A
simplistic view of the upcoming Chinese deal reveals that benefit from
the Chinese aid is minimal, for example the proposed 100 schools will
only translate to 2 schools per country in a continent whose member
countries need more than 100 schools each, the same applies for the
proposed 100 agricultural experts to be sent to Africa and the 50 clinics.
Thus it is clear that benefits of Chinese aid per individual country is
minimal and will not add a significant difference to the achievement of
the MDGs in Africa. It is therefore still crucial for Africa to maintain
good relations with other partners (west) to compliment efforts towards
the achievement of the goals. A huge concern is that currently China and
Western relations with Africa are being approached from a competition
point of view. A way should be sought to combine these efforts for
maximum benefit for Africa.
Development Aid in Africa
A traditionally perceived way out of Africa’s quagmire has been the use
of development aid. The crisis of western aid has been that, the more
the industry has grown, the more distorted it has become and the more
detached from reality it has become. Strategic dynamics have grown to
undermine the fundamentals of aid thus it has largely failed to achieve
its objectives and thus been rightly criticized. The concern is that
there is a rather weak link between the aid intentions, amounts poured
into development and the worsening situation on the ground.
China and development aid
Critics and even development practitioners themselves have long made
recommendations on how development aid can be improved. They have
recommended that Africa needs more grants than loans, less technical
aid, cheap loans and aid without conditionalities and they have also
called for more trade not aid. This sections examines the extent to
which the supposedly better Chinese aid is meeting these recommendations
in order to assess the extent to which Chinese aid will be better in
addressing Africa’s challenges.
China is itself a developing country but it got freedom earlier and
adopted an aggressive approach to its development. Because it has not
depended on aid to the same level as Africa, it has since achieved
impressive development in the past 50 years. It is no wonder Africa is
ready to embrace engagement with China as it considered it as having a
crucial experience from which Africa can tap. China chooses to
concentrate more on the huge infrastructural investments, production and
trade and the turnover from these have proved more beneficial than
development aid. Thus, unlike the western approach, China concentrates
more on trade and investments and less on charity and social sectors.
While Africa excitedly welcomes China as a better development partner,
it is important to be cautious and not go into the relationship blindly,
it is critical for Africa to take time to analyze the implications and
real benefits of the China policy and engagement with Africa. After all,
China has aggressive superpower ambitions which it is advancing and may
in the long-term harden its approach/stance to ensure the achievement of
its objectives.
The excitement around the “new” Chinese approach brings about the
general perception that China is offering Africa a better aid package –
but is this necessarily true? Much like the west, China’s development
aid to Africa has centered around grants, loans and technical expertise,
therefore the two’s departure points are similar. The Chinese approach
therefore begs an interrogation to assess any differences between
Chinese and traditional western approaches. Currently, the
technicalities/dynamics of Chinese aid are not very transparent as the
deals are brokered at bilateral (government to government) level. This
discussion therefore bases some of its facts on experience on the ground
which translates to/implies possible similar existing bilateral
agreements between the two parties.
Technical expertise
Technical expertise has remained a major concern of the development
industry. As a conditionality, western donors have traditionally
attached technical expertise to their development aid.
On technical expertise the Chinese have proved worse than the west.
Chinese projects are typically accompanied by droves of Chinese
nationals. What has been particularly difficult for locals, is that in
many cases the Chinese even import Chinese casual labors, leaving the
majority of locals in the cold and yet Africa has an abundance of
unskilled labor which could immensely benefit from these projects.
Chinese aid, and especially technical aid should be adjusted to consider
such circumstances. While it should be targeted at reducing unemployment
in Africa, it is instead targeted at reducing unemployment in China.
Technical aid is thus undoubtedly one of the areas in which Africa will
have to battle with in regard to Chinese aid as Chineses labor does not
seem to be a negotiable part of Chinese aid. Earlier than later, Africa
should draw up its own policy on technical aid/labor to ensure that
collaboration with China will assist in reducing the unemployment
pandemic typical of the continent.
Trade
Europe has for long been Africa’s largest trading partner – but with the
coming in of China, tables are certainly turning. China’s continues to
develop insatiable energy needs and Africa is more than ready to plunder
its natural resources to satisfy China. The danger of this benefit
though is that it is only being calculated in monetary terms at the
expense of issues around environmental sustainability and resource
depletion, which are crucial to the continent’s future. Both China and
Africa should develop policies to safeguard environmental and
sustainability concerns of the extraction of resources from the
continent. For now, China’s preoccupation is the extraction of Africa’s
resources, raising the question of the long-term sustainability of these
resources.
The Beijing Consensus
China’s aid commitments as stated in the China-Africa policy were
further elaborated/expounded during the Sino-Africa Summit (Nov 2006)
where the eastern nation pledged to double aid to Africa to US$5 billion
for direct investments ($3 billion in preferential loans, $2 billion in
export credits) by 2009 and increasing the number of loans, development
projects in health and agriculture and also in debt cancellation. From
the above deal, African loyalty in favor of China is set to grow further
in the coming years, making the neo-liberal agenda less relevant.
And yet the doubled Chinese aid will come in the form of loans. What is
not yet clear to African publics are the conditions under which Africa
is acquiring these loans. Admittedly the Chinese loans are cheaper than
western loans and come with less political and other conditionalities
and penalties unlike the IFI Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF).
Chinese aid has one major political conditionality attached to it –
adherence to the “One China” policy. Any country engaging China cannot
engage Taiwan. The caveats of this conditionality may however breed
other political conditionalities not yet clear to Africans at this stage.
The Chinese loans also have, attached to them, economic conditionalities
to allow Chinese firms access to the exploitation of Africa resources,
repatriation of profits and labor as discussed above. It is also not yet
clear what the implications of these loans will be on the continent’s
debt crisis.
The west has often been accused of double counting/discounting aid and
one cannot help but wonder too if the Chinese offer for debt relief,
technical assistance, scholarships and exchange visits will not be
double counted as a part of the aid package. Thus it is a
misrepresentation to claim that Chinese aid is free of conditionalities.
Given the above discussion, it is sensible to conclude that Chinese aid
may not be significantly different from western aid and therefore may
not move Africa towards the achievement of the MDGs. Currently there is
more excitement for anticipated benefits overshadowing the analysis of
the actual benefits which are in fact minimal. High hopes/expectations
should not be confused for actual benefits because what may seem like
the oasis in Africa’s development journey may only be a mirage. So far
Chinese aid (grants, loans and technical expertise) has not proved
itself significantly different from western aid.
Conclusion
For a continent in such a quagmire, anyone offering a generous hand to
Africa will always be welcome. Africa’s resource gap has oftentimes
subjected it to exploitation by some “partners” and yet due to limited
options, the continent has had to bear with these exploitative
relationships, subjecting its masses to deeper poverty, humiliation and
desperation for the sake of accessing resources. The IFI conditionality
regime is a classic example where Africa has had to subject itself to
humiliating top-bottom relationships resulting in the IFIs maintaining a
perpetual heavy grip on the continent. To date nearly all African
countries are still undertaking IFI imposed structural adjustment
programs off tangent to the interests of their peoples. The result of
these programs has been increased poverty, debt and dependency.
What has made China a seemingly better and easier to embrace friend to
Africa has been it’s seemingly softer approach it has used. Thus
embracing China has been a walk in the park for Africa. The west has had
to be coerced (by years of lobbying and advocacy) into adopting measures
like the Paris Declaration in efforts to tip the scales up in favor of
the developing world. Even then this agenda has not been fully embraced
by all donors as they see themselves loosing their autonomy in the
process. Thus compared to China, the west has generally been a difficult
partner to deal with.
The west is in the forefront of criticizing China’s stance in Africa. In
some circles, China has been branded as irresponsible and reckless
mainly due to the non-interference policy. It is however doubtful that
this criticism is a result of genuine concern for African welfare or the
reality of the failure to block China from grabbing the traditional
domain. Thus the Beijing Consensus to solidify relations with Africa and
increase trade seems to pose a challenge to the Washington Consensus.
Yet the two parties potentially have something good to offer Africa,
thus it is only sensible to combine the two for maximum benefit. The
current competing approach is not beneficial to Africa. The west should
not see itself as Africa’s savior but its partner - the “savior
attitude” is what is bringing about the competition.
The above discussion has shown that as far as aid (grants, loans and
technical expertise), Chinese aid is not significantly different from
western aid. For China to increase the effectiveness of its aid, it
should urgently revisit its technical aid agreements, increase grants as
opposed to loans, and find a beneficial non-exploitative way of
accessing African resources.
• Moreblessings Chidaushe currently works as a Programme Officer - Lobby
& Advocacy for African Forum and Network on Debt and Development
(AFRODAD) based in Harare, Zimbabwe. Holds a Masters Degree in
International Development from the University of Bath, UK. Dynamic,
open-minded person. Follows development aid issues passionately and
believes that not until Africa finds a solution to its challenges will
there ever be social and economic justice on the continent.
• This is a shortened version of an article by Moreblessings Chidaushe.
The full version, including references, will be available in a
forthcoming book to be published in January by Fahamu and called
‘African perspectives on China in Africa’. The full articles will also
be made available as .PDF files on the Pambazuka News website.
• Please send comments to editor at pambazuka.org or comment online at
www.pambazuka.org
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ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: MORE OF THE SAME?
Michelle Chan-Fishel
Is China a friend or foe to the African continent? Michelle Chan-Fishel
writes that while China’s investments do involve socio-economic
development, environmental and social problems are emerging ‘with a new
face’. Chan-Fishel looks at Chinese interests in Sudan, Angola, Nigeria,
Zambia, Zimababwe, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial
Guinea, Cameroon and Liberia. ‘Chinese companies are quickly generating
the same kinds of environmental damage and community opposition that
Western companies have spawned around the world.’
Introduction
For many African governments, China's emergence from poverty to becoming
an economic powerhouse serves as an inspirational example. From the
mid-1980s, China’s pursuit of market economics, with a focus on
export-oriented industrialisation and inward foreign direct investment,
helped raise GDP and build infrastructure. In many parts of Africa,
China is perceived by governments as an ‘economic messiah’, a new
investor and ally in a world where there is growing unease over what
African governments perceive to be the patronising attitudes of the West.
The president of the African Development Bank Donald Kaberuka has
remarked: ‘We can learn from them (China) how to organize our trade
policy, to move from low- to middle-income status, to educate our
children in skills and areas that pay off in just a couple of years.’
Similarly, Mozambican President Armando Emilio Guebuza has said: ‘When
we see China coming up and developing an attitude of support to help our
productivity, we Africans say “Welcome”, because these investments and
projects, especially in infrastructure, will help reduce our poverty
problems.’
There are currently an estimated 750 Chinese companies operating in 50
African countries. But Beijing's African investments are also tied to
socio-economic development, including debt relief, grants, soft loans,
buyer credits provided by state-owned banks, scholarships, preferential
market access, and technical aid in the fields of medicine, agriculture
and engineering.
Concerns
The economic foundation of China’s relationship with Africa is obvious:
the procurement of natural resources. Beijing’s only political condition
for establishing ties between China and African countries is the ‘one
China principle’ – refusal to diplomatically recognise Taiwan.
But China's no-strings-attached support has sounded alarm bells in the
West. Recently, World Bank president Paul Wolfowitz criticised Beijing
for undercutting anti-corruption measures, such as requiring revenue
transparency for resource extraction projects. Some human rights
watchdogs have notably criticised China for weakening democracy and
human rights in Africa through its readiness to deal with ¬– and
sometimes sell arms to – the Sudanese, Angolan and Zimbabwean governments.
Accusations of ‘neo-colonialism’ have already surfaced, as China’s
search for energy and minerals is reminiscent of the ‘scramble for
resources’ that characterised Western colonialism. The history of
natural resource extraction in Africa has a poor track record,
characterised by environmental degradation and increased poverty. As
Chinese companies become increasingly involved in the oil and gas,
mining, and logging sectors, these environmental and social problems are
emerging with a new face.
Sudan
Perhaps the most controversial of China’s oil interests, and one that
demonstrates well China’s commitment to secure oil deals is its
relationship with Sudan. Beijing is the leading developer of oil
reserves in the Sudan, currently importing 60 per cent of the country’s
oil output. Today, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is
the largest shareholder in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company
(GNPOC). What makes China’s involvement in Sudan so controversial are
the atrocities occurring in the western region of Darfur region,
atrocities which the US and other nations have branded genocide.
Numerous human rights groups have accused Sudan of systematically
massacring civilians and chasing them from ancestral lands to clear
oil-producing areas.
Prior to the conflict in Darfur, China was suspected of financially
underwriting Sudan’s 21-year civil war, which ended with the signing of
a permanent peace accord in January 2005. In 2000, Sudanese resistance
forces were said to be collecting photographs of Chinese-made weapons to
prove the increase in Beijing’s support for Khartoum. In July 2000,
WorldNetDaily reported that Sudan had acquired 34 new jet fighters from
China. In June 2001, the Mideast Newsline reported that Sudan had built
three weapons factories with Chinese assistance in order to halt rebel
advances. China also reportedly provided arms support to Sudan in
exchange for oil. Although it is difficult to determine exactly how much
money China has invested in Sudan, one source states that ‘China
reportedly invested US$20 billion in Sudan, apart from soft loans,
grants and other forms of aid.’ According to a study by PFC Strategic
Studies, the Sudanese government could collect as much as US$30 billion
or more in total oil revenue by 2012.
Angola
In recent years, Angola has emerged as one of China’s top trading
partners. Last year, China was busy securing long-term oil agreements
with Angola, and Sonangol (Angola’s state-run petroleum company)
committed to provide long-term oil supplies to China’s Sinopec. Sonangol
and Sinopec will evaluate Angola’s offshore Block 3, and will also
jointly study plans for a new oil refinery. In October 2004, as India
was preparing to close a major deal for about US$620 million to buy
Shell’s 50 per cent share in Block 18, China made a last minute bid – to
win the deal. China’s offer of US$2billion in aid for various projects
in Angola made India’s offer of US$200 million for developing railways
pale in comparison.
Nigeria
Previously, China had been shut out of Nigeria by Western firms.
However, through patience, political prowess and technological
contributions, such as promising to build and launch a communication
satellite for Nigeria by 2007, Chinese firms are gaining a foothold in
the industry. In December 2004, China’s Sinopec and Nigeria’s NNPC
signed an agreement to develop oil mining leases 64 and 66, located in
the waters of the Niger Delta in southern Nigeria. In July 2005, China’s
CNOOC signed a contract with NNPC worth US$800 million to guarantee
China receives 30,000 barrels per day for one year.
Recently, China and Nigeria signed a deal in which China would provide a
US$4 billion infrastructure investment package in exchange for first
refusal rights on four oil blocks. In time, it is suspected that China
could easily replace some of these Western firms when their drilling
licences come up for renewal.
Mining
China is the world’s fastest-growing market for minerals. Africa figures
heavily in Beijing’s strategies to secure access to mineral resources.
Copper in Zambia
Copper is Zambia’s leading export commodity, and production is soaring.
The Chamber of Mines forecasts production of about 550,000 tonnes in
2005 and more than 600,000 tonnes in 2006. But as miners try to extract
more and more copper ore, the accident rate is soaring. According to the
Mineworkers Union of Zambia, at least 71 people died in Zambian mining
accidents in 2005. ‘We're worried about the accident trends’, said
Mavuto Gondwe, a union director with responsibility for health and
safety. Indeed, in 2005, an explosion at a BGRIMM mine was the biggest
single accident in the history of the Zambian mining industry. BGRIMM is
controlled and 60 per cent owned by China Non Ferrous Metal Industries,
a Chinese government-owned company.
Coal and platinum in Zimbabwe
Shunned by Western leaders and investors for the government’s human
rights practices, Zimbabwe has begun a determined campaign to hitch its
plummeting fortunes to China's rising star. Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe
calls the policy ‘Look East’, and it has resulted in tremendous growth
in trade and economic cooperation between the two countries. Several
joint venture companies are being established, and under the
Zimbabwe-China Joint Commission, Zimbabwe has benefited through the
Chinese government's concessionary and interest free loans and grants.
The Chinese are widely reported to covet a stake in Zimbabwe's platinum
mines, which have the world's second largest reserves, and the Mugabe
government has hinted that he will accommodate them. The mines'
principal operator denies being pressured into dealing with the Chinese,
but negotiations are under way to sell a stake to Zimbabweans yet to be
identified. The operator has postponed major spending on the mines,
citing the cause as political uncertainty.
Cobalt in Congo
According to the Cobalt Development Institute (CDI), China was the
world’s leading cobalt producer in 2005. Approximately three-quarters of
all cobalt made in China in that year derived from imported
concentrates, of which almost 90 per cent came from the DRC.
While the DRC is making slow progress in its transition process after a
four-year civil war, the major regional and international mining houses
are anticipating stability in the country. In the Katanga area, Chinese
companies such as Colec and Feza Mining are initiating copper and cobalt
mining and processing projects. Earlier this year, Nanjing Hanrui Cobalt
Co Ltd, one of the largest conglomerates in China, purchased three
high-grade copper-cobalt mines in Lubumbashi in the DRC. After a decade
of growth, this private company has become the leading cobalt powder
producer in Asia, ranking among the top three of the world. Because of
the firm’s expansion, the international monopoly on cobalt has been
broken, and the global cobalt powder prices have been reduced by half.
International companies such as Japan’s Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Toshiba,
Sumitomo, South Korea’s Samsung and LG all buy cobalt powder from Nanjing.
Timber
China is the largest importer of forest products in the world, and its
imports of forest products have tripled in less than a decade. In 1998,
China placed stringent restrictions on domestic logging, forcing the
country to import a high percentage of its total wood consumption. Since
then, China climbed six spots to become the world’s top forest products
importer, taking 120,000,000m in 2004. China is now the leading
importer of round logs. In 2003, China was second in industrial
roundwood imports, second for wood-based panels, pulp, paper and paper
boards, and fifth for sawn wood. China imports 40 per cent of its total
forest consumption.
Gabon
Today, China is Gabon's largest timber trading partner. In 2003 Gabon
supplied 40 per cent of China's log imports from the west/central Africa
region, and China imported 46 per cent of Gabon's total forest exports.
Gabonese law requires processing before export, yet China's demands are
for raw logs.
According to some analysts, China's influence in the sector encourages
‘flagrant disregard for the law’, and taxes are not paid on 60 per cent
of the area allocated as forest concessions. National law states that
failure to gain ministry approval of a management plan for a forest
concession within three years triggers forfeiture of the concession; yet
only five of more than 200 companies (representing 30 per cent of
concessions) in 2000 had even stated their intention to start writing a
plan. Additionally, all five of these companies had already logged their
concessions for more than three years. The illegal timber exports to
China have been estimated to be as high as 70 per cent of total timber
exports.
Equatorial Guinea
China purchases an estimated 60 per cent of the timber exported from
Equatorial Guinea, another country with known illegal logging problems.
According to the World Wildlife Fund, annual timber extraction in
Equatorial Guinea exceeds the maximum legally allowed limit by 40–60 per
cent. It is also estimated that up to 90 per cent of the total harvest
going to China is illegal. Shimmer International, a subsidiary of the
notorious Rimbunan Hijau, has close ties with the minister of forests.
Along with its many subsidiaries and associated companies, it is the
dominant player in the country’s logging sector. China’s Jilin Forest
Industry (Group) is also involved in timber extraction and processing.
Cameroon
Cameroon exports about 11 per cent of its timber to China. The Centre
pour l’Environnement et développement estimates that at least 50 per
cent of logging is illegal in Cameroon. According to Friends of the
Earth, 96 per cent of logging violations in Cameroon between 1992 and
1993 were followed by incomplete judicial procedures, and one in five
cases in this time period were dropped after intervention by an
‘influential person'.
Hong Kong-owned Vicwood Pacific acquired the Cameroon subsidiaries of
the Thanry Group in 1997. From 2002, Thanry has been one of the
principle loggers and international timber traders in the Congo River
Basin and had established itself as a major violator of forestry laws
and a creator of regional social unrest. Between 2000 and 2002, Thanry
was fined over US$1,300,000 for what has been called 'anarchic logging',
including cutting undersized trees, logging outside legal boundaries,
and logging in unallocated concessions. The World Bank also discovered
that the origin of many of Thanry's logs had been falsified so as to
avoid Cameroon's export controls.
Liberia
In Liberia, rebel leader-turned President Charles Taylor relied heavily
on timber resources to support his own military efforts and to fund
mercenaries in neighbouring Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. Taylor used
the revenue gained from the sale of the timber to buy arms for troops,
support foreign mercenaries, create enormous personal wealth, and
support the personal security forces that were essential to his power.
The timber transport vessels were also used to traffic arms throughout
the region.
China has rapidly increased its log imports from Liberia. By 2001, it
was Liberia's largest buyer of wood products. That year, China imported
US$42 million worth of logs (58 per cent of the country's total
exports), most of which came from the OTC through Chinese importer
Global Star Tradings. A report commissioned by USAID stated: ‘Harvested
timber is transported to Liberian ports where it is bartered to Chinese
and other trading partners either directly in exchange for weapons and
munitions needed by Taylor to carry on his wars, or is sold to raise
funds to achieve the same end.’ On 6 May 2003, the UN Security Council
imposed an embargo on Liberian timber products. China had imported
365,000m of logs from Liberia in 2003 before the sanctions. But log
imports plunged to 30,000m in the second half of 2003; and China did
not appear to have imported Liberian logs during the first half of 2004.
Conclusion
While conventional wisdom posits that Chinese multinationals treat their
workers and the environment more poorly than their Western counterparts,
not enough research has been done to actually prove this hypothesis.
What is clear, however, is that Chinese companies are quickly generating
the same kinds of environmental damage and community opposition that
Western companies have spawned around the world.
For communities adversely affected by these mega-projects (regardless of
the corporate sponsor), the question is: first, do they give their free,
prior and informed consent to the investment? If the answer is ‘yes’
then the challenge becomes, ‘How can communities and governments
negotiate with the sponsor to receive the best deal possible, in terms
of economic benefits sharing, human rights, sustained livelihoods,
environmental quality, and cultural and community integrity?’
Evaluated this way it is evident that in some cases, what private
companies can provide through ’corporate social responsibility’ – e.g.
health clinics that may or may not be furnished with medicines, books
for local schools – pales in comparison with the deals that Chinese
state-owned companies can offer (e.g. debt relief, concessional lending).
Furthermore, African leaders and policy makers are faced with additional
question when it comes to Chinese investment: Is the Chinese model of
development, which admittedly has been characterised by spectacular
economic growth, worth emulating? Based on the unlimited extraction of
natural resources, ultra low-wage manufacturing, and the export of cheap
goods (due especially to ‘throwaway’ societies in the West), this
paradigm – which is in essence one of corporate globalisation, not of
China alone – is simply not sustainable.
This low-price development model actually comes at a very high cost – to
societies, both inside and outside China, as well as to the environment.
The untold story of China’s rapid economic growth is one characterised
by vast levels of income disparity, unfair treatment of workers and lost
livelihoods, especially in the rural areas. These problems are so acute
that they threaten political stability. Environmental problems are
similarly acute: breathing the air in China’s most polluted cities is
the equivalent of smoking two packets of cigarettes a day. On an
international level, meanwhile, the effects of corporate globalisation
(particularly Western consumption) are leading to the destruction of the
ecological support systems on which all life depends.
It is tempting for African leaders to simply want to play Western and
Chinese extraction companies off against each other in an effort to ’get
a better deal’, and doggedly follow China’s path of economic growth.
Indeed, it is important for them to carefully conceive extraction
projects in order to secure the best possible deal for their people. But
ultimately, it will be important to realise that this
low-price/high-cost economic model will not work: neither for Africa,
nor for China, nor for the rest of the world.
• This is a shortened version of an article by Michelle Chan-Fishel. The
full version, including references, will be available in a forthcoming
book to be published in January by Fahamu and called ‘African
perspectives on China in Africa’. The full articles will also be made
available as .PDF files on the Pambazuka News website.
• Please send comments to editor at pambazuka.org or comment online at
www.pambazuka.org
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AS THE BEGINNING ENDS: CHINA’S RETURN TO AFRICA
Daniel Large
China-Africa relations received unprecedented attention during 2006,
both in terms of visibility and attention, writes Daniel Large. China’s
involvement is important to consider, he says, because China will
continue to need African resources, because of the increased trade and
investment in Africa as a result of the relationship and because of an
emerging Chinese development agenda on the continent. Unlike early
Chinese explorers dating back to 1433, the current Chinese involvement
in Africa is here to stay.
China’s Year of Africa in 2006 climaxed with the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (Zhong Fei Luntan, or FOCAC). A friend aptly remarked,
‘Africa has taken over Beijing!’ Beijing mobilised to deliver high
standards of Chinese hospitality and red-carpet treatment for 48 African
delegations made up of political leaders, businessmen and accompanying
journalists.
As the third ministerial and first heads of state conference, this
FOCAC, between the 4–5 November 2006, was the most prominent such summit
meeting after the first (Beijing, 2000) and the second (Addis Ababa,
2003). In many ways the first FOCAC was a trial run for this more
lavish, ambitious and successful summit. It was carefully planned and
impressively executed political theatre. Unlike six years ago, not just
African but the world media was there to report. The FOCAC was a
distinctively bilateral affair, contrasting with the more multilateral
celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Bandung conference last year.
Its staged choreography, including President Hu Jintao’s reception of
individual Africa leaders in the Great Hall of the People, resonated
with historical overtones of tribute, a contemporary version of ‘distant
people’ arriving in ‘uninterrupted succession’. The extensive symbolic,
monetary and political capital invested in FOCAC, its near flawless
public execution and modern Beijing spoke of an increasingly
self-confident China. Coming at the end of a year which has seen the
dramatic irruption of China in Africa as a world media issue, topic of
conversation and policy concern for governments, international
organisations and civil society groups, it additionally, and very
publicly, amounted to a declaration of arrival and positive intent: the
Chinese government is serious about developing its African relations,
and sought not merely to impress this upon its Africa guests but also
the world at large. This forum cemented the official apparatus of
cooperation and consolidated the foundations of development. Altogether,
it formally marked the end of the beginning of China’s latest engagement
with Africa, a process qualitatively different from the past and set to
have potentially significant consequences for Africa.
This article briefly reflects on the current juncture of China-Africa
relations at the end of an eventful 2006. After pointing to what is
different about China’s return under new circumstances to Africa, it
addresses key dynamics of current relations before identifying issues
that are likely to increasingly come to the fore as the normalisation of
relations proceeds and the exceptionalism that China still enjoys in its
African relations wears off.
China’s return to Africa
Overall, 2006 was a watershed year for China-Africa relations in terms
of the visibility of the subject and attention devoted to it. It
featured a number of notable events, starting with the now-traditional
tour by Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing (this time to Cape Verde,
Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Nigeria and Libya) and the release of China’s
Africa policy statement in January.
After visiting the United States, President Hu Jintao toured Morocco,
Nigeria and Kenya in April, followed by Premier Wen Jiabao’s June trip
to Egypt, Ghana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, South Africa,
Tanzania and Uganda in June. Besides FOCAC, the wide geographical extent
of these high-level tours was reinforced by regional meetings. The
second ministerial meeting of the Macau Forum on September 24–25 in
Macau featured high-level representation from Angola, Mozambique, Cape
Verde, Guinea Bissau, East Timor, Brazil, Macau and China. The
Conference of Sino-Arab Friendship, held in Khartoum at the end of
November, established a permanent secretariat there under Arab League
sponsorship and made a commitment to hold meetings every two years.
China has arrived in Africa.
Rather than a sudden explosion into Africa, the Chinese engagement
represents a return to the continent in a number of different ways.
Strictly speaking, unlike 1433 when the Chinese sea voyages to Africa
stopped, China never left Africa in the post-colonial period. The 1980s
saw Africa downgraded in China’s foreign relations and China’s
involvement in Africa was gradually reoriented into more commercial
forms. Current relations should be traced to China’s renewed interest in
Africa that was sparked in 1989 and consolidated with Jiang Zemin’s tour
to six African countries in May 1996, a process that paved the way for
the acceleration of the current phase after 2000.
Today’s unprecedented interest amongst the media, academic quarters, and
a range of governments and international organisations evokes but
exceeds the last comparable episode of attention, the wave of interest
that followed Zhou En Lai’s African political safari in 1963–64. That
was a very different context: rather than revolutionary prospects being
‘excellent’, as Zhou infamously declared in Mogadishu, the FOCAC
proclaimed this to be the case for China and Africa’s ‘new strategic
partnership’ for common prosperity. China’s return is occurring under
new circumstances. A more developed China operates under conditions of
enhanced interdependence. Gone is the Soviet Union.
Taiwan has lost the diplomatic recognition contest. Ideological
disagreements have been superseded by political differences, especially
on key concept of sovereignty, as China participates in the global
economy and pursues better trade terms rather than an alternative
economic socialist vision. Practical Chinese engagement, including
Chinese companies, is still facilitated by and anchored within a state
framework. The array of Chinese in Africa is more diverse, however, with
an increase in entrepreneurial migration including to such locations as
Cape Verde.
Why China in Africa Matters
The first reason why China’s return to Africa is important is that it is
there to stay. With the addition of India and Asian states, this is part
of what has been described as ‘the most dramatic and important factor in
the external relations of the continent – perhaps in the development of
Africa as a whole – since the end of the Cold War.’
China needs, and will continue to need, African resources more than
previously. One commentator wrote in the early 1970s: ‘For the most part
strategic minerals do not figure prominently in China’s quest for
economic relations with Africa.’ Today a fundamental aspect underpinning
relation is modern China’s need for a range of resources to supply its
rising domestic and industrial needs. The most important sector by far
is oil: some 30 per cent of China’s oil comes from Africa, its top
suppliers being Angola (14 per cent), Sudan (7 per cent) and
Congo-Brazzaville (4.4 per cent). China’s energy diplomacy (nengyuan
waijiao) has mainstreamed as a foreign policy issue in the Hu Jintao
period, which has seen an expansion and intensification of diplomacy not
merely in Africa. ‘An unprecedented need for resources is now driving
China’s foreign policy.’ The Chinese government’s relationship-building
diplomacy with oil states is a means to enhance its energy security.
The second area of why China matters relates to increasing trade and
investment in Africa, and the impact of this on political economy and
for Africa’s international relations. Sub-Saharan trade remains
proportionally not as significant as its world trade but has grown
rapidly and if sustained, ‘the likely future impacts may be very
substantial’. Total trade for 2006, according to official statistics, is
expected to be over US450 billion, more than Africa–EU trade. This is
spearheaded by the strategic pursuit of resources, around which
investment is concentrated, and attempt to protect and enable guaranteed
flow of raw materials for China’s energy needs. China’s foreign direct
investment for Africa as of mid-2006 of some US$41.18 billion is mostly
channelled to resource-rich countries, headed by Sudan and Nigeria.
As such, the thrust of China’s relations can be considered as
fundamentally extractive, with other motivating factors, such as Africa
as a market or production platform, less important at this stage of
relations. The growth in African exports is thus predominantly confined
to a growth of major commodity exports to China and India. As a
developing power looking to grow within a globalising world, China has
distinctive aspects in its African relations.
However, it ‘replicates in key ways developed state policies of
disadvantageous terms of trade, exploitation of natural resources,
oppressive labor regimes and support for authoritarian rulers. The
commonalities of the PRC and Western approaches are therefore fundamental.’
A third area, albeit less significant for now, where China matters is
its emerging development agenda in Africa and the considerable interest
from different parts of Africa in applying aspects of China’s
development experience in their own contexts. China’s legitimacy in
questions of development rests in part on its own domestic record. It
additionally benefits from a certain popular disillusionment with
post-colonial development efforts in Africa, and the promise that China
can deliver where ‘the West’ has not.
China’s official development discourse diverges: it is explicitly
non-prescriptive, employing a language of ‘no strings attached’,
equality and mutual benefit. It emphasises the collective right to
development over the rights-based approaches focused on individual
rights. It stresses the importance of political stability,
internally-driven development appropriate to given conditions and
promotes a sovereignty-based order. Finally, its non-intervention
approach publicly separates business from politics.
Normalising China-Africa relations
Through experience, familiarity, and the progressive deepening of links,
Chinese actors are becoming a more established part of Africa. This
process whereby a range of Chinese interests become a more normal part
of life is one that must necessarily erode the popular reputation for
exceptionalism China has enjoyed, together with such particular cases as
Darfur. In the political imaginary in different parts of Africa,
projections of China are often made in these terms, especially during
and after FOCAC, in keeping with the West’s historic tendency to
alternate between seeing China as a great hope or threat.
The first broad area where this process is set to proceed concerns the
political implications – internal and international – of China’s
approach to political relations with African states and the limits of
public adherence to non-interference. Giving a corporate marketing edge
to a political position, one Chinese minister asserted: ‘Nonintervention
is our brand, like intervention is the Americans’ brand’. However, the
idea of separate business and political realms is deeply disingenuous.
The Chinese approach business as functional politics. The ‘business, not
politics’ approach depends on an ability to navigate political waters,
will necessarily be enmeshed in politics and entail a logic of
negotiation and conflict of a political (if not always openly so)
nature. When it comes to protecting existing investments that have been
established on the basis of political non-interference, China’s African
involvement is likely to need to evolve once the boundaries of its
‘late-entry’ non-interference mode of engagement are tested and
transgressed.
A second point is the need to engage the Chinese side better and to
appreciate the evolving challenges China faces domestically and in the
international context as it pursues its own development. There are
reasons to suggest that ‘linear predictions of a manifest Chinese
destiny may be flawed’.
Contextualising Africa within wider Chinese trade, foreign policy and
participation in the global trade system, including the indirect impacts
of China on Africa’s economic performance, is important. China’s trade
with Africa is proportionally a small part (3 per cent) of its
international trade and its energy needs are not neatly separable from
those of global corporations (some of whom have invested in the Chinese
oil majors operating in Africa).
There is the question of international responses. In the longer term
China may reconfigure and could even break the monopoly of development
concern and activity held by the current set of international
organisations if its relations evolve to a deeper structural level of
involvement. Ideas mooted about a Chinese Development Bank for Africa
raises the question, for example, of how China may affect the
international donor landscape of development finance in Africa. However,
while keen to promote a range of development concerns, from aid, health,
education, and even the environment, Beijing operates within prevailing
international standards, including the Millennium Development Goals, and
does not seek to challenge these. The competition China represents could
catalyse new creative responses from the different layers of existing
development architecture in Africa.
The final area concerns how different constituencies in Africa can
respond. Can African governments develop appropriate responses and
pursue these bilaterally, and also through more coordinated means
through common positions via the AU? On the one hand, African
governments can attempt to ‘take the opportunity of the competition
between China and the West and obtain the best terms for our people.’ On
the other hand, many African governments face the challenge of how to
maintain good relations with and yet not become economically and
politically dependent on China.
Conclusion
China’s return to African is a consequential subject that it is
developing rapidly. However, despite wide coverage, not enough is known
about concrete dynamics and significant knowledge gaps remain, including
those exchanges that are less visible at present—commodity flows,
educational, creation of new elites, or African business in China.
Singling out an abstract ‘China’ in Africa is, of course, limited
headline value and needs to be disaggregated to more properly reflect
the dynamics of the Chinese engagement. In such topical countries as
Sudan, where Petronas and ONGC-Videsh are important together with CNPC,
China is part of what is better approached as an Asian-African axis the
cumulative impact of which may be to effect a historic shift in the
centre of political and economic gravity. However, as well as
contextualising the seemingly meterioric rise of China in Africa, a
historical approach would temper such crystal-ball gazing with caution
about the limitations of long-term projects. Africa may have taken over
Beijing during the 2006 FOCAC, but there is no inevitability about a
transformative impact.
China bears a growing responsibility to match practice with its positive
approach, to demonstrate it is different, rather than merely assert this
with its official discourse which sets high standards and concomitant
expectations of its official discourse. The issue of whether China can
‘prosper where others have failed’ could be inverted: can Africa benefit
in longer term, more sustainable and more representative ways from
China’s enhanced attention and links with Africa in ways that departure
from established patterns with external powers? Through a historical
lens, China has set the terms of its African engagement up to and
largely including the present; ‘the onus rests upon African leaders to
push the development agenda to the next level.’
There is thus a need to retain perspective of relations as they
currently stand, and not exaggerate the importance of China but at the
same time to recognise that this is consequential and not ephemeral. The
idea, for example, that ‘“Empire” has begun to die before our very eyes,
and Beijing will be written on its heart!’ may be indicative of current
stratospheric hopes held in some quarters, but must be tempered. As
President Nyrere’s recognised, while ‘equality and mutual benefit’ is a
key tenet of relations, Tanzania-China relations was a partnership of
‘most unequal equals’, and this could also be used more generally to
capture broader China-Africa relations.
At the end of China’s Year of Africa, as the beginning of its return to
African ends, and as it becomes a normal phenomenon throughout the
continent, there are good reasons to contemplate a possible Chinese
decade of Africa.
China’s re-engagement reprises questions of power, states and
constraints on development, including Africa’s unfavourable position in
the world market, that are sadly familiar in Africa’s post-colonial
history. Those with high hopes that China can benefit Africa as well as
itself, for example, have to recognise its current economic involvement
must change for broader development to occur.
• Daniel Large is a doctoral research student at the School of Oriental
and African Studies, London and has studied in China and conducted
research in Africa. He is co-editing a book on China-Africa relations to
be published early in 2007. Email: dl19 at soas.ac.uk
• This is a shortened version of an article by Daniel Large. The full
version, including references, will be available in a forthcoming book
to be published in January by Fahamu and called ‘African perspectives on
China in Africa’. The full articles will also be made available as .PDF
files on the Pambazuka News website.
• Please send comments to editor at pambazuka.org or comment online at
www.pambazuka.org
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'WHO’S AFRAID OF CHINA IN AFRICA?'
Ndubisi Obiorah
Economic, political and security cooperation between China and Africa
has grown exponentially in the last decade, presenting new opportunities
and challenges for Africa. The need for Africans to understand China,
and its motives for the enhanced engagement with Africa over the last
decade, is now greater than ever before, writes Ndubisi Obiorah.
The rapidly evolving relationship between China and Africa is reflected
in the evolution of African perceptions of China and its motives for
engagement with Africa. For decades during the Cold War, the primary
perception of China in much of Africa was as an ally against
colonialism, neo-imperialism and Western domination, especially amongst
left-wing circles. China was the alternate source to the Soviet Union of
political, diplomatic and military assistance for African liberation
movements. Post-liberation governments however often had to contend with
Sino-Soviet rivalry for influence as well as the vexed question of
Taiwan. Chinese aid, particularly scholarships, were welcomed across
Africa. In the eyes of many Africans, the Tan-Zam railway project
established China’s profile as a friend and ally against Western
neo-colonialism and the apartheid regime in South Africa. Chinese
success in building a railway pooh-poohed by ‘Africa hands’ in the West
was a turning point in Sino-African relations and led to wider
recognition in Africa of China's growing industrial and technological
prowess.
From the 1950s, Chinese businesspeople from Hong Kong and Taiwan as
well the overseas Chinese diaspora in South-East Asia established
trading ties with African counterparts. Taiwan and Hong Kong were widely
known across Africa by the early 1970s as sources for cheap imports of
textiles and consumer goods although often of dubious quality. In
particular, traders from southeastern Nigeria established elaborate
trade networks with Hong Kong and Taiwan manufacturers and traders as
well as with overseas Chinese businesses in southeast Asia. The
increased popularity of kung fu movies and the establishment of schools
of martial arts in major African cities led to relatively greater
awareness of China among ordinary Africans - although often with
distorted perceptions of Chinese history and culture.
Virtually in tandem with the shift in China's focus in its relations
with Africa from ideology to trade, the dominant image of China in
Africa by the 1990s had changed from ideological ally against
colonialism, apartheid and Western domination to business partner and
emerging economic colossus. The Chinese doctor or technical aid worker
traded places with the Chinese entrepreneur or state corporation. The
impact on Africa of China's trade with Africa and the wider world as
well as the activities of Chinese businesses operating in Africa elicits
diverse perceptions from local populations which deserve extensive and
careful study as well as nuanced analysis. It is immensely difficult to
attempt to describe popular perceptions in Africa of Chinese business or
of China itself with a tolerable degree of accuracy because this is a
relatively new area of scholarly inquiry and reliable information beyond
anecdotal sources is hard to come by.
Perceptions among Africa's political leadership and intelligentsia of
the prospects and implications of China-African engagement warrant
further research and measured analysis. China's offer of trade and aid
without apparent political or humanitarian conditionalities is
apparently much appreciated by some of Africa's politicians (French
20/11/05).
It is noteworthy however that perceptions of China among
Africa's political leaders go beyond appreciation for 'no-strings' aid
and trade. China as 'alternative' political and economic model to
Western prescriptions appears to be a pervasive optic among African
politicians, intellectuals, civil society and media. While the end of
the Cold War brought welcome changes including the end of proxy wars
fought on Africa's soil and the liberation of Namibia and South Africa,
the unipolar world characterized by Western dominance that followed has
been the source of much discomfort for many African intellectuals and
political leaders. In this light, China's emergence as a major axis of
global power is often welcomed among African intellectuals who hope that
it may herald a return to global multi-polarity in which milieu Africa
and the developing countries will have a greater role on the global
stage than they currently do.
A Chinese model?
In a nuanced perspective on China, the senior leader of the Nigerian
legislature, Senate President Ken Nnamani, in a welcome address entitled
"China: A Partner and Example of Development and Democracy" during
President Hu's April visit to Nigeria, describes China's 'outstanding
(economic) performance exclusive of western democracy' as "the paradox
of development and democracy".
Nnamani’s comments highlight the increasingly common perception in
Africa of China as an alternate political and economic model to the
Washington Consensus. Since the mid-1980s, many African countries have
been compelled to adopt a series of 'Structural Adjustment', 'Economic
Recovery' and 'Poverty Reduction' programmes often under pressure from
Western donors and international financial institutions. From the early
1990s, demands by Western donors that African governments adopt economic
reforms prescribed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
have often been 'bundled' with so-called 'conditionalities' usually
consisting of demands for 'political reforms' such as political
liberalization, ending of one-party regimes, respect for human rights
etc. Environmental advocacy groups in Western countries often pressure
their governments to demand environmental audits and impact assessments
before funding new infrastructure and industrial projects in Africa.
When African post-colonial governments began moving towards one-party
states and 'African socialism' in the 1960s, they often proffered the
rationale that Western models of democracy were unsuited to Africa's
material conditions and to its history and cultures. Through the 1970s
and 1980s, the debate raged in Africa as to whether Western political
and economic models could be transported to non-Western societies,
whether capitalism or Soviet-style socialism was the better model for
Africa or whether African states could craft a 'Third Way' to nirvana.
The end of the Cold War and the apparent triumph of the Washington
Consensus led to a temporary cessation of the debate partly due to the
disillusionment and intellectual exhaustion of the African Left. When
donor conditionalities were introduced, some African governments
vigorously resisted the political conditionalities and argued that
Western democracy was unsuited to Africa's needs and would fuel ethnic
conflict and instability but their dissent was increasingly muted as aid
flows dried up.
Through the 1990s, it appeared that the debate had been settled for good
and that most Africans, at least implicitly, accepted the thesis that
political liberalization and structural adjustment would lead to
economic recovery in the short term and sustainable development in the
long term. By the turn of the millennium, virtually no African
government openly questioned the Washington Consensus or suggested
'African alternatives'.
China's emergence as a major economic power in the 1990s despite not
being a democracy or adopting economic policies typically recommended by
the IFIs has become a source of great interest for both Africa's rulers
and ruled. For some among Africa's contemporary rulers, China is living
proof of 'successful' alternatives to Western political and economic
models. The semi-colonial Western domination of pre-revolutionary China
is often cited as being analogous to Western colonialism in Africa in
the early-mid 20th century while China's status as a developing country
in the 1950s through the 1990s is also cited as co-terminous with
Africa's post-colonial experience. For many, China represents hope that
another world is possible in which bread comes before the freedom to vote.
Given the democratic reversals experienced in much of Africa from the
late 1990s onwards, there is a distinct possibility that some
authoritarian regimes in Africa will seek to utilize China's economic
success to rationalize avoiding further political liberalization and
genuine democratization. Human rights advocates and democratic actors in
Africa may increasingly find their traditional arguments that respect
for human rights and political liberalization will inexorably lead to
economic success challenged by some African governments pointing to
China as the poster-child for development sans democracy. A mid-term
prognosis could be some African governments invoking the 'China
paradigm' to justify the adoption of state-led economic policies coupled
with intensified political repression.
Virtually by stealth, the old debate about appropriate paths to Africa's
development has been re-ignited by China's emergence as a major global
power. The implications of this debate for advancing human rights and
democracy in Africa are critical. A failure to re-establish the primacy
and legitimacy of liberal democracy and strong human rights protections
among Africa's intellectuals, media and civil society as the most
appropriate path for Africa's development may ultimately lead to popular
disillusionment with Western-inspired political and economic
prescriptions that are perceived as unable to put bread in the mouths of
hungry infants while communist China becomes the workshop of the world.
More important than the desires of some African governments to return to
political illiberality is the danger of resurgence in the old,
anti-Western, anti-democratic tendency among Africa's intellectuals,
boosted by China's apparent success.
It is increasingly likely that a central challenge for civil society in
Africa in the next few years will be an effort to prevent democracy
reversal especially an 'intellectual rollback' to the 1970s. It may
become necessary to re-establish or re-validate across Africa the
legitimacy of democracy and human rights per se and also as the most
appropriate and effective path to Africa's development. Africa's human
rights advocates may be well served in this effort by projections that
India may eventually surpass China's economic progress, thanks at least
in part, to a freer political and intellectual culture. As the largest
democracy in the world with long standing ties to Africa, India's
economic progress in the last decade especially the exponential growth
of its ICT industries could serve as an 'alternate' model to China.
A human rights perspective
While China's rapidly expanding engagement in Africa is enthusiastically
welcomed by African governments and some African intellectuals, China's
relations with Africa's governments is often perceived among human
rights NGOs and Western commentators as increasingly problematic for
governance and human rights in Africa. China's increasing presence in
Africa has generated a flurry of Western media reportage and commentary,
often with graphic headlines, the prevailing note of which is that
Chinese trade, political and security cooperation may enable repressive
regimes in Africa to avoid even the relatively limited constraints on
their conduct imposed by Western donor conditionalities. Elements in
Africa's civil society are concerned about the potential implications of
China's relationship with African governments for the advancement of
human rights and democracy in Africa.
China-Africa security cooperation is particularly problematic.
Chinese-made weapons are often cheaper than Western equivalents and
China does not usually impose political, human rights or humanitarian
conditions in its arms sales.
The Nigerian government is increasingly turning to China for weapons to
deal with the worsening insurgency in the oil-rich Niger Delta. The
Nigerian air force purchased 12 Chinese-made versions of the upgraded
Mig 21 jet fighter; the navy has ordered patrol boats to secure the
swamps and creeks of the Niger Delta. Nigerian military officials have
made clear that they will increasingly turn to China for weapons to
quell the revolt in the Niger Delta which traditional Western suppliers
appear reluctant to provide.
In particular, China's role in the Sudan crisis, where it has supported
a military regime accused of perpetrating or at the very least
encouraging ethnic cleansing has cast a disturbing light on Chinese
engagement in Africa (Alden 2005). China bought 50 percent of Sudan's
oil exports in 2005, which presently accounts for 5 percent of China's
oil needs (Pan 2006). China is accused of blocking or diluting UN
Security Council efforts to effectively address the Sudanese
government’s role in the humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region.
Human rights concerns about China's renewed engagement in Africa must of
necessity extend beyond China-Africa inter-governmental relations.
Indeed, it may be argued that in the near future, the role of the
Chinese private sector in Africa may come to acquire as great a
significance, if not greater, than that of the Chinese government or its
state-owned enterprises in Africa. Some Chinese companies operating in
Africa have been accused by NGOs of violating employment and
environmental rights in the communities where they operate.
NGOs in Nigeria have accused the Chinese logging company WEMPCO of
discharged untreated effluents into the Cross River in southeastern
Nigeria, thereby damaging the health and livelihoods of local fisher
folk. The company is also accused of colluding with local officials and
law enforcement to suppress protests by the local community.
Western commentators contend that China’s lack of domestic political
criticism frees its government and companies in their business
endeavours in Africa from “reputational risks” and other pressures that
Western companies operating in Africa are routinely exposed to. Whereas
shareholders of Western companies may be cautious about investing in
state-led energy projects in African countries which rely on a
brutally-enforced stability, such issues have little visibility to the
Chinese public (Melville and Owen 2005). This presents significant
challenges for human rights advocates in Africa.
A common African response?
An effective common African response at the governmental level appears
unlikely for quite a while to come due to the structural weaknesses of
Africa’s regional organization, the African Union. China effectively
deals with Africa on its own terms via the China-Africa Cooperation
Forum which is convened by China. The AU, which should lead Africa’s
engagement with China, is enfeebled by the language and culture divides
which still plague Africa’s regional politics.
A common African response is more likely at the civil society level
where there is often a mutuality of concerns about human rights,
democracy, labour and trade issues. Enhanced Africa-wide networking to
develop common frameworks for responding to human rights and governance
issues arising from China’s role in Africa is imperative.
What can African civil society do?
Civil society in Africa is increasingly concerned with the role of China
in Africa especially the Chinese government’s relations with repressive
regimes in Sudan and Zimbabwe. As China becomes a major weapons supplier
to Africa's governments and Chinese energy and mining companies take up
substantial stake in resource extraction in Africa, these concerns can
only grow.
China's enhanced presence in Africa is primarily driven by economic
considerations; efforts to develop policy levers to prompt more
constructive Chinese engagement in Africa will have to proceed from
China's economic interests. Accordingly, African civil society cannot
adopt the conventional 'naming-and-shaming' tactics that have served it
well in addressing human rights abuses thus far; 'naming-and-shaming'
tactics can however be adapted to deal with Chinese companies operating
globally.
As a starting point, China studies in African universities and research
institutions should be encouraged by African governments, private sector
and civil society. In this respect, the pioneering introduction of
Chinese language studies at the Nnamdi Azikiwe University in Nigeria and
the University of Stellenbosch in South Africa are particularly
noteworthy developments which should be replicated elsewhere in Africa.
African civil society should bring pressure through the African Union
for a parallel civil society forum inclusive of business, labour and
consumer groups to be instituted at the biennial meetings of the
China-Africa Cooperation Forum. The parallel Civil Society Forum will
bring together non-governmental organisations from China and Africa to
enhance people-to-people relations, exchange of ideas and perspectives
and to lobby their respective governments to address the Social
Dimension of China-Africa relations.
African civil society should take advantage of Western concerns about
China’s expanding role in Africa through ‘coalitions of interest’ with
Western governments in raising concerns about governance and human
rights in African countries where the Chinese government is deeply
engaged with repressive regimes.
African NGOs can also work with Western NGO colleagues to mobilize
threats of mass boycotts of Chinese-made consumer goods to protest
China's arms exports to repressive governments in Africa.
The potential of violence directed at Chinese businesses and nationals
in Africa by rebel movements who regard China as an ally of the local
repressive regime is likely to compel China to re-examine its security
cooperation with African governments. It may be argued that an
'all-comers-served' approach to security cooperation with African
governments may not continue for much longer without significant cost to
China.
African civil society should seek to highlight to the Chinese government
that its activities in Africa cannot be entirely risk-free in the
absence of peace and stability which cannot be secured in the absence of
democracy and human rights. In particular, African NGOs can also
highlight to the Chinese government that unrestrained exports of light
arms exacerbate conflicts in Africa and worsen trafficking in small arms
which may well end up used against Chinese companies and nationals
operating in Africa. In the Beijing Declaration issued at the first
China-Africa Co-operation Forum in October 2000, the Chinese government
committed itself along with African governments to strengthen their
co-operation in stopping the illegal production, circulation and
trafficking of small arms and light weapons in Africa. African NGOs can
and should take China up on this voluntarily accepted commitment.
While the Chinese government may not have to pay much regard to domestic
public opinion, the Chinese government is historically very sensitive
about its international image. China’s abstention on a Security Council
vote on Darfur in early 2006 should be cause for some guarded optimism.
This suggests that China is not totally oblivious of potential harm to
its global reputation if it came to be perceived as the principal patron
and protector of Africa's tyrants.
After an initial phase of snapping up resource extraction concessions,
it is well nigh conceivable that China will be compelled by instability
and conflict in Africa to realize that its long term economic interests
are best served by promoting peace in Africa and that this is most
likely to come about by encouraging representative government in Africa
rather than supporting dictators. As Chinese investors move beyond
resource extraction to investments of a long-term nature, they will
increasingly mount pressure on their government to avoid actions or
policies likely to exacerbate instability or conflict.
In the long term, it is conceivable that greater internal political
liberalization within China will also result in less appetite for
supporting repressive regimes in Africa.
• Ndubisi Obiorah studied international law and human rights at Harvard
and Essex. He has been a visiting fellow and researcher at Harvard
University, the National Endowment for Democracy and Human Rights Watch.
He has served as a consultant to USAID and the International Centre for
the Legal Protection of Human Rights (INTERRIGHTS), London. He is
presently director of the Centre for Law and Social Action (CLASA) in
Lagos, Nigeria. CLASA, an independent, non-profit policy centre, brings
together scholars and activists for inter-disciplinary collaboration in
research and advocacy on governance, human development and social
policy. nobiorah at clasa.org
• This is a shortened version of an article by Ndubisi Obiorah. The full
version, including references, will be available in a forthcoming book
to be published in January by Fahamu and called ‘African perspectives on
China in Africa’. The full articles will also be made available as .PDF
files on the Pambazuka News website.
• Please send comments to editor at pambazuka.org or comment online at
www.pambazuka.org
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AFRICA AND CHINA: THEN AND NOW
Kwesi Kwaa Prah
It is hypocritical of Western states to be concerned about how China is
approaching Africa given their history of exploitative relations with
Africa, says Prof. Kwesi Kwaa Prah in this interview with Pambazuka
News. Kwaa Prah also argues that its futile for Africans to be pointing
fingers at the West or at China. “Africans have to organise their side
of the story as best as they can in their own interests,” he says.
Pambazuka News: One of the articles in your forthcoming book deals with
the earliest contact between China and Africa. Many people may not be
familiar with that history. Could you explain it briefly?
Kwesi Kwaa Prah: It goes back to the early 15th century when the famous
Chinese admiral Zheng He made seven epic journeys to various parts of
the world including Asia and Africa between 1405 and 1433. During the
course of these journeys he visited Africa. This was about 80 years
before Columbus so it goes very far back. It is even suggested that some
of the maps that Columbus used he borrowed or had antecedence in Chinese
global maps of that period.
Pambazuka News: And how did that history progress into China’s
relationship with Africa in terms of its engagement with newly
independent African states of the 50s and 60s?
Kwesi Kwaa Prah: Well, there is a hiatus, an enormous hiatus, because of
the distance and difficulty of communication and the colonial interlude
which both China and Africa encountered. China went through a cycle
which is not too different from the African cycle in terms of its
encounter with the West and colonialism, from the period of the opium
wars and the boxer rebellion, the period of about a half century which
ended in 1902-03. And then there was the period before China become a
republic in 1912; and the era of the warlords post 1912 to the
beginnings of the Chinese revolution in the early 20s and then on from
the early 20s to 1948 when China, in the words of Mao Tse Tsung, “stood
up” in 1949.
Now after that China’s contact with the rest of the world especially
Africa and Asia started in earnest. By the time of the Bandung
conference in 1955 China’s beginnings of real contact with Africa was in
the making and I’m talking about Africa proper, I’m talking about
sub-saharan Africa, non-Arab Africa and that is because China’s
relations with the Arab world were different and of an earlier period
and so and so forth, but contact with Africa proper, black Africa or
sub-Saharan Africa, starts in the late 50s in earnest and the rest is
history.
Pambazuka News: So that’s a period spanning several hundred years and
the question then arises in terms of how that influenced China’s current
approach to Africa and policy as outlined in the January policy paper
released by the Chinese government.
Kwesi Kwaa Prah: Yes, well, you’ll recall that there was a stage when
Zhou Enlai arrived soon after or in the decade of African independence
in the 1960s and visited East Africa and made the statement that Africa
is “ripe for revolution”. China supported the African liberation
movements but also in sharp rivalry with the Soviet Union and so the
position China took often was not beyond consideration of its own
tussles with the Soviet Union.
By and large China has been consistent in the sense that it has tried to
help African states with infrastructure and at fairly low rates. This
was particularly the case in the first two decades of independence
before the cultural revolution in China itself. China did a lot to build
roads and railways, to support African infrastructure and industrial
plans, at a point in history when China itself was economically fairly
weak.
Pambazuka News: Many have argued that the engagement with Africa in the
1950s and 1960s was more of an ideological outlook towards Africa, but
that the current realities in an era of globalisation mean that China’s
interest in Africa is solely commercially driven.
Kwesi Kwaa Prah: I wouldn’t put it in such polarised terms that at one
pole it is ideological and at the other end of the scale its all
economic. I think what one can say is that it was more preponderantly
articulated and expressed in ideological terms in the earlier period. It
had also economic dimensions but this was hardly pronounced. Now it is
distinctly more pronounced as China tries to search for markets and also
to search for raw materials, in this period that is.
Pambazuka News: So do you see that as a negative and positive engagement?
Well, I don’t see it in positive or negative terms in the way that lots
of people want to discuss the issues at this present time. China wants
to pursue policies that are in its best interests and what we have to do
in Africa is also to trade and pursue polices that are in our own
interests. It’s as simple as that – all states do that.
What I find a bit reprehensible is the tendency of certain Western
voices to start making obstructionist [statements] or start raising
concerns about China’s attempt to get into the African market because it
is a bit hypocritical for Western states to be concerned about how China
is approaching Africa when they have had centuries of relations with
Africa starting with slavery for centuries and continuing to the present
day with exploitation and cheating with subsidies which help the
European economic community to ridiculous extents that a cow in the
European community gets a subsidy of $2 a day and 60 percent of Africa
doesn’t get that. So we ask ourselves what is this concern: It is not
real concern, it is jealousy and rivalry about Chinese inroads into Africa.
That is not to excuse the way China is also approaching Africa. China is
obviously also approaching Africa from its own interests or as it
perceives its interests and some of this interest is not necessary in
the interests of Africa. This is something that Africa has to work out.
It is futile for Africans to be pointing fingers wether at the West or
at China. Africans have to organise their side of the story as best as
they can in their own interests.
Pambazuka News: How should Africa go about doing that? What are some of
the policy responses that are needed on the African continent?
Kwesi Kwaa Prah: Well, for a start I don’t think Africa really has any
chance of doing anything in this present world without unity. That is
the bottom line. Africans have to unite. Africans divided as they are
have no platform for bargaining with anybody. If Africa was united today
it would be a world power, poor as it is, and it would be capable of
dealing with China on its own terms or with the West on its own terms.
Unity is the basic pre-requisite for African advancement and for Africa
to be able to bargain with China or anybody else.
Pambazuka News: One of the articles in your book, authored by yourself,
is entitled ‘Nationalism, Revolution and Economic Transformation in
China: Any Lessons for Africa?’ What does China’s example offer for Africa?
Kwesi Kwaa Prah: Well, you have to read my book first, that is for a start.
Pambazuka News: Give us a taster?
Kwesi Kwaa Prah: Well, I think one of the things we have to learn is
that advancement in our time must be home grown. Africans have to learn
to pull themselves up by themselves, one. Two, this process has to be
based on their own cultural pre-requisites. It is not possible to
develop Africa grounded in languages like English, French or Portuguese
or Arabic for that matter. Africans have to realise that the cultural
base for development has to be their own. That is not to say they should
not learn other languages, no, but they must make their languages the
centre of all the development efforts that they make.
Pambazuka News: China has cultural agreements with 42 African countries
and 65 cultural exchange programmes in Africa. It has offered
scholarships to 10 000 students and seconded more than 400 Chinese
professors to African universities. Much of your work has been in the
field of language and culture so what would you say are some of the
issues raised by China’s cultural involvement in Africa?
Kwesi Kwaa Prah: We still have to see a lot of this you know. These are
projected plans, this is what they would want to do and it is very
fresh. I don’t think it has left the drawing board yet and I don’t think
the implementation is with us as of now. We will have to see. I would
see we will have to just wait and see how it pans out and how it is
implemented. It is to early day to make announcements about these plans.
Pambazuka News: When is the book due out and where can people get it from?
Kwesi Kwaa Prah: Well, I expect that the book should be out early next
year, that is 2007. It should be available through the African Books
Collective and bookshops in South Africa and also through the web. If
you enter Casas you should be able to get the details.
• Interview conducted by Patrick Burnett, Fahamu
• Prof. Kwesi Kwaa Prah is director of The Centre for Advanced Studies
of African Society (Casas), which is based in Cape Town. Casas was
established in 1997 as a Pan-African centre for creating research
networks in Africa and its Diaspora. Professor Kwa Parah is the editor
of a forthcoming book Afro-Chinese Relations: Past, Present and the
Future. Visit http://www.casas.co.za for more information.
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USEFUL LINKS AND RESOURCES
The Editors
OFFICIAL CHINA WEBSITES
Peoples Daily online in English
http://english.people.com.cn/
Official website of China-Africa summit
http://english.focacsummit.org/
Xinhua News Agency website in English
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
http://www.chinese-embassy.org.za/
chinese embassy in South Africa
UNOFFICIAL AND SEMI-OFFICIAL SITES
‘Afroshanghai.com: the African community in Shanghai and China’
Shanghai-based website anbd blog for African and Afro-American expats in
China.
http://www.afroshanghai.com/
http://chinadigitaltimes.net
‘a collaborative news website covering China's social and political
transition and its emerging role in the world. ...Our goal is to harness
the distributive power of the Internet to advance the world's
understanding of China...China's democratic transition, sustainable
development and peaceful emergence in the global community’. Run by the
Berkeley China Internet Project in the Graduate School of Journalism at
the University of California, Berkeley.
China Dialogue: China and the world discuss the environment’
Edited by Isabel Hilton and based in London and Beijing it describes
itself as ‘the world’s first fully bilingual website devoted to the
environment’. With a joint British-Chinese board. it is part-financed by
the UK Government as part a series of ‘sustainable development
dialogues’[see
]http://www.sustainable-development.gov.uk/international/dialogues/]
http://www.chinadialogue.net/
BUSINESS AND ECONOMY
‘China Business’ - the special China section of the Hong Kong-based Asia
Times Online
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business.html
Business Report - South Africa.
http://www.busrep.co.za/
THINKTANKS AND NEWS SERVICES
African Geopolitics; ‘world leaders and international experts express
their views on African affairs’
‘the first bilingual quarterly on African affairs’
http://www.african-geopolitics.org/home_english.htm
also http://www.african-geopolitics.org/home_french.htm
The Jamestown Foundation. ‘mission is to inform and educate policy
makers and the broader policy community about events and trends in those
societies which are strategically or tactically important to the United
States and which frequently restrict access to such information’.
http://www.jamestown.org/
Africa Confidential is one of the longest-established specialist
publications on Africa, with a considerable reputation for being first
with the in depth news on significant political, economic and security
developments across the continent.
...all our contributors write for us on the basis of strict anonymity, a
principle that was established from the outset in 1960 to ensure
writers’ personal safety in the turbulent, early years of post-colonial
African independence. Hence the newsletter’s title’.
http://www.africa-confidential.com/index.aspx?pageid=3
Open Democracy: ‘openDemocracy is the leading independent website on
global current affairs...offering stimulating, critical analysis,
promoting dialogue and debate on issues of global importance and linking
citizens from around the world...openDemocracy is committed to human
rights and democracy’.
http://www.opendemocracy.net/home/index.jsp
CAMPAIGNS AND NGOs
‘Global Witness campaigns to achieve real change by challenging
established thinking on seemingly intractable global issues. We work to
highlight the link between the exploitation of natural resources and
human rights abuses, particularly where the resources such as timber,
diamonds and oil are used to fund and perpetuate conflict and corruption’.
http://www.globalwitness.org/
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative [EITI]
The EITI supports improved governance in resource-rich countries through
the full publication and verification of company payments and government
revenues from oil, gas and mining.
campaigns.
http://www.eitransparency.org/
Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people
around the world.
We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold
political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime,
and to bring offenders to justice.
http://www.hrw.org/
Friends of the Earth defends the planet and champions a healthy and just
world. Active in 70 countries, Friends of the Earth has the world's
largest network of environmental groups.
http://www.foe.org/
Global Timber.‘Provides information and statistics on the global trade
in wood-based products, especially that from Africa and East Asia [and]
insights into trade in Illegal Timber particularly in relation to
importing countries such as Japan, the UK, and the USA’.
http://www.globaltimber.org.uk/
Reuters Foundation - alerting humanitarians to emergencies.
http://www.alertnet.org/
SPECIAL ISSUES
‘China in Africa’
Special issue of South African Journal of International Affairs Vol 13
No.1 Summer-Autumn 2006
ISSN: 1022-0461
see also the Institute’s website at www.saiia.org.za
‘The New Sinosphere - China in Africa’
ed Leni Wild and David Mepham
Institute for Public Policy Research
London 2006 £9.95
ISBN 1 86030 302 1
see also the IPPR website at www.ippr.org
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4 Podcasts
AFRICA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA
Professor Kwesi Kwaa Prah
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/broadcasts/index.php
Professor Kwesi Kwaa Prah speaks to Pambazuka News about the history of
Chinese engagement in Africa and theorises about what is to come. This
accompanies our special issue exploring China's relationship with
Africa. Professor Kwaa Prah is about to release a book entitled:
"Afro-Chinese relations: Past, Present and the Future". He is based at
the Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society. The music in this
podcast is by Freddy Macha
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