[A-List] US imperialism: Central Asia

[Keaney Michael]

Threat of civil wars looms in Azerbaijan and Georgia
By Hooman Peimani
Asia Times, May 10 2002

As a land-link between Asia and Europe, the Caucasus has been unstable
for more than a decade. The three Caucasian states of Azerbaijan,
Armenia and Georgia gained independence when the Soviet Union
disintegrated in 1991. They have since experienced instability in one
form or another, including civil wars in Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Ceasefire agreements ended those conflicts in 1993 and 1994,
respectively, but left their root causes intact. In the absence of peace
agreements, the persistence of unsettled issues has frustrated both
their governments and their populations. They have suffered not only
from the civil wars themselves, but also from the existing
no-war-no-peace state of affairs, an unpredictable situation
discouraging economic activity and preventing normal life.

Against this background, certain factors have created an environment
conducive to the resumption of civil war in both countries in the near
future. They include the worsening economic situation, the expansion of
social discontent with the status quo, the growing opposition to the
governments and the growing inter-elite conflict. A new round of civil
war will not only engulf Azerbaijan and Georgia in instability, but
could potentially develop into bloody regional and international
conflicts.

Instability in the form of civil war began in the Caucasus in the last
years of the Soviet Union. In 1988, Azerbaijan's Armenian-dominated
enclave of Nagorno Karabakh sought unification with neighboring Armenia.
This development provoked a civil war between the Azeris and the
Karabakhi Armenians and dragged Armenia into the hostility in support of
its ethnic kin. The civil war outlived the Soviet Union and continued
when Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia emerged as independent states.

In the post-Soviet era, the removal of communism as the dominant
ideology encouraged the eruption of Armenian and Azeri nationalism,
which added fuel to the conflict. After six years of devastating war, a
ceasefire agreement ended the conflict in 1994 when the Karabakhi
Armenians extended their control over the entire enclave, the Lachin
Passage (a land linking the enclave to Armenia) and large parts of
western Azerbaijan. The ceasefire stopped the civil war, but did not
address the belligerents' demands.

The following no-war no-peace situation has been dissatisfactory for
both sides. Azerbaijan has since lost about 20 percent of its territory
to Karabakhi control. About a million Azeri inhabitants of the occupied
territory have become refugees inside Azerbaijan. Unsurprisingly, they
have become firm supporters of a military solution to regain the lost
territory, a solution backed by most of the Azeris feeling humiliated by
the Armenians. The defeated Azeri government has not accepted the status
quo. Nor have the Karabakhis. They have run their territory as an
independent state, but its independence has not been recognized by any
state.

To avoid the internationalization of the conflict and the resumption of
civil war, the Armenian government and its Karabakhi counterpart have
not sought unification, even though they are connected to each other
through various economic, political and military ties. The uncertain
status of the enclave has prevented its economic growth despite
impressive efforts in that regard. The unsatisfactory and fragile status
quo has created grounds for the resumption of civil war.

In the case of Georgia, civil war began right after its independence.
Its two large ethnic minorities, the Abkhaz and the Ossetians, also
declared independence for their respective regions, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Those declarations triggered a civil war for which the Georgian
government was totally unprepared. It lasted until 1993 when a ceasefire
ended the conflict, but it did not lead to the conclusion of a peace
treaty to settle the dispute once and for all.

The exhausted Georgian government had to accept the ceasefire when the
separatist forces secured their total control over their breakaway
regions. The latter have since run their regions as independent states,
although no state has accepted their independence. The civil war forced
300,000 Georgians to flee from the rebellious regions to other parts of
Georgia where they have since lived as refugees. As in the case of
Azerbaijan, these refugees have become outspoken proponents of war to
end separatism in their favor. The Georgian troops and the separatist
forces have both violated ceasefires on numerous occasions to test each
other's resolve and preparedness and/or to extract concessions from each
other.

The unsettled ethnic conflicts in Georgia and Azerbaijan have frustrated
both their governments and their separatist forces. The failure of all
efforts by various mediators - namely the United Nations, the European
Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Russia
and the United States - to find peaceful settlements to those conflicts
has exhausted all the interested parties. It has also discredited
peaceful means toward those ends.

No wonder, then, that there have been voices of discontent demanding a
military solution to change the status quo. As the humiliated parties to
the conflicts, the Azeri and Georgian governments have threatened to use
force to regain control over their breakaway regions, although there is
no realistic ground for their success in any future military
confrontation. However, popular pressure to change the status quo and,
in particular, to enable the refugees to return home could force their
unstable and unpopular governments to resort to war, if only to appease
their dissatisfied people. Since last year, the growing number of bloody
skirmishes between pro-government and separatist forces along the
ceasefire line in Georgia has increased the possibility of this
scenario.

In the absence of peaceful settlements to the prolonged conflicts in
Georgia and Azerbaijan, the resumption of civil war will be a
predictable end to the deadlocked situation. In such a case, the
hostility will not be confined to the two countries only. Armenia, Iran,
Russia, Turkey and the United States have ties with and commitments to
the governments and/or separatist forces, apart from their economic and
political stakes in the Caucasus. Those realities will make it
difficult, if not impossible, for them to remain indifferent to the
outbreak of civil war in the Caucasus.

As neighboring countries, Armenia, Iran, Russia and Turkey would also be
concerned about the spillover of the civil wars into their countries,
which are linked to the Caucasus through a variety of ethnic,
linguistic, geographical, historical, and religious ties. Thus, economic
interests, geographical realities, political considerations, security
imperatives and natural ties could drag the five mentioned regional and
non-regional countries into the Georgian and Azeri civil wars.
Hopefully, the predictably dire consequences of such a scenario for the
Caucasus, its neighboring regions and world peace as a whole should
create an additional incentive for all the interested parties to find
peaceful settlements to the prolonged ethnic conflicts in Georgia and
Azerbaijan.

Dr Hooman Peimani works as an independent consultant with international
organizations in Geneva and does research in international relations.