[A-List] Russia/US alliance

[Sabri Oncu]

Lexington

Reaching out to Vladimir

May 23rd 2002
From The Economist print edition

Why does Russia matter so much to George Bush?

WHEN the cold war ended (which, strangely enough, was a decade
ago, not this week), Russia seemed relevant to America only
because it had nuclear weapons. As that arsenal was reduced,
Russia's importance would surely shrink too. After all, Russia
was only as rich as Portugal. Without nukes, that fact would
tell. While Russia would plainly matter more than Portugal to
America's geostrategists—its regional interests stretch from the
Baltic to the Bering Strait, from sea to frozen sea—it would
become a second- or even third-order country.

It would be replaced, at least from America's point of view, by
rising China and rich Europe. The challenge of China was obvious
to all, and remains so. But to some of the camp-followers of the
older George Bush, the opportunity for Europe was no less
striking. With its shared democratic values, an even larger
economy (the single market opened in 1993) and, with luck, a
single foreign policy, Europe, led by Germany, could become the
most important partner in the New World Order.

To begin with, the younger George Bush seemed to accept parts of
that doctrine: his advisers talked about Russia only in nuclear
terms. Not any longer. When he signs the three-page Treaty of
Moscow at the Kremlin on May 24th, it will be his fifth
get-together with Vladimir Putin in less than 12 months. Mr Bush
will spend three days in Russia, but less than a day each in
Germany and France, whose leaders he will be meeting for the
first time on home soil. With Vladimir, Mr Bush has famously
looked into the man's soul; by contrast, he has difficulty even
looking Gerhard and Jacques in the eye.

With the exception of Tony Blair, whom Mr Bush seems to think of
as an honorary American, the Europeans often seem like
wallflowers at the Kremlin ball. America's relations with Russia
are better than at any time since the end of the second world war
and are improving, while transatlantic relations are probably as
bad as they have ever been. How did this happen?

One commonly espoused view in the American media—that Russia now
loves America more than Europe does—does not make sense. Yes, Mr
Bush was greeted in Berlin, the city of John Kennedy's "Ich bin
ein Berliner", by angry demonstrators. But the only reason why
they will not turn up in Moscow is because of Mr Putin's more
heavy-handed security services. Yes, the elites of Germany,
France and every other European country harbour plenty of
anti-American sentiments: they have sneered at Mr Bush's
"unilateralist overdrive" and fumed at America's backing for
Ariel Sharon. But none of them can hold a candle to Russia when
it comes to being rude about American foreign policy—or, for that
matter, when it comes to anti-Semitism.

Similarly, Mr Bush's warmer feelings for Mr Putin cannot be
explained solely by the latter's great shift westwards after
September 11th. Mr Putin certainly won points by refusing to kick
up a fuss about American bases in Central Asia or Mr Bush's
withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. But those
perfidious Germans and French also rallied round America,
invoking for the first time Article 5 of the NATO treaty (on
mutual self-defence) and stepping up intelligence co-operation.

Indeed, the difference in warmth has largely been on America's
side. The administration made relatively little of NATO's offer
of military help in Afghanistan, though it would have been easy
to accept; in contrast, Mr Bush happily agreed to Mr Putin's
demand to enshrine the nuclear-arms reductions in a verifiable
treaty, casually abandoning his strong preference for a
gentleman's agreement by handshake. Which leads to an
uncomfortable conclusion: that Mr Bush's people really do think
Russia has more to offer America than any other country.


Russia's big attractions

In the world after September 11th, Mr Putin has three reasons to
command Mr Bush's attention that Western Europe (often
mercifully) cannot match. First and most important is nuclear
security. This reflects Russia's weakness. The biggest danger
facing the United States is the threat that terrorists will steal
weapons-grade plutonium, or radiological material for a dirty
bomb. Russia is the most likely source. Of course, the new
missile treaty should reduce that threat—but only a little and
over ten years. For the foreseeable future, America must rely on
the Russians to guard thousands of warheads—and, if Russia cannot
guarantee that on its own, America will have to help. In
contrast, Mr Bush can take the safety of French nuclear weapons
for granted.

Second, Russia is the world's third-largest oil producer and has
the world's largest gas reserves. It is the country best able to
reduce America's dependence on oil from the Gulf. If (a big if)
it can increase oil output at current rates for five years, it
might even outstrip Saudi Arabia as an oil exporter. That would
increase America's freedom of action in the Middle East
(something conservatives in America are whispering about).

Third, Russia is needed in the war against al-Qaeda. Russia has
closer ties with all the "axis of evil" countries than Europe, so
it is a better conduit for diplomatic pressure. And although the
Europeans can be relied upon (more or less) to do what America
wants in the war on al-Qaeda, Russia cannot, quite. In Iran, for
instance, it is helping to build a nuclear reactor. Left to
itself, it might provide Iran (which it regards as a responsible
Central Asian power) with nuclear fuel, not too many questions
asked. In exchange for closer ties with America, though, it might
impose stricter controls on fuel supplies.

This new appreciation of Russia is thus only partly a compliment
to Mr Putin. It also reflects Russia's shortcomings and America's
frustration with the Europeans. A little opportunism on Mr Bush's
part in his dealings with Russia certainly makes sense. But
longer term alliances are based on trust—swapping intelligence
and so on. Those are things that those neglected Europeans do
without bidding, let alone treaties.

Full at:
http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_ID=1143359