[A-List] Briefing: Najaf Truce - Or Trap? US Broke Ceasefire Immediately

[Richard Menec]

by
Maya Evans
Milan Rai

*********

TRUCE OR TRAP?

US Broke Ceasefire Immediately:
'Truce' Merely A Stage In The Conflict
JNV Anti-War Briefing 63 (31 Aug. 2004)

BEFORE THE INK WAS DRY
The Najaf ceasefire did not resolve the conflict in Najaf. Before the ink
was even dry on the agreement signed by militant Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr
and the supreme Shia religious leader Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the
United States and its client forces were breaking the terms of the truce. In
particular, US Marines refused to withdraw from Najaf, as required by the
Sistani peace deal. Muqtada al-Sadr may wish to move the conflict over the
occupation to the political sphere, but the US and the Allawi do not.

US FRUSTRATION
Ayatollah al-Sistani's return to Najaf after a strange absence (see JNV
Briefing 64 The Sistani Puzzle) was followed by a 24-hour ceasefire and the
signing of a peace deal that allowed al-Sadr's Mehdi Army militia an
'honourable' (and safe) withdrawal from the holy Imam Ali shrine, without
the use of force.

'The governor of Najaf, Adnan al-Zurufi, said the Ayatollah's four-part
formula provided for Najaf and Kufa to be free of all "weapons and militia",
for "foreign forces" to leave both cities, for Iraqi civilians to be
compensated for their losses during the fighting and for voter records to be
compiled for the general election in January.' (Independent, 27 August 2004,
p. 3) Note this interesting last point, a shared Shia concern.

'A disenchanted government minister said: "Our past mistakes have turned Mr
Sadr into a player. He still has his army, but he is now a political problem
and not just a military one. And he won't be going away soon. With every
crisis he emerges on top and stronger than before." ' (Guardian, 28 Aug., p.
17) 'Mr Sadr is fortunate in his enemies,' noted the FT. (FT, 28 Aug., p.
10)

'US commanders on the ground expressed frustration yesterday that they had
been "close to being in a position to finish this." (FT, 28 Aug., p. 10) The
real threat to US-Shia relations now is not the militancy of the al-Sadr
movement (al-Sadr is turning to politics), but the determination of the US
and the Allawi government to reverse their defeat.

THE PEACE DEAL - US WITHDRAWAL?
The Washington Post reported that when the Mehdi Army withdrew, 'Four
battalions of Iraqi security forces received tea and water from residents as
they arrived in the city center with the handful of American advisers who
had trained them. "People received us clapping, and by the will of God we
will replace the U.S. Army," said Sgt. Sabah Muhsin Sarhan of the 2nd
Battalion of the Iraqi Intervention Force, the name for the anti-insurgency
force in the new army. "Our job is to protect our country, and we don't want
the foreigners. We don't want the Jews to control us." ' (28 Aug., p. A01)
This is one of Washington's 'allies' in Iraq.

Sgt. Sarhan did not get his wish. The Post reported, 'The particulars of the
Najaf deal are especially troubling to U.S. military strategists. It calls
for the U.S. military and anti-U.S. militias to stay out of the city. The
provision will have a disproportionate impact on U.S. forces, which tend to
move in large, visible units whereas militiamen can simply take a minibus in
and out of the city.' (Washington Post, 28 Aug., p. A01)

Solution? Break the terms of the truce. 'The senior [Iraqi] government
official said a date has not been set for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Najaf. "It is contingent upon Najaf becoming a safe place, free of
militants," the official said. "If the standoff is resolved and the
militants leave Najaf, then the presence of foreign forces in Najaf will not
be necessary." ' The militants then left. 'U.S. commanders in the city said
Thursday night that they had not received orders to withdraw.' (Post, 27
Aug., p. A01)

'The U.S. military, which ceased offensive operations on Thursday because of
the peace talks, did not withdraw from positions inside Najaf after the deal
was announced. [Iraqi minister Qasim] Dawood said U.S. forces would be
instructed to "draw back" by the interim prime minister, Ayad Allawi, once
Sadr's militia departs.' (Washington Post, 27 Aug., p. A01)

THE US REFUSES TO WITHDRAW
Some chance. Allawi is not in charge. The BBC reported on 28 Aug., 'American
troops are adopting a lower profile, but are still patrolling some areas' of
Najaf - supposedly 'at the request of the Iraqi interim government.' (28
Aug., <http://tinyurl.com/4aoux>)

As the Telegraph noted, it 'was doubtful that American commanders would give
up hard-fought ground without dramatic and concrete concessions from the
30-year-old cleric.' (Telegraph, 27 Aug., p. 1)

'United States forces will remain in Najaf until the interim Iraqi Prime
Minister, Iyad Allawi, judges that control of the city can safely be handed
over in its entirety to the country's own police and security forces, senior
American officials said yesterday. While the formula promoted by the Grand
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani for ending three bloody weeks of fighting in Najaf
provides for the withdrawal of foreign forces, US Marines and cavalry will
keep their tanks, armoured vehicles and troops in defensive positions until
Iraqi security forces are fully ready to take over.' (Independent on Sunday,
29 Aug., p. 18) When Hell freezes over.

Most early reports of the peace deal only mentioned requiring a US
withdrawal from Najaf. The Independent (27 Aug., p. 3) and later reports in
the FT (28 Aug., p. 5; 30 Aug., p. 7) and the Guardian (28 Aug., p. 2) were
firm that the US withdrawal applied to both Najaf and the nearby city of
Kufa (where al-Sadr has his home). There have been no reports from Kufa, but
it is likely the US broke the terms of the truce there also.

After Iraqi forces took over Najaf, 'Both al-Sistani and al-Sadr supporters
said they were angry at Iraqi police for arresting Mahdi Army members even
though the fighters got tacit amnesty under the peace plan. (Knight Ridder,
27 Aug., <http://tinyurl.com/5ldq3>)

The same day, 'While being interviewed by The Observer, a Mahdi fighter
spotted a group of officers from the new Iraqi police force approaching in
contravention of the peace deal. Muttering "traitors", he slid his bolt on
his weapon while his friend clipped a belt into a heavier automatic. Within
moments, a full-sale firefight broke out. Four more men, including three
civilians, were being carried away, leaving trails of fresh blood in Najaf's
streets'. (Observer, 29 Aug., p. 20)

Such events tailed off, due either to police restraint or (more probably)
restraint on the part of the Mehdi Army.

THE PEACE DEAL - DISARMAMENT?
'Fighters loyal to Mr Sadr would leave the shrine by 10.00am today and
receive an amnesty if they laid down arms', it was said. (FT, 27 Aug., p. 1)

Then Sayyed Immad Mohamed Kalantal, mutual relation of al-Sistani and
al-Sadr and an intermediary in their peace negotiations, revealed that the
Mehdi Army militia were allowed to retain their weapons under a secret
provision of the truce, 'including AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenade
launchers'. 'Kalantal said the clause had been agreed by Iyad Allawi, the
Iraqi prime minister.' (Sunday Times, 29 Aug., p. 23)

Regardless of the provisions of the Najaf deal, more conflict is on the way,
especially over the Mehdi Army's rocket-propelled grenades and mortar
launchers. Disarmament of militias was identified as a key issue in Regime
Unchanged.

THE PEACE DEAL - IMMUNITY FOR AL-SADR?
Several newspapers reported that, 'Kasim Daoud, minister of state, said Mr
Sadr would not face arrest.' (FT, 27 Aug., p. 1) Actually, Daoud said, 'He
is as free as any Iraqi citizen to do whatever he would like in Iraq.'
(Washington Post, 27 Aug., p. A01) Daoud did not say whether al-Sadr might
be arrested later for the death of a rival Shia cleric. Apparently, 'Mr
Allawi, the prime minister, has assured Mr Sadr that his arrest will not be
expedited', but 'there are no guarantees beyond the life of the interim
government, which will cease to exist after the first round of national
elections' due in January. (Guardian, 28 Aug., p. 17) The 'guarantee' has a
shorter lifespan than this.

'U.S. officials have long argued that the solution to the Sadr problem has
to originate with Iraqis. Their calculation is that the U.S. position in
Iraq would not be helped by having U.S. troops kill the rebel cleric. "At
some point the Iraqis themselves will take Sadr out - like the Colombians
taking out drug lords with U.S. in the background," said a Pentagon
official.' (Washington Post, 28 Aug., p. A01)

Asked if al-Sadr would be allowed to enter the Imam Ali shrine again, Daoud
replied ambiguously: 'Muqtada al-Sadr is like any other Iraqi citizen. He
has duties and he has rights.' (KR, 28 Aug., <http://tinyurl.com/4xhb4>)

THE TRUCE TRAP
The US started the latest round of violence in Najaf by breaking the terms
of the 4 June truce, by entering an area they had promised to stay out of,
and attempting to raid al-Sadr's house in Kufa. The US has ended the latest
round of violence by immediately violating the truce they had just agreed
to, by entering and remaining in areas of Najaf and Kufa they had promised
to withdraw from. They didn't wait eight weeks to break the truce this time.

If al-Sadr militants respond to these US truce violations with force, we may
expect official and media condemnation of the 'lawless and violent
terrorists' who just will not live up to their end of any bargain.

Al-Sadr's actual response to the US provocations? A national ceasefire. 'Due
to the situation in Najaf and the provinces... we call on all members of the
Mahdi army to cease fire unless in self-defence, and to be patient until the
political programme which Sar's followers are planning is revealed,' said a
senior al-Sadr aide, Sheikh Ali Smeissim. (Telegraph, 31 Aug., p. 12)

And the US-Shia conflict moved on to Sadr City in Baghdad.

-- 
Milan Rai
Justice Not Vengeance
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