From a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Thu Nov 1 05:58:32 2001 From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2001 14:58:32 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Mission to expel Message-ID: Wholly consistent with the Birt/Dyke policy regarding news and current affairs, as evidenced by the output of BBC World... Documentary department jobs slashed Jason Deans The Guardian, Thursday November 1, 2001 The BBC is axing 129 programme-making posts in its factual and learning department. The long-anticipated cuts will fall mainly in London, but BBC production staff in Manchester will also be affected. Management jobs in Birmingham will also go, but the brunt of the losses will be in London. The factual and learning department makes general documentaries and arts programmes. Shows made by the department include Timewatch, Omnibus, Airport and When Louis Met.... BBC factual and learning staff, who have been waiting for months to hear about their fate, are to be told about the cuts this morning. The BBC was originally planning to introduce the cuts in the summer. But the announcement was delayed because it was feared news of documentary and arts programme-makers getting P45s might send the wrong signal to the culture secretary, Tessa Jowell, while she was deciding whether to give the go-ahead for the BBC's proposed new digital TV services. Full article at: http://media.guardian.co.uk/broadcast/story/0,7493,584689,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Thu Nov 1 06:27:42 2001 From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2001 15:27:42 +0200 Subject: [A-List] The Guardian Message-ID: Over on PEN-L we've had a debate (of sorts) regarding the role of the UK media in the great scheme of things. The Guardian has a reputation as an outlet of liberal/left opinion, and, true enough, you can find occasional voices of reason there, such as Paul Foot, Gary Younge, Melissa Benn, Seumas Milne and Larry Elliott. Tory Geoffrey Wheatcroft also makes regular, readable and interesting contributions, tellingly critical of the status quo. Even John Pilger gets a look-in occasionally. But for every one of these there is a multitude of Blairites who can be relied upon to relay the true thinking of the UK permanent government and its natural party, New Labour. Thus the article below. Anyone watching BBC World last night would never have known of Blair's embarrassment, although his discomfort was plainly visible (arms flailing manically in frenzied gestures of conciliation). News domestic to Britain requires a more sophisticated gloss, however, and this is it -- a farrago of propaganda and disinformation aimed at discrediting the very person/regime that, 24 hours earlier, was so crucial to *Blair's* strategy. Now it can be written off as the contradiction "at the heart of Bush's worldwide war". Never mind that Syria, like Iraq, has one of the most religiously pluralistic regimes in the region, unlike, say, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, allies of the west. Syria and Iran are, of course, heavily implicated in the 1988 Lockerbie disaster, but their cooperation was needed for Desert Storm in 1991 so Colonel Gaddafi was wheeled out to serve as the convenient whipping boy. And on it goes... How Blair's Syria gamble failed Attempt to rein in 'rogue state' proves disastrous Ewen MacAskill and Patrick Wintour in Damascus Thursday November 1, 2001 The Guardian Tony Blair visited the tomb said to contain the head of John the Baptist which is housed in the main mosque of Damascus's Old City. He might look back on it as an omen: hours later it was Mr Blair's head that was being served up on a plate. Downing Street officials had not expected much in the way of results from Mr Blair's first meeting with the young Syrian leader, Bashar al-Assad. But they did not anticipate that Mr Assad would reject Mr Blair's overtures in such a public and abrupt way. Mr Assad, dispensing with the usual diplomatic niceties, used a joint press conference to rebuff Mr Blair over the bombing of Afghanistan and Syria's policy of providing a haven to anti-Israeli groups classified by both the US and Britain as terrorists. Diplomatically, it was a disaster. Mr Blair has not looked as uncomfortable in the presence of a foreign leader since an outburst on Chechnya by the Russian leader, Vladimir Putin, during a joint press conference in London last year. Both Downing Street and the Foreign Office knew beforehand that Mr Blair was taking a risk in going to Syria, a country that is a dictatorship with an abysmal human rights record, and which is still engaged in fighting Israel by proxy. The decision was influenced mainly by a trip made to Syria a fortnight ago by Lord Powell, Lady Thatcher's former foreign affairs adviser. The recommendation to the prime minister was that Syria was ready to come in from the cold and that he should go. It now looks a blunder. The Syria trip joins the list of growing diplomatic setbacks since Mr Blair and the foreign secretary, Jack Straw, embarked on a series of whirlwind tours after the September 11 attacks. Mr Straw ran into trouble in Iran and Israel and Mr Blair was snubbed by Saudi Arabia two weeks ago. Mr Blair might have hoped for better from Mr Assad, who was being educated in Britain last year when his father died and he was called home to take over, and whose wife is British. But Syria represents the contradiction at the heart of George Bush's worldwide war against terrorism. Syria provides a home and cash for groups such as Hizbullah, one of the most disciplined and powerful groups of fighters in the Middle East, which forced Israel to leave the Lebanon and which continues to snipe at Israel along its border. Until this year Damascus had also been the headquarters of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and still provides a haven for its members. The PFLP assassinated an Israeli cabinet minister a fortnight ago. During his discussion with Mr Blair in private, Mr Assad argued that these groups had a legitimate right to fight Israel. Giving the impression his hands were tied, Mr Assad said that he had to listen to the Arab street just as Mr Blair had to listen to his "street". But in the press conference, Mr Assad was much more outspoken and less emollient than Downing Street had been prepared for. He won applause from Syrian reporters for condemning the bombing of Afghanistan and reiterated that resis tance on the part of the anti-Israeli groups was legitimate. The Foreign Office would have told Mr Blair the visit was high risk. Mr Assad is no respecter of visitors: he used a press conference in Damascus in May to mark the Pope's visit to engage in an anti-semitic rant, which left the Pontiff embarrassed. Vulnerable president Hopes that Mr Assad would turn out to be a reformer after the tough dictatorship of his father have so far been misplaced. He is in a vulnerable position, surrounded by vested interests, unable to make the compromises that would bring reform. Political opponents, journalists and others are regularly thrown into jail. He is too weak to negotiate a peace settlement with Israel, which still occupies Syria's Golan Heights from the 1967 war. A Foreign Office source, making the most of the visit, said: "We were not going to brush the differences under the carpet. We want to have a debate with them about what constitutes terrorism." Mr Blair had twin objectives: one was to look for a way of weaning Syria away from its support for Hizbullah and other groups, and the other was to try to get Syria to re-enter talks with Israel on the return of the Golan Heights. He secured neither. Since Labour came to power, Britain has been pursuing a commendable policy of trying to bring the so-called "rogue states" or "states of concern" into the in ternational community. In contrast to the United States, it has restored diplomatic ties with Libya and Iran. Opening up a good relationship with Syria was the next obvious step. Downing Street and the Foreign Office shrugged yesterday at the suggestion that the visit had been a mistake and insisted that the test of whether the trip was worthwhile remained to be decided. If the visit marked the start of a dialogue between Syria and Britain, it would have been worthwhile. Even though the visit will not ease his talks with the Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon, today, Mr Blair concluded: "You can either stay out of the dialogue, or you can try to get into it and build a bridge of understanding for the future." Full article at: http://politics.guardian.co.uk/attacks/story/0,1320,584591,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Thu Nov 1 06:32:39 2001 From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2001 15:32:39 +0200 Subject: [A-List] News management Message-ID: Bear in mind Blair's speech to the Welsh Assembly this week: "we must never forget...", suggesting more than just a spontaneous and unsolicited patriotic manoeuvre on the part of CNN. CNN to carry reminders of US attacks Matt Wells, media correspondent Thursday November 1, 2001 The Guardian CNN is to risk accusations of bias by ordering news presenters to end reports from Afghanistan with a reminder that the Taliban regime harbours terrorists who supported the September 11 attacks on the US. The network says it seems "perverse to focus too much on the casualties or hardship in Afghanistan" without reminding viewers of its domestic service that up to 5,000 innocent people died in New York and Washington. Some CNN correspondents are understood to be concerned that a "pro-American stamp" will be put on the end of their reports. But CNN's executives are concerned that pictures showing misdirected US missile attacks landing on residential areas or Red Cross warehouses could be manipulated before they come out of Afghanistan. In a memo to staff, obtained by the Guardian, Rick Davis, CNN's head of standards and practices, says: "As we get enterprising reports from our correspondents or al-Jazeera inside Afghanistan, we must continue to make sure that we do not inadvertently seem to be reporting uncritically from the perspective or vantage of the Taliban. "Also, given the enormity of the toll on innocent human lives in the US, we must remain careful not to focus excessively on the casualties and hardships in Afghanistan that will inevitably be a part of this war, or to forget that it is the Taliban leadership that is responsible for the situation Afghanistan is now in." News presenters on the service that is shown to US viewers will be required to end each report with a formula such as: "We must keep in mind, after seeing reports like this, that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan continues to harbour terrorists who have praised the September 11 attacks that killed close to 5,000 innocent people in the US." Alternatively, they can say: "The Pentagon has repeatedly stressed that it is trying to minimise civilian casualties in Afghanistan, even as the Taliban regime continues to harbour terrorists who are connected to the September 11 attacks that claimed thousands of innocent lives in the US." And "if relevant", the presenter can say that "the Pentagon has stressed that the Taliban continues to harbour the terrorists and the Taliban forces are reported to be hiding in populated areas and using civilians as human shields". The memo concludes: "Even though it may start sounding rote, it is important that we make this point each time." Presenters on CNN International will not be subject to the edict. Walter Isaacson, chairman of CNN, told the Washington Post: "I want to make sure we're not used as a propaganda platform. We're entering a period in which there's a lot more reporting and video from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. You want to make sure people understand that when they see civilian suffering there, it's in the context of a terrorist attack that caused enormous suffering in the United States." Jim Murphy, executive producer of the CBS Evening News, said: "I wouldn't order anybody to do anything like that. Our reporters are smart enough to know it has to be put in context." Bill Wheatley, NBC News vice-president, said: "I'd give the American public more credit, frankly." The BBC said it had no plans to include any such reminders on its own news programmes. However, a spokeswoman added: "Correspondents may or may not decide to put in this sort of detail in their reports to put things in context." Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,584636,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Thu Nov 1 19:57:49 2001 From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) Date: Thu, 01 Nov 2001 21:57:49 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Re: A-List digest, Vol 1 #23 - 7 msgs Message-ID: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu wrote: > Send A-List mailing list submissions to a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/a-list or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to a-list-request at lists.econ.utah.edu You can reach the person managing the list at a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of A-List digest..." The A-List Digest Today's Topics: 1. Pakistan is in danger of falling apart (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) 2. Israeli "intelligence" (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) 3. Britain/US split? (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) 4. Europe/US rivalry (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) 5. accessing the message archive (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) 6. Republican contrarians ruminate on the dollar (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) 7. CIA met bin Laden in July (Le Figaro) (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) --__--__-- Message: 1 To: "Rad Green" , "Leninist International" Cc: Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2001 22:54:15 -0800 From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [A-List] Pakistan is in danger of falling apart Reply-To: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu Pakistan is in danger of falling apart Regional separatism and support for Islamist groups are growing William Dalrymple Tuesday October 23, 2001 The Guardian A couple of years ago, on a visit to the North West Frontier, I called in on Khan Abdul Wali Khan. The Khan had once been one of the Pathan's great leaders; but he was now a frail old man. We sat in his summer house in the middle of his irrigated garden. The Khan poured jasmine tea and asked me about my impressions of the area. I told him what I had just seen at the nearby Darra arms bazaar: hundreds of men busy manufacturing home-made assault rifles and anti-aircraft cannon. "Yes," said the Khan. "There are now more than one million Kalashnikovs in this province alone. It has got completely out of control." He shook his head sadly. "I feel," he said, "as if I'm living on an ammunition dump." I thought of the Khan this week as anti-American protests spread across Pakistan. Although there has been unrest in Karachi and a bomb in Rawalpindi, it is among the Pathans that the rioting has been most serious: a cinema, the UN compound and a bazaar burned down by Pathans in Quetta, and four more shot dead in a village nearby; significantly, the local Baluchis have played virtually no part in the riots. Worse still on the frontier, where the Pathans are from the same tribes as their cousins in the Taliban, Peshawar has disappeared into a miasma of tear gas and police shooting, with at least half a dozen dead. Machismo is to the North West Frontier what religion is to the Vatican. Bandoliers hang over the men's shoulders; grenades are nonchalantly tucked into their pockets. I once walked into a Khyber tea house to find a group of Pathan mojahedin huddled in a corner dismantling a live landmine with a broken screw driver. None of the other tea drinkers blinked. The Pathans have never been completely conquered, at least not since the time of Alexander the Great. They have seen off centuries of invaders, and they retain the mixture of self-confidence, independence and suspicion that this has produced. Beyond the checkpoints on the edge of Peshawar, tribal law - based on the tribal council and the blood feud - rules unchallenged. The dominant Afridi tribe controls the Afghan heroin trade and kidnapping and murder are virtually cottage industries. It takes very little for latent discontent of the Pathans with the Pakistani government to erupt, but this latest wave of riots is on a different scale to anything since partition, raising the perennial question as to the future of Pakistan - can the centre hold? If many in Pakistan now question the long-term viability of the state, it is certain that none would be so ready to separate themselves from it as the Pathans. Throughout the 1940s, Wali Khan's father, known as Padshah Khan, passionately opposed the creation of Pakistan, leading the Pathans to side with Gandhi's Congress against Jinnah's Muslim League. During this period the Pathans believed that they would gain their own state, allied to India, just as East Pakistan - modern Bangladesh - was originally separated by thousands of miles from its western wing. In the bloodshed of partition, this Pakhtun state never happened, but the dashed hopes left the Pathans estranged from the idea of Pakistan. Padshah Khan spent the 1960s and 1970s struggling in vain for a union with the equally disgruntled Pathans in Afghanistan to form a new state - Pakhtunistan, straddling the Durand Line (the hated frontier drawn up by the British in 1893 which broke the tribes in two). But the Pakhtun nationalist spirit survived his death in 1988, and has mutated into a very different Islamist form under a variety of Taliban-like groups such as the Jamiat Ulema i-Islam (JUI). If, as seems quite possible, Afghanistan breaks up in the aftermath of the American assault, with the Tajik Northern Alliance controlling the north, and a Pathan post-Taliban successor state taking the south, then demands for the creation of Pakhtunistan can only gain momentum. Regional separatism is only one of the problems now faced by Pakistan. President Musharraf's decision to support the American assault on the Taliban, against the wishes of more than 80% of his population, has greatly strengthened Islamist groups, bringing them support from swathes of the population not normally part of their constituency. Serious civilian casualties in Afghanistan or heavy-handed action by the Pakistani security forces would further radicalise the population. Last week Musharraf sacked two leading pro-Taliban generals and placed three pro-Taliban religious leaders (including the spiritual leader of the JUI) under house arrest; but after a decade of Talibanisation, Pakistan has never been closer to an Islamic revolution, or at least an Islamist coup. Such a coup would put nuclear weapons into Islamist hands: Bin Laden's wildest dream. These strains and tensions within Pakistan can only increase in the months ahead. It is likely to be a bumpy ride. ? William Dalrymple is the author of The Age of Kali: Indian Travels and Encounters (HarperCollins) ------------------------------------------- Macdonald Stainsby Rad-Green List: Radical anti-capitalist environmental discussion. http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/rad-green ---- Leninist-International: Building bridges in the tradition of V.I. Lenin. http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/leninist-international ---- In the contradiction lies the hope. --Bertholt Brecht --__--__-- Message: 2 Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2001 14:40:02 +0200 To: "A-List (E-mail)" From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [A-List] Israeli "intelligence" Reply-To: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu News direct from Paul Wolfowitz's man in Scotland. Only the Israelis could come up with a scheme that links together all *their* enemies in one huge dastardly plot. And in whose interest is it for Pakistan's "shadowy ISI" to "establish" links between Iraq and al-Qaeda? Since when was the ISI a reliable source? Israeli intelligence warned US days before attacks IAN BRUCE The Herald, 31 October 2001 ISRAEL'S military intelligence service, Aman, issued an urgent warning of an impending terrorist "spectacular" against America, several days before the suicide bombers flew passenger airliners into New York's Trade Towers and the Pentagon on September 11. Aman had no details of the targets, but picked up enough indicators of major terrorist activity from a combination of informants and electronic eavesdropping to send out an alert, which also covered US interests in Britain, France and Germany. Much of the Israeli intelligence centred on Imad Mughniyeh, head of the Iranian-backed Hizbollah movement's foreign operations section, and on Dr Ayman Al Zawahiri, the Egyptian-born terrorist mastermind reputed to be Osama bin Laden's chosen successor. The Israelis say they have evidence linking both men to agents representing SSO, Iraq's foreign intelligence service, and believe Baghdad has provided finance and logistical support to them. Links between the terrorist network and Iraq have been established by Pakistan's shadowy ISI agency and by the Czech Republic's counter-intelligence service. Salah Suleiman, an Iraqi SSO agent, was detained on the Pakistan border last October after a series of trips into Taliban-controlled territory to meet bin Laden. After interrogation, he was deported. Iraqi agent, Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir Al-Ani, has been expelled by the Czechs for "conduct incompatible with his diplomatic status". They had been monitoring his activities after a tip-off from Israel that he was planning to bomb Radio Free Europe, a station financed by the CIA that broadcasts to Iraq and Iran. Baghdad regards the broadcasts as "an act of aggression". During the surveillance, they photographed Al-Ani with Mohammed Atta, the al Qaeda agent believed to have flown the first plane into the World Trade Centre. Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/31-10-19101-0-24-15.html --__--__-- Message: 3 Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2001 14:47:35 +0200 To: "A-List (E-mail)" From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [A-List] Britain/US split? Reply-To: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu World must tackle peace agenda, says Hain=20 Minister says greater global unity is needed to confront broader issues if war on terrorism is to be won Stuart Millar Wednesday October 31, 2001 The Guardian A senior government minister warned yesterday that forthcoming international negotiations on climate change, development and trade could influence the chances of long-term success in the campaign against terrorism.=20 Peter Hain, the Foriegn Office minister, said the international community would have to demonstrate greater political will and coherence in tackling broader global issues if it was to have any chance of defeating al-Qaida and other terror groups. "The war against terrorism is unlike other wars, because we cannot wait until the war is over to win the peace," he said. "Winning the peace is part of winning the war."=20 Mr Hain was speaking at a conference in London organised by the Royal United Services Institute and the Guardian to examine the key issues and challenges facing the international community in the aftermath of September 11.=20 In the first practical example of attempts to implement the cooperative world order outlined by Tony Blair in his speech to the Labour conference earlier this month, Mr Hain put the focus firmly on a series of crucial conferences from now into next year.=20 This week, talks are taking place in Morocco for the United Nations' framework document on climate change, while international trade negotiations begin next week in the Qatar capital, Doha.=20 In March next year, the UN is holding the financing for development conference in Monterrey, Mexico, which will be followed later in 2002 by the UN's world summit on sustainable development in Johannesburg. These events, Mr Hain said, would provide governments with a chance to show they had learned the lessons of September 11 and were willing to use the existing international framework to better effect.=20 He said: "The message from al-Qaida is that enhanced business as usual will not be enough.=20 "We need a step change in the urgency with which we tackle the peace agenda, in the amount we invest in it - not only financially but in political will and ingenuity."=20 He added: "We do not need new texts, new principles and treaties to win the peace. What we need now is better implementation to translate the texts we have into better lives for real people."=20 His comments may also be read as a veiled warning to the US that the doggedly unilateralist position adopted by George Bush since he arrived in the White House is no longer acceptable.=20 The summits are the first key test of Washington's willingness to re-engage with the international community on global initiatives to tackle diverse issues, such as global warming, third world poverty and the Aids epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa.=20 "These are the security challenges of the world after September 11," Mr Hain said. "The grand coalitions of the 21st century will not be coalitions of government alone, because governments acting alone cannot provide solutions to this kind of problem."=20 But Mr Hain sidestepped questions about whether this ambitious vision could ever be realistically implemented when the US and Britain had made so many deals with countries previously regarded as pariahs to prop up the coalition for military action in Afghanistan.=20 Jonathan Eyal, a senior fellow of the RUSI, said a price was being paid to maintain the coalition which could affect future success.=20 "We have heard nothing recently about the need for democracy in the Gulf, or about the export of this arid form of Islam coming from the Gulf.=20 "We have three central Asian countries which do not have an accountable system of government, and nobody is saying much about Chechnya in the last few weeks.=20 Mr Eyal asked: "Are we not repeating exactly the same problems we have in the past, acquiring fairweather friends and having bigger difficulties later on?"=20 But Mr Hain replied only that these issues needed to be addressed by the new world order. Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,1361,583838,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi --__--__-- Message: 4 Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2001 16:59:40 +0200 To: "A-List (E-mail)" From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [A-List] Europe/US rivalry Reply-To: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu As promised, related to the "Britain/US split" thread is this current development, very reminiscent of the Westland affair that almost brought down the Thatcher government in 1986. Italy was involved then, too, as the government's preferred bidder for Westland was the US/Italian Sikorsky-Fiat consortium, rather than the European consortium involving British Aerospace that Defence Secretary Michael Heseltine was trying to put together. The split within the Cabinet resulted in the resignations of Heseltine and Leon Brittan, Trade and Industry Secretary, who went on to become Deputy Head of the European Commission and got his revenge on his former sponsor (Thatcher) by pushing forward European integration (and incidentally helping to put into place the infrastructure to help the continuing UK "takeover" of the EU apparatus -- Brittan has been succeeded as Deputy by none other than Neil Kinnock, arch-"moderniser" of the Labour Party during the 1980s and one of the few, if not the only, survivor of the Commission headed up by Jacques Santer). =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D Airbus project pullout prompts tussle in Rome Financial Times, Oct 26, 2001 By JAMES BLITZ A big tussle was developing last night in the centre-right Italian government led by Silvio Berlusconi over a decision to quit a flagship European defence project.=20 Antonio Martino, defence minister, insisted that the government would stand by a decision to quit the Airbus 400M programme, a joint project to build a large military transport, despite objections from Renato Ruggiero, foreign minister.=20 "This aircraft is not necessary for Italy's military requirements. . . we have to spend our resources on other projects," said Mr Martino, a Eurosceptic figure, on national television.=20 On Wednesday night, Mr Ruggiero sharply criticised the move, saying he had not been consulted, and that he hoped the decision "was not the final one".=20 Mr Ruggiero said if there were economic and financial reasons for quitting the Airbus programme, those arguments must be heard. "But the overall decision has got to be justified," he said. "I am certainly extremely sensitive to arguments that would have led to a different decision being taken."=20 Mr Ruggiero, former head of the World Trade Organisation, is a career diplomat and apolitical figure. His entry into Mr Berlusconi's government was promoted by President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, the head of state, as a means of signalling Italy's continued commitment to the European Union.=20 However, Mr Berlusconi has made little secret of his wish to forge a special bilateral relationship with the US. Mr Martino had admitted earlier this week that he had "many personal doubts" about continuing with the A400M programme. Industry analysts think Italy wants to enhance co-operation in this field with Lockheed Martin or Boeing in the US.=20 Some European diplomats think Italy's decision to quit the project explains why Jacques Chirac, French president, excluded Mr Berlusconi from a mini-summit with Britain and Germany in Ghent last Friday to discuss the attack on Afghanistan's Taliban regime.=20 But whatever the reason, Italy's centre-left opposition thinks tensions between Mr Berlusconi and Mr Ruggiero are emerging as the main fault-line in the centre-right government. "This may be a short-term problem, one that reflects the new government's initial difficulties working out a foreign policy line," said a leading centre-left figure. "But we may be on the verge of a major rift between the two, with significant repercussions."=20 Another sign of growing tension over Italy's foreign policy came in a newspaper interview with Francesco Cossiga, a former president.=20 He called on Mr Berlusconi to implement the immediate closure of Nato's military bases in Italy, arguing that Italy was being ignored by the US and its main European partners.=20 "We must accept that Nato is finished," said Mr Cossiga. "Its only role is to help the US dress up its military operations. We must start raising the problem of Nato's military bases in Italy. Closing them is the only way to avoid Italy falling into league division two." Full article at: http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.html?print=3Dtrue&id=3D= 01 1026001201 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi --__--__-- Message: 5 Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2001 19:22:23 +0000 To: A-List From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [A-List] accessing the message archive Reply-To: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu The message archive is now accessible without need for a password. The archive address is: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/a-list/ --__--__-- Message: 6 Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2001 19:30:41 +0000 To: A-List From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [A-List] Republican contrarians ruminate on the dollar Reply-To: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu PFV 10/23 MONEYCHANGER - DR. WALKER TODD ON THE AMAZING LEVITATING US = DOLLAR A MONEYCHANGER Interview: DR. WALKER TODD ON THE AMAZING LEVITATING US DOLLAR Dr. Walker Todd is no stranger to Moneychanger readers. He was born in=20 Murfreesboro, Tennessee and graduated from Vanderbilt University. He holds= =20 a master's degree from the University of Wisconsin, a Ph.D. in French from= =20 Columbia University, and a J.D. from Boston University School of Law. For= =20 20 years he worked for Federal Reserve banks as a lawyer and economist. In= =20 1981, he served on the U.S. negotiating team that secured the release of=20 52 US hostages from Iran and established an international tribunal plan=20 for adjudicating claims against Iran. Today he is an independent economic= =20 and legal consultant living in Chagrin Falls, Ohio Dr. Todd kindly made=20 time for this interview on June 8, 2001. Although that dates=20 the interview somewhat (because we know what happened=20 immediately afterward, like the dollar index topping) and 9-11 has changed= =20 the scene tremendously, this interview is still very valuable today. It=20 offers us clues us about the troubles the US dollar faces, not to mention= =20 those faced by the "Masters of the Universe, the dollar's managers in the= =20 Fed and US treasury. Dr. Todd also offers us some danger signs to watch=20 for cracks in the dollar. MONEYCHANGER Frankly, I'm baffled. The US dollar obviously holds the key= =20 to financial events in the near future, but how can you explain its=20 historically high valuation? Even in the face of the long bond market=20 falling, Greenspan dropping interest rates, and a record balance of=20 payments deficit, the dollar just keeps on riding high. And this=20 surrealistic script is played out against the background of an obviously=20 topping stock market. TODD We were in a similar period in the early 1980s. Everyone likes to=20 forget that. From roughly August '82 until September '86, conditions were= =20 very much similar to today's, considering the US dollar versus competing=20 foreign currencies, the posture of US interest rates versus major foreign= =20 interest rates, and the like. Conditions at home were also similar. The=20 dollar had become very much too strong at that time. Manufacturing was in a world of hurt. If you'll recall that period saw=20 the first wave of wipe-outs in the auto industry, and some major steel=20 downsizing. LTV Steel in Cleveland filed for bankruptcy in '86 or '87. And= =20 the US was running what at the time looked like a record trade deficit=20 (current account deficit). These conditions are similar, and at the same time the stock market was= =20 in the middle of a big boom. Stock prices rose steadily from roughly 8/82= =20 to 9/86. A strong dollar is good for Wall Street. Since most people who=20 make their living on Wall Street live within a 50 - 100 mile radius=20 of New York city, they don't care much what happens to the rest of=20 the country -- as long as Wall Street prospers. The US Treasury Secretary, of course, always has to be concerned with=20 what Wall Street thinks of the Treasury. Nevertheless, he also represents= =20 the US public's interests in maintaining their treasury. Since 1934 the=20 Treasury has been charged exclusively with managing the dollar's foreign=20 exchange value. At the end of the day, responsibility for the dollar -=20 strong, weak, or whatever you have -- resides at the Treasury department.= =20 From roughly mid-`95 onward Clinton's administration touted the virtues=20 of a strong dollar policy to cure foreign country's ills. The theory was=20 that we would sacrifice a little bit of US Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to= =20 help bail out countries struggling to pay their debts. How do=20 we sacrifice? We expand US imports by keeping the dollar strong. But=20 if you're importing it, it doesn't add to GDP, does it? This theory=20 was triggered off Mexico's troubles at the end of 1994. Mexico, however, failed to recover before the next wave of=20 defaults began. That began in east Asia in summer 1997 with Thailand,=20 and eventually embraced Korea, Indonesia, and a bunch of others. As those= =20 countries began going down the tubes, once again the foreign policy=20 Establishment advisors to the Treasury began touting the virtues of the=20 strong dollar and expanded US imports to help these countries out of a=20 jam. In a meeting once I heard a staff economist of the Council on Foreign= =20 Relations say, "Well, it's going to cost us half a point of GAP to get=20 east Asia out of this slump -- but that's not much." What's the problem with that line of reasoning? The half a point of GDP= =20 never comes out of hide of Wall Street or the New York financial community. When they're talking about giving up half a point of GDP,=20 they're talking about shutting down steel mills, automobile plants,=20 and turning off farmers' exports. That's exactly what's been=20 happening ever since. We're just now living at the crest of the wave. MONEYCHANGER This was Rubin's and Clinton's idea? TODD It was. To give Rubin some credit, though, he was not a=20 wildly cheerleading, enthusiastic supporter of this policy. Instead,=20 Larry Summers was. MONEYCHANGER So this was Summers' policy. TODD Yes, and remember he started out as an assistant secretary=20 for international affairs, became under-secretary for international, then= =20 deputy secretary, and finally Treasury secretary at the end of the Clinton= =20 years. It was Larry who tended to run international policy at the Treasury. MONEYCHANGER Was he not a Kissinger prot=E9g=E9? TODD No, his guru was a Harvard economics professor named Martin = Feldstein. MONEYCHANGER Who used to belong to the president's council of economic=20 advisors. TODD Yes, under Reagan. MONEYCHANGER How long can a currency maintain a low interest rate policy= =20 and run high current account deficits? Both force down a currency's value.= =20 It's obvious that the bond market already smells a rat, because in spite=20 of Greenspan's interest rate drops, the long bond market refuses to rise. TODD Exactly. It's a telling point that about two months back=20 the crossover point was reached where the Fed cut rates but the long bond= =20 no longer fell. MONEYCHANGER Which implies the steely-eyed bond traders said, "Nope, we= =20 aren't going to play this hand." TODD Exactly. 1986 was only 15 years ago and there are probably enough=20 old boys around Wall Street who remember that and are saying, "No, if you= =20 want me to take 10-year risks with the dollar and US Treasury bonds, I=20 want to be paid a higher rate for it." The interesting thing is, why doesn't a similar concern pop up in the=20 gold price? MONEYCHANGER You tell me. The gold price has just made me throw my hands= =20 up in the air. There are only three possible explanations for its deadness. First, the derivatives revolution of the last 70 years has given people= =20 alternative to gold in disaster protection or inflation. TODD Right. At a minimum call it "inflation protection." The=20 market offers other vehicles besides gold. MONEYCHANGER Vehicles that they didn't have 20 years ago. The=20 second explanation is that the market has become so indifferent to=20 gold because for 70 years the American people has been propagandised=20 on this imaginary, fiat system so that finally we have a generation that= =20 has forgot gold. The third explanation is that they're just outright rigging the price. I= =20 think there's a lot of evidence for that. You can't view Greenspan's=20 history and conclude you have a man indifferent to the gold price. In=20 fact, back in 1994 he stated before Congress that any central bank that=20 ignores the gold price does so at its own peril. Still, gold doesn't=20 respond to these inflationary pressures. So maybe it's one of those three= =20 explanations, or a combination. TODD I think it's a combination. Around the= =20 margins there may be a little manipulation of the gold price. I haven't=20 yet seen enough hard evidence of the manipulation to buy the GATA theory=20 totally, but I think they've got their arms around at least a little bit=20 of the truth. The circumstances are such that it would only take a little bit=20 of manipulation to make a major change in the outcome. So I think=20 that there's a little bit of manipulation and still just enough=20 central bank gold sales under the Washington Agreement so that demand=20 is soft. MONEYCHANGER From the beginning of 1999 to the end of 1999, Greenspan=20 pumped $100 billion of currency into a system that began with $450 billion= =20 in circulation. The rate of monetary growth since then, depending on which= =20 monetary aggregate you use, has been clipping along well above 15%, and in= =20 some indicators above 20%. TODD Normally you'd say that's way too much, and the US has just gotten= =20 away with it because enough foreigners are willing to hold dollars, so we= =20 haven't yet had to pay the price. But I want to remind everybody about some earlier episodes, 1971 1979.= =20 A lot of official US policy is built on assuming that there will never=20 come a time when foreigners will get tired of holding US dollars. In the=20 two years I mentioned, 1971 1979, that's exactly what happened. They=20 called the Fed's bluff and said, "We're not going to finance your current= =20 account deficit any more, at least, not at the current exchange rate."=20 Willy-nilly, the US was forced to devalue. In 1979 they combined it with a= =20 major hammer-hit on interest rates. MONEYCHANGER A few months ago a professor from McGill University floated= =20 a theory that demand for cash dollars in Europe was keeping the dollar's=20 exchange rate up. At the end of this year the old national paper=20 currencies - Deutsche marks, pesetas, francs, lira - will be withdrawn and= =20 replaced by the paper Euro. At that point the folks with untaxed, black=20 market profits held in national currencies will lose them. If they try to= =20 swap them for Euro currency, they'll get caught. TODD Right, if you've been holding Deutsche marks underground, you've=20 got a problem. MONEYCHANGER So the professor's theorises that, anticipating=20 that changeover, Europeans are cashing in black market marks and=20 franks and lira for US dollars and holding their untaxed profits that=20 way. Add another fact to that. 70% of new $100 bills are sent=20 overseas, and Treasury estimates that two-thirds to three-quarters of=20 US currency circulates outside the borders of the US already. We already= =20 know there's a big foreign demand for US cash. To what extent is the Euro= =20 conversion affecting that? TODD It's just a small fraction of the whole, but at the margin=20 it accounts for a lot of the demand, like the official manipulation=20 of the gold price. It's not much as a fraction of the whole, but at=20 the margin it makes a big difference in the marginal price. That's=20 what is happening with foreign demand for the dollar. While it might=20 not amount to much as a fraction of the whole, it's still enough at=20 the margin to sop up as much as one-third to one-half of the=20 current foreign demand for dollars. MONEYCHANGER Which is significant at the margin. TODD Yes. MONEYCHANGER And the margin is what the people at the Fed are=20 always trying to control, just like herding cattle. If one breaks out,=20 you have to get him back in, or the rest of them will follow him. TODD Exactly. Good analogy. MONEYCHANGER What signs should we look for that the dollar is=20 coming unglued? One thing we haven't mentioned yet is the huge chunk of=20 US government debt that foreigners own. Two years ago that stood=20 at 40%. TODD It's still in that neighbourhood, a little over $2 trillion.=20 Ironically, the proportion of foreign ownership may keep rising as the=20 Treasury redeems debt. The denominator is the total publicly held debt and= =20 the numerator is the foreign held part. That foreign-held percentage will= =20 keep rising in the near future, even if they don't buy another dollar of=20 debt. Any significant liquidation of the foreign position in US government= =20 debt would be a major danger signal. MONEYCHANGER Where would we find that? TODD The only way you see it regularly is in the Fed's Board=20 of Governors H.4.1 Release, the weekly statement of condition of=20 the Federal Reserve banks. They also publish a monthly summary of that in= =20 the Federal Reserve bulletin. A line item entry there shows "US government= =20 securities held in custody by the Federal Reserve Banks for foreign=20 official and international accounts." You can always look at that total to= =20 see whether it's rising or falling. The benchmark number is $600 - 700=20 billion, where it has been in recent years. [Go to , where you will=20 find a list of dates to choose from. Choose the latest report. After the=20 body of numbered items, you will find the first remark. "On June 6, 2001,= =20 the face amount of marketable U.S. government and federal agency=20 securities held in custody by the Federal Reserve Banks for foreign=20 official and international accounts was $709,699 million, a change of=20 $ 2,692 million for the week." -- FS] MONEYCHANGER A liquidation of any significant portion of that debt would= =20 signal trouble. TODD Say the Japanese, with problems of their own, decide to cash=20 in their dollars, you might see $300 billion walk out the door.=20 You'd notice that in the Fed total. You might also see it in the long=20 bond rate. MONEYCHANGER Driving the value of long bonds down by=20 drastically increasing their supply. TODD Another signal would be a sudden, unexplained rise in the Euro. If= =20 the Europeans hold their interest rates more or less steady (and currently= =20 they are signalling that's exactly what they will do) and still the Euro=20 started rising rapidly against the dollar, that would be a signal that=20 people are bailing out of the dollar. MONEYCHANGER Recently the European Central Bank (ECB) dropped interest=20 rates. That certainly looked like collusion with the Fed. I think people=20 get confused when they listen to central bankers because they all loudly=20 proclaim their own independence. Yet once a month they meet in Basel at=20 the BIS. TODD The cynic would say they are independent of their governments but=20 they all collude with each other. [laughing] MONEYCHANGER When you were talking about the early '80s I was thinking=20 about the Plaza Accords. TODD The Plaza and Louvre Accords were the two things that kept turning= =20 the dollar around on a dime in '85 and '87. MONEYCHANGER The chart made it very obvious that some big policy change= =20 had been made. TODD But anyway I don't think we've got that sort of agreement yet. You= =20 might argue, we may need one to stem the rise of the dollar. [laughing]=20 Another signal to watch is the US Dollar Index, the trade-weighted value=20 of the dollar against major foreign currencies. The base year, by the way,= =20 is 1973, the first year of the official float of the dollar. A "100" on=20 the dollar index equals the 1973 value. At 95 or below, US manufacturers and exporters do okay. Between 95 and=20 100, we are losing export competitiveness. At 100, it becomes very hard for= =20 US exporters to sell anything abroad. The current dollar index is around=20 120. The last time it was that high was 1986. [For current quotes on the US Dollar Index, go to , in the=20 "Please select the FUTURE Commodity below" window, select "US Dollar=20 Index." You can get a daily or weekly chart of the US Dollar Index at --= FS] MONEYCHANGER Right before the stock market came down so hard. TODD Exactly. MONEYCHANGER The dollar index has stayed over 100 (with a few=20 short exceptions) since the beginning of 1998. So US=20 export competitiveness has been dropping for a long time. TODD Do you know about the four farmers' lawsuit in Colorado? MONEYCHANGER No. TODD Early in 2000 Gene Schroeder and three other plaintiffs filed=20 a federal suit against the Treasury and other departments.=20 They challenged the foreign exchange management of the dollar. On=20 what grounds? Because as it was being carried out, it subverts=20 the interests of farmers. This was wrong statutorily and constitutionally= =20 because it constituted an indirect "taking" of farmer's production and=20 property rights. When you look at the statutes that give the Treasury the= =20 power to regulate foreign exchange, or the executive branch power to=20 negotiate foreign bilateral trade agreements, all of those statutes are=20 conditioned on taking the agriculture's interests into account. Clearly,=20 they are not using these powers that way, so we're saying either you begin= =20 to do that or you pay us parity prices. Where has the lawsuit gone? Initially the federal district court=20 in Denver dismissed our complaint in July 2000. The farmers appealed=20 to the 10th circuit federal court of appeals. We asked for oral argument.= =20 The government opposed it, but we got oral argument anyway on March 13,= 2001. It was the biggest event in the history of the 10th circuit, except for= =20 the Timothy McVeigh stuff. We had over 120 farmers standing around a room= =20 designed to hold ninety. MONEYCHANGER They must have nearly croaked. They must have called out=20 every US marshal for a hundred miles. [laughing] TODD To give the court full credit, I thought they were great. As=20 a lawyer I was proud and pleased with the way the 10th circuit conducted= =20 itself that day. It was probably the finest hour in the history of the=20 American judicial system. The judges were informed, they had read all the= =20 briefs, they understood the arguments, they asked appropriate and=20 pertinent questions. It was a great day to be in the courtroom. They made it very clear that they took the issue very seriously and that= =20 they will issue a deliberate opinion. We're still waiting for that. If we win, that certainly throws a monkey wrench into the=20 Treasury's foreign exchange works. They suddenly have to consider new=20 factors in deciding whether to prop up the strong dollar and keep all=20 the things going that we were talking about. MONEYCHANGER Do you think Greenspan is riding a tiger? Does the new administration know they can't just climb off=20 the tiger? TODD Yes, and they also are well aware that if=20 Greenspan intends to induce a recession for them, they want get it over=20 with now, as opposed to two years from now. The longer he keeps delaying,= =20 the more likely that latter prospect is. MONEYCHANGER Why is= =20 he willing to take the gamble of keeping the stock market bubble alive? TODD Generally speaking I think he's concerned about the=20 financial condition of not only some banks but also some large=20 financial market players. As you sit there and see all these other=20 companies filing Chapter 11 it's clear he doesn't care if most companies=20 go bankrupt. What he cares about is banks and securities firms,=20 hedge funds, and so on. MONEYCHANGER So you're saying (and it shouldn't come as a surprise to=20 anyone) is that the country is run for the benefit of Wall Street, and the= =20 rest of us be damned. TODD Yes, but I want to give Treasury Secretary O'Neill some=20 credit. He's the first treasury secretary we've had from west of=20 the Alleghenies in at least 20 years. MONEYCHANGER But he also hails from Andrew Mellon's old firm,=20 Alcoa. [laughing] TODD Franklin, Franklin, Franklin, listen up. What was Andrew Mellon's=20 policy on gold in the 1920s? He liked it, didn't he? MONEYCHANGER Yes. TODD He's our kind of guy. Don't badmouth Andrew Mellon. MONEYCHANGER Okay, but O'Neill is part of the same old Wall Street Big= =20 Business Establishment. TODD Yes, but if you must choose between Andrew Mellon on the one hand=20 and Goldman Sachs on the other hand, which would you choose? MONEYCHANGER No choice. I'll go with Mellon every time. TODD Don't stand there waiting for the second coming. You're not going=20 to get it. O'Neill is such a refreshing change compared to what we've had= =20 to deal with in the last 20 years, especially the last 5 or 6 years, that= =20 I'll shout hosannas at the very mention of his name. MONEYCHANGER I was suspicious of Rubin and Summers. I think they would=20 do anything to make money for their crowd in New York. I could be wrong,=20 but I don't think they'd gag a minute at using the power of government to= =20 make money for their friends. Of course, they wouldn't do it in a direct= way. They wouldn't hand out $100 bills, but they would create=20 conditions whereby they can profit. In another direction, do you think it's possible that the dollar could=20 come unglued altogether? TODD Well, yes, but you have to define "unglued." Let's phrase=20 it another way. If the dollar index is at 120 and the powers that be=20 in Basel ordered us to get the dollar to a level so that the=20 current account deficit corrects itself and at least approach balance=20 again, how low do you have to take that index? Let's put a tag on that. The answer is, based on recent experience we have to get it at=20 least below 95, and to give it some running room you might want to take=20 it all the way down to 90. The last time they did a major adjustment=20 of that sort in the late '80s they took it all the way down to 87 or 88.= =20 Let's assume 90 on the dollar index is the target figure=20 for re-establishing a balanced current account. Well, 120 less 90=20 equals 30, and 30 divided by 120 equals 25%. You have to wipe out 25% of the US dollar's foreign exchange value. MONEYCHANGER My goodness! TODD That's the price of restoring a sustainable balance. That=20 great loss is the main complaint. People have been pointing this out=20 to the treasury for well over a year, back when the dollar index was only= =20 110. They warned the treasury, the longer you let this go on, the bigger=20 the adjustment you must take to return to a sustainable balance. MONEYCHANGER Walker, you're talking about returning the dollar to=20 a sustainable current account balance, but when I say "come unglued," I=20 mean the possibility of a collapse. TODD Don't think that the dollar can drop to 25% of present=20 value, because the world doesn't work that way anymore. Maybe in a=20 fair minded world it should, but in a manipulated, collusive,=20 central bank-run world, the greatest decline you're likely to see is in=20 the neighbourhood of 25 - 30%. What would that do to the stock market? You might trigger a larger than= =20 25% decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, just because once the=20 dollar goes to the weak side, foreign investors lose the incentive to buy= =20 US rather than European stocks. That would drain an awful lot of money out= =20 of Wall Street. A 25% correction in the dollar might trigger a 40% or 50%= =20 correction on Wall Street. MONEYCHANGER We've watched Greenspan push the limit on what we thought=20 was possible for central banks to do -- certainly major central banks --=20 in terms of inflation. Imagine 20% annualised monetary growth rates for a= =20 couple of years. He has kept air in the Wall Street Bubble, and kept on=20 blowing it up! In spite of all this, I believe I just heard you say that=20 fundamentally it is no longer possible for the dollar to collapse. TODD I think you'd see a 25% decline. That is entirely feasible now.=20 MONEYCHANGER But not an evaporation. TODD Right, not an evaporation. You won't see 1933 again. MONEYCHANGER Well, I suppose that's comforting. TODD You may get a generation long decline to 1933, but as an overnight= =20 phenomenon, no. [laughing] MONEYCHANGER I know that a "generation-long" decline is kind of a joke,= =20 but then again, it's not a joke. TODD We certainly went through that from 1966 forward. Over=20 the following generation the dollar lost a great deal of its value.=20 But the way the world is, assuming semi-rational men continue to run=20 it, I wouldn't expect the dollar to decline more than 25-30% at the most.= =20 Europeans will always have to be dragged in kicking and screaming. The=20 bidding would start with the treasury asking for 20%, and the Europeans=20 asking for 10%. The likely initial compromise is a 15% decline in the=20 dollar. That still does nothing. All you do at a dollar index value of 100= =20 is to lock in the trade deficit at the current level with no improvement.= =20 Then you have to ask, How do you like $400 billion trade deficits and $500= =20 billion current account deficits as far forward as the eye can see? MONEYCHANGER Doesn't that at some point decapitalise the United States? Doesn't that at some point destroy the value of the dollar? TODD Yes, but it has consequences that are more pernicious than that. It= =20 transfers US assets into foreign hands, inviting the re-creation of 19th=20 century finance, especially the first half of the 19th century. You are no= =20 longer the master of your own fate. You wind up having to do whatever=20 foreign creditors demand. MONEYCHANGER You become Argentina. TODD Yes. So it's pernicious from the standpoint of=20 constitutional governance in the long run. You don't want this trend to=20 continue, versus the views of the globalisers, who are all saying, "Well,= =20 we just ought to be one more happy trading station on the great plain of= =20 global trade." MONEYCHANGER Isn't there a fundamental issue of independence=20 and sovereignty here? So you're saying that it doesn't really matter much= =20 whether Republicans or Democrats are in charge . . . TODD Oh, I think it does matter, but it matters more which set=20 of Republicans. As long as you've got Republicans from west of=20 the Alleghenies running things, I'd argue you're better off than if=20 you have any set of eastern Democrats or eastern Republicans=20 running things. At the moment, we have the best set. MONEYCHANGER Is this like telling the man with diabetes that only his=20 toes are gangrenous? TODD Yes, it's not a nice position but you have to live with it. We can= =20 live with heartland Republicans. Where the problem always arises, as you=20 saw with Vermont senator Jeffors, is that eastern Republicans are a=20 different breed and you may not necessarily want them representing you. MONEYCHANGER Well, those of us from the South have felt that way for a=20 long time. What does all this say for the stock market? TODD I tend to agree with you that it feels like it's at the crest of=20 the wave, along with these other factors I've been discussing. You watch=20 that dollar index keep going up and start asking yourself, "Where's the= top? 125? 130?" The bubble will blow as high as Greenspan and the Treasury=20 allow that dollar index to go. MONEYCHANGER So our discussion has come full circle. The=20 really important indicator to watch right now is the US dollar index. TODD I think so. At 100, I think Wall Street just stays wherever it sits= =20 at the moment. It will just sit there a while. At 95 you have a prospect=20 for the DJIA to rise smartly, because US manufacturers' profits return. MONEYCHANGER But is the converse true? If the dollar stays high, is the= =20 stock market doomed? TODD No, suppose the dollar index went to 130. One way it would=20 get there is Greenspan the Treasury allowing long bond rates to continue= =20 to rise to sustain foreign investors' purchases of dollars in order to buy= =20 those Treasury securities at the higher rate. As long as you see a=20 corresponding rise in long term interest rates, that dollar index is=20 likely to keep going up and suck Wall Street up along with it. Where Wall Street would decline, I think, would be in that range from=20 120 falling to 100, because with the dollar index in that range, there's=20 no upside for the Dow. They still can't export anything, and nobody wants= =20 to buy your paper. MONEYCHANGER So on the one hand we export goods at the lower end of the= =20 dollar index range, and at the upper end of the range we export paper. TODD That's right. MONEYCHANGER What a world! [laughing] That's insane. TODD I agree with=20 you, it's an insane world. In the view of classical economists, and=20 Austrian economists especially, money ought to be a neutral factor. That's= =20 the virtue of forcing a central bank to adhere to some price that it=20 cannot control, a gold price, for example. MONEYCHANGER But I think I have understood that you are saying that we=20 can't go back to a gold standard or convertibility. TODD I think Anna Schwartz made the wisest comment I ever heard on this= =20 issue. She was asked that question at a CMRE meeting once, "Why don't we=20 go back to a gold standard?" She answered, "Because of the way central banks handle things."=20 This immediately followed her talk about what a botch central banks=20 had made of things. She added that at the Gold Commission in 1981 we decided that there are= =20 many virtues in the gold standard, but the problem is that government has= =20 grown far larger in our lives than it was in 1933, the last time we were=20 on a gold standard. At the time, if you looked at total government=20 expenditure was in the neighbourhood of 5 - 10% of GDP versus today where= =20 government at all levels is maybe 40% of GDP. That means in the old days=20 the necessary adjustments to maintain a gold price could be absorbed by a= =20 private sector that was 90% of GDP. Today that absorption would have to be= =20 taken by a private sector that's only 60% of GDP, so that the consequences= =20 for the living standards of the average American would be at least=20 50% more severe than in the old gold standard days of panics=20 or recessions. They would automatically be 50% worse to get you where you= =20 had to go. So the task in the near term is shrink government to the extent= =20 that you could then safely adopt and live with a gold standard. MONEYCHANGER So you must shrink government before you can ever get rid=20 of the central bank incubus? TODD And the bad news is, of course, that the Establishment controlling= =20 that central bank will fight like rabid dogs to keep you from shrinking=20 their government so as to take away their indirect control of everything=20 through their control of the central bank. MONEYCHANGER That implies also that without a central bank,=20 no government can metastasise to waste away 40% of the=20 commonwealth's production. TODD That's why the standard Democratic Party formulas are a disaster,=20 because they contemplate ever bigger government. MONEYCHANGER This has really been a cheerful conversation, Walker, but I= =20 really appreciate your insight on the dollar, and that's what we're going= =20 to keep our eyes on. Thanks very much. TODD You're quite welcome. [end] The Moneychanger is a privately circulated monthly newsletter edited by= =20 Franklin Sanders. Our goal is to help Christians prosper with their=20 principles intact in an age of monetary and moral chaos. Subscriptions are= =20 $95/year from P.O. Box 178, Westpoint, Tennessee 38486; (888) 218-9226). E-mail us at moneychanger at compuserve.com or visit our=20 website www.the-moneychanger.com . Copyright 1999, 2000 Le Metropole Cafe. All rights reserved. --__--__-- Message: 7 To: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2001 23:58:40 -0200 From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: [A-List] CIA met bin Laden in July (Le Figaro) Reply-To: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu The conservative and _respectable_ French newspaper Le Figaro dated October, 31, says that the "CIA would have met bin Laden past July = (....) at the premises of the American Hospital in the Dubai" emirate. He stayed there during 15 days to be treated of a "serious renal insufficience" by an US doctor, dr. Terry Callaway, a renowned = specialist. It seems to have been a gentlemen's meeting, since the main CIA agent = in place "would have even been informed about possible strikes" (Cet = agent aurait m=EAme =E9t=E9 inform=E9 sur d'=E9ventuels [*] attentats.). = It rather seems a joke: the CIA representative is not an undercover agent because he = is widely known overthere (que beaucoup de gens connaissent =E0 = Duba=EF). =20 [*] Note that in the Latin languages _eventuel_ means uncertain = but possible, although in English it means "taking place at un unspecified later time" (Webster). =20 Osama bin Laden imported to his refuge at Kandahar a mobile dialyse apparatus past year. Is this handicapped man capable to endure a = fierce persecution through the inhospitable and barren mountains of the rugged Afghanistan? Osama arrived to Dubai flying from the Pakistani airport of Quetta and = was probably accompanied by the second man of his terrorist ring, the = notorious Egyptian surgeon Ayman al-Zawahari, plus 4 bodyguards and an Algerian nurse. He was kindly visited not only by the CIA but also by many relatives and Arab personalities.=20 Le Figaro furthemore says that "the Dubai meeting was the logical suit = of a =ABcertain American policy=BB", so concluding its report on the old = ties between Osama bin Laden and CIA since 1979, at Istanbul, where he = managed a family's company. The newspaper also says that the FBI had already "discovered the =ABmontages=BB that CIA has developed with its = =ABIslamic friends=BB along the years" since the former agency traced the blowing = of the US embassies at Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzanie) in = August, 1998, to a military explosive made in USA that had been furnished three years ago to Osama bin Laden's voluntary Arab brigades in Afghanistan.=20 In August, 2001, the US agencies held an urgent meeting with their = French counterparts and required minutely exact information from Algerian = islamic militants, but quite strangely the US top officers refused to disclose = the outlines of what they looked for (les Am=E9ricains opposent un mutisme difficilement compr=E9hensible). Furthermore: "According to = different Arabian diplomatic sources and to the French information services, = quite precise intelligence was communicated to the CIA about the terrorist attacks against American interests in the world, "comprising the = Union's territory" in September, 7 --Le Figaro doesn't say if by _Union_ = it refers to the European Union or to the United States . The full text in French of these news is transcribed below. The second Le Figaro news --under the headline "A =ABmonster=BB = created by the American services"-- mention the creation of the Osama bin Laden's ring with the help of the CIA, of the Saudi information services and of = the billionaire Adnan Kashoggi. Funds were then freely collected at the mosques in USA. Le Figaro adds: "=ABCIA created a monster whose = control it has eventually lost=BB, as it was already predicted several years = ago by Daoud Mir, the former Afghan _charg=E9 d'affaires_ in Paris." The = second news may be found at: http://www.lefigaro.fr/cgi-bin/gx.cgi/AppLogic+FTContentServer?pagename=3D= Futu reTense/Apps/Xcelerate/View&c=3DfigArticle&cid=3DFIGINRRVETC&live=3Dtrue= &Site=3Dtrue &gCurChannel=3DZZZJTGN6J7C&gCurRubrique=3DZZZ4GPM6J7C&gCurSubRubrique=3D= ZZZ6YQM6J7C The third news refer to the Washington Post Monday edition (Oct., 29). = It deals with the 20 secret meetings (at least) in the latest three = years, up to a few days before the WTC bombing, between the Talibans and the = US government in order to get Osama bin Laden extradicted to the United States. See the following URL: http://www.lefigaro.fr/cgi-bin/gx.cgi/AppLogic+FTContentServer?pagename=3D= Futu reTense/Apps/Xcelerate/View&c=3DfigArticle&cid=3DFIGAMRRVETC&live=3Dtrue= &Site=3Dtrue &gCurChannel=3DZZZJTGN6J7C&gCurRubrique=3DZZZ4GPM6J7C&gCurSubRubrique=3D= ZZZ6YQM6J7C Le Monde, another well known French daily newspaper, published on = October 23 an extensive article about the Islamic extremism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Estimates of foreigners coming from everywhere in the = Muslim world range up to 25,000. From 1992 on many foreign _moudjahidins_ (holy warriors) were enlisted in the former 7th brigade of the Bosnian Army, including war criminals (3,000 to 5,000 _moudjahidins_ ). They were allowed to enter the country during the civil war by the former Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic, also an ally of USA in the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. A part of them obtained Bosnian = nationality. Richard Holbrooke, the US negotiator of the 1995 Dayton agreements, = named it a "pact with the devil".=20 Many _humanitarian_ Islamic NGOs are quite actively woking in the country, including those which keep relations with the Osama bin = Laden's ring, as the Saudi High Commission, or the Sudan-based TWRA -- Third = World Relief Agency, that is a cover for weapons smuggling. It is also = related to sheikh Omar Abdel Rahmane, the mastermind behind the 1993 World = Trade Center bombing. According to a non-identified member of the government, the aid of the Arabian countries=20 to the tiny Bosnia and Herzegovina amounted to 1,5 billion dollars = along the past five years, what means 25% of the total foreign aid to that country. Nevertheless, almost all the resources thus obtained have = been used to promote Islam, to build new mosques, to keep koranic schools = and to publish religious literarture. The full text of the article may be found at http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3230--236116-,00.html In solidarity, R. Magellan ########################################### http://www.lefigaro.fr/cgi-bin/gx.cgi/AppLogic+FTContentServer?pagename=3D= Futu reTense/Apps/Xcelerate/View&c=3DfigArticle&cid=3DFIGJMSRVETC&live=3Dtrue= &Site=3Dtrue &gCurChannel=3DZZZJTGN6J7C&gCurRubrique=3DZZZ4GPM6J7C&gCurSubRubrique=3D= LE FIGARO Alexandra Richard Publi=E9 le 31 octobre 2001,=20 page 2 La CIA aurait rencontr=E9 Ben Laden en juillet L'ennemi public num=E9ro un aurait =E9t=E9 soign=E9 dans = l'h=F4pital=20 am=E9ricain de Duba=EF au d=E9but de l'=E9t=E9 pour de graves=20 insuffisances r=E9nales. Durant son s=E9jour de 15 jours, le=20 milliardaire saoudien aurait re=E7u la visite d'un repr=E9sentant=20 local de la CIA. Cet agent aurait m=EAme =E9t=E9 inform=E9 sur=20 d'=E9ventuels attentats. Duba=EF, l'un des sept =E9mirats de la f=E9d=E9ration des Emirats=20 arabes unis, au nord-est d'Abu Dhabi. Cette ville de 350 000=20 habitants a =E9t=E9 le th=E9=E2tre discret d'une rencontre = secr=E8te entre=20 Oussama ben Laden et le repr=E9sentant de la CIA sur place, en=20 juillet. Un homme, partenaire professionnel de la direction=20 administrative de l'h=F4pital am=E9ricain de Duba=EF, affirme que=20 l'ennemi public num=E9ro un a s=E9journ=E9 dans cet = =E9tablissement=20 hospitalier du 4 au 14 juillet. En provenance de l'a=E9roport de Quetta au Pakistan, Oussama=20 ben Laden a =E9t=E9 transf=E9r=E9 d=E8s son arriv=E9e =E0 Duba=EF = Airport.=20 Accompagn=E9 de son m=E9decin personnel et fid=E8le lieutenant,=20 qui pourrait =EAtre l'=C9gyptien Ayman al-Zawahari - sur ce point=20 les t=E9moignages ne sont pas formels -, de quatre gardes du=20 corps, ainsi que d'un infirmier alg=E9rien, Ben Laden a =E9t=E9 = admis=20 =E0 l'h=F4pital am=E9ricain, un b=E2timent de verre et de marbre = situ=E9=20 entre Al-Garhoud Bridge et Al-Maktoum Bridge. Chaque =E9tage comporte deux suites =ABVIP=BB et une quinzaine=20 de chambres. Le milliardaire saoudien a =E9t=E9 admis dans le = tr=E8s=20 r=E9put=E9 d=E9partement d'urologie du docteur Terry Callaway,=20 sp=E9cialiste des calculs r=E9naux et de l'infertilit=E9 = masculine. Joint=20 par t=E9l=E9phone =E0 de multiples reprises, le docteur Callaway = n'a=20 pas souhait=E9 r=E9pondre =E0 nos questions. En mars 2000 d=E9j=E0, l'hebdomadaire Asia Week publi=E9 =E0=20 Hongkong s'inqui=E9tait de la sant=E9 de Ben Laden, faisant =E9tat = d'un grave probl=E8me physique pr=E9cisant que ses jours =E9taient = en danger =E0 cause d'une =ABinfection r=E9nale qui se propage au=20 foie et n=E9cessite des soins sp=E9cialis=E9s=BB. Selon des = sources=20 autoris=E9es, Ben Laden se serait fait livrer dans son repaire=20 afghan de Kandahar l'ensemble d'un mat=E9riel mobile de=20 dialyse au cours du premier semestre 2000. Selon nos=20 sources, le =ABd=E9placement pour raison de sant=E9 de Ben=20 Laden=BB n'est pas le premier. Entre 1996 et 1998, Oussama=20 ben Laden s'est rendu plusieurs fois =E0 Duba=EF pour ses=20 affaires. Le 27 septembre, quinze jours apr=E8s les attentats du World=20 Trade Center, sur demande am=E9ricaine, la Banque centrale=20 des Emirats arabes unis a annonc=E9 avoir ordonn=E9 le gel des=20 comptes et des investissements de 26 personnes ou=20 organisations soup=E7onn=E9es d'entretenir des contacts avec=20 l'organisation de Ben Laden, notamment aupr=E8s de la Duba=EF=20 Islamic Bank. =ABLes rapports entre l'Emirat et l'Arabie Saoudite ont=20 toujours =E9t=E9 tr=E8s =E9troits, expliquent nos sources, les = princes=20 des familles r=E9gnantes qui avaient reconnu le r=E9gime des=20 talibans se rendaient souvent en Afghanistan. Un des=20 princes d'une famille r=E9gnante participait r=E9guli=E8rement =E0 = des chasses sur les terres de Ben Laden qu'il connaissait et=20 fr=E9quentait depuis de nombreuses ann=E9es.=BB Une liaison=20 a=E9rienne entre Duba=EF et Quetta est d'ailleurs quotidiennement=20 assur=E9e par les compagnies Pakistan Airlines et Emirates.=20 Quant aux avions priv=E9s =E9miratis ou saoudiens, ils desservent=20 fr=E9quemment Quetta o=F9 ils ne sont la plupart du temps ni=20 enregistr=E9 ni consign=E9 dans les registres de l'a=E9roport. Durant son hospitalisation, Oussama ben Laden a re=E7u la=20 visite de plusieurs membres de sa famille, de personnalit=E9s=20 saoudiennes et =E9miraties. Au cours de ce m=EAme s=E9jour, le=20 repr=E9sentant local de la CIA, que beaucoup de gens=20 connaissent =E0 Duba=EF, a =E9t=E9 vu empruntant l'ascenseur=20 principal de l'h=F4pital pour se rendre dans la chambre=20 d'Oussama ben Laden. Quelques jours plus tard, l'homme de la CIA se vante devant=20 quelques amis d'avoir rendu visite au milliardaire saoudien. De=20 sources autoris=E9es, l'agent de la CIA a =E9t=E9 rappel=E9 par sa = centrale le 15 juillet, au lendemain du d=E9part de Ben Laden=20 pour Quetta. A la fin juillet, les douaniers =E9miratis arr=EAtent =E0 = l'a=E9roport de=20 Duba=EF un activiste islamiste franco-alg=E9rien, Djamel Beghal.=20 D=E9but ao=FBt, les autorit=E9s fran=E7aises et am=E9ricaines sont = alert=E9es. Interrog=E9 par les autorit=E9s locales =E0 Abu Dhabi, = Beghal raconte qu'il a =E9t=E9 convoqu=E9 en Afghanistan fin 2000=20 par Abou Zoubeida - un responsable militaire de=20 l'organisation de Ben Laden, Al Quaida. La mission de=20 Beghal: faire sauter l'ambassade des Etats-Unis, avenue=20 Gabriel, pr=E8s de la place de la Concorde, =E0 son retour en=20 France. Selon diff=E9rentes sources diplomatiques arabes et les services=20 de renseignements fran=E7ais eux-m=EAmes, des informations tr=E8s=20 pr=E9cises ont =E9t=E9 communiqu=E9es =E0 la CIA concernant des=20 attaques terroristes visant les int=E9r=EAts am=E9ricains dans le=20 monde, y compris sur le territoire de l'Union. Un rapport de la DST dat=E9 du 7 septembre rassemble la=20 totalit=E9 de ces donn=E9es, pr=E9cisant que l'ordre d'agir devait = venir d'Afghanistan.=20 En ao=FBt, =E0 l'ambassade des Etats-Unis =E0 Paris, une r=E9union = d'urgence est convoqu=E9e avec la DGSE et les plus hauts=20 responsables des services am=E9ricains. Extr=EAmement inquiets,=20 ces derniers pr=E9sentent =E0 leurs homologues fran=E7ais des=20 demandes de renseignements tr=E8s pr=E9cises concernant des=20 activistes alg=E9riens, sans toutefois s'expliquer sur le sens=20 g=E9n=E9ral de leur d=E9marche. A la question =ABque craignez-vous = dans les jours qui viennent?=BB, les Am=E9ricains opposent un=20 mutisme difficilement compr=E9hensible. Les contacts entre la CIA et Ben Laden remontent =E0 1979=20 lorsque, repr=E9sentant de la soci=E9t=E9 familiale =E0 Istanbul, = il=20 commen=E7a =E0 enr=F4ler des volontaires du monde=20 arabo-musulman pour la r=E9sistance afghane contre l'Arm=E9e=20 rouge. Enqu=EAtant sur les attentats d'ao=FBt 1998 contre les=20 ambassades am=E9ricaines de Nairobi (Kenya) et de=20 Dares-Salaam (Tanzanie), les enqu=EAteurs du FBI ont=20 d=E9couvert que les traces laiss=E9es par les charges proviennent=20 d'un explosif militaire de l'arm=E9e am=E9ricaine et que cet=20 explosif a =E9t=E9 livr=E9 trois ans auparavant =E0 des Afghans = arabes,=20 les fameuses brigades internationales de volontaires, engag=E9s=20 au c=F4t=E9 d'Oussama ben Laden durant la guerre d'Afghanistan=20 contre l'arm=E9e sovi=E9tique. Poursuivant ses investigations, le FBI d=E9couvre des=20 =ABmontages=BB que la CIA avait d=E9velopp=E9s avec ses =ABamis=20 islamistes=BB depuis des ann=E9es. La rencontre de Duba=EF ne=20 serait donc que la suite logique d'une =ABcertaine politique=20 am=E9ricaine=BB End of A-List Digest From a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Thu Nov 1 20:01:37 2001 From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) Date: Thu, 01 Nov 2001 22:01:37 -0500 Subject: [A-List] capital employers v. finance capitalists? Message-ID: November 1, 2001 Wall Street Stunned by Treasury's Action on Long-Term Bonds By GRETCHEN MORGENSON With fears mounting that nine interest rate cuts in almost as many months may not be enough to rev up the United States economy, the Treasury Department added some high-test yesterday to the Federal Reserve's fuel mix. Unfortunately, Wall Street got run over in the process. Treasury officials said that their decision to halt the issuance of 30-year bonds was intended to save the government money. But traders scoffed at that explanation, viewing the move as an almost desperate effort to push down long-term interest rates, which had remained stubbornly high, and prod both corporate and individual borrowers to spend again. "Without a doubt the thing that the Fed really wants to do is get mortgage rates and corporate rates down," said Peter McTeague, government bond market strategist at Greenwich Capital Markets, a brokerage firm in Greenwich, Conn. "But mortgage rates weren't falling as much as people hoped because they are more driven by the long end of the yield curve. So they're trying every little trick in the basket. If the Fed funds rate isn't going to do it, let's see if we can do something else." The predicament for the Fed has been that even as it slashed interest rates from 6.5 percent at the beginning of the year to 2.5 percent last month, longer-term borrowing costs for corporations and individuals had not fallen as hard. For example, yields on the 10-year note, the benchmark for many mortgage rates and corporate bond issues, began the year at 5.1 percent and fell only to 4.5 percent by the time the Fed lowered rates for the ninth time on Oct. 2. By last week, 10- year yields had actually risen to 4.64 percent. Yields on the 30-year bond rose even as the Fed cut short-term rates. Starting the year at 5.45 percent, yields on the long bond hit 5.9 percent in May. In an interview yesterday, Peter Fisher, the Treasury's undersecretary for domestic finance, said that "today's decision is in no way an attempt to manage long-term interest rates. That is not what motivated us." But there is no doubt that the sticky nature of longer-term rates has exasperated policy makers. This is especially the case with mortgage rates, since consumer spending has been the only prop supporting the economy in recent months. Keeping consumers feeling flush has, therefore, become a top priority. One way to do this is by lowering mortgage rates, encouraging people to refinance their home loans and put more money in their pockets. The case may have become even more compelling after the report on Tuesday of a plunge in consumer confidence and other recent reports that home buying has started to slip. While mortgage refinancing activity has soared since Sept. 11, the Mortgage Bankers Association's index of home buying activity has instead stumbled. Existing home sales dropped 5.2 percent in September from a year earlier and 11.7 percent from August. But the plunge yesterday in yields on government securities will bring mortgage rates down significantly and soon. The Treasury's announcement stunned Wall Street firms. To be sure, the government had been reducing the amount of long-term bonds in the market by buying back issues periodically and not issuing new ones. But traders had come to believe that because the federal budget surpluses have all but vanished, the government would have to resume heavy borrowings to finance deficit spending. And the Treasury gave Wall Street none of the usual warning signs that come in the form of trial balloons floated before a policy shift as big as this one. When Treasury prices surged on the news of the bond's demise, most major brokerage firms were caught with significant losses. Investors rushed to buy soon-to-be extinct issues. Prices of long-term bonds soared, and their yields plunged, falling from 5.21 percent on Tuesday to 4.88 percent yesterday. It was the biggest single-day move since investors fled to the safety of government securities during the stock market crash of 1987. Traders who had sold long-term Treasuries short to hedge their holdings in corporate bonds and mortgage-backed securities got crushed. "This was a complete blind siding," one trader said. "They would have accomplished the same thing just by signaling it. But they decide not to signal it, and everybody on the Street got slammed." From a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Fri Nov 2 01:26:56 2001 From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2001 09:26:56 +0100 Subject: AW: [A-List] Israeli "intelligence" Message-ID: <4FC0BEA08BA4D51188F20002A5291B2617E523@MAILIX07> Dear Ian- I find your comments, frankly, out of touch with reality. The article is interesting and makes a lot of sense. Rule number one (I tell you this as a former diplomat) - keep your eyes open on all sides, and disregard no information whatsoever, out of ideological reasons! Kind regards Arno Tausch -----Urspr?ngliche Nachricht----- Von: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu [mailto:a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu] Gesendet: Mittwoch, 31. Oktober 2001 13:40 An: A-List (E-mail) Betreff: [A-List] Israeli "intelligence" News direct from Paul Wolfowitz's man in Scotland. Only the Israelis could come up with a scheme that links together all *their* enemies in one huge dastardly plot. And in whose interest is it for Pakistan's "shadowy ISI" to "establish" links between Iraq and al-Qaeda? Since when was the ISI a reliable source? Israeli intelligence warned US days before attacks IAN BRUCE The Herald, 31 October 2001 ISRAEL'S military intelligence service, Aman, issued an urgent warning of an impending terrorist "spectacular" against America, several days before the suicide bombers flew passenger airliners into New York's Trade Towers and the Pentagon on September 11. Aman had no details of the targets, but picked up enough indicators of major terrorist activity from a combination of informants and electronic eavesdropping to send out an alert, which also covered US interests in Britain, France and Germany. Much of the Israeli intelligence centred on Imad Mughniyeh, head of the Iranian-backed Hizbollah movement's foreign operations section, and on Dr Ayman Al Zawahiri, the Egyptian-born terrorist mastermind reputed to be Osama bin Laden's chosen successor. The Israelis say they have evidence linking both men to agents representing SSO, Iraq's foreign intelligence service, and believe Baghdad has provided finance and logistical support to them. Links between the terrorist network and Iraq have been established by Pakistan's shadowy ISI agency and by the Czech Republic's counter-intelligence service. Salah Suleiman, an Iraqi SSO agent, was detained on the Pakistan border last October after a series of trips into Taliban-controlled territory to meet bin Laden. After interrogation, he was deported. Iraqi agent, Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir Al-Ani, has been expelled by the Czechs for "conduct incompatible with his diplomatic status". They had been monitoring his activities after a tip-off from Israel that he was planning to bomb Radio Free Europe, a station financed by the CIA that broadcasts to Iraq and Iran. Baghdad regards the broadcasts as "an act of aggression". During the surveillance, they photographed Al-Ani with Mohammed Atta, the al Qaeda agent believed to have flown the first plane into the World Trade Centre. Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/31-10-19101-0-24-15.html From a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Fri Nov 2 02:23:42 2001 From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2001 11:23:42 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Israeli "intelligence" Message-ID: Arno Tausch writes: Dear Ian- I find your comments, frankly, out of touch with reality. The article is interesting and makes a lot of sense. Rule number one (I tell you this as a former diplomat) - keep your eyes open on all sides, and disregard no information whatsoever, out of ideological reasons! ===== Actually these were my comments but with the listserver apparently processing all mails without registering the original sender some clarity has been lost. My comments re Ian Bruce's article are based on a continuing surveillance of his very interesting and peculiar output in the provincial newspaper, The Herald, published in Glasgow, Scotland. For such a provincial newspaper journalist, he appears to be well-connected, if not so well-informed. Or should that be disinformed? My scepticism regarding his output is based on a succession of gung-ho articles he has published which, to be frank, are downright racist in their depiction of those whom our leaders are bombing with impunity. I can forward these articles to the list, and will be forwarding his articles in future anyway, for the purposes of further scrutiny. They reveal as much of what the establishment would like us to believe as they do of whatever is really happening on the ground. I don't disregard information for ideological reasons -- I am acutely aware of the strong possibility for disinformation being disseminated for ideological reasons. Bruce is only one in an endless stream of British journalists whose connections to the UK intelligence services are legion. Below is a post I forwarded to PEN-L in response to some queries regarding the Guardian newspaper, whose image as a liberal/left standard-bearer is belied by its historical and current role in the evolution of the British state. Posted to PEN-L on 3 October: Jim D. reasonably asks: Michael, shouldn't it be basic that we should distrust all of the bourgeois media -- not just the GUARDIAN -- because they have clear bourgeois biases, including favoring the national security state, etc.? Even though the New York TIMES doesn't seem to be connected with the CIA, I am very careful with what I believe in their stories. ===== Yes, absolutely right. The UK press generally serves a much more unified "market" which can be segmented according to politics and again according to presumed degree of affluence/education, giving highbrow rightwing crap, middlebrow rightwing crap, lowbrow, etc. The Guardian has traditionally occupied the "left", and has been put to use in various ways over the last 30 years, not least in helping to hobble Wilson/Callaghan/Foot Labour, supporting the breakaway Gaitskellite successor SDP, and ushering in the New Labour ascendancy. An analogous job to the dishing Labour from the left tactic is being accomplished now by the Daily Telegraph, which is more likely to complain of the Conservative Party selling out, and thus support every idiot punk Thatcherite who declares loyalty to the cause. A while back I deliberately inserted the mischievous little paragraph from Private Eye noting Telegraph editor Charles Moore's sighted exit from MI5 HQ. Given Britain's smaller size and historically more unified news media space, it's a very cosy club indeed. This means all newspapers are ripe for manipulation, overt and covert. It also means that information, however partial or distorted, can inadvertently leak out from time to time, especially when different branches of the secret state are conducting their own turf wars, as with the long tussle between MI5 and MI6, and even between different "wings" of MI5 itself. I suppose picking on the Guardian goes back to a point raised by Michael P. back in March/April or thereabouts, when he queried why it was that a significant proportion of forwarded news articles are from the Guardian. This got us into the merits of that specific paper, and on to Mark Jones' point about the historic relationship between the Guardian and the intelligence services, followed by Michael Pugliese's interventions, followed by my own research into the British state following the IMF UK 1976 episode, etc. There are people here who are on record as praising the reliability of the Guardian, and it maybe needs to be reiterated just how questionable that particular source really is, for all its housing of worthy social democrats over the years(e.g. Roy Hattersley), and even the odd radical (Paul Foot, Mark Steel - now at the Independent, Gary Younge, Seumas Milne). There are still plenty of Polly Toynbees, Jonathan Freedlands, Martin Kettles, Peter Prestons, Matthew Engels to keep the liberal intelligentsia happy. (But far better is the Tory Geoffrey Wheatcroft.) The image of the Guardian as hammer of the right is helped by its recent history of bringing down various Conservative Party Ministers, including Neil Hamilton and Jonathan Aitken. But the related point made by Mark Jones regarding the realignment of the permanent government towards New Labour and away from the increasingly unstable and unpredictable Conservatives, riven with factions and infighting thanks to the punk Thatcherites, adds a different gloss to the apparently laudable conduct of the Guardian as a haven of campaigning journalism. The Guardian also got in on the "stop Portillo" campaign, playing a bit part to the major roles taken by both Telegraph titles, whose own contributions were so clearly orchestrated to produce a wholly predictable outcome (Thatcher denying all support for Portillo just prior to the crucial MPs' vote) show that security service mischief-making is far from over in the British news media. You continue: BTW, traditionally the CIA was the "liberal" spy agency in the US (compared to the FBI). Its agents were sophisticated Ivy League types who hobnobbed with (and corrupted) liberals, social democrats, and laborites. The CIA traditionally embraced a more long-term and "enlightened" perspective than the FBI. Is the MI5 the same way? If so, one can learn something from them (and their allies in the media) while being extremely careful not to believe everything they say. ===== There is no doubt that MI5 has housed some seriously reactionary types over the years, too extreme even for many colleagues. MI6 has its own horrible history, laid out in detail by Stephen Dorril in his recent book, but, yes, if one can make comparisons then MI6 would be analogous to your characterisation of the CIA. Particularly in Northern Ireland, MI6 comes out rather well compared to the ruthlessness which characterised MI5 operations there, and which contributed to many civilian deaths and subverted whatever minimal norms of bourgeois liberal democracy remained. As Peter Taylor revealed in his "Brits" series and book, it was via MI6 that Mrs Thatcher broke her vow and "talked to terrorists". Meanwhile army types were horrified at what MI5 were getting up to. Some of this is revealed in both the David Leigh and Dorril/Ramsay books on the Wilson plots. There is also a much longer, detailed study by Paul Foot, "Who Framed Colin Wallace?", Wallace being an army information officer who was being fed all sorts of smears regarding Wilson, but whose uncovering of an establishment paedophile ring led to him being framed for manslaughter and jailed. It gets more complicated when someone like Foot, for example, who has no truck with the British state, can be relied upon to indulge his sectarian tastes by rubbishing e.g. Arthur Scargill, whose limitations are apparent to many on the left but whose pariah status on the right means that leftists' disaffections can be exploited, as with the attempt by Robert Maxwell and Roger Cook in 1990 to frame Scargill and Peter Heathfield for the misuse of NUM funds and the pocketing of large sums of Soviet miners' money sent to help striking British miners. Thus, to answer your question, I think it's a mixture of instinct, historical knowledge, cross-checking and inspired guesswork. An important question to answer is, "whose purposes are served by this reporting?" The advantage of a forum like this is that the latter particularly can be tested and others who are informed on related and similar matters can add to the common understanding. Marx's notion of determinations is useful here, given all the subtexts encountered in some of the topics we have focused on in recent times, whether on the IMF in Britain, the marginalisation of punk Thatcherism, the ascendancy of New Labour, etc. Not to mention the rather more global role performed by the Financial Times in its campaign against James Wolfensohn. In closing, you ask: BTW2, what is PRIVATE EYE's connection with the intelligence goons? ===== That's an intriguing one. I tried to cover that in my review of David Leigh's book, noting the relationship of certain individual staff members to the state (Auberon Waugh, Patrick Marnham, e.g.) and their toleration by editor Richard Ingrams whose own sympathy towards Thatcherism and loathing of Harold Wilson significantly skewed the content of the magazine, and led to the departure of people like Paul Foot and the noticeable reduction of commitment by other founders like Willie Rushton and John Wells, who were unhappy with the rather one-sided nature of the satire being employed. In certain respects the latterday Ingrams Eye looked like a comic book version of the Spectator. Under Ian Hislop's editorship, it's become a more equal opportunities satirist again, and Rushton and Wells returned, as did Paul Foot, to be joined by Francis Wheen, while old hacks like Peter Mackay, Nigel Dempster and Patrick Marnham were booted out. Meanwhile former owner Peter Cook encouraged Hislop to develop the investigative reporting side of the magazine. I think there is a generally healthy distrust of state and corporate power displayed in most of the magazine's contents. That attitude can, of course, be exploited by some in the intelligence services to score tactical points. To be independent of the goons does not immunise one from their manipulations. But I would reckon that the Eye's head and heart are generally in the right place, as concern state and corporate power at least. On the basis of current evidence, anyway. Michael K. ===== This does not explain the role of a provincial newspaper like the Herald. Until recently the Glasgow Herald, the paper serves a readership concentrated mostly in the west of Scotland, for obvious reasons. Intelligence angst about Scottish separatism, close links with Ireland/Northern Ireland, and now a large Pakistani emigre population would provide sufficient rationale for spooks to get busy. And busy they are. What I cannot understand is the point of Bruce's very provocative disquisitions on the "character" of the Afghan people -- just who is supposed to be impressed by that? Certainly not the large Pakistani community, which, incidentally, in my experience, was never enthusiastic about the "Islamic" ideas of General Zia (the US stooge who came to power via a bloody coup in 1977, paving the way for Brzezinski-inspired destabilisation of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul). Of course "provincial" newspapers, like foreign ones, however obscure, can be used in a technique known as "surfacing", where information comes to light in a faraway place and can then be relayed back to the intended audience under cover of simply reporting what others have been saying. Hence the career of Colin Wallace, British Army Information Officer serving in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s who was being fed lots of whacked out smears concerning Harold Wilson by the goons of MI5. Another feature of recent times has been the laments regarding the lack of "expertise" on Afghanistan and the Middle East generally. The CIA and allied agencies have been caught short because they have not engaged in the same levels of infiltration, subversion, etc., that they did under the Cold War. Better to sub-contract these activities to darker-skinned types who can live the alcohol-free, celibate and rough lifestyle necessary. The KGB had the good taste to lay on all kinds of tasty entrapments for our agents, after all. No such pickings in Kandahar. Thus which sub-contractor has been using this arrangement for its own benefit? Probably all of them, but certainly Israeli intelligence which, as the closest ally to the US, is in the best position to influence and manipulate according to its prerogatives. One need only see the energetic performances of Ehud Barak in the world media in recent months, talking about "terrorism" in such terms as to mirror the monochrome treatments routinely served up by Mossad et al. So, I am certainly open to considering evidence that backs up the tale being peddled by Mr Bruce. But I have to see it first. Meanwhile I've got plenty that suggests Mr Bruce is simply the current incarnation of Chapman Pincher, long a reliable establishment urinal (to use E.P. Thompson's wonderfully accurate description) whereby fragments of fact are deposited along with judicious helpings of disinformation, mischief and smear. Our job here is to evaluate what gets passed off as reportage and distil the urine accordingly. Michael Keaney From a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Fri Nov 2 03:29:27 2001 From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2001 12:29:27 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Strategy of tension Message-ID: It's no wonder our leaders worry about "dirty" bombs. They and their predecessors have manufactured most of them, and have had plenty of time to study the results of using depleted uranium ordnance in both Iraq and Kosovo. Anthrax having served its purpose, now we can ratchet up the tension with some alarmism about suitcase bombs. BTW, has anyone here ever seen the Sean Connery 1982 movie, "Wrong is Right", titled "The Man with the Deadly Lens" in Britain? It's uncannily close to what is going on now. Supposedly a satire on the relationship between US news media and politics, it centres on events in a fictional North African state whereby the CIA engineers the assassination of the "moderate" king in order to stop a possible alliance with the "extremists" who have been fighting a civil war against him until now. Then it's a question of how the US president can legitimately declare war on that country without losing face (and an election, more importantly) because of being uncovered as the assassin in the first place (a corner engineered for him by the CIA). This is achieved by the "discovery" and disarming of two suitcase atom bombs hanging from a flagpole in New York. War is declared, and the president wins the election. If you find a copy in the rental store, check it out. If anything it's more believable than anything you're likely to be told by Donald Rumsfeld. Not that this would be difficult, of course. ===== West fears terrorist 'dirty' bomb IAN BRUCE The Herald, 2 November 2001 THE ultimate nightmare for security services throughout the West is a terrorist "dirty" bomb made from high-grade nuclear waste packed around home-made explosives. Packed in the back of a van parked on the top storey of a high-rise car park in a city centre, it could inflict tens of thousands of casualties, some a generation away from the initial blast as a result of cancers and birth defects. The worst-case scenario, depending on wind speed and direction, power of the blast and materials used, could render parts of a city uninhabitable for the next century or two. All of it would be contingent on whether or not it rained within hours of the detonation. A decent shower would bring the most damaging radioactive particles rapidly to earth and limit the worst of the contamination. The Royal Navy's Clyde submarine base was established on the principle of "Faslane weather", an anchorage where it rained on a daily basis more often than not. It was a major unstated factor in the selection of Faslane as the home port for Britain's nuc-lear deterrent force. While there was virtually no risk of an atomic explosion, the average rainfall would, hopefully, diminish the aftermath of an accidental release of radioactive material. The fact that it also gave a ready access to the sea for Polaris missile boats was a bonus. Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist network has been actively seeking nuclear capability since the early 1990s. Its first attempts focused on the purchase of a ready-made warhead in the chaos of the Soviet Union's fragmentation. Even Moscow is still unsure whether it has a full inventory of the atomic weapons it deployed in the tens of thousands during the Cold War. There are unsubstantiated rumours that al Qaeda managed to buy two "backpack" nuclear demolition charges, weapons designed to be used by the Spetznaz, the Soviet equivalent of the SAS, behind Nato lines in the 1980s. But intelligence sources say that, if bin Laden has the warheads, then he lacks the enabling codes to detonate them. If he had them, then he would have used one or both to destroy New York's Trade Towers instead of relying on a complex hijack plan and the nerve of kamikaze pilots. Far more alarming and pos-sible is the adaptation of relatively easily-available nuclear material to a makeshift "dirty" bomb. According to the International Atomic Energy Authority, there have been 175 cases of illegal trafficking in nuclear material, and 201 cases of trafficking in medical and industrial radio-active waste since 1993. Only 18 of these cases have involved small amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium, the basic component of nuclear weapons. But 13 have happened in the last year. It takes 50lbs of specially treated uranium or 18lbs of plutonium to form the core of a bomb, but the process to convert it from radioactive mass to a warhead and then deliver that warhead to a specific target, is beyond the means of most states, never mind terrorist organisations. The cheaper option is to obtain the most radioactive material which can be stolen or bought on the black market: the waste from the hundreds of nuclear power stations dotted around the world. With a few kilos of the mixed plutonium and uranium, or better still caesium-137, a substance more toxic than Ebola virus and more enduring than diamonds, the ultimate terrorist would have the lethal coating for his poor man's atomic bomb. Most terrorist groups have access to commercial or military plastic explosives. The IRA used to make its bigger vehicle bombs from "Co-op mix", a combination of weedkiller, sugar, diesel, and various other ingredients found in most kitchens and garden huts. The trick with a dirty nuclear release is to trigger it upwind of the target area on a day when the breeze will spread the contamination as widely as possible. The accidental reactor meltdown and release of a windblown plume at Chernobyl in 1986 polluted almost 3000 square miles of the Ukraine and deposited dangerous levels of radioactivity across most of northern and western Europe. There have been 11,000 admitted cases of thyroid cancer in Ukraine and Belarus alone since then. Sheep in Wales are still being checked quietly for contamination, 15 years after the event. Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/2-11-19101-0-49-12.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Fri Nov 2 03:31:37 2001 From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2001 12:31:37 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Strategy of tension Message-ID: UK nuclear plants may be next for kamikaze jet attacks IAN BRUCE The Herald, 2 November 2001 THE crashing of a hijacked passenger jet into Sellafield nuclear plant on the Cumbrian coast, could release 44 times more lethal radiation than the 1986 Chernobyl disaster in the Ukraine. Gordon Thompson, executive director of the US Institute for Resource and Security Studies in Massachusetts, says such an incident would send a plume of deadly particles into the atmosphere, and certainly contaminate much of Britain and Ireland. Depending on wind direction and speed, the plume might spread over much of the near-continent, causing two million cancer cases in the next 50 years. British Energy, the East Kilbride-based body that supervises the UK's seven gas-cooledatomic power stations, dismissed Mr Thompson's claims as "alarmist". But he was backed by Mohamed El Baradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Authority, the UN watchdog authority that regulates safety standards for the nuclear industry. He said targeting nuclear facilities to cause "a Chernobyl-style disaster" was the most probable choice for terrorist groups hoping to "incite panic, contaminate property, and inflict death and injury among civilians." The path of the PanAm plane blown up by a bomb over Lockerbie in 1988 was a few moments' flight time from Sellafield. Full article: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/2-11-19101-0-48-27.html NOTE: Both Syria and Iran were in the frame for the Lockerbie bombing, until their support for Desert Storm in 1991 was required. Colonel Gaddafi was wheeled out to serve as whipping boy on that occasion. Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Fri Nov 2 03:34:33 2001 From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2001 12:34:33 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Strategy of tension Message-ID: Of course the unintended consequences of scare campaigns include workers acting in their self-interest, not just government officials and business leaders. ===== Postal staff in walkout ANNETTE McCANN The Herald, 2 November 2001 POSTAL workers in Edinburgh staged a walkout yesterday after the wages of those who refused to return to work following a recent anthrax scare were deducted. John Keggie, the deputy general secretary of the Communications Workers' Union (CWU) condemned the situation as "irresponsible" given the pressures facing postal workers following the US terrorist attacks. Around 85 workers at the Brunswick Road delivery office were affected. The protest was staged between 6am and 8am, leading to delays to the morning deliveries in Leith. The CWU is calling for an inquiry and for disciplinary action to be taken against the management. But a Royal Mail spokesman said: "The staff involved in the walk-out were a group who refused to work normally after the building had been given the all-clear by the police." Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/2-11-19101-0-46-48.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Fri Nov 2 03:54:30 2001 From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) Date: Fri, 02 Nov 2001 10:54:30 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Israeli "intelligence" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011102104940.030b0608@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Michael Keaney wrote: >with the listserver apparently >processing all mails without registering the original sender some >clarity has been lost. This may be my fault. While attempting to make the archive more accessible I set the reply-to function to delete the original sender and haven't managed to correct it yet. Ho hum. Sign your emails is the best I can suggest right now. Mark From a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Fri Nov 2 04:16:42 2001 From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) Date: Fri, 02 Nov 2001 11:16:42 +0000 Subject: [A-List] fwd: paper by Alexander N. Domrin on Russia Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011102111230.00a9eaf0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Alexander N. Domrin1 Ten Years Later: Society, 'Civil Society' & the Russian State. Conference ?Ten Years Later: The Development of Russian Civil Society?, Wittenberg University, Springfield, OH, November 3, 2001. I. Grazhdanskoe obschestvo (civil society) is becoming a new mantra of the Russian government and the political elite in general. The term is widely used in Russian political lexicon today. A reference to ?creation of civil society? or its ?further development? is usually present in a typical set of arguments of Russian policy-makers endorsing certain political initiatives in the country. Work on ?developing structures of civil society in Russia? is regularly discussed during meetings of President Putin with leaders of parliamentary factions or with presidential envoys (as happened, for instance, on 28 June 2001 during Putin's meeting with envoys Petr Latyshev (Urals federal district) and Leonid Drachevskii (Siberian federal district))2. Even the creation of a coalition of two political parties - pro-Putin Edinstvo (Unity) and Primakov-Luzhkov's Otechestvo-Vsya Rossiya (Fatherland-All Russia) - was welcomed by President Putin for two main reasons: because it was expected to become an ?important step aimed at strengthening and developing the political system, and creating civil society?3. The number of registered public organizations in Russia has reached approximately 300,0004, including more than 70,000 social and noncommercial organizations, which are directly or indirectly involved in charitable work. Charity organizations unite about 2.5 million citizens providing assistance to about 30 million Russians5. Reportedly, the number of Russian regions that have formal cooperation arrangements with, for instance, groups working with orphans and the disabled, has risen from 12 (out of 89) in 1998 to 40 in 20016. Not by a coincidence, it was on 12 June 2001, a symbolic date in Russia's most recent history7 and an official Russia Day holiday, that President Putin held a meeting with representatives of wide-ranging (although far from being comprehensive) public organizations. All in all, the meeting in the Kremlin was attended by 28 NGOs, including the Association of Beekeepers, the Allotment Gardeners' Federation, the All-Russian Society of Stamp Collectors, as well as those uniting lawyers, invalids, journalists, consumers, ecologists and even bards. It was proposed to form a Civic Chamber attached to the Office of the President. The Chamber is expected to become an important component of the process of building a civil society and of development of grass-roots activities of population. Concrete preparations for creation of such Chamber are being made by Gleb Pavlovsky, a former dissident, ?political prisoner?, and now the head of a high-profile Foundation for Effective Policy, and Vladislav Surkov, a senior official of the presidential administration. It's expected that the Civic Chamber will be preceded by a certain Civic Forum (or a Union of the Civic NGOs), which is to be convened on November 16-17, 2001 with participation of more than 250 NGOs8. The current rapid intensification of dialogues of the Russian political elite and social scientists on civil society and problems of its evolution is not accidental. Yet another stunning defeat of radical ?reformers? in the Russian parliamentary elections in December 1999, and Putin's decisive victory in the presidential campaign in March 2000, are viewed by many observers as the end of ?revolutionary changes? in Russia9. In a popular expression, civil society is the point where revolution ends and routine (byt) of a democratic regime starts. In a certain way, the term grazhdanskoe obschestvo is following the pattern of the use of another concept more than ten years ago - pravovoe gosudarstvo (Russian equivalent of Rechtsstaat or ?law-governed state?, ?state based on the rule of law?). Indeed, ?civil society? is probably as often mentioned now as the words glasnost' (openness, transparency) or pravovoe gosudarstvo were used in the perestroika (restructuring, change, reform) period of the Soviet history in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Back in June of 1991, it was observed (in a report prepared for the U.S. Congressional Research Service), that ?voluntary or involuntary lack of consensus on the meaning of the rule of law, broad interpretation of the term, and attempts to use it in political demagogy as a populist tool lead to outright abuses of the concept?10. And just like perestroika itself has transformed in reality and public consciousness into katastroika (from ?catastrophe?)11, and the ?architect of perestroika?, Michail Gorbachev, deservedly enjoys the support of not more than 0.5 percent of the Russian electorate (who voted for him in the 1996 presidential elections), indiscriminate use of the term ?civil society? in Russian political doublespeak today can potentially lead to the same consequences tomorrow12. The more politicians speak about ?civil society?, the less meaningful it becomes. As an example, let's consider two official documents of the State Duma: Plan of ?Civil Society? Legislative Drafting 13 and Recommendations of Parliamentary Hearings ?Russian Federalism and Problems of Development of Civil Society?. The Plan of ?Civil Society? Legislative Drafting was adopted by the State Duma in the beginning of 1995 and contained titles of 31 bills. Besides bills aimed at regulating the establishment and activities of public associations (No.1) and charity organizations (No.2) or formulating ?General Principles of Organization of Local Government in the Russian Federation? (No.11), the list also included so different in their constitutional significance and scope of legal regulation draft acts as ?On Election of the RF President? (No.13), ?On Election of Deputies of the State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly? (No.12), ?On Referendum in RF? (No.14), ?On the RF Constitutional Assembly? (No.16), ?On Alternative Civil Service? (No.3), ?On Political Parties? (No.6), on the one hand, and ?On Distribution of Erotic Production? (No.30), ?On Prohibition of Propaganda of Fascism in RF? (No.26), ?On Protection of Linguistic, Cultural and Other Traditions in RF? (No.28), on the other hand. Similarly, parliamentary hearings at the Russian State Duma on ?Russian Federalism and Problems of Development of Civil Society? (15 November 1999) led to an adoption of three sets of ?recommendations? in various areas of social activities. In the area of scientific research, the participants in the hearings recommended Russian scholars, among other things, to concentrate on such eternal problems as ?humanism and federalism?, and on such vague topics as ?fusion of the energy of civil society with the policy of sustainable development?, ?federalism and civil consciousness of the Russian society?, or ?civil self-governing society - a condition of creation and development of real federalism in Russia?. In the sphere of information and mass media, it was advised to ?concentrate on the necessity of a productive dialogue between political parties, social movements and the state power, between the Center and regions aimed at reaching political consensus between them?, to introduce a special section ?Individual, Civil Society, Federalism in Russia? in a number of Russian scholarly magazines (Zhurnal rossiyskogo prava, Pravo i ekonomika, Svobodnaya mysl', Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya, Polis, Federalizm, etc.), to start a new talk show on TV called ?Civil Society and Federalism in Russia?. Apart from long-term and, to a large extent, hypothetical and detached from current Russian reality goals (such as creation of ?complex programs, federal and regional, aimed at developing and strengthening civil society?, or establishment of an ?institute for research in problems of civil society?), the third set of proposals (?in the legal and administrative sphere?) contained a short list of just six draft laws which, from the point of view of organizers of the conference and its participants, would assist Russia in moving closer to ?real federalism? and to ?strengthen civil society in our country at the contemporary stage?. The proposed bills included: ?On Responsibility of Officials for Violations of Civil Rights and Freedoms, Constitutional Foundations and Principles?; ?On Guaranteeing Consistency of Legal Acts of Subjects of the Russian Federation with the Federal Legislation?; ?On the Mechanism of Rendering Decisions of the RF Constitutional Court?; ?On the Mechanism of Recognizing Unconstitutional the Legal Acts of Subjects of the Russian Federation Contravening the Federal Legislation?; ?On Responsibility of Officials for Violations of Constitutional Rights of People?; ?On Information Safeguarding Citizens' Security?. The problem with that set of draft laws is that, despite the fact that it includes a very small number of titles, two of them basically repeat each other (bills ?On Responsibility of Officials for Violations of Civil Rights and Freedoms, Constitutional Foundations and Principles? and ?On Responsibility of Officials for Violations of Constitutional Rights of People?), and two others intend to regulate very close aspects of law and could probably be united in one (bills ?On Guaranteeing Consistency of Legal Acts of Subjects of the Russian Federation with the Federal Legislation? and ?On the Mechanism of Recognizing Unconstitutional the Legal Acts of Subjects of the Russian Federation Contravening the Federal Legislation?). It's hard to understand from the title of another bill (?On Information Safeguarding Citizens' Security?) what area of social relations it intends to regulate. In case of adoption of the last bill (?On the Mechanism of Rendering Decisions of the RF Constitutional Court?), the new act would most probably be eventually recognized violating the Russian Constitution. Indeed, if the activities of the RF Constitutional Court are regulated by a Federal Constitutional Law (?On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation? of 24 July 1994), the proposed ?mechanism of rendering decisions? of the Constitutional Court could, in principle, be introduced not by a regular parliamentary act, but only by another Constitutional Law. Yet, the Russian Constitution contains an exhaustive list of Federal Constitutional Laws (on referendum, on arbitration courts, on the Commissioner for Human Rights, on martial law, on a state of emergency, etc.), but the proposed act is not among them. Finally (and the most important in the context of this article), it's totally unclear what all those bills have in reality to do with civil society, and in what way their adoption, in the opinion of the law-makers, would contribute to development of civil society in Russia or its ?strengthening?. II. The concept of civil society has a longer history in transitional regimes of Central and Eastern Europe. Already in the late 1970s, the civil society doctrine was understood as a program of resistance to the Communist government in Poland. To a large extent, the ?velvet revolutions? themselves were ?carried out in the name of 'civil' society?14. Unlike in Central and Eastern Europe, where such terms as ?civil society?, ?citizen's committees?, ?citizen's assemblies?, ?citizen's initiatives?, etc. were the ?most frequently used terms in the public discourse of that time?15, revolutionary (in their essence) legal and political reforms were initiated at the end of the 1980s in the USSR not under ?civic? slogans, but under slogans of Soviet transition to ?democracy? and the ?rule of law?16. The term ?democratic? was present in the titles of the most radical groups and movements in the country: from Novodvorskaya's schizoid Democratic Union to massive (at that time) Democratic Russia and from the Social Democratic Platform of the CPSU to Travkin's Democratic Party of Russia and Rutskoy's ?Communists for Democracy?. Symbolically, one of the very first political groups that used the term grazhdansky in its title was Grazhdansky soyuz (the Civic Union), the most promising and influential democratic organization standing in the opposition to domestic and foreign policy of the Russian government in general, and to the disastrous course of Chubais' privatization and the experiments of market bolshevists17 with the Russian economy in particular18. Refusal of Yeltsin and his radical supporters to hold a dialogue with the Civic Union in the second half of 1992 marginalized Russian politics and channelled governmental economic and social policy to predominantly confrontational and eventually violent forms. With the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, internal content of the idea of civil society so drastically changed that some authors even began speaking about the ?fall of the concept of civil society?19. This observation is probably correct if we mean an exclusively negative, destructive component of the concept - a denial of the state per se as an apparatus of force; mobilization of societal resistance aimed at overthrowing the state. However, in the words of Bronislaw Geremek (a former Polish Solidarity activist and subsequently the parliamentary leader of the Democratic Union, the largest of the post-Solidarity parties), civil society today ?cannot and should not base itself on emotions, but on the building of carefully nurtured institutions... The main task now is constructing democratic mechanisms of stability?. And in the opinion of Larry Diamond (of the Hoover Institution), the ?single most important and urgent factor in the consolidation of democracy is not civil society but political institutionalization?20. ?Democratic mechanisms of stability? and ?political institutionalization? are the key words here. And in this respect the conclusions of Geremek and Diamond are highly relevant to Russia as well. At the first glance, the term ?civil society? is quite extensively represented in contemporary Russian legislation. The term ?civil society? has been used in more than a hundred legal acts and official documents (adopted in 1991-2001). Such acts include at least 10 presidential decrees, half of which were issued in March-June of 1996 at the height of Yeltsin's presidential campaign21, two presidential directives22, three resolutions of federal legislative bodies (Supreme Soviet and State Duma)23, two resolutions of the RF Constitutional Court, and one resolution of the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow District24; three federal programs: on ?Continuation of Reforms and Stabilization of Russian Economy? in 1993, on support to book-printing in Russia in 1996-2001, and ?Culture of Russia (2001-2005)?25, and at least three resolutions of the RF Government26. ?Civil society? is also mentioned in numerous legal acts and official documents adopted in regions of Russia27, for instance, in six resolutions of Moscow Government28, in three addresses of regional leaders of Russia (Bashkortostan29 and Tatarstan), and in a number of other acts of executive or legislative bodies30. Lip service to the necessity of developing or strengthening ?civil society? in Russia was paid in all ?State of the Nation? annual addresses of the Russian President to the Federal Assembly (1994-2001), as well as in the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation31 and in the Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation32. Yet, apparently, there is only one federal Law - ?On Education? (No. 3266-1 of July 22, 1992) - that uses this term. A quarter of all official documents mentioning ?civil society? (to be precise, 25 of them) are international agreements, communique or memoranda (including those adopted by the UN, UNESCO, OSCE, G-8, the Council of Europe and its Parliamentary Assembly, the Supreme Council of Russia-Belarus Union, as well as a joint statement by Presidents Putin and Kostunica of October 27, 2000 in Moscow). This figure will become even bigger if we add documents hardly having significant legal meaning (like an information report of the RF Central Bank of October 3, 1995, or four orders, three letters and one resolution of the RF Ministry of General and Professional Education and the RF Ministry of Education)33, plus those adopted by lesser institutions and organizations (like three resolutions of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of February-March 1996, or a resolution of the 3rd Congress of Russian Judges of March 25, 1994 ?On the Concept of the RF Judicial System?). As a result, a comprehensive Dictionary of Russian Legislation: Terms, Concepts, Definitions contains about 25,000 legal terms and definitions but there is not ?civil society? among them34. Even the most fundamental commentaries to the RF Constitutions don't mention ?civil society? in their indexes35. III. Russian legislation is not the only one having unsettled relations with the term ?civil society?. The concept of ?civil society? remains a matter of much dispute predominantly among scholars of philosophy and political theory. Civil society itself is a philosophical concept (which is also used in political science and sociology). Scholars trace the origins of this doctrine to the works of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Bodin, Grotius, Gobbs, Milton, Spinoza, Locke, classics of French and German Enlightenment (Montesqieu, Rousseau, Pufendorf, Leibniz, Thomasius, Wolf), as well as to the system of civil society developed by Hegel36. The concept of civil society is much closer to contemporary political studies rather than to legal research. A sample search in just one magazine - Journal of Democracy in the 1990s - indicated at least 19 major publications dedicated to ?paradoxes?, ?renovation?, ?democratization?, ?resurgence?, ?awakening? and other perturbations of civil society in various parts of the world, including Russia and other post-communist countries37. On the other hand, publications dedicated to legal aspects of the concept in Russian or foreign academic periodicals and editions are extremely rare. In legal terms, civil society does not have a strict definition either in Russian or Western law. It is practically unknown in American legislation. The term and its definitions are absent in such sources as Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law, Ballentine's Law Dictionary, with Pronunciations, Mellinkoff's Dictionary of American Legal Usage or in Brian A. Garner's A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage. Burton's Legal Thesaurus contains 27 associated concepts of 'civil' - from civil law to civil war, from civil contract to civil disobedience, and from civil service to civil suit, but there is no ?civil society? among them. A fundamental reference edition Words & Phrases. Permanent Edition. 1658 to Date (1964-2001) consists of more than 100 volumes and includes ?all judicial constructions and definitions of words and phrases by the state and federal courts from the earliest times, alphabetically arranged and indexed?, except ?civil society?. Black's Law Dictionary is presumably the only known American law dictionary which contains a legal description of ?civil society?, but that doesn't help either, because that source defines the term as ?the political body of a state or nation; the body politic? (p.1396) which basically incorporates the whole spectrum of socio-political relations in the country38. Naturally, the fact itself that the term ?civil society? can hardly be found in the U.S. legislation does not necessarily mean that civil society does not exist in the U.S. It means, however, that civil society cannot be instituted by special parliamentary acts or executive orders and is created and nurtured in decades of social development. Various authors offer different and sometimes contradictory definitions of ?civil society? (or, like Bronislaw Geremek and contemporary Russian legal scholar V.M. Lebedev, refuse to define it or delimit its interrelations with the law-governed state at all)39. For example, ?moderately restrictive? definition of ?civil society? proposed by M. Steven Fish has room for Gaidar's DemRossiya (whose role and legacy are favorably evaluated by Fish), but allegedly excludes ?fanatical organizations and groups that seek to seize control of the state and rule exclusively?40 (emphasis added. - AD). On the other hand, Alexander Lukin correctly describes Democratic Russia and other radical ?'democratic' activists? in Russia as viewing democracy ?not as a system of compromises among various groups and interests... but as the unlimited power of 'democrats' replacing unlimited power of the communists?41 (emphasis added. - AD). Thus, Democratic Russia certainly meets Fish's definition of a ?fanatical organization? and can not be considered a ?civil society? group (or ?civic group?). Before speaking about the peculiarities of Russian interpretations of civil society, it's necessary to state that, despite all misunderstandings and periodic use of the term in political demagoguery, rehabilitation of the concept of civil society in Russian science and political life is certainly a very positive accomplishment in itself. Needless to say, for many decades, there was no place in Soviet social sciences (including law) for an objective, unbiased study of such complex concepts as ?civil society?, ?rule of law? or ?separation of powers?. The dogmatic view on the nature of the Soviet society42 as a ?society without conflicts? (beskonfliktnoe obschestvo) made any serious research of those doctrines irrelevant. The Philosophical Dictionary (1975) described ?civil society? exclusively as a concept of ?pre-Marxist philosophy?43. Sergei S. Alexeev, a Sverdlovsk legal scholar and a future Chairman of the USSR Constitutional Supervision Committee, insisted that law ?by its nature cannot be above the state? and that rule of law is a ?deceitful, false, scientifically untenable (lzhivaya, fal'shivaya, nauchno nesosyatel'naya) bourgeois theory?. Avgust A. Mishin interpreted the legal status of President in the U.S. and other foreign countries as that of the ?constitutional monarch?, a ?somewhat atavism?, a ?sign of a philistine admiration for Crown?. In 1989, Moscow professor Vladimir N. Danilenko still argued that judicial constitutional review provides ?wide opportunities for an assault on rights and freedoms?44. One more general observation. The Ideological Department of the CPSU Central Committee may have collapsed, but a typical partiyniy approach still has its staunch supporters among certain Western experts. Just like the Communist propagandists were explaining virtually all negative features of the Soviet realities either by foreign capitalist conspiracies or by ?birth marks of the damned pre-1917 Russian past?, these modern activists of Western agitprop prove to be every bit as ideological as their Bolshevik predecessors and find explanations to current Russian problems in anything other than crimes and misdeeds of Yeltsin's kleptocratic regime45 or in mistakes of the ?experts? themselves, for years providing Russian ?reformers? with ?bad advice? in ?fatally-flawed macroeconomic policy?46. In his paper ?Market Reform, Democracy, and Civil Society after Communism? Anders ?slund repeats an old libel when calling the Russian parliament (which was dissolved by Yeltsin in 1993) ?pre-democratic and highly unrepresentative? (p. 17). ?Pre-democratic?? Unlike the USSR Congress of People's Deputies (elected in March 1989), the Russian parliament was elected after abolition of the CPSU Supremacy Clause (in Article 6 of the USSR and RSFSR Constitutions), without such ?filters? as the system of ?electoral commissions?47 or reservation of a third of all seats in the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) for representatives of ?public associations? (like CPSU, Komsomol, and other CPSU-controlled organizations). At its very first session (held on May 29 - June 16, 1990), the Russian CPD elected Yeltsin, the most visible radical politician in the country, as its Chairman. Upon Yeltsin's initiative the parliament introduced presidency in Russia48, granting the Russian president extensive powers, including those overlapping powers of the Union President. The Congress also declared that presidential elections were to be held in about three weeks (on June 12, 1991), thus guaranteeing Yeltsin, the only all-Russian leader at that time, a definite priority over other candidates49. It was the same parliament that ?defended? democracy, Constitution and Soviet President in the days of the ?soap opera? coup in August 1991, and then pushed dissolution of the Union Legislature and stripped the USSR deputies of their rights and privileges. Democratic record of the first Russian parliament is unquestionable. Half a year after formation of the Russian parliament, U.S. Senator Cranston introduced ?Report of the Survey Mission to the Soviet Union (July 29 - August 3, 1990)? (prepared by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)) and endorsed the report's statement saying that ?the legislature of the RSFSR is at the forefront of political reform?50. Next year, Representative Schaefer ?applaud[ed] the anticoup resistance spearheaded by democratically elected leaders?. He ?especially regognize[d] the resistance displayed by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic, led by its speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov?. In the Congressman's words, ?the legitimacy and authority of these democratically elected Russian leaders [Khasbulatov, Yeltsin, Sobchak. - AD] helped undermine crucial military support for the coup plotters?51. It was ?slund himself who in 1991 described Ruslan Khasbulatov, Professor of Economics and a future leader of parliamentary opposition to Yeltsin52, as a ?radical economist [who] ascended to political prominence with appropriate visibility?53. In the words of Sergei Kovalev (20 January 1992), who was named by David Remnick ?Andrei Sakharov's greatest disciple in the human rights movement?54, ?for the very first time in its history, those people are in power in Russia who are elected by people and express real interests of people?55. Kovalev himself was elected to the Russian parliament and chaired the Human Rights Committee of the Russian Supreme Soviet. Was the first Russian parliament ?highly unrepresentative?? According to official figures of the Central Election Commission, on March 4, 1990, 6,705 candidates ran for 1,068 seats in the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) - an average of more than six per district. There were more than 4 candidates in 300 electoral districts, and more than 20 (!) in 24 of them. The reports of the U.S. Federal Election Commission and the New York-based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights recognized the 1990 elections of the RSFSR CPD as ?the freest ever held in Russia?56. In an independent opinion of an Irish scholar, ?just as an abolition of the Party's leading role in society signaled the end of its monopoly on political life, so too the centralized Soviet government was undermined by the new parliamentary institutions. Their creation inaugurated the final crisis of Soviet power: they challenged the legitimacy of central rule from Moscow and heralded the end of the Soviet empire... Indeed, the Spring [of 1990] election campaign ... may be seen as the high-point of the democratic debate?57. It's not the first time that ?slund defames the first Russian parliament. He first dismissed it as ?pre-democratic? in his notorious article of 1994 ?Russia's Success Story?58. ?slund justified Yeltsin's violent coup d'etat59, because, in his opinion, the Russian Constitution was ?until December 1993, Russia's fundamental problem?60 (emphasis added. - AD) and, naturally, didn't deserve a better fate than it's de facto suspension in September 1993. Similarly, in his conference paper ?slund refuses to recognize the Russian parliament elected in 1990 as a ?parliament? at all and says that the first parliamentary elections were held in Russia ?almost two years after [Russia] attempted radical economic reform program[s]?, i.e. in December 1993 (p.23). But the new parliament didn't meet ?slund's expectations either. Already in the 1993 elections of the State Duma, the party of ?slund's cronies Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais suffered a catastrophic defeat (just like other radical ?reformers?)61. 85% of those who participated in the elections voted against Russia's Choice, despite a disproportionate use of TV broadcasting and other media by the party. As a result, when the investigation by Russia's independent Accounting Chamber (modeled on the U.S. General Accounting Office) came to a conclusion that Chubais' privatization (especially the loans-for-shares scheme) had been accomplished with massive fraud, ?slund didn't have any arguments against the Accounting Office's findings and dismissed them asserting that the Accounting Chamber ?is alas controlled by the Communist-dominated parliament?62. For information of Western readers: neither the State Duma (lower chamber of the Russian Federal Assembly), not the Federation Council (upper chamber) has ever been ?dominated? by the CPRF (alone or in a bloc with other friendly parliamentary factions, like the Agrarian Party), and the Accounting Chamber has never been ?controlled? by them. And ?slund knows that63. (More on other ?slund's myths and half-truths see footnote 119)64. IV. Despite all differences in the understanding of ?civil society? by Russian scholars, politicians, and legislators65, we can nevertheless try to formulate certain common and more or less accepted approaches. Unlike their Western counterparts who consider civil society an ?intermediary phenomenon, standing between the private sphere and the state? (Larry Diamond)66, ?an autonomous, self-regulating domain independent of the State? (Adam B. Seligman)67, thus placing a dividing line between civil society and the state, Russian scholars and policy-makers tend to interpret the ?law-governed state? (pravovoe gosudarstvo) as a political manifestation (ipostas') of ?civil society? (emphasis added. - AD). Rule of law is unquestionably a key element in sustaining the development of civil society, but a law-governed state is viewed not as if it is separated from civil society, but as a reality, which is based on the latter. Interrelations between the law-governed state and civil society are understood by Russian scholars as relations between form and substance, as a balanced, mutually restricted cooperation68. Civil society is interpreted not as diminishing the law-governed state, but rather completing it69. Overall, Russian scholars are hesitant to consider civil society as the uncontrolled realm of individuals. Following Hegel, Russian scholars tend to conclude that civil society doesn't exist before the state or outside of it. As if arguing with one of the above quoted authors (Adam Seligman), Oleg Rumyantsev, the Secretary of the (parliamentary) Russian Constitutional Commission in 1990-1993, wrote: ?Civil society is not absolutely autonomous, because it experiences certain influence from the state, doesn't exist before or outside of the latter, but coexists with its obvious reality which in a way embraces it?70 (emphasis added. - AD). The state provides protection to civil society, including protection of citizens' life and health, and maintenance of law and order. In Russian interpretation, civil society cannot be established at the state's expense. The state is responsible for maintenance of social justice in the country and approximation of levels of material wealth of citizens. With its protective foreign and defense policy, the state exercises its role as the ultimate guarantor of the existence of civil society and the Nation71. Even Western scholars do not consider civil society as an absolute value in itself. M. Steven Fish, for instance, speaks in quite positive terms about the absence of a ?vigorous civil society? in Russia in post-Soviet days, which was an ?advantage? for Gaidar's ?shock therapy?, because it reduced the ?strong popular resistance? to ?economic liberalization?72. Indeed, Russian radical ?reformers? (and their foreign advisors) cannot be consistent, sincere or logical when demanding creation (or development) of civil society in Russia today, because the absence of civil society (or its weakness) in the beginning of the 1990s was one of the most important factors that actually allowed them to exercise the pillage of the country under disguise of ?reforms?. It also deserves mentioning that the Draft Constitution prepared by the (parliamentary) Russian Constitutional Commission in 1990-1993 contained a special chapter dedicated to civil society. The Constitution of the Republic of Crimea of 1992 actually has such a chapter, and it was drafted with the support of members and experts of the Russian Constitutional Commission. Naturally, there was no room for a chapter on civil society in the semi-authoritarian, superpresidential, ?victor's Constitution?73 of Yeltsin74. To be successful, development of civil society in Russia has to be accompanied by strengthening Russian statehood. In Putin's words (from his address to the June 2001 meeting with NGOs), ?Great Russia is a great society?. Russian people are tired of state weakening activities of radical social groups and organizations that came to existence at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s; those organizations, whose motto can be expressed in the words of an Osip Mandelshtam's poem: ?We live but don't feel the country under us? (My zhivem pod soboyu ne chuya strany). Richard Rose's 7-year-old observation that ?if forced to choose, a majority of East Europeans would prefer weak and ineffective government to strong government?75 is no longer correct in respect to Russia. One of the main reasons of a stable and guaranteed electoral success of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (and an important factor of victory of pro-Putin Unity in the 1999 parliamentary elections) can be explained by the fact that 42.1 of its supporters consider the KPRF program and activities ?state-oriented?76, whereas only 21.6 and 20 percent of voters of Yabloko and the Union of Rightist Forces find it important that their parties will work for strengthening Russian statehood77. According to a recent opinion poll, restoration of state power is considered the main unifying and mobilizing idea in Russia now. 35 percent of respondents named ?the revival of Russia as a mighty global power? as capable of uniting the Russian people comparing to 13 percent who named communism and socialism, 7 percent who named capitalism, 6 percent - democracy, 5 percent - Russia's ?uniqueness as a nation?, and 3 percent - religion78. V?clav Havel's description of civil society as a ?social space that fosters the feeling of solidarity between people and love for one's community?79 is very close to the Russian traditionalist understanding of the concept. According to a contemporary scholar from Siberia, ?civil society is a society of citizens having not only a certain level of legal consciousness, but a sense of national pride... love to one's fatherland?80. A number of public organizations may disagree that their views are characterized by Vladimir Kartashkin81 (a well-known Russian specialist in international law from the Institute of State and Law and the head of the presidential administration's Commission for Human Rights) as ?destructive?, but that's exactly how they are viewed not only by the Commission, but by the overwhelming majority of Russians. Although Kartashkin's statement was immediately dismissed by such NGOs (first of all, by the human rights group Memorial known for its disproportionate denouncement of Russian history and state82), the same approach was expressed by Vyacheslav Igrunov, a Soviet human rights activist, now a leading figure in the democratic Yabloko party, a federal State Duma deputy and Director of the Institute of Humanitarian and Political Studies. At a press conference of the Civic Forum organizing committee, Igrunov appealed to the Russian public organizations to stop ?futile exercises in fault-finding? (besplodnoe kritikanstvo) and urged that they turn to creative work in cooperation with the state. For many years, in Igrunov's words, the confrontational attitude was the most essential and characteristic element of certain NGOs, but now it's outdated. Confrontation leads to marginalization of members of such groups and groups themselves, and eventually marginalizes the ideas which are exploited by such people and organizations.83 Even the U.S. Congress-funded Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty had to recognize that ?there are, of course those groups which reject any kind of cooperation?84 with Russian authorities in their activities. Such groups certainly have their right to ?reject any kind of cooperation? with the Russian state, and the state has a legitimate right to call their activities ?destructive?. It's clear in this particular case, which side enjoys people's empathy. Failure to reregister (by September 2000) by a Yaroslav'l Oblast regional branch of Memorial and a subsequent decision of a local court to liquidate the branch (in July 2001)85 was favorably viewed by Yaroslav'l residents and didn't produce any major protests, meetings or demonstrations in Memorial's support. V. Western theoreticians of civil society, like Larry Diamond, agree that ?civil society encompasses a vast array of organizations, formal and informal?, and mention economic organizations (productive and commercial associations and networks) before any other civil society components: cultural, informational and educational organizations, interest groups, developmental organizations, issue-oriented movements, civic groups86. But the state is not only a power structure, but an active subject of economic activities too. That is true of any society, including Russian. The state has always played a special role in the national economics of Russia, and the state has traditionally enjoyed special property rights in respect to state enterprises, land, forests, etc. About a third of all property assets in Russia still belong to the state87. According to Argumenty i fakty (quoting officials and experts of the RF Ministry of Property Relations), ?where the state owns from 25 to 50 percent of shares, things go even worse than at enterprises with 100 percent state participation?88. No surprise, that 79 percent of the Russians ?strongly support or more or less support? strengthened state control over the economy89. Thus, even from a theoretical point of view it would be wrong to recognize a regular economic organization or an enterprise as an element of civil society and to deny this right to the state. Moreover, in the judicial sphere the state is accountable like any other subject of civil society: an individual citizen or a collective. It can probably be argued that the Russian interpretation of civil ?society? is closer to ?community? in Russian traditional understanding of that term, especially because both words are synonyms in Russian - obschestvo. In this respect, Grigoriy Yavlinsky's recent criticism (in a liberal newspaper) that Russia has a ?defective? and ?unstable? democracy which ?is not supported by the majority of Russians?, and that civil society is substituted with ?the Soviet version of community?90 is close to reality, even though the same newspaper tried to ridicule him by saying that ?the chief trouble with our democracy is the people. Without them it would work perfectly well?91. Indeed, as far as civil society and its elements are concerned, according to a recent opinion poll (conducted by the Public Opinion foundation among 1,500 urban and rural residents in June 2001), only five percent of Russian citizens are active in public organizations. Seventy-three percent of the respondents said they would not like to work in any public organization versus 15% who said that they would92. A recent UNICEF report Young People in Changing Societies finds that young people are even less active in social organizations (or in sport activities) than in the late 1980s93. The average Russian expresses distrust of seven out of 10 key institutions of civil society, with political parties as the least trusted (7%) and courts and army as the most trusted (40% and 62%, respectively) institutions in the country94. Only 14 percent of Russians (every seventh of us) consider Russia a democratic state, with 54 percent saying that ?overall? it is not. Sixty percent don't believe that their votes are capable of changing anything95. Although as few as 6.9% of the 1,500 Russians polled by the Russian Public Opinion and Market independent research center (ROMIR) believe that a situation in which political leaders make arbitrary decisions as they see fit would be best for Russia, and although as few as 2.8% believe that military rule would be very good for Russia, only 9.1% of Russians (fewer than every tenth of us) believe that democracy is ?the best form of rule despite certain problems it poses? (an additional 38.7% ?to some degree? share this view)96. An analytical report Attitude of Population to Federal Laws and Bodies of State Power prepared at the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the Russian Government97 indicates that 70 to 80 percent of Russians think that ?laws overall do not work?. 28.2 percent of civil servants recognize that they have to ignore or violate federal laws in their work. 70 percent of the population believe that they have to undertake illegal actions in order to guarantee their legitimate rights more often now than before the beginning of legal reforms in the country. 56 percent of the population (and 58.9% of civil servants) consider the government and other federal bodies of the executive branch the most corrupt. Since the end of 1989, people's trust in the federal legislature has shrunk from 88 percent (to the USSR Supreme Soviet) to 4.3 percent (to the State Duma). Only 3.7 to 3.9 percent of Russians (4.8-5.1% of civil servants; 7 to 8.7% of Russian elite) agree that Yeltsin's decade was a ?necessary stage in development? of the Russian society98. 95.1 percent of the population (and 94.4 percent of civil servants) vote for a ?decisive restoration of order in the country?. Although as many as 89 percent of the 1,600 Russians polled by the All-Russia Center for Public Opinion Studies (on April 14 -17, 2000; in 150 poll locations in 83 areas of 33 regions of the country), ?strongly support or more or less support? guaranties of democratic rights and freedoms of every citizen, an increasingly growing percentage of Russians (from 71% in February 1998, to 81% in April 2000) believe that order (?even if it is necessary to break some democratic principles and limit people's personal freedoms to establish it?) is the ?most important issue for the country at the moment?99. According to another opinion poll (conducted by Monitoring.ru), 68 percent of the Russians favor such a restrictive institution as propiska (versus 23 percent who say that it should be abolished) and believe that citizens of the Russian Federation should have to register at their place of residence via the propiska system100. War of kompromat between TV channels controlled by rivaling oligarchs, profiteering101, overcommercialization, de-intellectualization and a general degradation of liberal mass media in Russia, have led to quite expectable consequences - the second oldest profession has nearly lost its function as a means of expressing independent public opinion and, in the words of Oleg Poptsov, a veteran of the glasnost campaign and the president of TV Tsentr (under jurisdiction of the Moscow city government), ?has now moved closer to the first oldest [profession] than ever before?102. As a result, although there is no much support for introducing any kind of political censorship, over 60 percent of respondents (across all categories) in a May 2001 opinion poll are prepared to approve some sort of a preliminary checking or censorship of press reports and publications, in order to ensure ?objectivity of information and a balanced evaluation of current events?. An even more significant majority of Russians (three quarters of respondents, regardless of their age or education levels) are in favor of censorship aimed at safeguarding public morals103. According to a poll conducted by the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM) in June 2001, about three quarters of Russians (72 percent), including Alexander Solzhenitsyn104, a symbol of resistance to the Communist tyranny of the past, Yuri Chaika, Russian Minister of Justice, and many other leading figures of Russian society and culture, openly and vigorously support restoration of the death penalty for certain crimes, whereas only 19 percent want it abolished105. Another survey held by the same research center was dedicated to Iosif Stalin's 120th birth anniversary and had even more indicative results: 44 percent of the Russians believe that the Stalin era brought good and bad in equal portions to this country; 19 percent think that there was more good than bad; and 3 percent more consider that era an absolutely good time. This sums up to 66 percent106. Yavlinsky is wrong, however, when he emphasizes the word ?Soviet? in his warning of a creation of ?the Soviet version of community? (emphasis added. - AD) for what was described above as a current interpretation of civil society in Russia is closer in its essence to a traditional Russian, rather than the Soviet version of a community. It is true that at the turn of the 21st century, Russia (in many respects) lacks a developed civil society in its Western understanding. The term itself for us in Russia has more theoretical than practical meaning. A question that still needs to be answered by social scientists, however, is whether the civil society concept is universal and equally applicable to various countries and civilizations. As Harold J. Berman has observed, contemporary legal systems are only surface expressions of deeper, broader forces of cultural evolution: ?Law cannot be neatly classified in terms of social-economic forces. A legal system is built up slowly over the centuries, and it is in many respects remarkably impervious to social upheavals. This is as true of Soviet [now Russian. - AD] law, which is built on the foundations of the Russian past, as it is of American law, with its roots in English and Western European history?107. Naturally, that observation concerns the creation of civil society (or community) in Russia. It was already mentioned that civil society can hardly be instituted by a discrete legal act. Luckily, Russia has already passed through the ordeal of legislative euphoria and normative idealism of Gorbachev's period; the tendency to view the law as a panacea for social problems, to make the law absolute without recognising the limits of any legal action108. It's a recognized fact that legislation, as a rule, reflects various pre-legal norms and values (as well as prejudices) that are accepted by large strata of a society at a given time period. Legislation can work effectively when it embodies socio-cultural principles that are accepted by the majority of the people. If a new ?progressive? or ?reactionary? piece of legislation (usually in a form of a by-law or an executive legal instrument) is shoved down throats of the majority of the population or when people don't accept or understand it, such legislation in all likelihood becomes a ?dead letter?. In the worst scenario, the law will not just be ignored and triviliazed by people, but will prove to be detrimental to the goals that were proclaimed by the law-makers themselves. The RSFSR Law ?On the Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples? is probably one of the most notorious examples in this respect. The act (passed by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on 26 April 1991) promised both ?political? and ?territorial rehabilitation? to the ?repressed peoples? (repressirovannye narody) and proclaimed re-establishment of ?historical borders?. Specifically, Article 6 of the law provided for ?the restoration of their [?repressed peoples'?. - AD] national borders which had existed before the frontiers were changed by an anti-constitutional force?. While raising a question of reconsidering existing ?inner borders?, the law provoked mutual territorial claims of ethnic republics and administrative regions against each other, and led to open local conflicts. Behind a smoke screen of proud words about ?human rights?, ?repentance? and the necessity to ?rehabilitate the repressed peoples?, the law provided the regional elites (often represented by ethnic minorities) with a legal sanction for the redistribution of territories, power, and property in the Russian Federation and for boosting their political and economic influence. Subsequently, at least two major emergencies were triggered by that law: the ?Chechen struggle for independence?, which actually began in September 1991, and the Ossetian-Ingush conflict over the North Ossetian Prigorodny raion (1992-1995). A recent reshuffle of the Clemency Commission of the presidential administration and a replacement of its former head Anatoly Pristavkin raised a new wave of criticism of Russian 'civility' in Western press. The Pristavkin's commission was portrayed exclusively as ?one of the few structures of a civil society?, and as a ?humanizing tool? in Russia's ?failing?, ?notoriously corrupt, inefficient and highly dependent? judicial and law enforcement system. Members of the commission were praised as ?liberal writers and scholars who worked day and night, so as to save as many victims of faulty trials as possible?. Pristavkin himself modestly called his commission ?an island of mercy in a sea of cruelty?109. Sentiments aside, according to official statistics, the number of recommended pardons has grown from 2,726 in 1992 (when the Clemency Commission was formed) to 4,988 in 1995, 7,418 in 1999, and 12,843 in 2000. As a rule, all recommendations of the commission were satisfied by Presidents Yeltsin and Putin (in the beginning of his term). Every Tuesday (the only day when the Clemency Commission holds it meetings), members of the commission considered between 200 and 700 (!) cases. At least 308 times, administration of the prisons or colonies objected to the commission's recommendations to pardon certain inmates, but they were pardoned anyway. The percentage of petty criminals pardoned in 2000 upon recommendations of the commission was less than a quarter, whereas 76% of the pardoned criminals comprised of those who had been sentenced for murders (2,689), ?assaults leading to a severe injury to the health of a victim? (2,188), banditry (1,848), robbery (709), kidnapping (18), etc.110. One of the latest sets of 17 draft ?pardon decrees? sent by the Pristavkin's commission to Putin (with a recommendation to sign them) included 2,565 names. 2,449 of them (95 percent) were criminals convicted for ?serious and very serious? (tyazhkie i osobo tyazhkie) crimes111. Recidivists comprised about 60 percent of the list: 1,070 of them had been convicted twice, 318 - three times, 81 - four times, and 37 - five or more times112. For comparison, although the legal institute of clemency is known in most countries of the world, it's applied extremely rarely, in exceptional cases or circumstances. The comprehensive list of acts of clemency (which may be a reprieve, remission of fine, commutation, or pardon) in 206 years from George Washington to Bill Clinton (excluding scandalous pardons granted by Clinton to 140 crooks and criminals on his last day in office)113, includes about 27,000 names114. In the last 8 years only 0.3 percent of convicted criminals have been pardoned in the U.S. In Germany 111 people were pardoned in 1994-1999. Nobody has been pardoned in Japan in the last 30 years. President of France receives 25,000-35,000 pardon petitions a year, but satisfies not more than 1.5-2 percent of them. Legislation of Great Britain doesn't know clemency at all115. VI. Although virtually all participants in the recent press conference of the Civic Forum organizing committee spoke about the necessity of ?constructive cooperation? between the institutions of civil society and the state, full-fledged cooperation between them is still in the realm of wishful thinking. If distrust was indeed a ?pervasive legacy of communist rule?, as Richard Rose claims in his article ?Rethinking Civil Society: Postcommunism and the Problem of Trust? (p.18), it's even more so in post-Communist, ?democratic? Russia116. And it's not the peculiarities of Russian statist, conservative and traditionalist understanding of civil society that pose the main problem to an actual development of civil society in the country, but rather the current condition of the Russian society itself. Vladimir Putin inherited a crushed, looted and humiliated country struggling to survive the liquidation regime of the ?reformers?117. The country, whose GDP has lost about 44 percent in just 10 years118, whose increase in mortality rates (60 percent since 1990) has been ?unprecedented in any country during peacetime since the Middle Ages?119, whose population has been shrinking by up to half a percent a year120, the country which now stands in the 134th place among all states in terms of male life expectancy (by 1997, death rate among Russian males had equaled that of war-ravaged Liberia121) and 100th in terms of female life expectancy122, whose men have a smaller chance to survive to age 60 than a century ago123, and which has more homeless children today than after the Bolshevik revolution124. An unprecedented social catastrophe in Russia, ?a human crisis of monumental proportions? (in definition of the U.N. Development Program's report Transition 1999. Human Development Report for Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS)125, which was largely ignored by the Western community126, makes discussions about ?civil society? in Russia today even more artificial and irrelevant than 10 years ago. The concept of civil society certainly implies some degree of well-being. Destitute people are unable to form a civil society. At the turn of the 21st Century, the Russian Nation must consider how to stop the depopulation of Russia and overcome disastrous consequences of Yeltsin's regime rather than involve the country in another round of radical economic ?reforms? and futile social engineering. Otherwise, there won't be neither Russia nor its society, whether civil or uncivil. It is certainly not true that Russia's socioeconomic catastrophe was ?largely unanticipated?, that the deindustrialization of the Russian economy was an ?unintended consequence? of liberal ?reforms? (Thomas Graham) or that ?when the liberal experiment began, no one, either in Russia or in the West, anticipated... this strange and troubling outcome? (Martin Malia)127. Warnings about the inevitability of such a collapse and about the suicidal character of monetarist experiments with the Russian economy were repeatedly voiced by the Russian Parliament already in 1992 and became one of the main reasons of its violent dissolution by President Yeltsin. A dissolution which was not only unconditionally supported, but encouraged by the Western ?international community? in general128 and by executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government in particular129. VII. This brings us to the final observation - on the role of foreign ?aid? in development of civil society in Russia. Although foreign inputs can support creation of infrastructure to nurture fledgling democratic institutions, a truly democratic and civil society is to be founded on a solid domestic ground. Democratic institutions derive their legitimacy from people and not from foreign sponsors of ?changes?. The current situation in Russia, where the non-governmental sector ?is still dependent on Western funding?130, is utterly unhealthy131. A recent proposal by two American scholars to replace the ?old formula for democracy 'Get the institutions right, and the people will follow'?, with a new one 'Represent the will of the people within the state, and the institutions will follow'132, can be right only when the 'will of the people' is voiced by the people and not by their foreign mentors. Colton & McFaul basically agree and repeat Peter Stavrakis' criticism of American ?aid? in general133 and of the activities of the U.S. Agency for International Development in Russia in particular134 (never mentioning him or his publications, though). The problem is that the proposed change of strategy of foreign aid from ?technical assistance for the crafting of democratic institutions, be it democratic electoral laws, constitutions, courts, or political parties? to ?pro-democratic elements in Russia's society?135, to ?those brave people in Russia still fighting for democracy?136, not in the times of Peter Stavrakis' ground-breaking article, but in 2001 is a sly attempt to keep providing foreign money to the same small clique of corrupt and/or morally bankrupt pro-Western ?reformers? (who were among the main recipients of American ?aid? in the 1990s, but who are either no longer in the Russian government or on their way from it) under a disguise of ?aid? to educational NGOs (like Gaidar's Institute of Transitional Economy), or public associations (like dwarf organizations of Filatov, Shumeiko, Rybkin and other ?reformers? of Yeltsin's period137, survivors of his kleptocratic regime, ?an authority of thieves or of people dependent on them?138). Those very ?reformers? who first looted Russia and then ?conned? their Western sponsors139. What American aid to the non-governmental sector actually means can also be illustrated by a Belarussian example. Although the main (if not the only) reason for Washington's dissatisfaction with the current Belarussian regime is President Lukashenko's independent foreign and domestic policy, his refusal to follow commands from overseas and his devotion to creation of a full-fledged Union with Russia, the U.S. State Department in its public statements puts pressure on the Belarussian authorities not for that, but for the fact that they allegedly have ?harassed civil society? and ?abandoned? (since 1996) Belarus's ?transition to democracy and the rule of law?140. In plain words, Colin Powell's warning (made two weeks before the presidential election in Belarus) meant that the Bush Administration had no doubts as to the veracity of a new landslide victory of Alexander Lukashenko, the most trusted and respected Belarussian leader141, but indicated that it would never recognize their results142. Surprisingly, we in Russia never heard similar warnings from the U.S. officials either when Yeltsin (an ?explicitly pro-American, pro-Western, pro-market? president, keeping ?Russia on a pro-Western track?, as he was characterized in the U.S. Congress143) shelled the Russian parliament and suspended the activities of the Constitutional Court144, or when Russia's ?dream team? (with support of American consultants and foreign money) staged the 1996 presidential election farce145. In a truly amazing admission, Michael G. Kozak, the U.S. Ambassador to Belarus, bluntly stated in a letter to The Guardian that America's ?objective and to some degree methodology are the same? in Belarus as in Nicaragua, where the U.S. backed the Contras against the left-wing Sandinista Government146. Another British newspaper, The Times, reminded its readers that Washington's war against Nicaragua with U.S.-funded, trained and led death squads claimed at least 30,000 lives147. Ambassador Kozak's letter to The Guardian 15 days before the presidential election in Belarus is an opening warning to the Belarussian electorate: vote the U.S.-approved way or face the fate of Nicaragua. Kozak (also known by his petname 'Weasel' which was given to him by the late CIA Director William Casey)148 was a perfect choice to do this kind of work in Belarus. Earlier in his career, he served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs under Presidents Reagan and Bush, working in Panama, Nicaragua and El-Salvador. While Kozak was serving in Nicaragua, Reagan famously compared the Contras to the French Resistance fighters. Has America already forgotten this shameful episode of its modern history? Kozak's letter gives a reason to see in a much more concrete light the remark of NATO official Jamie Shea, reportedly made during his address to the Cambridge Club in November 2000. According to Kommersant-Daily (21, 24 November 2000), Shea told the club that NATO helped the Yugoslav opposition elect Vojislav Kostunica and that ?Belarus might become the next country where a similar tactic can be applied?149. In fact, Ian Traynor, a Moscow correspondent of The Guardian, also comes to a conclusion that the American anti-Lukashenko ?strategy repeated in exact detail the tactics the U.S. used to help the Serbian opposition overthrow Slobodan Milosevic a year ago, and the Nicaraguan opposition unseat Daniel Ortega in 1990?150. Another British observer confirms: ?Some Americans view Belarus as another Serbia - and indeed, officials responsible for Serbia and Belarus were united at a U.S. State Department meeting in February?151. A spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in Minsk told The Times that the embassy helped to fund 300 non-governmental organizations and admitted that ?some? of them were linked to those who were ?seeking political change?152. ?Helped? is certainly an understatement here. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty is more precise: ?Many groups in Belarus rely on foreign money for their activities?153. Christian Science Monitor revealed that Washington spent $24 million in 2000 to support NGOs and opposition groups in Belarus, and is going to spend even more this year. And according to The Guardian, ?about $50m (?35m) in US aid has gone to various Belarus opposition organisations in the past two years?154. That's in the country where National Bank reserves do not exceed $200 million!155 To what extent such groups, created and funded by the U.S. in Belarus can be considered ?independent? (i.e. ?not governed by a foreign power; self-governing; free from the influence, guidance, or control of another or others; self-reliant?) is certainly a big question. To make things more understandable to American readers, 300 Washington-funded NGOs is one organization for every 34,000 citizens of a 10-million republic. What would be the reaction of American people and the Bush Administration if some foreign country (for instance, Libya or Iraq, whose governments are as friendly to the U.S., as the U.S. government to Belarus) would set up and provide multibillion funding to some 8,250 ?civil society? groups (one for every 34,000 Americans) aimed at ?seeking political change? (read: ?overthrowing the President?, ?changing the political regime?) in the U.S.? There is nothing unusual in President Lukashenko's Decree No.8 of March 12, 2001 ?On Certain Measures of Regulation of the Procedure of Receipt and Use of Foreign Gratuitous Aid?. The decree consists of 5 articles. It enlists a wide variety of activities that can be funded by foreign aid but outlaws the use of foreign funds for electoral or conspiratorial purposes (art.4). All that NGOs need to do is to register foreign aid with the presidential Department for Humanitarian Activities (art.1.2) and keep funds in approved state banks (art.2)156. There is nothing ?draconian?157 about the decree either. On the contrary, it should have been issued long before. And it was in complete accordance with Article 4 of the decree that on July 12, 2001, Belarus authorities seized U.S.-supplied equipment (which had been leased by the U.S. Embassy Democracy Commission to a newspaper in Krichev) designed to ?assist the country's democratic opposition ahead of Sept. 9 presidential elections?. Rather than being embarrassed that the U.S. Embassy had been caught violating Belarussian sovereignty and legislation, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher demanded that Washington's computers be returned158. Belarussian ?opposition? and its Western sponsors labeled the decree as unconstitutional159, but failed to produce any argument proving its allegedly unconstitutional character. Why doesn't the Constitutional Court decide it? Belarussian law does not allow individual citizens to petition the Constitutional Court? Neither does the Russian Constitution of 1993 cheered by an American expert as creating ?a genuine western democracy?, ?a true federation?, protecting ?all basic civil rights... not only in theory as they did in the past, but in practice as is true in western democracies?160. The empire strikes back! Often correctly criticized, Lukashenko's Constitution of Belarus161 is just a stronger version of Yeltsin's Constitution162. What was viewed in the West as a perfect Constitution for an ?explicitly pro-American, pro-Western, pro-market? president of Russia (?a corrupt but friendly drunk?, as he is called by American press today163, ?a selfish arrogant bully... destined to bankrupt the country... corrupt, venal... half dead and often incoherent?, but ?our guy?164), back-lashed and became counter-productive to American interests when the same or similar constitutional provisions were endorsed by a more independent (not corrupt and much sober) national leader of Belarus165. The Belarussian experience with foreign interference in internal affairs of that republic under disguise of Western ?aid? to ?civil society? groups is not so much different from the Russian experience166. The continuation of U.S. reliance on a narrow circle of pro-Western liberal intelligentsia and ?agents of democratic change? (mainly concentrated in Moscow and half a dozen of other urban centers)167 proves to be wasteful, eventually unproductive for the U.S. interests (if those interests are not aimed at the ultimate subordination of Russia and further aggravation of her socio-economic problems) and detrimental to the interests of long-term institutional legal and democratic development of Russia, including development of her civil society. What Western governments and experts should do instead of continuing their futile (and ridiculous) attempts to ?pull Russia into the West?168, threatening Russia with ?negative consequences?169, and frightening themselves and their communities with horror stories that if Russia does not continue ?reforms? ?following strategies developed in Western capitals?170, then ?it most likely will have become a dictatorship and a threat to Europe?171, is rather follow the advice of Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. (of Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies): ?Those of us who care about the advance of democracy in the world should make it our foremost intellectual and practical task to find out why our reform strategy went wrong in so much of the former Soviet bloc?172. From a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu Fri Nov 2 04:20:48 2001 From: a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu (a-list-admin at lists.econ.utah.edu) Date: Fri, 02 Nov 2001 11:20:48 +0000 Subject: [A-List] footnotes to Domrin paper on Russia Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011102111841.00aa3540@pop.tiscali.co.uk> 1 Aknowledgment: The author wishes to thank Alexei Lyubimov of the State Duma Law Department and Natalia Myakova of the Russian Parliamentary Library for their support with materials for this article. 2 Polit.ru, 28 June 2001. Probably in the context of the forthcoming discussion of civil society development in Russia, a day before the meeting with the President, envoy Latyshev told Moscow reporters about his new initiative to start TV broadcasting of the judicial proceedings against corrupt officials as a form of combating official corruption (Polit.ru, 27 June 2001; Interfax, 27 June 2001). 3 Polit.ru, 12 July 2001. 4 For further research in the Russian non-governmental sector see a number of useful websites: www.ngo.ru (Catalog of Social Resources on Internet); www.trainet.org (Virtual Resource Center for NGOs); www.hrights.ru (Human Rights Institute); www.hro.org (Human Rights Online); infohome.dcn-asu.ru and infohome.alt.ru (InfoHouse-Altai); www.cip.nsk.su (Inter-regional Public Foundation Siberian Civic Initiatives Support Center); www.hartia.ru (Information and Discussion Portal of Civil Society in Russia). Views of Russian special services on civil society are quite adequaltely represented in: ?Grazhdanskoe obschestvo i ego vragi? [Civil Society and Its Enemies]. An Interview with Sergei Goncharov, Spetsnaz Rossii, No. 10 (61), 20 October 2001; also available at http://www.specnaz.ru:8101/gazeta/10_2001/3.htm. 5 Interfax, 4 September 2001 (quoting Evgeni Vodopyanov, the vice president of the Union of Charitable Organizations of Russia). 6 See ?Good Works?, The Economist, 24 March 2001, p. 61-62. 7 On 12 June 1990, the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty proclaiming the ?supremacy? of Russian Constitution and Russian laws ?throughout the territory of the RSFSR?, suspending ?the effect of acts of the USSR which are contrary to the sovereign rights of the RSFSR? (Art. 5), and declaring the necessity of concluding a new Union Treaty (Art. 6, 15). According to an objective assessment of F.J.M. Feldbrugge, a leading European expert in Russian law, together with the subsequently adopted Russian laws of October 24, 1990 ?On the Effect of Acts of USSR Agencies on the Territory of the RSFSR? (establishing that the Union possessed only such powers as had been handed over by the Union republics, and granting the Russian Supreme Soviet or Council of Ministers the ?right to suspend the operation? of Union acts ?if they violate the sovereignty of the Russian Federation?), and of October 31, 1990 ?On Safeguarding the Economic Foundation of the Sovereignty of the RSFSR? (proclaiming that ?the land, its minerals, ... airspace, waters, forests, flora and fauna, and other natural and raw material resources located on the territory of the RSFSR, the resources of the continental shelf and maritime economic zone of the RSFSR,... and artistic and cultural valuables shall be the national wealth of the peoples of the RSFSR?, and declaring that the assets of all ?state enterprises, institutions, organizations, and agencies? on the RSFSR territory are Russian state property), the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Russia ?virtually robbed the USSR of its assets on RSFSR territory... Pulled the rug from underneath of the USSR? (F.J.M. Feldbrugge, Russian Law: the End of the Soviet System and the Role of Law (Series ?Law in Eastern Europe?, No. 45. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), p. 140). On 12 June 1991, Boris Yeltsin was elected the first President of Russia. 8 A complete list of participants in the meeting with President Putin and more information on the forthcoming Civic Forum are available at the Forum's website at www.civilforum.ru. 9 That's indicative that after years of strong hopes (on the verge of wishful thinking) that ?Russia's revolution has by no means ended? (at least three times literally repeated in: ?Forget About Monica, It's Moscow and the Stakes are Global?, Los Angeles Times, 14 August 1998; ?Russia's Crisis. Will Russia Survive Its Economic and Political Crisis??, PBS Online Newshour, 17 September 1998 (reproduced on Johnson's Russia List, #2387, 20 September 1998); ?A Russia Still Redeemable?, Washington Post, 21 September 1998) or that ?Russia is midstream in a social revolution? (?Russia's Revolution Is Not Over?, Christian Science Monitor, 20 September 1999) Michael McFaul finally accepted the inevitable and called his book Russia's Unfinished Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). 10 The report was later published as: Alexander Domrin, ?Issues and Options in the Soviet Transition to the Rule of Law?, 30 Coexistence. A Review of East-West and Development Issues (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, Boston, London) 1 (March 1993). 11 Catastrophic consequences of perestroika were recognized by the most of Western scholars already in 1992-93. See, for instance: John Blaney, Mike Gfoeller, ?Lessons from the Failure of Perestroika?, 108 Political Science Quarterly 3 (Autumn, 1993); James Clay Moltz, ?Divergent Learning and the Failed Politics of Soviet Economic Reform?, 45 World Politics 2 (January 1993). 12 This observation applies not only to Russia and other former Soviet republics. In some other areas of the world the use of the ?civil society? formula often lacks any legal meaning and serves as an element of a pseudo-legal justification for purely political goals. That is quite indicative that even ethnic Albanian terrorists and separatists in Macedonia demand recognition of the Albanian language as the second official language of the republic under a pretext of the necessity to ?secure the adequate development of a civil society? and to ?secure the full integration of all citizens of Macedonia into the civil society?. (Vecer, 12 July 2001. Quoted in: Ulrich Buechsenschuetz, ?Macedonia: Speaking a Different Language?, RFE/RL Newsline, 26 July 2001). 13 Plan zakonodatelnikh rabot po tematike ?Grazhdanskoe obschestvo? [The State Duma's Plan of ?Civil Society? Legislative Drafting] and Rekomendatsii parlamentskikh slushaniy ?Rossiysky federalizm i problemy razvitiya grazhdanskogo obschestva [Recommendations of Parliamentary Hearings on Russian Federalism and Problems of Development of Civil Society] are available in the Parliamentary Library under indexes: ??/?M2-3/c?/95-84 and ??/?M2-3/c?/99-552 (respectively). 14 Aleksander Smolar, ?Civil Society After Communism: From Opposition to Atomization?, 7 Journal of Democracy 1 (January 1996), p. 24. Compare to the following observations: ?With all the fuss and noise not a single new idea has come our of Eastern Europe in 1989? (French historian Francois Furet); ?a peculiar characteristic of this revolution, namely its total lack of ideas that are either innovative or oriented towards the future? (Jurgen Habermas) (quoted in: Mary H. Kaldor, ?The Ideas of 1989: The Origins of the Concept of Global Civil Society?, 9 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems (Fall 1999), p. 475. 15 Aleksander Smolar, op.cit., p. 24. 16 See, for instance, Devyatnadsataya Vsesoyuznaya Konferentsiya KPSS: dokumenty i materialy [The Nineteenth All-Union Conference of the CPSU: Documents and Materials] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1988). 17 It was already in 1993, when Peter Stavrakis, at that time Associate Director of the Kennan Institute, came to a conclusion that ?Bolshevist monetarism adapted quite comfortably to the historical terrain of Soviet experience, as the Gaidar team exhibited the same ideological fervor that had motivated its Leninist precursors?. (Peter Stavrakis, State Building in Post-Soviet Russia: The Chicago Boys and the Decline of Administrative Capacity (Washington: Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Occasional Paper # 254. August, October 1993), p. 56). The term ?Bolshevist monetarism? was later transformed into another adequate version: ?market Bolshevism?. (See, for instance: Peter Reddaway & Dmitri Glinski, Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2001)). 18 See K Rossii edinoy, sil'noy, demokraticheskoy, protsvetayuschey. Politicheskaya programma Grazhdanskogo soyuza [Towards Russia United, Strong, Democratic, Prosperous. Political Program of the Civic Union] (Moscow: Civic Union, 1992. V.P. Averchev, A.N. Domrin, A.V. Lukin, etc. Alexander Lukin, ed.) 19 See, for instance, Aleksander Smolar, op.cit., p. 24. 20 Bronislaw Geremek, ?Problems of Postcommunism: Civil Society Then and Now?, 3 Journal of Democracy 2 (April 1992), p. 12; Larry Diamond, ?Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation?, 5 Journal of Democracy 3 (July 1994), p. 5). 21 Decree No. 354 of April 3, 1992 ?On the Secretary of State of the Russian Federation?, Decree No. 673 of July 6, 1995 ?On Drafting the Concept of Legal Reform in the Russian Federation?, Decree No. 424 of March 27, 1996 ?On Certain Measures Aimed at Strengthening State Support to Science and Institutions of Higher Education in the Russian Federation?, Decree No. 440 of April 1, 1996 ?On the Concept of Transition of the Russian Federation to Sustainable Development?, Decree No. 803 of June 3, 1996 ?On Basic Provisions of Regional Policy in the Russian Federation?, Decree No. 864 of June 13, 1996 ?On Certain Measures of the State Support to Human Rights Movement in the Russian Federation?, Decree No. 909 of June 15, 1996 ?On Approval of the Concept of State National Policy of the Russian Federation?, Decree No. 1300 of December 17, 1997 ?On Approval of the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation?, Decree No. 1370 of October 15, 1999 ?On Approval of Basic Provisions of the State Policy in the Sphere of Development of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation?, and Decree No. 24 of January 10, 2000 ?On the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation?. 22 No. 360-?? of July 14, 1992 ?On Ensuring the Activities of the Research Center of Private Law?, and No. 589-?? of December 18, 1996 ?On Support to ?People's House? Public Institutions?. 23 Resolution of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet No.1801-1 of October 24, 1991 ?On the Concept of the RF Judicial System?, and resolutions of the State Duma No. 450-1 ?? of January 13, 1995 ?On a Tentative Program of Legislation-Making? of the State Duma in 1995, and No. 359-II ?? of May 17, 1996 ?On Holding Elections of the RF President in Constitutionally Defined Terms?. 24 Respectively, No. 7-? of April 30, 1997; No. 14-? of November 22, 2000, and No. ??-?40/2488-01 of May 22, 2001. 25 The federal programs were respectively adopted at a session of the RF Government on August 6, 1993 (a month and a half before Yeltsin's coup d'etat in Russia), by Resolution of the RF Government No. 1005 of October 12, 1995, and by Resolution of the RF Government No. 955 of December 14, 2000. 26 No. 939 of September 19, 1995; No. 327 of March 23, 1996; and No. 547 of May 1, 1996. 27 Also see: Stanovleniye institutov grazhdanskogo obschestva [Evolution of Civil Society Institutions. Materials of interregional scientific and practical conference ?Evolution of Civil Society Institutions in Saratov Oblast (1989-1999)?, 20-21 January 2000 (Saratov: Government of Saratov Oblast, Povolzhye Academy of Civil Service, 2000. V.N. Yuzhakov, ed.) 28 See, for instance, Resolution No. 392 of May 4, 1999 ?On the Concept of Moscow Program of Social Development?, and Resolution No. 87-?? of January 23, 2001 ?On the Complex Program of Development and Support of Small Business in Moscow in 2001-2003?. 29 More on the 1999 address of President of Bashkortostan see, for instance: A. Makhmutov, ?Sem' kluchevikh problem Poslaniya-99 Prezidenta Respubliki Bashkortostan Gosudarstvennomu Sobraniyu? [Seven Key Problems of the 1999 Address of President of Bashkortostan to the State Assembly], Ekonomika i upravleniye, No. 3, 1999. P. 3-7. 30 See, for instance, decision of the head of administration of Astrakhan Oblast No. 598-p of May 31, 2001 ?On Organization of a Scientific-Practical Conference 'Civil Society to Children of Russia'? or Resolution of Mayor of Tomsk No. 141 of March 15, 2001 ?On Organization of Electoral Action 'The 19th Wave' Held by the Tomsk Branch of 'Civil Society and Elections' on March 19, 2001?. 31 See Rossiyskaya gazeta, 11 July 2000. 32 The Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation was approved by the RF President on September 9, 2000. 33 The letters and resolution were issued in 1997-2000 and defined such questions as a mandatory minimum of curricula in general schools, etc. 34 Slovar'-spravochnik po rossiyskomu zakonodatel'stvu: terminy, ponyatiya, opredeleniya [A Dictionary & Manual of Russian Legislation: Terms, Concepts, Definitions] (Moscow: Yuridicheskiy dom ?Justitsinform?, 1998. Compiled by L.F. Apt, A.I. Vetrov, etc.) 35 See, for instance: Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii. Kommentariy [Constitution of the Russian Federation. Commentary] (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1994. B.N. Topornin, etc., eds. 624 p.); Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii. Problemniy kommentariy [Constitution of the Russian Federation. A Problematic Commentary] (Moscow: Tsentr konstitutsionnikh issledovaniy MONF, 1997. V.A. Chetvernin, ed. 702 p.). 36 More on philosophic origins of the concept of civil society see: G.F.Slesareva, ?Grazhdanskoe obschestvo v istorii politicheskoy mysli Evropy (on antichnosti do pervoy treti XIX veka)? [Civil Society in History of Political Thought of Europe (from Ancient Times to the First Third of the 19th Century], Mezhdunarodniy istorichesky zhurnal, No. 10, July-August 2000; Yu.M. Reznik, Grazhdanskoe obschestvo kak fenomen civilizatsii. Chast' 1. Ideya grazhdanskogo obschestva v sotsial'noy misli [Civil Society as a Phenomenon of Civilization. Part 1. Civil Society in Social Sciences] (Moscow: Soyuz, 1993. 167 p.); V.V. Vityuk, Stanovlenie ideyi grazhdanskogo obschestva i eyo istoricheskaya evolutsiya [Emergence of the Civil Society Concept and Its Historic Evolution] (Moscow, 1995. 91 p.). 37 See, for instance: Alison Brysk, ?Democratizing Civil Society in Latin America?, July 2000; Joao Carlos Espada, ?Liberalism of Sorts. Review of After 1989: Morals, Revolution and Civil Society, by Ralf Dahrendorf?, October 1998; Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, ?The Paradox of Civil Society?, July 1996; William A. Galston, ?Civil Society and the 'Art of Association'?, January 2000; Thomas B. Gold, ?Tiananmen and Beyond: The Resurgence of Civil Society in China?, Winter 1990; E. Gyimah-Boadi, ?Civil Society in Africa?, April 1996; Iliya Harik, ?Rethinking Civil Society: Pluralism in the Arab World?, July 1994; Wilmot James and Daria Caliguire, ?The New South Africa: Renewing Civil Society?, January 1996, Aymen M. Khalifa, ?Reviving Civil Society in Egypt?, July 1995; Laith Kubba, ?Arabs and Democracy: The Awakening of Civil Society?, July 2000; Peter M. Lewis, ?'Civil' and Other Societies. Review of Civil Society and the State in Africa, edited by John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan?, April 1995; Marc F. Plattner, ?The Uses of 'Civil Society'. Review of Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals, by Ernest Gellner?, October 1995. 38 See Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, 1996. xx, 634 p.); Ballentine's Law Dictionary, with Pronunciations. [By] James A. Ballantine [1871-1949] / 3d ed., edited by William S. Anderson (Rochester, N.Y.: Lawyers Cooperative Pub. Co, 1969. ix, 1429 p.); Mellinkoff's Dictionary of American Legal Usage (By David Mellinkoff. St Paul, Minn.: West Pub. Co., 1992. x, 703 p.); Brian A. Garner's A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (2nd ed. New York : Oxford University Press, 1995. xxvi, 953 p.); Burton's Legal Thesaurus (By William C. Burton. 3rd ed. New York: Macmillan Library Reference, 1998. xix, 1212 p.); Words & Phrases. Permanent Edition. 1658 to Date (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publ. Go., 1964); Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. / Bryan A. Garner, editor in chief. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 1999. xxiii, 1738 p.) 39 In Geremek's words, ?We don't need to define [civil society]. We see and feel it? (quoted in Flora Lewis, ?Civil Society: Its Limits and Needs?, International Herald Tribune, 30 September 1989. According to Lebedev, ?Specialists in political science refuse to draw a clear-cut distinction between [civil society and law-governed state]; they consider it a difficult task. As a lawyer, I find it an irrelevant task as well? (See V.M. Lebedev, ?O systeme grazhdanskogo obschestva Rossii?, Grazhdanskoe obschestvo i regional'noe razvitie [?On the System of Civil Society in Russia?, Civil Society and Regional Development] (Scientific and Practical Conference, 22 April 1994, Tomsk. Tomsk Oblast Duma & Tomsk State University, 1994. E.I. Chernyak, ed.), p. 16). A former prime minister of the Czech Republic V?clav Klaus also confesses that he find the term civil society ?superfluous?, a ?hollow phrase? and claims that he does ?not think that a civil society is different from a democratic society?. (See ?Civil Society After Communism: Rival Visions. V?clav Havel and V?clav Klaus with Commentary by Petr Pithart?, 7 Journal of Democracy 1 (January 1996), p. 18). 40 M. Steven Fish, ?Rethinking Civil Society: Russia's Fourth Transition?, 5 Journal of Democracy 3 (July 1994), p. 41. 41 Alexander Lukin, ?Forcing the Pace of Democratization?, 10 Journal of Democracy 2 (April 1999), p. 39. 42 Especially after adoption of the 1961 CPSU Program proclaiming that the Soviet society had entered the stage of ?developed socialism?. 43 Philosophsky slovar' [Philosophical Dictionary] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1975. 3rd edition. M.M. Rozenthal, ed.), p. 93). 44 See S.S. Alekseev, Sotsial'naya tsennost' prava v sovetskom obschestve [Social Value of Law in the Soviet Society] (Moscow: 1971), p. 193); A.A. Mishin, Tsentral'niye organy vlasti burzhuaznikh gosudarstv [The Central Organs of Power in Bourgeois Countries] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo MGU, 1972), p. 10; V.N. Danilenko, Deklaratsiya prav i real'nost'. K 200-letiyu Deklaratsii prav cheloveka i grazhdanina [Declaration of Rights and Reality: 200th Anniversary of Adoption of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya, 1989), p. 55. 45 Yeltsin's rule was characterized by U.S. Representative Christopher Smith (R-NJ) as a kleptocratic regime ?masquerading as a democracy? (quoted on Johnson's Russia List, # 2277, 22 July 1998). The word ?masquerade? is apparently very dear to the hearts of American observers. Compare, for instance, to: ?Yeltsin, a Soviet usurper masquerading as a democrat? (Anne Williamson, ?An Inconvenient History?, Johnson's Russia List, # 3477, 1 September 1999). As a reminder, just several years ago Yeltsin's opponents in the Russian Supreme Soviet were defamed as ?communist fascists masquerading as parliamentarians? (Thomas Oliphant, ?Another Clash with the Beast?, The Boston Globe, 6 October 1993). 46 As Eric Kraus, Chief Strategist of Nikoil Capital Markets, correctly observed: ?In the early 1990s, disastrously incompetent economic advice from Western experts was eagerly accepted by the successive (and no less incompetent) transition governments? (Eric Kraus, ?On the Barricades: Renegotiating the Paris Club?, Johnson's Russia List, #5053, 26 January 2001; available at www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5053.html). More on Yeltsin's kleptocracy and the U.S. role in its creation, see: Russia's Road to Corruption. How the Clinton Administration Exported Government Instead of Free Enterprise and Failed the Russian People (U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. Speaker's Advisory Group on Russia. Christopher Cox, Chairman. September 2000), available at: www.house.gov/republican-policy/russia/home.html. 47 Electoral commissions were formed for each constituency by the corresponding Soviets (Councils) to supervise and direct the election of deputies to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in 1989. They had significant powers to control the electoral process, especially at the stage of registration of candidate deputies. In cases when there were more than two nominees, Art.38 of the USSR Election Law allowed electoral commissions to hold preelection meetings, question the candidates, and then eliminate even properly nominated individuals. 48 Laws ?On the President of the RSFSR? and ?On the Election of the President of the RSFSR? were adopted on April 24, 1991. Subsequently, the fourth CPD session (May 21-25, 1991) introduced a new chapter (Chapter 13-1) to the Constitution instituting presidency in Russia. 49 Yeltsin was so sure in his victory that before the elections he sent Andrei Kolossovsky to Washington to start preparations for his first visit to the USA as the Russian President; the visit began some ten days after the elections. 50 ?NDI Calls for Democratic Development Assistance to the USSR?. (Senate - September 27, 1990), Congressional Record, 27 September 1990. S14080. 51 ?The New Soviet Union? -- Hon. Dan Schaeffer (Extension of Remarks - September 11, 1991), Congressional Record, 11 September 1990. E2977. 52 Ruslan Khasbulatov was elected to the Russian Parliament as a Yeltsin supporter. Upon Yeltsin's suggestion, he was elected First Deputy Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet as a representative of one of the ethnic minorities (Chechen), which had greatly suffered under Stalin. Even when six of the seven leaders of the Supreme Soviet in February 1991 denounced Yeltsin for his arbitrary methods of ruling, Khasbulatov continued to support him. When Yeltsin was elected President, he personally named Khasbulatov as his successor. Many deputies refused to vote for him at the fifth CPD session in July 1991 because of his lack of independence, as they suspected, from Yeltsin. When Khasbulatov was finally elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet in October 1991, it was interpreted as a Yeltsin victory. 53 Anders ?slund, ?The Making of Economic Policy in 1989 & 1990?, in Milestones in Glasnost & Perestroika. The Economy (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1991. Ed A.Hewett & Victor H. Winston, eds.), p. 346. 54 David Remnick, Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia (New York: Random House, 1997), p. 71. 55 See ?Pozitsiya? [The Position], Russky obozrevatel' (Moscow), No. 1, 1995. P. 22. 56 See Human Rights and Legal Reform in the Russian Federation (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, March 1993), p. 45. As a result of elections at the local level, held simultaneously with the Russian parliamentary elections of 1990, radical democrats scored particularly impressive victories in the City Councils of Moscow and Leningrad: candidates from Democratic Russia bloc won 292 out of 465 seats in Mossoviet, and 355 out of 400 in Lensoviet. Never again Russian radicals would get such results. 57 Judith Devlin, The Rise of the Russian Democrats: The Causes and Consequences of the Elite Revolution (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar, 1995. Series ?Studies of Communism in Transition?), p. 152-153. 58 Anders ?slund, ?Russia's Success Story?, 73 Foreign Affairs 5 (September-October 1994), p. 60. 59 In an assessment of an unbiased American scholar, in September 1993, ?with a stroke of the pen, Yeltsin had wiped out Russia's embryonic and uneasy separation of powers. Mao had bested Montesquieu? (Robert Sharlet, ?Russian Constitutional Crisis: Law and Politics Under Yeltsin?, 9 Post-Soviet Politics 4 (October-December 1993), p. 327). ?It was a highly risky decision, since it was plainly illegal?, wrote a British reporter (Jonathan Steele, ?Inside Story: Chaos Theory?, The Guardian, 13 November 1993.). ?Rarely in history there has been a coup prepared so ineptly and so openly. Yeltsin violated the constitution so flagrantly that there could be no talk of his having 'made a mistake' or 'exceeding his powers'?, commented a deputy of the Moscow City Council (Boris Kagarlitsky, Square Wheels. How Russian Democracy Got Derailed (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994), p.197). 60 Ibid. 61 Vladimir Shlapentokh named that catastrophic defeat of pro-Yeltsin ?reformers? and a similarly catastrophic impotence of pollsters in predicting the electoral outcome in December of 1993 ?the Russian disaster?: ?The results of the election shocked... the West, a reaction similar to that which occurred with the Sandinista's defeat in the Nicaraguan election of 1990, only with a remarkable difference: in one case, the West was gloomy, in the other, delighted? (Vladimir Shlapentokh, ?Poll Review: The 1993 Russian Election Polls?, 58 Public Opinion Quarterly (Winter 1984), p. 579, 585. 62 See The Weekly Standard, 19 January 1998. 63 This episode was also described by Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski in their book Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy. When one of the authors challenged ?slund on his claim, he did not reply. 64 It's a common problem of Western experts of Russia that facts about Russian society are sometimes supplanted by perceptions, which in their turn are often based on myths, cliches, or lies. (The title of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, for instance, openly indicates that it's ?based on the perceptions of business people and risk analysts?) (emphasis added. - AD). A typical illustration of such an observation is a response to a question asked by an American businessman and scholar at a high-profile academic conference in the U.S.: do you think that a ?well-connected Russian? is likely to be found guilty of embezzlement from a foreign owned firm? ?None of the conference participants, - wrote the author, - volunteered the opinion that justice would prevail?. (Ronald R. Pope, ?The Rule of Law and Russian Culture - Are They Compatible??, 7 Demokratizatsiya (Spring 1999), p. 204; emphasis added. - AD). How reliable and convincing is such ?opinion?? Why is it that none of the conference participants expressed a different point of view? Not a single person had the slightest doubt and raised his hand to indicate it? Why such ?opinion? is so far away not only from the views of Russian lawyers (who could be accused of being biased and non-objective), but from the position of Peter Solomon, probably the most eloquent contemporary foreign expert on the Russian judicial system, who in his latest publications has been describing ?positive developments? in the Russian legal and judicial sphere (including the spread of ?constitutional litigation and the framing of issues in constitutional terms?, the ?dramatic expansion of legal education?, and the ?success of judges in creating their own organizations?), asserting that, ?despite the disappointments of radical reformers, court reform in Russia is not dead?, and insisting that, for instance, ?the decisions by three different sets of judges in the Nikitin case stand as testimony to the reality of change in the administration of justice in Russia?? (See, for instance: Peter H. Solomon, Jr., ?The Persistence of Judicial Reform in Contemporary Russia?, 6 East European Constitutional Review 4 (Fall 1997)); Peter H. Solomon, Jr. & Todd S. Foglesong, ?The Procuracy and the Courts in Russia: A New Relationship??, 9 East European Constitutional Review 4 (Fall 2000)). Reliability of the conference participants' ?opinion? becomes even more questionable, because in another article the same R. Pope wrote about taking to Russian court someone Veksler, a former manager of his ?model American home in Vladimir? and a daughter of an ?influential local official?, on charges of embezzlement. Despite Veksler's influential ?connections? and presence of ?one of the most expensive defense attorneys? in the city, the Vladimir district court found her guilty of the ?theft of an exceptionally large sum of money? and sentenced her to 5 years in prison. The Vladimir Oblast court upheld the decision, and the Russian Supreme Court found no legal basis for it to review the lower courts' decisions. (See Ronald R. Pope, ?An Illinois Yankee in Tsar Yeltsin's Court: Justice in Russia?, 7 Demokratizatsiya (Fall 1999)). 65 See, for instance: A.S. Avtonomov, ?Pravovoe oformlenie grazhdanskogo obschestva v Rossii? [Legal Regulations of Civil Society in Russia], Predstavitel'naya vlast': monitoring, analiz, informatsiya, No. 1, 1995, p. 73-88; E.Yu. Dogadaylo, ?Grazhdanskoe obschestvo i gosudarstvennaya vlast'? [Civil Society and State Power], Predstavitel'naya vlast': monitoring, analiz, informatsiya, No. 2, 1996, p. 48-56; V.V. Lapaeva, ?Obschestvennoe mnenie kak institut grazhdanskogo obschestva? [Public Opinion as an Institution of Civil Society], Advokat, No. 3, 1997, p. 69-81; V.V. Lapaeva, ?Obschestvennoe mnenie i zakonodatel'stvo? [Public Opinion and Legislation], Sotsiologicheskie issledovania, No. 9, 1997, p. 16-27; Yu. Nisnevich, ?Problemy vzaimodeystviya obschestva i vlasti v Rossii? [Problems of Interrelations Between Society and Power in Russia], Informatsionniye resursy Rossii, No. 4, 1997, p. 6-10. 66 Larry Diamond, ?Civil Society and Democratic Development: Why the Public Matters?, in: Democratization: Does the Public Matter? (Papers from the 1996 Distinguished International Lecture Series. Cheri Long, Douglas Midgett, Issue Editors. Center for International and Comparative Studies, The University of Iowa, 1999), p. 6. According to Larry Diamond's more detailed definition, civil society is the ?realm of autonomous, voluntary associations that pursue limited ends in the public sphere, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or [a] set of shared rules? (Larry Diamond, ?Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation?, p. 5.) 67 Quoted in: Susan Shell, ?Conceptions of Civil Society. Review of The Idea of Civil Society, by Adam B. Seligman and of Civil Society and Political Theory, by Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato?, 5 Journal of Democracy 3 (July 1994), p. 124). 68 See, for instance, Grigory N. Manov, ?Vstuplenie?, Grazhdanskoe obschestvo i pravovoe gosudarstvo: predposylki formirovaniya, [?Introduction?, Civil Society and Law-Governed State: Prerequisites of Creation] (Moscow: IGiP AN SSSR, 1991. G.N. Manov, ed.), p. 5-6. 69 Pravovoe gosudarstvo v Rossii: zamysel i realnost' (k desyatiletiu perestroyki). Krugliy stol yuristov, 19.04.1995 [Rule of Law in Russia: Concept and Reality (the 10th Anniversary of Perestroika). A Roundtable of Lawyers, 19 April 1995] (Moscow: Gorbachev-Fund, ?April-85?, 1995), p. 16. 70 Oleg Rumyantsev, Osnovy konstitutsionnogo stroya Rossii [The Basics of the Constitutional System of Russia] (Moscow, 1995), p. 76. Also see: Oleg Rumyantsev, ?Stanovlenie grazhdanskogo obschestva v Vostochnoy Evrope?, Sovremenniy sotsializm i problemy perestroyki [?Emergence of Civil Society in Eastern Europe?, Modern Socialism and Problems of Perestroika] (Moscow: IEMSS AN SSSR, 1989), p. 6-31. 71 See, for instance, Z.M. Chernilovsky ?Grazhdanskoye obschestvo: opyt issledovaniya? [Civil Society: An Attempt of a Research], Gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 6, 1992, p. 142-151; O.V. Martyshin, ?Neskol'ko tezisov o perspektivakh grazhdanskogo obschestva v Rossii? [Several Observations on Perspectives of Civil Society in Russia], Gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 5, 1996, pp. 3-13. 72 M. Steven Fish, ?Rethinking Civil Society: Russia's Fourth Transition?, p. 34. 73 Robert Sharlet, ?Citizen and State under Gorbachev and Yeltsin?, in Developments in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics (White, Pravda & Gitelman, eds. 1994), pp. 128. Yeltsin's attempt to block any public discussion of the Draft Constitution was characterized by British scholars as ?hardly a sound precedent of democratic practice? (Stephen White and Ronald J. Hill, ?Russia, Former Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe?, in The Referendum Experience in Europe (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996. Michael Gallagher and Pie Vincenzo Uleri, eds.), p. 163). 74 In an alarming conclusion of an American scholar, Yeltsin ?demonstrates how attempts to copy the American system are likely to end up in dictatorship, as they have so often in Latin America? (Robert V. Daniels, ?Yeltsin's No Jefferson. More Like Pinochet?, The New York Times, 2 October 1993, p.23). 75 Richard Rose, ?Rethinking Civil Society: Postcommunism and the Problem of Trust?, 5 Journal of Democracy 3 (July 1994), p. 19. 76 A slightly smaller percentage of supporters of Unity - 41 percent - explain their choice by the?state-oriented? policy of the party. 77 Otnoshenie naseleniya k federal'nim zakonam i organam gosudarstvennoy vlasti [Attitude of Population to Federal Laws and Bodies of State Power] (Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the Russian Government (Moscow), July 2000), p. 11. 78 Nikolay Popov, ?Kakaya vera nas spasyot? [What Faith Will Save Us], Novoe vremya, No. 2918, 14 October 2001; also available at http://www.newtimes.ru/newtimes/oio.asp?n=2918. 79 ?Civil Society After Communism: Rival Visions. V?clav Havel and V?clav Klaus with Commentary by Petr Pithart?, 7 Journal of Democracy 1 (January 1996), p. 18). 80 B.G. Mogilnitsky, ?Grazhdanskoe obschestvo i istoricheskoe soznanie?, Grazhdanskoe obschestvo i regional'noe razvitie [Civil Society and Historic Consciousness?, Civil Society and Regional Development. Scientific and Practical Conference, 22 April 1994, Tomsk] (Tomsk Oblast Duma & Tomsk State University, 1994. E.I. Chernyak, ed.), p. 6.) 81 In Kartashkin's words, ?Many human rights activists, particularly in the capital, unfortunately continue their destructive struggle -- they have not forgotten their dissident past, although the situation has totally changed?. (Interfax, 22 June 2001). 82 Russian radical liberals are notorious for their Russophobic diatribes and allegations. In a typical statement of Sergei Kovalev, for instance, it's not Yeltsin's government (which was overwhelmingly supported by Kovalev in 1990-1994, when he first chaired a parliamentary committee and then a presidential commission), that bears the main responsibility for the war in Chechnya, but ?the traditional Russian state? (emphasis added. - AD). In Kovalev's words, the Russian state is a ?clumsy, unintelligent monster? which ?is inherently incapable of properly evaluating situations,... cannot live without using force,... does not know how to resolve problems bloodlessly, for blood is its favorite food? (emphasis added. - AD). According to Kovalev, it was not Yeltsin's government of ?reformers? (like Kovalev himself), who multiplied endless problems of Russia, but ?the traditional Russian state? itself. The state which ?does not really know how to resolve problems at all. It only knows how to create them? (Sergei Kovalev, ?Russia After Chechnya?, The New York Review of Books, 17 July 1997, p. 28). After the crushing blow to radical ?democrats? at the December 1993 parliamentary elections Yuri Afanasyev concluded that ?support for communist and fascist blocs? should be explained by ?the essential nature of the Russian people? (Yuri N. Afanasyev, ?Russian Reform Is Dead?, 73 Foreign Affairs 2 (March/April 1994), p. 22). Why didn't Afanasyev think that it was because of this ?communist and fascist nature? of the Russian people, that Russians voters twice elected him, first to the USSR parliament (from my electoral district in Noginsky raion of Moscow Oblast), and then to the parliament of the Russian Federation? But when he and other radicals lost people's trust, and those very people, who voted for Afanasyev in 1989 and 1990, changed their mind and voted for his opponents, he began saying that we, Russians, are actually natural born fascists. Another radical politician and leader of the scandalous Democratic Union Valeriya Novodvorskaya argues that ?Russia is not only a country of fools, but a country of bastards too?. She regrets that Russia ?has never been smashed. Completely smashed, like Hitler?. In her words, ?Gaidar is a nice man... Yeltsin is Russia's fire-bird. And we won't let her fly away!? (Compare to ?slund's statements: Gaidar is ?one of the great historical personalities of our time?; ?President Yeltsin is Russia's last best hope? (see: The Economic and Political State of Russia. A Presentation by Yegor Gaidar, January 20, 2000 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Russian and Eurasian Program, Vol. 2, No. 2, January 24, 2000); Jeremy Weinberg, ?1996: Reforms Iced, Market Bulls Ran Anyway?, The St. Petersburg Times, 20-26 January 1997)). Novodvorskaya's credo was honestly expressed in the following words: ?If in order to wipe out Communists, Fascists and Imperialists, it will be necessary to wipe out from earth (steret' s litsa zemli) this country with all its population, we will do that without any hesitation (my ne drognem)!? No surprise that in Novodvorskaya's opinion the ?best day in our history of the 20th Century? was ?the morning of October 4 [1993], when the White House was burning?. (Quoted in: ?Pozitsiya? [Position], Russky obozrevatel', No. 1, 1995. P. 22). During the 1996 and 2000 presidential election campaigns Novodvorskaya made a major disservice to Yavlinsky when she appealed to Russian ?democrats? to support him. It was a sufficient reason for many of us not to give him our votes. 83 Polit.ru, 11 July 2001. 84 See Alexander Verkhovsky, ?Operation Civic Forum?, 2 RFE/RL (Un)Civil Societies 30 (1 August 2001). 85 In a similar case, the Moscow Oblast court on September 27, 2001, refused to agree to an appeal by the RF Ministry of Justice to disband the National Bolshevik Party headed by a detained writer and a former Soviet emigre in France and U.S.A. Eduard Limonov (Interfax, 28 September 2001). The refusal underlines a growing independence and nonpartisanship of the Russian courts. 86 See Larry Diamond, ?Civil Society and Democratic Development: Why the Public Matters?, p. 7. 87 As of 1 September 2001, state property in Russia includes 9,855 federally-owned state unitary enterprises, 34,868 institutions and 4,308 share packages. The share packages differ in size. In 84 joint-stock companies the Russian Federation owns 100 percent of their authorized capitals, in 605 - more than 50%, and in 1,719 - less than 25% (?Na prodazhu? [For Sale], Argumenty i fakty , No. 39, 26 September 2001, also available at http://www.aif.ru/aif/1092/06_03.php). 88 Ibid. 89 Polit.ru, April 21, 2000. 90 Grigoriy Yavlinsky, ?Liberalizm dlya vsekh? [Liberalizm for All], Obschaya gazeta, No. 26, 28 June 2001; also available at www.og.ru/archieve/2001/26/mat/mn1.shtml. 91 Dmitry Furman, ?Kogda vozmozhen liberalizm dlya vsyekh? [When Liberalism for All Is Possible], Obschaya gazeta, No. 28, 13 July 2001; also available at www.og.ru/archieve/2001/28/mat/mn1.shtml. 92 11% of the respondents were undecided. Activities in the spheres of culture, education and sports, and work with children and teenagers attract 4% of the respondents. 3% of those polled were prepared to work with charitable organizations that give social aid to elderly and lonely people, homeless children and low-income families. 2% of the respondents would like to join environmental protection organizations and take part in city beautification projects (planting trees and flowers, and cleaning courtyards). The same percentage of the respondents said they would like to work with trade unions and with war veterans' organizations. And one percent of those polled would prefer to join hobby groups, for instance societies of beer-lovers, car drivers or dog owners. (Interfax, 2 July 2001). 93 The report is available at www.unicef-icdc.org/presscentre/presskit/monee7/youth. 94 Richard Rose, ?Rethinking Civil Society: Postcommunism and the Problem of Trust?, p. 25-26. Russia is not unique in this respect. Rose finds a ?similar level of distrust? in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland (p. 25). A new study also finds that the ?distribution of attitudes toward democracy within the Russian population is not so very different from many other countries in transition? (Timothy J. Colton, Michael McFaul, Are Russians Undemocratic? (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, No. 20, June 2001), p. 21). Overall, the results of Colton-McFaul's study corroborate conclusions of a group of Iowan scholars made several years ago (based on 600 completed interviews in 1990, 1,400 in 1991, 1,300 in 1992 and 1,750 in 1995) that Russian legal values are close or similar to those in other former Soviet republics or in the U.S.: ?The Russian mass public is not... hostile to the rule of law... We discover more support for legal procedure [in Russia] than might have been expected... On the whole Russians show greater support for legality than do Lithuanians... We find American and Russian publics to have a very similar proportion of those willing to jettison suspects' rights in the name of fighting crime? (William M. Reisinger, Arthur H. Miller, and Vicki L. Hesli, ?Russians and the Legal System: Mass Views and Behaviour in the 1990s?, 13 Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 3 (September 1997), p. 24, 25, 45; also see: William M. Reisinger, Arthur H. Miller, and Vicki L. Hesli, ?Political Values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania: Sources and Implications for Democracy?, 24 British Journal of Political Science (1994), p. 183-223; Arthur H. Miller, Vicki L. Hesli, and William M. Reisinger, ?Comparing Citizen and Elite Belief Systems in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine?, 59 Public Opinion Quarterly (Spring 1995), p. 1-40; William M. Reisinger, ?Legal Orientations and the Rule of Law in Post-Soviet Russia?, Constitutional Dialogues in Comparative Perspective (London: McMillan; NY: St. Martin's Press, 1999. Sally J. Kenney, William M. Reisinger and John C. Reitz, eds.), p. 172-192). 95 See Nikolay Popov, ?Fantazii na temu demokratii? [Democratic Fantasies], Novoe vremya, No. 34, 2001; also available at www.newtimes.ru/oio.asp?n=34. 96 The poll was held in early April 2000 in early April in 94 urban and rural areas of Russia's 40 regions in every ?economic-geographical area? of the country. The results were reported by Interfax, 19 April 2000. 97 The analytical report was prepared for the Russian Government and not for publication; on file with the author. 98 A later opinion poll (conducted by the All-Russia Center for Public Opinion Studies in mid-January 2001) indicated similar results showing that 75 percent of Russians believe that in historical terms the Yeltsin era did Russia more bad than good (with 15 percent who don't think so). See Strana.ru, 1 February 2001. 99 The poll represented Russia's adult population (18 and above) according to gender, age, level of education, location, and type of populated area; with possible error of about 3.8%. The results are reported on Polit.ru, 21 April 2000. 100 Interfax, 12 July 2001. 101 A recent survey of 400 journalists across Russia conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences found that 30 percent of them had inserted hidden advertising into stories ?regularly? or ?occasionally?. Overall, 67 percent of journalists had done it ?more than once?. ?Journalists... themselves have destroyed their image as defenders of liberties?, admits political editor of St. Petersburg-based daily Nevskoe vremya (quoted in Galina Stolyarova, ?Poll Highlights Media's Weakness?, The St. Petersburg Times, 28 August 2001). Also available at www.sptimesrussia.com/archive/times/699/top/t_4459.htm. 102 See Oleg Poptsov's interview in: Alexander Gubanov, ?Televidenie eto mekhanizm upravleniya stranoy. Mekhanizm upravleniya stranoy nuzhdaetsya v remonte? [Television is a Mechanism of the Country Control. The Mechanism of the Country Control Needs to Be Repaired], Obschaya gazeta, No. 31, 26 July 2001. P. 6. Also available at www.og.ru/archieve/2001/31/mat/i2.shtml. 103 Yuri Levada, ?Sotsvopros? [A Social Question], Novaya gazeta, No. 53, 30 July 2001; also available at 2001.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2001/53n/n53n-s22.shtml An earlier opinion poll (held in March 2001) had similar results: 57 percent of Russians favored reimposing some kind of censorship over the media, up from 48 percent in November 2000. The number of those opposed to censorship dropped from 38 to 33 percent during the same interval. (See RFE/RL Security Watch, 9 April 2001, quoting Gleb Pavlovsky's Public Opinion Foundation website www.fom.ru). 104 In Solzhenitsyn's words, ?Sometimes, capital punishment is needed for the sake of saving the nation and the state. In Russia, matters stand this way at the moment?. 105 Interfax, 28 June 2001. 106 Trud, January 6, 2000. 107 Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR: An Interpretation of Soviet Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963 2nd ed. x, 450 p.), p. 5; Harold J. Berman, Justice in Russia: An Interpretation of Soviet Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950. X, 322 p.), p. 3. 108 Legislative euphoria had some positive effects at the early stage of legal reforms in the USSR. For example, from June 1987 to the autumn of 1988 only, approximately 1,200 federal and 7,500 republican decrees that hindered the Soviet transition to the rule of law were repealed. In the same period, more than 33,000 federal and 80,000 republican ministerial and departmental rules and regulations concerning economic and social relations in the country were abolished. (See, for instance: Alexei Klishin, ?Economic Reform and Contract Law in the USSR?, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1990, p. 253.) 109 See, for instance: Kathy Lally, ?Pardons Turn Rare in Putin's Russia?, The Baltimore Sun, 14 June 2001; Masha Lipman, ?How Putin Pardons?, The Washington Post, 17 July 2001; Sophie Lambroschini, ?Russia: Pardon System Plays Mercy Role Amid A Cruel Society?, RFE/RL, 23 February 2001; available at www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/02/23022001115056.asp. 110 Personally, it always bothered me why in nearly all of his TV and newspaper interviews Pristavkin always speaks about Yelena Kozlova who stole a goat worth $20 and was sentenced to five and a half years in prison, as if she was the only one pardoned by his commission. Apparently, he told the same story to Kathy Lally whose article in The Baltimore Sun starts with a description of that really outrageous and intolerable case. But what about the remaining 12,000 pardons a year? The above-mentioned figures give the answer. 111 The categorization of crimes in the Russian Criminal Code is more complex than in the felony-misdemeanor division in the U.S. The four categories of crimes and their maximum punishments are: minor crime (up to 2 years in prison); moderately serious crime (up to 5 years in prison); serious crime (up to 10 years in prison); very serious crime (over 10 years in prison, life imprisonment or death, not implemented since Russia's admittance to the Council of Europe in February 1996). (See, for instance: Gennady M. Danilenko & William Burnham, Law and Legal System of the Russian Federation (Juris Publishing, 2000. 2nd ed.); William Butler, Russian Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 112 Russian press wrote about defense attorneys who proudly advertise their service saying that they have an access to the Clemency Committee, but the fee for that service is high (dorogo stoit). (See Marina Gridneva, ?Nasil'nik mil ne budet?, Moscovskii komsomolets, 9 July 2001). 113 The list could be easily compiled by the Pristavkin's commission and included Marc Rich, a tax fraud racketeer and fugitive from the law, Susan Rosenberg, an urban terrorist, John Deutch, an ex-Director of CIA; Henry G. Cisneros, a former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; Susan H. McDougal, an old business partner of the Clintons and their accomplice in the Whitewater scandal; Patricia Hearst, a heroine of Soviet propaganda in the mid-1970s; and Clinton's half-brother Roger, who had pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine in Arkansas; although not an Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard. 114 Ronald Reagan, for instance, pardoned 406 people in 8 years. 70 people were pardoned, only one commutation granted, and 1,554 executive clemency applications denied in 1989-1993. (See remarkable studies by P.S. Ruckman, Jr. of clemency in the U.S.: ?Executive Clemency in the United States: Origins, Development, and Analysis (1900-1993)?, 27 Presidential Studies Quarterly (Spring 1997); ?Keys to Clemency Reform: Knowledge, Transparency?, Jurist, 7 March 2001; available at jurist.law.pitt.edu/pardonop5.htm). A complete list of executive clemency applications of 1953-1999 is available at www.rvc.cc.il.us/faclink/pruckman/pardoncharts/jopdata.htm. 115 See Marina Gridneva, op.cit. It's amazing that criticism of Putin's decision to improve the effectiveness of the Clemency Commission's work comes mainly from the U.S., a country having the largest prison population in the world (approximately 2 million in 2001; twice bigger than in Russia), executing somebody every five days on average, and, according to the latest Amnesty International report, continuing ?to violate international standards by using the death penalty against the mentally impaired, individuals who were under 18 at the time of the crime, and defendants who received inadequate legal representation?. (Amnesty International Report 2000; available at web.amnesty.org/web/ar2001.nsf/webamericas? Also see another Amnesty International report: U.S.A.: Failing the Future. Death Penalty Developments, March 1998 - March 2000; available at web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/AMR510032000?) Between 1977 and 1999, the U.S. state authorities commuted only 40 death sentences on ?humanitarian grounds? nationwide. (See U.S.A: Killing Without Mercy: Clemency Procedures in Texas (Amnesty International, 1 June 1999; available at www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/AMR510851999). 116 According to the latest poll conducted by ROMIR-Gallup International, 45.3 percent of Russians do not trust their government comparing to 45.1 percent who do (Interfax, 30 August 2001). In Eugeny Primakov's words, ?the hardest consequence and lesson of the crisis [of August, 1998] has been not the fall of production or the fall of the ruble, but a total crisis of trust? (ITAR-TASS, 4 December 1998). 117 The definition is used in the publications of economist Alexander Anisimov and political scientist Alexander Kalinin concluding that Yeltsin's regime cannot be characterized as an ?occupation regime? because the term ?occupation? still presumes a certain degree of care and protection. A more adequate definition of the rule of Yeltsin ?reformers? is a ?liquidation regime?, i.e. a regime liquidating the Russian state, people and culture. (From an interview with A. Kalinin, Moscow, 4 May 2001). 118 Russia's industrial product has plummeted about 50 percent. Back in 1941-45, when Hitler's troops were occupying about half of the European part of the USSR, when more than 1,700 cities and 70,000 villages were destroyed in warfare, and about 26.5 million Soviet citizens lost their lives, the reduction of the Soviet industrial product was only about 30 percent. 119 The conclusion belongs to Murray Feshbach, former branch chief of at the U.S. Bureau of the Census and a research professor of Georgetown University, now a Senior Scholar at the Wilson Center. (See The Washington Post, 12 July 1995). Another American scholar draws our attention to an important detail: ?Remember: the Russian crisis has erupted in a country in a formal state of peace. In origin, duration, and character, Russia's mortality crisis is fundamentally different from those others?, like in Spain (1936-39), Western Germany (1943-46), Japan (1944-45), and South Korea (1950-53), which had ?record cruel plunges in countrywide life expectancy around the middle of the twentieth century. Merely to note those dates, however, is to see a contrast between these cases and the case of Russia. The mortality crises in Spain, Western Germany, Japan, and South Korea were direct consequences of wars or civil war?. (See Nicholas Eberstadt, ?Russia: Too Sick to Matter??, Policy Review (The Heritage Foundation), No. 95, June & July 1999; available at www.policyreview.com/jun99/eberstadt.html). 120 In the beginning of 2000, Anders ?slund, an economic advisor to the Russian Government in 1991-1994, made a new attempt to somehow beautify the results of ?reforms? and his work in Russia. According to him, ?a frequently cited statistic is that the average life expectancy for Russian men has declined [from 63.9 years in 1990. - AD] to 57.7 years. But that was in 1994. After that, the figure increased... to 61.8 years in 1998? (Anders ?slund, ?Underselling Russia's Economy?, New York Times, 18 January 2000; also available at www.ceip.org/files/Publications/Underselling.asp). The attempt was short-lived. According to the RF Statistics Committee average life expectancy for Russian men in 1999 was 58.9 years, one of the lowest index among the developed countries of the world (see A. Mikhailova, ?Statistika vozrastnoy struktury naseleniya Rossii? [Statistics on the Age Structure of the Russian Population], Ekonomika i zhizn', No. 7, 2001). What was even more important for Russian demography is that in 1999 Russia's shrinking population took its largest post-Soviet drop, with the reduction of population by 0.49 percent or 716,900 (to 145.6 million). It's indicative, that in his latest article (which is partly based on his piece ?Underselling Russia's Economy?) ?slund describes 10 ?myths? about the current socio-economic situation in Russia, but no longer repeats his assertions about growing life expectancy in Russia. Instead of it, he takes comfort in explaining the demographic catastrophe in the country by two factors: all-European tendency of low birth rates and Russian high death rates. (See ?Think Again, Russia!?, Foreign Policy, July-August 2001; also see his ?Mif o kollapse proizvodstva posle krusheniya kommunizma?, Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 7, 2001, p. 115-138). The second factor is certainly true, although it is not limited to the generation of those who were born in 1930-1945 only, as ?slund says. But the first factor is another deception, because low birth rates in Russia and Europe have different reasons, and don't mean much by themselves. What matters is an enormous reduction of births in Russia (from about 2.5 million in 1987 to about 1.25 million in 1999) with a similarly enormous growth of deaths (from about 1.55 million in 1987 to about 2.2 million in 1999), whereas in Western Europe we see practically parallel lines of births and deaths (for instance, in Germany a number of births in 1980 was about 0.9 million and in 1999 - about 0.8 million with a number of deaths in 1980 - about 0.95 million and in 1999 - about 0.85 million; in Italy - a number of births in 1980 was about 0.6 million and in 1999 - about 0.55 million with a number of deaths in 1980 - about 0.55 and about 0.6 million death in 1999). As Murray Feshbach's study shows, if in European countries (like Germany or Italy) the net ratio is close to 1.1 deaths to every birth, in Russia, deaths exceeded births by 929,600 in 1999, a ratio of 1.8:1. Feshbach's verdict: Russia is facing a ?demographic Chernobyl that would give a fearful meaning to the word meltdown?. (Murray Feshbach, ?Russia's Population Meltdown?, 15 The Wilson Quarterly, 1 (Spring 2001), p. 18, 21). Another ?selective truth? is ?slund's triumphant statement that infant mortality in Russia ?plunged by 17 percent from 1993 to 1998? (in the same ?Think again, Russia!?), as if the Russian ?reformers? should be praised for that, and his inexplicable silence about the fact that infant mortality more than doubled in Russia between 1990 and 1993: from 14 per 1,000 live births to 30, and that the 17 percent reduction of infant mortality is simply miserable comparing to that terrible growth. (A study by Carl Haub, Chair of Population Information at the Washington-based Population Reference Bureau, frequently quoted at the World Bank Transition Newsletter. The Newsletter About Reforming Economies, available at www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/apr95/pgs18-19.htm). And that's exactly for what we should ?thank? the ?reformers? and their Western consultants! (To what extent we can trust official statistics in Russia today is also a question. The same M. Feshbach, for instance, mentioned a possibility that the correct infant mortality figure in 1997 was closer to 40 per 1,000 live births than the official figure reported as below 20). And why does ?slund speak only about infant mortality and not about mortality of other age groups, for instance, children? The authors of a new study Young People in Changing Societies (undertaken by the Innocenti Research Centre (Florence, Italy) on behalf of UNICEF) estimate that about half a million children aged 5-14 who lived in Eastern Europe and USSR in 1989 have already died, almost half in Russia alone. The mortality rate among young people rose in 11 (out of 27) post-Communist countries, particularly within the CIS; it fell in 16 other countries, including the Baltic states and Eastern Europe. The danger of a young person dying was three times greater in Russia than in Slovakia, the Czech republic or in Hungary. The report concludes that these deaths are explained by mainly social causes and could have been avoided under different social conditions. ?slund, however, denies that ?average healthcare standards in Russian have fallen?. And this is another falsehood, just like his allegation that ?capitalism has made medicines widely available... and the equipment at hospitals has greatly improved?. A special chapter (Chapter 4; p. 39-52) of the UNEP report Transition 1999. Human Development Report for Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS is dedicated exclusively to health crisis in Russia and other post-Communist countries. See a thoughtful rebuttal to several other ?slund's allegations (including his old thesis of a ?splendid achievement? of ?market reform and privatization? in Russia, an ?extraordinary improvement in [Russia's] infrastructure?, and ?considerable structural improvements?) by Edward Lukas, Moscow correspondent of The Economist, on Johnson's Russia List, #5338, 6 July 2001; available at www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5338.html. Also see Peter Reddaway's rebuttal to ?slund's allegation about ?the falling crime rate? in Russia as a ?result of energetic government efforts? in: The Weekly Standard, 2 February 1998. In his comments ??slund The Myth Maker?, Jim Millar (of The George Washington University) wrote: ?Economic advisors to governments have the same responsibility as medical doctors do to their patients. Above all, they should not make the patient worse. Second, when the patient does get worse they have an obligation to seek second opinions and to reconsider their diagnosis and prescriptions. Anders ?slund, on the contrary, now seeks to show that the patient was never sick in the first place, nor did the patient become worse after receiving treatment. Both Russia and Ukraine have been Anders' patients, and both remain very sick if not terminally so?. (Johnson's Russia List, #5167, 24 March 2001; available at www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5167.html). And in his recent article, John Helmer even compared a new appointment of ?slund, having a reputation of a ?frequent promoter of Chubais' views? (see The Moscow Tribune, 19 April 1997), to a World Bank team investigating the success of privatization in Russia to ?having David Irving teach the history of the Holocaust? (see John Helmer, ?Hiring Professor Huckster and Inspector Hype?, The Russia Journal, 4-10 May 2001; also available at www.russiajournal.ru/printer/weekly4587.html). 121 See this comparison at the World Bank Transition Newsletter. The Newsletter About Reforming Economies (April 1997), available at www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/apr97/pgs24-28.htm. 122 ITAR-TASS, 16 March 2001. 123 This index is 1.5 times smaller than in developed countries. In the U.S. it's currently 85-88 percent. In the Russian Empire, at the time of the 1896/97 census, for 50 guberniya of European Russia the survival rate of 16 year olds up to the age 60 was 56 percent. Contrary to what could be expected, especially by Western observers, major improvements occurred in the Soviet period (excluding major demographic catastrophe periods such as Civil War, collectivization, and World War II) with the growth of the considered index to some 72 percent in 1965. It dropped to 68 percent in 1982, while now 46 percent of Russian men will not live to retirement age. (See Murray Feshbach, ?Comments on Current and Future Demographic and Health Issues?, Johnson's Russia List, #5338, 10 June 1997). 124 There are between 625,000 (an official figure) and 2 million abandoned homeless children in Russia today (see ITAR-TASS, 29 June 1999). Newspaper stories about kids living in cardboard boxes among garbage cans or about a 6-year-old Vanya Mishukov who was raised by stray dogs (The Guardian, 16 July 1998) no longer look like a gross dramatization of life in Russia and most other former Soviet republics. (Also see Sergei Rykov, ?In Free Russia Children Are Raped, Robbed and Murdered?, Komsomolskaya Pravda - RIA Novosti, 17 April 1997). 125 UNDP Press Release ?Men Hardest Hit by Hurried Transition to Free Markets in Ex-Soviet Countries? available at www.undp.org/rbec/pubs/hdr99/pr.htm. Russian Nation has not overcome the catastrophic consequences of ?reforms? yet. The demographic situation in Russia had been assessed as ?critical? by experts of the World Health Organization (WHO). In assessment of Dr. Mark Donzon, the WHO European Bureau Director, and Mikko Vienonen, Special Representative of the WHO Director, Russia's population is expected to fall by another 2.8 million over the next three years (from 144.4 million in 2001) and further shrink to 130 million by the year 2015. (ITAR-TASS, 2 February 2001). Was it holy naivety, ignorance or deliberate disinformation of the U.S. Senate when on September 3, 1993, Strobe Talbott, at that time Ambassador-at-Large for the NIS, claimed (in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) that ?national rebirth has begun? in Russia? 126 In the words of Mark Jones, a British writer, ?the only two things that are certain are that there will be more unrecorded, unlamented Russian deaths and that the triumphal pageant of western-inspired ?reforms? will pass the heaps of corpses by, noses aloft? (Johnson's Russia List, 27 May 1997). 127 Thomas E. Graham, Jr., ?Putin's Russia. Why Economic Reform Requires Political Support. Reflections on U.S. Policy Toward Russia?, 9 East European Constitutional Review 1-2 (Winter-Spring 2000); Martin Malia, ?The Haunting Presence of Marxism-Leninism?, 10 Journal of Democracy 2 (April 1999), p. 41. Thomas Graham corrected himself, however, when making the following comment: ?The [Clinton] administration backed an economic course - the so-called ?Washington Consensus? - that did not take sufficient account of Russian political realities, including a widespread elite and popular opposition to that course. Critics were generally dismissed as communists, hard-liners, or economic illiterates. In the end, the administration found itself backing a small, unpopular group of radical reformers. Not only was the economic program not implemented, but the way it was pursued cast into doubt American support for the democratization of Russia?. (Thomas Graham, ?US Ignores Russia's Elite At Its Own Peril?, Christian Science Monitor, 26 Oct. 2000; also available at www.ceip.org/files/publications/grahamusigners.asp). There is a quite adequate legal definition for what was described by Thomas Graham (in his witness testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on Corruption in Russia and Future U.S. Policy, 30 September 1999) as an initiative of ?a relatively small circle of senior [U.S.] administration officials? to enter into ?a partnership with a similarly small circle of senior Russian government officials for the purpose of transforming Russian society? (Federal News Service, 2 October 1999). The definition is 'conspiracy'. 128 As it was later cynically explained by an American scholar, if the ?international community? gives its support to a ?traditionally undemocratic act?, as it did in Russia in September 1993, then this act is actually ?democratic?, albeit ?unconstitutionally democratic?. (Donna R. Miller, ?Unconstitutional Democracy: Ends vs. Means in Boris Yeltsin's Russia?, 4 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 2 (Fall 1994), p. 876). 129 It was openly admitted by Peter Reddaway (of The George Washington University) in his witness testimony before the Senate Hearing on Corruption in Russia (30 September 1999), that the United States ?have this record of involving ourselves not just in economic policymaking in Russia, but also in personnel. It was actually an unwritten condition of the IMF loan in 1995 of $6.8 billion that Mr. Chubais would be the person in charge of running economic policy. It was not written into any agreement, but it was an unspoken agreement, unrecorded agreement... That is the sort of meddling, the sort of attempt to direct Russian policy at the macro level. And supporting Mr. Yeltsin prior to his decision to destroy the Russian Parliament in 1993, we gave our permission to do that. We allowed democracy to be subverted in that way. Those are the sorts of meddling and involvement that I think have been very much against our national interest? (Federal News Service, 2 October 1999; emphasis added. - AD). 130 Mary McAuley, ?The Big Chill. Civil Society in Russia in a New Political Season?, Ford Foundation Report (Winter 2001); available on Johnson's Russia List, #5156, 17 March 2001 at www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5156.html. Russian NGOs cannot be accused in being too prude and selective in respect of their sponsors, and that concerns not only foreign, but domestic grant-providers too. Not many other things could make a bigger damage to the image of the Sakharov Center or the Moscow-based International Foundation for Civil Liberties in the eyes of common Russian people then the fact that those civic groups are provided with a generous financial support (to be precise, 3 million U.S. dollars in the first case, and one million in the other) from robber baron B.A. Berezovsky. (See RFE/RL Newsline, 29 August 2001). 131 For example, NGOs working in collaboration with the Russian Foundations for Legal Reform have 8 sources of funding of their activities with ?foreign foundations? constituting the largest source among all of them - 22.7%. In reality, foreign support might be even bigger because 12.6% of budget coming from ?sponsor dues? does not necessarily mean that such sponsors are always 'domestic'. (F.E. Sheregi and E.A. Abrosimova, Pravovye initsiativy nekommercheskikh organizatsiy Rossii [Legal Initiatives of Noncommercial Organizations of Russia] (Moscow: Russian Foundations for Legal Reform, Center for Social Prognosis, 1999), p. 93). 132 Timothy J. Colton, Michael McFaul, op.cit., p. 22. 133 ?USAID officials simply misunderstood the relationship between formal institutions and civil society: successful legal and political institutions are preceded by the development of a culture of respect for the law and democratic structures. Yet USAID supported creating jury trials, party systems, the transplantation of civil and commercial codes, and the drafting of constitutions in countries completely lacking in a social base to support these elements of civil society. Contractors, forced to respond to the political pressures felt by USAID, were in no position to provide proposals that explored the tougher route of building a civic culture. From USAID's perspective, building a courtroom in less than two months time was more useful than a lengthy program designed to foster community values supportive of democratic institutions?. (Peter J. Stavrakis, ?Bull in a China Shop: USAID's Post-Soviet Mission?, 4 Demokratizatsiya. The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 2 (Spring 1996), p. 261. Also available at The American Foreign Policy Council's website at www.afpc.org/issues/bull.htm). 134 ?AID programs have failed miserably in helping NIS states develop the limited, competent administrative institutions that are essential for the breakthrough to civil society... Russia and other successor states have inadvertently done the United States a great favor by exposing the fundamental incapacity of USAID to achieve assistance goals that promote American interests abroad. The lesson to be drawn from USAID's encounter with the NIS is that reform is insufficient; if America aspires to provide assistance that promotes the development of free-market, civil societies, there is no alternative to eliminating AID and replacing it with a leaner, more efficient and competent structure? (Peter Stavrakis, op.cit., p. 249, 248. Also see Janine R. Wedel, ?Clique-Run Organizations and U.S. Economic Aid: An Institutional Analysis?, 4 Demokratizatsiya 4 (Fall 1996); Janine R. Wedel, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001. 2nd ed.)); Stephen Cohen, Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia (New York: Norton, 2000). 135 Timothy J. Colton, Michael McFaul, op.cit., p. 22. McFaul repeated his appeal to the Bush administration to ?cut all democratic and economic aid to the state and redirect these funds to Russian society? in: ?Moscow, Misreading Bush?, The Washington Post, 23 January 2001. 136 Michael McFaul & Nikolai Zlobin, ?Judge Putin by His Democratic Acts, Not His Talk?, Los Angeles Times, 24 June 2001. 137 In the past, one of the authors of the CEIS report, was a consultant of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Moscow. In its multimillion USAID-funded activities (in 1992-1997, the NDI and the International Republican Institute (IRI), received $17.4 million from the USAID, to ?help reformist political parties strengthen their organizational structures and their role in elections? (Foreign Assistance. Harvard Institute for International Development's Work in Russia and Ukraine (Washington, U.S. General Accounting Office: November 1996), p. 37)) NDI, among other things, trained a group of approximately 3,000 ?reformist-minded political activists? in Russia (1992-1996) which ironically included Vladimir Putin, who is now described by the same McFaul (in his testimony to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee), as a potential ?Russia's Milosevic? [in this case, A. ?slund publicly disagrees with his Carnegie Endowment for International Peace colleague and calls a suggestion that Putin ?would be Russia's Milosevic? ?a flimsy assertion?. See his ?Think Again, Russia!?], someone ?willing to use the power of the state and ignore the democratic rights of society in the pursuit of his objectives?, whose election as a new Russian President was not a ?positive step? for the U.S. interests in Russia (Johnson's Russia List, #4247, 14 April 2000; available at www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/4247.html). McFaul contradicts himself in his last statement, just like in his (and Colton's) new ?formula for democracy? 'Represent the will of the people within the state, and the institutions will follow'. Doesn't Putin's landslide victory in the 2000 presidential election ?represent the will of the people?? Describing the results of a recent opinion poll, a VTsIOM sociologist was certainly right when saying that President Putin so overshadows all other political and social figures in Russia now that there are almost no individuals who serve as leaders of an independent civil society. This is a remarkable shift, the sociologist said, from conditions of 1999 when numerous leaders enjoyed significant rates of trust and thus could serve as catalysts for the promotion of civil society institutions (Izvestiya, 9 October 2001). 138 Sergei Karaganov [Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Science], ?Ruled by a 'Kleptocracy'?, The Times, 28 September 1999. 139 The verb kinut' (to con, rip off, swindle) is common in the slang of Russian criminals and was used by Anatoly Chubais, ?father of privatization? and chief negotiator of the 1998 $4.8 billion bailout package from IMF, in his interview to Kommersant Daily (8 September 1998) when he argued that lying to Western lenders in the days preceding the financial meltdown in Russia was the right thing to do: ?In such situations, the authorities have to do it. We ought to. The financial institutions understand, despite the fact that we conned them out of $20 billion, that we had no other way out?. An American journalist naively admitted that he found Chubais' statement ?especially startling because [Chubais] has been widely viewed as one of Russia's 'young reformers,' who could be trusted by the West because he favored establishing a market economy?. (See Richard C. Paddock, ?Russia Lied to Get Loans, Says Aide to Yeltsin?, Los Angeles Times, 9 September 1998. Also available at www.afpc.org/issues/infcon.htm) Chubais' revelations produced a discussion on JRL regarding the most adequate translation and ?economic? interpretation of the word kinut' (does it actually mean to 'con' or 'stiff somebody'), and are an excellent illustration of the criminal essence (?splendid achievements?, in ?slund's words) of the results of monetarist reforms in Russia. (See Johnson's Russia List, #2365, 11 September 1998). The term was later used by Jerry Hough when he wrote about the Russian reformers who ?just conned the IMF, and the IMF then conned Western investors? (see Johnson's Russia List, #2399, 29 September 1998). 140 ?Secretary of State Powell's Message on 10th Anniversary of Belarus' Independence? (of 25 August 2001) available at www.usis.minsk.by/html/powell_10th.html). American reporters are overall much less sophisticated than the State Department officials and tend to transform such unclear accusations as [Belarus] ?has tried - in vain - to stir up hostility toward Euro-Atlantic institutions? and such phrases as ?retrogression in economic policy and performance? to more primitive (thus, more understandable to American public) expressions. Respectively, Alexander Lukashenko has been labeled ?stupid?, ?paranoid?, someone ?with Neanderthal views? (Chicago Tribune, [Editorial], 29 March 1997), ?proto-fascist dictator? (James H. Billington, ?Russia, Between a Dream and a Nightmare?, The New York Times , June 17, 1998), ?Europe's last dictator? (White House press secretary Ari Fleisher, quoted in: RFE/RL Newsline, 18 September 2001), ?the Stalinist leader of Belarus?, and even ?an open admirer of Hitler? (?Russia and Its Tyrant Neighbor? [Editorial], The New York Times, 25 August 1997). That's about a leader of the Nation where every fourth citizen was slaughtered by Nazis... Ironically, one of American Lukashenko-bashers is Pat Buchanan denounced by his liberal compatriots as a ?defender of Nazis?, ?Holocaust revisionist?, ?anti-Semite... flirting with fascism? and ?praising Hitler?. (See, for instance, www.realchange.org/buchanan.htm). Provided such accusations are true, everything should be all right with Lukashenko, if he is trashed by someone like Buchanan. 141 According to official results of the elections, Alexander Lukashenko obtained 75.65 percent of the vote. His rivals Vladimir Hancharyk and Sergei Haydukevich got 15.65 and 2.48 percent. Turnout in the elections was 83.86 percent. (RFE/RL Newsline, 17 September 2001). 142 A group of international observers (citizens of Britain, U.S., Poland and Croatia) sent to monitor the presidential elections in Belarus by the British Helsinki Human Rights Group (BHHRG) testified that ?the organization of the elections was of a high level?, ?the secrecy of the ballot was observed?, ?there was a high level of participation?, ?none expressed any fear or pressure, contrary to what was claimed in the Western media?. Noting that it is ?always critical of early voting, which unfortunately exists in many countries including Germany and the U.K.?, BHHRG concluded that it ?saw no reason to challenge the result? of the elections. Whatever flaws can be found in the Belarus presidential election, they are hardly as large as the ones that afflicted the US presidential election of 2000. In the end, President Lukashenko was elected by the people, and not picked by Belarussian Supreme Court or Constitutional Court. In another report ?Belarus 2001: The Pre-electoral Situation?, BHHRG concluded: ?The claims that Belarus is a Stalinist dictatorship or ?worse than Cuba? - to quote Ambassador Kozak - are contrary to the evidence on the ground. This is proven by the fact that foreigners known for their active opposition to the president - like the executive director of the International Helsinki Federation (IHF), Aaron Rhodes, who has called him ?Hitler loving? - are able to visit and remain in the country unhindered for long periods of time and hold press conferences there?. (Both BHHRG reports are available at www.bhhrg.org/belarus). 143 See ?Yeltsin Moves to End Chaos - Hon. Steny H. Hoyer (Extension of Remarks)?, Congressional Record, 22 September 1993. P. E2219. 144 The activities of the Constitutional Court of Russia were suspended after it voted 9 to 4 (in an emergency session immediately after issuance of Yeltsin's Decree 1400 dissolving the Russian parliament) that the President's action violated Article 121-6 of Constitution, according to which the President couldn't use his powers ?to dismiss, or suspend the activities of, any lawfully elected agencies of state power?. Otherwise, the President's powers ?are discontinued immediately?. Originally, it was an article of the Law ?On the President of the RSFSR? (April 1991) that later (May 1991) was included into the Constitution and instituted presidency in Russia. 145 In 1998, a major Moscow newspaper alleged that U.S. money helped finance Yeltsin's electoral campaign. The newspaper charged that in March 1996, half a billion dollars (in $100 bank notes) was sent as a diplomatic shipment to the U.S. embassy in Moscow. The embassy officials confirmed that information arguing, however, that the shipment was planned to ensure that there were enough new $100 bank notes to meet demand in Russia. The explanation didn't hold water, because if the embassy arguments were true, the money could have been stored at the Russian Central Bank rather than at the embassy. In the newspaper's interpretation, half a billion dollars was quickly ?acquired by large Russian banks?, which ?played an active role in the Yeltsin campaign?. As known, Russian legislation prohibits candidates from accepting contributions from foreign donors. (Moskovskii komsomolets, 11 February 1998; RFE/RL Newsline, 11 February 1998). The newspaper's version got an additional confirmation next year, when Sergei Lisovsky, an advertising and show business mogul (detained on 19 June 1996, when trying to smuggle a Xerox paper box with $538,000 ?black cash? in it from the Russian government building), admitted that in the 1996 campaign ?the main money was Western? (see Novaya gazeta, June 28-July 4, 1999; also quoted in: Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 28 June 1999)). By the way, back in June 1996, Chubais, the reform icon, bluntly denied that the box or its contents even existed: ?I am deeply convinced that the so-called box with money is a traditional element of a traditional, Soviet-style KGB provocation?. 146 See The Guardian, 25 August 2001; also available at www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4245377,00.html. 147 Alice Lagnado, ?U.S. Adopts 'Contras Policy' in Communist Belarus?, The Times, 3 September 2001; also available at www.thetimes.co.uk/article/0,,3-2001303768,00.html. 148 Mark Almond [of Oxford University], ?For Nicaragua, Read Belarus?, The Guardian, 14 August 2001; also available at www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4242518,00.html. 149 Also see 2 RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report 44 (28 November 2000). 150 Ian Traynor, ?Belarussian Foils Dictator-Buster... For Now. Tested US Foreign Election Strategy Fails Against Lukashenko?, The Guardian, 14 September 2001; also available at www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4256816,00.html. 151 Alice Lagnado, ?Why the Rural Millions Love a Dictator?, New Statesman, 17 September 2001. 152 Alice Lagnado, ?U.S. Adopts 'Contras Policy' in Communist Belarus?, The Times, 3 September 2001. 153 Jeremy Bransten, ?Belarus: President Decrees More Restrictions on NGOs?, RFE/RL, 21 March 2001. 154 Ian Traynor, op.cit. According to Russian press, support to Belarussian opposition through Eurasia Foundation only has grown from $340,000 in 1996 to $1.5 million in 1998 and about $4 million in 2001. 155 Scott Peterson, ?US Spends Millions to Bolster Belarus Opposition?, Christian Science Monitor, 10 September 2001; available at www.csmonitor.com/2001/0910/p7s1-woeu.htm. The newspaper quoted Paulyuk Bykowski, a political writer for the weekly Belarussian Market newspaper, saying that ?Lukashenko is right that [outside money] flows into politics?. Of the 19 or so registered opposition parties, ?almost every one has 10 to 20 non-governmental organizations [eligible for outside cash]?. ?Name me any other country where you get paid for being in the opposition?, a Belarussian journalist wondered, and a newspaper editor ridiculed American seminars for their attempts to teach ?how we should live?. (Scott Peterson, ?US Spends Millions to Bolster Belarus Opposition?, Christian Science Monitor, 10 September 2001; Alice Lagnado, ?Why the Rural Millions Love a Dictator?, New Statesman, 17 September 2001). 156 English translation of the decree is available at www.belarusupdate.org/civilsoc/luka_decree.html. 157 Jan Maksymiuk, ?Lukashenka Wants Wide-margin Victory?, RFE/RL Newsline, 7 September 2001. 158 ?A.P. Denounces Belarus Authorities?, AP Online, 3 August 2001. 159 See, for instance: Jeremy Bransten, ?Belarus: President Decrees More Restrictions on NGOs?, RFE/RL, 21 March 2001. 160 See Ronald C. Monticone, ?A Brief Comparative Analysis of the Russian Constitution?, Constitution of the Russia Federation. With Commentaries and Interpretation by American and Russian Scholars (Lawrenceville, VA: Brunswick Publ. Corp., 1994), p. 14, 7, 9. 161 See, for instance: Presidential Powers and Human Rights under the Draft Constitution of Belarus (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, October 1996). 162 Indeed, if, for instance, according to the Russian Constitution, the decision on the President's removal from office must be adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the total membership of each chamber of the Federal Assembly, and the whole impeachment process is to be accomplished within three months after filing the charge against him (Art. 93), the Constitution of Belarus has the same provision regarding voting in the lower chamber (House of Representatives), but raises the threshold for the Senate to three-quarters of its total composition, and limits the time frame to one month (Art.88). Yet, the Russian Constitution provides for five stages in the impeachment process (including participation of both the Supreme and Constitutional Courts of Russia), which makes the process more time-consuming, whereas the impeachment process in Belarus is to be accomplished in four stages without involvement of the Constitutional Court. In practical terms, however, the Constitutions of both countries make their Presidents technically unimpeachable. 163 Jim Hoagland, ?Worse Than Yeltsin?, The Washington Post, 12 September 1999. 164 Michael Specter, ?My Boris?, The New York Times Magazine, July 26, 1998; also available at www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2288.html. Hoagland-Specter's description of Yeltsin is a modern paraphrase of Theodore Roosevelt's famous ?our son of a bitch?. 165 A British reporter author has to recognize that President Lukashenko is ?popular? and correctly notes that ?people are living in far worse conditions in some parts of Russia and Ukraine? than in Belarus and that average pensions in Belarus are about $30 a month, whereas in many Russian regions they are three times smaller. (Alice Lagnado, ?Why the Rural Millions Love a Dictator?, New Statesman, 17 September 2001). She is also right that ?most Belorussians? fear that a new, pro-Western leader would bring the poverty experienced by many Russians and Ukrainians after the transition to a market economy?, but still labels Lukashenko as a ?dictatorial Communist? (Alice Lagnado, ?U.S. Adopts 'Contras Policy' in Communist Belarus?, The Times, 3 September 2001). Why should Belorussian people denounce Lukashenko, if in the last five years Belarus' GDP has grown by 36 percent, and the industrial output by 65 percent (RFE/RL Newsline, 5 September 2001)? 166 More on problems and fallacies of American 'aid' to Russia see the author's recent article ?Amerikanskaya ?pomoshch? Rossii. Vremya kardinal'nogo izmenenia prioritetov? [American 'Aid' to Russia: Time for a Drastic Change of Priorities] published (with certain editorial changes) by a State Duma legal periodical, the oldest Russian emigre magazine (in New York), and a major Moscow newspaper (see: Predstavitel'naya vlast' - XXI vek, No. 2-3, 2001; Novy Zhurnal, No. 223, 2001; and Nezavisimaya gazeta-Dipkurier, 22 March 2001 (the newspaper changed the original title to ?Grustnaya istoria amerikanskoy pomoshchi Moskve? [Sad Story of American Support to Moscow. The U.S. Administration Provided Aid Not to Russia Herself, But to 'Agents of Changes']). Its shorter English version ?Something Wicked Comes This Way'. Sad Story of American 'Aid' to Russian 'Reformers'? appeared on Johnson's Russia List, #5180, 1 April 2001 and is available at www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5180.html. The article is partly based on the author's report at an international conference at the Yale Law School in 1999. (See: Alexander Domrin, ?Counter-Effects and Deficiencies of U.S. 'Aid' to Russia: Constitutional and Parliamentary Aspects?, What Role for the West? Promoting Legal Reform in the Former Soviet Union (New Haven, CT: Russia and Eastern Europe Law Forum, Yale Law School, April 23-24, 1999)). 167 It's sad but true: ?Americans have always seen Russian politics through the eyes of the radical Moscow intellectuals? (Jerry F. Hough, Evelyn Davidheiser, Susan Goodrich Lehmann, The 1996 Russian Presidential Election (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 1996), p. 14). 168 See Michael McFaul, ?Pull Russia into the West?, Christian Science Monitor, 26 July 2001. 169 McFaul began threatening Russia after a stunning defeat of ?reformers? in the 1993 parliamentary elections and electoral success of LDPR which, in his opinion, represented ?one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security in the post-cold war era?. ?Failure to... rethink Western policy regarding Russia, - McFaul warned, - will be the greatest mistake of U.S. and Western foreign policy, since appeasing another fascist insurgent sixty years ago?. And concluded: ?Perhaps most important, Zhirinovsky's electoral victory has made fascist ideas respectable in Russian politics?. (Michael McFaul, Understanding Russia's 1993 Parliamentary Elections: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy (Stanford University, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1994), p. 1-2). Jason Bitter (of the University of Toronto) answered to McFaul when he threatened Primakov's government with ?negative consequences of circumventing the democratic process?: ?Quite frankly I find it rather insulting to the U.S. to say anything about itself supporting Russian democracy. It has supported Yeltsin, not democracy. I am particularly interested in McFaul's ?negative consequences?. I am also interested in why the U.S. would choose to push democracy in Russia... while it maintains support for governments that are not democratic in other parts of the world. They have no moral foot to stand on?. (Jason Bitter, ?McFaul on PBS?, Johnson's Russia List, 21 September 1998; available at www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2389.html). 170 Sarah E. Mendelson, Western Assistance and the Development of Parties and Elections in Russia (Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Fall 1999), p. 5; available at www.ceip.org/programs/democr/NGOs/index.html. 171 Michael McFaul, ?West or East For Russia??, The Washington Post, 9 June 2001. 172 Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., ?The Feudalization of the State?, 10 Journal of Democracy 2 (April 1999), p. 39. Paradoxically, the same scholar who correctly stated that the failure of American ?reform strategy? ?has probably destroyed Russians' trust in the West for generations to come? seems to believe that American strategists of ?reforms? ?do have a second chance? and points at China (with its possible future transition from Communism to capitalism) as a new object for Western ?advice? (ibid.). Hopefully, the horrifying lesson of Russia will have a sobering effect on Chinese people, and they won't give such chance to their latter-day saviors. From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 2 04:57:19 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2001 13:57:19 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Britain/US split? Message-ID: The return of the B-52s Richard Norton-Taylor Friday November 2, 2001 The Guardian This time, they said, it would be different. It would be effective, it was unprecedented, not like any other war. "The days of carpet-bombing are over," they told us. It would be a sophisticated, covert campaign, they insisted, and we breathed sighs of relief when it seemed cool heads in Washington had won the day after the September 11 atrocities. The massive display of four aircraft carriers and 400 strike aircraft, cruise missile submarines and surface ships, were there for show, a psychological demonstration of firepower, was the message. They deceived us. It was not long before we were told that military action was, after all, "inevitable". American public opinion demanded it. Never mind the military impossibility of defeating such an elusive "enemy" in the "war on terrorism", and the inevitability of "collateral damage" - civilian casualties. It was not long before American generals spoke of "errant munitions", meaning "smart" bombs going astray. They brought in heavily armed gunships, first used in the Vietnam war, to attack "engagement zones", a term they preferred to "kill boxes". An officer on board the US aircraft carrier, Carl Vinson, described the use of cluster bombs - dropped by American B-52 bombers based on the "British" Indian ocean territory of Diego Garcia. "A 2,000lb bomb," he said, "no matter where you drop it, is a significant emotional event for anyone within a square mile". Now, increasingly desperate military planners are resorting to B-52 bombers, based on Diego Garcia, carpet-bombing - a tactic straight out of Vietnam. A day after Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, painted an upbeat picture of the achievements of the air strikes, saying they had destroyed "all nine" of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida training camps, the Pentagon admitted that the Taliban was proving more resilient than they had expected. Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, chief of the defence staff, sent out a very different message from that of his political master. "It is not likely, in my personal view, that the Taliban will give up," he said. He described the enemy, the al-Qaida network, as "more of an idea than something you can touch". It certainly will not give up as a result of carpet-bombing, or even well-publicised "covert" raids by special forces (based in "friendly" Gulf states which we are not supposed to name). "I can only suggest that it is like trying to eradicate cancer with a blowtorch," Sir Michael Howard, the historian, told a Guardian/Royal United Services Institute conference this week. Who will ever forget Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland, he said, when a few bursts of small arms fire by the British army gave the IRA a propaganda victory from which the British government was never to recover? Ministers and their advisers talk about getting to the "root cause" of Islamist extremism, of "a battle for hearts and minds" - a term, Howard reminded us, first coined by the British during the Malayan "emergency" against communists in the 1950s and 60s, a campaign which lasted 15 years. By root causes, the British government appears to mean poverty and hunger rather than action to establish a Palestinian state or tackle Arab grievances about Iraq and US troops in the Middle East. It is a supremely patronising and arrogant response. It is also misleading. Al-Qaida draws many of its most militant supporters, including suicide bombers, from families of the elite, not the deprived. With daily pictures on our screens of air strikes and civilian casualties, Hoon this week tried to play down the significance of military force at a press conference called primarily - according to the Ministry of Defence - for the benefit of the Arab and Muslim press. The campaign against terrorism, he said, was first of all a "law enforcement" campaign. Second, said Hoon, it was a "humanitarian" campaign - Afghanistan must be prevented from being a "breeding ground for terrorism". Give them food, they will soon give up their animosity towards the west in general and the US in particular, seems to be the message. Only last, Hoon went on with no trace of irony, was this a military campaign. "Some parts of the world," he said, "are beyond the reach of Scotland Yard." By all means bring in the cops, the spooks, the special forces - and the courts. B-52s, the crude weapon of the frustrated bully, should be banished to the scrapyard. This campaign, as ministers and their defence advisers are finally admitting, has shown up the poverty not only of military thinking but of the very utility of weapons of war. In the end, the Taliban regime will fall and we will be told, as we were when Slobodan Milosevic ordered his forces out of Kosovo, that bombing succeeded. Don't believe it. Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,1361,585368,00.html NOTE: Richard Norton-Taylor is the Guardian's intelligence correspondent. He has collaborated before with author/journalist David Leigh (now also at the Guardian) on the investigation of the Matrix-Churchill arms to Iraq scandal that hit the Major government in 1994. His position is very much more detached than that of Ian Bruce, although his image was tarnished by his involvement in the recent fiasco involving the Guardian paying out vast sums of money in order to serialise the absolutely trivial memoirs of ex-MI5 boss Stella Rimington. This article I would treat as evidence of growing disquiet within establishment circles regarding the recklessness and counterproductiveness of the US military campaign. Also, it serves as a kite to be flown in order to gauge reaction, much as might be done in a focus group, for example. This way the state can assess the state of UK public opinion without appearing to be doing so. This can be done independently of Norton-Taylor's relationship with the intelligence services. Like Paul Foot, Seumas Milne, David Leigh, et al., his sincerity can still serve useful ends. Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From sherrynstan at igc.org Fri Nov 2 05:01:46 2001 From: sherrynstan at igc.org (sherrynstan at igc.org) Date: Fri, 02 Nov 2001 07:01:46 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Prashad on the war Message-ID: September 2001 War Against the Planet By Vijay Prashad President George W. Bush of the United States appeared on television sets across the world on the 11th of September and declared war against the planet. Not only will those who committed the dreadful crimes of the morning be brought to justice, he declared, but so too will those who once harbored and now continue to harbor them. Supply ships have started their way to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and toward Spain. A large part of the $40 billion designated by the US Congress will go toward the preparations that have already begun within the US military establishment, in close contact with its allies. The Taliban, in Afghanistan, quickly pleaded that the suffering of its poor should not be increased with the wrath of the cruise missiles. So did Libya's Gaddafi. Others, such as Pakistan, hastily declared their fealty to the US strike back, and pledged to allow planes to fly over its territory. India was not far behind, eager to allow its land for what may be the largest assault since the bombardment of Cambodia and Iraq. One commentator on the US television networks lamented that the US lost its virginity at 845am on 9/11 when the first plane struck the World Trade Center. But the war did not begin at that time. This was not Pearl Harbor. The war has been ongoing for quite some time now, at least for five decades. Indeed, five decades ago the United States assumed charge of that band of nations that stretches from Libya to Afghanistan, most of whom are oil rich and therefore immensely important for global capitalism. The civilizational mandate held by France and Britain came to a close when World War II devastated Europe, and it fell to the US to adopt the white man's burden. It did so with glee, indeed on behalf, for the most part, of the Seven Sisters, the largest oil conglomerates in the world (most of them US-based transnational corporations). Alliances forged with right-wing forces in these regions found fellowship from the US, just as the Left fashioned relations with the USSR. The United States participated in the decimation of the Left in north Africa and west Asia, from the destruction of the Egyptian Communist Party, the largest in the region, to the rise of people like Saddam Hussein to take out the vibrant Iraqi Communist Party, and of the Saudi financier Osama bin Laden to take down the Communist Afghan regime. We hear that 9/11 was the "worst terrorist attack in history," but this ignores the vast history of bombardment, in general, tracked by Sven Lindquist in his new book (for the New Press), and it certainly ignores the many terrorist massacres conducted in the name of the United States, for instance, such as at Hallabja in Iraq or else in South America by Operation Condor. These are just a few examples. But what is that history before 845am on 9/11, and will it show us that "retaliation" misses out the fact that the US has been at war for many decades already? I. The Afghan Concession. In 1930, a US State Department "expert" on Afghanistan offered an assessment which forms the backbone of US social attitudes and state policy towards the region: "Afghanistan is doubtless the most fanatic hostile country in the world today." Given this, the US saw Afghanistan simply as a tool in foreign policy terms and as a mine in economic terms. When the Taliban (lit. "religious students") entered Kabul on 27 September 1996, the US state welcomed the development with the hope that the new rulers might bring stability to the region despite the fact that they are notoriously illiberal in social terms. The US media offered a muted and cliched sense of horror at the social decay of the Taliban, but without any sense of the US hand in the manufacture of such theocratic fascists for its own hegemonic ends. In thirty years, Afghanistan has been reduced to a "concession" in which corporations and states vie for control over commodities and markets without concern for the dignity and destiny of the people of the region. Oil, guns, landmines and heroin are the coordinates for policy-makers, not the shadowy bodies that hang from the scaffolds like paper-flags of a nation without sovereignty. Shortly after the Taliban took power in Kabul, the US State Department offered the following assessment: "Taliban leaders have announced that Afghans can return to Kabul without fear, and that Afghanistan is the common home of all Afghans," announced spokesperson Glyn Davies. The US felt that the Taliban's assertion in Kabul would allow "an opportunity for a process of reconciliation to begin." Reconciliation was a distant dream as the troops led by the Tajik warlord, Ahmed Shah Masood and the troops led by General Abdul Rashid Dostum and the Hazara-dominated Hezb-e-Wahdat party disturbed the vales of Afghanistan with warfare. Citizens of the advanced industrial states mouthed cliches about "timeless ethnic warfare" and "tribal blood-feuds" without any appreciation of the history of Afghanistan that produced these political conflicts (in much the same way as the media speaks of the Tutsi-Hutu turmoil without a sense of colonial Belgium's role in the production of these politico-ethnic conflicts). In 1964, King Zahir Shah responded to popular pressure from his subjects with a constitution and initiated a process known as "New Democracy." Three main forces grew after this phase: (1) the communists (who split into two factions in 1967, Khalq [the masses] and Parcham [the flag]); (2) the Islamic populists, among whom Burhanuddin Rabbani's Jamiat-i-Islami from 1973 was the main organization (whose youth leader was the engineering student, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar); (3) constitutional reformers (such as Muhammad Daoud, cousin of Zahir Shah, whose coup of July 1973 abolished the monarchy). Daoud's consequent repression against the theocratic elements pushed them into exile from where they began, along with the Pakistani Jamaat-I-Islami and the Saudi Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami, to plot against the secular regime in Afghanistan. In 1975, for instance, the theocratic elements, led by Hikmatyar in Paktia, attempted an uprising with Pakistani assistance, but the "Panjsher Valley incident" was promptly squashed. The first split amongst the theocratic elements occurred in the aftermath of this incident. Instability in Afghanistan led to the communist coup in 1978 and the eventual Soviet military presence in the region from 1979. The valiant attempts to create a democratic state failed as a result of the inability of hegemonic states to allow the nation to come into its own. >From 1979, Afghanistan became home to violence and heroin production. Money from the most unlikely sources poured into the band of mujahidin forces located in Pakistan: the US, the Saudis (notably their general intelligence service, al-Istakhbara al-'Ama), the Kuwaitis, the Iraqis, the Libyans and the Iranians paid the theocratic elements over $1 billion per year during the 1980s. The US-Saudi dominance in funding enabled them to choose amongst the various exiled forces -- they, along with the Pakistanis, chose seven parties in 1981 that leaned more towards theocratic fascism than toward secular nationalism. One of the main financiers was the Saudi businessman, Osama bin Laden. Five years later, these seven parties joined the Union of Mujahidin of Afghanistan. Its monopoly over access to the US-Saudi link emboldened it to assassinate Professor Sayd Bahauddin Majrooh in Peshawar in 1988 when he reported that 70% of the Afghan refugees wanted a return to the monarchism of Zahir Shah (who waited in a Roman suburb playing chess). Further, the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan called a shura (council) in 1989; the seven parties nominated all the representatives to the body. All liberal and left wing elements came under systematic attack from the shura and its armed representatives. The US-Saudi axis anointed the theocratic fascists as the heirs to Afghanistan. With over $1 billion per year, the mujahidin and its Army of Sacrifice (Lashkar-i Isar) led by Hikmatyar (who was considered the main "factor of stability" until 1988) built up ferocious arsenals. In 1986, they received shoulder-fired Stinger missiles that they began to fire indiscriminately into civilian areas of Afghanistan. Asia Watch, in 1991, reported that Hikmatyar paid his commanders for each rocket fired into Kabul. Claymore mines and other US-made anti-personnel directional fragmentation mines became a staple of the countryside. Today, about 10 million mines still litter the vales of Afghanistan (placed there by the Soviets and by the US-Saudi backed mujahidin). In 1993, the US State Department noted that landmines "may be the most toxic and widespread pollution facing mankind." Nevertheless, the US continues to sell mines at $3/mine (mines cost about $300-$1000/mine to detect and dismantle). Motorola manufactures many of the plastic components inside the mines, which makes the device undetectable by metal-detectors. The CIA learnt to extend its resources during the Southeast Asian campaigns in the 1970s by sale of heroin from the Golden Triangle. In Afghanistan, the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) [Pakistan's CIA], the Pakistani military and civilian authorities (notably Governor Fazle Huq) and the mujahidin became active cultivators, processors and sellers of heroin (a commodity which made its Southern Asian appearance in large numbers only after 1975, and whose devastation can be gleaned in Mohsin Hamid's wonderful novel, Moth Smoke). The opium harvest at the Pakistan-Afghan border doubled between 1982 and 1983 (575 tons), but by the end of the decade it would grow to 800 tons. On 18 June 1986, the New York Times reported that the mujahidin "have been involved in narcotics activities as a matter of policy to finance their operations." The opium warlords worked under cover of the US-Saudi-Pakistani axis that funded their arms sales and aided the conveyance of the drugs into the European and North American markets where they account for 50% of heroin sales. Heroin is not the only commodity flogged by the mujahidin. They are the front-line troops of an ensemble that wants "commercial freedom" in Afghanistan so that the Afghan people and land can be utilized for "peaceful" exploitation. The California-based oil company Unocal (76), then busy killing the Karens and other ethnic groups in alliance with the Burmese junta and with the French oil company Total, had its eyes on a pipeline from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean, through Afghanistan. Only with an end to hostilities, at any cost, will the international corporations be able to benefit from the minerals and cheap labor of the Afghans. So far, the corporations have reaped a profit from sales of arms to the Afghans; now they want to use the arms of the Afghans for sweatshops and mines. For corporations and for corporatized states (such as the US), an unprincipled peace allows them to extract their needs without the bother of political dissent. The Taliban briefly offered the possibility of such a peace. Formed in 1994 under the tutelage of the ISI and General Naseerullah Khan (Pakistan's Interior Minister), the Taliban comprises southern Pashtun tribes who are united by a vision of a society under Wahhabism which extols a form of Islam (Tariqa Muhammadiya) based on its interpretation of the Quran without the benefit of the centuries of elaboration of the complexities of the Islamic tradition. In late September 1996, Radio Kabul broadcast a statement from Mullah Agha Gulabi: "God says that those committing adultery should be stoned to death. Anybody who drinks and says that that is not against the Koran, you have to kill him and hang his body for three days until people say this is the body of the drinker who did not obey the Koran and Allah's order." The Taliban announced that women must be veiled and that education would cease to be available for women. Najmussahar Bangash, editor of Tole Pashtun, pointed out shortly thereafter that there are 40, 000 war widows in Kabul alone and their children will have a hard time with their subsistence. Further, she wrote, "if girls are not allowed to study, this will affect a whole generation." For the US-Saudi-Unocal-Pakistan axis, geo-politics and economics make the Taliban a worthy regime for Afghanistan. Drugs, weapons and social brutalities will continue, but Washington extended a warm hand towards Mullah Mohammed Omar and the Taliban. US foreign policy is driven by the dual modalities of containment (of rebellion inspired by egalitarianism) and concession (of goods which will bring profit to corporate entities). Constrained by these parameters, the US government was able to state, in 1996, "there's on the face of it nothing objectionable at this stage." Certainly, on 10 October 1996, the State Department revised its analysis of the Taliban on the basis of sustained pressure from Human Rights and women's groups in the advanced industrial states as well as pressure from the conferences held by Iran (at which numerous regional nations, such as India participated). In conflict with its earlier statement, the US declared "we do not see the Taliban as the savior of Afghanistan. We never really welcomed them." The main reason offered for this was the Taliban's "uniquely discriminatory manner" with women. The US state department would have done well to mention the heroic attempt made by the communist regime to tackle the "woman question." In late 1978, the regime of Nur Mohammad Taraki, President of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan, promulgated Decree no. 7 which aimed at a transformation of the marriage institution by attacking its monetary basis and which promoted equality between men and women. Women took leadership positions in the regime and fought social conservatives and theological fascists on various issues. Anahita Ratebzad was a major Marxist leader who sat on the Revolutionary Council; other notable leaders included Sultana Umayd, Suraya, Ruhafza Kamyar, Firouza, Dilara Mark, Professor R. S. Siddiqui, Fawjiyah Shahsawari, Dr. Aziza, Shirin Afzal and Alamat Tolqun. Ratebzad wrote the famous Kabul Times editorial (28 May 1978) which declared that "Privileges which women, by right, must have are equal education, job security, health services, and free time to rear a healthy generation for building the future of the country....Educating and enlightening women is now the subject of close government attention." The hope of 1978 is now lost and the pessimism must not be laid at the feet of the Taliban alone, but also of those who funded and supported the Taliban-like theocratic fascists, states such as the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The real reason for the US frustration with the Taliban was its recalcitrance toward global capitalism (as an example, the Unocal scheme fell apart). The Taliban, created by many social forces, but funded by the Saudis (such as bin Laden) and the CIA, was now in the saddle in the center of Asia, and it soon became a haven for disgruntled and alienated young men who wanted to take out their wrath on the US rather than fight against the contradictions of global capital. Bin Laden, the CIA asset, became the fulcrum of many of their inchoate fears and angers. II. Oil, Guns and Saddam. During the Gulf War of 1991, a decade ago, the US-Europe discovered the Kurds for a few years. The Kurds and the Kuwaitis provided the war aims for the Alliance, since we kept hearing how Saddam Hussein's armies had exploited both. Oil is not the reason, we were repeatedly told; we are only concerned for the ordinary people of the region oppressed by these madmen, such as Saddam Hussein, Hafez al-Assad and the Ayatollahs. We heard little about the recently closed Iran-Iraq war, about the various contradictions in the region, indeed about the role of the US-Europe for several decades in the fabrication of the regimes that ruled here. As the cruise missiles fell on Iraq, we did not then hear that the first major aerial bombardment in modern times took place in December 1923 when the Royal Air Force pummeled the rebellious Kurds (they felt the wrath of the guns again in March 1924, not being disciplined firmly enough by Headmaster Britain). In 1932 the British put in place the puppet royal dynasty, the al-Saud family to rule the Arabian Peninsula as Saudi Arabia. This regime was to protect the "interests" of global capitalism, particularly after oil was discovered there in the early 1930s. The British put King Faisal over the newly created Iraq, a Sunni leader over a predominantly Shi'ite land. Workers movements in the region came under attack from these regimes, many of which violently crushed democratic dissent in the name of the dollar. Henry Kissinger was later to create political theory of a policy that had been long in the works: that the US should lock arms with any political leader who will resist the will of socialism, who will ensure that international capitalism's dictates be maintained and who can therefore be a "factor of stability." The rogue gallery of this policy includes a host of CIA assets, such as the Noreiga, Marcos, Pinochet, Suharto, the Shah of Iran, the various Gulf Sheikhs, and latterly such fundamentalist friends as the BJP in India. Even when some of these leaders flirted with the Soviets (Saddam and al-Assad), their usefulness to US policy prevented a break in their links to the CIA, mainly to contain domestic left-wing dissent. The Ayatollah may have been a natural asset, but his regime was stamped by a radical and patriarchially egalitarian Shi'ism that terrified the Oil Kingdoms, whose tenuous rule was now bolstered even further by the armies of the imperial powers and their proxy state at this time, Iraq. When the Iran-Iraq war broke out, people spoke of it as a sectarian war between Shias and Sunnis, but few pointed out that Iraq has a large Shia population and that Iraq fought primarily with the backing of the US and its alliance to "contain" the Iranian revolution and the rule of the Mullahs. Saddam, then, was friend not foe. During these years, no one mentioned the Kurds. For decades the communist movement grew amongst the Kurds, both in Turkey and in northern Iraq. But by the early 1970s, the CIA entered the battlefield to cut down the left and bolster the right. Between 1972 and 1975 the CIA paid $16 million to the eccentric and untrustworthy Mullah Mustafa Barzani as a "moral guarantee" of US support for this activities. In 1959, Barzani had expelled the communists from his mainly Iraqi party and he had sent Iranian Kurds to their death in the camps of the Shah. Barzani was an asset that the US cultivated, and is now a close ally of Saddam Hussein, another US asset. In 1975, Marxist-Leninists within the Kurdish resistance formed the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which pushed many Kurds to the Left, including those in the Iraqi Kurdish Front formed in 1988. Saddam Hussein was given the green light by Washington to take out the PUK, and he conducted chemical bombing on them in 1983 (at Arbil) and most spectacularly in 1988 (at Halabja, where five thousand died, and many thousand continue to suffer). The outrage of Halabja created a momentary stir in the Left media, but nothing was done then because Saddam was a US ally and asset - it returned to do ideological work during the Gulf War. As many died at Halabja as on 9/11, but their death does not factor in when NPR announces that 9/11 was the "worst terrorist attack in history." When terror is conducted in our name, then it is not terror but "retaliation." III. Revenge or Justice? President Bush promises to get those who did the bombings in New York and Washington, but he also promises that those who harbor them will feel the wrath of the US. This is the most dangerous statement so far. Not only does it violate all manner of international laws, it ignores the fact that the US has harbored these criminals for years, mainly at the expense of the global Left. Saddam and bin Laden are products of the US, even as they, like Frankenstein's beast, turn against their master now. The lesson is not to continue the madness, to go after the symptom with $40 billion of firepower. The lesson, for all democratic minded people, is to undermine the basis of our global insecurity. First those people who did the horrendous deed on 9/11 must be found, arrested and brought to trial. The path of justice should not be short-circuited by the emotions of the moment. Second, our fight in the US continues, as we continue to point out that US foreign policy engenders these acts of barbarism by its own desire to set-up strong-arm "factors of stability" in those zones of raw materials and markets that must be subservient to US corporate interests. Vast areas of anger, zones of resentment will continue to emerge - this is not the way forward. Another indiscriminate bombardment will bring forth more body bags for the innocent. History shows us that the US was not innocent on 9/11, even as thousands of innocent people died. We should not confuse these two things: the terrorists made no distinction between those who conduct political and economic terror over their lives, between a regime that they dislike, corporate interests that they revile and innocent people who live in the same spaces. The terror of the frustrated works alongside the terror of the behemoth to undermine the powerful and democratic urges of the people. Both of those terrors must be condemned. -- Vijay Prashad is an Associate Professor and Director of the International Studies Program, Trinity College, Hartford, CT. Copyright (c) 2001 Vijay Prashad. All Rights Reserved. From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 2 05:25:27 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2001 14:25:27 +0200 Subject: [A-List] George Galloway's speech Message-ID: Yesterday there was a debate followed by a vote on the bombing. A small number of Labour MPs "rebelled" against the government, together with Welsh and Scottish nationalists. George Galloway is a longstanding opponent of the campaign against Iraq, and has made a number of courageous efforts to highlight the situation of ordinary Iraqis, including a very high profile transportation of an Iraqi girl to a Glasgow hospital for treatment of her leukaemia, a gift courtesy of the humanitarian bombers who employ depleted uranium ordnance to underline the values of "civilisation", humanity, freedom, and everything else suddenly attacked on Sept 11. ===== Mr. George Galloway (Glasgow, Kelvin): Like my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, South and Shoreditch (Mr. Sedgemore), I hope that the Government will listen to what I have to say. I know something about the Islamic world and have spent the best part of 10 years warning in this Chamber about the rising tide, the rising radicalism and the Islamicisation of the Muslim world and the terrible clash that would result. My warnings were not much listened to before; I hope that after 11 September they are being listened to more. Let me respond to a number of difficult and troublesome comments made during the debate. The hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr. Howarth) should not ask British Muslims to choose between Her Majesty and their religion, for they will not do it. They will put nothing in front of their religion. They will not put Her Majesty in front of their religion any more than I would put Her Majesty in front of mine. It is an unrealistic and unfair demand. I say to my right hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George), who has left the Chamber, that no one in this country should be told to keep their heads down during a period of national debate and soul-searching such as this. I appreciate that he may not have meant it in quite the way it sounded, but it sounded very bad. 1 Nov 2001 : Column 1071 I deplore the comments of the right hon. Member for Swansea, East (Donald Anderson) about foreign students at Britain's universities. I am married to a biologist--a scientist--who took her PhD at Glasgow university. She is a Palestinian with an Arab name, so I am acutely sensitive to this point. Foreign students in this country, whatever subjects they study in British universities, should not be made to feel uneasy or put under a searchlight, as the comments of the right hon. Member for Swansea, East seemed to imply. The hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. O'Brien), a former Minister indeed, seemed to think that any Parliament anywhere should be required to give unequivocal and unconditional support to the Government. That might be the kind of Parliament that Osama bin Laden would have in mind; it is not this kind of Parliament. The only thing more depressing than the demand of the former Minister that Parliament should show unequivocal, unconditional support for the Government was the rapid surrender to it by the spokesman for what he himself described as the Loyal Opposition. I shall vote against the Government this evening, albeit on a procedural motion, because I believe that a substantive motion should be on the table to allow hon. Members to table reasoned amendments and the House to express deliberate judgment on the aims and conduct of the war. Mr. Malcolm Savidge (Aberdeen, North): Will the hon. Gentleman give way? Mr. Galloway: I do not have time. I believe that some of my hon. Friends and some Opposition Members will join us in the Lobby and that a substantial number of hon. Members will abstain. We and the abstainers will only grow in number in the days to come. There is a fantastic dislocation between the atmosphere in the Chamber and the atmosphere outside in the country, and still more in the wider world. One would not think, listening to the Secretary of State for Defence, that more than half the population of this country want the bombing to stop now so that humanitarian aid can flood in. One would not know, listening to some of my colleagues who often lecture us about feminism, that more than half the women in Britain are demanding an end to the war. One would not know, listening to the Liberal Democrat spokespeople, that more than half the Liberal voters in the country are demanding an end to the war. One would not know, listening to some Labour Members, that millions--if the opinion polls are right, some 12 million to 14 million people--in this country were demanding an end to the war, or that millions of them were Labour voters. One certainly would not know from some hon. Members who represent constituencies with substantial Muslim populations that there was great unease and opposition to the war in our country. One would not know that the campaign was going disastrously around the world. One would not know that it is scarcely possible for an American politician to set foot in the Arab countries. Our Prime Minister has to go as what The Wall Street Journal unkindly described as "the American ambassador" to those countries. 1 Nov 2001 : Column 1072 When our Prime Minister goes to Arab countries, he receives short shrift from the leaders whom he meets. As my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) said, countries such as Iran are unequivocally against the bombing. Syria lectured the Prime Minister yesterday against bombing. If anyone here thinks that public opinion in the Arab world is with them, they are living in cloud cuckoo land. I have the benefit of watching Arab television, listening to the phone-in programmes and reading the Arab press. If Members of Parliament think that they have the support of the Islamic world--1.3 billion people strong--they are living in cloud cuckoo land. Our new friend General Musharraf promised his people at the outset that the campaign would be short, sharp and targeted. The fact that it is neither short nor sharp is the reason why it is now a dagger pointed at his heart. Everyone in Pakistan knows it. More than 90 per cent. of the people of Pakistan are demanding that their Government desist from co-operating in the savage bombardment of Afghanistan. That is a fact. The Secretary of State for International Development may think that General Musharraf is secure in his post. I do not know anyone else who thinks that the self-appointed president of Pakistan is in any way secure. Sharp? B52s, sticks of bombs, carpet bombing--is that sharp? We saw just how accurate the targeted, laser-guided weapons were. Now we have moved to carpet bombing from B52s. We are told that the bombing is of military positions, as if the military lines in Afghanistan were somehow wholly separate from the villages and towns in which people lived, not to mention from the displaced people in Afghanistan. Sharp? Cluster bombs? I never thought I would hear Labour spokespeople defending cluster bombs. Is the military struggle with the Taliban so finely poised that we cannot eschew the use of cluster bombs? I watched the Secretary of State for International Development on the beach at Brighton--done up in her mine-clearing suit--weeping about the victims of land mines. She knows that in so far as cluster bombs are not land mines they are worse than land mines, because land mines at least are mapped--land mines dropped from aeroplanes are by definition unmappable. I only have time to deal with a couple of additional points. The aims of a campaign such as this cannot be separated from its likely outcome. Members who wish it to be restricted to Afghanistan are fooling themselves: this war is going to be extended to other countries. If they do not want that to happen, they must join us now. If they do not want the Northern Alliance, they must join us. The Northern Alliance are the people who destroyed and beggared Afghanistan in the first place, whose mediaeval obscurantism put the women in chains, destroyed the towns and cities, took the women out of the universities, hanged the former President Najibullah from a lamp-post--they put his penis in his mouth and left him hanging to rot. That is the Northern Alliance--your new best friends who you hope to put into power. My last point is this: we want this war stopped during Ramadan--not out of respect for the Muslims, but because it would give the Government a chance, without losing face, to send a message to the Islamic world that they are going to pause during the holy month of Ramadan; that they are going to consider how the project 1 Nov 2001 : Column 1073 has gone so far; that they are going to consult more widely; that they are going to try diplomacy; that they are going to try legal means and political means during that pause in the war; and that, above all, they are going to flood the country with humanitarian assistance--food and kindness--which will do far more to win the masses of Afghanistan to their cause than bombing them from B52s and bombing them with cluster bombs will ever do. ===== NOTE: The "Honourable" Member for Aldershot, Gerald Howarth, is a disgusting racist long associated with the anti-immigration wing of the Conservative Party and a former prot?g? of George Kennedy Young, ex Deputy Chief of MI6, Kleinwort Benson merchant banker, private army conspirator against Harold Wilson (the Unison Committee for Action) and organiser of pressure group Tory Action. Young's bid to take over the now-banned Monday Club in the early 1970s was backed by Howarth and the latter's mother, both of whom were office bearers in that organisation. Howarth is also one of the few Conservatives who have stood by, through thick and thin, the disgraced former minister Neil Hamilton. Together they, with "Sir" James Goldsmith's money and "Lord" William Rees-Mogg's connivance, successfully sued the BBC in 1985 for having broadcast a Panorama documentary, "Maggie's Militant Tendency", which detailed both their careers as anti-immigration racist boot boys. The contrived capitulation of the BBC (courtesy of Rees-Mogg) paved the way for the ejection of Director General Alasdair Milne and his replacement by Michael Checkland, whose deputy, John Birt, was running the BBC long before officially succeeding Checkland. We know now just how tectonic a shift in that institution Birt was able to engineer. The irony is, of course, that the older establishment employed the modernisers to accomplish ends which ultimately saw that establishment itself modernised out of power and now merely a dwindling sect of punk Thatcherites in the New Labour era. And Birt, of course, is now Blair's special adviser on policy strategy. Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 2 05:53:42 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2001 14:53:42 +0200 Subject: [A-List] marriages of convenience Message-ID: Mark Jones wrote: Can there be a Russia/US/China triumvirate? Don't think so, and I plan to post more on this. ===== Moscow asks Nato for help in restructuring Financial Times, Oct 26, 2001 By JUDY DEMPSEY Russia has discreetly asked Nato for assistance in restructuring its defence ministry and armed forces after recent talks in Brussels between President Vladimir Putin and Lord Robertson, Nato secretary-general. The request was welcomed by Nato officials, who believe the attacks on the US could provide an opportunity for the alliance to forge a much closer relationship with Russia. Since the attacks on New York and Washington, Russia has backed Washington's fight against terrorism, including the US-led strikes against Afghanistan. It has also supported efforts to oust the Taliban regime and replace it with a broad-based coalition of Afghan political groupings from inside and outside the country. But in asking Nato for assistance, Mr Putin has taken a gamble that carries big risks, while Nato itself will have to start defining Russia's future role with the organisation. Mr Putin has to deal with a military establishment that is still deeply suspicious of Nato - particularly if it moves ahead with further enlargement that could include the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. President George W. Bush has said enlargement will take place irrespective of a country's location. In any case, a threat from Nato has been repeatedly used by the Russian military to justify preservation of the old military infrastructure. On the other hand, say defence analysts, Mr Putin has to start introducing reforms in an army that has proved incapable of ending the war in Chechnya and one that also requires investments to modernise itself. Furthermore, without reforms, the threats that Russia faces - money laundering, drug trafficking, ethnic tensions and lax border controls - will prove impossible to handle without fundamental reforms. "In many ways Nato and Russia share the same interests - and these are about security," said a Nato official. "Nato, as Putin knows, has moved away from just being a collective defence organisation to one that is increasingly focusing on security issues. Look at the Balkans, where we are active." Mr Putin, diplomats say, is likely to rely heavily on Sergei Ivanov, his defence minister, for preparing the ground for Nato advice. The argument both he and Nato will use is that the first wave of enlargement, encompassing Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, in no way threatens Russia's security or national interests. The defence establishments in these countries have been slow to do away with the old communist structures. Nevertheless, Nato has since increased its expertise to make the defence ministries more transparent and accountable to civilian control. Nato is also involved in helping potential new members overhaul their ministries and armed forces. The mechanics of Nato assistance have still to be worked out - as indeed has the new forum for meetings and consultations Mr Putin and Lord Robertson agreed earlier this month. "Much now depends on how Putin can sell it to the generals back home," said a senior European diplomat. Full article at: http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.html?print=true&id=01 1026001172 From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 2 06:05:17 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2001 15:05:17 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Britain/US split? Message-ID: Peter Mandelson: My verdict on Syria's young leader: a decent man doing a difficult job 'It was the most relaxed and honest exchange I am ever likely to have with a foreign head of state' The Independent, 01 November 2001 I am a friend and supporter of Israel, and nothing that has happened recently has diminished that commitment. My stance did not stop me, however, travelling to Syria, supposed foe of Israel, at the turn of this year. In fact, politics had nothing to do with my plans, except in the sense that I wanted a short break before the resumption of intensive negotiations in Northern Ireland last January (subsequently derailed by my departure from office). I still play my tape of the car music that accompanied my five-day journey across the country, which my driver presented to me on my departure. Politics barely intruded in all the conversations I had with new Syrian acquaintances, except for one unexpected diversion from my plans in Damascus. The young Syrian President, Bashar al Assad, invited me to call at his home and, standing down my guide for 30 minutes, I changed into collar and tie and sped off to greet him. Three and a half hours later I returned to my mystified guide after what I can only describe as the most relaxed and honest exchange I am ever likely to have with a foreign head of state. Why did it take so long ? Because Bashar is an intelligent and cultured individual who, having lived and studied in London, wanted to show off his perfect English (unfortunately I did not meet his English wife); but also because, like so many leaders of his type and generation, he is looking for a fresh paradigm for his country that will rescue it from economic backwardness without plunging it into political chaos. Hu Jintao, visiting London this week from China, could tell an identical story. Syria's case history is instructive. Dogged throughout most of the last century by violent coups, military dictatorships and one-party rule, it found stability of sorts under Bashar's father, Hafez al Assad. Assad senior was famous for his personality cult and ruthlessness and his militant opposition to the State of Israel. On his death last year, power unexpectedly passed to Bashar, not yet groomed and arguably unready for the burdens of office placed upon him. Without pausing for breath, Bashar had to work out from scratch what he stood for, what he wanted and how he was going to achieve it. Surrounded by the power plays of his father's elderly court that have lived on past his father's reign, he has had to establish himself from a standing start as a true embodiment of the Assad dynasty and also a challenger of everything it stands for. In a very different political climate from our own, it makes New Labour's task look straightforward. And it was our political experience that kept us talking for our three and a half hours. It does not matter whether I liked Bashar (although I did) or whether he was being totally open with me. What matters is that he is trying to run a country that is alive with competing pressures and tensions, all of which have been made a hundred times worse by the actions of al-Qa'ida and Osama bin Laden. Bashar no more needs his people polarised into rival Islamic camps - divided over support for the infidel Americans or the crazy bin Laden - than he needs a hole in the head. There are Muslim fundamentalists agitating in his country, like every other Arab nation. He has to tread carefully. His task is to create enlightenment and spread reform without providing a pretext for rabble-rousers and religious reactionaries to stir the masses and pitch them against his rule. The last time this was attempted in Syria, his father responded by razing much of the town of Hama to the ground by means of a 10-day artillery bombardment of unparalleled brutality. Nobody imagines that such a course is open to Bashar, or that he would seek it. But this makes it all the more necessary for him to feel his way and to maintain the careful balance of his administration; and to recognise that, among his (Muslim) people, the clearcut virtues of the war against (Islamic) terrorism do not look so simple, or right, from the other end of the telescope, where the politics are about nationalism as well as religion, and about culture as well as human rights. That does not make it right for Syria to give shelter to Hamas or Hizbollah or any other Arab terrorist group, any more than it is desirable for the provisional IRA to maintain arms dumps in the Republic of Ireland or for the Real IRA to base itself in that country. In Ireland's case, however, the Government is attempting to move against or curtail both of these organisations, while in Syria there is no evidence of similar action - although the country's internal politics might make this very difficult. Most of my discussion with Bashar was about his country's development and the experiences that Britain has had. But we touched on the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict. I offered some lessons from my time in Northern Ireland, stressing the need for a process of some sort to exist, whatever the strains. I argued that confidence-building, on both sides, is vital, whatever the pressures. The two sides had to meet halfway for negotiations to have a chance of success. He did not disagree with any of this. He merely pointed out that some in Israel seemed determined to go in the opposite direction, and that while he was prepared to settle for land in exchange for peace, Israeli settlers had a very different conception of what that meant. I did not pursue the subject except to point out that the behaviour of Israeli settlers did not constitute an expansionist policy of the state as a whole. I would say that Bashar was less than convinced by this observation and I wonder, in that light, what his views would be now, 10 months and many mutual provocations and savage killings later. In two weeks' time I will find myself in Israel to speak at the annual Balfour declaration anniversary dinner. I suspect I will encounter the same sort of apprehension and concern about the turn of events that the Prime Minister has discovered on his visit to Damascus. Nobody benefits from terrorism. It is a cancer whose tentacles spread to every country and society, whatever its origins. That is why the Bashars of this world know that it has to be countered. Our job is to make it easier for them to help without compromising the objectives of the task. The author was the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 1999-2001 Full article at: http://argument.independent.co.uk/commentators/story.jsp?story=102505 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Fri Nov 2 09:18:18 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Fri, 02 Nov 2001 16:18:18 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Britain/US split? In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011102161741.0239cf60@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Probably I am missing something here, but what does this tell us about the US/Britain split? Mark At 02/11/2001 13:05, you wrote: >Peter Mandelson: My verdict on Syria's young leader: a > decent man doing a difficult job > > 'It was the most relaxed and honest exchange I am ever > likely to have with a foreign head of state' > > The Independent, 01 November 2001 From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Fri Nov 2 09:26:09 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Fri, 02 Nov 2001 16:26:09 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Economist: Changing Russia Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011102162322.02491d08@pop.tiscali.co.uk> [some people are saying Putin faces real problems in his Defence Ministry after the Cuban base closure; how true is this? Does anyone know, even The Economist? Mark] Hope gleams anew At home and abroad, things have never looked brighter for Russia's president, Vladimir Putin. Will it last? IT IS hard, looking back over the past decade or so, to imagine a better few weeks for Russia?at home or abroad. Since September 11th, Vladimir Putin has done a lot to make the West like him. He has embraced the American-led anti-terrorist coalition, calling the air-strikes on Afghanistan ?measured and appropriate?. He has started closing a clutch of controversial foreign military bases. Even talks about talks with Chechen rebels have begun. At home, the economy is still growing and reforms continue; the corpse of the Kursk submarine has been raised; and a notorious tycoon-cum-politician from the Yeltsin era, the railways minister, Nikolai Aksyonenko, is facing corruption charges. When he emerged into public view two years ago, Mr Putin looked like a colourless compromise, in hock to the Yeltsin-era magnates and the hard men of the armed forces and the security services. He liked consensus and caution, not bold moves. The rhetoric was sometimes friendly and liberal but was rarely turned into action. Not now. Particularly on foreign policy, he shows a striking sureness of touch, for example over the closure of two of Russia's remaining big Soviet trophies overseas, an electronic listening station in Cuba and a naval station in Vietnam. Hardliners moaned, but Mr Putin was adamant: they cost too much and were irrelevant to Russia's real needs. Russia has also softened on America's missile defence; a deal now looks in sight when Mr Putin meets President Bush this month. Relations with NATO have never been warmer. Mr Putin is also reshaping Russia's stance in the former Soviet Union. Old-fashioned twitchiness about spheres of influence has lessened. American soldiers are now in Uzbekistan, with Kremlin blessing. Russia is pulling out some soldiers and weapons from a base in Abkhazia (a separatist bit of Georgia) and promises to do the same from Transdniestria (a Russian-speaking enclave of Moldova). Russia's presence in both places, in defiance of international obligations, has stoked fears of neo-imperialist schemes in the old empire. Now the tone is very different. Mr Putin has been remarkably polite to Georgia, telling it to sort out the Abkhaz problem without Russia, if it wants to cope with a messy result alone. As Transdniestria's elections in December draw near, its peppery separatist leader, Igor Smirnov, looks vulnerable; the Kremlin is much chummier now with his Moldovan opponents. A top Russian general is even talking indirectly to Chechnya's president, Aslan Maskhadov, officially still a wanted criminal. Economic reform is speeding up too. This week Mr Putin promised more tax reform and a new financial intelligence service to fight money-laundering; reiterated his country's eagerness to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the body that regulates global commerce; and said his country wanted ?normal, candid and reliable? relations with the outside world. An economic adviser, Andrei Illarionov, once a notorious gloomster, is also sounding very cheerful. Even falling oil prices will not stunt Russia's economic growth, he says, though this is likely to be 4% next year, down from last year's record 8% figure. Russia is even thinking of paying back some of its foreign debt early. Though high oil prices and the effect of the huge devaluation in 1998 gave the economy a terrific fillip, restructured old firms and new businesses are helping too. Change is least visible in politics. Regional elections are still tarnished by money and skulduggery. The bureaucracy is almost untouched. The squeeze on the independent press continues: Anna Politovskaya, the most intrepid Russian reporter dealing with Chechnya, has fled to Vienna after receiving threats. But the competent and well-publicised salvaging of the Kursk did strike a good note, in sharp contrast to the lies and confusion that surrounded the tragedy of its sinking as it unfolded in August last year. But how deep does all this go? Kind words from Washington and London have given a gloss to Russia's image. But some hard truths remain. One is that although some interests overlap, others do not. Russia has little difficulty in supporting airstrikes against a common enemy, the Taliban. But any American move against, say, Iraq may be another story. Another problem is that many of the people who matter in Russia still think very differently from Mr Putin. Even some of the president's own team sing a different song. Many senior soldiers still want to halt a final retreat from empire. This week Georgia, whose president, Edward Shevardnadze, is in political trouble, said Russian planes had again bombed its territory. Like Mikhail Gorbachev ten years ago, Mr Putin may find it hard to make a pro-western stance pay off at home. A lot of powerful people still resist economic reform too. Over the past ten years many people have done well out of Russia's entrenched protectionism, bureaucracy and cartels. They would hate to see them dismantled in favour of the international competition, openness, normality and reliability praised by Mr Putin. And for all the current back-slapping, Russia must still grow even faster if it is to catch up with the West reasonably soon. Foreign investment is still puny, despite an oil deal worth $12 billion announced this week. Huge tracts of the economy, such as the banks, utilities and the public sector, are largely unreformed. A third question is sincerity. Mr Putin's motives are inscrutable. He may have calculated that now is the time to woo the West with grand gestures and spontaneous concessions, in the hope of a grateful payback later. Those hopes might include easier terms for joining the WTO or a new grand alliance with NATO, possibly at the expense of some of Russia's neighbours. These are not immediate worries, though. Mr Putin's huge popularity means that his new foreign policy faces no direct threat. Most Russians are delighted to see their country more popular and respected, and glad to avoid a direct entanglement in Afghanistan. Even slow and patchy economic reforms are better than none. Still, real change in Russia, and real trust from the West, will take years, not weeks. From jlgulick at sfo.com Fri Nov 2 15:28:17 2001 From: jlgulick at sfo.com (John Gulick) Date: Fri, 02 Nov 2001 14:28:17 -0800 Subject: [A-List] marriages of convenience In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.1.20011102140904.00a4eec0@pop3.norton.antivirus> Michael Keaney posted the following _FT_ article, "Moscow asks Nato for help in restructuring," in which an "anonymous" NATO official was quoted as saying: "In many ways Nato and Russia share the same interests - and these are about security ... Nato, as Putin knows, has moved away from just being a collective defence organisation to one that is increasingly focusing on security issues." This raises anew the question I posed last week: are we witnessing the two steps forward-one step back creation of new international military/intelligence instruments by means of which the world's ruling classes will police the morbid symptoms of neo-liberalism, peripheral capitalism, "failing states," and so on ? (Which of course begs the question of the degree to which any and all ruling classes accumulate capital -- directly and indirectly -- by means ilicit according to standards of bourgeois legality). If so, is this best conceptualized as a collection of bilateral and multilateral "marriages of convenience," or have we crossed some qualitatively new thresshold en route to the formation of a global ruling class ? I suppose I should dredge up Mark's Lenin vs. Kautsky post, which I shall do in due time. John Gulick From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Sat Nov 3 02:10:59 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Sat, 03 Nov 2001 09:10:59 +0000 Subject: [A-List] al-Ahram on Russia and a New World Order Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011103090739.00a930d8@pop.tiscali.co.uk> A new world order? The Russians and the Americans are edging closer together, but old rivalries die hard, writes Mona Abdel-Malik in Moscow (photo: photos: AP) The 11 September attacks in the US have had global ripple effects, among them the rather unexpected rapprochement between Russia and the United States. While Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that Russia would support the US in its struggle against terrorism, he also qualified this statement by explaining that Moscow was only willing to cooperate with Washington on its own terms. Russian officials have expressed muted irritation over a pervasive US-centric view of world politics. The 1999 terrorist bombing of a Moscow apartment building that killed hundreds of people was granted little space in the international media. Yet, when Americans died on 11 September, the whole world has been mobilised and, indeed, required to participate in retaliatory actions. In the long run, however, Russia may gain political ground with respect to some of its controversial policies. Since 11 September, the US has taken a new approach towards Russia's military presence in Chechnya. The European Union (EU) and the US have repeatedly threatened Moscow with sanctions over evident disregard of human rights in the predominantly Muslim breakaway province of Chechnya. With the onset of the US bombing campaign in Afghanistan, Moscow was quick to point out to the Bush administration that US tactics were comparable to those used by the Russians in Chechnya. President Putin told the Americans in no uncertain terms that the Chechen situation could not be considered outside of the context of the US-led war against terrorism. Moscow is hoping to obtain a relatively free hand in Chechnya in exchange for its cooperation with the US. But Putin has been hesitant to commit to a military role, only specifying that Moscow is willing to give Washington access to its intelligence files. Russian officials have suggested that Russian officers who served in Afghanistan during the country's occupation by Russian forces would work as consultants to US military experts -- a strange twist of fate, considering it was the US-backed militias that drove the Russians out. Afghanistan is a formidable country for any invader: history has shown that some of the world's best armies, including those of the British and Soviet empires, were cowed into retreat in their attempts to conquer Afghanistan. The Taliban -- many of whom are former mujahedin fighters who received training from the CIA to expel the Soviet army -- are now the enemy, and those same Russian occupiers are a crucial US ally. Russia's willingness to assist the US in their war against the Taliban is, naturally, motivated by self-interest. Moscow has its own stakes in the war against Afghanistan and over the past several years has provided the Northern Alliance opposition forces with military support to fight the Taliban. Again, the lessons of history have proved reflexive: military commanders of the Northern Alliance were also among the fearless mujahedin who fought the Soviet occupation. If Moscow has edged closer to Washington in the wake of 11 September, there is one issue on which the Russians will not compromise: the so-called clash of civilisations that has erupted around the US's paranoia and need for retaliation. Though the US has stressed that it is not waging a war against Islam, Muslims the world over are still waiting to see evidence of this claim. Some 20 million Muslims live in Russia and Islam is considered the second of the four official religions. The country has common borders with numerous Muslim states and shares their strategic interests. In short, Moscow cannot afford to be seen as hostile to Islam. Addressing Germany's Bundestag, prominent Russian politician and former Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov (whose German is flawless) warned against the dangers of dividing the world's states into "civilised" and "rogue" nations based on compliance with US actions. The largest country in the world, Russia straddles Europe and Asia, dooming its leadership to eternal manoeuvring between East and West. The world after 11 September has a very different geo-political map. The Kremlin knows that a new world order is in the process of being formed and Putin has brought Russia closer to the West by showing its readiness to join the US in its battle against international terrorism. Consequently, the Kremlin is hoping to get quick returns on this investment. In addition to an end to Western criticism of Russia over Chechnya, Moscow is seeking a greater share in global decision- making. A restructuring -- or even cancellation -- of the USSR's debt may also be expected as payback for Moscow's support in wiping out the Taliban. After all, the Kremlin is taking some significant risks by joining the US-led alliance against terrorism. Moscow's support of US attacks on the Taliban may eventually lead to serious discontent among Russians. Furthermore, the Kremlin risks losing its influence in Central Asia. Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan originally put forward a similar position to that of Russia: they were only ready to provide the US and its allies with air corridors to transport humanitarian aid. A few days later, US troops and intelligence were already arriving in Uzbekistan. The Uzbek leadership quickly realised that it cannot afford to lose such a valuable chance to move closer to the US. In doing so, however, it must distance itself from Russian influence. Tashkent's goal has been clearly stated: with US aid, it hopes to take on the role of regional leader. Moscow's greatest concern right now is the world order that will emerge after the war in Afghanistan. Washington is evidently doing its best to use the pretext of the war to settle itself in Central Asia and strengthen its positions in the region. Russia may have something to say about that. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Sat Nov 3 02:10:38 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Sat, 03 Nov 2001 09:10:38 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Felgenhauer: Russian military v. Putin-Bush Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011103090910.00a9e950@pop.tiscali.co.uk> [will the Russians buy into Putin's 'realist' embrace of the West, and does it matter what they think anyway? Mark] Moscow Times November 1, 2001 Putin Flying in Face of Elite By Pavel Felgenhauer After the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, Russia and the United States have obviously become closer than they were before. But will this alliance hold? Is this a truly long-term affair, or just a marriage of convenience for the purpose of fighting a common enemy in Afghanistan? It seems that President Vladimir Putin may be indeed trying to change Russia's long-term foreign and defense outlook. Putin has announced he is closing one of the last vestiges of Russian global might: a strategically important eavesdropping outpost in Cuba. Russian military intelligence, or GRU, is today still keeping a special communications brigade of some 1,600 men in Cuba, despite the Cold War being over for more than a decade. This brigade intercepts hundreds of millions of radio, telephone and other electronic communications ? government and private ? from the United States. The staff of the brigade works to decipher and sort out important information from the mass of data gathered. The GRU has other electronic listening posts on Russian territory. Planes and satellites also gather electronic intelligence data. However, the Cuban base was always considered a jewel in the crown of Russian military intelligence. Satellites simply cannot gather all the important signals. The United States, with the most advanced electronic eavesdropping program in the world, does not rely fully on satellites. Last spring, a mid-air collision between a U.S. spyplane and a Chinese fighter caused a serious international crisis. But the United States still continues to fly electronic intelligence-gathering missions to foreign shores and keeps listening posts in foreign countries. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian military secured the ongoing use of the base in Cuba. The lease cost $200 million a year, but a deputy defense minister told me in 1993 that this was a sound investment. The Cuban base gathered not only military-related data, but also lots of commercial and private secrets. Moreover, the $200 million was paid not in cash, but in barter: military equipment, spare parts for Soviet-made armaments, oil, etc. Some of these barter goods could only be sold to other customers as scrap. Russia was not bound to pay any rent until 2004 for its naval and air base in Vietnam, which will be closed in January 2002, at the same time as the base in Cuba. The official Kremlin spin that the overseas bases are being closed to economize and free up more money for other defense projects is not taken seriously by anyone in Moscow. In 2000, Russia reportedly had a trade surplus of some $46 billion. The Kremlin could surely find the money to pay for the Cuban base, if it really wanted to. The Cuban government, which received some shared intelligence information, has strongly protested the closure of the Russian eavesdropping installation and has accused Moscow of trying to appease Washington. Many influential figures in Moscow are also openly questioning Putin's decision. Military leaders, diplomats from the Foreign Ministry and people connected to the intelligence community are for the first time freely challenging Putin's decisions. There is open talk of "grave mistakes" made by Putin in his attempt to move closer to the West, of the Kremlin unilaterally surrendering strategic assets, and of sacrificing Russia's true national interests in a fatal attempt to integrate with the corrupt West. The opposition is almost unanimous and Putin's authority may be challenged even more brazenly, if, as it has been rumored, Moscow and Washington are on the verge of finding a formula to jointly abandon or seriously modify the 1972 ABM Treaty, in order to allow the United States to develop missile defense. If Putin, along with the base in Cuba, abandons the ABM Treaty and with it Moscow's opposition to NATO enlargement, while continuing to support the war on terrorism, Russia may indeed become a close long-term ally of the West. Ongoing economic reforms that have already drastically improved the local business environment make Russia ready to undergo a much needed revolution of modernization by absorbing a lot of Western capital and technologies. To make this come about, Putin will have to replace a large part of his elite and intimidate the rest into total submission. Show trials, arrests and the ouster of high officials are inevitable, as has happened many times before in Russia when the country made a sudden U-turn and the existing elite was dismissed. Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Sat Nov 3 02:16:57 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Sat, 03 Nov 2001 09:16:57 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Shevardnadze puts off Europe trip amid crisis Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011103091614.00a9ca88@pop.tiscali.co.uk> By David Stern in Tashkent and Andrew Jack in Moscow Published: November 2 2001 18:10 | Last Updated: November 2 2001 21:49 President Eduard Shevardnadze of Georgia on Friday delayed a trip to Europe to manage a fresh political crisis in the southern Caucasus state as hundreds of people demonstrated against his administration in the capital, Tbilisi. His decision came after he dismissed his cabinet on Thursday and the speaker of the parliament resigned when thousands marched through the streets to protest at a clampdown by the authorities on the private Rustavi-2 television station, a strong critic of the government. The latest round of political theatre in the former Soviet state could prove a serious blow to the already weak position of the wily 73-year-old president. Many believe he will not quit, because he is now regarded as the single figure who can assure stability in the country. The protests coincide with renewed tension with neighbouring Russia, which accuses Georgia of harbouring rebels from the republic of Chechnya. Georgia in turn says Russia is behind military raids across its borders and is bolstering separatists in its breakaway region of Abkhazia. Protesters last week attacked Georgia's rampant corruption and economic stagnation, and called for Mr Shevardnadze's departure. The president - respected in the west for his previous role as Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika-era Soviet foreign minister - is reviled by many Georgians, with one polling company putting his approval rating in the single digits. "Shevardnadze's position right now is very bad. He is under a lot of pressure, especially from the student protesters," said Alexander Rondeli, a Georgian political analyst. The most recent events follow a turbulent summer that witnessed massive street protests over the murder of Giorgi Sanaya, a popular young journalist, for which some blamed government officials. Observers say the coming weeks may determine the country's future political path, as Mr Shevardnadze will be forced to address growing calls for reform from the public and within his own political party, the Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG). "The next two to three weeks will show where Shevardnadze stands. He will have to appoint a new cabinet and speaker of parliament, and there are calls to introduce changes to the constitution to create a system with the post of a strong prime minister," said one western expert. Some say that the path may have been cleared for long-overdue political and economic measures. Two top officials considered among the most recalcitrant, Kakha Targamadze, the interior minister, and Gia Meparishvili, the prosecutor general, were included in the purge. Observers say that, as a result, in the struggle between communist-era officials and young reformers within the CUG, the reformers' hand may have been strengthened. Others, however, are less optimistic, saying that though Georgia's power struggles provide for great viewing, they are the last thing needed in this volatile Caucasus state with a history of internal strife. "Georgia has not had an effective government for a long time," said one businessman based in Tbilisi. "The proof is that a few demonstrators can force it to resign." from FT.com From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Sat Nov 3 06:15:00 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Sat, 03 Nov 2001 13:15:00 +0000 Subject: [A-List] marriages of convenience In-Reply-To: <5.1.0.14.1.20011102140904.00a4eec0@pop3.norton.antivirus> References: Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011103120453.00ab13e0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 02/11/2001 22:28, John Gulick wrote: > have we crossed some qualitatively new thresshold en route to the > formation of a global ruling class ? Are you arguing that this "formation of a global ruling class" is happening, or asking for *disproofs*? What is the evidence for this? People like Manuel Castells staked their careers on this kind of globaloney, but the "world system" (whatever that is) has been more integrated before, 1873-1914 for eg or between AD 3-476 to take two periods at random. All we know for sure is that such experiments always ended badly... The hypostasis and formalisation of the American Empire (if that is what is now happening) is surely a sign of weakness and the terminal decline of US hegemony. It amounts to abandoning even the fig leaves of rationalisation and democratic pretension and the adoption of brute force and simple coercion, of routine assassination, torture and of fear as political methods of last resort ("You are free. You have the freedom to stand up and sing God Bless America. Or you are a self-declared Enemy of the People, subject to denial of rights and arbitrary execution.") How on earth can such a historical monstrosity see the light of day? Think about what is involved! Today hundreds of millions of people yearn for revenge and retribution. Hatred of America is extremely widespread, is it not? From Russia to the Middle East to Africa and South Asia, not to speak of Latin America, people do not see bin Laden as CNN would have us see him. The US world-empire gives new meaning to the notion of a Prison of Nations. Such an empire cannot survive without procuring some degree of mass consent. How can this mass consent be manufactured? Indeed, is this even an issue for men like Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, Powell--not to speak of Bush himself? Well, let's assume it can. Let's assume for a moment that the frenzied debates ongoing in the White house are not about the best ways to slaughter people in the Middle East and Asia, but are about how to conciliate, to reconstruct, to ameliorate, to have a 'peace process' etc. I do not believe for a moment that the present leaders of the US have any interest at all in the question of obtaining consent from their subjects. Fear, mass terror, the politics of Exterminism, the Highest and Final Stage of Imperialism, is their game. But anyway, let's suppose. Can US hegemony transition this crisis by combining unsustainable, ultimately self-destructive coercion and state-terror with some kind of neo-keynesian, global social democratic synthesis, a la Tony Blair? Without this, it surely cannot survive. B-52's alone are not enough, even together with US inspired, trained, paid shadow forces, assassination squads, remote-controlled assassination technology. But even if the White House wanted it, Tony Blair's 3rd Way is, of course, never gonna happen. Not in this universe, not with this Republican Party and this Administration: because to carry thru such a policy would require a transfer of wealth and resources from the West to the Rest which is incompatible with the continuation of capitalist economy in its present form. Since the world's energy supplies are too low, and since the environmental dangers of increasing energy consumption are anyway catastrophic, it's clear from the get-go that not only would the Golden Billion have to sacrifice half or more of its energy and material consumption: there would have to be a wrenching reconstruction of Western economies and productive systems. Long before people get the point of this, and acknowledge its inevitability if the even-direr alternative of complete civilisational collapse is to be avoided, we shall be, and probably already are, too far into the vicious spiral of collapse: in short, it is already too late, not merely because of the political difficulty involved, not just because of systemic inertial momentum, which is too great for adjustment to be technically possible in the relevant time-frame: but ultimately because the capitalist world-system is already too much in the grip of positive-feedback mechanisms which are producing uncontrollable cascades of historical change. Tony Blair's much-vaunted global third way suffers from the fatal combination, therefore, of being both too little and too much. Too little to make any real difference, too much to be politically acceptable to anyone in Washington. You'd have to propose a significantly more realistic programme of global equity, amelioration and renewal than Tony Blair has done, to see any future other than one of the there following scenarios: (a) best case option: continuing cycle of low-intensity wars, terrorist outrages in the metropoles and abrading and collapse of peripheral states/societies; this is what intellectual laziness, avarice, lemming instinct and blind denial makes popular, but my advice, don't expect it to happen like this; or: (b) neutral case scenario: unsustainable damage to the core states of the imperial system caused by such things as detonation of civil nuclear installations, hazchem etc, followed by collapse of Asian nuclear powers, engulfing war in the middle east, collapse of the global economy etc. Or scenario (c) (i think this will happen): there will be a succession of catastrophic wars and pestilences which will reduce the human population to a few hundred millions. The temperate, industrialised zones will be too polluted, the soil too exhausted, the mines too plundered, to support functioning productive societies. The topical and subtropical zones, parched out by anthropogenic climate change, will be incapable of growing enough food. Each step of the way into this cycle of civilisational decline, we become fleetingly alarmed but then quickly inured, pacified, unable to register change, let the frog boiling. This October has been the warmest in Britain since climate records began in 1692. Even two years ago, the headlines would have been full of terriofying predictions about the effects of climate change. The temperature today is 2.6 deg C above the historic norm. The IPCC says such rises represent a fundamental threat to all life on earth, if they are sustained and not just aberrations. But no-one even notices any more. There has not been a single centimetre of newsprint in the British "serious" press, that I have seen, even commenting on October's extraordinary and menacing warmth. The Pentagon (should we call it now the Quadragon?) might be rendered uninhabitable, and the whole of Washington too, for that matter, by the simple expedient of detonating anywhere in the Beltway a few hundred grammes of Caesium-137. A briefcase, a stick of dynamite and a timer is all else you need. Who says it can never happen? But the truly terrifying thing is that when it does happen, it will trigger such a cascade of new horrors that even the loss of the nation's capital will soon no longer register on the frozen consciousness of the US population. Think about it, and tell me again that the Next American Century, complete with its World Empire, is really a possibility. Mark PS The Taleban is a child not merely of the CIA but also, perhaps primarily, of the IMF and its SAP's and debt collection methods in Pakistan and elsewhere. This is what has driven people frantic and driven them into the arms of fundamentalism. The IMF was the recruiting-sergeant of the Taleban just as the CIA and DoD was its quartermaster. Given this degree of self-destructiveness, given this capacity for conjuring up its own gravediggers, it's hard to see how US imperialism can hope to survive. If not now, then later, but the subject has got gangrene and cannot survive. From lnp3 at panix.com Sat Nov 3 06:37:32 2001 From: lnp3 at panix.com (Louis Proyect) Date: Sat, 3 Nov 2001 08:37:32 -0500 Subject: [A-List] marriages of convenience In-Reply-To: <5.1.0.14.1.20011102140904.00a4eec0@pop3.norton.antivirus> References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011103120453.00ab13e0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Message-ID: <200111031336.IAA06402@menyapa.cc.columbia.edu> On Sat, 03 Nov 2001 13:15:00 +0000, Mark Jones wrote: >The Taleban is a child not merely of the CIA but >also, perhaps primarily, of the IMF and its >SAP's and debt collection methods in Pakistan >and elsewhere. This is what has driven people >frantic and driven them into the arms of >fundamentalism. The IMF was the recruiting >-sergeant of the Taleban just as the CIA and >DoD was its quartermaster. In fact the Mahdist revolt of the 1880s was produced indirectly by Egyptian debt to the IMF of those days, namely Baring Bank and its cohorts in London. In fact Egypt was directly ruled by Pasha Bering through the 1900s. Rapid "development" in Egypt, a product of accelerated cotton production to satisfy world markets because of disruptions resulting from the US civil war, was financed by loans at usurious rates. When it became impossible to pay them, Egypt intensified its exploitation of Sudan, its colony. In the name of Allah, the Mahdi roused the dervishes who with sword and spear defeated the modern British army with its machine guns and cannons. -- Louis Proyect, lnp3 at panix.com on 11/03/2001 Marxism list: http://www.marxmail.org From tomzbox at hotmail.com Sat Nov 3 18:43:06 2001 From: tomzbox at hotmail.com (Tom Warren) Date: Sat, 03 Nov 2001 18:43:06 Subject: [A-List] marriages of convenience Message-ID: Writes Mark: > >The hypostasis and formalisation of the American Empire (if that is what >is > >now happening) is surely a sign of weakness and the terminal decline of >US > >hegemony. I ask the question you asked: "What is the evidence of this?" One could also read this as a strengthening of the hegemony, ... we no longer perceive any need to sugar-coat it. A few months ago we were writhing around avoiding an honest explanation for the bombs falling on Kosovo and Bosnia. Imagine the difference in hegemonic strength between those Yugoslavian rationalizations and what we'd say today. "Hey, give it up, get over the line or we'll bomb your ass back to the Stone Age. Don't ask why." > >It amounts to abandoning even the fig leaves of rationalisation > >and democratic pretension and the adoption of brute force and simple > >coercion, of routine assassination, torture and of fear as political > >methods of last resort ("You are free. You have the freedom to stand up >and > >sing God Bless America. Or you are a self-declared Enemy of the People, > >subject to denial of rights and arbitrary execution.") And this abandonment is read by you as a sign of weakness? Perhaps moral weakness, perhaps weakness of character by some in charge in the Whitehouse I won't be naming names) But certainly not hegemonic weakness, political, economic or military weakness. I still accuse you of wishfully thinking the door is rotten, Mark. You are correct that this is a signpost on the road to weakness, but the road still must pass through "Stronger-than-we-are-now"-ville first. > >Such an empire cannot survive without procuring some degree of mass > >consent. How can this mass consent be manufactured? By some crazy moslem fanatics slamming planes into buildings. >>I do not believe for a moment that the present leaders of the US have any > >interest at all in the question of obtaining consent from their subjects. > >Fear, mass terror, the politics of Exterminism, the Highest and Final >Stage > >of Imperialism, is their game. But anyway, let's suppose. And the Highest and Final stage is yet to come, is it not? Mr. "Weakness" is not yet knocking on the door of the Pentagon. > >Can US hegemony transition this crisis by combining unsustainable, > >ultimately self-destructive coercion and state-terror with some kind of > >neo-keynesian, global social democratic synthesis, a la Tony Blair? Remind yourself of that time period you selected: 3-470 -something AD. I figure we got another three hundred years of this "two-bit Machiavellian" vengeance to wreak at the current rate of "weakening". > >Without this, it surely cannot survive. B-52's alone ... > >...US inspired, trained, paid shadow forces, assassination > >squads, remote-controlled assassination technology ... > >Not in this universe, not with this Republican Party and this > >Administration: because to carry thru such a policy would require a > >transfer of wealth and resources from the West to the Rest which is > >incompatible with the continuation of capitalist economy in its present > >form. Wishful thinking? You seem to overlook our Imperial lesson plans; we have at least learned enough Jiu Jitsu to recognize that one uses one's opponent's strength to flip him. ('member ol' Ronnie Reagan?) The transfer of resources will be from them to our banks and oil depositories. We may spend a few bux on Tomahawks, but that's investment, not capital. > >Since the world's energy supplies are too low, and since the > >environmental dangers of increasing energy consumption are anyway > >catastrophic, it's clear from the get-go that not only would the Golden > >Billion have to sacrifice half or more of its energy and material > >consumption: there would have to be a wrenching reconstruction of Western > >economies and productive systems. Long before people get the point of >this, > >and acknowledge its inevitability if the even-direr alternative of >complete > >civilisational collapse is to be avoided, we shall be, and probably >already > >are, too far into the vicious spiral of collapse: in short, it is already > >too late, not merely because of the political difficulty involved, not >just > >because of systemic inertial momentum, which is too great for adjustment >to > >be technically possible in the relevant time-frame: but ultimately >because > >the capitalist world-system is already too much in the grip of > >positive-feedback mechanisms which are producing uncontrollable cascades >of > >historical change. Yeah! NOW you are mentioning some things that WILL undermine the hegemony! Only you're failing to provide me with much faith that you can link THOSE factors to our current little vengeance-seeking nine-eleven tirade. We only have to smear AL Kayda and Ben Laden and singe a few more whiskers on Sadam to keep the ball rolling! We can continue this kind of short-sighted Imperialism for a very long time ... at the VERY least until 2035 when one or another of Hanson's predictions taps us on the shoulder and points to the REAL dragon that will eat us all, Imperial and oppressed alike. Then we'll just switch to MaCarthyism and declare the real war, the one on eco-terrorists. (I assume you and I will be two of the first on the lists of usual suspects to round up, thanks to our new email monitoring programme. Gawd, I hate the thought of being in a cell with Jay Hanson and Stan!) > >Or scenario (c) (i think this will happen): there will be a succession of > >catastrophic wars and pestilences which will reduce the human population >to > >a few hundred millions. The temperate, industrialised zones will be too > >polluted, the soil too exhausted, the mines too plundered, to support > >functioning productive societies. The topical and subtropical zones, > >parched out by anthropogenic climate change, will be incapable of growing > >enough food. > > > >Each step of the way into this cycle of civilisational decline, we become > >fleetingly alarmed but then quickly inured, pacified, unable to register > >change, let the frog boiling. This October has been the warmest in >Britain > >since climate records began in 1692. Even two years ago, the headlines > >would have been full of terriofying predictions about the effects of > >climate change. The temperature today is 2.6 deg C above the historic >norm. > >The IPCC says such rises represent a fundamental threat to all life on > >earth, if they are sustained and not just aberrations. > > > >But no-one even notices any more. There has not been a single centimetre >of > >newsprint in the British "serious" press, that I have seen, even >commenting > >on October's extraordinary and menacing warmth. > > > >The Pentagon (should we call it now the Quadragon?) might be rendered > >uninhabitable, and the whole of Washington too, for that matter, by the > >simple expedient of detonating anywhere in the Beltway a few hundred > >grammes of Caesium-137. A briefcase, a stick of dynamite and a timer is >all > >else you need. Who says it can never happen? But the truly terrifying >thing > >is that when it does happen, it will trigger such a cascade of new >horrors > >that even the loss of the nation's capital will soon no longer register >on > >the frozen consciousness of the US population. Yep. all of the above is certainly the most plausible. ... now you're talkin'! And they're gonna put a new facade on the Pentagon, the plans call for a large statue of two Geo. Bushes pissing on a small map of the Middle East in the Plaza where the plane landed > >Think about it, and tell me again that the Next American Century, >complete > >with its World Empire, is really a possibility. > > > >Mark If it were not, Blair would not be dancing around in his Cowardly Lion suit crying "Put 'em up! Put 'em up!" and France would CERTAINLY not be whining for a place at the table this week. A whole lotta guys are jumping on the World Empire bandwagon, from Syria, fer chrissakes, to North Korea! (I will NOT mention Putin and his love-affair with NATO! I will not , I will not ...) The Next American Century is a reality, unfortunately, my friend. Yet, you correctly describe the end game. You just didn't play enough of the Risk board game in graduate school to see the bigger pitcher. Wish away, however, it's good for the soul. ... and Stan may fix things before it comes to that, there is always that hope. love, tom "I fear that we have awakened a sleeping giant and filled him with a terrible resolve ... " -- Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Dec. 8th, 1941 _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp From julfb at sinectis.com.ar Sat Nov 3 15:10:27 2001 From: julfb at sinectis.com.ar (Julio Fernández Baraibar) Date: Sat, 3 Nov 2001 19:10:27 -0300 Subject: [A-List] marriages of convenience Message-ID: <200111032210.TAA06213@arwen.sinectis.com.ar> An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed... Name: not available URL: From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Sun Nov 4 03:23:26 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Sun, 04 Nov 2001 10:23:26 +0000 Subject: [A-List] marriages of convenience In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011104102122.00ab7bd8@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 03/11/2001 18:43, you wrote: >Writes Mark: > >> >The hypostasis and formalisation of the American Empire (if that is what is >> >now happening) is surely a sign of weakness and the terminal decline of US >> >hegemony. > >I ask the question you asked: "What is the evidence of this?" One could >also read this as a strengthening of the hegemony, ... Tom, you are right to upbraid me with making what can be seen as unproven assertions, with no effort to prove them and making them in a bombastic way what's more. Yes, I accept that we need to make detailed investigations of what is happening between Russia, China and the US in particular. Mark From mstainsby at tao.ca Sat Nov 3 15:40:19 2001 From: mstainsby at tao.ca (Macdonald Stainsby) Date: Sat, 3 Nov 2001 14:40:19 -0800 Subject: [A-List] Urgent! Anti-war all student coalition Message-ID: <024601c164b8$86d5c080$5b075318@vc.shawcable.net> Coming up on November 10-11, 2001 in Berkeley, California is the premier two-day conference to establish an all-campuses of North Americas' West Coast coalition of students to fight this war. I am contacting you on behalf of the organisation Mobilization Against War And Racism (MAWAR)- and even more specifically the student committee within the larger group. MAWAR began as a conference of some 300 concerned and scared citizens (including, of course, but not limited to students) on September 15, 2001. Since that time we have organized three demonstrations, begun a massive educational newspaper, set up committees for grass roots outreach and much more. Essentially, we have answered the public need for a strong anti-war voice emanating from the public itself. The student coalition was formed almost spontaneously at a large planning session for MAWAR. We were talking amongst the larger group about all the different student groups that were popping up on many of the campuses around the city. This includes but is not limited to: Simon Fraser, UBC, Douglas, Capilano, Kwantlen and Langara colleges. We decided that night that we realised (obviously) that our power is greater in larger numbers. We set up a "rolling teach in" week- where each campus would put on a teach in on the major issues of the day, history of the Mid to far East, organising on campuses against the Vietnam war, alternative media- and many other immediately burning issues. The teach ins we held were all a success, including the most important one at the end of our week of rolling teach-ins: the all-campus one that was all day, Oct 28th. This was held- due to lack of alternate venues- out in the far reaches of the UBC campus on the morning after many people had attended the Halloween parties. We still received nearly 200 people over the day. This was all the day after the larger MAWAR coalition (of which we in the student committee are all members as well) put together a march and demonstration from the local library to the American consulate. MAWAR has filled the void for a loud voice against the war, and the student committees are finding fertile ground for the expansion of the anti-war movement on the campuses. the skies over Afghanistan may be dark with bombers, but there is always the light of hope that comes from such times. We received notice of the upcoming all-western continental conference in Berkely only recently. Like so many grassroots organisations, we are hopelessly underfunded. To aid in our grassroots organising, we put the bulk of our resources directly into reproducing our fine newspaper (online at: http://www.tao.ca/~mayworks/911/1/index.shtml ), which is our most important tool. I will make several pleas here. 1) we need to be as big and loud a voice as possible. We in the student movement already know the urgency of internationalism. Our first starting place on that note is the conference coming up in Berkeley. It is very important to have our Canadian, Vancouver voice heard at this event. We feel it is very importnat that we help and actively participate in the formation of this new group, which I for one hope will stand in the great tradition of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) that was so instrumental in helping build the resitance to the Vietnam war. We have an even better starting place than they did, so our chances are great. 2) We want and request any and all donations possible to sponsoring 1 or 2 participants from Vancouver to head down to the conference. If people are able to help with the funding and sponsoring of some of the new, young radical student groups here in making our voice as loud and co-ordinated as possible as needed, please contact myself at 604- 525-9171 or mstainsby at tao.ca or you can call Sima Zerehi at 604 209 7703. We obviously need these funds immediately, if at all possible. Arrangements for how to make contributions directly can be worked out. If you read this far, all there is left to say is a word: Peace. sincerely, Macdonald Stainsby on behalf of MAWAR and the MAWAR student coalition. ------------------------------------------- Macdonald Stainsby Rad-Green List: Radical anti-capitalist environmental discussion. http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/rad-green ---- Leninist-International: Building bridges in the tradition of V.I. Lenin. http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/leninist-international ---- In the contradiction lies the hope. --Bertholt Brecht From jlgulick at sfo.com Sat Nov 3 16:11:54 2001 From: jlgulick at sfo.com (John Gulick) Date: Sat, 03 Nov 2001 15:11:54 -0800 Subject: [A-List] marriages of convenience In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.1.20011103132336.00a5bcb0@pop3.norton.antivirus> Mark wrote: > >Are you arguing that this "formation of a global ruling class" is > >happening, or asking for *disproofs*? I knew in advance that you don't buy the "global ruling class" line, so I was hoping that you'd furnish some perspicacious disproofs, and that others would weigh in with evidence on either side of the fence. And that perhaps along the way my own fuzzy thoughts (and shaky command of basic empirical facts) would be clarified. > >What is the evidence for this? People like Manuel Castells staked their > >careers on this kind of globaloney, but the "world system" (whatever that > >is) has been more integrated before, 1873-1914 for eg or between AD 3-476 > >to take two periods at random. All we know for sure is that such > >experiments always ended badly... To be sure, Castells is not the only one. (What separates Castells from many others is that his prosecution of the globaloney line is based on sheer academic opportunism, not principled argument -- incidentally, the same goes for his mechanical structural "Marxism"-by-the-numbers of the 1970's, which yielded many dreadfully indigestible urban sociology tracts). You're also spot on in suggesting that a long-term historical perspective is absolutely crucial. Again, my substantive knowledge of the later days of British Empire is very weak, but I believe many have convincingly shown that in the late 19th/early 20th centuries, the world economy was more "globalized" than today (to vulgarize, the big powers had relatively high proportions of FDI in, financial claims on, market penetration of, etc. one another's home country and non-colonial "blocs"). This did not mean, quite obviously, that inter-imperialist rivalry had dissolved under the friendly reign of the British navy over the high seas. I suppose what I find arresting about post-911 geopolitics (at a sheer phenomonological level, having not read about it extensively or thought about it very clearly), is the degree to which the US war in Central/South Asia is hastening the rearticulation of Russia and China with the global system. In the Russian case, Putin appears to be trying to pull off what Yeltsin had zero legitimacy to pull off -- craftily using avowed moral and logistical support for the "international war on terrorism" to consolidate Russia's dependent integration into world capitalism. The outcome will be to turn Russia for once and all into something akin to Pinochet's Chile, on a much vaster scale and with grander implications for the balance of forces among the world's ruling classes. Russia's robber baron energy, media, and banking moguls will no longer be just the detritus of state socialist collapse, but be firmly entrenched as Russia's official dependent ruling class, this time with more organized and sustained state backing. The PRC case is quite different. I think one could successfully argue that Beijing is peddling its diplomatic support for the US war as a bargaining chip, one that it hopes will allow it to pursue world capitalist integration on its own neo-mercantilist terms, despite its admission to the WTO. (Yes, I am aware that this is a fatally nebulous formulation). The problem remains the same as before for the PRC's "state capitalist" (or whatever you want to call them) elite -- will prostrating China before the law of value on a world scale set off uncontrollable popular unrest ? And will it lead to the break-up of the coherence of that very same "state capitalist" elite, such that it can pursue any kind of autonomous accumulation strategy ? So this dialogue has proven to have therapeutic value after all. I guess what I'm arguing (or at least proposing) is not that post-911 geopolitics is expediting the formation of a "global ruling class," but that it is instead hastening the pace of dependent integration in Russia, and raising anew the political contradictions of world capitalist integration in the PRC. And, given that post-911 geopolitics may well be quickening these tendencies, it naturally raises the question of the unequal interdependency of the world's ruling classes. But you are perfectly correct to imply that in my initial formulation I too casually equated deference to US military dominance with the possible emergence of a "global ruling class." And, even supposing that such a facile equation can be made, you also appropriately suggest that the viability of US military dominance itself deserves a diagnosis -- taking into account the resistance of the wretched of the earth (under whatever ideological banner), the nearing exhaustion of the bio-physical environment's "Promethean fuels" (hydrocarbons and soil), etc. But that is an analytically separate set of issues for another day. John G. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 5117 bytes Desc: not available URL: From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Sun Nov 4 03:25:19 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Sun, 04 Nov 2001 10:25:19 +0000 Subject: [A-List] fwd: (Book Review) Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011104102459.02ad8d00@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Subject: Trust Us, We're Experts (Book Review) BioMedNet BOOK REVIEW http://news.bmn.com/hmsbeagle/109/reviews/review Trust Us, We're Experts How Industry Manipulates Science and Gambles With Your Future by Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber Reviewed by Sibylle Hechtel Posted August 31, 2001 ? Issue 109 Review It's not often you read a book that dramatically changes your outlook or opinions. Most books amuse, entertain, or inform. Trust Us, We're Experts shocks. It easily could lead the uninitiated to question their assumptions about "facts" and "truth" in the marketplace. Authors Rampton and Stauber of the Center for Media and Democracy http://www.prwatch.org/cmd/> chronicle the history of public relations, from Edward Bernays' laying the groundwork for the fledgling industry in the 1920s to the power it wields over public policy today. According to the authors, Bernays, a disciple of Sigmund Freud, "created more institutes, funds, institutions, and foundations than Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Filene together." In his book Propaganda, Bernays argued that scientific manipulation of public opinion is key. "A relatively small number of persons," he wrote, " . . . pull the wires which control the public mind." Bernays believed that "[s]omebody interested in leading the crowd needs to appeal not to logic but to unconscious motivation." Trust Us, We're Experts shows how the world's richest and most powerful corporations do this. The authors describe how the tobacco industry first hired movie stars to sell cigarettes and then spent millions of dollars to counter findings that cigarettes cause cancer, a strategy based on the so-called third-party technique and on testimonials. "'How can the persuader reach these groups that make up the large public?' Bernays asked. . . . 'He can do so through their leaders . . . . The group leader thus becomes a key figure in the molding of public opinion.'" The third-party technique distinguishes PR from advertising. "The best use of a PR firm will be when the firm supplies useful information to influential reporters and analysts who have large audiences." This strategy camouflages the actual source of information, encourages conformity to vested interests while pretending to encourage independence, and replaces facts with emotion-laden symbolism. I was particularly appalled at the story of scientist Arpad Pusztai. Pusztai identified troubling results in rats fed genetically modified potatoes. When he announced his findings, his bosses at the Rowett Research Institute in Aberdeen, Scotland, suspended him (he soon retired) and discredited his research. Before reading this account, I had believed the official version: Pusztai did shoddy research. But this book indicates that Pusztai's work was fine - its only fault was that it went against major commercial interests. Another disturbing case involved psychologist Claire Ernhart of Case Western Reserve University. Ernhart, who received grants from the industry-funded International Lead Zinc Research Organization, also serves as a courtroom "expert witness." A physician, Herbert Needleman, published results showing that lead-exposed children are more hyperactive and suffer more attention deficit. In 1981, Ernhart formally accused Needleman of having conducted flawed research. An Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) investigation found inconsequential statistical errors. The world's largest PR firm, Hill and Knowlton, then sent a draft copy of the EPA report to journalists together with a cover letter claiming that the EPA panel had rejected Needleman's findings. When the EPA reversed its position and adopted Needleman's findings, Hill and Knowlton continued to circulate the draft report. In 1991, Ernhart wrote to the National Institutes of Health charging Needleman with scientific misconduct. In 1992 Needleman obtained an open hearing to confront his accusers. Ernhart and another psychologist claimed Needleman had manipulated variables to produce biased, anti-lead results. Needleman's scientific defenders showed that even without these variables, his results remained the same: For every 10 parts per million increase of lead in a child's baby tooth, there was a two-point drop in IQ. The authors recount similar cases in which millions of dollars were paid to PR companies by corporations whose interests ranged from the food and restaurant businesses to the oil and chemical industries. The issues involved industrial diseases and work-related illnesses; safety and risk assessment; and the impact of organochlorines such as DDT, PCBs, and dioxin, chemicals that can disrupt hormone metabolism. Rampton and Stauber continue with a description of the battle between environmentalists and the biotech food industry. They note that many of the world's largest chemical corporations, such as Monsanto, Novartis, Hoechst, Pharmacia, Dow Chemical, and DuPont, shifted their investments from chemicals to food and pharmaceuticals. The investigative journalists conclude that "government regulators are not presently functioning to safeguard the public's best interest." As an obvious example of abuse, they cite the story of one regulator, a former Monsanto attorney, who helped draft an FDA policy and later left the FDA to return to work for Monsanto. Trust Us, We're Experts also considers the effect of big money on universities and scientific journals, describing instances in which tobacco companies paid 13 scientists $156,000 to write letters to influential medical journals. Chapter 9 looks at the concept of "junk science," a self-serving term coined by corporate attorneys, lobbyists, PR firms, and industry-funded "think tanks" to discredit scientific and medical studies that might threaten corporate profits. In chapter 10, the authors discuss another problem closely linked to industry: global warming. They also address recent severe weather events, such as the breaking off of three large icebergs from the Antarctic ice shelf in May of 2000. As an example of a corporate contribution to the debate, the authors tell the story of a PR representative of the American Petroleum Institute who outlined a plan to recruit scientists without "a long history of visibility and/or participation in the climate change debate." They would have $5 million over two years, including $600,000 to develop a cadre of 20 "respected climate scientists" who were to "recruit . . . a team of five independent scientists to participate in media outreach. These scientific spokesmodels would be sent around to meet with science writers . . . thereby raising questions about and undercutting the 'prevailing scientific wisdom.'" At times, Rampton and Stauber can be na?ve or unrealistic. They bemoan the increasing dependence of science on government funding and lament the loss of the "gentleman scientist" of an earlier era. But when wealthy scientists attempt research using their own money today, the science community brands them amateurs and accords them little respect. The authors also question scientific journals' use of page charges: "Bear in mind that authors can pay to have scientific findings published, even in some peer-reviewed journals." But most journals charge per page to cover publication costs, and everybody pays the same amount. Page charges stem from journals' financial needs, not from a cynical willingness to profit from otherwise unpublishable research. Before reading this book, I was an enthusiastic supporter of biotechnology and genetically modified (GM) foods. Now I'm not so sure. Last summer, I debated GM foods with a fervent opponent. I argued that they could provide vitamin A in rice for developing nations, and produce bananas that could be used as vaccines for children in the third world. I still find these goals desirable, but I'm now more skeptical. I ascribed distrust of GM foods to ignorance or technophobia. After reading this book, I fear that my enthusiastic support resulted partly from ignorance - not of the science, but of the politics. This book, which is well researched and includes 33 pages of footnotes and references, is an excellent primer for readers not familiar with the manipulation of public opinion. A major strength is its help in directing readers to relevant information, and instruction on how to investigate problems affecting local communities. ----------------------- Sibylle Hechtel is a freelance writer whose articles' topics include science and rock climbing. As an undergraduate, she climbed Yosemite's El Capitan with Beverly Johnson in 1973. This was the first all-female ascent of one of the most difficult rock climbs in the world. She continued her graduate studies at the University of California at Irvine, where she wrote for Summit and the American Alpine Journal, and worked as a TV stunt woman and model for a Coca-Cola commercial. After finishing her Ph.D., she did research on mitochondrial DNA at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, and then took a job as a lecturer at Cal Tech. After four years of performing labs in basements without windows, she left academia to join expeditions around the world: first Western climbers in the Ak-Su range (Kyrghistan) in 1987; Everest in 1988; and the Austrian Women's Expedition to Shishapangma, Tibet, in 1994 (the 13th or 14th highest peak in the world).She lives in Colorado, where she spends her days off climbing and teaching skiing in the winter. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Sun Nov 4 03:31:21 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Sun, 04 Nov 2001 10:31:21 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Doha? Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011104103045.02b3f918@pop.tiscali.co.uk> What is happening at Doha? Anyone know? Mark From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Sun Nov 4 03:49:05 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Sun, 04 Nov 2001 10:49:05 +0000 Subject: [A-List] simmons on n sea peaking Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011104104654.02ad8aa0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> The North Sea: Oil Production Has Peaked! The GOM Model Must Come To The North Sea Norway and the United Kingdom ("U.K.") North Sea crude oil and liquids production peaked in 2000 at 5.9 million barrels oil per day ("bopd"). This production performance capped an impressive decade of production growth, which saw production grow 55% from 3.8 million bopd in 1991. The North Sea has changed. The "easy" production growth of the 1990s is over. High depletion rates and declining field sizes in both the U.K. and Norway dictate that 2000 was the peak production year for the North Sea. The Deepwater, Atlantic Margin, Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea regions offer opportunities for production growth, but the core continental shelf region is set to experience declining production. We believe that a maturing North Sea with shrinking field sizes and higher depletion rates is less economically attractive to major E&P companies. The major E&Ps must deliver large production volume growth each year in order to overcome their own depletion rates and achieve growth targets. A capital and labor constrained industry combined with a quest for the "biggest bang for the buck" forces the largest E&Ps to go after the "elephants" in deepwater and other frontier regions. Therefore, we expect major E&Ps to de-emphasize the North Sea and independents to raise their profiles, especially in the U.K. To some extent, this is already happening. Measured by operated production, BP and Shell still dominate the U.K. sector, and Statoil and Norsk Hydro continue to dominate Norway. However, in the U.K., the independent E&Ps are now the most active drillers. The most recent licensing rounds in the U.K. and Norway have seen an influx of independent E&Ps. Independent E&Ps have also aggressively entered the U.K. market through acquisitions of producing properties. We believe this process has just begun. While major E&Ps are likely to hold on to core fields, infrastructure and promising development opportunities, it is reasonable to expect they will divest themselves of other properties. Independent E&Ps, which are no less aggressive in searching for production growth, will pursue development of new fields or redevelop existing fields. We believe the oil service industry and independent E&P companies will be long-term beneficiaries of this changing market. The North Sea provides a fertile market for independent E&Ps to grow reserves and production. As the independent E&P companies focus on developing the remaining potential of the North Sea, which will be increasingly comprised of smaller fields, the demand for oil services in the near and long-term should increase. [see: http://www.simmonsco-intl.com/research/docview.asp?viewnews=true&newstype=1&viewdoc=true&dv=true&doc=199 for remainder] From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Sun Nov 4 04:07:17 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Sun, 04 Nov 2001 11:07:17 +0000 Subject: [A-List] roots of Islamic anger Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011104110648.02b3fa60@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Peter Beaumont, foreign affairs editor, Nablus Sunday October 14, 2001 The Observer The teenagers were teasing us in bad English. 'Do you like bin Laden?' asked the one leaning over my chair. 'Do you respect him?' he pestered, giggling with his friends among the shabab - 'the boys'. In the barber's shop opposite the mosque in the Balata refugee camp in the West Bank city of Nablus, it was difficult to know the correct response. For slow-thinking journalists, however, there is a primer scrawled recently in Arabic on the mosque's walls. 'Blood for blood,' it warns, 'the West will fall.' Among a sizeable minority of the young men of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, bin Laden has become a folk hero. It is not just for his championing of the Palestinian cause, as he did on Arab television last week after the first day of the US bombing. It is not even for attacking America in the first place, which many, even among Hamas supporters, admit repelled and shocked them. Instead, by a convoluted logic, they admire him for becoming the target - with the Taliban - of American bombing. Strangely self-fulfilling, it is the fatalistic logic of those who feel themselves to be perpetually the victim. It was a contradiction summed up last week by a survey of Palestinian students at the West Bank's Bir Zeit University - 89 per cent believed the US was wrong to attack Afghanistan; 64 per cent said the attacks on the United States violated Islamic law. What is most alarming, however, is the sizeable minority - 26 per cent - who said they believed the suicide hijackings were consistent with the teachings of Islam. Last week in Gaza City those tensions erupted as the policemen of Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority fought with the young men of Hamas who had come out to demonstrate in sympathy with the people of Afghanistan - and bin Laden - in the worst outbreak of inter-Palestinian violence in years. What is certain is that Osama bin Laden is opening deep and dangerous fault lines throughout the societies of the Middle East. In a month since 11 September, his actions and the West's reaction to them have become, for a substantial and radicalised minority, a kind of shibboleth that marks you on either side of an ideological divide: Are you for - or against - America and the West? It is the question bin Laden wants the Islamic world to ask itself. Ironically, the outcome he envisages is one he shares with the right-wing US historian Samuel Huntington who - like bin Laden - believes that, by their inherent, contradictory cultural values, conflict between Islam and the West is inevitable. But is it? For behind the simplistic world views of the Huntingtons and bin Ladens - sitting at at their culturally excluding and exclusive poles - is a reality as complex as it is murky. The hostility towards the West, for all its specific grievances such as the bombings of Afghanistan and Iraq, and America's support for Israel, is as deeply embedded in a century of internal conflicts as in the history of the West's often clumsy interventions. They are frictions specifically born of the struggle of the Islamic world to reinvent itself amid competing ideas of democracy, nationalism, modernisation and religious revival. That struggle - for better and worse - inevitably has been played out in terms of a continuous process of evaluation of its progress against the achievements and failures of America and the West. But the question remains: What, precisely, fuels that rage against the West? I find Professor Abdu Sattar Kassem, a lecturer in political science at the University of Nablus, outside his apartment block in the city centre. It is Friday and he is anxious to pray. To keep the interview as short as possible, he hands me an article he has written on the question. 'As an Arab,' he writes, 'I understand why so many Arabs and Muslims hate the US and look at it as a power of evil.' A charming and clever man who studied in the United States, he says: 'The dumbest thing of all is that when I tried to talk to American colleagues and explain why they were disliked in the Middle East, they simply did not want to hear it or believe it. 'It is a form of cultural arrogance. They simply believe that they are best, and nothing can challenge that. 'What you have to understand is that many Arabs and Muslims want to build an Islamic civilisation in its own right. They blame the West in general - and America in particular - for subjugating that ambition by dividing the Arab world through the dictators that America supports. 'America has done this by fragmenting the Islamic world, dividing it under rulers it supports. 'America has perverted the attempts to democratise the Arab world. They are hypocrites. They preach freedom and democracy, but prevent Arabs from enjoying it and exploit their wealth. 'The final issue is the US support for Israel in tormenting the Palestinians. Let me tell you something, it will not be enough for America to force the Israelis to accept a Palestinian state. 'Muslims will not be satisfied with that. They must withdraw all support for Israel. Create a level playing field.' These are complaints you will hear repeated by many Muslim and Arab intellectuals across the region. But not all are happy simply to blame the West for all the failings of the Muslim world. Among them is Hazem Saghiyeh, a London-based columnist for the Arabic newspaper Al Hayat, who, while identifying the same causes of friction as Professor Sattar Kassem, puts a radically different gloss on the roots of Muslim dislike of the West. These, he says, have as much to do with the failure of the Islamic project itself in issues of governance and modernisation in the past century and a half as they do with American and Western interference. He does not deny there are good reasons for Muslims to dislike America and the West - not least the almost universally unifying feature of the widespread Islamic support for the Palestinian cause and the way in which the West has shored up obnoxious regimes across the Middle East. But he argues that equally important is a historic sense of inferiority in the Muslim world. It is a sense of inferiority, he believes, that has magnified the importance of America and the West in its history. 'Crucial is the sense of superiority to Europe enjoyed for almost a thousand years by Islam. For centuries after the defeat of the Crusaders it felt, not without some justification, that it was intellectually, morally, scientifically superior. 'Islam - and the Ottoman Empire in particular - was plunged into a deep crisis from which it has never really recovered following the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. 'For a long time the Muslim world had become isolated and inward-looking and had had little contact with the outside world. The new epoch of European supremacy was a trauma and injury to its psyche.' Significantly - as other historians of the Middle East have pointed out - this crisis in the middle of the nineteenth century was accompanied by the emergence of deep divisions in the Islamic world itself over how best to reassert its values. It divided those who argued for reform, modernisation and an Islamic Enlightenment from those arguing for Islamic fundamentalism. The result, Saghiyeh believes, was a narcissistic culture of victimisation that survives until the present day. 'That narcissism and sense of humiliation,' he says, 'was accentuated by the disaster in 1948 when the Arab armies were defeated by the Israelis.' They were tensions exacerbated, says Saghiyeh, by the widespread failure of nationalist Arab models of governance in the postwar era that delivered autocratic, human rights-abusing regimes across the region. A side-effect of the poor record on human rights and freedom of speech has been the rise of a parallel narrative in Islamic consciousness. Robbed of the freedom to express themselves, many have turned to the 'conspiracy theory' as an alternative model to explain the problems of the world. 'The rise of the conspiracy theory in the Muslim world in the last few decades is extremely important. Because people feel they are not in control, because they feel they world is becoming stranger and stranger, they look for something behind it.' That 'something' is the myth of an almost omnipotent and controlling American power behind the scenes. At the heart of the hostility towards the West is a shared set of specific discontents across the Muslim world that have created a feeling of powerlessness and alienation in a substantial section of its populations. Specifically it is a discontent being driven by a myriad of social, demographic, political and economic problems. They are problems neatly encapsulated by experiences of the Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait. The rapid growth in population, which in some states has left a population where two-thirds are under the age of 30, has combined with general economic problems and issues of bad governance (in particular, rampant corruption) to create a massive gap of expectation in its young and sometimes well-educated populations. At its heart is a feeling of deracination and alienation among young Muslims across the region. 'There has been a process of suburbanisation,' says Saghiyeh. 'There has been a population explosion that has been accompanied by a shift from the countryside to the cities without gaining the benefits they expected of urban life: a comfortable life and the best jobs. Consequently these young people feel neither urban nor from the countryside.' It is a feeling of rootlessness that is mirrored in the failures of modernising projects in the Muslim world itself. 'These are also people who have lost their traditional ways of life but have not become modern, who have not benefited through all their education. It is a recipe for psychological breakdown and hysteria.' In the past two decades that gap of expectation has increasingly been filled by the politicisation of Islam and Islamic fundamentalism - which has emerged out of the failure of the Arab nationalist secular project that created a series of violently monolithic states, including Syria and Iraq. The result, says an Egyptian diplomat based in the Middle East, is that many people - frustrated with the failure of economics, politics or nationalism to give them the better lives they seek - have turned to Islam as a revolutionary solution. 'They look to men like bin Laden as a revolutionary solution - a magic formula when all else has failed. 'And remember that people like bin Laden carefully target the poor and illiterate, people they know are suffering, and present their vision as a kind of revolutionary Islam that will magically solve all their ills.' It is a revolutionary message first preached two decades ago by Ayatollah Khomeini. It was Khomeini who in the Eighties provided the vocabulary for hatred of America as the 'Great Satan' that has been recycled by others, such as bin Laden, who seek to reimpose the seventh-century utopian community of the Prophet Muhammad - the velayat-e faqih (clerical rule). Walking through the alleys of Nablus's refugee camps with Samir, my driver, during Friday prayers, it is hard to avoid the sense of the continuing politicisation of Islam or its appeal. It is equally hard to avoid the fact that for many of the younger generation it is a process framed explicitly in a hostility to the West. 'You know,' he says, 'when I was young it was only the old men who went to the mosque. Now it is almost everyone. Especially the young men.' We stop and chat to 30-year-old Tawfik Ibrahim. 'The Americans are happy with what has happened to the Palestinians,' he tells us politely. 'Now they are bombing the poor people of Afghanistan who have no planes or bombs. 'They can kill bin Laden. But there will be hundreds more bin Ladens. As long as women can have children...' Key strands in militant Islam THE SALAFIYYA A medieval school named from the Arabic words al-salaf al-salih, 'the venerable forefathers', referring to the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. It believed Islam had been corrupted and sought to restore its purity. Salafis are not necessarily militant. The Arabic term for the barbarism that existed before Islam. In the 1930s fears arose that Islam faced extinction. Radicals, including Rashid Rida and Maulana Maudoodi, developed the notion that modern Western culture was equivalent to jahiliyya. Egyptian writer and activist, probably the key influence on bin Laden, the Rousseau of militant Islam. Executed in the 1960s for inciting resistance to Egyptian regime. In Signposts on the Road (1964) he found jahiliyya everywhere, but particularly in the hedonism and sexual licence of the US, where he was radicalised as a student. IBN TAYMIYYA A medieval intellectual. Qutb found a way round the ancient prohibition against overthrowing a Muslim ruler - he declared them infidels. He reinterpreted the work of Ibn Taymiyya, equating his struggle against the Mongols in Syria with his own struggle against Arab rulers. This is thought to have sealed his death warrant in Egypt. SHEIKH OMAR ABDEL RAHMAN Convicted of conspiring to blow up the UN building and other New York landmarks. In his 1996 'Declaration of War against America', he wrote that the Saudi government, which expelled him and served as host to US troops during the Gulf War, was illegitimate and its leaders had ceased to be Muslims. From sherrynstan at igc.org Sun Nov 4 10:11:48 2001 From: sherrynstan at igc.org (sherrynstan at igc.org) Date: Sun, 04 Nov 2001 12:11:48 -0500 Subject: [A-List] comment and article Message-ID: While I am fascinated and energized by the research and analysis of the world's bourgeoisies, and keenly interested in what all this means, I begin to feel uncomfortable with all this dueling erudition, which is possibly because as a non-academic I can't share in it. But it seems to me that this preoccupation with the machinations of the world's ruling classes is ignoring what is developing among the other classes--and while I share Mark's frustration with what seems frozen consciousness in the US, stating it that way doesn't accurately represent what is going on here, where support for the war is a mile wide and an inch deep, and people are starting to ask a lot of embarrassing questions. I'm certainly not prepared to cede anything to determinism, even if it is based on some fairly sound prognostic indicators. Our working class is very diverse and stratified within itself, and a one-sized assessment of conscoiusness or militancy simply doesn't fit all. Our malaise on the ! ! left is due largely to the fact that we haven't had a good old-fashioned mass movement to get its roots into for quite some time, but that is changing. I'd like to hear more about what people see from the point of view of workers, since that's from where the hirsute one shifted the world view. And Tom, by 2035, I'll be 84. I'll have to be nice to you, because you may be the only one in our cell who is there to change my diaper and listen to my embellished lies of times past. Stan I enclose this from WSWS: WSWS : News & Analysis : Europe : Russia & the CIS The struggle for influence and oil in the Caucasus Renewed fighting in Abkhazia By Patrick Richter and Peter Schwarz 2 November 2001 Use this version to print | Send this link by email | Email the author While public attention is concentrated on America's war against Afghanistan, a conflict in another part of Central Asia that has gone largely unnoticed has flared up again. Since the beginning of October, violent clashes have been taking place in Abkhazia between guerrilla groups and government units, which threatens to develop into a conflict between Russia and Georgia. According to international law, Abkhazia, which stretches from the summits of the Caucasus to the banks of the Black Sea, belongs to Georgia, and is situated in its northwest. It has been de facto independent since 1992-93, when 10,000 died in a bloody civil war and over a quarter of a million Georgians were driven out. The government of Abkhazia has even requested that the rebel province be admitted into the Russian federation, while the Georgian government in Tblisi insists that it remains a part of Georgia, and at the most wants to negotiate an extended autonomy. Abkhazia is presently being protected by Russian troops, which supported the separatists in the civil war, and since then have functioned as a "peacekeeping force" in Abkhazia. Since 1993, the ceasefire has also been supervised by a UN mission (UNOMIG) consisting of 23 countries, including the USA, Russia and Germany. In 1999, agreement was reached at the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe summit in Istanbul to vacate the Russian military base at Gudauta in Abkhazia, but this has still not been implemented by Moscow. High-ranking military representatives said this would take at least 15 years. After the conflict had been smouldering for many years, it flared up again in August this year in a border dispute between Abkhazia and Georgia over the Kodori Gorge. According to Russian and Abkhazi sources, several hundred Chechen and Georgian guerrillas led by Chechen field commander Ruslan Gelayev penetrated the gorge from the Georgian side, carrying out assaults on Abkhazi villages and positions. After a temporary break in the fighting in September, hostilities flared up again and reached a high point in the battle to take the village of Georgyevskoye on October 4, which Abkhazi units recaptured the same day, with at least 14 killed. Four days later, on October 8, a UN helicopter was shot down during a regular monitoring flight. Nine people died-five UN observers, a local translator and the three-strong Ukrainian crew. On the following day, combat aircraft bombed villages in northern Abkhazia. Moscow at first denied this had involved Russian planes, and claimed later a Russian plane flying a sortie in Chechnya (500 kilometres away!) had gone astray. On October 17, Russian combat aircraft are again said to have penetrated into Georgian territory. In the meantime, both Russia and Georgia have moved thousands of soldiers to the common border, the worst crisis in relations between the two countries since 1993. Conflicting explanations So far, it is unclear who is responsible for this renewed flare-up in the fighting in Abkhazia and for the shooting down of the UN helicopter. In the hail of mutual recriminations even those familiar with the situation are unable to clearly ascertain what is truth and what is propaganda. For a long time, Russia has accused Georgia of offering a refuge to Chechen rebels in the Pankissi Gorge, which borders directly onto Chechnya. From here, by arrangement with the Georgian government, Gelayev's fighters set out to assist in reconquering Abkhazia and to open up a second front against Russia. The newspaper Rossyskaya Gazeta claimed on October 12, referring to captured Chechen fighters, that the attack on the Kodori Gorge had been personally agreed by Gelayev and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze. Reliable evidence for such claims has not been forthcoming, however. The Georgian government denies any responsibility and denies that Gelayev was ever in Georgia. According to Georgia, the recent disputes are a result of Russian provocation, with the goal of discrediting the Georgian government by branding it as supporting terrorism. The Georgian army is not known to possess the portable surface-to-air rockets, with which the UN helicopter was shot down. According to the third and most likely explanation, Chechen and Georgian partisans in fact instigated the fighting, and these were not supported by President Shevardnadze but by Georgian government circles who reject Shevardnadze's pro-Western course. In this respect, Interior Secretary Kakha Targamadze was mentioned, who is regarded as "Moscow's man" in Tblisi and a possible successor to Shevardnadze. Targamadze's participation would explain how Chechen fighters were able to travel 400 kilometres across Georgia to the Abkhazi border without being noticed or obstructed. This explanation is also supported by the fact that Shevardnadze was absent when the fighting broke out, as he was making a state visit to the USA. It is also conceivable that the Russian military, independently or in association with pro-Russian forces inside Georgia, were acting behind the back of President Vladimir Putin. Putin's recent rapprochement with the USA has met widespread rejection in Russian military and secret service circles. Above all the recent decision to shut the Russian Lourdes listening station in Cuba and the Cam Ranh naval base in Vietnam, as well as the agreement to allow the US to use former Russian military facilities in Uzbekistan, has resulted in unusually open criticism. Just a few days before it became a reality, Defence Secretary Sergei Ivanov had categorically excluded the stationing of American troops in Uzbekistan. Mikhail Delyagin, director of the Moscow Institute for Globalisation, spoke of "extreme stupidity, because we have given up our strategic influence". The Moscow newspaper Vremya Novostei, which is published in association with Newsweek, already sees Russia's entire political elite in unexpressed opposition to Putin, and recalls the last phase of Mikhail Gorbachev's presidency in 1990. A struggle for oil Even if it is not clear who is pulling which strings in Abkhazia, the recent disputes nevertheless show that behind the "alliance against terrorism" the struggle continues between the Great and regional powers for power and influence in Central Asia. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the question has remained at the centre of foreign policy disputes: who will control this strategically important region rich in raw materials lying in the heart of the Eurasian landmass? A key question is how the rich oil and gas reserves of the region can be brought to the world market. After the independence of the former Soviet Central Asian Republics, Russia still enjoyed a monopoly in this regard, since all the existing pipelines traverse Russian territory. The Western powers, therefore, began to seek alternative export routes that would break the Russian monopoly and provide a direct route to the Caspian oil for the Western companies. The shortest route, running southward to the Persian Gulf, was blocked because of the American policy of sanctions against Iran. Under no circumstances was the Mullah's regime in Teheran to be able to control the flow of oil. In the southeast, first the civil war in Afghanistan and then the conflict with the Taliban regime meant the existing plans for a pipeline along this route collapsed. The present war against Afghanistan aims to change this situation by installing a pro-Western regime in Kabul. In the meantime, however, the only remaining route was to the west, and here Georgia offered itself as the ideal corridor, which connects oil production in Azerbaijan with the Black Sea. Great efforts were undertaken by Europe and America to loosen Georgia from Russian dependence and integrate it into the various Western alliances. Georgia and Azerbaijan were at the heart of the European Union's 1993 TRACECA project (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia). This was conceived of as rapidly and cost-effectively establishing traffic and communication routes from Europe to Asia-the "Silk Road of the 21st Century"-as an alternative to Russian routes. In 1996 this was followed by another consortium named INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Towards Europe), to which the USA also belonged and which concentrated on the building of pipelines, railroad lines, roads, ports and airports between Azerbaijan and the Ukraine via Georgia. A highpoint of these efforts was a conference in Baku in September 1998, in which 33 countries and 12 international organisations took part, with 21 large oil companies from the USA alone participating. >From the mid 1990s, Georgia, Azerbaijan, the Ukraine, Moldavia and finally Uzbekistan established the GUUAM alliance (named after the initial letters of these countries), which sought closer ties with NATO. Another pro-NATO alliance exists between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Russia opposed this development, by stoking up ethnic conflicts in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and so strengthened the country's chronic political instability. President Shevardnadze even accused Moscow of being responsible for an assassination attempt made against him. Georgia, for its part, offered the Chechen separatists an area into which they could retreat from the Russian troops. A pipeline runs through the disputed territory of Chechnya, which connects the Azerbaijani capital Baku with the Russian Black Sea port Novorossisk, and which until 1999 was the only connection between the Caspian and Black Sea. In the meantime, it has almost completely dried up. In spring 1999, Western efforts showed their first success. An oil pipeline leading from Baku to the Georgian Black Sea port of Supsa began operations. It had been built by a consortium led by the British-American company BP Amoco. For the first time since the days of the oil pioneers Rothschild and Nobel, oil again flowed from Baku to the West bypassing Russia. However, at just five million tons per year, the new pipeline's capacity is small. A pipeline ten times more efficient, through Turkey to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, is still in the planning phase and could only be finished in 2006 at the earliest. For political reasons, the US government has strongly advocated the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline for years. However, the oil companies always regarded it with scepticism because of its great length (1,730 kilometres) and high cost ($2.9 billion). It would only prove profitable if, beside Azerbaijani oil, it were also used to carry oil from Kazakhstan, which is presently transported by ship or by a further pipeline via the Caspian Sea. On October 1, the opening of a pipeline linking Tengiz, the most important oil field in Kazakhstan, with Russia's Black Sea port at Novorossisk, delivered these plans a grievous blow. Built by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the new facility carries oil exclusively across Russian territory and has a yearly capacity of 28 million tons, which can be increased to 67 million. Although CPC also involved prominent foreign companies, in particular America's Chevron, nevertheless the start-up of the Tengiz-Novorossisk pipeline means that the plans to create an efficient western corridor independent of Russia have failed, for the time being. It is in this context that the renewed fighting in Abkhazia must be seen, which has so far predominantly benefited Russia. On the one hand, it supplies a pretext for the Kremlin to put pressure on Georgia militarily. After the crash of the UN helicopter, Defence Secretary Ivanov said it was now absolutely clear that the Georgian leadership was unable to control the situation in its territory or was manipulating terrorists for its own ends-a scarcely veiled threat that Russia might seek to impose order in Georgia and secure it against the "terrorists". On the other hand, the instability in Georgia is undermining the plans for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. This failure would leave Russia controlling the export routes from the Caspian and thus an important lever to influence geopolitical developments in the region. Russia's participation in the American "alliance against terrorism" does not mean that the Russian government has stopped defending its own strategic interests, which in the long run are incompatible with those of America's. The same applies also to China, the European powers and all the other members of the alliance. Such alliances between imperialist powers, "no matter what form they may assume, whether of one imperialist coalition against another, or of a general alliance embracing all the imperialist powers, are inevitably nothing more than a 'truce' in periods between wars. Peaceful alliances prepare the ground for wars, and in their turn grow out of wars." (Emphasis in the original) These words were written 85 years ago by no less a figure than Lenin, who composed one of the most astute studies of imperialism. They retain their full validity today. From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 5 00:36:47 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2001 09:36:47 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Britain/US split? Message-ID: Subject: Re: [A-List] Britain/US split? Probably I am missing something here, but what does this tell us about the US/Britain split? Mark At 02/11/2001 13:05, you wrote: >Peter Mandelson: My verdict on Syria's young leader: a > decent man doing a difficult job > > 'It was the most relaxed and honest exchange I am ever > likely to have with a foreign head of state' > > The Independent, 01 November 2001 ===== That it was Peter Mandelson, of all people, who "just happened" to be in Syria and "just happened" to be invited by Assad is interesting, to say the least. While the visit was made during his short-lived stint as Northern Ireland secretary, we know enough of Mandelson's history and subsequent trajectory to suggest that this was a fishing expedition on behalf of the New Labour clique that dominates the British state and is presently conducting a quiet takeover of the European Union apparatus. The British policy towards Israel/Palestine is interesting for its ambiguity and, in recent times, consistent ability to provoke sharp responses from Israel. One need think only of successive visits by British Foreign Office ministers to Israel which have inspired the wrath of the hosts. This goes back to John Major's administration, when David Mellor visited a Palestinian village and couldn't believe what he saw. Characteristically undiplomatic, he couldn't help but tell his hosts what he thought of their custodianship of the indigenous population. This began the current frosty relations between Britain and Israel, which, in large part, stem from the manner in which Britain, the former colonial power, was ejected from that region. Between losing out to the Stern gang and an ascendant US imperialism (exercised via the UN), "Israel" was very much a cause of resentment within the Foreign Office. Ernest Bevin believed Israel to be the creation of communists, and was happy to more or less replicate Nazi Germany's propaganda equating communism with Zionism. This fed into the conservative establishment's latent anti-semitism and its visceral anti-communism. Many within the intelligence and military establishments fought covertly to subvert the creation of Israel and this meant they were fighting with the Arabs. The creation of Jordan is a case in point. How strongly these historical ties linger today is moot, but it is clear that, from a dispassionate perspective, imperialists have nothing to gain from the irrational and provocative manoeuvres characteristic of post-Rabin Israel. For all his imagery as the great peacemaker, Peres is as much a Jerusalem fundamentalist as Sharon, hence their supposedly paradoxical ability to work together. Below is a recent article from the New York Review of Books which casts some interesting light upon the politics of Jerusalem and the dynamics driving the current repression: The New York Review of Books October 18, 2001 The Deadlocked City By Amos Elon Divided Jerusalem: The Struggle for the Holy City by Bernard Wasserstein Yale University Press, 412 pp., $29.95 1. Ariel Sharon knew what he was doing on September 28, 2000. In hot pursuit of the Israeli premiership, he marched onto Jerusalem's most contentious piece of real estate, the magnificent plateau, paved with pink and gray polished stone, which Jews call the Temple Mount and Muslims Haram al-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary). Other than during the Friday prayers, the site often seems nearly empty. On this particular day, Sharon arrived guarded by almost a thousand armed policemen and soldiers. He later claimed that his sole purpose had been to test "the freedom of access and of worship" on the Mount. His real motive was to win over the support of the extreme right and thus foil Benjamin Netanyahu's return to political power. He would attain his aim, though, only with some support from Yasser Arafat. At this time, Arafat also needed to improve his image as a hard-liner. Palestinians had been increasingly dissatisfied with him. They were demoralized by the abstractions of a "peace process" that never brought them any benefits but only increased their daily sufferings and humiliations. Israel, under Ehud Barak, continued to plant more settlers in the occupied West Bank and Jerusalem than it had under Benjamin Netanyahu. It was as though during the recent peace talks in Northern Ireland the British government had continued to ship more Protestants from Scotland to Northern Ireland and settled them on land expropriated from Catholics in Londonderry. To protest Sharon's provocation and improve his own declining image, Arafat either launched a bloody Palestinian uprising or did nothing to prevent it: the worst outburst of violence by Palestinians in a hundred-year conflict that is now more intractable than ever before. Ehud Barak, the then prime minister, also thought he knew what he was doing in permitting Sharon's expedition to this most sensitive Muslim shrine. Only a few days earlier, Arafat had been Barak's guest at a small dinner at Barak's private house. (In retrospect the setting seems hard to believe.) On this occasion, Arafat made a last-minute appeal to Barak to block Sharon's visit, just as similar political demonstrations on the Mount had been prohibited before. Barak turned him down. He, too, was badly slipping in the polls. His coalition had broken apart. He wanted Sharon to replace Netanyahu as the Likud candidate. Polls indicated that he had an outside chance to beat Sharon but not Netanyahu. Barak is a highly intelligent but politically maladroit former general whose hobby is taking complicated watches apart and putting them together again; he is both the most decorated soldier in the Israeli army and an accomplished pianist. He should have known that on Jerusalem's Haram al-Sharif, the wars of religion continue under a different name. In Jerusalem, hatred has often been another form of prayer and never more so than when the knives are pulled and the bombs are thrown. The religious hatred called odium theologicum has long been an instrument for gaining power and property, whether in local politics or in real estate speculation. Myths of divine promise alternate with myths of Blood and Soil. "History" and "religion" are relentlessly and superstitiously evoked and nowhere more so than on the Haram, or Temple Mount, where Sharon staged his political coup. Peace-making was never easy before and is now going to be infinitely more difficult. With Pavlovian regularity, unspeakable outrages against civilians now lead to murderous punitive raids that only provoke worse outrages. Even if the recent American-sponsored cease-fire should last, the end is nowhere in sight. So many futile "cease-fires" have preceded it. Is Arafat able to restrain the tiger he's been riding for almost a year? Can Sharon really be counted on to accommodate Arafat, whom he has been calling "our bin Laden"? There have been hundreds of dead so far and thousands of wounded, most of them Palestinians. 2. The tenth-century Arab geographer Muqaddasi-the name implies that he was a native of Jerusalem-wrote that the city was "a golden basin filled with scorpions." The holy places are mostly inside the walled Old City, within a stone's throw from one another. In some cases, they form part of the same architectural complex. For Orthodox Jews, the holiness of Jerusalem, however, extends far beyond the ancient walled city. According to Orthodox doctrine, everything seen from a high tower forms part of the sacred territory. After 1948, all synagogues that fell under Jordanian rule were destroyed. Nevertheless, not religious but political considerations were responsible for the new municipal borders of Jerusalem after the annexation of the former Jordanian sector following the 1967 war. Those borders now surround ninety-four square miles, much of it of former Jordanian land.[1] The new borders were intended, as Bernard Wasserstein shows in his excellent book, to include as many Israelis and as few Palestinians as possible. And yet, since the Palestinian population grows much faster, it has long been increasingly doubtful whether the Israeli majority can be maintained, even if, as is likely, the municipal area is further enlarged to include the new Israeli satellite towns built after 1967 on Palestinian land. In view of this likelihood, there has always been a certain crackpot quality to the nationalist rhetoric in Israel on the subject of Jerusalem. When the current mayor, Ehud Olmert, a member of the Likud, was recently asked by a reporter why municipal services in the Arab part of Jerusalem were so bad, he replied angrily that there was no Arab Jerusalem. There was only a "Jewish Jerusalem." Sharon calls Jerusalem "Israel's Capital, united for all eternity." The late prime minister Menachem Begin, who, after dramatically resigning in the wake of the disastrous Lebanese war, spent his last years alone in a shuttered room suffering deep depression, was one of the first to use this slogan. He did so in an ecstatic, ringing voice as though intoning an incantation. In the early 1980s, to avoid being outflanked on the Jerusalem issue by even more extreme nationalists, Begin decided to support a second annexation law-which redundantly declared that all of Jerusalem was indeed annexed to Israel-and put it through the Knesset. The Labor Party spokesmen said that the bill was unnecessary and even warned that it might cause damage; but then the Labor members of the Knesset voted for it. Yitzhak Rabin stayed away from the vote and argued with Shimon Peres over Labor's support for the law. To this day, Peres is a hawk on Jerusalem. The only result of the second annexation law was that the few foreign embassies located in West Jerusalem moved to Tel Aviv in protest. The UN Security Council passed a resolution condemning Israel for its annexation-fourteen votes to zero. The United States abstained. I remember asking Begin at the time whether, in his view, "eternity" could be legislated. "In this case it can and must be," he snapped back. We were sitting at a window table in the Knesset dining room. Begin pointed down the hill toward the Jerusalem Museum. "For proof that we are right you must go there. The remnants of our ancient glory are on view there. We are reviving it in our own days." I asked him if he agreed with the conventional wisdom that held that Jerusalem must be left to the end of the negotiations or there would never be an Arab-Israeli settlement. Begin looked up and said sharply: "Jerusalem will never be a subject for negotiation!" 3. A rational solution to the problems posed by two irreconcilable nationalisms in Jerusalem would have been to internationalize the entire city. This, in fact, was recommended by the original UN partition resolution of 1947. Israel accepted it; all the Arab countries did not. The Arab nations launched a war against the new state in 1947 and after the Jews defeated them, the new state of Israel changed its mind about Jerusalem, favoring a secret agreement with Jordan to divide the city between them. Golda Meir and King Abdallah agreed about this even before the guns fell silent. Neither gave a thought to the Palestinians. Jordan promised Israelis free access to the Wailing Wall but did not keep its word. Minefields and high walls topped by barbed wire divided the Israeli and Jordanian parts of Jerusalem. In theory, internationalization remains an attractive solution if only because it seems so reasonable. Neither Israel nor the Palestinians are ever likely to agree to it. They would not even agree to the internationalization of the Old City, where most of the holy places are. By now, generations of Palestinians and Israelis have been forcefully and dogmatically instructed by their political and religious leaders that the Old City is exclusively theirs. The early Zionists were wiser than their children and grandchildren. Like most European nationalists of the liberal school they were opposed to religious authority. Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism, never bothered to have his only son circumcised. He advocated the internationalization of Jerusalem. For the capital of his proposed secular Judenstaat (a "state for Jews" as distinct from what later came to be called a Jewish state) he preferred Haifa, overlooking the Mediterranean sea. Jerusalem, he felt, was redolent with fanaticism and superstition, the musty deposit of "two thousand years of inhumanity and intolerance.... The amiable dreamer of Nazareth has only contributed to increasing the hatred." Chaim Weizmann, Israel's first president, shared Herzl's feelings. An eminently rational man, Weizmann disliked Jerusalem. He was revolted by rabbis imposing themselves on politics and by politicians playing with religious fires. When the first Palestine partition plan was mooted in 1937, he suggested that only some of the modern parts of Jerusalem, inhabited mostly by Jews, be included in the proposed Jewish state. As for the Old City, "I would not take [it even] as a gift." Too many "complications and difficulties" were associated with it. Even as he wrote these words in a letter-preserved in the Weizmann Archives-brown-shirted members of Betar, a right-wing paramilitary Jewish youth movement, were clashing with Arab fundamentalists in Jerusalem not far from the Wailing Wall. They were fostering lethal Arab fears -at the time still based only on pure myth-that the Zionists were planning to tear down the mosques on the Haram and rebuild the Jewish Temple there. Freud referred to these clashes in a letter to Einstein. He was unable to muster sympathy, he wrote, "for the misguided piety that makes a national religion out of a piece of the wall of Herod, and so challenges the feelings of the local natives." The early Betar extremists (forerunners of Begin's Likud) were decried at the time as fascists by most Palestinian Jews. As far as we know, no one, not even Betar, contemplated at this time the possibility that the Jewish state they were fighting for would one day claim sovereign rights over the Haram, a site which for the past fourteen centuries had been the third-holiest place in Islam. The idea of rebuilding the Temple on its ancient site lay dormant until the 1967 war. It suddenly surfaced after the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem. Israeli paratroopers hoisted the national flag over the sacred rock- now enclosed in a great mosque-on which many layers of meaning had accumulated from the days of Abraham to Mohammed, who is said to have ascended to heaven from it. Then Defense Minister Moshe Dayan quickly spotted the flag and ordered that it be removed. He ordered the troops to evacuate the sacred enclosure and hand it back to its Muslim attendants. That same day, the chief rabbi of the Israeli army, Shlomo Goren, an officer with the rank of major general, gave a first inkling of the difficulties of enforcing Dayan's wise order in the future. Much like Sharon thirty-three years later, Goren strode onto the Haram accompanied by singing acolytes and blowing a ritual shofar. He was reprimanded. The Arabs were then too cowed to do anything. According to another major general, Uzi Narkiss, the officer commanding the Israeli troops, the following conversation, which is quoted by Wasserstein, took place that day between him and Goren: Goren: Uzi, this is the time to put a hundred kilograms of explosives under the Mosque of Omar-and that's it, we'll get rid of it once and for all. Narkiss: Rabbi, stop it! Goren: You'll enter the history books by virtue of this deed. Narkiss: I have already recorded my name in the pages of the history of Jerusalem. Dr. Zerah Warhaftig, the Israeli minister of religious affairs, whom I interviewed two weeks later, told me that legally speaking the Temple Mount had been Jewish property since the days of King David, who had "paid the full price for it (fifty silver shekels) to Araunah the Jebusite." But he was a patient man, he added with a smile, ready to hold off from actually taking possession until the coming of the Messiah. We are fortunate, the minister told me, that the Talmud forbids Jews to enter the Temple Mount since their ritual uncleanliness can be overcome only with the ashes of a red cow, a rare species, now extinct. This saved Israel from unnecessary troubles with the Arabs. Others had less wisdom than this old-fashioned, Orthodox, but dovish politician, who was known for his moderation. Scuffles between the Muslim guards and both secular and religious Israelis started soon after. In August 1967, on the day commemorating the destruction of the Temple by the Romans in the year 70, Major General Goren reentered the Mount with a Torah scroll, an ark, and a pulpit. He set up a provisional synagogue between the Dome and the mosque of al-Aqsa and held a prayer service. The Israeli police failed to stop him, although some tried to do so. Other policemen were later said to have joined in the prayer service. Not long after, Major General Goren resigned from the army and was appointed chief rabbi of Israel. In Israel, where Orthodox Judaism is the state religion, this is a government post. Goren immediately ordered the removal of signs placed by Dr. Warhaftig at the entrance to the Temple Mount warning Jews that Talmudic law forbade them to enter the precinct. Goren's appointment endowed the High Rabbinate with a political militancy it had lacked until then.[2] As chief rabbi, Goren contested Warhaftig's view that the Temple Mount was out of bounds for Orthodox Jews, arguing that large parts of the Haram were not "as sacred" to the Muslims as they were to the Jews and should be made available for building a synagogue. In a particularly provocative statement he claimed the Muslims themselves attested to this by taking their shoes off only inside the two mosques but not on the surrounding platform. Starting in the late 1960s, clashes and fistfights between Palestinians and Israelis became more frequent around the Temple Mount. Young followers of Meir Kahane wearing T-shirts saying "The People of Israel Lives" painted Stars of David on the outside walls of mosques and yelled obscenities through the narrow lanes leading to the Haram. In the Old City an institute was set up devoted to rebuilding the Temple; it included a training center for priests who would eventually perform animal sacrifices on the Temple Mount. The venture was richly funded by American Christian fundamentalists, American Jewish donors, and secretly, on at least one occasion, by the Israeli government. The Arab municipality of the former Jordanian sector was dismantled and the Palestinian mayor was expelled to Jordan. His former counselors refused to join the Israeli municipal council under Mayor Teddy Kollek. Adjacent to the Wailing Wall, the residents of an entire Muslim quarter were expelled overnight without compensation. With Kollek's wholehearted approval, their houses were razed to make way for a vast plaza. One reporter, Herbert Pundik of the Hebrew daily Davar, told the mayor he thought it outrageous to turn the relatively intimate place where prayers had been offered for hundreds of years into "a vast, noisy Piazza del Popolo" where nationalist Israeli rallies were soon to be held and army recruits sworn in. Kollek disagreed. "It was the best thing we did," he said. In a vein characteristic of the new mood he added: "The old place had a galut [diaspora] character; it was a place for wailing. This made sense in the past. It isn't what we want to do in the future." Two years after the 1967 war, a deranged Australian fundamentalist Christian successfully set fire to al-Aqsa mosque, proclaiming that the removal of the mosque would bring about the millennium. The fire caused extensive damage and destroyed precious twelfth-century works of art. In the occupied West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem protesters took to the streets. In 1982, an equally deranged American, a "born-again" Jew named Alan Harry Goodman, wearing an Israeli uniform and armed with an M-16 automatic rifle, shot his way into the Dome of the Rock. He was a volunteer serving in the Israeli army, which had issued him his gun. His aim, he announced, was to "liberate" the Mount and become king of the Jews. Riots over this bloody deed spread to faraway Muslim countries in Asia and Africa and lasted intermittently for several weeks. Jewish fundamentalists eager to assert Israel's historical "sovereign rights" continued to seek access to the Temple Mount. The higher courts upheld government efforts to keep them out. They were not always successful. The cause of the transgressors was taken up by Likud and other secular politicians farther to the right. Protected by parliamentary immunity, they were able to organize political demonstrations on the Mount with impunity. Several underground conspiracies to force the issue by a spectacular act of destruction were successfully uncovered by the police. Some conspirators were caught red-handed, or on the very eve of an attempt to blow up the Temple Mount. Others merely tried to force their way in and lay the "cornerstone" of the new Temple. Some tried to renew the ancient practice of animal sacrifices. The courts gave the conspirators lenient prison sentences for hoarding explosives and related offenses. Some of them were prominent figures in the new settlements across the old demarcation line. The most flagrant received life sentences which, however, were quickly commuted. Prominent Likud politicians, including the former prime minister Yitzhak Shamir, successfully petitioned the president to commute sentences; the worst among them were given amnesty by President Chaim Herzog-a member of the Labor Party-and set free. 4. The annexation of the former Jordanian sector of Jerusalem was never recognized by the United States or any other country, though US protests softened over the years, grew rare, and successive US presidents went through the ritual of promising during their election campaigns to move the US embassy to Jerusalem. In Israel itself, after the victory in a war named for the "six days" of creation, popular support for the annexation was nearly unanimous. Politically active Israelis, notoriously divided on most other issues, never seemed more united than on this one. The annexation was widely described as a moral and historical right, Israel's "manifest destiny." The Arabs and the rest of the world, it was said, would just have to learn to live with it. Only two men in the governing national coalition cabinet dissented, Salman Aranne, a Labor minister of education, and the dovish National-Religious minister of interior, Moshe Shapiro. Both voted in the cabinet against ordering the army to occupy the Jordanian sector in response to the sporadic shelling. Both did so out of fear that occupation would cause endless conflict and difficulty in the future. But they kept their votes secret; they became publicly known only after they died. The annexation of East Jerusalem was one of the most popular acts of the Israeli government. In June 1967, Gershom Schocken, the editor-in-chief of the independent, liberal newspaper Ha'aretz, scolded the government for not formally annexing East Jerusalem sooner. (Today the same paper favors withdrawal from most of the West Bank and from much of East Jerusalem and advocates giving the Palestinians sovereignty over the Temple Mount.) In the summer of 1967 not only Schocken, who was both publisher and editor, but also most of his staff were overcome by the euphoria of a victory that was stunning, unexpected, and seemingly complete. I remember a meeting of the editorial board, perhaps a week after the cease-fire. Schocken loudly vented his impatience at the government's delays and hesitation. "Cowards! What on earth are they waiting for!" he said. Jordanian Jerusalem and its hinterland must be annexed immediately. Tomorrow could be too late. The most junior among the assembled senior editors ventured an opinion that the Palestinians could not be forced to become Israelis against their will. They had the same right of national self-determination as the Jews. Another staff member, an aging survivor of the Weimar Republic and a specialist on constitutional law, observed that the planned annexation ran counter to the laws of war and international conventions Israel had signed. Both were shouted down by their colleagues. Opinion was similar in all the other dailies except the Communist Kol Ha'am, a low-circulation paper with no public following except perhaps-for nationalistic rather than Marxist reasons-among Israel's Arab community. With very few exceptions, the literary establishment-led by the Nobel Prize winner in literature, S.Y. Agnon, and nearly all the best-known novelists, poets, and playwrights-lent their full support to the extremist manifesto, issued by the new Greater Israel Movement, calling for the immediate annexation not only of Arab Jerusalem but of all occupied territories, including the Sinai peninsula, the Golan Heights, and the entire West Bank. An exception was the young novelist Amos Oz. After walking through the narrow lanes of the Old City of Jerusalem he told an interviewer that he felt he was in a "foreign city" (Ir z'ara). Only three prominent members of the academic community spoke up at this stage against all annexations. The biophysicist Yeshayahu Leibowitz-an Orthodox Jew-ridiculed the cult of the Wailing Wall as pagan stone-worship. He believed that the planned annexations would turn Israel into a "police state." He was followed by the historians Yehoshua Arieli and Yehoshua Talmon. Talmon said that the experience of the French in Algeria should serve as a warning that Israelis might become as brutalized and corrupted as many of the pieds noirs, who tried to rule over an alien people against its will. Their fears soon came painfully true. In the years that followed, Jerusalem was "united" only in theory. Between Palestinians and Jews there was little if any social intercourse, no intermarriage, no economic cooperation to speak of, except, perhaps, in the underworld or between the Israeli security services and their paid collaborators and spies. That there were so many Palestinians informing on one another made some Israelis despise and belittle the Palestinians even more. The city continued to have two downtown areas, two business centers, two public transport systems, two electric grids, and two systems of social welfare. It was not a "mosaic," as Kollek often called it; mosaics have a certain harmony of design; here the division reflected only discrimination and a deepening chasm. There was an enormous disparity between the public funds allocated respectively to the Israeli and Palestinian quarters. Israel recognized pre-1948 Jewish property rights across the old demarcation line, in Jerusalem and elsewhere in the West Bank; but it refused to recognize the rights of Palestinians to property they owned on the Israeli side of the city before 1948. Despite repeated warnings that unfair treatment of Palestinian Jerusa-lemites in providing education, housing, sanitation, and other social ser-vices might lead to disaster, the discrimination against them continued, and continues to this day. Kollek often complained about this, but in distributing the taxes he collected in both parts of the city, he himself was as unfair to the Palestinians as the national government. Kollek was considered a "liberal," but his liberalism was often only a successful public relations ploy aimed at soliciting money abroad for his Jerusalem Foundation. The foundation sponsored some projects for Palestinians, but it was on the whole as discriminatory as the municipality. Palestinians were denied building permits; if they stayed abroad for more than a year or two, their resident permits were arbitrarily canceled. For political as well as for moral reasons Dryden's lines in Absalom and Achitophel, a parody of English radical Protestants under the Glorious Revolution, became more and more apt: But when the chosen people grew more strong, The rightful cause at length became the wrong. If it were not for Israel's overpowering military force, the city would have fallen apart. Despite this imbalance, the Palestinian neighborhoods were, in effect, governed by Arafat from Beirut or Tunis until 1994; and since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 they have been governed by the authority's various security organs. Professor Wasserstein describes well the melancholy failure of the formidable Israeli state to realize in time the limits of its power. He lists the ups and the downs and the many "solutions" for joint government of the city, some of them absolute pipe dreams, that were concocted over the years by well-meaning think tanks and by academics peddling their cures in pleasant locations in Europe and America. A lot of good will on both sides went into these efforts. It was in vain. Among the solutions listed by Wasserstein were outlandish proposals to agree on "functional," as distinguished from political, sovereignty as well as "residual," "sliding," "shared," "vertical," or "horizontal" sovereignty, on one occasion even "sovereignty vested in God." Some of these solutions might be workable on the Dutch-Belgian border but scarcely among people at the savage climax of a hundred-year war. In Jerusalem alone, over 200,000 Israelis have been planted over the years across the old demarcation line on land confiscated from their Palestinian owners and their removal is considered inconceivable by most Israelis. (200,000 more were settled elsewhere in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.) Barak's unprecedented generosity at Camp David, when it came to Jerusalem, did not go beyond offering the Palestinians sovereignty over only a few isolated Palestinian enclaves cut off from the Palestinian state and from one another by the new Israeli neighborhoods near the Temple Mount. Barak offered the Palestinians sovereignty over their mosques on the Temple Mount but not over the ground on which they stood; and, allegedly with US support, he demanded a place on the Haram for Jewish prayer services. For the little he had offered, he was bitterly attacked by Sharon and was even criticized by Peres. Sharon himself owns an Arab house in the heart of the Muslim quarter of the Old City, though he rarely stays there. Throughout the annexed areas beyond the old demarcation line Jews and Palestinians now live in a patchwork of enclaves, and enclaves within enclaves, from which it is hard to imagine them being extricated in order to redivide the city. The oddest proposal I have seen is that the Palestinians should establish their capital in the nearby village of Abu-Dis, rename it, if they so wish, Jerusalem or al-Quds, and live happily ever after. The sad fact is that the city can no longer be partitioned effectively, while only a handful of idealists on both sides are ready to "share" it or be content with "custody" over religious sites in a city whose sovereignty would be left fuzzy. Wasserstein shows how, despite all restrictive measures against Palestinians from a demographic point of view, the great effort to "Israelize" the city, the "united" city, is failing. He writes clearly and dispassionately on a theme that has been more clich?-ridden than most and long monopolized by propagandists and hucksters. He rightly assumes that even if the Jordanians had not opened hostilities in June 1967, Israel would probably have been unable to resist the temptation to take East Jerusalem. His book is the most sober and in many ways the fairest description I know of official positions and popular sentiments on both sides between 1967 and 1999. 5. I found life in Jerusalem sad during those years. Violence was rampant. After each outrage, municipal workers in cars marked JERUSALEM CITY OF PEACE in three languages rushed to the scene with rags and brooms to wash the blood from the flagstones and make the place normal again for the tourists. There were also hopeful moments: in 1990 some 30,000 Israelis and Palestinians joined hands in a long human chain around the walls of the Old City, floating balloons and chanting WE WANT PEACE. But these occasions were rare and far apart; and even the human chain ended badly when the police tried to break up a group of Palestinian youths chanting, as the Israeli police put it, "nationalistic slogans." Those were still illegal at the time. Some thirty people were wounded and one woman lost an eye. In the Old City the prevailing tension was nearly always palpable. There was a feeling, sometimes, of being inside a claustrophobic fortress. It seemed ludicrous that this strife-ridden place should ever have become the proverbial city of peace. Much of the Old City was as the Crusaders and the Turks had left it. The Crusaders believed they would be here forever and built impressive walls. The Israelis have also erected enormous structures inside and outside the walls, but they were built more quickly and flimsily and they are considerably less beautiful. Some of the first major Israeli construction projects in East Jerusalem, the new high-rise buildings and the rebuilt university on Mount Scopus, were designed hastily under the influence of the then fashionable brutalist style in architecture. One often wondered at so many ugly buildings being built, so many eyesores and environmental disasters in the name of undying "love" for Jerusalem, Israel's eternal capital. The new university on Mount Scopus is especially disastrous. Tourists often mistake it for a fortress or military installation, with its narrow windows at odd angles like slits cut in the walls to accommodate machine guns. The new buildings have effectively killed campus life. The enormous, cavernous spaces are windy and often deserted. Few professors use their oddly shaped offices. Most rush back to West Jerusalem as soon as their courses are over. Although the university was built on a hill with one of the most magnificent urban views on earth, many of its windows look out on other walls. If Israel had not annexed East Jerusalem in 1967 and planted 200,000 settlers there, it could have had peace with Jordan in the early 1970s. It chose not to. Ever since, Israel has been unable to resolve the painful paradox of steadily increasing military power and steadily decreasing national security. The reasons for this continuing paradox are political: the attempt by one people to rule another against its wish. These reasons will not go away, although in the wake of the horrible terrorist outrages in New York and Washington, the US may be willing to intervene more firmly than in the past. The sadness of life in Jerusalem during those years was compounded by the scarcity of real human intercourse with the other side. Both sides were cursed by near-absolute self-righteousness. Both swore they were the victims-never the cause of any harm themselves. Among Israelis there was only very rarely a shadow of guilt over the fact that their astounding material, social, and international success had come at the price of rendering millions of Palestinians homeless. If it were not for European anti-Semitism, Israel would probably not have come into being. The Palestinians were not responsible for the collapse of civilization in Europe under the Nazis but in the end they were punished for it. Moral myopia in Israel was facilitated by the fact that Arab states maltreated the Palestinian refugees, exploiting them for their own purposes; and, except in Jordan, they were kept stateless down to the third generation. The power balance between Israelis and Palestinians was always so overwhelmingly in favor of the Israelis that any potential empathy among Palestinians for the people that vanquished them hardly ever emerged. If it did, it was eventually crushed when missiles from the latest-model jet planes, tanks, and helicopter gunships hit Palestinians, indiscriminately, in frequent, grossly excessive punitive raids for outrages committed by Palestinians in Israeli towns. Nor have I ever found anyone in the Palestinian camp who was seriously concerned by the fact that the PLO was, as far as I know, the only national liberation movement in history willing to extend its ruthlessness anywhere in the world, to innocent citizens of third countries and to participants in the Olympic games. Palestinians on one occasion blew up a Swiss passenger plane in mid-flight, and they hijacked or blew up other foreign planes, killing Austrians, Americans, Germans, Frenchmen, Turks, and Spaniards. Nor, more recently, have we heard Arafat or any Palestinian human rights group criticize the brainwashing of impressionable teenagers by "holy men" who convince them that they would be revered as martyrs and entertained by beautiful women in paradise if they only blew themselves up in a discoth?que full of other young people or in a crowded fast-food restaurant ten minutes from the Haram. The political deadlock runs parallel to the mutual lack of human empathy. For all its newly found dovishness, an editorial cartoon in the liberal Ha'aretz recently depicted the current Intifada as the infestation of a human body by a pack of vicious vermin. I saw only one letter to the editor protesting this cartoon. It came from one Klement Messerschmidt, a German resident in Jerusalem. He protested the utter dehumanization of the Palestinians implied in the drawing, which was reminiscent of Nazi cartoons. "Has no one on Ha'aretz felt uncomfortable with the use of this loaded metaphor?" The only reaction that seems appropriate now is despair. -September 19, 2001 Notes [1]Paris, on 105 square kilometers, accommodates approximately 2.1 million inhabitants, compared to some 600,000 currently in Jerusalem (68 percent Israelis, 32 percent Palestinians). [2] Last year, the current chief rabbi caused an international incident by thanking the Pope in his presence for recognizing greater Jerusalem, including the Palestinian parts, as Israel's national capital "united for all eternity," something the Pope had been very careful not to do. ====== So, where does this leave Mandelson? No chance that he just "happened" to be visiting Israel. It was a clandestine approach of the new President, educated and, until his father's death, resident in Britain. It was made at a time when the US was in disarray owing to the judicial coup enabling Bush to assume power, and when, of course, Clinton's efforts to become Nobel peace prize winner had failed utterly, prompting the Bush team to disengage (however temporarily) from the region. That it was Mandelson, now head of the EU think tank, The Policy Network, who made the approach suggests that it was very much in line with EU social democratic prerogatives (and Chirac, not Jospin, belongs here with D'Alema, Prodi, Schr?der and Persson). Whatever, it runs contrary to the much trumpeted notion of Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism, enthusiastically peddled by Israel and pretty much swallowed by a US intelligence establishment that resents the Syrian state's non-cooperativeness (i.e., independence). That Mandelson and co. should feel so free as to reveal this clandestine approach now, and in this manner, suggests that Blair's efforts at coalition-building are as much an effort to retain control of the international agenda rather than allow Bush, backed by Wolfowitz, Perle, et al., to plunge everyone into the darkest pit of international relations since the 1930s. Hence the Britain/US split. Michael Keaney From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 5 07:35:08 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2001 16:35:08 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Strategy of tension Message-ID: Weekend warriors not ready for action IAN BRUCE The Herald, 5 November 2001 LESS than half of Britain's 40,000 "weekend warriors" are fit for their role, and the Territorial Army could not be used even as a protection force for nuclear power or reprocessing plants, and other key installations. The admission, in answer to a parliamentary written question by Paul Keetch, the LibDem defence spokesman, reveals that 16,652 TA members would not qualify for call-up in emergency because they failed to pass their annual individual and unit training requirements. These include fitness, weapons handling and safety, and small unit tactics. There is also some doubt as to whether the Ministry of Defence could contact most of the 127,000 regular reservists on its books. These are men and women who have served in the full-time forces and are required by law to remain available for recall to the colours until their service would have amounted to 22 years, or they are regarded as being too old for active duty. A plan to mobilise 10,000 reservists for a ground invasion of Kosovo in 1999 was abandoned when the MoD discovered that it could not contact them. The MoD confirmed that a wider role for the TA, including defending installations considered at risk of attack, was one of the options being considered as part of the review of the armed forces ordered by Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary. He said: "I certainly think there may emerge from this review a greater role for a military presence within the UK ... I can see the TA may be involved in that." The overstretched manpower of a regular army with fewer than 100,000 trained troops and too many overseas commitments makes reliance on reservists and TA volunteers vital in a crisis. Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/5-11-19101-1-0-8.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 5 07:51:34 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2001 16:51:34 +0200 Subject: [A-List] UK constitution Message-ID: The subject of Allen's book is one that has preoccupied Tony Benn for many years, and was dealt with in some detail in his books "Arguments for Socialism" and "Arguments for Democracy", published over 20 years ago. These were unique in that they were serious considerations by a *Labour Party* politician of a subject most were content to treat as given. Not only that, but Benn was of course concerned to highlight the use of Crown prerogative by the Prime Minister and the sham of democracy that this represents. On his mind at the time was the decision by James Callaghan to improve the UK's Polaris missile capability under the Chevaline programme, which was undertaken in secret without any Cabinet discussion whatsoever. Of course a feature of Blair's government is the complete lack of any Cabinet discussion on anything, so things have obviously moved on a bit since 1979. What I can't tell from this article is whether or not Allen is being satirical in his apparent lampooning of the constitutional pretences, or whether indeed he is advocating a full-scale "modernisation" of the state New Labour style and dropping all the facade that may be obstructing the "efficiency" of HMG. Given that this guy was a government whip, probably the latter. Labour MP's bill books an audience with President Blair Nicholas Watt, political correspondent Monday November 5, 2001 The Guardian Tony Blair enjoys powers which "would make Stalin blush", according to a Labour MP who is to introduce a parliamentary bill seeking to formalise the prime minister's role as Britain's "full blown executive president". Graham Allen, MP for Nottingham North, who was sacked as a government whip after the election, warns that the powers amassed by Downing Street in the past 50 years are so great that they are distorting the constitution. "Instead of a healthy balance we have an executive, the UK presidency, which stands like an 800lb gorilla alongside a wizened legislature and judiciary," Mr Allen writes in a book published this week: Time to be Honest about the UK Presidency. Its publication coincides with Mr Allen's priminister ship bill, which is to be introduced in the Commons later this month. If it became law - a highly unlikely, thanks to his former comrades in the whips' office - voters would be given the chance to elect their head of government directly. "The UK has in effect a presidency," he argues. "We should recognise it. We should welcome it. We should democratically control it." Downing Street officials, who insist publicly that they are observing the constitutional convention that the prime minister first among equals, will privately recognise many of Mr Allen's claims. Jonathan Powell, Mr Blair's chief of staff, reportedly said in private last year that he wanted to create a "Bonapartist" system in which Downing Street controlled every element of government. This runs against the constitutional convention that cabinet ministers are accountable to parliament for their departments. Mr Allen says that for 50 years successive prime ministers have ignored the conventions as they amassed more powers. "The blanket of powers of the UK presidency inadvertently suffocates initiative at every lower level," he says. "Modern government is full of bright capable people, many of whom have been deeply frustrated by the top-down culture which they feel they cannot change or influence." Calling on the prime minister to "come out" and admit he has become a president, Mr Allen outlines powers which outstrip those held by President Bush. "A whole panoply of so-called royal prerogative powers are reserved to the prime minister ... [which] includes the making of treaties, and the ability to go to war," he writes. "Of course, in true British style, all this power is concealed by acres of window dressing, privy councils, royal audiences, parliamentary rituals, the facades of ancient buildings and public school accents. "While we in the UK would rather chatter about the cut and colour of the camouflage, behind it the UK president has power that would make Stalin blush." As a first step to changing the system, Mr Allen recommends a novel way to liven up the "ritualised, partisan, perfunctory questioning" of ministers in parliament. "Why close our minds to an MP or an Andrew Marr figure using the currently empty chamber each morning with a roving mike getting MPs' first-hand evidence live on TV on key constituency problems of the day, or a semi-circular chamber, or guest witnesses addressing the House - anything to get the House to speak to and for the electors and their concerns," he writes. Full article: http://politics.guardian.co.uk/labour/story/0,9061,587787,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 5 07:56:33 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2001 16:56:33 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Europe/US rivalry? Message-ID: Love the idea of Blair issuing a "summons" to other European leaders. Britain rules the waverers, once again. ===== Blair summons Europeans for 'council of war' By Ben Russell, Political Correspondent, and Marcus Tanner The Independent, 05 November 2001 Tony Blair summoned the leaders of six European nations to Downing Street last night for urgent talks on the next steps in the US-led campaign against terrorism. The Prime Minister held what amounted to a council of war with the leaders of France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, fuelling speculation about an extension of the military campaign. The meeting came as the US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, ruled out any pause in the air strikes during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military ruler, appealed yesterday for a pause in the air strikes during Ramadan, which begins on 17 November, warning of "a huge negative fall-out". But Mr Rumsfeld, in Pakistan as part of a whirlwind four-day tour of Afghanistan's neighbours, said four weeks of American bombing had undermined the Taliban to the point where they had virtually ceased to govern. In Washington, the Pentagon said more special forces had moved into Afghanistan. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, said "a couple more teams" had been deployed in Afghanistan to help anti-Taliban forces. "We'll continue to resupply [the opposition] right through the winter. We think they have every chance of prevailing." In Afghanistan's northern Takhar province US jets and B-52 bombers roared over Northern Alliance encampments before dropping bombs on Taliban front lines. But the Taliban insisted they had recaptured territory lost earlier to the Northern Alliance. They said they had advanced 43 miles south of the strategic city of Mazar-i-Sharif, which the opposition is struggling to capture. In London, Mr Blair hosted a dinner for the French President, Jacques Chirac, and Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schr?der, the Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi and the Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Maria Aznar. The importance of the meeting was underlined as the five leaders were joined at the last minute by Wim Kok, Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Guy Verhofstadt, the Prime Minister of Belgium, which currently holds the presidency of the EU, and Javier Solana, the European Union's foreign affairs representative. Downing Street said the meeting had been called to share experience and information after Mr Blair's tour of the Middle East and Chancellor Schr?der's mission to Russia for talks with President Vladimir Putin last week. Last night's meeting was described by a Number 10 spokesman as a "useful opportunity for the leaders to get an overview of the situation". Full article at: http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=103208 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 5 08:04:38 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2001 17:04:38 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Public private parasitism Message-ID: Byers faces fresh crisis as air traffic firm heads for ?50m loss By Barrie Clement Transport Editor The Independent, 03 November 2001 The Government is coming under intense pressure to bail out the public-private partnership running the air traffic control system, which is understood to be heading for a ?50m loss instead of a previously predicted ?60m profit. The annual conference of air traffic controllers meeting in Stockport today and tomorrow will urge Stephen Byers, the Secretary of State for Transport, to rescue of National Air Traffic Services (Nats) just three months after it came under the control of the PPP. The ?110m reversal in the fortunes of the company comes as another embarrassment to Mr Byers on top of the financial d?b?cle at Railtrack, which has been placed into administration. Sources say that the steep downturn in predicted income at Nats can be attributed to over-optimistic calculations by seven of Britain's biggest airlines when they formulated plans to buy 46 per cent of shares in the service, as well as the slump in air travel after 11 September. The use of smaller aircraft since the terrorist attacks has hit Nats hard because the company is partly paid by tonnage. The air traffic controllers' union Prospect said yesterday that the new organisation, in which the state retains a 49 per cent stake, is already in "serious financial difficulties". Iain Findlay, national aviation officer at the union, pointed out that the Government took ?750m for the shares bought by airlines and had a responsibility to help. "As a major stakeholder and shareholder in Nats, the Government must look again at the financial structure to prevent a 'Railtrack of the Skies'. It should be taking the idea of partnership seriously," he said. The conference will call for a commitment from the Government to press ahead with the new control centre at Prestwick, Strathclyde. Construction has been delayed while Nats reviews its ?1bn investment plan because of the terrorist attacks. Mr Findlay said: "Controllers can not stand by and see a world-class service deteriorate. Just three months into privatisation we are suffering the first major cutback. Investment in vital infrastructure, such as the new air traffic control centre in Scotland, must be maintained according to the original timescale to ensure capacity and safety are not affected." A spokesman for Nats said the company was still working out the impact the decline in air travel would have on finances. Management had taken a number of steps to reduce costs, including the delay in the Prestwick centre and a 20 per cent reduction in support and management staff. A spokeswoman for the Department of Transport said the Government had received no request for financial assistance. "Any such request would be treated on its merits," she said, but the provision of state aid could fall foul of European Union law. Full article at: http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/transport/story.jsp?story=102918 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 5 08:07:13 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2001 17:07:13 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Public private parasitism: neocolonial section Message-ID: Britain accused over Ghana water project By Paul Peachey The Independent, 03 November 2001 The Christian Aid charity accused the British Government yesterday of using the lure of a ?10m aid package to open up Ghana's water industry to foreign investment. The money is to be released once bids have been received for two contracts to supply water to most of urban Ghana. The Anglo-Dutch firm Cascal is among four overseas firms expected to bid for the right to supply 74 towns and cities. Clare Short, the Secretary of State for International Development, said the charity's claim was "completely false". The aid was part of a "responsible and equitable" response to Ghana's water problems. Despite the need for huge investment in the water system, Christian Aid said feelings were running high against the public-private scheme and a day of protest was planned on 9 November in Ghana. The charity said the cost of drinking water had already doubled in preparation for foreign involvement in the West African country, where almost half of the population has no regular and safe supply. The British aid is part of a $500m (?350m) restructuring of the Ghanaian water industry, led by the World Bank. Christian Aid said the Ghanaian authorities had come under pressure to accept a scheme favoured by the World Bank, rather than what was best for the country - a claim dismissed by the World Bank as "an insult". Full article at: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/africa/story.jsp?story=102902 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 5 08:16:01 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2001 17:16:01 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Britain/US split Message-ID: Mark has already discussed how the Blair vision is both too little (to save the status quo) and too much (for Bush et al to stomach). Here is a distillation of that vision written by the FT's former Moscow bureau chief, the guy who applauded Yeltsin's use of tanks against the Duma in 1993, has since recanted a bit, and is now ploughing a furrow similar to that of the current Moscow bureau chief, Robert Cottrell, whose discussion of Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski's book on Russia's shock therapy experience was an accomplished washing of hands in the manner of -- well, ok, it didn't really work, but what else could, realistically speaking, have been done? Unfortunately the New York Review does not seem to have that review on line. Whatever, here's Lloyd with a third way response to the global anticapitalists courtesy of Demos, another of New Labour's think tanks of choice, about which more later (hopefully). ===== The centre-left needs a global vision By John Lloyd Financial Times, Nov 05 2001 00:00:00 The left in the rich countries of the world has produced two political responses to global capitalism. One is the almost apologetic stance of centre-left political parties and governments. By far the more vivid and inspiring is the anti- globalisation movement. In little more than five years, the organisations of this movement have established themselves as uncompromising critics of "capitalist globalisation". They argue that it is a phenomenon from which only rich people in rich states gain. The anti-globalisation movement has developed in three waves. The first comprised organisations such as Medecins sans Frontie`res and Oxfam, inspired by religious, humanist or social democratic concern for the poor and war victims. The second, including groups such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, emerged from a more radical movement to protect the planet from commercial and other despoliation. The third wave, including such groups as Globalise Resistance and Ya Basta, does not wish to complement or influence governments but to destroy them. These organisations have highlighted the misery and drudgery, the oppression, hopelessness and voicelessness of much of the world's population. They impart, especially to young people, a sense of dedication to the cause of others less fortunate than most of those in the western world. Yet they impose little in the way of a burden on supporters, who do not have to work among the poor, attend party or group meetings, or donate regular sums. They offer spontaneity and fun, wrapped in moral outrage. They have another advantage. They are burdened with no ideology, programme or example. Socialism and Marxism are among their inspirations - but stripped of their less appealing elements. More than 30 years after the event, they have appropriated and given meaning to the 1968 Parisian wall slogan: "Be practical: demand the impossible!". By demanding the impossible, they have created a tide of support. Social democrats have looked on these works and despaired. They cannot descend to the violence, mass pressure and anti-Americanism that have marked the urban protests of the past three years. They cannot be anti-capitalist: indeed, they require a healthy capitalism to achieve their reformist goals. All of the centre-left governments in power in Canada, France, Germany and the UK have accepted in differing ways that the market economy is the only economic system available. They feel - or at least their supporters feel - a little uneasy about that. Social democracy is a democratic movement at a time when democracy has been taken for granted and party memberships are in decline. In contrast, the anti-globalisation movement has a network, a sense of moral purpose and mobile young people accustomed to coping with foreign cities. One irony is that its militants are drawn from the most globalised generation yet seen. In power, centre-left governments inherit obligations and limitations not of their making. Their conversion to orthodox liberal economics limits their ambitions. They are anxious to prove that they can run prudent economies and efficient states. The idealism that was at their core becomes mired in the necessary compromises and evasions of office. These governments have also brought in measures to alleviate poverty, strengthen civil society, boost public spending and increase foreign aid budgets. But these are not the stuff of which youthful - or even ageing - ideals are now made. The political response of the centre left has thus been muted, defensive, even apologetic. It can no longer be so. The terrorist acts of September 11 remind us that terrorism is also globalised - and efficiently so. The challenge of the anti-globalisation movement to social democrats is that of a stimulus. They prompt the centre left to engage in global politics. Some of the leaders have now sketched in a partial response. Gerhard Schroder, chancellor of Germany, did so last month, all but completing the transformation of Germany into a power able to deploy force outside its borders to protect minorities and stabilise states. Tony Blair, Britain's prime minister, did so at the Labour party conference last month, when he called for a world where "justice and prosperity for the poor and dispossessed" are possible. These are idealistic aims. The difference is that social democrats are in power, which brings with it both the ability to further these aims and the inhibitions that could hamper them. But the aims are at least a start. The centre left now has to develop a global vision of reform for existing institutions and the creation of new ones. It has to create a global governance able to promote justice and prosperity more effectively. For social democrats, such a task presents both a return to past ideals and a reason for future existence. The writer is author of The Protest Ethic: how the anti- globalisation movement challenges social democracy, published today by Demos, Elizabeth House, 39 York Road, London SE1 7NQ Full article at: http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT32JZ97NTC &live=true&useoverridetemplate=FTD1OUN2DNC&tagid=FTDNE3BOBNC Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Mon Nov 5 12:47:35 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Mon, 05 Nov 2001 19:47:35 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Europe/US rivalry? In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011105193202.00a89720@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 05/11/2001 14:56, you wrote: >Love the idea of Blair issuing a "summons" to other European leaders. >Britain rules the waverers, once again. > >===== I happened to notice Dutch prime minister Wim Kock (I think I have that right) emerge from the meeting. His relieved smile was plain to see. I conclude from this that actually there will be no war in Afghanistan, not one that anyone but Afghanis need to worry about anyway. If Blair had announced serious impending hostilities, the good burghers of Amsterdam would be gathering their belongings, not grinning inanely. This means that there will be no war. Just a little more of the ongoing random thud and blunder, then a big meeting somewhere. True there is a lot of media hoo-hah about Donald 'Hammer of the Afghans' Rumsfeld's visitations in Asia. Rumsfeld looks like a click-eyed, heel-dragging creature from a scary movie, the kind that always is right behind you no matter how fast you run. His death's head looks like the template for an SS hat badge. His attempt to talk up the war seems phoney. It's hard to guess what Our Leaders are up to, but they are seem so dumb that we probably just lack the imagination to comprehend them. I can't really believe that they plan to send half a million GI's to 'Stan and what's more to base their logistics in places like Dushanbe. I've been there. Even the hardened citizens of Dushanbe have logistical problems you wouldn't dream of. Like, I guess, the entire Taleban leadership, my fingers are crossed hoping that the Bushies really are this dumb, but they surely can't be. Can they? They aren't really going to fight a major war in 'Stan? Nah, can't be. Nemesis postponed, eh? Shame. I've grown to like the Talebanchiki. Mark From tomzbox at hotmail.com Mon Nov 5 22:10:23 2001 From: tomzbox at hotmail.com (Tom Warren) Date: Mon, 05 Nov 2001 22:10:23 Subject: [A-List] Europe/US rivalry? Message-ID: Writes Mark: >True there is a lot of media hoo-hah about Donald 'Hammer of the >Afghans' Rumsfeld's visitations in Asia. Rumsfeld looks like a click-eyed, >heel-dragging creature from a scary movie, the kind that always is right >behind you no matter how fast you run. His death's head looks like the >template for an SS hat badge. His attempt to talk up the war seems phoney. Mark, and list: My West Coast friends and I are having a small apoplectic stroke about the failure of US media to report a crucial incident ... Here is the source (I hope this link works) http://www.portal.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2001/11/03/wraid103.xml&sSheet=/news/2001/11/03/ixhome.html anyway, here's the rub: Every article that we've accessed or read on U.S. websites tell us that it was only the weather that hampered landing special forces. Yet, the UK's Telegraph is quoting Rumsfeld as saying "...the ground fire was simply too heavy..." Maybe we've missed something -and if you've seen this reported in the U.S., we'd like to know about it- but this is looking like more blatant propagandizing by our so-called 'free press'. I am under the impression that the Telegraph is a reliable source, but I am not THAT familiar with brit media. It's hard to know where to lob my next grenade without adequate forward observers .... TIA Tom _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp From tomzbox at hotmail.com Mon Nov 5 22:14:20 2001 From: tomzbox at hotmail.com (Tom Warren) Date: Mon, 05 Nov 2001 22:14:20 Subject: [A-List] War on Eco-Terrorism begins? Message-ID: Without comment: The following text appears at http://www.greenparty.org/bangor.txt: GREEN PARTY USA COORDINATOR DETAINED AT AIRPORT PREVENTED BY ARMED MILITARY FROM FLYING TO GREENS MEETING IN CHICAGO Armed government agents grabbed Nancy Oden, Green Party USA coordinating committee member, Thursday at Bangor International Airport in Bangor Maine, as she attempted to board an American Airlines flight to Chicago. "An official told me that my name had been flagged in the computer," a shaken Oden said. "I was targeted because the Green Party USA opposes the bombing of innocent civilians in Afghanistan." Oden, a long-time organic farmer and peace activist in northern Maine, was ordered away from the plane. Military personnel with automatic weapons surrounded Oden and instructed all airlines to deny her passage on ANY flight. "I was told that the airport was closed to me until further notice and that my ticket would not be refunded," Oden said. Oden is scheduled to speak in Chicago Friday night on a panel concerning pesticides as weapons of war. She had helped to coordinate the Green Party USA's antiwar efforts these past few months, and was to report on these to The Greens national committee. "Not only did they stop me at the airport but some mysterious party had called the hotel and cancelled my reservation," Oden said. The Greens National Committee -- the governing body of the Green Party USA -- is meeting in Chicago Nov. 2-4 to hammer out the details of national campaigns against bio-chemical warfare, the spraying of toxic pesticides, genetic engineering, and the Party's involvement in the burgeoning peace movement. "I am shocked that US military prevented one of our prominent Green Party members from attending the meeting in Chicago," said Elizabeth Fattah, a GPUSA representative from Pennsylvania who drove to Chicago. "I am outraged at the way the Bill of Rights is being trampled upon." Chicago Green activist Lionel Trepanier concluded, "The attack on the right of association of an opposition political party is chilling. The harassment of peace activists is reprehensible." For further information, please call 1-866-GREENS-2 (toll-free) _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Tue Nov 6 02:16:06 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2001 11:16:06 +0200 Subject: [A-List] UK intelligence made simple Message-ID: For modern spies, the Great Game is over By Alan Judd Daily Telegraph, 29 October 2001 WE shall hear much about the role of intelligence in the current Afghan war, and in the wider "war against terrorism" to follow. But what is intelligence, what can we expect of it, what are its limits, is it prescriptive or descriptive, or both? Intelligence is information obtained covertly from people who do not wish you to have it. It is usually gathered by intercepted communications, by secret agents, by aerial or satellite reconnaissance or by direct visual reconnaissance. In Afghanistan, secret agent reporting would be the responsibility of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6), interception that of GCHQ, and the rest that of the military, although there are nearly always overlaps. Visual reconnaissance is likely to be particularly important during the Afghan campaign, less important later. Intelligence is not more significant than overt information simply because it is covertly obtained. It should be assessed along with all other information on the target subject, covert and overt, and the assessors should ideally not be the people who produce it, since it is hard for them to be objective about their own product. In Britain, the mechanism for doing this is overseen by the Cabinet Office assessments staff and by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which tasks the intelligence agencies. Whitehall departments decide what intelligence they want and the JIC prioritises; if no one asks for intelligence on a particular subject, or if it is given low priority, the agencies don't waste time and money seeking it. Thus, some alleged intelligence failures, such as the Falklands, are part of wider policy failures. The agencies fail if Whitehall gives priority to a subject and they fail to produce on it. Even when accurate and complete, intelligence is not an automatic pass-card to everything. Circumstances may change, a terrorist cell may disobey its orders, a dictator change his mind overnight. Intelligence cannot, for example, tell you what is in Osama bin Laden's mind unless he truthfully communicates it to someone - and that assumes he knows himself. But, to take hypothetical examples, it can tell you that he depends on three individuals for his contact with the outside world, that his sole remaining source of funds is an international charity, that he has a medical condition for which he needs drugs, that he has re-established contact with his network in Greece and asked them to recruit a nuclear physicist. Predictive conclusions may be drawn from intelligence but individual reports are usually best presented as descriptive: "X assembled his forces on 23rd, and on the 24th told them he intended to attack on the 25th." Who said what to whom, where, when and who else was there are what policymakers most want to know. Intelligence may be important and true but useless. Learning that you are about to be attacked by overwhelming force might be of consuming interest, but if you can't do anything about it it is ultimately valueless. Or it may be true and timely but so unwelcome that intelligence customers can't bring themselves to accept it. This happened with early 1930s MI6 reports on German U-boat construction and with Churchill's intelligence-derived warnings to Stalin (along with those of Stalin's own agents) of Nazi invasion plans. Although all kinds of intelligence will contribute in Afghanistan and thereafter, agent reporting - sometimes called "humint" - is particularly important when you are attacking small groups. Typically, humint relies on agent penetration of the target. Either you recruit an existing member, which means you have first to identify, then get physical access to him, then persuade him to spy for you - and what would induce a highly motivated suicide bomber to do that? Or you have to recruit someone and insert him into the group, if you can find an agent with the very particular background, motivation and abilities to make him attractive to them while remaining loyal to you, daily risking torture and death on your behalf. Or you need staff with the right sort of background, skills and courage to go under "natural cover" - assuming a false identity and living as someone else - to get close to the group. Or you recruit someone who is not actually a member but a provider of facilities, such as money, accommodation, equipment or passports. In the days of European terrorist movements, one European service found its most effective agent was a babysitter - she knew times, dates, durations and sometimes approximate destinations. Even assuming you achieve this, you need secret and effective communications that work when your agent is supposedly incommunicado, usually the most vital time. With determination, luck and imagination, these formidable obstacles can be overcome. Osama bin Laden and his group are a hard target but not unique - the Thuggees in 19th-century India must have seemed equally impenetrable at first to those who eventually destroyed them. However, there are also cultural and legal hurdles. Terrorists are often involved in wider criminality (the IRA and Colombian drugs cartels, for example, or the Taliban and heroin). In order to penetrate them you have to deal with people who might be subject to arrest on British territory. They might tell you things you'd rather not know but it's no good withdrawing from the relationship simply because it makes you or your organisation complicit. This may require changes in law or procedure in this country; it certainly will in America, where the CIA and FBI were discouraged from recruiting terrorists under human rights regulations enacted under President Clinton. US intelligence officers could be sued for recruiting someone who subsequently did something "inappropriate" or whose behaviour involved "human rights violations". The question of assassinations was recently highlighted by President Bush's apparent revoking of the ban on US-inspired assassination. MI6 does not commit assassination in peacetime. But what about wartime - and is this war or not? The present unsatisfactory position seems to be that it would be all right for our soldiers or cruise missiles to kill bin Laden by accident or in self-defence, but probably not by shooting him at his campfire. It would probably also be against the law for an MI6 officer overseas to conspire with his agent to assassinate bin Laden. If such a plot came to light, could bin Laden - in view of our incorporation of human rights law - have a case against the British Government? This issue needs clearer moral thought and political leadership than as yet have been given it. A more predictable change is that the intelligence agencies will expand; GCHQ will need more linguists and there have recently been informed press reports that MI6 is seeking more staff. It is apparently looking for Civil Service fast-stream equivalents - able, honest, imaginative men and women in their twenties or early thirties. But beware: these campaigns will be methodical rather than romantic affairs, and for only very few will there be echoes of the 19th-century Great Game. The man who coined that phrase, Captain Arthur Connolly, was beheaded in Bokhara on a rescue mission after grisly confinement. For the sake of those we want to help us, we must ensure that our secrets stay secret. Alan Judd is author of The Quest for C, the biography of the founder of MI6 Full article at http://www.dailytelegraph.co.uk/01/10/29/do01.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Tue Nov 6 02:27:10 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2001 11:27:10 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Fleet Street's finest Message-ID: Tom Warren writes: I am under the impression that the Telegraph is a reliable source, but I am not THAT familiar with brit media. ===== Hmmm. In an earlier post I cross-sectioned the UK press into categories such as highbrow rightwing crap, middlebrow centrist crap, lowbrow, etc. While the Guardian dons the mantle of highbrow centre leftism, the Telegraph is the paper of choice for the cultured punk Thatcherites, that dwindling remnant of the once hegemonic element of the British state that cannot reconcile itself to the loss of empire, full UK participation in Europe, immigration, multiculturalism, etc. While this is very congenial, politically speaking, for its proprietor, Conrad Black, I suspect that it is also very handy for the new dominant tendency within the British state, which is using the Telegraph to accomplish a goal analogous to that accomplished by the Guardian in the mid to late 1970s/early 80s, which was to bash the Labour Party from the left (quite a feat, all things considered). The Telegraph has been pulling the Conservative Party rightward, consistently supporting its new non-entity leader, Iain Duncan Smith, against the much more accomplished and substantial figure of Kenneth Clarke, whose europhilia is anathema to the Telegraph's (and Black's) studiously observed pro-US stance. Black, remember, penned a piece in his National Interest quarterly that suggested that Britain should leave the EU and join NAFTA. Some within the Conservative Party have actually taken this seriously. However, interfering proprietor that he is, Black is not the only one to call the shots at the Telegraph. I've also forwarded a Private Eye snippet that mentions the sighting of Telegraph editor Charles Moore leaving the headquarters of MI5, presumably after lunch. The Telegraph's central Asian correspondent, Ahmed Rashid, is widely respected and his book on the Taliban is garnering praise from a wide spectrum of opinion. He seems to be a good journalist with a keen objectively analytical eye. However, another article I've forwarded from Private Eye suggests that Rashid's expertise is being pushed aside in favour of the musings of Mrs Black, Barbara Amiel, not previously noted for her expertise on geopolitics. As befits a paper with a strongly establishment lineage, there is a robust tradition of military/defence reporting, although it has to be said that the stuff penned by chief defence correspondent, the military historian Sir John Keegan reflects as much of the old sins of racism and imperial arrogance as it does strategic acumen. In this war of civilisations, the West will prevail By John Keegan Daily Telegraph, 8 October 2001 PRESIDENT BUSH'S threatened war against terrorism has begun. What is so striking at the outset is the brief lapse of time between its declaration and its outbreak. The Gulf War, also led by the United States, took six months to prepare. This war, declared on September 11, the day of the atrocities, is in full swing only 27 days later. All the same stages have been gone through - organisation of an alliance, diplomatic preparation, positioning of forces. The first blow has been struck in one-sixth of the time. Striking quickly, as well as hard, may be a quality of this war deliberately chosen, and with good reason. A harsh, instantaneous attack may be the response most likely to impress the Islamic mind. Surprise has traditionally been a favoured Islamic military method. The use of overwhelming force is, however, alien to the Islamic military tradition. The combination of the two is certainly designed to unsettle America's current enemy and probably will. Samuel Huntington, the Harvard political scientist, outlined in a famous article written in the aftermath of the Cold War his vision of the next stage hostilities would take. Rejecting the vision of a New World Order, proposed by President Bush senior, he insisted that mankind had not rid itself of the incubus of violence, but argued that it would take the form of conflict between cultures, in particularly between the liberal, secular culture of the West and the religious culture of Islam. Huntington's "clash of civilisations" was widely discussed, though it was not taken seriously by some. Since September 11 it has been taken very seriously indeed. If I thought Huntington's view had a defect, it was that he did not discuss what I think the crucial ingredient of any Western-Islamic conflict, their quite distinctively different ways of making war. Westerners fight face to face, in stand-up battle, and go on until one side or the other gives in. They choose the crudest weapons available, and use them with appalling violence, but observe what, to non-Westerners may well seem curious rules of honour. Orientals, by contrast, shrink from pitched battle, which they often deride as a sort of game, preferring ambush, surprise, treachery and deceit as the best way to overcome an enemy. This is not to stereotype Afghans, Arabs, Chechens or any other Islamic nationality traditionally hostile to the West as devious or underhand, nor is it to stereotype Islam in its military manifestation. The difference in styles of warfare is borne out by the fact of military history. Western warfare had its origins in the conflicts of the citizens of the Greek city states who fought to defend the strictly defined borders of their small political units. Beyond their world the significant military powers, however, were nomads, whose chosen method was the raid and the surprise attack. Once they acquired a superior means of mobility, in the riding horse, they developed a style of warfare which settled people found almost impossible to resist. The Arabs were horse-riding raiders before Mohammed. His religion, Islam, inspired the raiding Arabs to become conquerors of terrifying power, able to overthrow the ancient empires both of Byzantium and Persia and to take possession of huge areas of Asia, Africa and Europe. It was only very gradually that the historic settled people, the Chinese, the Western Europeans, learnt the military methods necessary to overcome the nomads. They were the methods of the Greeks, above all drill and discipline. The last exponents of nomadic warfare, the Turks, were not turned back from the frontiers of Europe until the 17th century. Thereafter the advance of Western military power went unchecked. One Islamic state after another went down to defeat, until in 1918 the last and greatest, the Ottoman empire, was overthrown. After 1918 the military power of the Western world stood apparently unchallengeable. The Oriental tradition, however, had not been eliminated. It reappeared in a variety of guises, particularly in the tactics of evasion and retreat practised by the Vietcong against the United States in the Vietnam war. On September 11, 2001 it returned in an absolutely traditional form. Arabs, appearing suddenly out of empty space like their desert raider ancestors, assaulted the heartlands of Western power, in a terrifying surprise raid and did appalling damage. President Bush in his speech to his nation and to the Western world yesterday, promised a traditional Western response. He warned that there would be "a relentless accumulation of success". Relentlessness, as opposed to surprise and sensation, is the Western way of warfare. It is deeply injurious to the Oriental style and rhetoric of war-making. Oriental war-makers, today terrorists, expect ambushes and raids to destabilise their opponents, allowing them to win further victories by horrifying outrages at a later stage. Westerners have learned, by harsh experience, that the proper response is not to take fright but to marshal their forces, to launch massive retaliation and to persist relentlessly until the raiders have either been eliminated or so cowed by the violence inflicted that they relapse into inactivity. News of the first strikes against Afghanistan indicate that a tested Western response to Islamic aggression is now well under way. It is not a crusade. The crusades were an episode localised in time and place, in the religious contest between Christianity and Islam. This war belongs within the much larger spectrum of a far older conflict between settled, creative productive Westerners and predatory, destructive Orientals. It is no good pretending that the peoples of the desert and the empty spaces exist on the same level of civilisation as those who farm and manufacture. They do not. Their attitude to the West has always been that it is a world ripe for the picking. When the West turned nasty, and fought back, with better weapons and superior tactics and strategy, the East did not seek to emulate it but to express its anger in new forms of the raid and surprise attack. September 11 was a declaration of war. October 7 was the declaration of a counter-offensive. The counter-offensive will prevail. Sir John Keegan is Defence Editor Full article at: http://www.dailytelegraph.co.uk/01/10/8/do01.html Of course there may also be, from time to time, shadenfreude at US errors, the implication being that "we British" would never make such silly mistakes. But times have moved on, and the Telegraph's position is an anachronism, one that serves the present hegemons very well in marginalising and potentially destroying what has been the main political opposition to New Labour in Britain. The Liberal Democrats are lining up to become HM Official Opposition, and the next general election will decide whether or not that goal is achieved. Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Tue Nov 6 02:40:05 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2001 11:40:05 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Europe/US rivalry Message-ID: Ulrich Beck is a sociologist whose major work has been to theorise what he calls the "risk society" (see various books published by Sage). Interesting to see that he has an appointment at LSE, where the likeminded Anthony Giddens holds court. That Beck is publishing this in the FT is interesting, especially the day after John Lloyd's distillation of his Demos-published tract on the third way approach to the current situation (http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/a-list/2001-November/003363.html). Globalisation's Chernobyl September 11 exposed neoliberalism's shortcomings as a solution to the world's conflicts, argues Ulrich Beck Financial Times, Nov 06 2001 The terrorist attacks on America were the Chernobyl of globalisation. Just as the Russian disaster undermined our faith in nuclear energy, so September 11 exposed the false promise of neoliberalism. The suicide bombers not only exposed the vulnerability of western civilisation but also gave a taste of the conflicts that globalisation can bring. Suddenly, the seemingly irrefutable tenets of neoliberalism - that economics will supercede politics, that the role of the state will diminish - lose their force in a world of global risks. The privatisation of aviation security in the US provides just one example, albeit a highly symbolic one. America's vulnerability is indeed very much related to its political philosophy. It was long suspected that the US was a possible target of terrorist attacks. But, unlike in Europe, aviation security was privatised and entrusted to highly flexible part-time workers who are paid even less than employees in fast-food restaurants. It is America's self-image that creates its vulnerability. The horrible pictures of New York contain an as yet un-decoded message: a state can neoliberalise itself to death. Neoliberalism has always been a fair-weather philosophy, one that works only when there are no serious conflicts and crises. It asserts that only globalised markets, freed from regulation and bureaucracy, can remedy the world's ills - unemployment, poverty, economic breakdown and the rest. Today, the capitalist fundamentalists' unswerving faith in the redeeming power of the market has proved to be a dangerous illusion. In times of crises, neoliberalism has no solutions to offer. Fundamental truths that were pushed aside return to the fore. Without taxation, there can be no state. Without a public sphere, democracy and civil society, there can be no legitimacy. And without legitimacy, no security. From this, it follows that without legitimate forums for settling national and global conflicts, there will be no world economy in any form whatsoever. Neoliberalism insisted that economics should break free of national models and instead impose transnational rules of business conduct. But, at the same time, it assumed that government would stick to national boundaries and the old way of doing things. Since September 11, governments have rediscovered the possibilities and power of international co-operation - for example, in maintaining internal security. Suddenly the necessity of statehood, the counter-principle of neoliberalism, is omnipresent. A European arrest warrant that supersedes national sovereignty in judicial and legal enforcement - unthinkable until recently - has become a possibility. We may soon see a similar convergence towards shared rules and frameworks in economics. In this sense, terrorism has achieved the exact opposite of what it intended: it has brought forth an era of globalised government, the cross-border invention of politics through networking and co-operation. It turns out that resistance merely accelerates globalisation's development. Here, then, is the central paradox: globalisation is the name given to a strange process that is driven forward both by those who support it and by those who oppose it. Just think of the precision with which the terrorists choreographed their attacks on New York and Washington, knowing that their deeds would be transmitted live around the world by global media networks. Does this mean that globalisation itself is the root cause of terrorism? Was September 11 an understandable reaction to a steamroller that is going to destroy even the most remote corners of the world? No. No abstract idea, no God, can justify or excuse the attacks. Globalisation is an ambiguous process but one that cannot be rolled back. Smaller and weaker states in particular are turning away from autarky in an effort to catch up with world markets. But we need to combine economic integration with cosmopolitan politics. Human dignity, cultural identity and otherness must be taken more seriously in the future. Since September 11, the gulf between the world of those who profit from globalisation and the world of those who feel threatened by it has been closed. Helping those who have been excluded is no longer a humanitarian task. It is in the west's own interest: the key to its security. To turn back the hatred felt by billions of people, the wells that will always nourish Osama bin Ladens, globalisation must become accountable and its fruits and freedoms must be distributed more fairly. The danger is that the exact opposite will happen: that the imagined risks and false promises of security will instead create a spiral of expectations that can only end in disappointment. There is a risk that transnational co-operation will become a means of creating fortresses, states in which both the freedom of democracy and the freedom of markets are sacrificed on the altar of private security. The author is professor of sociology at the university of Munich and at the London School of Economics Full article at: http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT3U5G8OOTC &live=true Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Tue Nov 6 02:42:08 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2001 11:42:08 +0200 Subject: [A-List] North Sea oil and gas Message-ID: UK seeks Norway gas links to ease concerns Financial Times, Nov 2, 2001 By DAVID BUCHAN Britain and Norway are to study proposedpipeline connections to bring Norwegian gas into the increasingly import-dependent UK market and ease concerns about relying on more distant supplies. The North Sea oil and gas fields should be "seen as one area rather than two divided by a border", said Brian Wilson, the energy minister, as he and Einar Steensnaes, his Norwegian counterpart, announced the creation of a joint working group. It will consist of government and industry representatives of the Pilot group set up to extend the life of the UK North Sea oil sector, and of Topplederforum, its Norwegian counterpart. "There is scope for more interconnections to give Norway access to our liberalised market and to meet our demands," Mr Wilson told a Norwegian oil and gas conference organised by the CWC group in London. Britain and Norway boosted offshore co-operation earlier this year by agreeing on the Vesterled pipeline to link Norway's Heimdal gas processing facility to the Frigg pipeline, which links the dwindling Frigg field to Britain. Mr Wilson is chairing the government's energy review, which is partly motivated by the fact that Britain is sliding into import dependence for gas. The government would prefer to take gas from its neighbouring ally rather than more distant and possibly volatile Russia. Mr Wilson pointed out that "carriage of Norwegian gas also prolongs the life of UK pipelines", which in turn remained available to help squeeze more out of the British sector. The UK developed its part of the North Sea earlier and faster than Norway, which has husbanded its resources. Full article at: http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.html?print=true&id=01 1102001078 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Tue Nov 6 02:46:25 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2001 11:46:25 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Energy crisis Message-ID: BUSINESS & THE ENVIRONMENT 3: Machines run on hydrogen an option for the long haul: CARBON-FREE EMISSIONS by Matthew Jones: The replacement of hydrocarbons as an energy source will not occur overnight Financial Times, Nov 5, 2001 By MATTHEW JONES Since primitive man discovered how to use and control fire from lightning strikes the world has been largely reliant on energy sources that produce carbon dioxide, the main gas blamed for global warming. Reversing this trend of more than a million years will be a challenge of incredible proportions. In the medium term it is accepted that reductions in carbon dioxide emissions will be mainly achieved by making current fossil fuel technology more efficient, through carbon trading schemes and greater energy conservation. However, a growing number of ambitious projects to demonstrate the viability of a "zero carbon" economy are also beginning to gather momentum. Earlier this month Cambridge University said it would be the first in Britain to pioneer a carbon-free public transport scheme after winning financial backing in principle from the European Commission. The project, linking the centre of the city to the university's new science campus on the western outskirts, will use solar energy to convert water into hydrogen, which will then be used to power a specially designed bus. The only emissions will be harmless water vapour, oxygen and heat. A similar scheme is being developed in partnership with the municipality of Gotland, a Swedish island in the Baltic Sea. Carbon-free mini buses are planned to start operating in Visby, a World Heritage city, one month after Cambridge's hydrogen bus hits the roads in late 2003. Solar power for the Cambridge project will be provided by a 350m long colonnade covered with photovoltaic cells. The electricity produced will be used to extract hydrogen from water using a process of electrolysis. Up to 10 days supply of the gas will then be stored in a tank half the size of a shipping container and converted back to electricity when needed by a fuel cell inside the bus. Whitby Bird and Partners, the designer of both the Cambridge and Gotland projects, admits that the Cambridge scheme will be about seven times more expensive than a traditional bus service. However, it points out that the price could be reduced over time if solar cells were incorporated into buildings, as will be the case in Gotland, and if production of solar and fuel cells increased. Shane Slater, project manager for the scheme, believes the technology's full potential lies beyond transport to include static energy requirements for homes, offices, factories and hospitals. "Instead of being a drain on energy, buildings could generate their own electricity supplies as well as providing fuel for transport uses," he says. Other hydrogen enthusiasts are pursuing different ways of producing the fuel from renewable means. Projects under development include plans by Iceland to use its abundant geothermal resources. The island aims to become the world's first carbon-free economy and is examining plans to run public transport, private vehicles and fishing vessels on hydrogen. A consortium of Statkraft of Norway, Sydkraft of Sweden and ABB of Switzerland has also agreed to build a hydrogen plant driven by wind power next year, and similar proposals for static energy needs are being explored by Nunavut, the northern Canadian territory. David Hart, head of hydrogen research at Imperial College's centre for energy policy and technology in London, believes remote economies which do not have an indigenous supply of oil may be able to make the switch to a carbon-free economy in as little as five or 10 years time. "Hydrogen is a much more flexible way of storing electricity than other systems such as batteries, flywheels and supercapacitors and could be cheaper than transporting oil to remote locations. "This technology is ideal for places such as the Mediterranean islands where a clean environment is an important issue for tourism and the costs of importing petroleum products are high," he says. For the rest of the world the transition will take much longer. Michael Jones, hydrogen technology manager at BP, the world's largest solar cell manufacturer as well as a top three oil and gas producer, says the costs of renewable energy in less remote areas will remain uncompetitive for decades, despite increasing financial incentives for countries to adopt green energy schemes. In the meantime, hydrogen energy systems will evolve, but the hydrogen will be produced by reforming fossil fuels either in large scale plants or using mini-reformers built into vehicles. This will achieve only partial carbon savings, but will be a marginal improvement on the most fuel efficient combustion engines today and will pave the way for a truly zero-carbon economy. Oil companies have been accused by environmental campaigners of having a vested interest in keeping the world dependent on fossil fuels for as long as possible. However, Mr Jones points out that BP and others are investigating ways of capturing the carbon released in reforming oil and gas. By injecting it into depleted oil and gas fields they can effectively achieve zero carbon emissions at a more viable price. "There is no sense building higher barriers than necessary to getting the hydrogen economy off the ground. We will see towards the end of the decade more introduction of fuel cells into vehicles and buildings but for at least the next 25 years hydrocarbons will continue to be the main source of primary energy," he says. Full article at: http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.html?print=true&id=01 1105001271 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Tue Nov 6 02:59:03 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2001 11:59:03 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Britain/US split Message-ID: For a good indication of what passes for thought in the corridors of the British state, Guardian reportage and commentary is usually sufficient. This article follows on from Seymour Hersh's New Yorker article, putting rather a different gloss on US military adventures than you might hear from Rumsfeld. Revealed: how bungled US raid came close to disaster ?Delta Force caught in ferocious Taliban ambush ?Debacle prompted review of war tactics Luke Harding in Quetta Julian Borger in Washington and Richard Norton-Taylor Tuesday November 6, 2001 The Guardian The Pentagon's only publicly announced commando raid on Taliban positions, hailed as a success and beamed around the world in grainy video pictures only hours after it took place, actually went badly wrong, seriously injuring American soldiers, sources in Pakistan said yesterday. The debacle, which saw US Delta Force soldiers come under intense fire from the Taliban, prompted a review of special forces operations in Afghanistan and seems to have led to a delay in similar behind-the-lines operations. The ferocity of the Taliban resistance caught US commandos unawares and showed that 13 days of bombing had failed to break the Taliban's organisational morale. It has sparked a debate in the Pentagon on the advisability of such daring missions in the absence of clear intelligence. Soon after the October 20 raid, the US appeared to switch its military strategy, throwing its weight fully behind the Northern Alliance, relying on the opposition movement to provide ground troops for the campaign. The day after the raid the Pentagon hailed the operation a success, which proved that US forces could strike anywhere at any time and in a manner of their choosing. However, details provided to the Guardian by sources in Pakistan and the US, together with American press reports, have present quite a different picture. ? A raid led by Delta Force commandos on a Kandahar compound of the Taliban's leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, ran into heavy resistance, causing serious casualties and forcing a retreat. One US soldier's foot was blown off. ? A simultaneous raid by army rangers on a Kandahar airstrip was carried out only after forward troops had checked that the area was clear. It was mainly for the benefit of the cameras, and to boost the rangers' morale. ? The fierce Taliban response to the Delta Force raid led to a review of similar planned operations, and led to questioning of the leadership of the war's US commander, General Tommy Franks. According to an authoritative and independent source in constant touch with Kandahar, Delta Force commandos, the most secretive and elite in the US army, searched Mullah Omar's compound but found it had been stripped of anything that might provide useful intelligence. As they emerged they came under intense fire, forcing them to retreat. The Taliban later retrieved "an American foot" from the scene, still in its boot. "There was a lot of blood," the source said. "The Taliban had expected an attack and had taken everything of value out of the compound. They were ready and waiting. They were only too delighted when the Americans arrived. It was not as if Mullah Omar was going to leave a note inside saying: 'Osama is hiding here'." During the raid one of the Chinook helicopters was badly damaged. The Taliban later showed off a section of its landing gear and said they had shot the helicopter down. The account provided to the Guardian was consistent with an article published yesterday in the New Yorker magazine. The author, Seymour Hersh, said that 12 Delta commandos were wounded, three of them seriously. He quoted a US military officer as saying that the Delta assault found itself in "a tactical firefight and the Taliban had the advantage." The commandos were forced to retreat to waiting helicopters and abandon one of the objectives of the raid - the insertion of an undercover team into the area, the New Yorker article said. Delta Force is a primarily anti-terrorist unit based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its very existence is never formally discussed, nor are casualties. They are trained to attack with stealth in small teams, but the Kandahar raid was an extensive, noisy production, involving a back-up force of 200 rangers, AC-130 gunships and a 100 Delta Force commandos. At the same time, a company of rangers parachuted on to a Kandahar airfield in an operation portrayed the next day in dramatic television footage. But in his article, Mr Hersh said that before the drop, an army pathfinder team had checked that the airfield was free of Taliban forces. The raid was for the benefit of the cameras and to give young rangers with no combat experience some much needed confidence. The last joint rangers-Delta Force operation, in Somalia in 1993, ended in disaster with the shooting down of two helicopters and the deaths of 18 American soldiers. On October 20, the speed and intensity of the Taliban response at Mullah Omar's compound "scared the crap out of everyone", a senior officer told the New Yorker, which reported that the setback had triggered an inquiry into how such commando raids were planned and executed by Central Command. Since military operations against the Taliban began on October 7, there has been grumbling among the Penta gon's civilian leadership that Gen Franks, an artillery officer, is too hidebound and too steeped in US military doctrine and its reliance on overwhelming firepower, to lead a special forces campaign requiring guile and stealth. Some senior officials want special forces operations to be run directly from the Pentagon. Gen Franks and the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, General Richard Myers, both denied that the Taliban had inflicted casualties on US forces. Gen Franks, who is based in Tampa, Florida, said there were injuries during the operation, but that "we had no one wounded by enemy fire." The failure of the October 20 raid prompted senior British officers, to emphasise the importance of good intelligence. They made it clear they did not yet have it, and the postmortem following the raid has delayed repeat operations. "We need proper, joined-up, serious operations," a British defence source said. However, with better intelligence, further raids by small groups of special forces are now on the cards once more, almost certainly involving British special forces. British military planners also advised the US that a better option would be to set up a forward operating base inside Afghanistan. But that, they said, would have to wait. "The US will have to bomb their way into that position," a British defence source said. Meanwhile, the US strategy is now to focus firepower on assisting the Northern Alliance and other opposition groups to make advances against the Taliban. The Northern Alliance is said to be poised for major offensives on the capital Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif after carpet-bombing by US B-52's have pummelled the Taliban lines. Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,1361,588580,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Tue Nov 6 04:16:22 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2001 13:16:22 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Courage under fire Message-ID: Almost alone among the Blair intake of Labour MPs, Paul Marsden has emerged as a strong opponent of the bombing in Afghanistan, and is now undertaking a personal fact-finding mission to Pakistan to see things for himself. Having had a career as a quality assurance manager, New Labour no doubt thought they were getting their usual lobby fodder when he was selected. But he's emerged as a somewhat principled (and naive) defender of the virtues of parliamentary democracy, and appears to be sincere in his disgust at the cynical manipulation of the constitutional pretences that mask the elective dictatorship that the UK political system really is. He seems genuinely shocked about it (better late than never). There is no question that he and his family will be subjected to all kinds of petty harrassments and abuses -- some, perhaps, even not so petty. I think British residents should consider writing him a letter of support c/o House of Commons. MP accuses West of 'antagonising' the Muslim world By Marie Woolf Chief Political Correpondent The Independent, 06 November 2001 The rebel Labour MP Paul Marsden, who was compared to an appeaser of Hitler for opposing the war in Afghanistan, yesterday accused the West of "antagonising" people in the Muslim world at the start of a Pakistan fact-finding mission. On the first leg of a trip to gauge the humanitarian situation on the ground, the MP for Shrewsbury and Atcham said the West had "a total lack of understanding of the Muslim way of life in the region". He said he hoped his presence would "embarrass the British and American governments into doing something" to help the refugees, and renewed his criticism of the West's attitude to the Muslim world. "You can't erase 1,000 years of Islamic history with a sound bite," he said. Mr Marsden said he had been given a "very warm welcome" from the Pakistani people. In his first day in the country he had found mixed reactions to the bombing of Afghanistan on the ground. "There is a lot of sympathy about the attacks on 11 September but people think that there is a total lack of understanding in the West of the Muslim way of life in the region," he said. Mr Marsden was embroiled in a row with the Labour whips' office after he claimed the Chief Whip, Hilary Armstrong, had compared him to the 1930s appeasers of Hitler in a dressing down to try to stop him speaking out over the war. He joined the Father of the House, Tam Dalyell, in voting against the war in the Commons last week. Speaking to BBC1's Breakfast News from Islamabad in Pakistan yesterday, he said: "Time is running out for the innocent civilians who are starving to death. They have no interest in the conflict and they are having to pay the terrible price. It's about time we find out what the truth is." He now plans to meet Pakistani government representatives. Full article at: http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=103394 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 7 01:35:10 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2001 10:35:10 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Geostrategic imperatives Message-ID: November 5, 2001, New York Times The Turkey Card By WILLIAM SAFIRE Reached by cell phone in purgatory, where he is expiating his sin of imposing wage and price controls, Richard Nixon agreed to an interview with his former speechwriter. Q: How do you think the war in Afghanistan is going? Nixon: You call that a war? Light bombing of a bunch of crazies with beards, based on a policy of Afghanization before you even get started? That's strictly reactive and purely tactical. Q: Would you send in a couple of divisions of American ground troops? Nixon: No. The Bush people are employing the right tactics in their "phase I" - suppressing terrorist operations, helping the opposition make trouble, playing for breaks with payoffs and assassinations. What they fail to see is the global picture. They need to develop a grand strategy. Q: Which is - Nixon: Know your real enemy. It's not just bin Laden and his terrorist cells. It's the movement threatening to take over the Islamic world. Those beards and their even more dangerous state sponsors want the Saudi and Kuwaiti oil. That would give them the money to build or buy the nuclear and germ weapons to eliminate the reasonable Muslims and all the Christian and Jewish infidels. Q: How would you stop them? Nixon: Split 'em, the way we split the Communist monolith by playing the China card against the Soviets. Your generation's card is Turkey, the secular Muslim nation with the strongest army. Q: The Turks have already volunteered a hundred commandos - you mean we should ask for more? Nixon: Get out of that celebrity- terrorist Afghan mindset. With the world dazed and everything in flux, seize the moment. I'd make a deal with Ankara right now to move across Turkey's border and annex the northern third of Iraq. Most of it is in Kurdish hands already, in our no-flight zone - but the land to make part of Turkey is the oil field around Kirkuk that produces nearly half of Saddam Hussein's oil. Q: Doesn't that mean war? Nixon: Quick war, justified by Saddam's threat of germs and nukes and terrorist connections. We'd provide air cover and U.N. Security Council support in return for the Turks' setting up a friendly government in Baghdad. The freed Iraqis would start pumping their southern oil like mad and help us bust up OPEC for good. Q: What's in it for the Turks? Nixon: First, big money - northern Iraq could be good for nearly two million barrels a day, and the European Union would fall all over itself welcoming in the Turks. Next, Turkey would solve its internal Kurd problem by making its slice of Iraq an autonomous region called Kurdistan. Q: But that would mean new borders, and don't Arab states worry about dismemberment? Nixon: Turks are Muslims but not Arabs. When Syria was the base for terrorist operations against Turkey, the Turks massed troops on the border and Damascus caved, kicking the terrorist boss out of the country and he's now in a Turkish jail. And what's the big deal about new borders? Iraq was a 20th-century British concoction. Only 50 years ago, Israel became a state, and soon there'll be a Palestinian state. New times, new borders. Q: Speaking of Israel - Nixon: Let me say this about that. I'd tell Sharon to annex the Jordan valley, to protect Jordan, but then to hand over the rest of the West Bank or he's down the tubes. I know you disagree, Bill, but we're going for the grand strategic enchilada. Then I'd tell the Saudis and other rich Arabs to build good housing and plants in Palestine or accept a million Palestinian immigrants. With Iraq's threat neutralized and Iran coming around, the sheiks will ante up in a hurry. Q: But what about punishing bin Laden in Afghanistan - Nixon: Change the flow of money and power in the Middle East and bin Laden and his boys will fall into our hands like rotten fruit. Just use this crisis to reshuffle the deck and break out of the trap. Leapfrog "phase I" and there'll be no heavy allied casualties, no parades to stop the bombing, no Taliban, no germ scares. I have to go expiate now. Call me soon about Russia. How do you turn this damn new phone off? Copyright 2001 The New York Times Company | Privacy Information Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 7 01:40:27 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2001 10:40:27 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Europe/US rivalry Message-ID: This is an interesting development: interesting allegation, interesting publisher... Doubts on how Italy qualified to join euro Financial Times, Nov 5, 2001 By JAMES BLITZ, REBECCA BREAM and PETER NORMAN The government of a European Union country -understood to be Italy - used the derivatives market to camouflage the true size of its budget deficit so that it could be admitted to the European single currency, according to a report. The International Securities Market Association (Isma), the self-regulatory organisation, says in a report to be published today that it has uncovered evidence of a swaps contract in 1997 undertaken to manipulate government data. Isma raises concerns that the exploitation of loopholes in the accounting for derivatives may have been widespread when European countries were preparing for entry to the euro, launched in January 1999. The report says such abuses could still be going on, and Isma is pressing for greater transparency in the use of derivatives. The report, written by Dr Gustavo Piga and published by Isma and the Council on Foreign Relations, the independent US-based research group, does not explicitly name Italy, in order to protect the official who leaked the information. However, Dr Piga cites the case of a bond issue from 1995 upon which a currency swap contract was used in 1997 to reduce temporarily the size of the country's deficit to meet Maastricht criteria. The terms match exactly those of a Y200bn (Pounds 1.1bn) bond issued by Italy in 1995. Isma's report will lend weight to rumours that had circulated about the circumstances of Italy's entrance to the single European currency in 1999. Italy qualified to be a founder member of the euro against the expectations of most leading economists. In 1996, the country had a budget deficit that was 6.5 per cent of gross domestic product - more than double the level allowed under the Maastricht treaty. But by 1999, the year of the currency's launch, Italy had reduced the deficit to less than 2 per cent. Italy's new centre-right government is confident the situation is under control. The government now expects the deficit to end the year at about 1.1 per cent of GDP. Isma's report may also have serious implications for the investment banks that acted as counterparties in the swaps deals and did not disclose them. While the claims of the report may prove embarrassing to the Italian authorities, European monetary officials do not expect any significant repercussions. Full article at: http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.html?print=true&id=01 1105001220 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 7 01:42:46 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2001 10:42:46 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Energy crisis Message-ID: Another Wolf at the Door Kenneth S. Deffeyes Global oil production will probably reach a peak sometime during this decade. After the peak, the world's production of crude oil will fall, never to rise again. The world will not run out of energy, but developing alternative energy sources on a large scale will take at least 10 years. In the meantime, there will be chaos in the oil industry, in governments, and in national economies. What will happen to the rest of us? In a sense, the oil crises of the 1970s and 1980s were a laboratory test. We were the lab rats. You might remember it. Most Americans' real standard of living dropped progressively lower for several years. And those crises were far less severe than what's coming this time. Do you think I'm crying wolf? Admittedly, for the first half of the twentieth century oil forecasters did a lot of that. People who divided the then-known U.S. oil reserves by the annual rate of production would periodically start screaming that the nation's petroleum industry was going to die in 10 years. During each ensuing decade, more oil reserves would be added and the industry actually would grow instead of drying up. But in 1956, M. King Hubbert, a world-renowned geologist at the Shell Oil research lab in Houston, pioneered a different method of analysis and predicted that U.S. oil production would peak in the early 1970s. Hubbert's analysis divided those who follow these things into two warring camps. The controversy raged right up until 1970, when the U.S. production of crude oil started to fall. Hubbert was right. Around 1995 several analysts began applying Hubbert's method to worldwide oil production. Most of them estimate that the peak year for world oil will be between 2004 and 2008. These analyses were reported in some of the most widely circulated sources of scientific news: Nature, Science, and Scientific American. Yet none of our political leaders has yet paid any attention. Hubbert realized that, over time, the graph of annual oil production will follow a bell curve. For his first analysis, he found the curve that best fit the facts of past oil production and some well-educated guesses about the total output that will eventually be produced from conventional wells. Later, he discovered he could eliminate much of the guesswork. The production curve, he found, lags consistently behind the bell curve of cumulative oil discoveries (all the oil produced up to a given year plus the reported reserves for that year). In other words, the discovery curve is a predictor of eventual production. It was this trick that allowed Hubbert to see into the future. But reliable estimates of oil reserves are a vital ingredient in a Hubbert analysis, and this leads to the chief difficulty in using the method to predict the peak of world oil production: In the late 1980s, several OPEC nations reported huge, abrupt increases in their oil reserves. OPEC had recently changed its rules, assigning each member nation a share of the oil market based not just on the country's annual production capacity but also on its oil reserves. Most OPEC countries promptly hiked their reserve estimates. These increases were not necessarily fraudulent. "Reserves" exist in the eye of the beholder. Oil reserves are defined as future production, using existing technology, from wells that have already been drilled. (They should not be confused with the U.S. "strategic petroleum reserve," which is a storage facility for oil that has already been produced.) Typically, young petroleum engineers unconsciously tend to underestimate reserves. It's a lot more fun to go into the boss's office next year and announce that there is actually a little more oil than last year's estimate predicted. The abrupt increase in announced OPEC reserves in the late 1980s was likely a mixture of updating old underestimates and wishful thinking. The result is probably an overly optimistic view of future oil production. I've made corrections for OPEC optimism in my own Hubbert predictions; others have used different estimates. But our predictions are all in the same ballpark. It's a good guess that the best numbers were available to a firm in Geneva, Switzerland, called Petroconsultants, which until recently maintained a huge private database, to which the rest of us had no access. One long-standing rumor has it that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency was Petroconsultants' largest client. This much is known: The loudest warnings about the predicted peak of world oil production came from Petroconsultants. So who is listening? probably the OPEC oil ministers. Prices of crude oil have doubled in the past year. I suspect that the OPEC countries know that a global shortage may be only a few years away; and if they can trickle out just enough oil to keep the world economies functioning until that glorious day, they can market their remaining crude at mind-boggling prices. It is not clear, though, whether the major oil companies are facing up to the problem. Most of them display a business-as-usual facade. My limited attempts at spying turned up nothing useful. A company taking the 2004-2008 hypothesis seriously would be willing to pay top dollar for existing oil fields. There does not seem to be an orgy of reserve acquisitions in progress. But you have to understand, internally the oil industry has an unusual psychology. Exploring for oil is an inherently discouraging activity. Nine out of 10 exploration wells are dry holes. Only one in a hundred exploration wells discovers an important oil field. Darwinian selection is involved: Only the incurable optimists stay. They tell each other stories about a Texas county that started with 30 dry holes yet had a major discovery with its next well. Are they right? Is there some way the crisis could be averted? Drill Better? One of the responses to the far less devastating oil crisis in the 1980s was to ask for a double helping of new technology. It's not going to work this time, and here's why: Before 1995 (when the dot-com era began), the oil industry's rate of return on invested capital was higher than any other industry's. When the oil companies discovered that everything else they tried to diversify into was less profitable, they came home and poured billions of investment dollars into the development of petroleum technology. Much of the work was successful. That makes it difficult to ask today for new technology. Most of those wheels have already been invented. Drill Deeper? Unfortunately, the "oil window" goes only from about 7,000 feet to about 15,000 feet underground. Temperatures closer to the earth's surface are not hot enough to "crack" organic-rich sediments into oil molecules, while beyond 15,000 feet the rocks are so hot that the oil molecules are further cracked into natural gas. Drilling rigs capable of penetrating to the bottom of the "oil window" have been available since 1938. Drill Someplace New? Geologists have gone to the ends of the earth in their search for oil. The only rock outcrops in the jungle are in the banks of rivers and streams; geologists have waded up those streams picking leeches off their legs. As early as 1923, they knew that the Arctic Slope of Alaska would be a major oil producer. Today, about the only promising petroleum province that remains unexplored is part of the South China Sea, where exploration has been delayed because six different countries claim the drilling rights. Although the South China Sea is an attractive prospect, there is little likelihood that it is another Middle East. In any case, it takes a minimum of 10 years to go from a cold start on a new province to delivery of the first oil. One of the legendary oil finders, Hollis Hedberg, explained it in terms of "the story": When you start out in a new area, you want to know whether the oil is trapped in folds, in reefs, in sandstone lenses, or along faults. You want to know which are the good reservoir rocks and which are the good caprocks. The answers to those questions are the story. After you spend a few years in exploration work and drilling holes, you figure out the story. For instance, the oil is in fossil patch reefs. Then pow, pow, pow--you bring in discovery after discovery in patch reefs. Even then, there are development wells to drill and pipelines to install. It works--but it takes 10 years. Rising prices and the supposed magic of the free market won't change that. In fact, history shows the price of oil to be mostly irrelevant to finding oil. More oil was discovered in the United States in the 1930s than in any decade before or since. That was during the Depression--when the price of oil was $1 a barrel and the price was that high only because of production rationing. Nothing we initiate now can substantially postpone the world production peak: No Caspian Sea exploration, no drilling in the South China Sea, no SUV replacement, no renewable energy projects can bring results quickly enough to avoid a bidding war for the remaining oil. And we can only hope that the war is waged with cash instead of far worse weapons. So what should we do? The Hubbert analysis definitely has its weaknesses. In the book from which this article is adapted, I offer readers some expertise in evaluating the problem. If the experts' scenario for the years 2004-2008 reads like the opening of a horror movie, readers can make up their own minds about whether to accept the scary account. But ignoring the problem is the equivalent to wagering that world oil production will continue to increase forever. My own opinion is that the peak in world oil production may even occur before 2004, and while I would be delighted to be proved wrong, the truth is, it would take a lot of unexpectedly good news to postpone the peak even to 2010. In either case, by the time my granddaughter reaches retirement age, world production of oil will be down to a fifth of its present size. My recommendation: Bet that the experts' prediction is roughly correct, make good use of the few years before the crisis actually hits, and start planning now for increased energy conservation and alternative energy sources. In 1980 the oil crisis was a problem in distribution; the oil was there, but it wasn't getting to the corner gas station. In 2008 the oil won't be there. Psychologically, the realization that the change is permanent may be as devastating as the shortage itself. Still, if we take the experiences of past oil crises as guides, we can benefit from what we have learned. First, beware of any salesman peddling just one brand of snake oil. Many hucksters will claim to have found the new elixir that will solve the energy problem. Some of them will truly believe they have. We should know better. Prudence dictates that we make good use of each innovation where it fits best and find others to use elsewhere. Use geothermal energy where it is most effective; don't try to find a geothermal solution for the entire range of U.S. energy needs. Second, beware of the salesman peddling an enormous variety of snake oils. The message: "There are so many possibilities, some of them are bound to come through in time to save us." The long list of innovations--including gas hydrates, subsalt seismic reflections, coal-bed methane, and deepwater drilling, to name just a few of the usual promises--will give the impression that doomsday won't arrive in our lifetime. We'll muddle through. Unfortunately, every item on that list was already identified 20 years ago. Most are still not deliverable. Muddling is going to be painful. Third, beware of narrow focuses. In earlier oil shortages, we became fixated on improving automobile efficiencies in miles per gallon. Unfortunately, some of those improvements came at the cost of higher energy consumption in the refinery. We need to look at the whole system--from the refinery to the driver in traffic--when we make "improvements." Finally, we need to approach energy use the way a butcher approaches a side of beef. He could convert all the meaty part to hamburger, with high efficiency, but butchers (and economists) know to slice off some high-priced steak and a roast or two, then grind up the rest for hamburger. Electricity is steak; space heating is hamburger. When I switched my house from home heating oil to natural gas, I paid extra for a high-efficiency furnace. The efficiency is listed at 94 percent. Sounds fabulous. Here's the problem: Just downstream from my gas-air flame, the temperature is over 1,000 degrees--very high-grade energy. My "efficient" furnace ignores it, dilutes heat by design, and delivers 70-degree air to my heating ducts. A smarter idea is co-generation: Use the high-temperature gases to produce electricity and then use the lower-temperature air to heat the house. (Today, the smallest co-generation units operate on the scale of an apartment block.) I also think we need to get over our nuclear phobia. We certainly need better engineering and better operators. A nuclear plant operator ought to receive the level of training and the salary of a commercial airline pilot. Maybe it will happen when the economic squeeze gets everyone's attention. The point is, crude oil is much too valuable to be used for fuel. Eventually we'll figure that out, and it will be used only in manufacturing needed organic chemicals--plastics, fertilizers, that sort of thing. "You burned it?" our grandchildren will ask someday. "All those lovely organic molecules--and you just burned it?" Sorry, we burned it. In contrast to the hundreds of millions of years it took for the world's oil endowment to accumulate, most of the oil is being extracted and refined in about 100 years. (The short bump of oil exploitation on the geologic time line has become known as "Hubbert's peak.") In a sense, fossil fuels are a onetime gift that lifted us up from subsistence agriculture and eventually should lead us to a future based on renewable resources. Kenneth S. Deffeyes Copyright ? 2001 by The American Prospect, Inc. Preferred Citation: Kenneth S. Deffeyes, "Another Wolf at the Door," The American Prospect vol. 12 no. 18, October 22, 2001. Full article at: http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/18/deffeyes-k.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 7 01:49:50 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2001 10:49:50 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Geostrategic imperatives Message-ID: Kaplan seems to be reiterating a thesis first put forward by Daniel Patrick Moynihan ("Pandaemonium", OUP, 1993) and Zbigniew Brzezinski ("Out of Control", Scribner, 1993), in which the post-Cold War era, far from ushering in a "new world order", threatened global anarchy instead. This was the sort of analysis Samuel Huntington was concerned to refute, as much as Fukuyama's "End of History". Now it seems Kaplan is positing the popular version of Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" as the new Cold War, with a clearly identified enemy, hence the beginning of a new Cold War realism. The view from the limousine By Martin Wolf Financial Times, Nov 07 2001 The terrorist attack of September 11 was a well executed assault on focal symbols of western financial and military power - New York's tallest buildings and the Pentagon. The attack, and its aftermath, taught us lessons about the fragility of relations between the west and the Islamic world and the impotence of power. But it also taught us something even more fundamental, by killing the post-cold-war delusion of effortless international harmony and risk-free introspection. It made the world palpably dangerous. For moralists in the mode of Woodrow Wilson, this shock has created the opportunity to make the world a better place. Tony Blair, the prime minister, is such a man. But there is a darker perspective, brilliantly laid out by the American "realist" Robert Kaplan. For him, "the end of the cold war merely set the parameters for the next struggle for survival".* Yet if moralists and realists disagree on the response, they must agree on the analysis of today's world. Mr Kaplan describes it as bifurcated. Think of a stretch limousine driving through an urban ghetto. Inside is the post-industrial world of western Europe, North America, Australasia, Japan and the emerging Pacific Rim. Outside are all the rest. In Mr Kaplan's dark view, the combined stresses of population, urbanisation, environmental degradation and failed development are creating a world of gangster states and states eaten out by gangs, both with a terrifying capacity for anarchic violence. Where does Islam fit in? "Beyond its stark, clearly articulated message, Islam's very militancy makes it attractive to the downtrodden. It is the one religion that is prepared to fight." This is a world in which the rising aspirations of billions of people are failing to meet an improving reality. Now, after September 11, those lucky enough to ride in the limousine need to try to understand the world in which they and their children will live. Consider a few facts. In 1999, according to the World Bank, world average real income per head (at purchasing power parity) was $7,000. High-income countries, with a combined population of 900m, had average incomes of $26,000. In the developing world, 5.1bn people had average incomes of $3,500, 2.4bn of whom lived in low-income countries with average incomes of $1,900. The high-income countries generated 79 per cent of world gross national income at market prices and 56 per cent of it at purchasing power parity. The US, Canada and the EU alone generated 59 per cent of income at market prices and 43 per cent of it at PPP. Between 1965 and 1999, real incomes per head of those "in the limousine" rose at 2.4 per cent a year, against 1.6 per cent a year for the world as a whole. Average real incomes in sub-Saharan Africa fell, while those of the Middle East and north Africa stagnated. East Asia was the only developing region whose real gross domestic product per head rose faster than that of high-income countries. The high-income countries consumed just over half of the world's total output of commercial energy in 1998. The US alone consumed 23 per cent. The ratio of commercial energy consumption per head in high-income countries to that in the rest of the world was 5? to one. The ratio of US consumption per head to that in developing countries was eight to one. Forty-seven per cent of all emissions of carbon dioxide in 1997 came from high-income countries. Their emissions per head were five times those of developing countries. US emissions per head were eight times those of developing countries, seven times China's and 18 times India's. In short, the world's elite enjoys vastly superior incomes and absorbs a correspondingly disproportionate proportion of the world's resources. Its ability to do so is the fruit of the physical, human, social and intellectual capital accumulated by its forebears over centuries. These ancestors did a remarkable job in seizing their opportunities. But they also enjoyed a favourable environment and first-mover advantage in exploiting the world's resources, from the Americas to oil and the atmosphere. Naturally, the elite has no intention of giving up what it has. Which elite ever has? The domestic politics of elite countries are about obtaining still more. It is no accident that the Kyoto targets for reduction in greenhouse gas emissions were virtually irrelevant to global warming or that redistribution of incomes within rich countries exceeds cross-border redistribution by up to two orders of magnitude. Yet this pampered global elite is shrinking. In 1950, today's high-income countries had 32 per cent of world population. Today, this is just over 19 per cent. By 2050, according to the US Bureau of the Census, it will be down to 13 per cent. The share of western Europe in world population is forecast to shrink from 6.4 per cent today to 4.0 per cent in 2050, while Japan's is set to fall even more sharply, from 2.1 per cent to 1.1 per cent. Ninety nine per cent of the 3bn increase in world population forecast for the next 50 years is expected to be in the developing world. The moralist responds by arguing that the task is to make the world a better place by promoting development in the world's poorest countries, sustaining a dynamic global economy and managing movements of people in a humane way. This is no doubt right. But it is going to be frighteningly hard to achieve. China and India, for example, may be catching up on the living standards of the high-income countries. But more fragile countries will continue to stagnate. Two years ago, the ratio of average US incomes to those in Sierra Leone was 70 to one; on current trends, it will reach at least 120 to one by 2050. Realists agree with this bleak prospect. They add that ahead also lies the challenge of China, of an outbreak of wars over resources - particularly water - and of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, some perhaps into terrorist hands. September 11 tells us that the position enjoyed by the elite may be more fragile and less easy to defend than many have, until recently, assumed. On one point moralists and realists should agree. It is necessary to contemplate the risks and challenges that lie ahead with intellectual rigour and courage, not with the wishful thinking that marked the 1990s. * The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War, Random House Full article at: http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT3UW8M3QTC &live=true&useoverridetemplate=IXL8L4VRRBC&tagid=IXLMS1QTICC Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 7 02:07:11 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2001 11:07:11 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Britain/US split Message-ID: Once again Bruce is being briefed, off the record, by those in the know within the UK establishment, who seem to be eager to inform the rest of us of the weaknesses and failures of the US-led campaign. One difficulty with Bruce is that he does not forward a consistent line -- he is happy to take whatever information/disinformation comes his way, and print authoritative sounding "analyses" of the situation based on the latest leak. However it seems that the British military establishment is holding its nose as it goes along with the US in public. Even the BBC is now showing how ragtag the Northern Alliance fighters appear to be. Yesterday a few paraded for the cameras in their newly gifted army fatigues, and did not exactly impress. Meanwhile on the spot reporters are having to admit that there is precious little sign of any mobilisation along the Northern Alliance lines. Chances are they are digging in for the winter, as well as allowing the US to take the heat for a largely counterproductive bombing campaign (described as "desperate" by Bruce here -- not quite rah-rah-rah). It's unlikely that, should the Northern Alliance ever prevail, they will have been impressed by the armchair warriorism exhibited by their latecoming "allies" -- just as the Pakistan regime is not overly convinced of US sincerity in its pledges of support. In other words, we have an old-fashioned LBJ-style credibility gap. Tough lessons for US forces IAN BRUCE The Herald, 7 November 2001 THE United States is about to embark on the kind of steep tactical learning curve which cost the Soviet Union upwards of 100,000 casualties in a 10-year war against Afghan mujahideen they regarded as being beneath military contempt. By the end of that disastrous decade, even Moscow's elite Spetznaz commandos had learned to fear the resilience and tenacity of Afghan fighters. In Kabul yesterday, the Taliban paraded what they said were parts of a downed US helicopter through the war-shattered city in a show of defiance, but the Pentagon denied it had been downed. It said bad weather forced a helicopter to crash. US jets resumed strikes on Taliban positions north of Kabul, as the Northern Alliance claimed the capture of several villages near the strategic city of Mazar-e-Sharif. US tactics so far have involved dropping bombs from three miles up on positions which may or may not contain Taliban troops and picking off the occasional ageing tank and artillery piece with guided weapons. The proxy armies of the Northern Alliance have turned out to be an ill-trained, fractious, ragtag rabble with little acumen for co-ordinated operations. The intelligence war has been an unmitigated disaster. While the Pentagon has deployed the resources of the CIA, satellites and spy drones, the Taliban has run its own show from a room in a mosque with two mullahs and a short-wave radio transmitter. The regime's religious spymasters have already assassinated the legendary Mohammed Shah Massoud, the charismatic alliance commander, by employing suicide bombers masquerading as a camera crew. Two weeks ago, they lured the linchpin of US policy in southern Afghanistan, Abdul Haq, to capture and execution, by setting up a meeting with Taliban leaders who were supposedly about to defect. It was an ambush. The abortive special forces raid on Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar's compound in Kandahar was a prime indicator of serious American underestimation of its foes. They found nothing of value and were then driven off by a ferocious counter-attack out of the dark. A veteran British Gulf war officer told The Herald: "The US thought the Taliban would fold in a couple of weeks under sustained bombing. But the mujahideen are not Iraqis. Fighting is their life. The US is now deploying the 15,000lb Big Blue daisy-cutter bombs which send out a spray of highly inflammable liquid. When detonated, it creates an overpressure which can collapse shallow bunkers and fry the lungs of anyone in a 600-yard radius. Upping the ante in this way is a measure of US desperation. It probably will be ineffective. The Taliban dig their bunker-lines deep and tend to keep them lightly manned when not under assault. If any real progress is to be made, US troops are going to have to seize and hold airfields inside Afghanistan. That will involve thousands of men to keep them secure. In the meantime, the risk is that political imperatives will force military commanders to commit special forces to missions for which they were not intended. Their job is close reconnaissance and target identification, not assaulting enemy positions. The first priority is making airfields available in neighbouring Tajikistan and Uzbekistan for close support operations. If either the Northern Alliance gets its act together for a ground offensive or US and possibly British troops have to tackle that job in the spring, a rapid-response taxi rank of aircraft and helicopter gunships could spell the difference between success and bloody stalemate. Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/7-11-19101-0-11-25.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 7 02:12:05 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2001 11:12:05 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Middle East powder keg Message-ID: Sharon wants 1m new Jews for Israel Sharon wants 1m more Jews Emma Brockes and Ewen MacAskill Wednesday November 7, 2001 The Guardian The Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon, threatens to provoke a fresh row with the Palestinians today by warning that he has a plan to bring 1m more Jews to Israel. Mr Sharon made the controversial remarks in an exclusive interview with the Guardian. A wave of Jewish immigration on that scale would be ve hemently opposed by the Palestinians, who fear many of the immigrants would be sent to reinforce Jewish settlers living illegally on Palestinian territory in the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli diplomats last night sought to play down the significance of Mr Sharon's comments at a time when the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians is at its lowest point for decades. Violence yesterday claimed the lives of five Palestinians and one Israeli. One Israeli diplomat said the remark was a generational one, reflecting the prime minister's pioneering Zionist background. But Mr Sharon was specific in the interview: "We are not waiting here until [the Palestinian leader, Yasser] Arafat decides to take steps against terror. First of all, we are taking steps against terror: steps that he could have avoided. "The other thing is that we are building. We are planning now to bring another 1m Jews to Israel." The population of Israel at present is 6m, of whom 5m are Jewish and the rest mainly Muslim. Afif Safieh, head of the Palestinian delegation in London, last night condemned the plan: "Sharon believes what he says. It is a dangerous dream, a nightmare. He is a pyromaniac on a powder keg." He added that such immigrants tended to be the most reactionary, trying to make up for their late arrival as Zionists. It was an especially inflammatory plan, given the millions of Palestinian refugees still waiting to return to their rightful homeland, Mr Safieh said. Israel has attracted almost 1m immigrants over the last 10 years, mainly from the former Soviet Union. It is difficult to see where Mr Sharon will attract 1m more, though he could squeeze some from the former Soviet Union or try such countries as Argentina, which has 500,000 Jews. The general tone of Mr Sharon's interview is uncompromising at a time when the US is desperately trying to per suade him to cool the Middle East conflict to avoid undermining the US-led coalition against terrorism. Mr Sharon insisted that his relationship with the US president, George Bush, had not been strained over the last month and denied he had described him as an appeaser comparable to Neville Chamberlain. Mr Sharon was unrepentant over the Israeli policy of assassinating Palestinian militants alleged to be plotting bombings and shootings or having been behind such attacks. Following the assassination of an Israel cabinet minister, Israel re-occupied Palestinian territory, saying it wanted to root out Palestinian militants: "Some of them we managed to arrest, some of them are not any more with us. People don't like the word 'kill'. They were removed from our society." The Israeli prime minister dashed Palestinian hopes that any renewal of peace negotiations would resume where they left off, with the offer on the table at Taba, Egypt, in January this year from the then Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak. Mr Sharon said: "They will never get what he promised them." According to Mr Barak's team, there was a deal that would establish the boundaries for a Palestinian state, allow for the return of some refugees and divide Jerusalem between Israel and the Palestinians. But Mr Sharon was adamant: "Jerusalem will be forever united and undivided as the capital of the state of Israel." While the Israel foreign secretary, Shimon Peres, has twice met Mr Arafat in the last week, Mr Sharon has embarked on a strategy of trying to undermine the Palestinian leader. Some of Mr Sharon's circle privately believe that Israel would have a better chance of negotiating a deal with an alternative Palestinian leader. Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,589152,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 7 02:15:50 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2001 11:15:50 +0200 Subject: [A-List] The quagmire continues Message-ID: Warlords bury their differences in readiness for long and bloody battles Opposition failure to incite rebellion among Taliban increases risks for forces Rory McCarthy in Islamabad Wednesday November 7, 2001 The Guardian An impressive collection of warlords, tribal elders and wealthy politicians is arrayed against the Taliban regime, but five weeks into the US military campaign Afghanistan's opposition forces have made precious few gains. Last night they claimed new ground in the drawn-out battle to capture the key northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. As US jets bombed Taliban frontlines, opposition troops took three towns in the province of Balkh just south of the city, which sits near the border with Uzbekistan. Despite yesterday's gains, surprisingly resilient Taliban troops have beaten back a string of offensives in this area over the past few weeks. "All this fighting is aimed at capturing Mazar. We are just 8km (five miles) from Mazar airport," said Mohammad Mohaqeq, one of three opposition warlords moving in on the city. At first US military planners were banking on large-scale Taliban defections, widespread local uprisings and rapid advances by the Northern Alliance. Now it is embarrassingly clear that these hopes were wildly optimistic. Instead looms the spectre of a long and bloody guerrilla war involving a much larger deployment of international ground troops to support the opposition. US military officials admit that it will be several weeks before they can assess whether the Northern Alliance, with a force of 18,000 men, can ever defeat the regime. Taliban troop strength is believed to be at least 40,000. Northern Alliance commanders have complained of shortages of weapons and ammunition. But defence analysts suspect the opposition is waiting for the US bombing to inflict far more damage on the Taliban defences before they attack. The Northern Alliance was shaken even before the campaign began. Ahmed Shah Massoud, the alliance's charismatic, French-speaking guerrilla leader, was assassinated two days before the US attacks. Massoud was replaced by Gen Mohammad Fahim, his military deputy and intelligence chief and a very different figure. Although he too is a respected commander and also comes from the Panjshir Valley, the stronghold of the alliance, Gen Fahim lacks both the charm and political ambitions of his former leader. Now the general, who commands around 10,000 men, is at the centre of a web of warlords linked in a fragile alliance of egos, tribes and religions. At his right hand is Mohammad Yunus Qanooni, the alliance's quietly spoken interior minister. Last month Mr Qanooni negotiated a political deal with Afghanistan's former king, Zahir Shah, under which the king and the alliance would choose a 120-member supreme council to act as an interim government after the Taliban. But the plan largely excluded the Pashtuns, the tribes who dominate southern Afghanistan, and has made little ground. Even Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Islamic cleric who is the political leader of the Northern Alliance, appeared unhappy about any deals with the king. Mr Rabbani, the former Afghan president, ran the country during four years of bitter mojahedin blood-letting until he was unseated by the Taliban in 1996. Gen Fahim's men are largely ethnic Tajiks, based in the north-eastern province of Badakshan and in the Panjshir Valley, tantalisingly close to the capital Kabul. Further west, near the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif, the strongest alliance force is led by the fearsome Uzbek warlord General Abdul Rashid Dostum. Now a team of US military advisers is on the ground helping him try to retake his power base in Mazar. "We are busy studying the situation, but at the moment we don't have enough bullets or weapons," Gen Dostum said last week. "We are waiting for a mass uprising against the Taliban." One of Dostum's worst enemies is a man now trying to support his attacks, the Tajik commander Mohammad Ustad Atta, who is also leading a group of soldiers towards Mazar. If the city does fall, some in the alliance have suggested an untidy arrangement in which the city is divided between Gen Dostum, Cmdr Atta and Mohammad Mohaqeq, a Shia Muslim commander from the Hazara tribe whose forces claimed yesterday's new victories. Afghanistan's Hazaras, with their Mongolian features, are without doubt the ethnic minority that has suffered most under the Taliban. The Shia Muslim minority is a relatively liberal community based around Bamiyan, home of the destroyed Buddhas, in the central highlands. But it has frequently suffered at the hands of Taliban commanders who are guilty of documented civilian massacres. Yet Hazaras too were guilty of atrocities against Taliban fighters during the battles for Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997-8. Their fighters are regarded as one of the most loyal forces in the Northern Alliance. For now the alliance is united in its opposition to the Taliban. If the regime falls there will be little to prevent the alliance sliding into a dangerous bout of factional infighting once again, between rival warlords and ethnic and religious groups. "The Americans' political initiative has been such an abysmal failure it will force them to rely more and more on the Northern Alliance. But strengthening the Northern Alliance could become a millstone around their necks," said Rifaat Hussain, the head of the defence and strategic studies department at Islamabad's Quaid-i Azam University. On the western border with Iran the respected commander General Ismail Khan is attempting to take back the historic blue-tiled city of Herat, where he was governor until he was driven out by the Taliban. Despite the considerable support he still commands in the countryside around the city, Gen Khan has gained little ground since the bombing began. Across southern Afghanistan, however, most of the ethnic Pashtun majority still support the Taliban, and that loyalty ap pears only to have hardened in the face of the US bombing. The Northern Alliance is made up of non-Pashtun ethnic minorities who could at best take back Mazar-i-Sharif, close in on Herat and perhaps encircle Kabul. Yet there is little sign they could have any impact on the Taliban heartland in the Pashtun south. And so across the border in Pakistan US intelligence officials are encouraging dissident Pashtun commanders to draw up plans for new, high-risk missions into Taliban territory to build a rebellion against the regime. The secret meetings come after Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun commander and former politician, slipped into southern Afghanistan to turn tribal leaders against the Taliban but found limited support. Since the US attacks dozens of commanders have returned to the frontier city of Peshawar, in northwest Pakistan, after years in exile abroad. Many of these men are convinced they can revive old tribal loyalties among the Pashtuns in southern Afghanistan and unseat the Taliban. But they appear to be banking on an internal uprising, rather than preparing a full-scale invasion. With little sign of an internal rebellion against the Taliban, the risks of opposing the regime appear far greater than any first realised. Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,588969,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Wed Nov 7 06:49:29 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Wed, 07 Nov 2001 13:49:29 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Geostrategic imperatives In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011107132652.021beb48@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 07/11/2001 08:49, Michael Keaney wrote: > the post-Cold War era, far >from ushering in a "new world order", threatened global anarchy instead. Pakistan appears to be on the verge of collapse. If there is an anti-Musharraf coup by pro-Taleban elements within the Pakistani intelligence service and armed forces, how wide will popular support be for such a coup? According to media reports, the Americans are preparing to insert large troop formations to secure Pakistan's stockpile of nuclear warheads (estimated at 30-60 weapons). Any American intervention is bound to meet stiff resistance from the Pakistan army, for whom the nuclear 'crown jewels' are not merely military assets but iconic symbols of national power and sovereignty. If Pakistan erupts in civil war and revolution,effectively there will soon be a revolutionary-military bloc comprising Pakistan and Afghanistan, nuclear-armed and able to defend itself. This Islamic revolutionary bloc will confront Russia and its proxies to the north, Iran to the west and India to the south, in addition to whatever armed formations the Western powers are able to introduce. Pakistan's nuclear warheads were built with Chinese technical help. Will China sit on its hands and allow its main ally in the region be overwhelmed by its traditional enemies? In the event of a pro-Taleban revolutionary regime emerging in Pakistan, what will happen to Pakistan's close neighbours in the Gulf States and above all Saudi Arabia? What effect will the shockwaves have in Israel/Palestine? What will the Sharon government's response be to the appearance of a nuclear-capable Taleban-backed Pakistan? History appears to have reached a bifurcation of roads. The only certain thing is that the pre-September 11 world-system has vanished. Even if by some fate of political legerdemain the Bush regime manages to hang on in South Asia and restabilise its strategic positions there, without recourse to general war--in other words, even if the Bush regime shows enough acumen to avoid the abyss (likely, given the record?)--there will be a big shake up and massive losers--and winners. It is hard to see any kind of outcome which is satisfactory to US interests or favourable to the US version of 'world civilisation'. The consequences in Russia must also be monumental, if it turns out that at the very moment Putin has thrown his lot in with the West, the entire basis of US global hegemony unravels, turning south and central Asia into a boiling cauldron which no-one can put the lid back on. If Putin's great gamble fails, there will be a seismic change in Russia too. Mark Jones From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 7 07:53:19 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2001 16:53:19 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Geostrategic imperatives Message-ID: Mark Jones writes: Pakistan's nuclear warheads were built with Chinese technical help. Will China sit on its hands and allow its main ally in the region be overwhelmed by its traditional enemies? ===== I suppose it depends upon the perception of the threat posed by a transnational Islamic radicalism. One question to answer would be why, apparently, has it taken the Chinese government so long to realise the potential threat posed by the Uighur (sp?) muslims? Surely this is not a sudden development, unless, of course, the Chinese rulers are gifted with the same sort of myopia that seems to afflict the brightest and the best of the US policymaking elites (hard to believe). All of this also makes the Bush administration's clumsy aggression earlier this year towards China look even more ill-judged. None of the US's supposed "allies" regard Big Brother Number One as trustworthy, hence the reluctance within the Pakistani state apparatus that owes so much to US sponsorship during the 70s and 80s to embrace its former progenitor, given the haste with which Pakistan was dropped from favoured, close ally to rogue pariah. Musharraf's position is very complex indeed. The analysis put forward by Le Monde Diplomatique that he is some kind of secular front for a religious coup is wrong-headed I think, given the original circumstances of the coup and the nature of the regime of Nawaz Sharif -- and remember, Sharif and an extensive entourage was given safe passage to exile in Saudi Arabia. Many secular Pakistanis that I know of and know personally were very pleased to have Musharraf take over and despaired of Robin Cook's hopeless moralising about democracy. Of course at that time Pinochet was awaiting possible extradition to Spain when not having tea with Mrs Thatcher, so that complicated matters somewhat for the hopeless hypocrites responsible for this farce. But it was patently obvious at the time that Musharraf was necessary in order to halt the descent of Pakistan's state into the abyss. That it may now be a mere postponement is, of course, the result of the US and Britain's painfully shortsighted self-interest. Indeed, much of the current crisis stems from the absolutely hopeless foreign policy of the Clinton administration, which managed to upset just about everybody who is now deemed vital to the international coalition (with the exception of China of course -- Bush takes the honours for screwing up there). Now Bush is taking that process further by trying to crack the whip, as in his near-ultimatum to eastern European countries this week, re you're either for us or against us (I had wondered about the purpose of the reported anthrax outbreak in Lithuania, of all places). Mark concludes It is hard to see any kind of outcome which is satisfactory to US interests or favourable to the US version of 'world civilisation'. ====== It certainly will not be anything like business as usual, or close to the impossibly optimistic pictures painted by Rumsfeld, CNN, BBC et al., although even the BBC is now wavering, as with the clear reluctance of the Northern Alliance to adopt a kamikaze posture. That privilege appears to be reserved for Bush and his tribe, who are accepting it unawares and with alarming alacrity. Michael Keaney From lnp3 at panix.com Wed Nov 7 12:09:16 2001 From: lnp3 at panix.com (Louis Proyect) Date: Wed, 07 Nov 2001 14:09:16 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Communism under the flag of religion Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.20011107140916.0075dbf0@popserver.panix.com> (Colonel Charles "Chinese" Gordon was the bible-thumping, "anti-slavery" English officer who held the post of Governor of the Sudan in 1884, during the Mahdist uprising--the first Islamic revolt in modern history. This comes from book one of his Khartoum journals, covering Sept. 10 to Sept. 23. At the end of 1884, Khartoum fell to the Mahdi's forces and Gordon's decapitated head was paraded around on a pike. He got the nickname "Chinese" for his role in putting down the Taiping rebellion of the 1870s. In the passage below, the reference to "the Soudanese conservative of their property" can only be a reference to slave-holders, since this was the major industry in this forlorn region. The "communists" would be the dervishes under the Mahdi's command.) "I do not believe that fanaticism exists as it used to in the world, judging from what I have seen in this so-called fanatic land. It is far more a question of property, and it is more like communism under the flag of religion, which seems to excite and to give colour to acts which men would otherwise condemn. "If fighting occurs, it is the Soudanese conservative of their property fighting the Soudanese communists, who desire to rob them." Louis Proyect Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org From wwagar at binghamton.edu Wed Nov 7 18:15:38 2001 From: wwagar at binghamton.edu (wwagar at binghamton.edu) Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2001 20:15:38 -0500 (EST) Subject: [A-List] Geostrategic imperatives In-Reply-To: <5.1.0.14.2.20011107132652.021beb48@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Message-ID: Yes, indeed. While Bush II plays with his 15,000-pound bombs and his GOOD (as opposed to BAD) Islamic warlords in Afghhanistan, the whole Islamic world writhes in deep turmoil. The regime in Pakistan is holding on by a hair (perhaps of the same construction as the one that suspended the Sword of Damocles), and I am not sure the regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and elsewhere are doing much better. Our dear friends in Israel, who all by themselves obviate the need for enemies, continue as usual, making the whole notion of a sovereign Palestinian state slightly less ludicrous than independence for the District of Columbia. If "we" are serious about staying the course, I think "we" should bring back selective service as soon as possible, sell lots of war bonds, and hunker down for the next Vietnam. Ooops. Make that the next three or four Vietnams. Anyway, thanks to Mark and Michael for this bracing dash of realism. I am half-expecting that most of my students next semester will be women. As ever, with a brave tootling of fifes and a happy rattling of drums, Warren On Wed, 7 Nov 2001, Mark Jones wrote: > At 07/11/2001 08:49, Michael Keaney wrote: > > > the post-Cold War era, far > >from ushering in a "new world order", threatened global anarchy instead. > > Pakistan appears to be on the verge of collapse. If there is an > anti-Musharraf coup by pro-Taleban elements within the Pakistani > intelligence service and armed forces, how wide will popular support be for > such a coup? According to media reports, the Americans are preparing to > insert large troop formations to secure Pakistan's stockpile of nuclear > warheads (estimated at 30-60 weapons). Any American intervention is bound > to meet stiff resistance from the Pakistan army, for whom the nuclear > 'crown jewels' are not merely military assets but iconic symbols of > national power and sovereignty. > > If Pakistan erupts in civil war and revolution,effectively there will soon > be a revolutionary-military bloc comprising Pakistan and Afghanistan, > nuclear-armed and able to defend itself. This Islamic revolutionary bloc > will confront Russia and its proxies to the north, Iran to the west and > India to the south, in addition to whatever armed formations the Western > powers are able to introduce. > > Pakistan's nuclear warheads were built with Chinese technical help. Will > China sit on its hands and allow its main ally in the region be overwhelmed > by its traditional enemies? > > In the event of a pro-Taleban revolutionary regime emerging in Pakistan, > what will happen to Pakistan's close neighbours in the Gulf States and > above all Saudi Arabia? What effect will the shockwaves have in > Israel/Palestine? What will the Sharon government's response be to the > appearance of a nuclear-capable Taleban-backed Pakistan? > > History appears to have reached a bifurcation of roads. The only certain > thing is that the pre-September 11 world-system has vanished. Even if by > some fate of political legerdemain the Bush regime manages to hang on in > South Asia and restabilise its strategic positions there, without recourse > to general war--in other words, even if the Bush regime shows enough acumen > to avoid the abyss (likely, given the record?)--there will be a big shake > up and massive losers--and winners. > > It is hard to see any kind of outcome which is satisfactory to US interests > or favourable to the US version of 'world civilisation'. > > The consequences in Russia must also be monumental, if it turns out that at > the very moment Putin has thrown his lot in with the West, the entire basis > of US global hegemony unravels, turning south and central Asia into a > boiling cauldron which no-one can put the lid back on. If Putin's great > gamble fails, there will be a seismic change in Russia too. > > > Mark Jones > > From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Thu Nov 8 02:11:46 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2001 09:11:46 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Putin on Russia and the West Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011108091126.00ac2918@pop.tiscali.co.uk> abcnews.com from 20/20 November 7, 2001 Interview With Vladimir Putin Barbara Walters Talks to Russia's President M O S C O W, Nov. 5 In his first interview with an American journalist since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke to Barbara Walters about terrorism, Afghanistan and Russian-U.S. cooperation. Following are excerpts, with Putin's responses translated from Russian. Mr. President, you were in your office, and saw on television, the attack on the World Trade Center. What did you think? What did you feel when you saw it? I was working at the time. It was a usual working day. But I had very mixed feelings. Above all, first of all, it might seem a little bit strange, but I had the feeling of guilt for this tragedy. You certainly know that we have talked a lot and in very many places about this fact of international terrorism. We have talked about the possible threats to the United States and to other countries. But well, we're not able to face(?) who, where and how can strike. And this was the first feeling I have: the feeling of anger and to some extent the feeling of guilt. I should say at the same time that I understood quite well that what the American people and the American leadership felt at that time. Because quite recently, in 1999, we were the victims of a terrorist attack. And I'm not just referring to the Chechnya and the Caucasus. I'm referring to the explosion of residential buildings in Moscow and other cities as a result of which hundreds of innocent people died. So I understood the feelings that the Americans were feeling at that time, so I feel bad. Did you feel guilty because you did not warn us enough? I know that when you met with President Clinton, you warned them about the bin Laden problem. And you have said that you were ignored, and that surprised you. Did you feel guilty that you hadn't told us more so that we would have been better prepared? I wouldn't want to go into any assessments of my colleagues or counterparts, including the former president of the United States, because he was in a very difficult situation as well. But even at that time we certainly were counting on a more active cooperation in combating international terrorism. I don't know whether it would have been possible to prevent these strikes on the United States by the terrorists, but again, we were counting on a close cooperation. Again, it was a pity that our special services didn't get the information on time, and warn the American people and the American political leadership about the tragedy that came to pass. President Bush said that you were the first world leader to telephone him. He was very grateful for that. What did you say to him when you telephoned him? Well, first of all, I expressed our solidarity with the American people. I said that Russia itself suffered terrorist blows and explosions in the city of Moscow as well. And perhaps I understood better than many people what the American people and American president felt, so I wanted to express my solidarity to the American people, and not just on my personal behalf, but on behalf of the people of Russia. I knew that this was important and I did this not just out of emotional influences, but out of pragmatic considerations as well. Because at that time, and now, I understood, and do understand, that putting the efforts of the international community in fighting terrorism is very important to ... like it was very important to give American people to understand that in this dire moment in time, they are not alone. Russia and the West After the events of Sept. 11, you seem to have made a strategic and historic choice to become much closer to the West, to the United States. This could be a risk for you here at home, where not everybody wants you to be that close. Why did you do it? Oh, you know, I may tell you right now something that may sound quite unexpected to you. This is a choice that Russia made for itself quite a long time ago. Unfortunately it was not noticed by everybody. But after Sept. 11, it was impossible not to notice it. More than that, there was a realization that Russia not just can, but should be a strategic ally of the entire civilized community including certainly the United States. And I believe that the tragic events of Sept. 11 opened our eyes to that. To this. And underscored the fact that if we want to be protected, we should be together. President Bush I would like to ask a little bit about your relationship with President Bush. When President Bush first met you, he said that he looks into your eyes and he saw your soul. Some people smiled when he said that. What do you think he saw in your soul? Well, it's difficult for me to say what he saw in my soul. You should ask President Bush about that himself. But those who smiled in response to his words on hearing him say that, well there's one thing I can say about this. I believe it's not accidental that not them but he became the president of the United States. He sees better and deeper and understands the problems more accurately. I should tell you that to a great extent it is thanks to President Bush's position that the Russian-U.S. relations, Russia and United States, were not taken by surprise, by this event of September 11th. And I recall his words, and the fact that I was the first to call him ??? but this happened to a great extent because of his position, and this was a credit that should go to him for that. And the fact that today the international coalition is successful is also thanks to President Bush and I believe that the first step towards that was our meeting in Ljubljana [Slovenia] when he said those good words ??? addressed me and my country. And I should say even more from experience, my personal communication with President Bush. I'm convinced that he's a solid partner. We can argue about some problems, disagree about things, but I noticed that if he agrees with something, and if he says yes, he actually pushes the question down to resolution, to fruition, in terms of reaching agreement. Not only with me, but the entire Russian leadership have noticed this particular feature of the president's character. And we assess this quite positively, which is indicative of the fact that we can do business with this man, and he lives up to the agreements that he reaches. Perhaps after some very complex and difficult negotiations and exchanges. If he says he will do something he does it. Yes. Exactly. I hear you do too. I'm trying. You have that reputation. U.S. Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty Let us speak focus some of the possible agreements. From reports, it looks as if there may be an agreement in the reduction of nuclear weapons when you and President Bush meet. But there is still the great disagreement over the ABM treaty. You want it to continue. President Bush wants to stop it, and build a missile defense system. How do you think these two conflicting points of view can be reconciled? What do you see as the compromise? Well, it's somewhat difficult for me to talk about this with certainty, but I should say the compromise can only be found as a result of very intense negotiations.... We have a certain platform based on which we could reach agreements. Both in terms of reducing strategic offensive arms to certain levels, and I think in that context we could reach quite quickly mutual agreements. And in this context we could find common approaches to defensive systems. Anyway, our position in this is quite flexible. We believe that the ABM Treaty of 1972 is important, essential, effective and useful, but we have a negotiating platform starting from which we could reach agreements. AT least I hope so. Can you give us any hints. I mean President Bush said "I'm going to build a missile defense system." You say "I want the ABM treaty." Where is the possibility of compromise? I don't want you to do all your negotiating here, but it would be nice. Well, first of all the ABM treaty of 1972 already has a potential for developing defensive systems. We have developed this and it's around Moscow. The United States has a different option. There are other provisions in the treaty based on which we could find common approaches. And anyway, experts believe that based on those approaches we could quite be able to formulate terms and conditions on the basis of the existing treaty without violating its substance. That would be quite adequate to respond to the contemporary challenges and remove the concerns that the United States leadership has with respect to strategic defense. War on Terrorism Mr. President, you have been very supportive now of our war on terrorism, and you have said that you want nothing in return. But some advisers here in Russia say your country should get something: maybe a closer relationship with NATO, joining NATO, maybe helping with Russia's debt, maybe admission to the World Trade Organization. Would you hope to get any of this in return for U.S. support? I don't know who said that. Churchill once put it very beautifully. He said politicians think about the next election, but statesmen think about succeeding generations. Oddly, these are very fitting words to the situation. Russia is not expecting any preferences or any payment for its position for the support of your country in combatting terrorism. This is all for our support of the opposition in fighting terrorism. We have a common enemy, international terrorism, and the work that we are pursuing together is in our best interests. But it is also in our best interests to integrate Russia in the contemporary international community in every sense of the word, in defense, political, security. And from our discussions of late, that we have had with the leaders of the European countries and the United States, everybody understands that. Where we'll be handy to each other, I think, on many occasions. And in that sense, if we talk about rapprochement, between Russia and the United States and the West, not only Russia, but the international community has an interest in that. This doesn't have anything to do with the payment. Russia's not bargaining. It's not trying to make a deal. It is just that we cooperate. Searching for Bin Laden Do you think we will find Osama bin Laden? Is it important that we do? Oh, I think it is possible. But very difficult. And it is important yes. It is important. Because the main players in this should be brought to justice. But this will not resolve the overall terrorist problem. To be effective ??? globally effective ??? this fight should be fought not only by military force, but other means: political, economic, social. There has to be a range of efforts on the part of the international community to fight this evil. No Russian Ground Troops Are there any conditions under which Russia would send ground troops to Afghanistan? To us this solution would be unacceptable. And I'll tell you why. To us, sending troops to Afghanistan is like for you, the U.S., returning your troops to Vietnam ??? even more difficult I should say because the Afghan war is a recent experience, much more recent than the Vietnam experience. But I should tell you something else. Even now, the Russian army is helping the United States, and not virtually, but actually. Through intelligence, through supplying intelligence, very good quality, top level intelligence. But also helping you because we know the realities of Afghanistan. And we are helping the Northern Alliance in the amount of dozens of millions of dollars. And we should also help the United States in rescue operations, including on the territory of Afghanistan. Bombing Iraq I'd like to talk about Iraq. There is evidence that Mohamed Atta, one of the World Trade Center bombing terrorists, met with Iraqi intelligence. If it proves that Iraq was involved in terrorist attacks, would you support the U.S. bombing of Iraq? Perhaps even participate in the attempts? Well, as far as the Iraqi problem is concerned, this is a matter in which we have decided on that position a long time ago. And this position is to support the desire of the international community in finding out once and for all whether Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, or are trying to develop such weapons. And in that context, I believe we should renew the international inspection of facilities in the territory of Iraq. And in that context we have a proposal to make, and we are discussing it with our colleagues, including our American colleagues. I should say that we are not able to convince the Iraqi leadership that our proposals are acceptable, so therefore the processes are quite difficult. I don't believe that this issue will be resolved by bombing. Bombings are still very young. And the American and British continue bombing. But we should understand the objective of our actions. If our objective is to be convinced of the absence of the weapons of mass destruction on the territory of Iraq, we should seek that objective. Iraq should allow international inspections on their territory. In return then certain sanctions then should be lifted vis-a-vis Iraq. If we do that, I think many issues will be resolved. Will you help? Will you try? Yes. Definitely. Not only try, but we are conducting these consultations very actively, with our European and American partners. Iran and Nuclear Technology Iran. Russia shared the nuclear technology, with Iran, ostensibly for civilian use. But the CIA says that Iran could use this to build nuclear weapons. If President Bush asked you to stop supplying Iran, would you? Well, it is a legend which has nothing to do with reality. What we see here is the substitution of two notions: military, and technical cooperation with Iran. We are selling weapons, conventional weapons, to Iran. We have not ever, ever sold anything to Iran out of the range of technology or information that would help Iran develop missiles or weapons of mass destruction. We have some projects in atomic energy. The U.S. has the same projects in its relations with North Korea. It has nothing to do with developing nuclear weapons. We are categorically opposed to transferring any technologies to Iran that would help it develop nuclear weapons. There has been some information that allegedly Iran is drying to develop weapons of mass destruction. There's got to be a confirmation of that. Anthrax and Bioterror I want you to talk a bit about anthrax, because our country is very frightened. And the anthrax used in the United States mail attacks, was a very high-grade formula, that some experts said is available in the United States, Iraq, and possibly Russia. We've also heard that there are some stockpiles left over from Soviet times, of smallpox. Do you have any concern, that either the Anthrax, or your smallpox, could be stolen, or bought from your country? No. I believe that it would be impossible. I believe it would be impossible, and then, the test of the materials that are available in the United States, are indicative of the fact that it could not have been produced in the Soviet Union, let alone Russia. First of all, those materials have been guarded, were guarded in the Soviet Union, and Russia, very securely. So I exclude that possibility. Both anthrax and possibly smallpox. Yes. I believe this is true of anthrax and smallpox, but more than that, in our contacts with the American partners, and, well, we have no argument about that. We exchange information on that. Any information that could be of interest to our American partners is available, it is discussed and analyzed. You are have a vaccine for anthrax here in your country. If needed, and if asked, do you have enough to give to the United States? And would you? ... We believe that we should be partners, and perhaps even allies, with the United States, in very many areas. And, as to just helping the American people in combatting this evil, there can be no doubt about the fact that we will do everything possible. More than that. The U.S. has found out the possibility of such an operation. Our partners are working with our specialists, and this work will be pursued at a very practical level. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Thu Nov 8 02:31:06 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2001 09:31:06 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Samuel Brittan buys into renewables (!) Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011108093019.00ac51d8@pop.tiscali.co.uk> [Could this really be the end of civilisation as we know it? Mark] An exit from the Middle East Henry Kissinger's imaginative Concert of Great Powers needs to be backed by an equally innovative energy policy, says Samuel Brittan Published: FT November 7 2001 19:49 | Last Updated: November 7 2001 20:36 On October 25 I was privileged to hear by far the clearest statement so far of what western aims should be in the war against terrorism. It came, not surprisingly, from Henry Kissinger, the former US secretary of state. He reminded us that, in the entire postwar period, the security of free people everywhere has depended on America's willingness to defend them. "If America fails in its reaction to an attack on its own territory . . . thesecurity of the postwar world will disintegrate." He argued that terrorism exists in many cells all over the world but cannot survive without some bases. The strategic objective has to be "the elimination of these base areas, or at any rate the suppression of them by the host government". He warned that if the alliance's aims were limited to victory in Afghanistan, terrorism would come back. Eventually all states that supported terrorism must be induced to stop, with no distinction between the global and local varieties. He did not advocate military intervention to settle old scores - but support for terror had to come to an end reasonably soon. Mr Kissinger looked forward to a concert of powers including the US, its European allies and perhaps Russia, China and India, which could agree on the definition of terrorism and a common response. He did not think this world concert could be postponed until issues such as Palestine "which have a long time-frame" had been tackled. He compared today's Nato with the quadripartite alliance existing at the end of the Napoleonic wars against any resurgence of French expansionism. But this never had to be invoked. Instead the action was with a concert of European powers in which France participated - and which worked until Britain withdrew. Mr Kissinger rightly debunked some of the fashionable talk about allied military forces having the primary role to play in "nation-building" in Afghanistan. This task has eluded many countries over many centuries. At most he favoured a United Nations contact group of neighbouring countries and western economic aid. Can the same detachment be applied to countries around the Gulf? In my view, not at present. The US and its allies will never disentangle themselves from the Middle East and establish Mr Kissinger's wider concert while they are so dependent on Middle Eastern oil. Until oil dependence is drastically reduced, the western powers are doomed to recurring intervention in the affairs of the region and to making unpleasant choices between unattractive regimes, nearly all contemptuous of human rights. From time to time they will back the wrong horse - as they did more than 20 years ago in Iran and could easily do in Saudi Arabia now - and be blown from crisis to crisis. Surely the west must seek a world in which it does not have to decide between the present feudal regime in Saudi Arabia and the fundamentalist radical opposition to it. Would not we all feel safer as well as more dignified if Tony Blair did not have to go looking for common ground with every unattractive Middle Eastern dictator? But we shall not escape from these begging missions while diplomacy is stifled by the need for oil supplies. We have seen many maps showing how oil could be obtained from central Asia or Russia, bypassing the Arabian peninsula. But look at the areas through which the projected pipelines go. Some traverse the Caucasus and Turkey; others go through Afghanistan and Pakistan. These are some of the most turbulent and unstable areas of the globe. A medium-term escape from these dilemmas involves the US and its allies becoming, as a group, more self-sufficient in energy and particularly in oil. Let no one say that there is anything anti-free-market in paying an insurance premium to avoid dependence on a monopolistic seller. A paper by the National Bureau of Economic Research* notes that most US federal energy initiatives were in response to emergencies following large increases in petroleum prices but were afterwards allowed to lapse. After the first 1973 oil price shock, President Richard Nixon launched Project Independence for energy self-sufficiency by 1980. But by the end of 2000 the US was importing 56 per cent of its petroleum. In the same year energy imports of all kinds surpassed the previous peak by 36 per cent. The failure of US energy-saving drives partly reflects the behaviour of real oil prices, which have remained far below the peaks of 1980. Meanwhile US domestic refining capacity has been declining. Energy policy, like so much else, has been distorted by a running left-right battle. On the left it is argued that the problem lies in the failure of Congress to authorise petroleum taxes; so gasolene costs much less than in other western countries. On the right, the blame is put on excessive regulation. In the past 10 years the refinery industry has had to respond to five sets of new environmental regulations. A serious policy will have to cut across these wrangles. Environmental restrictions will have to be reduced to a minimum and shorn of their anti-business subtext. But Republican leaders will have to perform a U-turn on gasolene taxes. Faced with such problems, Paul Krugman, the US economist, is pessimistic about reducing dependence on Gulf oil. He accepts that strong conservation efforts could reduce US per capita oil use to European levels and make the country self-sufficient. But other industrial countries still account for two-thirds of oil imports from the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries. For once Professor Krugman may be too pessimistic - or too carried away by distaste for President George W. Bush's desire to drill in a part of the Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge. There are in fact plenty of ways in which Europe and Japan could reduce oil consumption. American profligacy is mainly due to car and truck users. Hardly any electricity is generated by oil, in strong contrast to the position in other countries. If the US were to tax petrol sufficiently and its allies were to substitute other primary fuels for electricity generation, we could be almost home and dry. Faced with the alternative of continued dependence on countries such as Saudi Arabia, US and other voters should at last be prepared to accept the mixture of planning and the price mechanism so badly required. *US Energy Policy during the 1990s, Paul Joskow Samuel Brittan's website is www.samuelbrittan.co.uk From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Thu Nov 8 02:34:59 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2001 09:34:59 +0000 Subject: [A-List] FT: US deploys old airborne toys - and tries some new ones Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011108093437.00abf840@pop.tiscali.co.uk> By Alexander Nicoll, Defence Correspondent Published: November 7 2001 20:31 | Last Updated: November 7 2001 20:52 A leaflet dropped by US aircraft in Afghanistan is testimony to the new technologies called into use by American forces: declaring that "we are watching", it shows a photograph of the registration number of a vehicle used by Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, apparently taken from an unmanned aerial vehicle. The campaign is proving a watershed for the use of unpiloted aircraft in warfare. Although unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been deployed in the Balkans and Iraqi no-fly zones for several years, the overwhelming need for intelligence in Afghanistan is pushing them rapidly into the front line. Aircraft still in development are being rushed into service in the quest to monitor military movements and suspected terrorist hideouts 24 hours a day. Nick Cook, aerospace consultant of Jane's Defence Weekly, said: "If you're looking at the trend for the future, I'm convinced that this is going to be viewed as the conflict in which the UAV earned its spurs." This week, the Pentagon said it was deploying Global Hawk, a high-altitude, long endurance drone produced by Northrop Grumman, of which only four are flying. Rear Admiral John Stufflebeem of the Pentagon's joint staff said: "It does have an all-weather capability. . . and we'll certainly take advantage of that, but it also has sensors that will be terrific when it's bright and shiny." Global Hawk is among several capabilities being added to the intensifying US-led campaign, amid efforts to achieve a breakthrough before winter makes operations even more challenging. This week, the US has more than doubled special forces troops on the ground, who can pick targets and shine lasers to guide precision bombs to them. To increase psychological pressure on the Taliban, it has dropped devastating fuel-air 15,000lb Daisy Cutter bombs used in the Vietnam and Gulf wars. To step up monitoring of events on the front lines, it is bringing in its Joint Stars battlefield surveillance system, mounted on converted Boeing 707 aircraft. From the outset, US and British commanders emphasised the campaign would be intelligence-led: aircraft could only drop munitions, and forces could only operate on the ground, if a picture was built for them of what they were aiming at. This is done partly by imagery from satellites and U-2 spy aircraft; signals-intercepting aircraft; and human intelligence from the Northern Alliance, countries including Russia and Pakistan, and special forces. UAVs add several capabilities. Global Hawk flies at over 60,000 feet for 35 hours, enabling it to supplement U-2 aircraft, which would need several separate missions to carry out the same task. The Pentagon plans to buy 51 more Global Hawks. The Predator, in use by the US Air Force and reportedly by the Central Intelligence Agency, is a cheaper, medium-altitude drone that can be sent into riskier environments - 60 have so far been delivered of which 19 have been lost "due to mishaps or losses over enemy territory", according to a senior US defence official. Donald Rumsfeld, US defence secretary, said two have been lost so far in Afghanistan because of icing. Predator is made by General Atomics. A defence official said: "This aircraft is known for its video. It's become the commander's real time eye in the sky, providing real time streaming video back to the command post. We can identify and track targets four or five miles away. . ." Jane's Mr Cook thinks the development of UAVs will parallel that of manned military aircraft, which were used to reconnoitre behind enemy lines in the first world war and then were given guns and bombs. The Pentagon has attached Hellfire tank-busting missiles to some Predators. According to Aviation Week magazine, USAF Predators have achieved nearly 100 per cent hits in "several dozens" of attacks on Taliban targets. Predator is operated by a remote "pilot", but Global Hawk operates itself via a pre-programmed mission, which can be altered while in flight. The Pentagon is developing more unmanned combat aerial vehicles. In the US alone, well over 100 new designs are being developed, including micro-vehicles with wingspans smaller than 15cm (6 inches). From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Thu Nov 8 03:11:38 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2001 10:11:38 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Klein on Doha Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011108101117.00b01048@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Doha, the economic frontline The developing world's needs are being sacrificed to the war effort Naomi Klein Thursday November 8, 2001 The Guardian What do you call someone who believes so firmly in the promise of salvation through a set of rigid rules that they are willing to risk their own life to spread those rules? A religious fanatic? A holy warrior? How about a US trade negotiator? Tomorrow, the World Trade Organisation begins its meeting in Doha, Qatar. According to US security briefings, there is reason to believe that al-Qaida, which has plenty of fans in the Gulf state, has managed to get some of its operatives into the country, including an explosives specialist. Some terrorists may even have managed to infiltrate the Qatari military. Given these threats, you might think that the US and WTO would have cancelled their meeting. But not these true believers. Instead, US delegates have been kitted out with gas masks, two-way radios and drugs to combat bioterrorism (Canadian delegates have been issued the drugs as well). As negotiators wrangle over agricultural subsidies, softwoods and pharmaceutical patents, helicopters will be waiting to whisk US delegates on to aircraft carriers parked in the Persian gulf, ready for a Batman-style getaway. It's safe to say that Doha is not your average trade negotiation; it's something new. Call it kamikaze capitalism. Last week, US trade representative Robert Zoellick praised his delegation for being willing to "sacrifice" in the face of such "undoubted risks". Why are they doing it? Probably for the same reason people have always put their lives on the line: they believe in a set of rules that promises transcendence. In this case, the god is economic growth, and it promises to save us from global recession. New markets to access, new sectors to privatise, new regulations to slash - these will get those arrows in the corner of our television screens pointing heavenwards once again. Of course growth cannot be created at a meeting, but Doha can accomplish something else, something more religious than economic. It can send "a sign" to the market, a sign that growth is on the way, that expansion is just around the corner. And an ambitious new round of WTO negotiations is the sign for which they are praying. For rich countries like ours, the desire for this sign is desperate. It is more pressing than any possible problems with current WTO rules, problems mostly raised by poor countries, fed up with a system that has pushed them to drop their trade barriers while rich countries kept theirs up. So it's no surprise that poor countries are this round's strongest opponents. Before they agree to drastically expand the reach of the WTO, many are asking rich coun tries to make good on their promises from the last round. There are major disputes - about agricultural subsidies and dumping, about tariffs and the patenting of life forms. The most contentious issue is drug patents. India, Brazil, Thailand and a coalition of African countries want clear language stating that patents can be overridden to protect public health. The US and Canada are not just resisting - they are resisting even as their own delegates head for Qatar popping discount cipros, muscled out of Bayer using exactly the kind of pressure tactics they are calling unfair trade practices. These concerns are not reflected in the draft ministerial declaration. Which is why Nigeria just blasted the WTO for being "one-sided" and "disregarding the concerns of the developing and least developed countries". India's WTO ambassador said that the draft "gives the uncomfortable impression that there is no serious attempt to bring issues of importance to developing countries into the mainstream". These protests have made little impression in Geneva. Growth is the only god at these negotiations and any measures that could slow profits even slightly - of drug companies, of water companies, of oil companies - are being treated by believers as if they are on the side of the infidels and evil-doers. What we are witnessing is trade being "bundled" (Microsoft-style) inside the with-us-or-against logic of the war on terrorism. Last week Zoellick explained that "by promoting the WTO's agenda, these 142 nations can counter the revulsive destructionism of terrorism". Open markets, he said, are "an antidote" to the terrorists' "violent rejectionism". (Fittingly, these are non-arguments glued together with made-up words.) Zoellick further called on WTO member states to set aside their petty concerns about mass poverty and Aids and join the economic front of America's war. "We hope the representatives who meet in Doha will perceive the larger stakes," he said. Trade negotiations are all about power and opportunity and for kamikaze capitalists, terrorism is just another opportunity for leverage. Perhaps their motto can be: "What doesn't kill us will make us stronger. Much stronger." From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Thu Nov 8 03:15:40 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2001 10:15:40 +0000 Subject: [A-List] UN fears 'disaster' over strikes near huge dam Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011108101511.00a8d958@pop.tiscali.co.uk> By Richard lloyd Parry in Quetta 08 November 2001 The Independent The United Nations is warning of a "disaster of tremendous proportions" after US planes bombed a hydro-electric power station close to a vast dam in southern Afghanistan. UN officials say that the loss of electricity will increase the suffering of civilians in southern Afghanistan, which has already suffered massive damage from American air raids. They fear that further air raids risk destroying the dam itself, with catastrophic consequences for the region. The Taliban city of Kandahar lost all its electricity a week ago, after bombs knocked out transmission from the hydro-electric power station at the Kajaki Dam in the remote reaches of Afghanistan's Helmand Province. According to diplomatic sources in Pakistan, the raids also struck a military post which has in the past been used by Arab militants of Osama bin Laden's al-Qa'ida network. The UN has sent Afghan employees to the isolated site to report on the extent of the damage. Initial reports suggest that the dam itself was not directly hit by the raids but, according to the office of the UN regional co-ordinator for Southern Afghanistan, even the failure of the electricity creates the risk of massive flooding and crop failures. "In case the dam and/or the three tunnels (with regulators) leading the water out of the dam also has been damaged it may result in a disaster of tremendous proportions," says an internal report prepared by the regional co-ordinator in the Pakistani city of Quetta and made available to The Independent. "If the dam collapses the whole Helmand valley would be flooded, risking the life of tens of thousands of people in addition to destroying the lands benefiting around 500,000 people (and feeding around 1,000,000 people) ... It is crucial to have the situation at the Kajaki dam/power plant assessed." The 48-year-old dam on the Helmand River is 300ft high, 900ft long, and holds back 1.85 million cubic metres of water in a 32-mile long reservoir. Ironically, the dam's engineering and the manufacture of the two turbines are American. The connection of the power plant with the city of Kandahar, 60 miles south-east, was one of the few development projects successfully completed by the Taliban earlier this year. The power station provides electricity to about half a million people and to several hospitals and industries, including a large textile factory. But it also powers the machinery which controls the crucial flow of the Helmand River through the dam itself. Downstream of the dam, the population survives off fields created out of the desert by irrigation. If this water supply is disrupted, there will be severe damage to the harvest in a region already threatened by drought and food shortages. Too little water would make it impossible to plant the winter wheat. Too much water too soon would exhaust the reservoir, causing the wheat crop to shrivel in the spring. "In addition, in the case of the long-awaited rain arriving, the dam risks bursting without a proper functioning control/regulatory mechanism in place," says the UN report. "Needless to say, the regulatory mechanism is powered by electricity." Kandahar lost much of its electricity supply three weeks ago, when a distribution plant in the city was damaged by US bombs. Water pumps were put out of action, forcing the population to rely on wells which had already been depleted by the continuing drought. The bombing of the Kajaki hydro-electric plant has cut off power, at its source, to the entire region, including the capital of Helmand Province, Lashkar Gah. Kandahar's central Mirwais Hospital continues to operate on a generator supplied by the Red Cross, but fuel shortages and a lack of spare parts mean that it is unlikely to run for much longer. "In view of the ongoing war and increasingly cold winter temperatures, unless international support is provided to keep the central hospital functioning it will have to close with disastrous consequences for the suffering population," the UN regional co-ordinator reports. Diplomatic sources in Pakistan say that a contingent of Arab troops of Osama bin Laden's al-Qa'ida group had in the past been based at a military post close to the Kajaki dam. It is not clear whether they were present when the bombing took place, or whether the damage to the hydro-electric plant was inflicted deliberately or whether it was an accidental consequence of inaccurate targeting. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Thu Nov 8 03:19:44 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2001 10:19:44 +0000 Subject: [A-List] "Now we are against the Taliban... soon we will be with them" Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011108101822.00b1fe90@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Taliban are shaken but defiant as bombing fails to instill terror By Justin Huggler in Dasht-e Qualeh, Afghanistan 08 November 2001 The Independent We could see the American special forces team guiding the bombs in, five men watching from a ridge just a few hundred metres from the Taliban front line, within range of Taliban rifles. And, less than an hour after the bombs ploughed into the hills, sending great columns of smoke into the sky, we saw the Taliban emerge unscathed from their trenches. The tiny figures were clearly visible against the golden sunset, where only a short while before there had been smoke and flames. And there was no mistaking what they were doing. They were praying. It could have been a gesture of defiance, the way they knelt and rose in prayer, keeping the regular hour of evening prayer, despite the bombs that seemed to make the hills burn in slow motion where they stood, less than an hour before. A Northern Alliance radio crackled. The voice of a Taliban soldier came across the static. "We are alright," he said. His voice was shaken, but defiant. These are the soldiers who are supposed to be dying, or fleeing in terror before the American onslaught. Sherendel Sohol, a Northern Alliance general, said he often heard men screaming and crying out for help when the American bombs fell. They have bombed this ridge of hills relentlessly in the last week, wave after wave of carpet-bombing. Only 20 Taliban soldiers have died in the bombing on this front line, Saeedjalal Saeedi, a senior Northern Alliance commander said yesterday, and only 15 have been injured. More than 100 bombs fell here on Sunday, but only six Taliban died in the onslaught that day, according to General Saeedi. Often the bombs only succeed in blowing chunks out of the hillside. You can see a white crater where one landed close to the Northern Alliance positions. The Northern Alliance soldiers watched from beside the rusting hulk of a Russian tank destroyed more than a decade ago in the war with the Soviets, and left in position. A functioning Northern Alliance tank was sandbagged in beside it. Across the wide valley, where the sun glinted off the many snaking streams of the Kokche river, that has seen countless invading armies come and go, from Alexander the Great to the Russians, was a perfect view of the Americans' war in Afghanistan. We could see the US ground forces in Afghanistan through the crosshairs of an old pair of Russian military binoculars mounted on a tripod: five men crouched among the sandbags of a Northern Alliance position on the near ridge of hills. Just a few hundred metres beyond were the Taliban positions, on a second, higher ridge called Kalaqata. A B52 circled lazily overhead, dropping bombs that sent great columns of black smoke rising in neat rows each time it passed over Kalaqata. There was an occasional stutter of anti-aircraft fire as the Taliban tried to shoot it down, but it was thousands of feet above the range of their guns. All that technological sophistication, that could allow the Americans to rain devastation from the safety of the skies, was being guided by five men crouching on a perilous hillside, within easy range of the Taliban's snipers. When the B52 had finished its work, the special forces raced down from the hillside in green Russian military truck, driving straight through the deep streams of the Kokche that most people here ford on horseback. They use a different vehicle every day, to avoid detection. Another day, we saw them use two jeeps with blacked out windows. Once they had gone, the Northern Alliance started trying to radio the Taliban. The soldier we got through to they knew only by his call-sign, Omari, but they seemed almost concerned that he was alright. They speak whenever there is a bombardment ? and only then. "Once, Omari's commander came on the radio, and asked me why I didn't defect to them and fight against the Americans," laughed a Northern Alliance commander. On another frequency, Northern Alliance propaganda started up. "You are not brave people," someone intoned in a high voice. "You have brought shame to the name of Islam." A Northern Alliance soldier sat and stared moodily at the hills. "Once, some of us in this army fought against the Russians, and some fought with them," he said. "Now we are together against the Taliban. And I think that soon we will be together with them," he gestured towards the Taliban positions, "fighting against..." he hesitated "...some one". Did he mean the Americans? "The Americans are imperialists," he said. The US special forces had disappeared into the gathering night. Up on Kalaqata, the Taliban were still prowling around. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Thu Nov 8 04:14:38 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2001 11:14:38 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Chinese conception of surprise attack Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011108111410.00ae35c8@pop.tiscali.co.uk> China Ponders New Rules of 'Unrestricted War' Washington Post, August 8, 1999 By John Pomfret BEIJING?In 1996, colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui were in Fujian province for military exercises aimed at threatening the island of Taiwan. As Chinese M9 intermediate-range missiles splashed into waters off two main southern Taiwanese ports, the United States dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region. Like most Chinese officers, the colonels were furious at the U.S. move, seeing it as another sign of American interference in China's internal affairs. But to Qiao and Wang, the first crisis in the Taiwan Strait was also a lesson. "We realized that if China's military was to face off against the United States, we would not be sufficient," said Wang, an air force colonel in the Guangzhou military district's political department. "So we realized that China needs a new strategy to right the balance of power." Their response was to write a book called "Unrestricted War," which has become one of the hottest of a new series of military publications that haunt China's strategic planners, as well as many average citizens, with these questions: How does a relatively weak country like China stand up to a powerful nation like the United States? How should China's military modernization program be modified to ensure that China gets the biggest bang for the yuan? And how can China, which dreams of reuniting with Taiwan, ensure that the United States, which is legally bound to protect the island, thinks twice about getting militarily involved in any showdown across the Taiwan Strait? Among their sometimes creative and sometimes shocking proposals for dealing with a powerful adversary are terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental degradation and computer virus propagation. The authors include a flow chart of 24 different types of war and argue that the more complicated the combination -- for example, terrorism plus a media war plus a financial war -- the better the results. From that perspective, "Unrestricted War" marries the Chinese classic, "The Art of War" by Sun Tzu, with modern military technology and economic globalization. "Unrestricted War is a war that surpasses all boundaries and restrictions," they write at one point. "It takes nonmilitary forms and military forms and creates a war on many fronts. It is the war of the future." The book is an important expression of China's feelings of powerlessness when confronted by U.S. might. By discussing terrorism and other controversial methods of waging war, the pair illustrates China's deep discomfort with a global system in which the United States seems to dictate all the rules -- even the rules of war. "We are a weak country," Wang said, "so do we need to fight according to your rules? No." "War has rules, but those rules are set by the West," continued the 45-year-old son of a military officer. "But if you use those rules, then weak countries have no chance. But if you use nontraditional means to fight, like those employed by financiers to bring down financial systems, then you have a chance." It is extremely rare for Chinese military officers to speak with a Western reporter. The pair agreed to do that after they were encountered accidentally during a visit to a Beijing office complex. One of their reasons for agreeing seemed to be an attempt to counter reports in the Chinese press that they were emphasizing terrorism as a way to do battle without consideration of the full range of methods they describe. Another reason they agreed to speak may be that there is a heated but hidden debate among China's strategic planners on how China's military should modernize. Some advocate a wholesale adoption of Western styles of warfare; others, such as Qiao and Wang, feel that China needs a new approach. "Take theater missile defense, for example," said Qiao, referring to the U.S. program to create an antimissile defense system in Asia. "It's obviously part of a U.S. plan to pull China into an expensive trap. We don't want China to fall into that trap because all Chinese military officers know that we don't possess the resources to compete in an arms race." Qiao and Wang's book is an important indication of the concern felt by the People's Liberation Army about its country's power, its strategic place in the world and especially its ability to counter overwhelming U.S. force. These concerns have become all the more urgent following the war against Yugoslavia and the May 7 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO warplanes -- two events that prompted nationwide hand-wringing at China's weakness. They received a further boost during the latest crisis with Taiwan, which began July 9 when President Lee Teng-hui announced he wanted China to treat Taiwan's government as an equal. Last week the United States announced a $550 million weapons sale to Taiwan, further infuriating China. To military men such as Qiao and Wang, there is a direct connection between Kosovo and Taiwan and Tibet. "If today you impose your value systems on a European country, tomorrow you can do the same to Taiwan or Tibet," Wang said. The roots of some of these concerns can be traced to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when Chinese officers were shocked at the gap between Western -- particularly American -- and Chinese military technology. "The country that studied the Persian Gulf War the most was not America, but China," Wang said. "The military studied all the weapons systems and all the strategy, but we two think that China cannot follow the U.S. model. We are much poorer than the United States. So we think China needs to begin to adjust the way it makes war. It's like Mao [Zedong] said to the Japanese: 'You fight your war and I'll fight mine.' " China has had problems when it has tried to embrace some weapons systems -- for example, submarines. A report in May by the Washington-based Natural Resources Defense Council said China has had great difficulty developing submarine-launched ballistic missiles and nuclear-powered submarines. China has only one operational Xia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile sub because technical difficulties with solid fuel for the missiles and nuclear reactors for the submarines curtailed full development. This submarine was built in 1981 but it took China's navy eight years to deploy it. It is believed that the Xia-class vessel -- along with China's five Han-class nuclear attack submarines -- have never sailed beyond China's regional waters. In other areas, such as missiles, China appears to have done a better job at turning a weapons system into a ticket to big power status and thereby causing the United States to ponder a military engagement in the Taiwan Strait. Two recent developments illustrate this point. Days after Taiwan's Lee announced the new policy, China declared it had mastered the technology to manufacture a neutron bomb and miniaturize nuclear weapons. Then on Aug. 3, China announced that it had tested a new long-range ballistic missile, believed to be the Dongfeng 31. Western military experts say both weapons systems could be used against U.S. forces in Asia if Washington should come to Taiwan's aid. In addition, Russian media have reported that a Russian factory has started production of 30 Sunburn anti-ship missiles for China. The Sunburn is one of the only missiles that can travel at twice the speed of sound while skimming the ocean's surface. Once deployed, it would constitute a significant threat to U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups. Qiao, 44 and also an officer's son, raised eyebrows in Beijing a few weeks ago when, in an interview with the China Youth Daily, he suggested that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic should have attempted to deal with NATO attacks by slipping a terrorist group into Italy and attacking NATO air bases. Terrorist bands also could have attacked population centers in Germany, France and Belgium, he said. "I am not a terrorist and have always opposed terrorism," he said in response to a question about the article. "But war is not a foot race; it's more like a soccer game. If it was a foot race, China would never be able to catch up to the United States. But it's a soccer game and the goal is to win. It doesn't matter how you kick the ball into the net." From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Thu Nov 8 04:28:11 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2001 11:28:11 +0000 Subject: [A-List] PLA strategists on Future War Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011108112444.00ae7688@pop.tiscali.co.uk> [from Unrestricted Warfare by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999] ... Supra-National Combinations [Chao Guojia Zuhe] [Combining National, International, and Non-State Organizations] It seems we now face another paradox: in terms of theory, "going beyond limits" should mean no restrictions of any kind, going beyond everything. But in fact, unlimited surpassing of limits is impossible to achieve. Any surpassing of limits can only be done within certain restrictions. That is, "going beyond limits" certainly does not equate to "no limits," only to the expansion of "limited." That is, to go beyond the intrinsic boundaries of a certain area or a certain direction, and to combine opportunities and means in more areas or in more directions, so as to achieve a set objective. This is our definition of "combined war that goes beyond limits." As a method of warfare with "beyond - limits" as its major feature, its principle is to assemble and blend together more means to resolve a problem in a range wider than the problem itself. For example, when national security is threatened, the answer is not simply a matter of selecting the means to confront the other nation militarily, but rather a matter of dispelling the crisis through the employment of "supra-national combinations." We see from history that the nation-state is the highest form of the idea of security. For Chinese people, the nation-state even equates to the great concept of all-under-heaven [tianxia 1131 0007 classical name for China]. Nowadays, the significance of the word "country" in terms of nationality or geography is no more than a large or small link in the human society of the "world village." Modern countries are affected more and more by regional or world-wide organizations, such as the European Community [sic; now the European Union], ASEAN, OPEC, APEC, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the WTO, and the biggest of them all, the United Nations. Besides these, a large number of multinational organizations and non-state organizations of all shapes and sizes, such as multinational corporations, trade associations, peace and environmental organizations, the Olympic Committee, religious organizations, terrorist organizations, small groups of hackers, etc., dart from left and right into a country's path. These multinational, non-state, and supra-national organizations together consitute an up and coming worldwide system of power.[3] Perhaps not many people have noticed, but the factors described above are leading us into an era of transformation in which great power politics are yielding to supra-national politics. The main characteristic of this era is that it is transitional: many indications of it are appearing, and many processes are just now beginning. National power is a main part, and supra-national, multinational, and non-state power is another main part, and the final verdict on which of these will play the main role on the international stage has yet to be delivered. On the one hand, the big powers still play the dominant part. In particular, that all-round big power, the United States, and the big economic powers like Japan and Germany, and the rising power China, and the fading power Russia, are all trying to exert their own influence on the overall situation. On the other hand, there are far-sighted big powers which have clearly already begun to borrow the power of supra-national, multinational, and non-state players to redouble and expand their own influence. They realize they cannot achieve their objectives by relying only on their own power. The most recent and most typical example is the use of the euro to unify the European Community. This vigorous process has continued to today, but it has just now emerged from a period of floundering. The time when the process will conclude is still far off. The recent direction and the long-range prospect are not clear-cut. They are things which come about as a matter of course. Nevertheless, some signs of a trend are evident; that is, the curtain is now slowly falling on the era in which the final decision on victory and defeat is made by way of state vs. state tests of strength. Instead, the curtain is quietly opening on an era in which problems will be resolved and objectives achieved by using supra-national means on a stage larger than the size of a country.[4] In view of this, we list "supra-national combinations" as being among the essential factors of warfare that exceeds limits. In this world of mutually penetrating political, economic, ideological, technical, and cultural influences, with networks, clones, Hollywood, hot girls [la mei 6584 1188 -- internet pornography], and the World Cup easily bypassing territorial boundary markers, it is very hard to realize hopes of assuring security and pursuing interests in a purely national sense. Only a fool like Saddam Hussein would seek to fulfill his own wild ambition by outright territorial occupation. Facts make it clear that acting in this way in the closing years of the 20th Century is clearly behind the times, and will certainly lead to defeat. Also pursuing its national security and national interests, as a mature great power the United States appeared much smarter than Iraq. Since the day they stepped onto the international stage, the Americans have been seizing things by force or by trickery, and the benefits they obtained from other countries were many times greater than anyone knows than what Iraq got from Kuwait. The reasons cannot be explained as merely "might makes right," and they are not just a problem of an evasion of international norms and vetoes. This is because, in all its foreign actions, the United States always tries to get as many followers as possible, in order to avoid becoming a leader with no support, out there all alone. Except for small countries like Grenada and Panama, against which it took direct and purely military action, in most situations the United States pursues and realizes its own interests by using supra-national means. In coping with the Iraq problem, the method the Americans used a very typical supra-national combination. During the entire course of their actions, the Americans acted in collusion with others, maneuvering among various political groups, and getting the support of practically all the countries in the United Nations. The United States got this, the premier international organization in all the world, to issue a resolution to make trouble under a pretext provided by the United States, and dragged over 30 countries into the joint force sent against Iraq. After the war, the United States was again successful in organizing an economic embargo of Iraq which has continued for eight years, and it used arms inspections to maintain continuous political and military pressure on Iraq. This has left Iraq in long-term political isolation and dire economic straits. Since the Gulf War, the trend toward supra-national combinations in warfare or other conflicts has been increasingly obvious. The more recent the event, the more prominent this characteristic is, and the more frequently it becomes a means used by more and more countries. In the past ten years this trend has become the backdrop for drastic international social turbulence. Worldwide economic integration, internationalization of domestic politics, the networking of information resources, the increased frequency of new technological eras, the concealment of cultural conflicts, and the strengthening of non-state organizations, all bring human society both convenience and troubles, in equal means. This is why the great powers, and even some medium and small sized countries, act in concert without need of prior coordination and set their sights on supra-national combinations as the way to solve their problems.[5 ] It is for just this reason that threats to modern nations come more often from supra-national powers, and not from one or two specific countries. There can be no better means for countering such threats than the use of supra-national combinations. In fact, there's nothing new under the sun, and supra-national combinations are not newly discovered territory. As early as the Spring and Autumn period [770-476 B.C], the Warring States period [475-221 B.C.], and the Peloponnesian War [431-404 B.C], supra-national combinations were already the oldest and most classical of methods employed by ancient strategists in the east and in the west.[6 ] The idea has not lost its fascination to this day. Schwartzkopf's supra-national combination in the Gulf War can be called a modern version of the classical "alliance + combined forces." If we must point out the generation gap between ancient times and today and describe the difference between them, then it is that for the ancients the idea was combinations of state with state, and not vertical, horizontal, and interlocking supra-national, trans-national, and non-state combinations.[7 ] These three ancient peoples could not have imagined that the principle would remain unchanged in the present. Nor could they imagine the revolutionary changes which have occurred, from technical means to actual employment. The brand-new model of "state + supra- national + trans-national + non-state" will bring about fundamental changes in the face and final outcome of warfare, even changing the essential military nature of warfare which has been an unquestionable truth since ancient times. This method, resolving conflicts or conducting warfare not just with national power, but also with combinations of supra-national, trans-national, and non-state power, is what we mean by the general term supra-national combinations. From an examination of some prior, successful examples it can be foreseen that from now on, supra- national combinations will be a country's most powerful weapon in attempting to accomplish national security objectives and secure strategic interests within a scope larger than the country itself.[8 ] As the world's only world-class superpower, the United States is the best at using supra-national combinations as a weapon. The United States never misses any opportunity to take a hand in international organizations involving U.S. interests. Another way to put it is that the United States consistently sees the actions of all international organizations as being closely related to U.S. interests. No matter whether the nature of the international organization is European, American, Asian, for some other region, or worldwide, the United States always strives to get involved in it, and manipulate it. The 1996 U.S. Department of Defense Report put it straightforwardly, "To protect and achieve U.S. interests, the U.S. Government must have the capability to influence the policies and actions of other countries. This requires the United States to maintain its overseas involvement, especially in those areas in which the most important interests of the United States are endangered."[9 ] For example, regarding the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization, the initial idea of its conceptualizer, Australian Prime Minister Hawke, was that it would only include Asian countries, Australia, and New Zealand. However, this idea immediately encountered strong opposition from President Bush, and it was then expanded to include the United States and Canada. At the same time, so as to check the momentum of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation, the United States spared no effort in instigating some Asian countries to sign independent agreements with the North American Free Trade Area. Not only did the United States make its way in, it also dragged others out. It might well be said that the United States used a double-combination tactic. ... http://cryptome.org/cuw.zip From lnp3 at panix.com Thu Nov 8 07:05:10 2001 From: lnp3 at panix.com (Louis Proyect) Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2001 09:05:10 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Support for Taliban deepens Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.20011108090510.006e1fe8@popserver.panix.com> Support Deepens For the Taliban, Refugees Report U.S. Errors Fuel Sympathy By Rajiv Chandrasekaran Washington Post Foreign Service Thursday, November 8, 2001; Page A01 QUETTA, Pakistan, Nov. 7 -- Afghans who have entered Pakistan in recent days say that a month of U.S. airstrikes has failed to diminish popular support in central and southern Afghanistan for the ruling Taliban militia, which they say continues to exert a firm grip over the civilian population despite a heavy loss of military equipment. The arriving Afghans, interviewed in Quetta, near the Afghan border, said sympathies toward the Taliban remain strong in part because of perceptions among many Afghans that the U.S. bombing campaign has hurt civilians as well as military and terrorist targets. Those views appear to have been stoked by U.S. bombing errors, compounded by an aggressive Taliban propaganda campaign casting the conflict as an American attack on Islam. "The Americans said they would only target Osama bin Laden's bases," said Abdul Mohammed, a shop owner who lives in the southern city of Kandahar, the Taliban's stronghold. "But now they are killing ordinary Afghan people, so people think that the Afghan people are America's enemy, not just the Taliban and bin Laden." U.S. military strategists had hoped the air attacks and the resulting destruction would generate public anger at the Taliban, forcing its leaders to surrender bin Laden and members of his al Qaeda network. But Afghan refugees said just the opposite has occurred. Mohammed, a weathered man in his fifties, traveled to Quetta two days ago to talk to Pashtun tribal leaders about ways to encourage Afghans to join an anti-Taliban movement in the country's central and southern regions. Such an uprising, along with continued advances by the Northern Alliance coalition in northern and eastern Afghanistan, has been seen as a key part of the U.S. strategy to topple the radical Islamic militia and flush out bin Laden. Although the Northern Alliance has been buoyed by U.S. airstrikes on front-line Taliban troops north of Kabul, Mohammed said he and his Pashtun brethren in central and southern Afghanistan face an increasingly difficult quest in generating opposition to the Taliban -- precisely because of the military assault. "The bombing has not weakened the Taliban where we are," he said. "It has made them stronger." Government buildings and Taliban military bases may have been hit, he said, but added, "They still have their guns and their trucks." "Every day we hear stories of more innocent people, more women and children, getting killed by the American bombs," said Abdul Qadir, who owns a small restaurant in the town of Spin Boldak, a few miles from the Pakistani border. Qadir said his friends and family despise the Taliban for not handing over bin Laden. But, he said, they hate the United States as well for mounting the military campaign. Now, "even the people who did not really like the Taliban are supporting them," he said. U.S. officials contend the strikes have hobbled the Taliban, destroying military facilities, severing communications systems, scattering fighters and disrupting government services. Earlier this week, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld proclaimed the Taliban was "not really functioning as a government." Refugees who said they were from Kandahar described a city with few municipal services in the best of times. The major changes since the bombings began, they said, have been failures in electricity and telephone service. As they have for years, residents use hand pumps to get well water and cook on small wood fires. The refugees said the city has an ample supply of gasoline, which is trucked in from Iran. In fact, fuel shipments have been moving through the country in such vast quantities that some diesel vendors in Quetta say they make purchases from smugglers at the Afghan border. Commerce in Kandahar is a mixed bag, according to refugees and several Pakistani journalists who recently traveled to the city with Taliban escorts. Many shops are closed, but street markets still are crowded with people buying fresh pomegranates, apples shipped in from Pakistan and freshly baked flat bread. "The markets were packed, the streets were crowded," said Shezada Zulfiqar, a Pakistani journalist who visited Kandahar last week. "It looks like a normal functioning city." In the two weeks after the airstrikes began Oct. 7, refugees and aid workers reported that Taliban soldiers had fled cities along with the militia's much-feared religious police from the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. But over the past two weeks, Afghans here said, many Taliban soldiers have returned to Kandahar in the daytime to keep watch on street corners and zip around in their trademark pickup trucks and muddy four-wheel-drive vehicles commandeered from U.N. aid agencies. The religious police, too, are back, the refugees said, but are not enforcing the dress code with their usual severity. "The Taliban have said that they are relaxing the rules because life has become more difficult," said Rachmat Ullah, 21, a farmer who used to live in a village five miles outside Kandahar. "But they are still there. Nobody dares to shave or go out without a burqa." Mir Ahmed, a grandfather who left Kandahar five days ago with 16 relatives, said that although fewer Taliban soldiers were on the streets than before the bombings began, "it is clear they are still in charge." He said people do not talk about politics, particularly efforts by the exiled former king and other anti-Taliban leaders to hold a grand national council aimed at forming a new government. "People are still afraid of the Taliban," he said. "Life has not changed at all." Although several government buildings have been demolished by bombs -- including the virtue and vice ministry -- Taliban officials have relocated their offices to mosques and offices of international aid agencies, the refugees said. After a hiatus at the start of the air war, the militia has resumed many of its ordinary activities, including executions of convicted criminals. Soldiers also have increased patrols in villages near Kandahar, often showing up unannounced to spend the night, the refugees said. In cities and villages, Muslim clerics have been trying to rally support for the Taliban by portraying the bombing campaign as an assault on Islam, the recent Afghan refugees said. "Our religious scholars keep making announcements that [President] Bush has challenged the Muslims," said Qadir, the restaurateur. "Even the people who dislike the Taliban are Muslims, and they have been convinced by these messages." Several of the refugees said, however, that the clerics have not been as instrumental in shaping public attitudes as the relentless, month-long air assault and the civilian casualties. "Osama is alive, but many of the Afghan people are not," said an elderly man named Haji Mohammed who fled Kandahar three days ago with his family after a building near his house was destroyed, killing three civilians, he said. Although the refugees and others who have recently left Afghanistan said many people still fault the Taliban for provoking the U.S. attack, they said those views are clearly in the minority. "We thought that America was our friend because they supported us in our war against the Russians," said Mohammed, the Kandahar shopkeeper. "But now people have lost that soft corner in their hearts for Americans. Their hearts are with the Taliban." Louis Proyect Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Thu Nov 8 07:11:09 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2001 16:11:09 +0200 Subject: [A-List] The quagmire continues Message-ID: US sews up patchwork ground force IAN BRUCE: Analysis The Herald, 8 November 2001 EUROPEAN military detachments selected for a peacekeeping force in Afghanistan will not enter the country until the Taliban regime has been deposed and a more ethnically representative government installed. Most of the 100,000 troops likely to be committed will be American, to avoid the kind of decision-making morass which plagued the Kosovo campaign in 1999, when at least half a dozen Nato governments interfered in the planning of operations. But the US game plan for an increasingly probable ground invasion next spring will include a British Commonwealth division of about 12,000 to 15,000 men under US command. Pledges of military support by Germany, Italy, Spain, and France, are unlikely to be taken up until the Taliban regime has been deposed and a more ethnically representative government installed. Then, the main outside contribution is likely to come from Turkey, the staunchest Muslim ally in the allied coalition. Ankara has already offered to lead or play a prominent role in a temporary post-conflict peacekeeping arrangement which would placate a wider Islam. The US hopes that other Muslim nations such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and perhaps Egypt and Syria will then offer units to guarantee a relatively peaceful transition from Taliban rule, while other forces withdraw. Britain's part of the Commonwealth division will be the 3500 men of the Royal Marines 3 Commando Brigade and a further 6000 to 8000 from 16 Air Assault Brigade. Other contingents would be provided by Australia, Canada and New Zealand. A British military source said last night: "The idea of a Commonwealth Division, much like the one which fought in Korea as part of the US-led United Nations army in the early 1950s, appears to be gaining favour. It would certainly make military sense from the points of view of common language, training and operational techniques. "Deploying a tank regiment from one country, infantry from another and artillery from a third makes for terrific propaganda, but it creates more problems than it solves at the sharp end. If invasion has to be the option, then attacking with overwhelming force and minimum confusion is the only way to minimise casualties." While welcoming all contributions, the only units requested by the US so far have been British and Australian SAS squadrons, French special forces drawn from the Foreign Legion's 2nd parachute regiment, and German chemical, biological and nuclear detection and decontamination experts. Turkey has sent 90 commandos to help train Northern Alliance forces. The Turks are the only Nato member country with recent mountain warfare experience against mujahideen-like guerrillas. The only non-US troops likely to see action during the winter are the UK and Australian SAS troopers, French reconnaissance teams, and perhaps Turkish counter-insurgency commandos. A Pentagon source said: "No- one has yet given the green light for a ground attack, but planning is already under way. In the meantime, everyone is hoping for the 'silver bullet scenario' ... intelligence allowing a raid to neutralise Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, without ... a major military build-up and a full-scale ground operation." Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/8-11-19101-0-25-17.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Thu Nov 8 07:23:43 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2001 16:23:43 +0200 Subject: [A-List] The Birtian legacy Message-ID: Reports of Dyke fury at stars who 'take BBC money then slag us off' Matt Wells, media correspondent Thursday November 8, 2001 The Guardian The BBC director general, Greg Dyke, has delivered an angry rebuke to highly paid BBC staff such as Nicky Campbell and Kate Adie who have made provocative public comments about the workings of the corporation. Mr Dyke, speaking to senior BBC management executives, said he was fed up at well rewarded stars causing trouble by rounding on the organisation in public. His remarks put a question mark over the future of the BBC's big names. In a diatribe during Tuesday's board of management meeting, Mr Dyke is reported to have said: "Why do we pay all these presenters all this money for them to then slag us off?" His fury boiled over after Campbell, host of an acclaimed phone-in programme on Radio 5 Live, claimed in a newspaper interview that he had turned down an offer of Jimmy Young's job on Radio 2. Campbell said: "Jimmy Young's not really been told what's going on - but the BBC is like that. I'll be the one that is shat on in five years' time. We're under no illusions here. The BBC is a wonderful organisation, but it's a ruthless one." Last month Kate Adie, the chief news correspondent, criticised the BBC for favouring youth and looks over experience by hiring female reporters with "cute faces and cute bottoms". She told the Cheltenham festival of literature: "The celebrity culture is interested in who people sleep with and whether their legs are the right shape. Everyone on TV now comes in for this type of scrutiny." While the BBC under Mr Dyke encourages open debate, that does not mean he has sanctioned "outright treachery", according to one source. But his comments are reminiscent of remarks made by his predecessor, John Birt, who criticised the "rude" interviewing style of broadcasters such as Jeremy Paxman and John Humphrys. In his newspaper interview, Campbell said the Radio 2 controller Jim Moir had described him as the "anointed one", but declared that he wanted to stay at the "cutting edge of current affairs" at Radio 5 Live rather than defect to the "green pastures" of Radio 2. He said he felt "very sorry" for the way Young, 80, had been treated. Campbell's comments caused big problems at the BBC: the corporation was backed into a corner and Young was infuriated. The broadcaster's colleagues and senior executives were astonished; Campbell said he had merely wanted to set the record straight after speculation about Young's position at Radio 2. His opponents, however, have suggested that his aim was to ensure that whoever eventually takes over from Young is regarded as a second choice. After the furore, Campbell confined himself to a formal statement in which he said: "There has been a great deal of media interest surrounding the future of Jimmy Young, a broadcaster I much admire. I have formally turned down the offer to take over from him, and wish to end all speculation linking me to the job, as I want to continue my work in news and current affairs." Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,589592,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 9 03:06:00 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2001 12:06:00 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Britain/US split Message-ID: Splits open in UK-US alliance Ewen MacAskill and Richard Norton-Taylor Friday November 9, 2001 The Guardian British ministers privately expressed frustration yesterday with the US prosecution of the war against terrorism, the first sign of serious differences between London and Washington since the attacks on September 11. Although Tony Blair saw his quick trip to Washington this week as an opportunity to cement Britain's position as the No 1 ally of the US, unease is growing in Whitehall. There is concern on both the military and diplomatic fronts over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the bombing strategy; perceived lack of US consultation with its allies; and insufficient US focus on the humanitarian crisis. The British government is also intent on opposing the expansion of the war beyond Afghanistan and is horrified at elements within the Pentagon pushing for an all-out assault on Iraq. The handling of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the main source of dispute, with Downing Street and the Foreign Office worried that dithering in Washington in its handling of the peace process risks alienating Arab opinion, which is seen as crucial in the coalition against terrorism. Mr Blair, who experienced at first hand last week during a trip to the Middle East the extent of Arab anger, pressed President George Bush in Washington on Wednesday to apply pressure on Israel to return to peace talks. But Mr Blair suffered a rebuff yesterday when it emerged that Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, will not be making a long-heralded speech at the UN general assembly this weekend in support of the creation of a Palestinian state. The speech had been flagged as a historic shift in US policy towards Israel, representing a significant move towards the Palestinian position. It has been expected for two months. Even on Wednesday, as Mr Blair was on his way to Washington, Downing Street was briefing that Mr Powell was poised to take a firm line with Israel. One British minister said that the content of Mr Powell's speech was not in doubt, just the timing. The minister said the Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon, had acted abominably in recent weeks. Mr Bush is to make a speech to the general assembly tomorrow, but Foreign Office sources said he was unlikely to use the opportunity to make the historic statement. There is also rising anxiety within Whitehall that after Afghanistan the Bush administration may turn its sights on Iraq. Mr Bush said on Wednesday that the bombing of Afghanistan was just the start of the war on terrorism. One British minister said that bombing Iraq would be catastrophic because women and children would be killed and the consequences for the US and Britain in the Arab world would be unimaginably dangerous. He warned that US and British embassies in the Arab world would have to close and British civilians would have to be advised to leave the area. He feared that moderate Arab regimes would be swept away. The sense of frustration also applies to defence and military circles. British defence officials recognise that Washington is calling the shots. But there is growing impatience about US delays in deploying and giving tasks to ground troops, including some 100 SAS troops believed to be in Afghanistan or nearby. One senior minister even spoke disparagingly about General Tommy Franks, the US commander of Operation Enduring Freedom, describing him as an "artillery man" reluctant to commit infantry. British military planners made it clear they are extremely concerned about the failed raid by US rangers on targets near Kandahar on October 20 and the decision to release a video of it for propaganda reasons. There are some 70 British military officers assigned to the Florida headquarters of Gen Franks. They are said to be providing valuable advice, yet there is a growing feeling in London that it is not being publicly recognised, defence sources say. "You're not the only ones," one well-placed source said yesterday, referring to Washington's failure to acknowledge publicly Britain's contribution. British defence sources point to what they say is the valuable task carried out by RAF pilots refuelling American aircraft and undertaking reconnaissance over Afghanistan. The sense of frustration in Britain is echoed in Germany where a row has erupted over whether the US had requested the 3,900 troops Berlin has earmarked for operations in Afghanistan. The US defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, initially denied having made the request for German troops. Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,1361,590474,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 9 03:10:34 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2001 12:10:34 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Blair vs. Brown Message-ID: Don't bank on it The single currency is unlikely to be successful as long as it run by a central bank as bad as the ECB Larry Elliott Friday November 9, 2001 The Guardian Well, better late than never. The European Central Bank finally emerged from hibernation yesterday and saw the headlights of a global slump bearing down on them. After watching idly as the eurozone slid ever closer to recession, Wim Duisenberg at last decided to act and cut interest rates by half a point. It was too little too late. The ECB was the third leading central bank to make borrowing cheaper this week, but while America's Federal Reserve has moved 10 times since the start of the year and the Bank of England seven, the ECB's paranoia about non-existent inflation has meant it has made just four reductions. The inadequacy of this response is plain to see, particularly in the linchpin of the eurozone - Germany - which has announced this week the biggest rise in unemployment in three years and a collapse in both industrial orders and output. The eurozone as a whole will be lucky to grow by half the 2.8% predicted by the European Commission in the spring, and 2002 looks no better. Given what has been happening in the United States, some slowdown in Europe was inevitable this year, but the ECB has made matters far worse than they need have been. Why? Because it is badly designed, badly structured and badly led. Set up to cope with the high inflation that dogged the global economy in the 1970s and 1980s, the ECB can't cope with a world that has moved on. Prices are already falling in Japan, and are heading south elsewhere in the west. Oil prices are below $20 a barrel and falling fast. Alone in the world, the ECB believes that inflation poses a bigger threat than deflation. Duisenberg, who comes across as a tetchy economics professor, has not helped matters. As far as the financial markets are concerned he is a bumbling incompetent who fails to send out clear signals of what the ECB is up to (very little, for the most part). Not up to the job, as Clement Attlee once said of a minister on his way out of government. All this matters to Britain, where the assumption is that the government will pop the question on the euro as soon as Gordon Brown's famous five economic tests are met. But the chancellor's assessment represents only one half of Labour's get-out clause; the other is that it will only sign up for a "successful" single currency. And the question that Brown is asking himself is whether the single currency can ever be successful when it is run by a central bank as bad as the ECB. The vibes given off by the chancellor and his advisers suggest that their answer is in the negative, and they are absolutely right. If they could institute a sixth test for British entry at this late stage - which they can't - it would be that there should be radical reform of the ECB to make it pre-emptive and proactive like the Bank of England. Although they would never admit it, there are those in Berlin and Paris who privately agree. The Bank of England has a symmetrical inflation target of 2.5%, with an undershoot treated as seriously as an overshoot; the ECB is simply committed to keeping infla tion below 2%. If UK inflation should fall below 1.5%, Sir Eddie George has to write a letter to the chancellor explaining what he's doing to push it higher; the ECB has no such stricture. Minutes of Bank of England meetings are released after two weeks; the ECB's deliberations are stuck in a vault and left there for 16 years. Ironically, the government minister now selling the euro to the public, saw what this would lead to: "The policy, legally enshrined in the Maastricht treaty, of a European Central Bank independent of democratic control and dedicated almost exclusively to price stability must be reversed. It is economically disastrous and politically dangerous." But that was Peter Hain six years ago, when he was a backbencher with a mind of his own. Despite the accuracy of his prophecy, his line now is that the pass was sold when Labour gave the bank control over interest rates, and that one central bank is much like another. But this simply will not wash. Handing control of monetary policy to technocrats does raise legitimate questions of democracy and political legitimacy, but it is fatuous to say that there is no difference between a bank like the Fed - which looks at growth, jobs and inflation when reaching its decisions - and a bank like the ECB which has an in-built bias to wards deflation. Despite all this, there are those who insist on seeing the ECB as a progressive force. They should think again. It is not just that the 90s were dire for Europe as it geared up for monetary union, with growth in Germany averaging less than 1.5% a year since 1992. It is not just that unemployment, after coming down briefly as a result of the US boom and the devaluation of the euro, is now going up. It is not just that Britain, outside the eurozone, will have the fastest growth in the G7 this year and next. It is that the ECB's cure for Europe's lost decade is the same as that prescribed for Britain - monetarism, cuts in public borrowing and labour market flexibility. What was the word for that? Oh yes, Thatcherism. That was it. Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 9 03:50:37 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2001 12:50:37 +0200 Subject: [A-List] New Labour Network Message-ID: The other woman in Blair's life walks out on him for job with BP Blow to PM as his oldest friend in politics, Anji Hunter, quits Downing Street Kevin Maguire and Patrick Wintour Friday November 9, 2001 The Guardian The tall, striking blonde returned from the bar of Brighton's Grand Hotel clutching a bottle of champagne in one hand, a pair of flutes in the other, to find her guest Mick Hucknall chatting with a female Labour delegate. Anji Hunter glanced at the woman's conference pass and brushed off the uninvited interloper with a dismissive "hello Janet, goodbye" as she simultaneously guided the Simply Red singer to the privacy of a comfy sofa and a t?te-?-t?te. The Downing Street director of government relations is the schmoozer's schmoozer, able to charm those from whom she wants something in less than 10 seconds if she spots someone more important over their shoulder. Bill Clinton and Rupert Murdoch, US ambassador William Farish, and the Hinduja brothers, before they became too hot to handle, plus businessmen, celebrities, editors, trade unionists and the odd cabinet minister have enjoyed the flirtatious, seductive "Anji treatment" as she worked rooms on Mr Blair's behalf. Yet Tony Blair will miss his oldest friend in politics for far more than her networking skills after she suddenly left No 10 for good last night, ahead of taking up a post early next year - following a three-month Whitehall quarantine period - as the energy group BP's director of communications on an estimated ?180,000 a year. Ms Hunter is a confidante and trusted aide, one of the few who can walk into his study without first knocking. She is known as the other woman in Tony Blair's life, or disparagingly as his "comfort blanket" for her ability to gee him up when he was down. Widely recognised as the gatekeeper who controlled access to the PM, she could strike fear into ministers and was one of the small group who discussed reshuffles and decided the fate of aspiring politicians. She is, in all probability, irreplaceable. Of the three political allies - Peter Mandelson, Alastair Campbell and Ms Hunter - who were closest to Mr Blair when he won first the Labour leadership and then the premiership, only Mr Campbell now remains at the heart of the Blair "project". Ms Hunter, a ruthless operator, played a crucial role in soothing tensions between Mr Blair and a Gordon Brown who believes he should have been leader, using her relationship with the chancellor's adviser Sue Nye to keep the two powerful personalities on good terms. As she said her swift farewells last night after a lunch with a small group of friends and colleagues (including Ms Nye) in a smart restaurant near Victoria station, Ms Hunter played down the impact of her departure on Mr Blair. "He's a big strong boy and he knows how to use the phone," said someone very close to the 46-year-old. The statuesque figure often seen on TV walking behind the PM was the most powerful unelected woman in Downing Street since Marcia Falkender called the shots in Harold Wilson's kitchen cabinet. Mr Blair said in a statement: "Anji Hunter has made a fantastic contribution to the government and Labour party. Our loss is BP's gain." Eyebrows were raised at the timing of her decision, after the loyal lieutenant returned with Mr Blair from talks with President Bush in Washington. Ms Hunter, who was once linked with a move to Buckingham Palace, flirted with joining BP before the election and had been persuaded to stay on with a new title and hefty salary hike to ?120,000 after the prime minister reportedly begged her to remain. Mr Blair's official spokesman claimed she had always intended to go a few months after helping "see in" the new administration, but the official version of events was contradicted by a No 10 colleague of Ms Hunter. The Downing Street staffer maintained her new role handling relations with outside bodies and other countries had not worked out and Ms Hunter made up her mind to quit before September 11, agreeing to hang on a couple of months to assist Mr Blair during what was a stressful period. She had won a power struggle with Downing Street political secretary Sally Morgan to gain her promotion from special assistant to director of government relations, Ms Morgan being shuffled off to the Lords and a middle-ranking cabinet office ministerial brief. Cherie Blair, said to have a frosty relationship with Ms Hunter, reportedly objected to her being handed a No 10 job in 1997 and two years ago is believed to have sided with Sally Morgan in a turf dispute with BP's new communications chief. Ms Hunter first met Mr Blair in 1970 when they both stayed overnight at a party. He was 17 and she 15, the daughter of a rubber plantation manager from Scotland with a distinguished war record. She was brought up in Malaysia until the age of 10 when the family returned to Brechin and, within months, her mother was killed in a car crash. Mr Blair was at Fettes, Edinburgh, and Ms Hunter a pupil at St Leonard's in St Andrews, 40 miles away, and they remained good friends after that initial meeting. He studied at Oxford University and she took A-levels at a college in the city, briefly stepping out with a guitarist in his rock group Ugly Rumours. She married landscape gardener Nick Cornwall in 1980 and the couple have two grown up children, keeping a family home in Sussex and flat in London. She worked part-time for Mr Blair after he became an MP in 1983 and, after gaining a first in history and English at Brighton Polytechnic in 1988, went to work for him full-time. Until yesterday she has done so ever since, save for a short break after the 1992 general election. The hiring of Ms Hunter will cement a cosy relationship between the Blairites and a corporation already dubbed "Blair Petroleum" for its ties with the administration. Her responsibilities include BP's image and branding strategy. "These jobs are not easy to fill," said a BP spokesman. "We felt we needed someone who knows how the world works." As the Cabinet Office prepared last night to cut off the Downing Street computer link to her home, Ms Hunter made it clear she would never return. Getting into a fix ? Asked to heal a rift between Gordon Brown and Peter Mandelson, she saw Geoffrey Robinson as a go-between and proposed the Robinson-Mandelson dinner that led to a ?373,000 loan, resignations and a bigger crisis ? She knew Mandelson was codenamed "Bobby" during the 1994 Labour leadership election to keep his involvement secret and avoid losing Blair votes in the party ? Alastair Campbell used Hunter to pass controversial stories to tabloid newspapers, allowing the spin doctor to deny any knowledge of how they became public ? Hunter fixed confidential chats between Blair and Paddy Ashdown when Labour was in opposition, aware it could have led to a coalition and voting system changes ? She formed an alliance with Margaret McDonagh (ex-Labour general secretary, now Express newspapers executive) against aide Sally Morgan. It backfired when Cherie Blair sided with Morgan ? Taken by Peter Mandelson for lunch with the Hinduja brothers when the dome was short of funds (and before the passport scandal erupted), she left with a gift of a pashmina Full article at: http://politics.guardian.co.uk/labour/story/0,9061,590466,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 9 03:51:55 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2001 12:51:55 +0200 Subject: [A-List] New Labour Network Message-ID: Among friends at 'Blair Petroleum' Kevin Maguire Friday November 9, 2001 The Guardian Anji Hunter will be among New Labour friends when she starts her new job as director of communications at BP - nicknamed Blair Petroleum for its close links with the government. The chief executive John Browne is close to the prime minister and a grateful Mr Blair added a peerage to the oilman's knighthood after he helped end the fuel protests of summer last year. Ms Hunter knows Lord Browne well from his frequent trips to No 10 and she is on first name terms with Nick Butler, an unofficial Blairite adviser who is the oil giant's policy chief. A very familiar face will be Philip Gould, Mr Blair's favourite pollster, who has fought three elections with Ms Hunter and has also undertaken research and run focus groups for BP. Lord Simon was chairman of BP until May 1997, when he resigned to become trade minister in Mr Blair's first government, sparking a row when it emerged he still owned a considerable shareholding in the company. Lady Smith, widow of the former Labour leader John Smith, was made a paid member of BP's Scottish advisory board after her husband's death, where she sat alongside Lord Gordon, another Labour peer. Barely a month after Peter Mandelson was forced to quit as trade and industry secretary over his secret ?373,000 cheap home loan from Geoffrey Robinson, BP paid his hotel and travel expenses to a conference in Paris, according to the register of members' interests. Two years ago the Foreign Office minister Peter Hain and Sir John Morris, then attorney general, received and declared free tickets and hospitality for the Wimbledon tennis championships from BP. BP and Labour point out the company also has close ties with some leading Tories; both the former chancellor Lord Howe and the ex-foreign office minister Lord Garel-Jones bank cheques as advisers. Nevertheless, BP appears to have been embraced by the New Labour establishment and is thought to be the government's favourite oil giant. In November 1997 Mr Blair invited Lord Browne (then still Sir John) and the billionaire Russian tycoon Vladimir Potanin to Downing Street to sign a ?300m deal. Alas it turned out to be a financial failure for BP. Full article at: http://politics.guardian.co.uk/labour/story/0,9061,590462,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 9 03:53:37 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2001 12:53:37 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Britain/US split Message-ID: Unhealthy reliance on the alliance Washington's support of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in Afghanistan could prove to be a diplomatic dead end, writes Simon Tisdall Simon Tisdall Thursday November 8, 2001 The Guardian As attention began to focus on Afghanistan in the days immediately following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the opposition Northern Alliance looked like natural allies of the US in the coming fight. The heirs to the US-backed mojahedin fighters who opposed and eventually repulsed the Soviet invasion in the 1980s, the Northern Alliance factions had been waging a civil war against the Taliban since losing control of Kabul, and nearly all of the country, after 1996. Nor did they have any love for the "Arab legion" volunteers who had flocked to Afghanistan to support the al-Qaida network and its leader, Osama bin Laden. The alliance wanted all foreigners to get out of their country and that included Islamist zealots from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. The fact that Russia and Iran supported the Northern Alliance was an additional, indirect encouragement to the US to follow suit. The support, or at least the acquiescence, of both countries was desirable if the Taliban were to be defeated. Russia in particular had long been covertly supplying the Afghan rebels with old Soviet-era arms. But then Washington began to have second thoughts. The behaviour of Northern Alliance forces when they were in power in Kabul before the Taliban evicted them in 1996 and the destructive rivalries of various warlords during that period were re-examined. Reports emerged linking the alliance to continuing involvement in the heroin trade based on Afghanistan's opium crop. The US also realised that if it was to win the support of Pakistan's military regime for its assault on Bin Laden and his Taliban protectors, it would be difficult simultaneously to support Pakistan's Northern Alliance enemies. Even after he was persuaded by the US (using financial and other incentives) to cut his country's ties with the Taliban, General Pervez Musharraf still insisted that any alliance role in a future Afghan government be minimised. After some hesitation, Islamabad threw its weight behind Afghanistan's exiled Pashtun king, Mohammad Zahir Shah, as the leader of a UN-approved successor regime. It certainly did not want the Northern Alliance political chief, former president Burhanuddin Rabbani, to get the job. But that was more than a month ago - and in war, things change fast. Since October 7, when the shooting started in earnest, the US has tried various alternative means of achieving its objectives without resort to a pact with the alliance. It has bombed Kabul and Kandahar - but the Taliban have not collapsed. In some ways they have been strengthened by the anger ordinary people in Pashtun areas (and in Pakistan) feel about the American attack and the resulting civilian casualties. It has attacked the al-Qaida network's training camps and mountain hideouts. But still Bin Laden has continued, unscathed and apparently unabashed, to issue his mocking videos appealing for all Muslims to join a jihad (holy war) against the west. The US has tried bribery, it has tried corruption, it has offered rewards for information, and it has waged a fierce, counter-propaganda offensive. It backed Pashtun tribal leaders who tried to lead uprisings in southern Afghanistan and provoke mass defections. But one, Abdul Haq, was captured by the Taliban and executed. Another, Hamid Karzai, had to be rescued this week by US helicopters after he was cut off and surrounded. When the US has tried to insert its fabled special forces, the results have fallen far short of glorious. Handicapped by a chronic intelligence shortage, such raids have been few and far between, and always accompanied by Taliban claims of great victories and the parading of metal parts supposedly from shot-down aircraft. In short, nothing much has worked - at least, not conclusively. And so the US has now come full circle. Having initially backed away from the Northern Alliance, it is now relying more and more on the alliance to make crucial progress on the ground before the onset of winter. This strategic switch began a bit more than a week ago with the deployment of B-52 bombers to attack Taliban defensive positions north of Kabul. This assault has intensified in recent days with the Americans dropping 15,000lb "daisy cutter" bombs not used since the Vietnam war. At the same time, the US has increased the number of special forces personnel and CIA spooks assisting and liasing with the Northern Alliance; it has begun to survey airfields in and around alliance-held territory for use in a resupply operation; and it has announced that it is commencing weapons deliveries to them. All this is apparently aimed at forcing a successful advance on the ground, most probably around the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. If territory can be taken and held before winter renders operations more difficult, the US figures, then there will be something to show for all its efforts to date. At present, there is precious little. If bases can be set up in the wake of such an advance, then the US will also be able to facilitate more effective UN humanitarian relief operations and begin planning for bigger military offensives in the spring. But this sudden, growing reliance on the Northern Alliance is far from problem-free. Serious concerns remain about the alliance's military effectiveness and political objectives. Despite also being known as the United Front, it is in fact a loosely-linked grouping of sometimes antagonistic factions divided on ethnic and personal lines. The Northern Alliance remains at odds with Pakistan and, in the absence of a UN-brokered agreement on a post-Taliban government, it is still unclear which way its various commanders will jump. In the event of a power vacuum, they could even end up fighting each other. There is also the question of Russian influence. President Vladimir Putin has promised Rabbani his unconditional support. This potentially puts Moscow at odds with the US and Britain over a future broad-based settlement. The Northern Alliance, meanwhile, is only too happy to accept America's winter supplies, its equipment, its money, and most of all its guns. But whether it will do America's bidding is another question entirely. At present, the alliance looks content to let the US air force do its work for it. It is clearly in no hurry to attempt a major advance against the Taliban's guns and despite claims of minor successes, is constantly complaining that it needs more help, more aid, more understanding. For the US, this was always going to be, at best, an alliance of convenience. But having taken the plunge and swallowed its earlier objections, Washington may find that the current set-up is pretty much a one-way street - with the lurking possibility that, for the Americans, it could yet turn into another dead-end. Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,589878,00.ht ml Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 9 03:55:12 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2001 12:55:12 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Britain/US split Message-ID: Clouds hang over special relationship Blair's pledge of allegiance masks worry and anger over US approach Ewen MacAskill, Richard Norton-Taylor, Julian Borger in Washington and Ian Black in Brussels Friday November 9, 2001 The Guardian Tony Blair famously pledged only hours after the attacks on New York and Washington to "stand shoulder to shoulder" with the US. Mr Blair, on his visit to Washington this week, still lined up enthusiastically with the US president, George Bush, but there was a gap visible for the first time. Significant differences are appearing over how the war should be fought and how Muslim opinion should be won over. Central to all this are the issues of the Middle East conflict and Iraq. Mr Blair returned from his Middle East trip last week convinced that there has to be a move towards resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There is frustration in Whitehall that Washington does not share this sense of urgency. A Downing Street spokesman insisted yesterday: "It was very clear from the conversations that the prime minister had with the US president yesterday that they [the Americans] are also absolutely committed to doing what they can." But another civil servant disagreed: "The US focus is on Afghanistan, not the Middle East." The other big difference is over Iraq. Some in the US administration are pushing for an all-out war on any state that harbours terrorists, with Iraq lined up as the next target. British ministers react to this with horror. There are differences too over the prosecution of the war. The British position, shared by the military and ministers, is that ground troops should be used as quickly as possible and that a bridgehead be established around the strategically vital city of Mazar-i-Sharif, as the bombing campaign creates hostility in Muslim countries across the world. The use of cluster bombs and "daisy-cutters" also risks turning British public opinion against the war. This underpins concern about the lack of total commitment by the US towards the impending humanitarian crisis. Britain would like the US to demonstrate that the coalition is more than cosmetic and to provide a real role for the military of other countries. A British official cautioned that it would be unrealistic to expect harmony, but the problem is that the dividing issues threaten to become more serious. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict One British minister complained this week about the delay by the US secretary of state, Colin Powell, in making his long-awaited statement setting out the US position on the Middle East conflict; one that would make a historic shift in the US balance towards support for a viable Palestinian state. That minister will have been even more exasperated to learn that a state department spokesman has now dashed expectations that the speech will be made at the UN general assembly in New York. Parts of it are believed to be included in President Bush's address to the assembly tomorrow, but it was unclear last night whether that speech includes mention of a Palestinian state. Since September 11, Mr Blair has made several trips to the Middle East, conscious that the divide between the Palestinians and the Israelis is one of the biggest causes of resentment towards the US in the Muslim world. Mr Bush has not demonstrated the same urgency. There is a strain of thinking within Washington that to try to resolve the Middle East conflict by switching from its traditional backing of Israel, would be seen as a reward for terrorism. Mr Bush has not met the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat since becoming president: he can correct that this weekend. Such a meeting would be symbolically important for the Arab world. Iraq Opinion within the US administration is divided, with some, such as the deputy defence secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, keen to take the war to Iraq and finish off Saddam Hussein. Attempts have been made by supporters of this strategy to make a link between Bin Laden and Saddam. The New York Times yesterday ran a lengthy piece quoting two Iraqi defectors as claiming the Iraqi government ran a secret camp to train Muslims to attack targets in the US and Europe, including hijack training. Such pieces help establish a context in which it will be possible for the US, if it successfully completes its actions in Afghanistan, to turn then to Iraq. In contrast with the mixed signals from the US administration, the British government is solidly opposed to any extension of the war beyond Afghanistan. One British diplomat said that Iraq was a "red line which Britain will not cross" unless there was solid evidence linking Bin Laden to Saddam, even if it was established that Saddam had spent the last few years preparing weapons of mass destruction. Military British military commanders are frustrated by US tactics and an apparent determination to "shut out" allies, as one defence source put it yesterday. While Washington has repeatedly said it wants military help, it is reluctant to acknowledge it, let alone use it, official sources say. "You're not the only ones. You may have said you want us but your body language says you do not", a well-placed defence source said yesterday referring to Washington's approach. He said it was "remarkable" that not a single non-American officer had appeared at public briefings held by General Tommy Franks, the US commander. Seventy British military planners, as well as a smaller number of French, German, and Italian, are assigned to his headquarters in Tampa, Florida. Tony Blair was reported as pointedly telling friends that 4,200 British armed forces personnel in the Gulf committed to the campaign had been made available "so that they can be used". It is thought that more than 100 SAS soldiers are deployed in or around Afghanistan waiting for an assignment. Unlike US special forces, which rely on quick raids, the SAS are trained to stay on the ground for long periods. Washington, according to British sources, insists that the next raids must be carried out by US special forces. These have been delayed as a result of the failure of the raid by US Rangers on positions near Kandahar on October 20. British defence officials also believe the US has not paid sufficient tribute to air-to-air refuelling and reconnaissance operations carried out by the RAF. Though cautious as a breed, British military commanders are increasingly impatient about the reluctance of the US to commit more special troops on the ground as the Northern Alliance has shown little sign of having much effect. British views on how the war should be fought have support from military strategists inside the Pentagon, who have been pressing Gen Franks to take a more radical and innovative approach less reliant on bombing. However, the institutional resistance represented by generals like Franks is considerable. They remain steeped in the Powell doctrine(named after the former chairman of the joint chiefs, and current secretary of state), which emphasised the use of overwhelming force, air power in particular, as a means of achieving goals with minimum casualties - in a word: "overkill". Humanitarian effort The British and European governments, appear to be more engaged with the potential humanitarian crisis than the US. Part of the reason the British government has been pushing for the bridgehead is to create 'safe havens' for refugees escaping from the harsh Taliban government, the bombing and starvation. The US is proving reluctant - fearful that 'safe havens' could be infiltrated by the Taliban. The British are credited in US military circles for reminding US central command on the need for taking the humanitarian effort as seriously as the bombing campaign. Coalition In Washington, the US state department shares the British concern over the White House's tone deafness to Arab sensitivities. The blunt objection by the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, of a pause in the bombing for Ramadan was seen as unnecessarily offensive by many US diplomats. Britain's approach to the crisis involves another potential transatlantic difference - the European Union's role. British officials said one of Mr Blair's objectives was to persuade President Bush to take up other EU members - notably Italy and Spain - on their offers of military help. There is mounting concern about the difficulty of maintaining EU support for a long war, especially one that includes continued bombing. Smaller countries, notably Portugal, Greece, Belgium and the Netherlands, have been offended by the way the big member states, led by Blair, have undermined EU attempts to forge common policies. While Mr Blair understands Mr Bush's need to avoid a Kosovo-type situation in which target lists have to be approved by 15 member states, the US also needs to keep at least France, Germany and Italy on side, and the others broadly supportive. This is where there could be a tug between the US and the EU for British loyalties. Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,590383,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 9 04:12:11 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2001 13:12:11 +0200 Subject: [A-List] UK secret state/defence sector Message-ID: Businessmen at centre of arms-to-Iraq affair win compensation By Chris Blackhurst The Independent, 09 November 2001 David Blunkett, the Home Secretary, has agreed to compensate two of the businessmen at the centre of the arms-to-Iraq affair. Nine years after their trial collapsed, Paul Henderson and Peter Allen have been told they will receive ex-gratia payments for wrongful prosecution. On 9 November 1992, Mr Henderson, Mr Allen and Trevor Abraham, executives from Matrix Churchill, a machine tools manufacturer, based in Coventry, walked free from the Old Bailey after the Government admitted it had known what they were doing and had encouraged them. Yesterday, the Home Office said Mr Blunkett had agreed to make an ex-gratia compensation payment to Mr Henderson and Mr Allen. The men's lawyer refused to say how much they would receive but it is thought to be substantial. Matrix Churchill folded because of the prosecution and their reputations were severely damaged. Their solicitor, Lawrence Kormonick, of Dechert, welcomed Mr Blunkett's move. "I look forward to a decision on the level of compensation that reflects the distress my clients have suffered. They are keen to put this matter behind them." Mr Blunkett's decision, while being sought by Mr Kormonick for some time, was unexpected. The timing is likely to be seen at Westminster as another attempt by ministers to rid the Government of potentially awkward stories under the shield of war. It is the first ex-gratia award to be made to any of the defendants involved in the arms-to-Iraq cases. Other claimants are expected to follow suit and the total payout could run to many millions. Several other businessmen had their careers and lives ruined by a series of prosecutions brought by HM Customs and Excise for making illegal sales to Iraq. They always claimed they were acting with the approval or knowledge of government security services. Mr Blunkett's move may mark an attempt by this Government to draw a line under one of the more unsavoury episodes in Whitehall history. Mr Henderson now runs an engineering firm in the Midlands and Mr Allen is working in sales and marketing in the US. "My clients are both extremely grateful to the Home Secretary," Mr Kormonick. Full article at: http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=104013 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 9 04:50:03 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2001 13:50:03 +0200 Subject: [A-List] UK secret state/defence sector Message-ID: Shameful affair that exposed a secret world Arms to Iraq: Compensation at last for a brave businessman who risked his life for Britain and was left to carry the can when the going got tough By Chris Blackhurst The Independent, 09 November 2001 Exactly nine years ago today, on 9 November 1992, the trial collapsed at the Old Bailey of three businessmen charged with breaking embargoes on the export of arms to Iraq. The defendants, Paul Henderson, Peter Allen and Trevor Abraham from a hitherto obscure machine tool company, Matrix Churchill, walked free after a government minister, Alan Clark, admitted in the witness box that he had given a "nod and a wink" to their trades. So began a political storm that ran and ran. It all seems such a long time ago, belonging to a bygone age, a different political landscape, populated by characters such as Mr Clark, William Waldegrave, Geoffrey Howe, John Major and of course, Margaret Thatcher. The following day, Mr Major, who was Prime Minister, announced the setting up of the arms to Iraq inquiry, headed by Sir Richard Scott. Three years later, after receiving evidence from more than 200 witnesses and studying 200,000 pages of written material, Sir Richard published his report. It was a sensation, revealing the workings of Whitehall in a way they had never been disclosed before, exposing the lengths to which ministers and civil servants would go to cover their backs, highlighting the inability of one side of government to communicate with the other, reinforcing the impression gained from the television comedy series Yes Minister that what politicians say in public is often different from what is said in private. And then, nothing. The politicians, who for a period, seemed touched by scandal, brushed aside the criticism and carried on as if nothing had happened - at least, in the case of the Tory ministers, until the 1997 election defeat. The civil servants, thanks in the main to astute lobbying from their union and senior Whitehall colleagues determined they did not suffer while their ministerial masters walked away unscathed, were able to continue their careers. Assurances were given that from now on, Customs would talk to the security services and vice versa, that publicly declared sanctions would be obeyed, that foreign policy would not be changed on the hoof in secret without informing Parliament - and promptly forgotten. For some people, though, the arms to Iraq saga left a permanent wound. Finally, at last, some of them are getting a degree of recompense. Mr Henderson, the boss of Matrix Churchill, had to watch as his company, tainted by scandal, went to the wall. No matter that Mr Henderson argued the Government and MI6 knew what he was doing and actively encouraged him to supply his products - which had a dual, civilian and military use, to Iraq. Guidelines banning the export of weapons to Iran and Iraq, who fought a bitter eight-year war, had been relaxed in Iraq's favour. Hard to imagine now but, of the pair, Iraq had been regarded by the Foreign Office as a potential friend of sorts. Iran had imposed the fatwa on Salman Rushdie and was seen as more extreme than its rival. Not for nothing did Mr Henderson's MI6 handler, "John Balsom", refer to him as "a very brave man" in court. Mr Henderson always claimed he was approached by MI6 to supply it with information about Iraq's weapons programme. At the time, Matrix Churchill was owned by the Iraqis so Mr Henderson was being asked to spy on his bosses and, on his frequent visits to Baghdad, to keep his eyes and ears open. It was a remarkably risky exercise - anyone suspected of spying in Iraq faced death (Farzad Bazoft, a journalist for The Observer, was hanged for espionage in 1990). Yet, bizarrely, Mr Henderson faced prosecution, not in Iraq, but in Britain, after Customs raided his premises. Matrix Churchill was not alone. It was a mad, frenetic period. Customs had taken upon itself to launch a single-department assault against what it perceived as Iraqi sanctions busting. Shortly before Customs swooped on Mr Henderson's factory in June 1990, officers had seized pipes at Teesport, which they claimed were heading to Iraq for use in a "supergun" project. Proving other branches of the Government knew what he was doing and even condoned it (not just MI6, the Department of Trade and Industry signed export licences knowing the machine tools were to be used to make fuses for shells) was an uphill task, not helped by the obfuscation of politicians. Four ministers signed public interest immunity certificates to block vital defence evidence from being submitted to the trial. It was a shameful episode and one that was fully deserving of political and media approbation. But the condemnation had no lasting effect and was forgotten. Mr Henderson was left to pick up the pieces. Only now, is he on the point of receiving any compensation. Full article at: http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=103976 NOTE: One name missing from all this is that of John Cuckney, Peter Wright's mentor at MI5 when he joined that organisation in 1955, and a longtime "fixer" for the British state. Appointed to the export arm of the Ministry of Defence, International Military Services Ltd., as president in 1974, he was still there in the 1990s, having, in the interim, overseen the "rescue" of Westland Helicopters in 1985 for Thatcher, blocking Michael Heseltine's efforts to create a European defence contractor consortium to rival the US military-industrial complex. Interestingly, according to Henk Overbeek, in an article from "Capital and Class" in 1986 (issue no. 29), Cuckney's appointment to Westland was made "upon instigation of the Bank of England". The Bank of England, it was, that pulled the plug on the Bank of Commerce and Credit International (BCCI) in 1991, a favourite laundry for the CIA in its funding of what it now purports to fight in Afghanistan. There is a lot in that episode that we do not yet know but which has a direct bearing on current events and the longer term trajectory of the British state towards Europe and away from the US. Cuckney was also put in place to oversee the administration of Robert Maxwell's empire regarding the pensions of its employees, given that Maxwell had plundered the funds to prop up his sinking businesses. Why Cuckney, of all people, was necessary for that job is anyone's guess, unless of course Maxwell's undoubted intelligence activities are taken into account. Looking at the current Blair team and the "modernisation" of the Labour Party itself, prior to Blair, Maxwell's people are all over the place -- another piece in the puzzle that is the UK secret state. And if I remember correctly, two of the four ministers who signed public interest immunity certificates in the Matrix Churchill case were Michael Heseltine and Kenneth Clarke, standard bearers of the "left" (!) of the Conservative Party. Also interesting to note is the relatively high profile given to this story by the Independent compared to the short article in the Guardian written by Richard Norton-Taylor, its intelligence correspondent (see http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4295350,00.html). This is odd given that Norton-Taylor collaborated with David Leigh in writing a book on the scandal in 1993, entitled "Betrayed: the real story of the Matrix Churchill trial", preceding the Scott Inquiry that hauled up both Thatcher and Major for cross-examination. Jonathan Aitken was involved in this also, as a director of Astra, a company involved in exporting arms to Iraq. Aitken's defence on that occasion was that he was never present at directors' meetings where Iraq was ever discussed, therefore he was not aware of any such trade with Iraq. Subsequent events were to prove his reliability as a witness, when the Guardian brought him down over his relationship with Wafic Said and Mohammed al-Fayed, one of the many old guard scalps claimed by the Guardian in the transition to the New Labour era of the present. The Guardian's reputation as principled campaigner rests upon its staunch opposition to the Conservative Party, which was nominally responsible for a lot of shady dealings including these discussed here. But the Guardian has been noticeably less scrupulous in investigating New Labour, and its reluctance to claim credit for "being there" with the Matrix-Churchill trial (Leigh is now also at the Guardian) is curious. However, also from the Independent, we know that New Labour, under Jack Straw, instigated a review ("modernisation") of the British intelligence apparatus under the aegis of former MI6 chief, Sir David Spedding. That this review came to light at all is remarkable, for it highlights various important developments, including the demotion of MI5 in the state pecking order. This "modernisation" featured communications streamlining such that cock-ups like the Matrix Churchill case would never happen again (that remains to be seen, of course). And again, as far as I know, the Guardian barely, if at all, covered this story. Its journalists appear to be more focused upon the Britain/US split and the Europe-ward trajectory of British state policy than upon unmasking the dirty dealings that once featured so prominently in the pages of that publication. This is useful because the Guardian can be relied upon as a reasonably reliable conduit of official thinking (as with Hugo Young's "authoritative" analyses of UK politics, or the off-the-record briefings that are frequently flagged up with "a source indicated...", "rumours are circulating that..."). But it also means that other sources are more likely to provide objective snippets of information about current dirty dealings being undertaken as part of the British state's development. Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 9 04:55:56 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2001 13:55:56 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Collateral damage Message-ID: The death song of the seas Whales and dolphins rely on sound for communication, to hunt, navigate and mate. Now many marine mammals may be dying because of the racket made by shipping and construction industries and military sonar, says Sanjida O'Connell The Independent, 08 November 2001 Earlier this year, 16 whales and a dolphin were stranded on the northern coast of the Bahamas. Six of the whales and the dolphin died; autopsies showed that they had severe brain haemorrhaging. It is suspected that both the stranding and the bleeding were caused by sonar transmissions from US Navy ships engaged in anti-submarine exercises nearby. There are growing fears that the ocean has become a booming, buzzing and confusing place for whales, dolphins and other marine mammals. Sound is their principal sensory medium. They use it to communicate, navigate, hunt and find each other in the vastness of the ocean. Blue whales are known to carry out "conversations" with each other over distances of up to 1,000km (600 miles). Many mammals hear like humans do, and within a similar range of frequencies, but cetaceans (whales and dolphins) communicate at sound levels both higher and lower than we can typically hear. As a result, marine mammals are affected by a wider range of sounds, and each species is affected by sounds in a different audible range; for instance, sounds in the region of 140 to 180 decibels (dB) can cause discomfort for beluga whales, while exposure to sound levels of 195 to 210dB may damage soft tissue and the ear drums of baleen whales. The military is one of many producers of underwater noise - jetskis and motor boats, shipping, off-shore construction and oil drilling are all contributors. "The seas are definitely more noisy than they were 50 years ago," says Doug Nowacek of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute in Massachusetts. The cetacean deaths earlier this year were not, unfortunately, an isolated incident. Haemorrhaging can be caused in people as well as marine mammals by sonar, or by underwater explosions. When whales and dolphins dive, air from their lungs is forced into cavities in their bodies. The trapped air bubbles can magnify sound waves by up to 25 times, leading to the sort of internal bleeding found in the animals stranded off the Bahamas. This "resonance" leads to massive tissue damage at much lower sound levels and over a wider area of the sea than had been thought possible, says Ken Balcomb of the Center for Whale Research in Washington. Balcomb has been studying Cuvier's beaked whales in the Bahamas for 10 years. The US Navy is now seeking approval for its new Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System, which would use four ships equipped with low-frequency sonar. They would be able to sweep 80 per cent of the world's oceans. In the proposed system, transmissions could be as loud as 230dB. The navy proposes to ensure, using observers and monitoring equipment, that no marine mammals are within a kilometre of the ships; beyond this distance, the noise will dissipate to a safer 180dB. But some scientists, including Balcomb, believe that 180dB could cause serious physiological damage, even at distances of up to 100km. There is almost no data on the effects of low-frequency sonar on creatures such as whales and dolphins. "The proposed US low-frequency sonar worries us most," Nowacek says, "because it will affect diving mammals such as sperm whales, elephant seals and beaked whales, which descend to depths of 1,000m." Britain's Ministry of Defence, in conjunction with QinetiQ (formerly part of the Defence Evaluation Research Agency), has developed a low-frequency sonar, called 2087, which is to be fitted to six anti-submarine ships. The ministry insists the sonar will be more dolphin- and whale-friendly. This seems unlikely; an MoD spokesman admits that "there's nothing magic" about the new system. "It's still sonar, it still transmits noise into the sea and not all sea animals are going to be enthusiastic about it," he says. Balcomb says problems may still arise. "A low-frequency system should not cause resonance effects in a dolphin, but the total power of the sonar system may nonetheless be sufficient to cause traumas at close range." The MoD says it is aware of the environmental issues, and intends to operate the sonar initially at low power to enable whales to move away. "There's no evidence to say it works - I don't know, I'm not a dolphin - but we are giving them a chance to get out of the way," a spokesman says. The plan has met with guarded scepticism from some sea-mammal scientists. "This 'ramp up' seems a common-sense precaution," says Jonathan Gordon, a sperm whale researcher at the University of St Andrews, "but no one has tested whether it actually achieves the desired effect. Without a test and observations it isn't safe to assume it offers real protection." Nowacek warns that many marine mammals can become accustomed to loud sounds and might not get out of the way. "Whales may not see ships or subs as a threat. There is nothing in their world that is naturally bigger than them, and if an animal gets hit and dies, it won't have a chance to learn." Also, the desire for food may take precedence. Many fishing ships have "pingers" that emit loud sounds in an attempt to scare marine mammals away and prevent them from being caught in the nets along with fish, but when a whale or a dolphin is hungry, this strategy has limited effectiveness and may actually attract the mammals to fish-laden nets. Apart from the resonance problem, no one knows how noise affects marine mammals in a general sense. The main sources of ocean noise are shipping and construction, which could block communication, Nowacek says. "It's like being at a cocktail party; you have to talk louder and louder to be heard. The problem of ocean noise is that it decreases the range of communication and means that whales and dolphins will have to shout louder." A study by researchers at Woods Hole has shown that when breeding whales are in the presence of a large ship, they increase the noise of their own communications as if competing with the ship. "It could keep them from meeting up and mating, and if they can no longer hear they cannot navigate," Nowacek says. Tony Heathershaw, the head of QinetiQ's Environmental Impact Assessment Centre at the Southampton Oceanographic Centre, advises the military and other agencies, such as oil and construction companies, on ways to manage underwater noise. He has developed a technique for assessing the impact of sound that takes into account frequency, intensity and duration and is based on health and safety regulations for humans in the workplace. For instance, the lower the noise, the longer a person can continue working; the higher and louder the noise, the less time a person should spend near it. "We have every reason to believe that work on human beings can be applied to marine mammals as well," Heathershaw says. "We may not know what's in the ocean at any one time, and we may not know what the threshold for hearing in a particular species in the ocean at that time is. The approach we take is very precautionary." Industry is starting to use Heathershaw's mitigation measures by operating noisy machinery only at certain frequencies and intensities for specific lengths of time or, if they are able to monitor the surrounding ocean, when they know large marine mammals are not present. The US has developed a "mitigation sonar" that can detect whether a cetacean is nearby even when a louder sonar is operating. However, Heathershaw is realistic about the size of the oceans and the difficulty of detecting other creatures; fish and diving birds, for instance, may also be affected. "It's difficult to avoid situations where mammals are not affected by noise. There's always likely to be some risk, whatever man does in the environment. What one is trying to do is minimise that risk." Full article at: http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/science/story.jsp?story=103915 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 9 05:14:10 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2001 14:14:10 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Europe/US rivalry Message-ID: Pfizer says US beating Europe in drugs sector: Tough price controls stifling innovation, warns pharmaceuticals group chief Financial Times, Nov 6, 2001 By GEOFF DYER Europe is rapidly losing ground to the US in the pharmaceuticals industry because of heavy controls on medicine prices, the head of the world's largest drugs company said yesterday. In one of the strongest attacks yet by a US executive on the European healthcare model, Henry McKinnell, chairman of Pfizer, said low prices for new drugs in most European countries were stifling innovation and forcing the industry to move more activities to the US. "Europe is clearly losing out in what will be one of the growth industries of the twenty-first century," said Mr McKinnell, who is also president of PHRMA, the powerful US pharmaceutical industry association. "Investment and jobs are being lost to the US because of pricing rules." International drug companies have long complained about the low prices they receive from government-run health systems in Europe and have suggested that Europeans benefit without paying for the innovative products financed by the larger profits in the US, where there is a freer market for drugs. All European governments have continued to press companies to reduce drug costs. The European Union this year took steps to streamline the process for approving new medicines in an attempt to attract more research projects to its member countries. "Europe risks the loss of its drug industry to the slow grinding erosion of resources," said Mr McKinnell. "In the 1980s Europe was considered the world's medicine chest, but it has now been displaced by the US as the industry's centre of gravity." France and Germany had "essentially destroyed their local industries" through their prices rules. While there were still large drugs groups in Europe, the successful ones had shifted many activities to the US. Many European companies were declining, with Germany's Bayer - which has issued three profit warnings this year and withdrawn one of its top-selling drugs on safety grounds - being the "classic example". The same was true of Japan, he said, where there were cases of multinationals refusing to launch products because prices were too low. The benefits of the US model in encouraging innovation were most evident in the bio-technology sector , which was responsible for an increasing number of the new medicines coming on to the market. The largest bio-tech company in the US was bigger than the whole European bio-tech sector combined, he said. While Europe paid less for drugs when they were introduced, prices did not fall considerably when patents expired because of the absence of a large generics industry. In the US, however, drug prices fell by up to 80 per cent when patent protection ended, he said. Full article at: http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.html?print=true&id=01 1106001356 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 9 05:19:33 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2001 14:19:33 +0200 Subject: [A-List] New economy bull Message-ID: The new economy falters: The global spread of? information technology will not be to the benefit of all workers and citizens, says Will Hutton: Financial Times, Oct 11, 2001 Was it only 18 months ago that the dotcom and telecommunications bubbles were reaching their impossible heights? A collective frenzy had descended on the financial markets and the western body corporate alike. It was part of the new common sense that the revolution in information and communications technology heralded a new era of creative destruction, like the railway age or the internal combustion engine, that would deliver a great surge in productivity and profits. Scepticism became progressively harder. The only question was to what degree productivity would rise. Today the world looks very different. Pessimism abounds. Enter Diane Coyle and her new book, written before September 11 but nonetheless completed during the period when the bubble was bursting. Coyle is staying true to the faith. Her book is not just an invocation to the revolutionary powers of the new economy but an insistence that the revolution will so challenge existing economic structures that necessarily it is going to empower the next generation of workers and propel a new prosperity. But for all her enthusiasm, she remains clear-eyed. Her paradoxes are that to get the best of this opportunity we need to rediscover old truths. Information technology demands smart workforces that are a great deal more wily and empowered than their predecessors, but this only reinforces the old axiom that high trust workplaces are creative workplaces. The new economy workforce cannot be driven by traditional command and control management techniques; delegation and trust are necessities. I have sympathy for Coyle's argument, even if on occasion it becomes overly gushy. Organisations are becoming more porous as a result of IT. The speed with which knowledge is disseminated benefits the organisationally agile; the future will be built on networks rather than self-standing organisational silos. Yet the book's unrelenting optimism after September 11 cannot help but increase the reviewer's scepticism. How many of the claims made for the new economy are genuinely structural, and how many were just the by-product of a tight labour market and the long boom? Coyle dismisses Professor Robert Gordon's critique of the US productivity miracle as being largely explained by the economic cycle so that IT effects are close to undetectable. Yet since she wrote the growth of US productivity figures have been revised downwards so sharply that Prof Gordon's doubts have renewed legitimacy. In any case, it is not the US but mainland Europe that has enjoyed a productivity miracle over the decade as a whole, where countries such as France and Germany now have output per man-hour higher than the US. I doubt that Coyle would regard either country as a standard-bearer of the new economy. Productivity continues to be more closely linked to un-new economy concepts such as levels of investment and organisational creativity rather than IT-driven individualism. Her book would also be strengthened if she confronted head to head some of the more sinister trends of the new economy. Digitalisation permits great potential powers of central and corporate control. In the US, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act has given corporate US immense power over who gets access to what information and how; it is a criminal offence either to break a copy protection mechanism or circumvent an access control. The American Library Association fought against the act but Disney and AOL-Time Warner's lobbying won out. As the recent Oxford Review of Economic Policy's edition on the internet warns, unless competition authorities are ultra-alert the web could fall into the grip of a few powerful companies. Nor is the idea that governments should monitor every mobile phone call and e-mail in the war against terrorism comforting. But perhaps the greatest threat posed by the new economy and information technology will be to entrench inequality - a danger of which Coyle is acutely aware. On top of all the traditional sources of inequality will be overlaid another; access to information and above all to those privileged networks. Those in the know and with an individual reputation fare well in this winner-take-all environment; those without tend to fare even worse. As a result there are virtuous and vicious circles so that the networked rich grow richer still - and the disconnected and unattached grow even poorer. Our market economies and societies are looking more like those of the 19th century than the 21st. The dangers are obvious, less so how to respond. I hope Coyle is right, but we are going to be even more determined and interventionist than even she concedes to secure universal prosperity - especially if the backwash of the world's biggest ever exploded financial bubble drags us into a sustained recession. And that is the biggest paradox of all. The reviewer is chief executive of the Industrial Society Full article at: http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.html?print=true&id=01 1011002254 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Fri Nov 9 06:46:53 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Fri, 09 Nov 2001 13:46:53 +0000 Subject: [A-List] *** WTO SET TO CRASH AND BURN AT QATAR ** Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011109134630.02963d60@pop.tiscali.co.uk> By John Gershman (Editor's Note: Excerpted from a new FPIF Global Affairs Commentary available in its entirety at: http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0111doha.html.) Amid widespread recriminations from developing counties and NGOs, the preparations for launching a new round of trade negotiations at the Fourth WTO Ministerial meeting in Doha, Qatar on November 9-13 are plunging ahead. Security concerns and restrictions on the participation of civil society organizations by the host country will insure a smaller and quieter meeting that the one held in Seattle nearly two years ago. The Bush administration has opportunistically draped its call for the launch of a new trade round in the rhetoric of the fight against terrorism. So far it appears that gambit has failed to work, with many developing countries opposed to the outlines of a new round as laid out in the revised October 27 Draft Ministerial Declaration. Particularly galling to Southern members was the failure to include brackets indicating disputed language around text that failed to present alternative or competing perspectives from Southern members. A statement from Nigeria said the draft, was "empty of content on the issues of interest to developing countries" while a coalition of 14 Southern and Northern NGOs argued that "the tone and content of the new text presumes a consensus on a future WTO agenda which does not exist." Nevertheless, the U.S., the European Union (EU), and the WTO Secretariat, still stung by the failure in Seattle, are pushing the draft ahead despite opposition from the overwhelming majority of the WTO's membership. The substantive disagreements also highlight an important problem of process, namely the recurring practice of the "Quad" (U.S., EU, Japan, and Canada) to engage in exclusive negotiations among themselves, occasionally and selectively including other countries, and then presenting a draft text as a fait accompli. The major bones of contention in the current situation include so-called "implementation issues," the relationship between Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and Public Health, and the inclusion of the four "Singapore issues" (investment, competition, government procurement, and trade facilitation, which were introduced at the 1996 Singapore Ministerial). With respect to the Singapore issues, the revised draft is worse than the initial draft for the developing countries, according to Third World Network's Martin Khor. For example, with respect to investment and competition issues, the first draft provided a choice between either beginning negotiations or continuing the study process in the working groups. This option no longer exists in the revised draft. Even among those developing countries that support continued trade liberalization, the core issue remains that of implementation issues. Strategic differences exist between those countries that are willing to support a new round that gives priority to the implementation issues, and others (especially from Africa and the Least Developed Countries) that want these issues addressed prior to the launch of a new round. * No New Round or a Development Round? The developing country agenda has largely been framed as advocating a "Development Round," a term that foregrounds their collective concerns while being vague enough to capture the often disparate interests of the developing countries, divisions that were acknowledged by the head of the G-77 when it released its own statement on Doha (http://www.g77.org/Docs/Doha.htm). Meanwhile, under the slogans of "No new round, turnaround" and "Shrink or Sink" Southern and Northern civil society activists have called for a rolling back of the purview of the WTO and a return to a framework more akin to the WTO's predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a framework for governing international trade. They argue that such a framework provides greater policy autonomy and room for maneuvering for developing countries. Such an agenda is reflected in the declaration signed by nearly 400 civil society organizations worldwide entitled "Our World is Not for Sale: Shrink or Sink." Whatever their strategic differences, Southern governments and civil society groups are largely unified in opposition to the current proposed agenda as outlined in the draft declaration. In contrast to Seattle, developed country trade officials and the WTO secretariat will not be able to pit civil society activists and Southern political leaders against each other. (John Gershman is codirector of the Global Affairs Program of the Interhemispheric Resource Center (online at www.irc-online.org) and Asia-Pacific Editor of Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org).) For more information, see: What's This Organization: An Annotated Glossary of Terms and Concepts about the WTO http://www.fpif.org/wto/index.html By Tom Barry From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Fri Nov 9 07:00:00 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Fri, 09 Nov 2001 14:00:00 +0000 Subject: [A-List] technologies to trap and store carbon dioxide Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011109135915.00a83438@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Vanessa Houlder Published: FT November 8 2001 20:30 | Last Updated: November 8 2001 20:38 As ministers argue over the finer points of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change in Marrakech this week, some researchers are considering a radically different solution to the problem. They are seeking methods of trapping and storing the carbon dioxide emitted from burning fossil fuels, as a means of postponing fundamental changes in the way energy is generated and used. Some of the more futuristic proposals have included injecting dust into the stratosphere, "greening" the deserts, creating artificial reefs of genetically engineered algae and building giant insulated balls of dry ice. Other suggestions are less eye-catching but not much less ambitious. Interest in the topic has been stimulated by the US administration's search for alternative methods of tackling climate change, following its rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. "We all believe technology offers great promise significantly to reduce emissions - especially carbon capture, storage and sequestration technologies," said President George W. Bush in May. In 1999, a US Department of Energy report listed potential benefits from carbon sequestration, ranging from new materials to improved agricultural practices. The approach was "truly radical in a technology context", it said. In July, the DoE announced plans to spend $25m (?17m) on studying methods of capturing carbon gases and storing them in underground geological formations or in terrestrial vegetation such as forests. Its goal is to develop sequestration that costs $10 or less per tonne of carbon, about 30 times less than many current options. Forests gradually absorb carbon from the air. But for most carbon storage techniques, the carbon dioxide must be captured immediately after combustion. Techniques are already available: carbon dioxide can be absorbed from gas streams by contact with solvents and activated materials or by being passed through special membranes. Other techniques are under development. One proposal involves an "oxy-fuel" boiler developed by Praxair, in New York. The boiler uses a membrane to separate oxygen from other gases in air. When this burns it produces a concentrated carbon dioxide exhaust, which is relatively easy to capture. Some researchers think the carbon dioxide removed in this way could be recovered and transformed into commercial products, such as plastics and rubbers, that are inert and long-lived. A 1999 Department of Energy report speculated carbon could find a new market in ultra-light vehicles made from advanced composite materials. But most approaches simply involve storing carbon dioxide. One popular line of research involves injecting carbon dioxide into oilfields. Work commissioned by the International Energy Agency estimates that depleted oilfields could store 126bn tonnes of carbon dioxide. Because injecting carbon dioxide enhances the recovery of oil - about 70 oilfields worldwide already use the technique - this may even become a source of profit. Another possibility is locking up carbon dioxide permanently by making it react with naturally occuring mineral oxides to form carbonates, thereby avoiding the need for underground reservoirs. But according to the IEA, this approach would cost at least $62 per tonne of carbon dioxide. Another avenue of research concerns the ability of carbon dioxide, under certain conditions, to form stable hydrate molecules. These are similar to the methane hydrates thought to occur in large quantities under the sea and in permafrost regions. But estimated costs exceed $500 per tonne of carbon dioxide, the IEA says. Storing carbon in trees and agricultural land is a cheaper and better-understood approach to sequestration. Attempts to improve the storage of these land sinks - which currently store about 40 per cent of man-made carbon dioxide emissions - are encouraged under the Kyoto Protocol. But the issue is controversial, not least because much of the carbon stored by growing trees will later be released. In a cautious report issued this year, the Royal Society warned that planting new forests could even prove counter-productive. Rising temperatures could kill off the forests, releasing their carbon to the atmosphere over a relatively short period. The uncertainties concerning land sinks were underlined in this Thursday's edition of Nature, the scientific journal. Researchers in Germany found that, despite absorbing carbon in the 1990s, land sinks had a largely neutral effect on carbon emissions in the 1980s. These variations probably arise from changes in foliage, plant litter and soil microbes. "Nonetheless, there remain considerable uncertainties as to the magnitude of the sink in different regions and the contribution of different processes," it said. Many of the concerns about storing carbon on land also apply to proposals for storing carbon dioxide in the deep oceans. In principle, the deep oceans have an enormous capacity to store carbon dioxide, because the high alkalinity of seawater means it is largely stored as carbonate ions. Currently, the oceans remove about 30 per cent of the annual carbon dioxide emissions produced by man, according to Csiro, the Australian research organisation. Researchers seeking to increase the storage capacity of oceans are examining two main options: injecting carbon dioxide into the deep sea; and increasing the uptake of carbon by marine phytoplankton by adding iron and other nutrients to the ocean. But there may be risks. Last month in Science, the international science journal, US researchers called for more research on the possible biological effects of deep-sea carbon dioxide sequestration. Deep-sea animals may be highly sensitive to environmental changes in carbon dioxide concentration and acidity, they said. Another concern stems from the possibility that stored carbon may suddenly be released. The danger was illustrated in 1986. More than 1,700 people living near the shores of Lake Nyos in Cameroon were asphyxiated after a plume of carbon dioxide bubbled up from the bottom of the lake. Even if stored carbon dioxide leaked from the ground or ocean without causing immediate damage, its impact on the climate could be highly damaging. "Unless the prospect of uncontrolled release of carbon dioxide can be demonstrated to be unrealistic, sequestration may prove unacceptable," according to research by the IEA reporting that after 50 or more years, leakage of only 1 per cent a year could amount to more than 1bn tonnes of carbon released to the atmosphere annually. Many environmental campaigners oppose research of this sort. "The global climate is a highly non-linear system determined by complex feedback processes and we still have a poor understanding of how it works. Any attempt deliberately to tinker with this system could backfire very badly," says Ben Matthews, an environmental activist. For many environmental campaigners, a technological "fix" to allow continued consumption of fossil fuels is anathema. It is analogous, they say, to running down our kidneys to the state where we have to be permanently attached to a dialysis machine. At the least, the possibility of dealing with carbon emissions could distract politicians from the need to improve energy efficiency and renewable technologies. There is, indeed, a risk that advanced carbon sequestration techniques could lull the world into a false sense of security. But if the climate change problem becomes overwhelming, we shall need all the help we can get. ft.com From tomzbox at hotmail.com Fri Nov 9 16:17:07 2001 From: tomzbox at hotmail.com (Tom Warren) Date: Fri, 09 Nov 2001 16:17:07 Subject: [A-List] technologies to trap and store carbon dioxide Message-ID: >There is, indeed, a risk that advanced carbon sequestration techniques >could lull the world into a false sense of security. But if the climate >change problem becomes overwhelming, we shall need all the help we can get. now *there's* a nice doomsday scenario waiting to happen ... where we use the last of our fossil fuels for stimulating carbon sequestration, in hopes that we can counteract the effect of C02 we created by using fossil fuels .... This planet is beginning to look like Oz. ... or Wonderland. tom "Hope is the last thing to die" -- [heard it on the radio] _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp From sherrynstan at igc.org Sat Nov 10 12:18:48 2001 From: sherrynstan at igc.org (sherrynstan at igc.org) Date: Sat, 10 Nov 2001 14:18:48 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Doha declaration Message-ID: NO TO A NEW ROUND IN DOHA [From Agence France Presse earlier this week: More than 200 anti-globalisation NGOs, barred from holding a counter-summit on the fringes of a World Trade Organisation (WTO) meeting in Qatar, are holding a "world forum" in Beirut starting Monday. The four-day forum will bring together delegates from Arab countries, including the Palestinian territories and Iraq, as well as several dozen non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from Europe and North America, and others from Asia, Africa and Latin America. "Some 170 groups and networks from 45 countries are expected, along with the 70 Lebanese NGOs and associations as well as those from the Palestinian camps in Lebanon," one of the organisers, Ammar Abud, told AFP. According to Ziad Abdulsamad, executive director of the Arab NGOs, "around 100 foreign visitors are registered, including some 60 Arabs and around 40 personalities from the rest of the world." Malaysian Martin Khor of the Third World Network and French-Egyptian Samir Amin of the Third World Forum will host the meeting which is due to wrap up on Thursday.] STATEMENT OF THE WORLD FORUM ON THE WTO, BEIRUT 5-8 NOVEMBER 2001 Between the 5th and the 8th of November 2001, on the eve of the 4th ministerial meeting of the WTO in Doha, a world forum on globalization and global trade was held in Beirut. The meeting was attended by civil society representatives from five continents to take a position on the Doha meeting of the WTO and its agenda. The meeting also discussed new global developments and the atmosphere of mil itarisation and war that is currently dominating all aspects of life on the planet. After numerous sessions and workshops, the participants declare the following: The importance of the Doha meeting is in the fact that it will be the first global meeting after the September 11 attacks and after the start of the war on Afghanistan. It is also held for the first time in Arab country, not far from besieged Iraq and from Palestine, where the Palestinian are facing a continuing Israeli occupation. This new reality should make us cautious against pressures on developing countries to make more concessions. We refuse any use of global trade or its mechanisms as a tool in the current declared war. Seven years since the creation of the WTO has given us ample time to examine the promises of prosperity, development, opening up of markets to the products of developing nations, and the numerous benefits that the latter would have enjoyed from joining the organization. What really happened was completely the opposite. Economic stagnation spread to include more and more countries. Developing countries faced huge losses in their economies and exchange. Protectionist measures in the countries of the global north remained an obstacle to the products of the South. Agriculture and food security was hit with tremendous losses and damage. The technological divid e between north and south became unprecedented, while barriers to the transfer of technology became stronger, and the workforce was barred from free movement. The implementation of WTO agreements and its mechanisms has shown that it is completely biased in favor of big multinationals and global capital. The WTO does not give any consideration to international justice, nor to th e interests of developing countries, not to the people of the global north themselves. It goes completely against development, and peoples' rights of development, this explains the emergence of a global movement opposed t o the existence of the WTO, its role and mechanisms. The rhetoric of the free market is an ideology biased in favor of global capital. What the WTO seeks is in complete opposition to the principles of social justice, human rights, and international charters. Our criticism o f the WTO is based on what humanity had agreed upon decades ago: the UN charters for human rights. The Human Rights declaration of 1986 states, in its first article, that the human right for development requires the compl ete implementation of the right of self-determination. That includes the complete and unconflicted sovereignty of people over their natural resources and wealth. The WTO aims to become a trading authority above countries and nations, thus practically eliminating their ability to formulate social, economic, and financial policies that achieve development. The WTO also removes the a uthority of national legal systems in all areas that fall within its scope. This drains the right for development, and the majority of economic and social right of people and individuals, from their meaning. It deprives p eople from political, institutional, and legal tools that would allow them to create national development policies and the means to achieve them. The rules at work in the WTO aim to make trade an absolute and comprehensive principle. They push development, human rights, and the interests of people to the side, where they are readapted to global trade and not the op posite. The creation of a global organization with such power and authority is a dangerous issue in itself. It becomes more and more ominous in light of the current push to militarize globalization and the unipolar hegemony on th e global decision. Based on the above, the participants in the Word Forum in Beirut, and at the conclusion of their discussions, declare the following positions to the 4th ministerial meeting in Doha on the 9th of November 2001: 1) We refuse a new round of negotiations in the WTO and any inclusion of new issues on the agenda, especially those connected with investment, competition, government procurement, and other issues that will overwhelm the meeting and puts the delegates of developing countries in a position where it is impossible for them to follow negotiations on all those issues at the same time. 2) We call for the reevaluation of previous agreements in light of the practice of their implementation that showed a great bias against the interests of developing countries. This includes the reevaluation and the correc tion, or the annulment, of harmful agreements, or those that where signed under pressure or ignorance. Those being factors that eliminate will and corrupt the contract. 3) We call for the cancellation of agreements on intellectual property that inhibit developing countries from providing adequate health care to their people; that block the transfer of technology, and that protect the int erests of supranational organizations and facilitates their pilfering of cultural and genetic heritage of developing countries. 4) We call for the exclusion of agriculture from the scope of the WTO and the ban on dumping practiced by multinational corporations. This means the lift of agricultural subsidies in industrialized countries, and the open ing up of their markets to the agricultural products of developing countries. It also includes the right of developing countries to create national policies to develop and protect their agriculture and farmers. It also me ans the refusal of any measures that aim to monopolize the production of seeds through patents and genetic modification. 5) We refuse to basic services (water, health, education, etc.) in trade agreements, since these are connected directly to the well being of people. These should remain under the control of people through their national i nstitutions and not market forces and the purpose of quick gain. 6) We refuse the inclusion of labor standards in WTO agreements and call for the adherence to the standards of the ILO. 7) We refuse any transgression of international environmental treaties, and we call for the adherence of trade agreements and practices to the respect of environmental safety and health standards. 8) We refuse the internal mechanisms of the WTO, especially its conflict resolution process, since they are neither democratic, nor transparent, nor do they provide equal representation in the decision-making process. We call for new mechanisms based on those conditions and the abilities of developing countries. Global economy and global trade should follow the bases of the consolidation of global justice and equality. They should allow all countries to benefit from economic, scientific, and technological advancement. This way gl obal trade will strengthen peace and global stability and not become an instrument in the creation of conflict and war. Our world is not for sale and peoples' lives and well being are not a material for trade. The global protest movement that succeeded in stopping the meeting in Seattle two years ago, because of the accumulation of the struggle and coordination and solidarity between its components, is now capable of stopping t he new round in Doha and in enforcing the respect of peoples' rights and the rights of developing countries in particular to achieve development, social justice and peace. Changing the location of WTO meetings from one country to another in order to avoid what happened in Seattle in 1999 will not solve the problem. What we demand is that the WTO changes its mechanisms and content, not the l ocation of its meetings. If the WTO does not do so, then any meeting, wherever it may be, will become another Seattle. Beirut, 8 November 2001 ************************************************* Focus-on-Trade is a regular electronic bulletin providing updates and analysis of trends in regional and world trade and finance, with an emphasis on analysis of these trends from an integrative, interdisciplinary viewpoi nt that is sensitive not only to economic issues, but also to ecological, political, gender and social issues. Your contributions and comments are welcome. Please contact us c/o CUSRI, Wisit Prachuabmoh Building, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok 10330 Thailand. Tel: (66 2) 218 7363/7364/7365, Fax: (66 2) 255 9976, E-Mail: admin at focusweb.org, Website: http://focusweb.org. Focus on the Global South is an autonomous programme of policy research and action of the Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute (CUSRI) based in Bangkok. Focus on the Global South (FOCUS) c/o CUSRI, Chulalongkorn University Bangkok 10330 THAILAND Tel: 662 218 7363/7364/7365/7383 Fax: 662 255 9976 E-mail: N.Bullard at focusweb.org Web Page http://www.focusweb.org From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 12 06:30:23 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2001 15:30:23 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Free trade while stocks last Message-ID: Time for the west to put up or shut up Larry Elliott Monday November 12, 2001 The Guardian Doha is make or break time for the World Trade Organisation. After the fiasco in Seattle, another failure to launch trade liberalisation talks would be fatal for the WTO's credibility, ushering in an era where countries would strike bilateral trade deals or group themselves into regional blocs. In the atmosphere of recessionary gloom that has descended on the west following the attacks on September 11, such an eventuality fills the west with horror. The fear among ministers is that deadlock in Doha will lead to a retreat into protectionism that will turn recession into depression, just as the Smoot-Hawley tariff did in the 1930s. As Paul Krugman has illustrated, there was no conceivable way - given the size of trade as a proportion of American GDP in 1930 - that Smoot-Hawley could have caused the great slump, but in the febrile atmosphere of November 2001 there is certainly a risk that a WTO stalemate would have seriously adverse effects on financial markets and business confidence. The stakes are higher than they were in Seattle in 1999, when America's boom meant it was acting as the global consumer of last resort. The talks did not break down because of the protests that brought the city to a standstill. They broke down because the developing countries were presented with a lousy deal by the west and were sick of being ignored and patronised. Countries like Bangladesh and India walked away from the negotiating table rather than accept Bill Clinton's idea that core labour standards should be written into trade deals, seeing the move as a form of backdoor protectionism. The rich and powerful countries say they have learned lessons from Seattle. So, the cliche of the moment is that Doha must see the launch of a development round that will see the fruits of economic growth and globalisation spread around to Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia. Promises a-plenty have been made about the need to make free trade work for the poor. Well now it is time for the west to put up or shut up. The altered state of the world since September 11 provides not just a golden opportunity but a prime motivation for the US, the European Union and the rest of the developed world to end their nauseating hypocrisy and take the concrete steps that are needed to make good their solemn promises. If the multilateral trading system is now facing a crisis of legitimacy it is not because of anti-globalisation protests but because the developed nations have said one thing and done another. History suggests that trade can be an effective mechanism for increasing economic growth in poor countries, but that requires rich countries to face down their protectionist lobbies and take decisions that might cause short-term pain to their electorates to secure long-term gains. After the events of September 11, the notion that poverty and economic insecurity in one part of the world can have ramifications in another might seem to be a no-brainer. If so, the message does not appear to have been picked up by trade negotiators in the west. Developing countries don't want competition policy and investment to form part of a new round, but the EU has in sisted that they be on the table because it needs some bargaining chips to compensate for the concessions it will have to make on agriculture. The Americans are playing hardball over intellectual property rights, even though the case made by Brazil, India and South Africa about the need for cheap generic drugs in times of national health emergencies has been borne out by the Bush administration's response to the anthrax scare in the US. Intimidation of the most blatant kind has been going on behind the scenes, with warnings to poor countries that they will have preferential trade terms rescinded unless they drop their objections to a text that is being cooked up without their input and will be presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. This blatant bullying gives the lie to the idea that the west intends Doha to be the launch of a development round. Instead, it is the same old recipe in which the rich and powerful seek to ex tract the maximum amount of concessions from the weak and powerless for the minimum cost. The west's rhetoric is all about the virtues of free trade; its actions are mercantilist. The developing world does not have much in common with the anti-globalisation movement in the west. It wants to see a new round of talks launched because it sees trade as a key ingredient in boosting growth and per capita incomes. But, rightly, it is not prepared to accept a deal at any price and sees Doha as a litmus test of the west's ability to deliver. As Kevin Watkins of Oxfam put it: "The record of industrialised countries in the area of trade policy is one of heroic under-achievement. They have collectively reneged on every commitment made." He says tariff barriers in rich countries are four times higher for poor countries than for industrialised countries, agricultural subsidies have been increased, pledges to free up trade in textiles have been ignored, intellectual property rights and investment rules are applied in a fashion that undermines social and economic welfare in poor countries and further marginalises them. So what should happen? Firstly, the west should recognise that it has an interest in poor countries becoming richer. Rich countries do not tend to be finishing schools for terrorists; instead they buy your exports. Secondly, a blanket trade liberalisation by poor countries while the rich countries leave their protective barriers in place would be counter-productive. In the current environment, that means that the developing world is stuck with offering commodities that are falling in price for the high-valued added manufactured goods made in the west. It was to avoid remaining an agrarian economy that Alexander Hamilton told Adam Smith to sling his hook when the great economist said America should concentrate on its comparative advantage in agriculture and leave the industrial stuff to Britain. The US, Germany and Japan all used trade barriers as a protective shield in their periods of rapid industrialisation. Thirdly, the west should take specific steps to help the developing world. It should ensure that tariffs on goods from poor countries are no higher than those from rich countries and it should scale down the particularly punitive tariffs on those goods that are especially vital to developing countries. The creditable attempt by the EU's trade commissioner Pascal Lamy to introduce tariff-free access to Europe for "everything but arms" from the world's 49 least developed countries was frustrated by powerful lobbies that have postponed the implementation of the deal for sugar, bananas and rice - the three areas of particular interest to the LDCs. If a "development round" is to mean anything, everything but arms should be applied across the developed world, and applied now. There's more that the west could do but this would be a start. If it continues to push for a deal that would merely replicate the one-sided failings of the Uruguay round, the poor countries should do now what they should have done then and walk away. The US, the EU, Japan and the other developed nations would be made to recognise that selfishness and stupidity normally go hand in hand, and that the unacceptable deal on offer not only harms the prospects of the poor but could put the multilateral trading system at risk. This may sound like a dangerous game for developing nations which, as the World Bank has pointed out, stand to suffer most from a global downturn. But it may be the only way to wring meaningful concessions out of the west. The way to deal with bullies is to stand up to them. larry.elliott at guardian.co.uk Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 12 06:32:53 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2001 15:32:53 +0200 Subject: [A-List] The quagmire continues Message-ID: Taliban is damaged but not fatally IAN BRUCE The Herald, 12 November 2001 THE fall of the strategic crossroads city of Mazar-e-Sharif marks a turning point in the US-led campaign in Afghanistan, but it is not yet a fatal blow to the ruling Taliban regime nor even the beginning of the end of a conflict likely to last well into next year. While US air strikes have paved the way for opposition Northern Alliance advances throughout the north of the country - crucially opening up key supply routes for military and humanitarian aid via Uzbekistan and Tajikistan - those lightning successes are stretching the manpower of the outnumbered rebels thinly, leaving them vulnerable to local counter-attacks as winter limits the protective power of the aerial umbrella. In the wider context, the prospect of victory after three years of stalemate has begun to rekindle the ethnic rivalries and personal ambitions of the warlords whose troops form the fragile alliance. Those fracture lines threaten a final political solution. In the absence of agreement among the tribal elders drawn from ethnic Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara groups on the composition of a 60-strong representative ruling council to govern a post-war Afghanistan, the warlords retain a balance of power based on self-interest. Few of the mujahideen commanders will be happy to hand over control of territory they regard as private fiefdoms to a loya jurga - grand council - dominated by a Pashtun king and at least half of whose members are likely to be, like the Taliban, Pashtuns. The biggest immediate danger is that the alliance will ignore George W Bush's entreaty not to lay siege to Kabul, the capital, and instead try to capitalise on the momentum of its success to launch a premature assault on the symbolic seat of government. The Taliban garrison defending the city numbers between 8000 and 10,000 men, many drawn from Osama bin Laden's veteran Arab Legion force. The alliance troops concentrating around Bagram airbase 25 miles to the north have between 2000 and 3000. They are short of ammunition and outgunned in tanks and artillery. Unconfirmed reports say that Taliban units retreating from Mazar-e-Sharif are heading south in small groups to reinforce the defences. Thousands of pro-regime Pakistani militants are also heading for the capital. A showdown at Kabul without full US backing in terms of all-out air strikes and logistics might well result in a bloody repulse of the poorly-coordinated alliance units. US military sources are cautious about the next moves in a strategy which is increasingly being formulated on the hoof rather than carefully planned. As long as the weather permits, Taliban movement on the country's few roads can be restricted by air attack, denying the regime the chance to concentrate forces for counter-attack. The next logical step is consolidation of gains in the north and occupation of Mazar's Soviet-built airfield to provide a springboard for further action deep into Taliban territory. But that would involve committing several thousand US and Western troops to guarantee the security of the base for air operations. A perimeter would have to be established 15 miles in every direction from the airfield to minimise the risk of attack by heavy mortars or the shooting down of jets or transports by Taliban infiltrators using shoulder-fired missiles, such as the Stingers supplied to the Afghan mujahideen by the CIA in the 1980s. The Taliban still has an estimated 200 in its arsenal and they remain a potent threat to aircraft and helicopters. Only when approach and departure flight paths could be protected would the Pentagon sanction forward deployment of fighter bombers and Apache helicopter gunships. The A-10 Warthog, a sturdy ground attack aircraft armed with a rotary Gatling gun firing 30mm shells the size of milk bottles, would be a likely choice to increase search-and-destroy capability. The advantage of having an internal base would also drastically increase the scale of air operations. Strike aircraft flying from carriers in the Arabian Sea have to refuel over Pakistan and can mount only one sortie a day. Flying from Mazar, each aircraft would triple that rate and also save expensive fuel. British officers have been pressing since the start of the campaign for a forward base "on the enemy's grid square" to ramp up the scale and effectiveness of special forces' forays for reconnaissance and raiding. The two factors uppermost in planners' minds this weekend are Northern Alliance attitudes to Taliban prisoners and pro-regime civilians in captured areas, and the Taliban's redeployment of its fighting strength. Mazar has been the scene of at least two tit-for-tat massacres in the last three years. Another ritual slaughter would set back hopes of persuading tribal chiefs in the regime's southern heartland to switch sides and might instead convince them to throw in their lot with the Taliban against all foreign invaders. A few hundred Taliban fighters have been killed or captured in the northern campaign from a force which numbered between 7000 and 8000. Others who have retreated from Mazar are likely to suffer a similar fate. The bulk of the regime's 45,000 fighters are untouched by the setback. Unless the Taliban leadership collapses before then, US analysts know that the final battles will not be for Kabul, but for Kandahar. Then there are the cave complexes of the Hindu Kush to be cleared in the hunt for bin Laden. Those are obstacles it might take US and British ground forces to overcome. Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/12-11-19101-23-14-5.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 12 08:11:55 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2001 17:11:55 +0200 Subject: [A-List] The boundaries of taste Message-ID: Would a similar ruling on BBC World's coverage be a case of extraterritoriality? TV watchdog criticises ITN for footage of World Trade Centre set to music By Arifa Akbar The Independent, 12 November 2001 An ITN news programme that played a montage of images from the 11 September terrorist attacks to a synchronised musical score has been criticised for causing "offence to taste and public feeling" by the Independent Television Commission. The two-minute sequence shown at the end of an ITN news special covering the attacks, which was broadcast less than 36 hours after the destruction of the Wold Trade Centre, elicited complaints to the commission from dozens of viewers. It said the most shocking aspect of the sequence, which was subtitled "a reminder of some of the harrowing images", was the way in which the music ran in time with footage of the impact of the hijacked planes on the twin towers and their collapse. A number of viewers complained that setting to music images of the collapse of the World Trade Centre was offensive, inappropriate and in bad taste. ITN apologised yesterday for the offence the footage, which was shown at 9pm on 12 September, had caused to viewers, many of whom would still have been shocked by the previous day's events. An ITN spokeswoman said: "We can only stress our apology to the people who did find it offensive." But in a statement to the commission, the broadcaster defended its intentions to include music in such a sequence as a highly subjective issue, influenced by personal taste. ITN described the tone of the musical finale as sombre and funereal and said that some viewers had contacted it to commend its inclusion as "moving". The end sequence was part of a five-hour marathon of live news transmission for ITN, which said that by concluding the coverage with a compilation of images set to music, it had "intended to provide viewers with a few moments on which to reflect". While the commission upheld viewer complaints, it did acknowledge the astute editorial judgements in the many hours of live production by ITN, and accepted that the musical accompaniment to the terrorist attacks, which included the rescue efforts and its tragic aftermath, was "effective and moving". The synchronised correlation between the music and on-screen destruction was what it found objectionable. Full article at: http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/media/story.jsp?story=104482 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 12 08:17:10 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2001 17:17:10 +0200 Subject: [A-List] The lingering legacy of Robert Maxwell Message-ID: After the media mogul (was) drowned in 1991, it emerged that the foreign editor of the Daily Mirror, Nick Davies, had engaged in some extra-curricular arms dealing. The exact relationship between Davies' supposedly extra-curricular activities and his employer were never made explicit, no doubt for very good reason. Here we see possible evidence why: the political editor of the Daily Mirror at that time is now, we are to believe, orchestrating a global (dis)information campaign concerning the current war in Afghanistan. Coalition leaders kept in line by Campbell's spin network By Jo Dillon and Andrew Gumbel Independent on Sunday, 11 November 2001 A transatlantic "spin" network masterminded by Alastair Campbell, Downing Street's director of strategy, has assumed tight control over presentation of the war against terrorism, reviewing speeches and co-ordinating trips by the war leaders to prevent duplication or disarray. Three 24-hour "communications centres" - in London, Washington and Islamabad - are about to go into operation. They were set up after Mr Campbell visited the US late last month as it became clear the West was losing the propaganda war with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. Even before they start work, action has been taken to silence the coalition's adversaries. Under Western pressure, Pakistan has ordered the Taliban to close its consulate in Karachi and halted daily press conferences at the Islamabad embassy. US and British networks have been discouraged from broadcasting unedited footage of Mr bin Laden. The centres are each to be staffed with 20 senior personnel from Britain, the US, Nato and Pakistan and could be extended to include representatives of other countries as the conflict progresses. Their job is to carry out the type of media manipulation techniques that Mr Campbell brought to New Labour and then exported to Nato during the Kosovo conflict. The first is rapid rebuttal. The West quickly realised that Mr bin Laden's video statements, broadcast on the Arab al-Jazeera station, and Taliban pronouncements in Pakistan could dominate the news agenda for hours before anyone had got up in Britain and America. The Islamabad operation, which is being set up by Alan Percival, a senior civil servant at the Lord Chancellor's department who was number two to Mr Campbell in 1997, will be responsible for monitoring and responding quickly to such broadcasts. Back in London, the Foreign Office-based team, led by Mr Campbell himself, has brought in Arabic speakers to monitor television, radio and web broadcasts meant for an Islamic audience. A Whitehall source admitted there was still "a sizeable proportion of the Muslim world that thinks this is a Zionist plot". Daily briefings now take place in London with Muslim journalists, and there is a co-ordinated effort to talk directly to the Muslim world. Tony Blair has done a string of interviews with the Muslim media, including al-Jazeera. General Richard Myers, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff - described somewhat haltingly by a State Department official last week as "the best they've got" at the Pentagon to sell the war effort - is among several US figures to give an interview to the station. The second job of the communications network is to co-ordinate "core messages". Mr Campbell met his opposite number in the White House, Karen Hughes, after it became clear that the Pentagon-White House briefing operation was failing to get the message across. Contradictory messages have come from the US: General Myers told reporters in Los Angeles that the war could well take not months, but years, but Mr Rumsfeld flatly denied this during a lightning trip to south Asia. Similar mix-ups have emerged over the anthrax investigation. And there are inconsistencies of tone, the president's vision of a necessary war against an implacable evil contrasting starkly with General Myers's admission that "if we can win this through diplomatic efforts, then that's the way to do it". Mr Campbell is also understood to have been concerned to ensure that speeches in Washington and London contained the same key messages, and that central players did not make keynote speeches or go on high-profile trips at the same time and "steal each other's limelight". The US is now planning a television advertising campaign specifically aimed at hearts and minds in the Middle East and beyond. The woman behind the new-look propaganda effort is Charlotte Beers, the undersecretary of state for public diplomacy, who was drafted into government from the world of Uncle Ben's Rice and Head and Shoulders shampoo by the Bush administration. According to Mr Powell, not only is Ms Beers "fluent with this sort of thing, but she is from the advertising business. I wanted one of the world's greatest advertising experts, because what are we doing? We're selling. We're selling a product. That product we are selling is democracy. It's the free enterprise system, the American value system". Mr Campbell's aim, as it was when he went to Brussels to get a grip on the propaganda machine - fronted by Jamie Shea - during the Nato strikes on Kosovo, is to ensure there is a united front. But there is not to be one "face" of the war against terror, as there was at Nato. This is to be a multinational, multicultural, global spin machine. As a Whitehall source put it: "It is a recognition that modern warfare is also about communications." Full article at: http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/media/story.jsp?story=104360 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 12 08:20:48 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2001 17:20:48 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Britain and the Modernisation of Europe Message-ID: Gibraltar accuses UK of preparing 'sell-out' to Spain By Andrew Grice Political Editor The Independent, 10 November 2001 Britain sparked a furious reaction from the government of Gibraltar yesterday after calling for its people to accept "fresh thinking" during negotiations with Spain over the Rock's future. As Tony Blair and his Spanish counterpart, Jose Maria Aznar, discussed ideas to resolve Britain's 300-year dispute with Spain over Gibraltar, the government in the British dependent territory accused London of preparing to "sell out" its people by handing sovereignty to Madrid. It seized on comments by the Foreign Office minister Peter Hain, who sought to reassure the Rock's people by saying they would have a vote on the colony's future and would not be forced to give up their British citizenship. The Gibraltar government attacked Mr Hain's comments as "extraordinary", adding: "The issue is not one of loss of citizenship but of sovereignty of the land and political rights of the people, which are indivisible from each other." At Downing Street last night, Mr Blair and Mr Aznar promised to find a solution acceptable to all sides to what they called the "sensitive issue". Their talks continued at Chequers, where Mr Aznar stayed last night. Mr Blair said: "The traditional positions of Britain and Spain have not changed ... The big difference in context is that the process is being conducted by two countries that are genuine allies and partners today." Foreign ministers from Britain and Spain will hold talks on the Rock's future on 20 November. The governments have set a deadline of December next year for resolving their long-standing differences. Mr Hain said: "It is very important that Madrid moves on and London moves on and the people of Gibraltar move on as well." He said that Gibraltarians had to recognise that times had changed and that a new relationship with Spain would be to their great advantage. He said the talks promised "an enormous prize and opportunity" for Gibraltar, which could become the main financial centre for the entire region. Mr Hain called for "fresh thinking" from Gibraltar and said he was "very puzzled" that its government might boycott the talks. He insisted: "There isn't any way that Britain is simply going to hand Gibraltar over to Spain, I give you that categorical assurance now. That is not a serious proposition." But Peter Caruana, Gibraltar's Chief Minister, said the idea that the sovereignty of Gibraltar could be handed around between Britain and Spain was "democratically obscene". He said: "Mr Hain expects the Gibraltar government to go along to talks on the basis that we will be consulted, but that he and Spain will be free to agree whatever they choose over our heads. We don't see why we should be expected to give up our British sovereignty to buy off the Spanish blackmails and the Spanish vetoes of European business, which is really what is behind all of this." In a statement, the Gibraltar government said Mr Hain's approach seemed to be "that Gibraltar had better accept a sovereignty deal because the alternative is a pain". It said there was "no evidence" to indicate "a genuine change" in approach by Spain. "The only change by Madrid that would enable the problem to be resolved is Spain's acceptance of our right to decide our own future and that she cannot have any share of the sovereignty of any part of Gibraltar contrary to the wishes of the people of Gibraltar." Full article at: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/europe/story.jsp?story=104162 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 12 08:48:02 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2001 17:48:02 +0200 Subject: [A-List] New Labour internecine warfare Message-ID: Brown and Byers clash War with Treasury makes it hard for Transport Department to get aid for railways Keith Harper and Julia Finch Monday November 12, 2001 The Guardian A potentially damaging rift has emerged between the chancellor, Gordon Brown, and the transport secretary, Stephen Byers, over the Railtrack affair, which could undermine Mr Byers' attempts to get more money out of the Treasury to invest in the rail network. One senior Transport Department official said yesterday: "The relationship between the department and the Treasury is the worst I have ever known. It is very sour indeed." The source said that Mr Byers has become so isolated from the chancellor that he has enlisted the help of the deputy prime minister, John Prescott, and the Cabinet Office minister Lord Macdonald - the previous transport team - to obtain a more sympathetic hearing from Mr Brown. The rift between the two departments is bound to increase pressure on Mr Byers, whose decision to put Railtrack into administration will come under further scrutiny this week as he faces a difficult debate on the Railtrack issue in the Commons tomorrow. He then faces the transport select committee on Wednesday to answer accusations that he has misled the Commons on Railtrack. Over the weekend Railtrack claimed that it had been planning a major cost cutting programme in order to survive without further cash handouts in the weeks before the government withdrew its funding. The group had been planning to reduce overheads by as much as 10% between 2003 and 2005, according to papers given to the City regulator, the financial services authority. Chief executive Steve Marshall described the programme as the group's "plan B". The group is believed to have asked the government to give it notice if it was not going to provide further cash so it could put its cost-cutting programme into action. The FSA had asked Railtrack to provide it with documents from May until it was declared insolvent last month to see if a false market had been created in its shares. It has also emerged that US finance house Babcock & Brown has expressed an interest in bidding for the Railtrack group. The German-backed Swiftrail consortium - which has signed up the country's top corporate rescue specialist, David James, as its chairman-in waiting should it win control - met Railtrack's administrators last Friday to further outline its plans. A spokeswoman for the Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions, said the government was pleased that commercial oper ations were coming forward with plans, even though Mr Byers is pressing ahead with his idea of a not-for-profit organisation to run the railway. Some ministers are becoming concerned that the Government could be landed with a much heavier bill for rail than it might if Railtrack had been re-nationalised. The Ernst & Young administrators - whose own fees are likely to be around ?70m by the time they have finished - have private fears that it could be at least a year before they sort out the Railtrack mess. Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/transport/Story/0,2763,591751,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 12 08:49:58 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2001 17:49:58 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Tony Benn on current crisis Message-ID: Tackle terror at its roots Tony Benn Monday November 12, 2001 The Guardian The war against terrorism, the prime minister tells us, could last for years and, although only one country has been bombed so far, it has been made clear that any country which is suspected of harbouring terrorist groups could be attacked. President Bush has said that "those who are not with us are against us" which defines the enemy even more broadly. Initially these operations were described as a crusade, but we are now told that this is not a "holy war" against Islam, although the Archbishop of Canterbury, on his visit to the Middle East, has pronounced it to be a "just war" that good Christians can and should support. Osama bin Laden has been named as the man behind the atrocity in New York but there is no question of him being brought to trial because the United States is opposed to any international war crimes tribunal which would have the authority to try US citizens. In any case, ex-president Clinton and President Bush have already ordered that he be assassinated on sight. It is easy to see why the US does not want Bin Laden brought to court. In his own defence he would, no doubt, point out that he was armed and financed by the CIA as a freedom fighter (or terrorist) to oust the Russians when they invaded Afghanistan. Apart from a UN security council resolution condemning terrorism, the procedure for dealing with threats to peace under the UN charter have been set aside. By invoking Article 5 Nato did not absolve itself from the responsibilities laid down in the Nato treaty to abide by the provisions of the UN charter. People who have been campaigning against the bombing at massive demonstrations all over the world - another big one takes place in London on November 18 - have been compared to those who appeased Hitler, or accused of lacking moral fibre (a wartime phrase used to describe cowardice in the face of the enemy), or of somehow having forgotten the horrific scenes in New York that day. Paul Marsden, in his remarkable but wholly credible account of his meeting with the Labour chief whip, was apparently told that opposition to war was not accepted as a matter of conscience. Strenuous efforts were made to prevent any vote against the war from taking place in the House, and the government has so far refused to seek a positive vote for its policy in the Commons. Meanwhile B-52s are carpet bombing the Taliban lines in the hope that the Northern Alliance will seize the opportunity thus created to break through and save the lives of US troops who might otherwise be sacrificed in battle - a questionable strategy which would create huge political problems were the Northern Alliance to take over the whole country. Despite all the war-like statements emerging every day from No 10, Britain's military role has been minuscule, apparently limited to firing a few missiles from a submarine, providing logistic support and keeping some British soldiers on standby. The real value to Washington of the prime minister's involvement is that he is providing political cover for whatever the president wants to do, thus breathing life into that popular phrase the "international community" which helps to divert attention from the fact that this is not a UN war. And so, as winter approaches with the possibility that hundreds of thousands of people may starve or freeze to death, we are being reassured that this is a just war that we must and can win. Perhaps we should be asking ourselves whether by our silence, we may be acquiescing in the perpetration of crimes against humanity in that those who have already suffered so much are now suffering even more because their land is urgently needed for a pipeline to get Caspian oil to the US market. Some people, who are very unhappy about all this, do ask the question: "what would you do?" But if terrorism is ever to be eliminated it must be tackled at its roots, by forcing Israel to accept a Palestinian state, ending the bombing of Iraq and the killing of its citizens by sanctions, withdrawing US forces from Saudi Arabia and establishing a truly international court of justice able to deal with terrorism. Bush's recent refusal to meet Arafat means Washington is not serious about a settlement. Perhaps the most important lesson of all is that our best hope of building a safer and more peaceful world lies in reconstructing our policy around the UN and authorising it to control the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation and the multinational corporations which now dominate the global economy and expect the Pentagon to step in to defend their interests from any national liberation movements that might threaten their profits. Full article at: http://politics.guardian.co.uk/attacks/comment/0,1320,591869,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 12 08:52:31 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2001 17:52:31 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Free trade while stocks last Message-ID: Isn't this a case of what industrial economists called "vertical integration"? Tobacco firm to profit from cancer genes Sarah Boseley, health editor Monday November 12, 2001 The Guardian One of the world's biggest tobacco companies aims to make billions of pounds from the diseases caused by cigarette smoking through deals with biotech companies for the exclusive rights to market future lung cancer vaccines. The strategy by Japan Tobacco, which makes Camel, Winston, Mild Seven and the menthol cigarette brand Salem, was condemned yesterday as both cynical and dangerous. If a successful lung cancer vaccine went on the market, it would not stop smokers dying of other tobacco-related diseases, such as heart disease and emphysema. But the arrival of a vaccine, promoted by a tobacco company, would encourage smoking in the false belief that they could be treated. "Giving a tobacco company exclusive rights to lung cancer vaccines is like putting Dracula in charge of a blood bank," said Helen Wallace, deputy director of GeneWatch UK, which uncovered the deals. Dr Wallace is worried that one of the biotech companies, the Seattle-based Corixa Corp., has based its work on the patenting of human lung cancer gene sequences, which may have come from a smoker who may not have known of the commercial prospects that his genes offered. Derek Yach, director of the non-communicable diseases cluster at the World Health Organisation, said: "We tackle lung cancer by breaking the addictive grip of the tobacco industry and taking action to help people quit smoking or never start. The last company that should control the rights to a lung cancer vaccine is one that makes huge profits from products that cause the disease." Japan Tobacco, the third-biggest tobacco firm in the world, has paid Corixa for an exclusive licence to develop and sell vaccine and antibody-based products aimed at the prevention and/or treatment of lung cancer, primarily in north America and Japan. The idea behind it is to use certain proteins found in lung cancer tumours to generate an immune response in the patient. So far, Japan Tobacco has paid Corixa several million pounds. The other contract, with the California-based Cell Genesys, was signed in late 1998 on payment by Japan Tobacco of ?8.7m and an undertaking of ?18.8m in research funding. In return, Japan Tobacco receives marketing rights. The tobacco giant also invested three years ago in the UK company British Biotech, which is developing a genetically engineered protein that can dissolve and prevent blood clots and may help prevent heart attacks and strokes. Public health officials and anti-tobacco campaigners say the best way to prevent deaths from smoking is by clamping down on the advertising and promotion of cigarettes. "What we have got is a company that wants to block the things that would prevent the diseases in the first place and profit from mopping up the mess that their products have created," said Clive Bates of Action on Smoking and Health. "It was a new low," he added. Lung cancer is one of over 50 diseases caused by smoking, he pointed out, and an effective vaccine would not prevent deaths from other causes. It would also inevitably be priced too high for those in poor countries. GeneWatch says that patents on gene sequences in lung cancer tumours may impede progress towards a vaccine, since they prevent research by others. Both Corixa and Cell Genesys strongly defend their contracts with Japan Tobacco, saying it is dealing with the pharmaceutical arm of the company (which accounts for less than 2% of the tobacco giant's sales) and that their main concern is to save lives. A Corixa spokesman said people should bear in mind the needs of cancer sufferers. Jennifer Williams of Cell Genesys said the deal was done in 1998, "when the company was not as well financed as it is now. It made sense for us to do that." But she said it was unlikely that they would seek an alternative partner. Roy Tsuji, general manager of the media and investor relations division at Japan Tobacco, said the company was diversifying because of the limited prospects for growth in the tobacco sector. "The vast majority of people welcome efforts that help find drugs for various diseases." Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/smoking/Story/0,2763,591965,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From lnp3 at panix.com Tue Nov 13 20:30:36 2001 From: lnp3 at panix.com (Louis Proyect) Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2001 22:30:36 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Colonel Gordon and the Mahdi Message-ID: <200111140329.WAA04457@apakabar.cc.columbia.edu> In the future--if there is a future--humanity will study the cultural artifacts of the United States and Great Britain just as scholars study Roman epic poems. To fully understand Empire, you have to study how its artists flatter their masters. Since Empire loses vigor from generation to generation, it is no wonder that Anglo-American late capitalism, the bastard offspring of Ancient Rome, has not produced a Virgil. Instead, in its dotage, it tends more and more to draw upon the movies to sing its splendors, with Rambo and Ronald Reagan standing in for the Aeneid and Julius Caesar. When Great Britain met its first battlefield defeat in the colonial world at the hands of the Mahdi-led "fuzzy-wuzzy" and dervish, it was thrown into as much of a quandary as the United States was after Somalia militiamen caught the US Marines in a devastating crossfire. How could savage tribesmen armed primarily with sword and spear defeat the best-trained and best-armed military in the world? (Map of the Sudan: http://www.marxmail.org/Sudan_map.jpg) To begin to grasp this imperialist trauma and, further, what drives a kind of neo-Mahdist revolt of today, there is no better place to start than "Khartoum," a 1966 British-American co-produced film that starred conservative icon Charlton Heston. Written by Robert Ardrey of "Territorial Imperative" fame, "Khartoum" made its debut when the United States was engaged in a life-and-death struggle with its own defiant rebels, in this case believing in Communism rather than Islam. Of course, with Communism no longer a factor in world politics, it is no accident that malcontents across three continents are now returning to 19th century millenarian ideologies. Striving for a kind of kitschy grandeur, "Khartoum" begins with a 5-minute overture that superimposes the word "Overture" on a blank screen so the audience will understand that it is not dealing with some technical difficulty. Frank Cordell's overture has two motifs that are heard throughout the film. The "Gordon" theme is a second-rate "Pomp and Circumstance" march, while the "Mahdi" theme sounds like the standard camel-walking-across-the-desert music heard a million times before in films like "Lawrence of Arabia." When the overture ends, the first images appear: silent pyramids and a gently flowing Nile. A narrator portentously states, "The Nile was always there." Indeed, Egypt and the Sudan--the two countries whose fates were intimately linked to the Nile--are timeless as well. These were lands of "mystery," where "the gods" were always a factor. It is out of this Orientalist stew of timelessness, gods and mystery that the Mahdi emerged. With this kind of introduction, it is a safe bet that any scenes dramatizing social and economic grievances would be left on the cutting floor. (It is sad to reflect upon the fact that producer Julian Blaustein had also produced the 1950 film "Broken Arrow," which was written by blacklistee Albert Maltz and which took a sympathetic view toward the American Indian.) Once the legendary underpinnings are in place, the movie can cut to the chase. The first scene depicts the massacre of a 10,000 expeditionary force made up of Egyptian conscripts and their commanding officer, Colonel William Hicks. Sent to subdue the Mahdist rebels, this British version of General Custer meets an Arab version of Sitting Bull. Perhaps for these British officers, there was little difference between the "Fuzzy-Wuzzy" and some North American Indians they once did battle with. General Garnet Wolseley, who would eventually head up an abortive mission to rescue Gordon from Khartoum, made the rounds across the British Empire, including Canada where he commanded the Red River Expedition. This was a force sent against Louis Riel and the rebellious Metis, composed of trappers and hunters with mixed Native and French Canadian ancestry. According to Robin Neillands: "Wolseley's force made their way across the wilderness to Manitoba in canoes paddled by French-Canadian 'voyageurs'. The rebellion had collapsed before they reached Fort Garry but the 'voyageurs' were to enter Wolseley's mind again in the Sudan a few years later. During this expedition he began to gather around his headquarters a group of efficient and forward-looking officers." ("The Dervish Wars," p. 45) In other words, counter-insurgency tactics learned in native Canada would come in handy in the Sudan. After Canada, Wolseley moved on to West Africa, where he fought the Ashanti from 1870-1873. By this time, he was the youngest General in the British army at the age of 40. His higher-ups regarded Colonel Hicks, who was less skilled than Wolseley at colonial subjugation, as mediocre at best. Sent out to capture the Mahdi in September of 1883, he suffered from the sort of over-confidence that marked British participation from the outset. When the Mahdi offered him mercy if he surrendered, Hicks told him no deal. The film accurately depicts the British troops (including 100 'cuirassiers', or cavalry, in anachronistic chain mail) deployed in a standard 'square' formation, which put horsemen and cavalry on the perimeter, and supply wagons in the middle. Weakened by many days of travel in the hot sun and short on rations, the British force was decimated by the sword-wielding Mahdists. (Mahdist troops attacking a "square" formation: http://www.marxmail.org/Sudan_battle.jpg) Since the film is entirely from the British perspective, the Mahdist fighters are seen as an undifferentiated mob of howling, 'jibba' (smock) wearing fanatics. In reality, the Mahdist army contained different types of soldiers, based on social and ethnic origins. The term dervish, derived from the Persian term 'darawish' or beggar, was applied across the board to the Mahdist soldiers. For example, an 'ansar' infantryman was armed with sword and spear. He came from the Beggara group of livestock-herding tribes, who were of mixed Arab and black descent. Riflemen were known as 'jehadiya' and had often formerly served in the Egyptian army. These tended to be blacks from the Hadendowa tribe, who were part of the Beja people and were called fuzzy-wuzzies by the British because of their butter-matted hair. For all of the racial preconceptions one might carry into this narrative, it is interesting to consider that blacks had most of the guns. (Ansar infantryman: http://www.marxmail.org/ansar.jpg) (Hadendowa "fuzzy-wuzzy": http://www.marxmail.org/hadendowa.jpg) The British were shocked by the defeat of Hicks. In a speech to the House of Lords one month later, Lord Fitzmaurice said, "An Army has not vanished in such a fashion since Pharoah's host perished in the Red Sea." Following the scene of Hicks's defeat, the film shows the triumphant Mahdi addressing his troops. Played by a scenery-chewing Lawrence Olivier, this Mahdi rolls his r's--"tomorrow" comes out as "tomorrrrrow." This heightens the character's exoticness in lily-gilding fashion. While the Mahdi ("expected one") united people around his own brand of Islam, the real man was not just a religious fanatic. He had a social vision for the Sudan, cloaked as it was in the Koran. (The Mahdi: http://www.marxmail.org/Mahdi.jpg) Born in 1844, Mohammed Ahmed-Ibn-el-Sayed-Abdullah became interested in religion at an early age. His carpenter father encouraged his development by sending him to a 'khalwas,' or religious school, that was traditionally led by a 'fakir', or holy teacher. Part of his instruction involved learning the Koran by heart. Mohammed Ahmed's asceticism and dedication gained attention from teachers and local people. Most scholars, as well as his enemies in the British army such as Charles Gordon and Winston Churchill, share Neillands's view of the Mahdi: "The broad thrust of Mohammed Ahmed's teaching followed that of other reformers in other religions. His Islam was one devoted to the words of the Prophet and based on a return to the original virtues of prayer and simplicity as laid down in the Koran. Any deviation from the Koran was therefore heresy. There was also a political edge to this doctrine. Mohammed Ahmed's contempt for the Egyptians and Turko-Circassian people, who oppressed the Sudanese, co-operated with the slavers and led a life of indolence and luxury, was all too plain but he offered hope as well. The way to paradise lay through humility and a strict observance of the tenets of Islam. "There was nothing particularly new in Mohammed Ahmed's doctrines but he was an inspiring teacher. His message - that this world was but a testing ground and paradise awaited those who followed the Muslim faith - had a strong appeal to a people who found their daily lives hard in the extreme and welcomed the promise or prospect of a better life if not in this world then in the one to come. As far as this life was concerned, a better life depended on getting free of the 'Turks'." (Dervish Wars, p. 63) You'll note that Neillands refers to the Mahdi's "contempt" for those who "co-operated with the slavers." Keep this in mind when we take a closer look at the British anti-slavery stance in the war against the Sudanese people. "Khartoum" now shifts to the chambers of Prime Minister William Gladstone (Ralph Richardson), who has assembled a high-level strategy meeting to figure out a response to the Mahdist revolt. The atmosphere can be likened to that which probably prevailed in the White House following Sept. 11. Taking into account the unflappable spirit of the British ruling classes, the scene could best be described as one of hand-wringing trepidation. As Neillands puts it: "Her Majesty took a very poor view of armies led by British officers being cut to pieces by sword-armed savages. This opinion even stretched to armies led by former officers like Valentine Baker. Baker was clearly not a gentleman; he may even have been a bounder and was currently serving in the forces of another power, but he was British and relentlessly brave. In Her Majesty's opinion repeated massacres of forces led by British officers in the Sudan were deleterious to British prestige. If they continued it might set a bad example to discontented folk in other parts of the Empire. Something had to be done to restore British military standing and Her Majesty expected someone - possibly the Prime Minister - to do it. The Queen's view was widely shared by the British public and the British press and they were not to be denied." In other words, Great Britain faced nearly the same situation the United States faces today. In the final analysis, just as was the case in 1883, the war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban is necessary to prevent a bad example being set for discontented folk in parts of the American Empire. It does not matter if the Taliban are a bunch of nasty religious fanatics. We cannot have American hegemony being challenged anywhere and under any conditions. It might give Venezuelans or South African the wrong idea. The characters in that room were a microcosm of British imperial power. Sir Evelyn Baring (Alexander Knox), a Kissinger-like realist and cynic, sees politics as a way to advance the fortunes of his family bank using the leverage of his post as Governor of Egypt. Lord Granville (Michael Hordern) is Gladstone's Foreign Minister and a hard-core self-described imperialist--this was at a time when euphemisms were unnecessary. Representing the military high command are Colonel J.D.H. Stewart (Richard Johnson), who would become Gordon's aide in Khartoum, and the aforementioned General Wolseley (Nigel Green). Although by no means a consensus, they agree to give Colonel Gordon a chance to sort things out, even though success seems uncertain. With Granville urging a hawkish interventionist course and Baring warning dovishly against troop commitments, Gordon is a sensible compromise. At any rate, nobody else would be willing to step into the developing quagmire except someone like Gordon, whose fanaticism matched the Mahdi's. Notwithstanding Gordon's religious zealotry and reputation for being a loose cannon, he had shown audacity in putting down the Taiping rebellion ten years earlier, whence he earned the nickname "Chinese." He would be dispatched to Sudan to collect information and to evacuate Egyptian citizens from Khartoum. Although Gordon was ordered not to take military initiatives, his reputation as a colonialist warrior must have raised the possibility in Gladstone's mind that Gordon might "improvise" after arriving there. (Gordon in dress uniform: http://www.marxmail.org/Gordon.jpg) But if Gordon was fanatical, at least he was on the side of the angels. (And he would be the first to affirm that.) Indeed, his impeccable moral standards would help to forestall any domestic criticisms of Gordon's mission in the Sudan as imperialist meddling. As a long-time opponent of slavery, the government could defend his assignment in the Sudan as a second tour of duty against the scourge of slavery. On his first tour of duty in 1873, Gordon had signed on with the Khedive Ismail to wipe out slavery in the Sudan, a country that Egypt was attempting to liberate, all the better to bring under colonial subjugation. With the Suez Canal looming as a strategic asset for the country, the Khedive sought to gain control over the territory surrounding the White Nile in the Sudan. In order to procure British support for his endeavors, the Khedive pledged to wipe out slavery in the Sudan, a cause that Great Britain had long been associated with. Through the pressure of the Anti-Slavery Society and individuals like Wilberforce, the British government not only abolished the trade itself, but also made warfare on traders. (The Khedive with his medals: http://www.marxmail.org/Khedive.jpg) The British War Office released Gordon for duty in the Sudan and he assumed the post of Governor. In keeping with his reputation for honesty and frugality, Gordon told the Khedive that he would accept a salary of only ?2,000 per year rather than the ?10,000 offered him. He told his sister, "My object is to show the Khedive and his people that gold and silver idols are not worshipped by all the world." (Marlowe, "Mission to Khartum", p. 33) Since some of the Mahdi's followers appeared to be disgruntled ex-slave traders, the British public--deeply committed to the anti-slavery cause, at least the way they understood it--could not possibly object to Gordon's presence. His mission would be the sort of thing that only the British version of the anti-American "hard left" could object to, just as we oppose US Marines rescuing the Haitian people from Macoute terror, or NATO preventing genocide in Kosovo. With his eventual triumph over the slave-traders, especially their most powerful figure Zobeir, Gordon was elevated into an anti-slavery icon. Emin Pasha, another Governor of the Sudan who was originally a Jewish-born Austrian doctor named Eduard Schnitzer, sang Gordon's praises: "[T]hanks to Gordon Pasha's eminent talent for organization, thanks to his three years of really superhuman exertions and labours in a climate which very few have hitherto been able to withstand, thanks to his energy which no hindrances were able to damp... Only one who has had any direct dealings with negroes ... can form a true estimate of what Gordon Pasha has accomplished here." (Moorehead, p. 208) Of course, Emin Pasha had become much the expert on 'negroes' during his tenure in the Sudan: "After many years' of experiences of the Negroes and intimacy with them I have really no hopes at all of a regeneration of Negroes by Negroes--I know my own men too well for that--nor have I yet been able to bring myself to believe in the hazy sentimentalism which attempts the conversion and blessing of the Negroes by translating the New Testament and by moral pocket handkerchiefs' alone." (Stanhope White, "Lost Empire of the Nile", p. 142) After Gordon arrives in Cairo to begin lining up all his ducks in a row, he goes through diplomatic formalities including attendance at a belly-dancing performance at the Khedive's palace in his honor, an event that actually took place. Charlton Heston sits there with a look of some discomfort on his face, but one that by no means could have matched the expression on the real Gordon's face, who was very likely a repressed homosexual. Once that is out of the way, he rolls up his sleeves and gets down to business. His first important consultation is with the infamous slave-trader Zobeir Pasha (Zia Mohyeddin), whom Gordon nominates as Governor of the Sudan! What could explain this reversal? More likely than not, British imperialist interests carried more weight in his mind than fighting slave-traders. Principle had little to do with anything. If the only political actor in the Sudan who could command an allegiance matching that of the Mahdi was a slave-trader, so be it. (The Zobeir pasha in old age: http://www.marxmail.org/Zobeir.jpg) In an interview with William Thomas Stead's "Pall Mall Gazette" (Stead was the world's first interviewer in the sense we understand this format today), Gordon spelled out his version of a domino theory. If the greatest danger facing Great Britain were losing its grip on the Mideast, then of course concerns about the rights of black Africans would have to take a back seat. Gordon told Stead: "The danger to be feared is not that the Mahdi will march northward through Wadi Haifa; on the contrary, it is very improbable that he will ever go so far north. The danger is altogether of a different nature. It arises from the influence which the spectacle of a conquering Mohammedan power, established close to your frontier, will exercise upon the population which you govern. In all the cities in Egypt it will be felt that what Mahdi had done they may do: and as he has driven out the intruder and the infidel, they may do the same. Nor is it only England that has to face this danger. The success of the Mahdi has already excited dangerous fermentation in Arabia and Syria." (Moorehead, p. 238) Although the British government might buy into the Zobeir proposal, summed up in Churchill's words that "the Pasha was vile, but indispensable," the British public might have trouble swallowing the elevation of "the greatest slave-hunter who ever existed." (Moorhead, p. 253) After loud protests from the Anti-Slavery society, and cynical support on its behalf from the Conservative Party, the Cabinet nixed the nomination of Zobeir on March 6, 1884. While it is understandable that a movie like "Khartoum" might fail to explore the question of how slavery had become so widespread in the Sudan to begin with, scholarly literature leaves much to be desired as well. If it is the case, as the argument goes, that Sudanese resentment over the outlawing of slavery helped to fuel the Mahdist revolt, then why would the revolt have continued after the nomination of Zobeir? Was this nothing but an inchoate rebellion of warlords over lost privileges? To answer these questions, it is necessary to understand how slavery had become such a running sore in the Sudan to begin with. Before understanding this, it is essential to understand the overall economic relationship between Egypt and the Sudan. To begin with, it is necessary to understand that Egypt, which was part of the Ottoman Empire throughout the 1800s, was considered a kind of "economic miracle" prior to the Mahdist revolt. Under the Khedive (Viceroy) Ismail, development proceeded at a rapid rate, all the while accumulating debt in the fashion of modern-day "economic miracles" such as the Asian Tigers in the 1990s. Alan Moorehead states: "When Ismail succeeded his uncle Mohammed Said in the vice-royalty in 1863 Egypt was financially sound and even prosperous. The American Civil War had caused a sharp rise in the price of cotton, and the Egyptian crop had increased in value from ?5,000,000 to ?25,000,000. Ismail transferred his private debts to the state, increased the taxes, and got to work. He spent money with an abandon which eclipsed anything the oil sheikhs of the Middle East have achieved in the twentieth century." ("White Nile", p. 149) To further complicate matters, Egypt had recently become a bone of contention between Great Britain and rival imperial powers over control of the newly developed Suez Canal. A joint project of France and the Ottoman Empire, Ferdinand de Lesseps's engineering miracle created a direct route between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Its debut on November 17, 1869 was marked by lavish celebrations all across Egypt, including a banquet for 3000 guests in Cairo, for which 500 cooks and 1000 servants were imported from France. Guests included Emile Zola, Th?ophile Gautier, Henrik Ibsen and other well-known critics of bourgeois values. Mounting debt eventually forced the Khedive to sell his Suez Canal shares to Great Britain for ?4,000,000. With this change of ownership, Egypt effectively became a British colony. Overseeing British penetration of the Egyptian economy was the aforementioned Sir Evelyn Baring, a man eminently qualified for such duties by temperament and family ties. Created by Sir Francis Baring at the end of the eighteenth century, the bank became a linchpin of British influence abroad. The Duc de Richelieu said in 1812, "There are six great powers in Europe, England, France, Austria, Prussia and the Baring brothers." (Neillands, p. 29) Baring first got his foot in the door of the Egyptian government in 1876, when the 'Caisse de la Dette' (commission on the debt) put representatives of creditor nations in charge of various agencies. Baring and a Frenchman were put in charge of the Ministry of Finance, an act reminiscent of making a George Soros employee head of the Argentine Treasury--an event that actually transpired not too long ago. The Khedive Ismail was eventually driven from office in June of 1879. Two years later, as Great Britain and other creditor nations began to squeeze Egypt in much the same fashion that Argentina and Turkey are being squeezed today, popular discontent provoked an officer's revolt led by Colonel Ahmed Arabi, a 19th century precursor to Nasser. In 1881, Arabi was 42 years and from humble circumstances. The son of a rural sheikh, he had nothing going for him except honesty, nationalist consciousness, and--a rarity for the Turkish-dominated Khedival army--an Egyptian birthright. Taking note of threatening developments, the French and British creditors issued a joint statement. They would "oppose all internal and external threats to the Khedive and the current order of things in Egypt." (Neillands, p. 38) Just as might be expected, the statement touched off a rebellion. After Great Britain and France demanded the resignation of the Khedive and the formation of a new government, the proud Egyptians responded by naming Colonel Arabi their new ruler. To quell this outbreak of democracy, the French and British sent a squadron of warships and more than 25,000 troops that drowned the country in blood, beginning with a ten hour bombardment of Alexandria. Even with nominal French support, the ever-cynical Sir Evelyn Baring explained why Great Britain had to go it alone, just the way the USA must today: "There can be no doubt that the bombardment was justifiable not merely on the narrow ground of self-defense but because it was clear that in the absence of effective Turkish or international action, the duty of crushing Arabi depended on Britain alone." (Neillands, p. 43) If Egypt was to be bled dry while satisfying its creditors, it was only natural that it would make its colony Sudan share the pain. Since Sudan was not part of the cash economy and had few natural resources that could generate foreign revenues, Egypt resorted to a time-tested method, one that in fact had been pioneered in Europe. By imposing a tax, the Sudanese tribesmen would be forced to enter the cash economy. But except for ivory what did the Sudan have that could yield currency on the world market? The answer was human bodies. By imposing taxes on the ethnically mixed Arab-black Beggara pastoralists of the north and east, they would naturally be pressured into capturing black Africans of the Dinka tribes who lived in the south and who could be sold for hard currency. The male slaves ended up as soldiers or cotton-picking fellaheen in Egypt, while the women became domestic servants or consigned to the harems of North Africa and Turkey. In order to line up British support for its initial foray into the Sudan, Egypt made all sorts of verbal commitments to ending slavery. The real solution to the problem was not in codes, nor in proper enforcement. As long as Egypt put pressure on Sudan to help meet its financial obligations to European creditors, there would be a slave trade. It was the world capitalist system that created a market for slaves, just as capitalist immiseration has created a market for prostitutes from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. To end prostitution or slavery, you need to end want and the commodity it generates: cash. We could not expect the Mahdi or his followers to develop a sophisticated ideological analysis of the oppression from the north. To the tribesmen who donned the 'jibba,' the demand was simply "Kill the Turks (they did not distinguish between Europeans, Egyptians and Turks) and cease to pay taxes." Piecing together the whole story on Mahdism and slavery is a daunting task. The English-language scholarship on the revolt is written from a heavily Eurocentrist perspective. One is forced to often read between the lines. After the death of the Mahdi, who succumbed to smallpox shortly after the fall of Khartoum and the execution of Charles Gordon, and until the British re-conquest of the Sudan in 1896, a Mahdist state existed under the leadership of the Khalifa 'Abd Allahi. The Khalifa was a military leader, who while lacking the Mahdi's religious charisma, did attempt to build a state based on Mahdist principles. According to Robert O. Collins, the Khalifa banned the slave trade in the chattel form that it had taken during Egyptian rule. Without suggesting that this ban was based on anything except Machiavellian considerations of retaining power, Collins is unambiguous: private slave trading was prohibited. Without a doubt, the Mahdist commanders continued to retain captured soldiers as slaves in their own ranks, but this kind of class relationship had little to do with the sort of massive assault that took place prior to the Mahdi revolt. Collins writes, "Slatin [a European who converted to Islam after being captured by the Mahdi] mentions the great pomp and circumstance with which 400 male slaves were marched through Umm Durman; a number which would have caused the great slave traders of the Turkiya [Egyptian colonization] to sneer in contempt." (The Southern Sudan, 1883-1898, pp. 57-58) In any case, the prospects for Mahdi independence and social emancipation were severely limited by the social and economic backwardness of the region and by growing pressure from the colonists during a period of ever-increasing European incursion. After finally taking control over the Sudan, the British created a civil service, railways, taxation, police and all the other accoutrements of colonial rule. Except for occasional nationalist outbursts, the British kept order in the country in classic "white man's burden" fashion. They made sure to utilize all the time-tested methods for keeping their subjects in line, including divide and conquer. They sought to deepen racial divisions that had existed in the past. Understanding that the southern tribes felt alienated from the north for obvious historical reasons, the British made sure to impose political-geographical obstacles that would deepen the divide. Muslim northern Sudanese were banned from the south by law. While excusing the British as being protective of the victimized southerners, the eminent scholar P.M. Holt is forced to admit: "The work the British administrators in opening up and pacifying the Southern Sudan, their devotion to duty at the cost of health and life, cannot be too highly praised. Yet there was an insidious danger in their position. Their isolation, the great burden of their individual responsibilities, and their immunity from criticism by the people they ruled, tended to confirm the idea that the system of administration they represented was the only possible system, and must endure indefinitely. The personal rule of the British administrators was in its origin beneficent; the mistake was that it went on too long." (A Modern History of the Sudan, p. 149) Too long, indeed. The other tried-and-tested method involved sending in Christian missionaries to the southern Sudan. Although "proselytization had, from the outset, been forbidden in the Muslim north," the "pagan south, on the other hand, was opened to the missionaries." Holt describes a situation that not only is too familiar for students of colonial rule, but one that anticipates Sudan's current-day problems: "The missionaries were entrusted with the development of education in the south. This made possible the early, if limited, organization of schools at a time when the government's meagre resources were needed for the north. As time went on, however, the defects of missionary education began to appear. The sectarian differences of Europe and America were incongruously transported to the marshes and forests of central Africa. The language of instruction at the higher levels was English; Arabic, except in a debased pidgin form, was unknown. A new barrier of language and religion seemed to have been added to those already existing between north and south. The missionaries, for their part, had reason to fear that the admission of northern Muslims into the region would endanger the permanence of their work." How could Great Britain have made such a tragic mistake, especially since it was committed to the values of Western Civilization, unlike the Muslim and pagan peoples of the Sudan? One can only wonder. While we should not succumb to making facile parallels between the Mahdi and any contemporary figure such as Osama bin-Laden or the Ayatollah Khomenei, there is little question that the world is encountering a social-religious movement that has many of the characteristics of the Mahdist revolt. With the triumph over Communism, there has not been an End of History. Instead, what we have seen is a re-creation of the type of struggle that was generated by a set of circumstances that existed in the Victorian era when one superpower ruled the world. Instead of gunboats, we have B-52s. The most important thing for the left is to come to terms with the nature of this revolt, which while cloaked in Islamic theology, addresses global inequality. If we fail to see the class divide that exists between the United States and its "terrorist" enemies, many of whom have nearly the same kinds of flaws as the Mahdists, it is very likely that we will be bypassed. In the Victorian era, a wing of the Second International opposed the colonial revolt because of the purported superiority of Western Values. In a January 5, 1898 article titled "The Struggle of Social Democracy and the Social Revolution," Eduard Bernstein makes the case for colonial rule over Morocco: "There is a great deal of sound evidence to support the view that, in the present state of public opinion in Europe, the subjection of natives to the authority of European administration does not always entail a worsening of their condition, but often means the opposite. However much violence, fraud, and other unworthy actions accompanied the spread of European rule in earlier centuries, as they often still do today, the other side of the picture is that, under direct European rule, savages are without exception better off than they were before. "However much violence, fraud, and other unworthy actions accompanied the spread of European rule in earlier centuries, as they often still do today, the other side of the picture is that, under direct European rule, savages are without exception better off than they were before. Even before the arrival of Europeans in Africa, brutal wars, robbery, and slavery were not unknown. Indeed, they were the regular order of the day. What was unknown was the degree of peace and legal protection made possible by European institutions and the consequent sharp rise in food resources..." For the sake of the left today, any such thinking must be rejected out of hand. Whatever the limitations of outbursts against imperialism today, they take place on our side of the class divide. While not endorsing the precapitalist slavery of the Mahdi, nor Taliban misogyny, we understand that the main enemy of progress is US imperialism, with all its latter-day versions of Gladstone, Gordon, Granville and Wolseley. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Evelyn Baring, Modern Egypt, (Routledge, 2000) 2. Winston Churchill, The River War, (Carrol and Graf, 2000) 3. Robert O. Collins, The Southern Sudan 1883-1898, (Yale, 1962) 4. Charles Gordon, Journals, (Negro Universities Press, 1969) 5. P. M. Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961) 6. Henry Keown-Boyd, A Good Dusting, (Leo Cooper, 1986) 7. John Marlowe, Mission to Khartum, (Victor Gollancz, 1969) 8. Alan Moorehead, The White Nile, (Harper-Collins, 2000) 9. Robin Neillands, The Dervish Wars, (John Murray, 1996) 10. Brian Robson, Fuzzy-Wuzzy, (Spellmount, 1993) 11. Stanhope White, Lost Empire of the Nile, (Robert Hale, 1969) -- Louis Proyect, lnp3 at panix.com on 11/13/2001 Marxism list: http://www.marxmail.org From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 14 08:19:22 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2001 17:19:22 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Collateral damage Message-ID: What sort of implications does this have for petrodollar recycling and the position of the US dollar as premier currency? Maybe OPEC will try to recover some global pull by switching to an alternative. Saddam has already denominated some sales of Iraqi oil in Euros. ====== Money Freezes Hit Muslim Faith in Western Banks By William Maclean Reuters Tuesday, November 13, 2001; 6:44 AM DUBAI-The freezing of assets by Western regulators hunting illicit funds following September 11 attacks on U.S. cities is scaring some Muslim investors from Western markets, a leading figure in Islamic banking said on Tuesday. Muazzam Ali criticized as arbitrary a U.S.-led probe into the funding of the attacks and said it undid years of work to build links between Islamic and Western banks. "Muslims now feel insecure keeping their funds in the West," Ali, chairman of the London-based Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance, told Reuters. "They have started transferring funds to their own countries. The process has already begun. The way funds are frozen is frightening. No charge sheet is made, no opportunity to explain, everything is arbitrary," he said in an interview. Ali gave no figures but his comments echo those of some Gulf bankers who say individual Gulf Arabs have withdrawn a small part of their multibillion dollar holdings in the West in response to fears of further freezing of assets, to the volatile international political climate and to market weakness there. Some put the amount withdrawn at $1 billion, a fraction of an estimated $700 billion worth of long-term investments held by Gulf Arab individual investors in the U.S. and European markets. "Freezing of accounts of Muslims on suspicion of links to 'terrorist' organizations has destroyed the credibility of the Western banks (with Muslims)," said Ali. "Islamic banking has a niche market and Western banks were quick to cash in on it. Unfortunately since September 11, things have changed and will not be the same again for a long time," he said in remarks by email and telephone. His comments echo those of other Muslim commentators who say the crackdown is flawed by confusion over the transliteration of Arabic names into English and sloppy research that has resulted in moves against entities that have no links to terrorism. Ali, whose group researches Islamic banking and also teaches it to firms around the world, helped launch the modern Islamic banking movement by founding the Geneva based-Dar al Mal al Islami finance body in 1980. He launched the institute 10 years ago. PROBE METHODS HUMILIATING Ali said the probe into the financing of the September attacks should have been far more sensitive. "The way post September 11 actions are being taken does not augur well for the relationship between the West and the Muslim world. The manner in which Muslim account holders are treated in the Western banks is humiliating. They are treated as suspects." "Even if at some stage he is 'explained'... the affected person or organization is ruined. In this scenario people will be reluctant to invest in Western banks." The U.S. Treasury last week added 62 more names to its list of people and groups whose U.S. assets are to be frozen, bringing the total to around 150 entities. The measure was aimed at cutting financial arteries believed by U.S. experts to be funding associates of Osama bin Laden, blamed by Washington for the September 11 attacks. Ali said Western banks that had developed expertise in attracting Islamic funds by setting up Islamic units in their own institutions risked losing some existing Islamic deposits. "The confidence between the West and the Muslim world that has taken decades to develop has suffered a setback. God alone knows when and how the old ties will be restored," Ali said. The dirty money probe is also open to abuse, he said, as malicious bankers might try to secure a freeze of rivals' assets by falsely accusing them of links to terrorism. "I am in favor of a strong relationship between all parts of the global banking system," Ali said. "But the relationship should be on the basis of civility and respect for each other." The small but growing Islamic finance industry involves over 200 institutions estimated to manage $170 billion in funds. Islamic banking bans payment and receipt interest-core of Western banking-as it is considered usury by many Muslims. Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 14 08:23:52 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2001 17:23:52 +0200 Subject: [A-List] UK secret state/defence sector Message-ID: Brigadier at war over pay for his troops IAN BRUCE The Herald, 14 November 2001 THE officer in charge of the elite 3 Commando Brigade has demanded that the Ministry of Defence hands over more than ?370,000 to his Royal Marines in unpaid allowances to compensate them for "broken promises and shabby treatment" during the recent six-week exercise in Oman. Brigadier Roger Lane has written to the MoD, warning that failure to pay the ?6-a-day hardship and separation cash to the 1500 Royal Marines who took part in the Saif Sareea (Swift Sword) exercise last month could lead to an exodus of highly-trained manpower on the eve of potential commitment to a ground war in Afghanistan. The ministry admitted yesterday the letter was "going up through the chain of command". Brigadier Lane, known to his men as "Honest Roger", calls in the letter for immediate payment of the average ?252-a-man allowance to help restore faith in the system and dispel the image of cost-cutting to the detriment of troops at the sharp end of defence. He is understood to have pointed out that the total sum involved equals the cost of training "a handful of recruits" while the effect on morale of not honouring the deal might be a decision by scores of key personnel to leave the Marine Corps in disgust at what they regard as a betrayal of trust. The Marines deployed on the biggest exercise since the end of the Cold War were asked to forego the usual daily bonus in return for guarantees that they would have reasonable access to e-mail and satellite phones to contact their families during their 42-day stay in Oman. But the troops, including 600 from 45 Commando in Arbroath, found themselves in tents and bivouacs at a remote camp in the Omani desert in 100-degree heat with no links to home beyond the regular forces' airmail. Even that, it is claimed, was erratic throughout the exercise. One officer told The Herald: "The guys feel cheated. They had no complaint about living in field conditions. That's part of the job. "But when someone promises them something, they have a right to expect that promise to be fulfilled. Especially when they give up agreed allowances in exchange. Contact with home is a huge factor in maintaining morale. "The MoD has done this to men earmarked as the spearhead of UK commitment to a coalition ground war in Afghanistan. It is hardly an incentive to people who may shortly be expected to put their lives on the line. "Brigadier Lane has earned enormous respect by taking a stand against the bean-counters. The MoD is guilty of shabby treatment of some of its finest frontline troops and should recognise the strength of feeling in the Marine Corps." An MoD spokesman said: "This was the first time that this kind of welfare package with modern communications had been offered to troops on exercise rather than on operational deployment in places like Bosnia and Kosovo, and there were problems with its implementation in the prevailing conditions. "Brigadier Lane's comments are going up through the chain of command. We await a decision." The armed forces operate a sliding scale system known as living overseas allowances which are designed to compensate service personnel for the higher cost of living in Germany, and hardship and separation in places like Northern Ireland and the Balkans. Soldiers in Northern Ireland qualify for an extra ?4.77 a day on active service. A 238-strong detachment from 40 Commando has been kept in the region to provide a back-up for SAS raids deep inside Afghanistan, with the rest of the brigade on standby in the event of a ground war involving western troops. Brigadier Lane upset his MoD masters last month when he announced that Royal Marines would not be used for publicity raids, but would be committed only when intelligence justified risking their lives on operations and "suitable targets have been identified". Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/14-11-19101-0-54-5.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 14 08:43:58 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2001 17:43:58 +0200 Subject: [A-List] UK secret state Message-ID: BBC used MI5 to vet pacifist staff ? Intelligence gathered to root out employees with defeatist attitudes ? Spy named as USSR's would-be assassin Owen Bowcott Wednesday November 14, 2001 The Guardian BBC officials asked for help from the intelligence services to carry out political vetting of all journalistic and engineering staff from as early as the 1930s, according to an MI5 file on relations with the corporation. Employees with communist or fascist sympathies were initially targeted but from the onset of the second world war BBC management tried to terminate the jobs of those with "pacifist or defeatist views". The climate of political suspicion which emerges from notes taken of many private meetings reveals that pressure for general vetting came as much from the corporation as from the security services. "I lunched today with Mr Pym, director of staff administration at the BBC," records an MI5 officer in November 1937. "With regard to the general question of vetting BBC personnel, Mr Pym said it would be of great assistance if we could, in addition to giving definite views [on] persons whom we considered unsuitable, let him have a private word regarding others of whom we had record but insufficient reason for giving a definite opinion." A secret code was devised to ensure that suspects could be vetoed. "For purposes of easy reference on the telephone," the MI5 officer explained, "it was agreed that if we said that a certain person qualified for inclusion in category A it would mean we had definite views as to his unsuitability, and if category B, that we had insufficient material to say definitely that we considered the person concerned unsuitable." The BBC's political vetting of journalists was first exposed by the Observer newspaper in the 1980s. The corporation defended the practice as being a hangover from the cold war which was later discontinued. The latest files, covering the years from 1933-1940, released to the public record office demonstrate the longstanding liaison between the security services and BBC managers. One of those who was most eager to develop close contacts was Colonel Alan Dawnay, controller of programmes at the BBC between 1933 and 1935. In 1933 another MI5 officer recorded a conversation he had with Col Dawnay. "[He] gave me a very clear indication of the line the BBC were anxious to pursue to maintain a reputation for reasonable impartiality on political subjects... anything that goes outside the ballot box - such as communism or fascism - is considered subversive, if not seditious." At another lunch, Col Dawnay and MI5 "came to the conclusion that nothing short of a general vetting would be satisfactory (leaving out personnel such as charwomen etc who could never be in any position to do anything against the interests of the BBC)." The MI5 files contain intriguing references to one "William Farrie, whose broadcast had to be stopped" and later, during wartime, to an electrician who was "very left-wing in his views and is defeatist and unpatriotic". Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,593137,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 14 08:45:30 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2001 17:45:30 +0200 Subject: [A-List] UK secret state Message-ID: Stalin 'picked Philby for plot to kill Franco' Owen Bowcott Wednesday November 14, 2001 The Guardian Kim Philby, the British double agent who defected to the Soviet Union, may have been chosen personally by Stalin to attempt to assassinate General Franco during the Spanish civil war, according to MI5 files released to the public record office today. The mission, entrusted to a "young Englishman", was revealed to the security services in 1940 by a Russian general who defected to Britain to avoid the show trials of Moscow's military high command. At the time, the MI5 officer who filed the wartime report had no idea of the identity of the man selected for the abortive plot, other than that he was said to have been a journalist. It was only when the file was updated a generation later that a security services official in London linked Philby to the plan. Kim Philby, who was recruited by the Soviet Union in the 1930s and fled to Moscow in the 1960s, covered the Spanish civil war for the Times. In his later years in exile he dismissed reports of his role in the plan to assassinate Franco as "absurd". The crucial document is contained in a file on Nikolai Yezhov, the head of the people's commissariat for internal affairs or NKVD, (formerly the OGPU and subsequently the KGB) in the late 1930s. Yezhov, only 5ft tall and nicknamed the "bloodthirsty dwarf", was responsible for pushing through Stalin's purges of Red Army officers and old Bolshevik dissidents. One of those who escaped Yezhov's reign of terror was General Walter Krivitisky, who fled to the west. He was debriefed by the intelligence services in January 1940 and his "memorandum of information" added to the file on Yezhov. "Early in 1937 the OGPU received orders from Stalin to arrange the assassination of General Franco," the general recalled. "Hardt [an officer who was later purged] was instructed by the OGPU chief, Yezhov, to recruit an Englishman for the purpose. "He did in fact contact and send to Spain a young Englishman, a journalist of good family, an idealist and fanatical anti-Nazi. Before the plan matured, Hardt himself was recalled to Moscow and disappeared." >From the memorandum, it is unclear whether Stalin had a particular English-man, Philby, in mind for the assassination plan. In the margins of this report, two words have been written in blue ink: "prob Philby". The ink appears to be the same as that used to record the file being taken out of the security's services internal library by an MI5 case officer in April 1968. Philby, who began spying for the Soviet Union in the mid-1930s, was later recruited by MI6 at the outbreak of the second world war. He eventually fled Beirut in 1963, fearing that he was about to be exposed as a double agent. After reaching Moscow, he became a general in the KGB, married a Polish-Russian, Rufa, and settled down to a quiet but privileged life. Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,593138,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 14 09:00:58 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2001 18:00:58 +0200 Subject: [A-List] New economy bull Message-ID: Remember all that stuff about how the "crony capitalists" of East Asia needed some good old Anglo-US-style transparency? While the bullshit run was in any case unsustainable, here's another, related reason why the US Treasury under Larry Summers & Robert Rubin overreached itself. So much for the "new financial architecture." ===== Earnings reports fail grade GLOBAL INVESTOR - ANDREW HILL Financial Times, Nov 12, 2001 By ANDREW HILL The rubric on mathematics exam papers reads: "Show your calculations." No matter that you are some kind of algebra genius, putting down the correct answer to the problem is not enough to win an A grade: you have to show how you reached the solution. Something similar should happen in the world of corporate reporting. Investors need to know not only that their company increased profits by 10 or 15 per cent, but how it did so. Too often in the last few years, companies have flunked the second part of that exam. Or rather, they have been under little pressure to complete the paper. Analysts, investors, bankers, and occasionally even auditors, have turned a blind eye, provided the solution met or exceeded their expectations. But as the US economy has turned towards recession, those same examiners have become less forgiving. Forget the dotcoms; who would have believed nine months ago that the name of Enron, one of the brightest stars in the stock market, would be extinguished and the company pushed into the arms of a rival, because it could not adequately explain its financial statements? It seems an auspicious moment to launch a new debate about earnings measures, as Standard & Poor's, the financial information group, did last Wednesday. Prompted by the investment community, S&P, whose indices are among the most keenly watched, issued a paper laying out a definition for "operating earnings". The measure's usefulness has been distorted and diluted in recent years, particularly by the promiscuous use of "pro forma" earnings. Companies used to provide pro forma results only if they had undergone a big change - such as a merger or acquisition - that made comparison with prior years difficult. Recently, however, US companies have become adept at excluding unpalatable items from their results, dubbing them "pro forma". Sceptics in the investment and regulatory community have suggested that a more accurate title would be EBBS, or earnings before bad stuff. The consequence, as S&P said in its document, is that "earnings reports are becoming harder to understand, more difficult to compare across companies and less useful to analysts and investors". The direct effect can be measured in the discrepancy between historical operating earnings collated by S&P, which takes a conservative line, and those collated by Thomson Financial/First Call, which accepts the more forgiving consensus verdict of analysts. As JP Morgan pointed out in a note last week, for the first six months of 2001, the average operating earnings figure for the companies in the S&P 500 was Dollars 26 per share according to First Call and less than Dollars 20 according to S&P. The debate about standardisation is not simple, however. Even S&P agrees that all three commonly used earnings measures - "as reported" earnings (the broadest measure, which excludes only discontinued operations and narrowly defined extraordinary items), operating earnings and pro forma earnings - have their uses. What makes operating earnings the most important is that they are the measure of choice for analysis and forecasting. S&P proposes a strict approach. Companies should include in their operating earnings restructuring expenses, purchased research and development, write-downs from ongoing operations and stock option expenses. Critics question, however, whether a one-size-fits-all standard is really necessary or useful. Inevitably, Chuck Hill, First Call's research director, reckons some latitude is necessary, and that analysts are best placed to decide what to leave out and what to include, depending on the company or sector. "That's one of the reasons why they get the big bucks; to make judgments about the earnings basis you need to value the stock," he says. The answer may lie somewhere between the two approaches. After all, the dotcom debacle and the Enron implosion should have made investors ever more sceptical both about the analysts themselves, and the companies they cover. Even if operating earnings are strictly defined, they will probably continue their uncomfortable cohabitation with reported and pro forma earnings. It is when the company, or analyst, fails to explain how the one led to the other that the chief examiner should start to hand out D grades. Full article at: http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.html?print=true&id=01 1112000812 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From sherrynstan at igc.org Wed Nov 14 12:08:07 2001 From: sherrynstan at igc.org (sherrynstan at igc.org) Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2001 14:08:07 -0500 Subject: [A-List] uh... Message-ID: from Louis Proyect: "was thrown into as much of a quandary as the United States was after Somalia militiamen caught the US Marines in a devastating crossfire." I was actually part of that original task force, and you've re-stimulated the old inter-service rivalry in me. It wasn't the Marines, but the Army. Stan From lnp3 at panix.com Wed Nov 14 12:09:14 2001 From: lnp3 at panix.com (Louis Proyect) Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2001 14:09:14 -0500 Subject: [A-List] uh... In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.20011114140914.01c8dba4@popserver.panix.com> You're right. It was the Rangers specifically. At 02:08 PM 11/14/01 -0500, you wrote: >from Louis Proyect: "was thrown into as much of a quandary as the United States was after Somalia militiamen caught the US Marines in a devastating crossfire." > >I was actually part of that original task force, and you've re-stimulated the old inter-service rivalry in me. It wasn't the Marines, but the Army. > >Stan > > > Louis Proyect Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Thu Nov 15 01:56:58 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2001 08:56:58 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Japan slipping over the edge? Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011115085611.00abd550@pop.tiscali.co.uk> FT Editorial comment: Halting Japan's deflation Published: November 14 2001 19:25 | Last Updated: November 14 2001 19:29 Over the past decade, the outside world's attitude to the Japanese economy has moved from awe to puzzlement and then to indifference. Now it should move to anxiety. At a time of gathering global economic distress, the plight of the world's second largest economy and largest creditor is set to become worse. The economy is again in recession. This comes when domestic prices are not just falling but are doing so at an accelerating rate. Since 1993, the deflator for gross domestic product has fallen by 6 per cent. But in the year to the second quarter of 2001, it fell by 2.2 per cent. The great danger is that the rate of price decline will now accelerate further. The faster the rate at which prices decline, the higher are real interest rates. Official interest rates are zero at the short end and less than 2 per cent at the long end. Yet the falling price level means that rates are higher in real terms than in the US, despite Japan's more worrying economic position. If prices were to fall by, say, 4 per cent a year, real interest rates would become devastatingly high. In an economy already burdened with vast post-bubble debt and a heavy burden of non-performing loans, the result would be an ever-widening spiral of mass bankruptcy, financial contraction and deepening recession. In such circumstances, it would not only be impossible to close the fiscal deficit but would almost certainly be necessary to accept a further widening. As nominal GDP shrank, real interest rates soared and fiscal deficits grew, the already heavy burden of public debt would swell still faster than before. Structural reform and dealing with the overhang of non-performing loans are important tasks for the medium term. But the overwhelming priority is to halt the gathering momentum of deflation. The failure of the Bank of Japan to achieve this, in apparent violation of its obligation to secure price stability, is simply a calamity. No other word for what is happening will do. The government has to get to grips with this increasingly dangerous situation. While reform is important, its priority is to find some way of ending deflation. The Bank of Japan argues that it has done all it can. This is untrue. While it is trying limited quantitative easing, it has not yet tried open-ended purchases of government bonds, of other domestic assets, of foreign assets or of foreign currency. Politically, however, the Bank may need to discuss the more radical alternatives with the government. The most desirable policy of all - one that raises the expected price level, by targeting a depreciated yen - will need the acquiescence of other countries as well, particularly the US, the Europeans and Japan's Asian neighbours. In current difficult circumstances they may be tempted to refuse - but should resist that temptation. A weaker yen is a modest price to pay for a healthier Japanese economy. Ending the deflation by a more aggressive and unorthodox monetary policy is certainly not all Japan needs to do. But it is a precondition for all the rest. This is now urgent, since the deflationary spiral must be stopped. In order to achieve this increasingly vital result, the government must now either do a deal with the Bank of Japan, or force its will upon it. From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Thu Nov 15 06:44:16 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2001 15:44:16 +0200 Subject: [A-List] UK state turf wars Message-ID: Home Secretary David Blunkett's recent ill-judged efforts to extend his powers are not so unique when you consider the record of his immediate predecessor, Jack Straw, who proposed restricting trial by jury. Then again, the power of the Home Secretary has always been a thorny issue, with the discretionary element a major bone of contention for civil libertarians and the procedure-obsessed alike. That Hugo Young should devote such a long essay to bludgeoning Blunkett is indicative of the broad coalition that Blunkett has managed to stir up against him. The key here, of course, is not that liberty should be held in contempt; rather, that judges should be paid so little respect. Here is one branch of the permanent government that's not going to see its status reduced without a fight. And as populist as this government tries to be, on occasion, Blunkett has no groundswell of opinion working for him as it is clear that he cannot turn this into a people vs. the judiciary fight. On this occasion it's the people (such as it is) with the judiciary, who were quite content to allow successive Home Secretaries to amass the catalogue of restrictive and repressive laws detailed below by Young. David Blunkett holds liberty and the judges in contempt The home secretary will soon decide who is to be detained without trial Hugo Young Thursday November 15, 2001 The Guardian In Britain, David Blunkett says, politicians not judges are the true defenders of liberty. This is a profound philosophical position. "It was not the lawyers and judges who secured democracy and freedom for our people," Blunkett told the Labour party conference. As home secretary and a non-lawyer, he plainly believes he has a mission to reiterate the doctrine of ministerial supremacy. Last week, his message became more absolutist. "The law," he insisted, "will be made by those who are held to account for both making it and changing it." On Sunday, his obvious contempt for the legal profession reached towards the law itself with an unscripted attack, straight from the heart, on "airy-fairy civil liberties" and the people who defend them. In history, Mr Blunkett has a case. From the Levellers to the Chartists, and not forgetting socialists, politicians not lawyers have shifted a social order that judges were often trying to protect. But the division of professional credit is not black and white. It was a jurist, Sir Edward Coke, who most famously challenged the Stuarts and their divine right of kings, saying in 1628: "Magna Carta is such a fellow, that he will have no sovereign." Lord Denning instigated more social reform from the bench, leading where MPs followed, than most politicians could dream of in a Westminster lifetime. Now, the Blunkett axiom ought to be reversed. We live in the security state, where liberties are forever being curtailed. The balance of power is entirely changed, a process in which David Blunkett, anti-liberty and anti-lawyer, is the current agent. He's by no means the first home secretary to play the part. In fact, it's a long time since the temper of politics and politicians in any party except the Lib Dems has been to extend liberty to do anything, except buy shares in Railtrack. But the terrorist crisis twists the balance ever further, asserting not only the dominance of politicians but the insignificance of judges. On September 21, the prime minister's spokesman, after an EU summit on terrorism, boasted that "we have some of the toughest laws anywhere in the world". He did not exaggerate. The Terrorism Act 2000 brought a heavy weight of law against suspected terrorists, including seven-day detention without charge, plus extensions, and wide-ranging powers of arrest without warrant. It made a new offence of inciting terrorism overseas, and defined terrorism to include even the "threat" of doing damage in pursuit of any "political, religious or ideological cause". This would be quite enough to criminalise any mass demonstration for a cause the government did not agree with, but even on the narrow point of suspect Islamic friends of Osama bin Laden, Mr Blair's man was right. This was tough stuff. Not tough enough, though. The anti-terrorism, crime and security bill, Mr Blunkett's answer to "airy-fairy" civil liberties, brings in a further raft of measures. Among other things, it abolishes privacy on the internet, extends the powers of government agencies to exchange information about individuals, and implements, under guise of the crisis, other invasive ambitions the authorities have long entertained. Its fiercest novelty is to provide for detention without trial of any non-citizen whom the home secretary suspects of being a terrorist. Such a person can be held for six months, then another six, and another, as long as the request is made. It is a truly drastic innovation. The politician, proposing himself as liberty's defender, says the crisis demands this. The majority must be defended against a possible threat from terrorist minorities, and to this end internment, effectively blanking out the judicial process, should be acceptable. The exclusion of normal law is to be far-ranging. Judicial review is explicitly ruled out. The court hearing will be restricted to a special immigration commission. Neither the public nor the detainee will hear the evidence. We are watching, in effect, the exclusion of judges by a totally executive-minded politician. The judges have not been immune to the demands of the security state. Given what they're sometimes prepared to do to assist the executive, it's not easy to understand why Blunkett has marked his tenure by regularly casting aspersions on them. In this field, they gave him most of what he wants a month ago, upholding his appeal in a case involving the deportation of a Pakistani national, Shafiq Ur Rehman. In the House of Lords, Lord Hoffmann and most of his colleagues said that if the home secretary wanted to deport Rehman on grounds of national security, the immigration commission could not challenge the facts behind that assertion. That's why the commission, under the new act, will prove a toothless invigilator of six-monthly renewed detentions. Successors of Lord Atkin, the judicial hero of the second world war, who insisted judges should be more than "mice squeaking under a chair in the Home Office", are nowhere to be seen. All the same, they need not be excluded as firmly as this new bill excludes them. To justify his measure, the minister has formally declared a state of emergency. He has to do this to keep on the right side of the European human rights convention. He admits it isn't a real emergency. It's more like a technicality, necessary for his law. But how long will the emergency last? When will circumstances permit it to be lifted? If the minister is left to decide alone, does anyone seriously expect this ever to happen? Though he says it will affect only the curiously precise figure of 16 people, does anyone feel happy that such a large weapon, potentially available against every foreigner, should be left lying round for use at any time? Without judicial intervention? Which takes us to the politicians, whom Mr Blunkett scores so much higher than judges in their record as freedom's friend. He conjures up a picture of solemn deliberation, in which the representatives of the people will now consider the historic measure he's bringing in, and pronounce a verdict of democratic wisdom. Yet the process will be even less like that than it is with normal laws. The debate will be a formality. The opposition will not oppose. Liberty will be in thrall to collective panic. The whips will silence independent judgment. It is not easy to see the wisdom yielded by this routine as somehow superior to what judges could bring to individual cases if they were allowed to. At the pinnacle sits Blunkett himself. Everything, in the end, is left to his judgment. He alone strikes the balance between security and liberty. He alone will be privy to the evidence that justifies imprisonment without trial. He alone will decide whether the security services are right when they claim that, after all, 160 not 16 people are a danger to the state. The work requires at least a quasi-judicial temperament, and one can imagine a few home secretaries whose judgment on such matters might be trusted. Blunkett has said quite enough to reveal a mind that plainly lacks discrimination about either liberties or lawyers. He thinks they both get in the way of the state, and the power that, in his hands, he cannot conceive as being anything but benign. Who will hold him to account? Full article at: http://politics.guardian.co.uk/attacks/comment/0,1320,593638,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Thu Nov 15 07:02:54 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2001 16:02:54 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Courage under fire Message-ID: On 6 November, I wrote: Almost alone among the Blair intake of Labour MPs, Paul Marsden has emerged as a strong opponent of the bombing in Afghanistan, and is now undertaking a personal fact-finding mission to Pakistan to see things for himself. Having had a career as a quality assurance manager, New Labour no doubt thought they were getting their usual lobby fodder when he was selected. But he's emerged as a somewhat principled (and naive) defender of the virtues of parliamentary democracy, and appears to be sincere in his disgust at the cynical manipulation of the constitutional pretences that mask the elective dictatorship that the UK political system really is. He seems genuinely shocked about it (better late than never). There is no question that he and his family will be subjected to all kinds of petty harrassments and abuses -- some, perhaps, even not so petty. I think British residents should consider writing him a letter of support c/o House of Commons. ===== Private Eye, No. 1040, 2 - 15 November 2001 Street of Shame "PHONE IDIOT LABOUR MP WHO SAYS DON'T BOMB BIN" advised the Daily Sport (prop: pornographer David Sullivan) on its front page, under a picture of Paul Marsden, Labour MP for Shrewsbury, who had had the nerve to voice doubts about the war in Afghanistan. The point was made more fully over the page under the apparently contradictory rubric DAILY SPORT SPEAKS ITS MIND. This time the advice was: DIAL-A-DICKHEAD. "This MP thinks the war against the Taliban is wrong. Phone him today and tell him what YOU think, folks. The MP's numbers in parliament and his constituency were helpfully supplied. The cream of British manhood enthusiastically responded, and the MP's staff and Commons telephonists had to put up with a stream of patriotic if obscene abuse. The answerphone at the Shrewsbury office took 98 such calls before the tape ran out. After listening to a few of the messages, the MP decided the calls were obviously a matter for the police and handed the tape to Inspector Knacker. Sadly for the brave callers, their mobile and other numbers were included in the record of their calls, so many of them may shortly have to answer embarrassing questions from the constabulary, or even, in the most extreme cases, face accusations about obscenity and/or violence on the airways. Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Thu Nov 15 07:11:52 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2001 16:11:52 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Public relations and the secret state Message-ID: Private Eye, No. 1040, 2 - 15 November 2001 Mrs Brown Knows The resignation of Sara Macaulay from her PR firm Hobsbawm Macaulay (HMC) on the birth of her child led the press to muse on how her plans might reflect the maternity leave policies of her husband, chancellor Gordon Brown. But little attention was paid to the link between her and the murky world of corporate lobbying. Macauley will not work for HMC after February, but will reportedly work part time for City PR firm Brunswick, which represents many of Britain's top plcs. The firm likes to get close to Labour -- it spent "?5,000 or more" on "ticketts for dinners" with the party this year -- and already has one key Labour insider to link it to number 10: Phil Wilson, former constituency agent for Tony Blair in Sedgefield, is now a Brunswick lobbyist. Having a new link to number 11 in the shape of the chancellor's wife will surely be good news too for Brunswick's clients like ICI, Pearson, Prudential, Storehouse, Rolls Royce, British Airways, Diageo and Barclays. Brunswick also represents powerful foreign interests, of course; and leaked documents from the firm show that it was involved in "Project Potemkin", representing Russian energy giant Gazprom. Gazprom has the rights to Russia's gas reserves. It accounts for around 8 percent of the country's GDP and supplies a quarter of all Europe's natural gas. The firm is thoroughly entwined with the Russian state -- it is 38 percent government owned and a major player in Russian politics -- and eternally controversial. It has been accused of asset stripping, tax evasion and being a state within a state. It has also been active in suppressing dissent about Chechnya. Earlier this year the firm evicted Vladimir Gusinsky, boss of TV station NTV which the gas giant partly owned. It wanted to do so because NTV had sharply criticised Vladimir Putin's war on Chechnya. The sacking led to large Moscow demonstrations against censorship, and the neutering of one of the voices against Russia's war. Coincidentally Blair and Brown's government has also been happy to overlook Russia's abysmal record in Chechnya. Brunswick refused to respond to around half a dozen calls from the Eye on its work for Gazprom. Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Thu Nov 15 08:36:53 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2001 17:36:53 +0200 Subject: [A-List] The lingering legacy of Robert Maxwell Message-ID: Private Eye, No. 1040, 2 - 15 November 2001 BOB - A - JOB WEEK "He just enriched my life." Thus Anne Robinson, writing after the death of her boss Robert Maxwell. On the tenth anniversary of Cap'n Bob's demise, it is noteworthy how many of his eulogisers and groupies have indeed subsequently been enriched, their careers apparently unharmed by uncritical allegiance to one of the biggest crooks of modern times. Robinson herself has been transformed from a Mirror hackette to a squillionaire international TV star, and has just published her autobiography, Memoirs of an Unfit Mother. Here's how the book describes Maxwell's arrival at the Mirror in 1984: "By reputation he was an ogre, a bully, a crook, a liar, an egotist and a charmer. Nothing he did in the following six years disproved this judgement. Which was why it was all the more lamentable that so many people who should have known better chose to trust him and believe what he said." Compare and contrast with what she wrote in November 1991: "We didn't meet often. But on each occasion he left me reeling from his charm, his amazing panache -- and the sheer speed at which his brain worked .. He was my inspiration and my hero." Perhaps his other qualities -- ogre, bully, crook, liar -- had momentarily slipped her mind. Another person who "should have known better" was Peter Jay, once described as the cleverest man in England. But as Maxwell's chief of staff he was slavishly loyal and obedient. He hired a private detective agency to spy on the house of Tom Bower, Cap'n Bob's unauthorised biographer, and after Maxwell's death came up with this remarkable tribute: "He had more physical and moral courage than anyone I have ever met." Some might think that such startling lack of judgement would disqualify Jaybotham from future employment elsewhere. Not so: he was hired as economics editor of the BBC, at a six-figure salary, by his old mate John Birt. In an interview last year he adjusted his assessment of the Cap'n's moral fibre slightly, describing the old monster as a "pre-moral figure, a kind of woolly mammoth stalking through the primeval forests". Moments later, however, Jay revealed that he still hadn't really come to his senses. "What he was not," he added, "was a crook." What of Mary Riddell, the Mirror hackette who wrote reams of fawning tosh in November 1991, praising Maxwell's "unswerving crusade to better the lot of the ordinary man"? Again, imbecility has been handsomely rewarded: she is now one of the most sought-after feature-writers in Fleet Street and has a weekly column on the leader-page of the Observer. Nor should we forget the Mirror's political editor, Alistair Campbell, who threw a punch at the Grauniad's political editor for not being sufficiently reverential after Maxwell's death. "A great deal has ben written about how Robert Maxwell saved the Mirror Group papers," Campbell thundered in the Sunday Mirror a few days later. "Not enough has been written about his commitment to Labour. Whatever those who fought for his expulsion may have thought, that commitment was unshakeable." How fitting, then, that this stalwart defender of a bullying tycoon who hadn't a socialist bone in his body should now be running the country on behalf of "new" Labour. And how kind of Tony Blair to promote other former Maxwell lieutenants, presumably so that Alistair won't feel lonely. At the time of the 1997 election Blair was warned by a well-wisher at a private dinner that Lord Donoughue, Geoffrey Robinson MP and Helen Liddell MP were irredeemably tainted by their associations with Maxwell and should be kept well away from government office. All three of them were promptly made ministers. ===== NOTE: Helen Liddell was put in charge by Maxwell of the Mirror Group's Scottish operations, comprising the Daily Record and Sunday Mail newspapers. During this time Gordon Brown wrote a weekly column for the Record. Gordon Brown's private office is run by Sue Nye, who is the wife of new BBC chairman, Goldman Sachs partner and Downing Street Policy Unit member (under "Lord" Bernard Donoughue during both Harold Wilson's and Jim Callaghan's ill-fated premierships, 1974-9) Gavyn Davies. Davies was offered the deputy governorship of the Bank of England in 1998 but turned it down because he could not be guaranteed to succeed Eddie George as governor. He got the vice-chairmanship of the BBC instead, and now oversees that organisation in partnership with fellow New Labourite Greg Dyke. In a Department of Trade and Industry report, Goldman Sachs was found to bear a "substantial responsibility" for overseeing the manipulations between Maxwell companies that allowed Maxwell to pilfer the Mirror Group's pension fund in order to prop up his wobbly empire. As we know, the person brought in to clean up that mess was UK establishment fixer "Sir" John Cuckney, "saviour" of Westland Helicopters and a whole lot else we'll probably never know about. Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Thu Nov 15 08:44:11 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2001 17:44:11 +0200 Subject: [A-List] The lingering legacy of Robert Maxwell Message-ID: Private Eye, No. 1040, 2 - 15 November 2001 How did Robert Maxwell manage to deceive so many important people in the City? This is a question that might be asked in this anniversary by a persistent reporter on one of the BBC's many investigative programmes. To illuminate his or her inquiries, a skilled investigator need go no further than the office of the newly-appointed chairman of the BBC, Gavyn Davies. For the last five momentous years of Maxwell's life, (1986-1991), Davies was chief UK economist at Goldman Sachs, the enormously rich and powerful investment bank that provided Maxwell not only with money and resources but also with credibility. During all the time it was advising Maxwell, Goldman Sachs was fined only once: ?160,000 by the regulator IMRO for late registration of Maxwell shares. For its constant advice and goodwill, Maxwell shelled out a mere ?24m in fees, a sum that needs to be compared with the ?18m pocketed by Gavyn Davies in one year's salary and bonuses at Goldman Sachs. ===== Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Thu Nov 15 11:11:44 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2001 18:11:44 +0000 Subject: [A-List] historical amnesia of the Quadragon Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011115180846.00ab9198@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Partial listing examples of generals who led their troops up into the mountains (or similar kinds of strategic retreat) and came down again victorious: Alexander against the Persians; Llywelyn, the Prince of Wales, who took his entire nation up into Snowdonia to avoid King John's superior army in 1211, and went on to help destroy John. (Magna Carta 1215); General Kutuzov who retreated from Napoleon in 1812, then destroyed the Grande Armee; Mao Zedong who went on the Long March in 1927 to avoid Chiang Kai-shek; Gen. Giap who took 10 men into the Vietnamese hills and came down again at Dien Bien Phu in 1954; Fidel Castro who went up into the Sierra Maestra with 26 men and came back to Havana in 1959 with a whole army; Marshall Zhukov who let the Nazis get to the Volga in 1942 then chased them back to Berlin; and most pertinent: Genghis Khan, who in 1204 invented the art of the feigned chaotic retreat and thus trapped in turn the Chinese, Tibetan, Persian, Russian, Polish, Lithuanian and German armies. No doubt there are many others. Mark From tomzbox at hotmail.com Thu Nov 15 20:17:33 2001 From: tomzbox at hotmail.com (Tom Warren) Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2001 20:17:33 Subject: [A-List] historical amnesia of the Quadragon Message-ID: >>No doubt there are many others. >>Mark Hmmmm. You may be correct in the overall assessment, Mark. I seem to remember that in the first battle ever fought by USOFA FORCES (Concord) the Minutemen used the draw play and proceeded to eat the lunch of their opponents (I fergit who, perhaps some other on the list can remind us) But surely that seminal battle is held reverent in the minds of the Quadragon? It would be a hell of a case of amnesia to forget that one! And I do seem to remember some indigenous troops coming down out of the mountains (Green Mountains), Giap-style, and upsetting the party for a certain group of Redcoats ? That history will not be forgotten by USOFA FORCES, certainly. But perhaps amnesia is not the issue, perhaps the Quadragon is simply accessing a different data base: I?ll see your eight tactical examples and raise you eight forces (including some indigenous) who came down out of the mountains or utilized the draw play and faced defeat by confronting USOFA FORCES and their allies! Brits in the Mississippi Valley Robert E. Lee (a close thing, granted, and may be disqualified by altering the definition of USOFA FORCES --- and I myself would do so in citing some earlier battles.) The Nez Perce Geronimo Cochise (the less said about Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse, however, the better) Pancho Villa Japanese on Okinawa, Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, Coral Sea, etc. North Koreans (the less said about the PRC and certain reservoirs, however, the better) Uhhhh ? technically the 2nd SS Panzer division came down out of mountains after defeat, regrouping and checking their ideology, but we?ll let that one slide, okay? Let?s just call that a ?draw play? by Patton while Monty dithered. It is my impression that Serbia is fairly mountainous and that Milosovic was regrouping, ? however NATO didn?t really meet them on the ground, just uranium bullets and smart bombs did. We?ll let that one slide too, I guess. Perhaps it?s only superior, visionary Marxists or North-Central Asians who can employ this tactic successfully. Moslem forces have had only limited success historically with it, and in the 20-21st centuries never without the support of US/Brit technology and money and intelligence. Otherwise, they don?t seem to pull it off, (Later campaigns of Saladin and Kurds since come to mind, and the Islamic attempts against my boy Genghis were abysmal failures.) Islamic forces seem to do best ambushing troops acting under muddled orders from absent and/or off-shore command and control. Best, Tom (exercising his outta shape chauvinist pinkys) ?Stop me before I kill again!? ? sign held up for the TV cameras by grinning US soldiers in Desert Storm. _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 16 02:38:48 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2001 11:38:48 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Pilger latest Message-ID: The Daily Mirror's stance on the war in Afghanistan is most interesting. There's no question that, under Robert Maxwell, it would have been slavishly pro-war. However, under the hitherto unpromising editorship of Piers "Moron" Morgan, it has attempted to recapture some of the campaigning spirit that characterised its reporting prior to Maxwell's proprietorship. Chiefly, it has proudly advertised that Pilger was once its chief foreign correspondent and has given him front page access. JOHN PILGER: THIS WAR OF LIES GOES ON The Mirror, 16 November 2001 There is no victory in Afghanistan's tribal war, only the exchange of one group of killers for another. The difference is that President Bush calls the latest occupiers of Kabul "our friends". However welcome the scenes of people playing music and shaving off their beards, this so-called Northern Alliance are no bringers of freedom. They are the same people welcomed by similar scenes of jubilation in 1992, who then killed an estimated 50,000 in four years of internecine feuding. The new heroes so far have tortured and executed at least 100 prisoners of war, and countless others, as well as looted food supplies and re-established their monopoly on the heroin trade. This week, Amnesty International made an unusually blunt statement that was buried in the news. It ought to be emblazoned across every front page and television screen. "By failing to appreciate the gravity of the human rights concerns in relation to Northern Alliance leaders," said Amnesty, "UK ministers at best perpetuate a culture of impunity for past crimes; at worst they risk being complicit in human rights abuse." The truth is that the latest crop of criminals to "liberate" Kabul have been given a second chance by the most powerful country on earth pounding into dust one of the poorest, where people's life expectancy is just over 40. And for what? Not a single terrorist implicated in the attacks on America has yet to be caught or killed. Osama bin Laden and his network have almost certainly slipped into the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier of Pakistan. Will Pakistan now be bombed? And Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, where Islamic extremism and its military network took root? Of course not. The Saudi sheikhs, many of them as extreme as the Taliban, control America's greatest source of oil. The Egyptian regime, bribed with billions of US dollars, is an important American proxy. No daisy cutters for them. There was, and still is, no "war on terrorism". Instead, we have watched a variation of the great imperial game of swapping "bad" terrorists for "good" terrorists, while untold numbers of innocent people have paid with their lives: most of one village, whole families, a hospital, as well as teenage conscripts suitably dehumanised by the word "Taliban". It is perfectly understandable that those in the West who supported this latest American tenor from the air, or hedged their bets, should now seek to cover the blood on their reputations with absurd claims that "bombing works". Tell that to grieving parents at fresh graves in impoverished places of whom the sofa bomb-aimers know nothing. The contortion of intellect and morality that this triumphalism requires is not a new phenomenon. Putting aside the terminally naive, it mostly comes from those who like to play at war: who have seen nothing of bombing, as I have experienced it: cluster bombs, daisy cutters: the lot. How appropriate that the last American missile to hit Kabul before the "liberators" arrived should destroy the satellite transmitter of the Al-Jazeera television station, virtually the only reliable source of news in the region. For weeks, American officials have been pressuring the government of Qatar, the Gulf state where Al-Jazeera is based, to silence its broadcasters, who have given a view of the "war against terrorism" other than that based on the false premises of the Bush and Blair "crusade". The guilty secret is that the attack on Afghanistan was unnecessary. The "smoking gun" of this entire episode is evidence of the British Government's lies about the basis for the war. According to Tony Blair, it was impossible to secure Osama bin Laden's extradition from Afghanistan by means other than bombing. Yet in late September and early October, leaders of Pakistan's two Islamic parties negotiated bin Laden's extradition to Pakistan to stand trial for the September 11 attacks. The deal was that he would be held under house arrest in Peshawar. According to reports in Pakistan (and the Daily Telegraph), this had both bin Laden's approval and that of Mullah Omah, the Taliban leader. The offer was that he would face an international tribunal, which would decide whether to try him or hand him over to America. Either way, he would have been out of Afghanistan, and a tentative justice would be seen to be in progress. It was vetoed by Pakistan's president Musharraf who said he "could not guarantee bin Laden's safety". But who really killed the deal? The US Ambassador to Pakistan was notified in advance of the proposal and the mission to put it to the Taliban. Later, a US official said that "casting our objectives too narrowly" risked "a premature collapse of the international effort if by some luck chance Mr bin Laden was captured". And yet the US and British governments insisted there was no alternative to bombing Afghanistan because the Taliban had "refused" to hand over Osama bin Laden. What the Afghani people got instead was "American justice" - imposed by a president who, as well as denouncing international agreements on nuclear weapons, biological weapons, torture and global warming, has refused to sign up for an international court to try war criminals: the one place where bin Laden might be put on trial. When Tony Blair said this war was not an attack on Islam as such, he was correct. Its aim, in the short term, was to satisfy a domestic audience then to accelerate American influence in a vital region where there has been a power vacuum since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of China, whose oil needs are expected eventually to surpass even those of the US. That is why control of Central Asia and the Caspian basin oilfields is important as exploration gets under way. There was, until the cluster bombing of innocents, a broad-based recognition that there had to be international action to combat the kind of terrorism that took thousands of lives in New York. But these humane responses to September 11 were appropriated by an American administration, whose subsequent actions ought to have left all but the complicit and the politically blind in no doubt that it intended to reinforce its post-cold war assertion of global supremacy - an assertion that has a long, documented history. The "war on terrorism" gave Bush the pretext to pressure Congress into pushing through laws that erode much of the basis of American justice and democracy. Blair has followed behind with anti-terrorism laws of the very kind that failed to catch a single terrorist during the Irish war. In this atmosphere of draconian controls and fear, in the US and Britain, mere explanation of the root causes of the attacks on America invites ludicrous accusations of "treachery." Above all, what this false victory has demonstrated is that, to those in power in Washington and London and those who speak for them, certain human lives have greater worth than others and that the killing of only one set of civilians is a crime. If we accept that, we beckon the repetition of atrocities on all sides, again and again. Full article at: http://mirror.icnetwork.co.uk/news/allnews/page.cfm?objectid=11427607&me thod=full From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 16 02:43:21 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2001 11:43:21 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Scottish Socialist Party on the war Message-ID: Alligators versus crocodiles ALAN McCOMBES: Comment The Herald, 16 November 2001 IMAGINE a place where people are decapitated in public squares for sorcery and sodomy. Where public displays of music, cinema, art and theatre are banned. A country where women are forced to cover every part of their body in public and are banned from driving. Where they must receive written permission from their closest male relative before they can board public transport or receive hospital treatment. A country where trade unions and strikes are banned and where no elections are ever held. Where people who abandon the Muslim faith can be sentenced to death. It sounds like Afghanistan under the Taliban. But this is a description of life in Saudi Arabia, a signed-up member of Operation Enduring Freedom. "America has no problem with tyranny as long the tyrants are rich and obedient rather than poor and disobedient," I was told by a left-wing Afghan activist who now lives in Pakistan. Last week, in a small town in Pakistan's North-West Frontier province, I met the leadership of the Afghan Revolutionary Labour Organisation. They have more reason than Tony Blair or George W Bush to hate the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. As socialists fighting for democracy, women's rights, and human rights in Afghanistan, they live in fear of assassination by right-wing religious extremists. Yet they will not be celebrating the conquest of Kabul by the Northern Alliance. Like most Afghans I met in Pakistan, they regard this as a war between the alligators and the crocodiles. To illustrate the point, I was shown video filmed secretly in Kabul when the Northern Alliance mujahideen turned the streets of the city crimson with blood in the mid-1990s. At least 1000 Afghan civilians - most of whom had never heard of Osama bin Laden, George W Bush, or Tony Blair before September 11 - have been killed by American bombs. So has it all been worthwhile? Is the world a safer place than it was on October 15, when the first bombs exploded? According to Afghan and Pakistani left-wing activists I have met over the past few weeks, the Taliban's social base had been narrowed down to the most fanatical religious extremists. It was only a matter of time before the regime imploded. Yet countless Afghans and Pakistanis told me that, although they hated the Taliban, they supported their refusal to give up Osama bin Laden in the absence of any clear evidence of his guilt. Bin Laden himself has been transformed into a folk hero, especially among the impoverished youth in the cities of Pakistan. George W Bush and Tony Blair may claim that they are winning this war. Over time, they may even succeed in their goal of killing or capturing bin Laden. Certainly, the Taliban regime is finished. But the starving, battered country it leaves behind now looks likely to become the Balkans of the East. Alan McCombes is editor of Scottish Socialist Voice. Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/16-11-19101-1-8-43.html From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 16 03:03:45 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2001 12:03:45 +0200 Subject: [A-List] New Labour apologism Message-ID: For those who have strong stomachs, I enclose the following piece of moralistic hand-wringing from the ever-dependable Polly Toynbee, the UK analogue to US feminists like Katha Pollitt. Toynbee was a founding member of the SDP (the New Labour forerunner founded with much fanfare in 1981 as part of the UK establishment's effort to destroy the Labour Party and UK labour movement once and for all -- obviously successful). In a recent Guardian column she paraded this proudly as she made clear her longstanding opposition to Ken Livingstone's politics. Toynbee is also a longstanding friend and sometime colleague of John Birt, ex-BBC director general (appointed to destroy the BBC once and for all -- obviously successful) and now Tony Blair's head of policy strategy and director of civil service reform. As well as giving Peter Jay a job post-Maxwell, Birt appointed Toynbee social affairs editor at the BBC, presumably for the same six-figure salary as that awarded to Jay. Toynbee has written "friendly critiques" of New Labour's performance both for the Guardian and in book form: "Did Things Get Better? An Audit of Labour's Successes and Failures", co-authored with fellow Guardian journalist David Walker and published by Penguin last year. Toynbee serves as the liberal feminist conscience of the modernising state. Here she gets to put "clear blue water" between herself and other leftists (not difficult at the best of times) by rehashing her criticisms of Livingstone with a Hitchens-style "told you so" on the war and the anti-war protesters. And, to get a taste, here is the pi?ce de resistance: "During the Vietnam war I was squashed up against police horses outside the US embassy. Now I might think differently: the war was a calamity, mistaken but not engaged for malign reasons." Pass the sick-bucket. ===== War of the words I have been able to change my mind. Why is the nihilist left unable to accept events have proved it wrong? Polly Toynbee Friday November 16, 2001 The Guardian War breaks out in the press. The battle between the Sun and the Mirror is a wonderful absurdity - the John Pilger anti-American Mirror versus the Sun's gung-ho jingoism: yesterday a Mirror diatribe bracketed together Stalin, Hitler and Bin Laden with the Sun's editor Yelland. Most other newspapers print abusive lists of who got it wrong among their competitors: but we here at the Guardian prefer to keep the argument in-house. Has anyone changed one iota as a result of the rout of the Taliban? No. Great bowls of rotten words remain uneaten: it is indigestible food. One notable recent exception was the admirable military commentator, John Keegan, who made a memorable confession of getting the Kosovo war wrong: memorable because no one else does it. So while we on the pro-war side shout: "We told you so!" The others reply: "Just you wait and see!" plunging gleefully, wishfully almost, into unimaginable Northern Alliance horrors yet to come. I wrote that even if what comes next is hardly a perfect model of democracy, "nothing can be worse" than the Taliban. George Monbiot replies: "Don't tempt fate." Much of the left writes as if only the utter humiliation of America and removal of its power will do. (More or less what Bin Laden has in mind.) Until then, everything the US does is de facto evil. If Mullah Omar's blood-curdling threats to destroy it foretell great horrors yet to happen, the anti-war faction will no doubt say it proves the Afghan hornet's nest should never have been poked: we will reply that it proves the madmen must be stopped. Either way, few think terrorism against the west is vanquished: worse is probably to come. Everyone stands exactly where they did: not one mind has been changed. Fire still pours out of the anti-war party, despite women emerging from burkas, girls back in school, music in the streets. The anti-war demo this weekend has not been called off. The Stop the War Coalition promises the biggest demo yet: "The fall of Kabul has only exposed to ever greater scrutiny the hypocrisy, injustice and dangerous ambiguity underlying this war." Emails still flood in as furious as ever, "slavering government poodle", "naive idiot" and "murdering bitch" are only among the more printable of yesterday's batch. The anti-war left gives no inch, their world view perfectly intact, nihilism disguised as pacifism. It is true that Oliver Cromwell's "I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you are mistaken," was not matched with any confession to ever being wrong himself. This prompts the question, does anyone ever admit to changing their mind? Are we all doomed for eternity to minds set in concrete? Politicians tend to claim they are constant as the morning star, so for example Roy Hattersley, scourge of New Labour, once regarded as the rightwing tip of his party, now claims he stands exactly where he always did: the ground has simply moved beneath his concrete shoes. That is politicians' traditional stance, but why is it a boast? Keynes said that when the facts changed, he changed his mind, a better maxim. But the inclination to deny ever being politically wrong is extraordinarily strong. U-turn was Mrs Thatcher's dirty word, however often she did it surreptitiously: her downfall only came when she stopped. But the truth is that most political views shift with the times. Most sensible people of my generation have travelled long political journeys. At 14, I marched from Aldermaston as a pacifist. During the Vietnam war I was squashed up against police horses outside the US embassy. Now I might think differently: the war was a calamity, mistaken but not engaged for malign reasons. And those 1960's revolutionary songs were fun, like Che T-shirts and cuba libres. In the 1970s trade union tanks parked on Labour party lawns seemed an inevitable part of the garden furniture. Feminism's new perspective shattered right acrossold leftwing lines, but we were wrong in many predictions of its results - from Mrs Thatcher to ladettes. In the 1980s, even while detesting Thatcherism, I was pulled along in her wake ideologically to value entrepreneurialism and question sullen producer-control over public services. No regrets about breaking with Labour and joining the SDP. Specific errors? Yes, when the majority of the SDP voted to merge with the Liberals, in sectarian anger I failed to realise it was the only possible result. When New Labour emerged I welcomed them as the legitimate son of SDP ideas. Of course political head and heart have moved with the times, ideas changed probably beyond recognition, if I could only remember exactly what I thought in pot-hazy 1968. More recently I wrote with revulsion at George Bush's election, damning his cavalier disregard for the world - Kyoto, NMD, Israel, his own poor and the world's. Now I hold my breath and wait to see how far he has changed: disarmament talks with Putin are good news, the attitude towards the Middle East looks better: this man has already travelled far. But the Pilgers and Benns, with their younger anti-globalising incarnations, budge not when the world changes around them: it's "no pasaran" to anything outside their prefabricated ideological box. To be a liberal and a progressive is to look forwards optimistically, to believe things can and must be made better. It is to invest in the power of good government, not to despise and despair of it. But now the left joins the right, oddly in fear of the future, change-averse, denouncing any improvement short of utopia. In New Labour a whole generation of politicians boasted of their personal change of mind: it was a vote- winner. True, they froze during their first term, petrified that a country that voted Tory for so long had not also changed its mind. But it had. Now we begin to see a thawing second term where public mind-changing is happening in every department. Once, Clare Short had to grovel for mentioning cannabis, now it is effortlessly decriminalised. Asylum laws are changed. Student fees are reconsidered. Railtrack is renationalised. "Best value", forcing contracting-out, is reformed. A euro referendum creeps closer - with more pro-euro speeches next week. As for Tony Blair's global vision, he describes something that is slowly happening. The G8 countries are now committed to the New Partnership for African Development, to help Africa resolve the lethal conflicts in Congo, Angola, Sudan, Burundi and elsewhere, promising money and support. The WTO this week for the first time tilted towards the poor world's interest: not perfect, but real progress. The UN is strengthened as the US and everyone needs it more than ever. This is the old half-full, half-empty question: perhaps an inborn quirk of character ordains which way a person sees the world. The old left are the nihilists, the liberal left are the optimists. Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/ukresponse/story/0,11017,595499,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 16 03:07:27 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2001 12:07:27 +0200 Subject: [A-List] UK police state Message-ID: Terrorism bill gives new powers to MoD police Richard Norton-Taylor Friday November 16, 2001 The Guardian Ministry of Defence police will have sweeping new powers, allowing its officers to arrest people anywhere in the country, under a hitherto unreported clause in the anti-terrorism bill tabled by the government this week. MoD police - all of whom can carry firearms - will have the same powers as officers in regional forces in "any police area", the bill says. They will be able to arrest anyone "whom they suspect on reasonable grounds of having committed, being in the course of committing, or being about to commit, an offence". At present, MoD police have jurisdiction inside or near bases, including US bases, and personnel working or living there. Elsewhere they have to seek permission of local police forces before intervening. Increased powers for the MoD police were included in the armed forces bill which fell before the general election as a result of opposition to the measure and lack of parliamentary time. That move, prompted in part by the MoD force's inability under existing law to intervene in last year's fuel protests, was also opposed by MPs because it is less accountable than local police forces. Conservatives, including Robert Key, then opposition defence spokesman, said it would transform the MoD police into a kind of national paramilitary force. Opponents of the armed forces bill believed the government wanted to use the 3,700 officers in the MoD police to help make up the shortfall in local police forces and deploy them, in particular, during demonstrations. The new anti-terrorism bill goes further than the armed forces bill which gave the MoD police new powers only in "life threatening" situations. The new bill also increases the powers of British Transport police and Atomic Energy Authority special constables. The MoD police are not formally subject to police complaints authority investigations, to the inspectorate of constabulary, or to the same disciplinary procedures as local police. It is not accountable to an elected police authority. It is an MoD agency controlled by a senior civil servant and the defence secretary without formal outside scrutiny, though the ministry recently agreed to appoint three civilians to its police board. The police complaints authority is investigating a number of allegations of abuse of authority and dirty tricks. They include complaints made by Tony Geraghty, a journalist arrested under the Official Secrets Act for writing a book, The Irish War. Charges against him and his alleged contact, Lieutenant Colonel Nigel Wylde, a retired army bomb disposal officer, were subsequently dropped. Mr Wylde and his wife, Monika, have also complained about their treatment by the MoD police. The contract of the MoD police deputy chief constable, Tony Comben, was terminated with immediate effect last month in circumstances which remain unclear. He has said he intends to appeal. Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,595335,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 16 03:13:16 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2001 12:13:16 +0200 Subject: [A-List] New Labour modernisation Message-ID: Labour drive to reverse 'control freak' tendency National executive committee role beefed up as Campbell embarks on charm offensive among MPs Michael White and Kevin Maguire Thursday November 15, 2001 The Guardian Tony Blair has sanctioned a drive to reverse the tide of "control freakery" within the Labour party as part of a concerted effort to end the mood of "disaffection and cynicism" within the ranks. Charles Clarke, appointed as party chairman in the cabinet after the election, has been given authority to revitalise the party structure, involve MPs and activists more in policy making and keep Downing Street's nose out of devolved politics in Wales and Scotland. In a parallel move to prevent the re-emergence of a party-government split like the one that dogged Labour in the 1970s, Alastair Campbell, the prime minister's director of communications, has embarked on a charm offensive to gee up disgruntled Labour backbenchers. "If the party and the government were to drift apart, as happened to us in the 1970s and to the Tories in the 1990s, that is obviously a recipe for political disaster for the Labour party," Mr Clarke said yesterday, after admitting that alarm bells had rung when only 59% voted at the general election, and that activism had been declining seriously. Though ministers are not pointing a finger of blame at Margaret McDonagh, who recently resigned as Labour's general secretary, it is clear they are encouraging her successor, David Triesman, to reverse her centralising style, particularly the sidelining of Labour's once powerful national executive committee. Monthly meetings and a revived committee structure are expected to be set up. Mr Clarke, former chief of staff to Neil Kinnock, is working with Mr Triesman and Robert Hill, Mr Blair's political secretary at No 10, who has been accompanying Mr Campbell in his series of talks with Labour MPs. In the new determination to stem the loss of party members and morale, ministers are involved in 25 question and answer sessions for activists from Scotland to Cornwall. The national policy forum, a Kinnock innovation, is to be given stronger powers. One immediate result of the shift was that Mr Clarke told the cabinet in the wake of Henry McLeish's resignation as first minister in Scotland last week that there must be no No 10 or Treasury favourite for the post now set to be filled by Jack McConnell. And at Westminster yesterday, backbench Labour MPs endorsed a plan to give them a greater say in the work of the government after receiving assurances that a scheme for making 100 of them "ministerial sponsors" would not prevent them from speaking out on other controversial issues. Mr Clarke had earlier told MPs that if they did not want to try this new method of greater involvement, they should reject it. He pointed to the outspoken criticism of the blueprint for Lords reform from Slough MP Fiona McTaggart as proof that MPs will not be automatically disciplined for being off message. Anxious to stress that Mr Blair is still engaged in domestic issues, Mr Campbell has taken the unusual step of holding a series of meetings in Westminster with the party's regional groups of MPs. Mr Campbell used the opportunity to tell Welsh Labour MPs that policy on the euro has not changed in recent months. But Mr Blair also wants MPs to know he is not forgetting the non-Afghan agenda on schools, hospitals and what ministers privately admit to be their poor record on transport since 1997. Labour is aware that a split between government on one side, and backbenchers and activists on the other, is what ruined the last Labour government, and brought down John Major's Tories in the 1990s. Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/guardianpolitics/story/0,3605,593605,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 16 03:18:54 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2001 12:18:54 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Arms trade Message-ID: ANC government cleared of arms deal offences Mungo Soggot in Cape Town and agencies Friday November 16, 2001 The Guardian The official investigation of the South African government's controversial ?5bn arms purchase has cleared it of impropriety but found a string of irregularities. The 380-page report says the deal was flawed. The defence minister, Mosiuoa Lekota, told reporters that the government accepted the report, and the acquisition of arms from the multinational consortium, which includes BAe Systems in Britain, Saab in Sweden and Thomson-CFS in France, and South African companies, would go ahead. There would be no further review. Criminal investigations of a number of individuals suspected of corrupt involvement in the deal are continuing. They include the official in charge of procurement, Chippy Shaik, whose brother was one of the winning bidders. Mr Shaik is strongly criticised in the report, as is the former defence minister and architect of the deal Joe Modise, whose subsequent involvement in a company which benefited from the deal is described as "extremely undesirable". The prosecuting authorities said yesterday that they would take action against people involved in a conflict of interest. The affair, under investigation by three state agencies for the past year, has been a major bugbear for the African National Congress government, which has been accused of using its parliamentary muscle to stifle the inquiry. The report focused mainly on technical and procedural transgressions involving the purchase of arms in various contracts, including fighter aircraft from BAe Systems. Yesterday opposition MPs walked out of parliament in Cape Town, where the report was tabled, claiming that the ANC was using house to conduct a "glorified press conference". Some called the report a cover-up. The affair has been a crucial test for the three investigative agencies, led by the national director of public prosecutions, the auditor general, and the public protector. The DPP, Bulelani Ngcuka, a former stalwart of the ANC, and his elite "Scorpions" unit have demonstrated the most muscular approach. Earlier this week the Scorpions served subpoenas on MPs requiring them to explain aspects of the deal. They were withdrawn after the Speaker said they violated parliamentary privilege. The MPs are now expected to be interviewed at a later date. Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,595344,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 16 03:31:18 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2001 12:31:18 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Punk Thatcherism news Message-ID: Kalms chosen as Tory treasurer By Nigel Morris Political Correspondent The Independent, 16 November 2001 The founder of the Dixons consumer electronics chain, Sir Stanley Kalms, was appointed Treasurer of the Conservative Party yesterday. He inherits from Lord Ashcroft a party whose finances are back on an even keel, despite two crushing election defeats. Iain Duncan Smith, the party leader, said: "Sir Stanley has been a long-time supporter of the Conservative party and successive Conservative leaders, and is highly respected in industry and the City. He is heavily involved as well in charitable works." Sir Stanley, 69, a eurosceptic, boasts a glittering track record in high-street retailing, having built a vast chain of stores from the humble beginnings of a single camera shop in north London that he joined in 1948. He was knighted in 1996. His financial acumen attracted Conservatives who are keen for the party to seek new financial backers. But the appointment will be seized on by critics as further proof of the party drifting closer to the anti-European right under its new leader. It could also undermine the chances of winning support from large companies sympathetic to British membership of the single European currency. Sir Stanley said last night: "I am a great admirer of Iain Duncan Smith, a man of decency and integrity. He is also a great patriot who will always defend the British national interest." Within three years of Sir Stanley leaving school at 16 to join the family business, Dixons was the biggest photographic dealer in the country. It embarked on an aggressive expansion in the 1960s that eventually swallowed up other high-street retailers such as Currys and PC World. He went on to create the group that today sells a quarter of all TVs, DVDs, video recorders and hi-fi in Britain, just under a fifth of all fridges and washing machines, a similar proportion of PCs and about 10 per cent of mobile phones. His success has been based on keeping up with technological advances and providing mass-market success for these types of products. An admirer of Margaret Thatcher, he was a founder of Business for Sterling, the pressure group set up to oppose membership of the euro. He has been a regular donor to the party and gave ?5,000 to Mr Duncan Smith's successful leadership campaign. Lord Ashcroft stood down after three years, declining Mr Duncan Smith's plea for him to remain in the unpaid post. Sir Stanley has been a non-executive director of British Gas plc and founded Dixons Bradford City Technology college as well as the Stanley Kalms Foundation. Born in Britain, his grandparents were Jewish immigrants from Russia and Poland. His parents settled in London. He is married with three sons, eight grandchildren and a great-grandson. Full article at: http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=105177 NOTE: The article neglects to mention that Kalms is very much involved with the notorious outfit, Aims of Industry, which once upon a time ran a very nasty, efficient blacklisting campaign in conjunction with the now defunct Economic League, aimed at the exclusion of alleged trade union activists from any work positions whatsoever. Aims of Industry also had (has?) links to the intelligence services -- not surprising given the close linkages that once connected industry, the City, and the apparatus of state (military, civil service, intelligence, Conservative Party). Follow the link below and see pictures of this year's Aims of Industry Free Enterprise Award ceremony, awarded to Institute of Economic Affairs director John Blundell. The clotted cream of punk Thatcherism turned out in force for that dinner, including Norman Tebbit, John Redwood, Lord Harris of High Cross (financier of Neil Hamilton) and Michael Forsyth (ex-Scottish Secretary, now merchant banker (always was?)). http://www.iea.org.uk/events/award.htm Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 16 03:53:22 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2001 12:53:22 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Punk Thatcherism Message-ID: The last great battle over the future of the British state (Atlanticist vs. European) concerns UK membership of the single European currency. The europhobes have organised themselves in a group, "Business for Sterling", backed by the clotted cream of the punk Thatcherite deadbeats who once ran things in Britain, when their concerns were very much in alignment with the rest of an establishment set on destroying the UK labour movement. That task accomplished, the integration of Britain into Europe could proceed more easily. However, residual opposition from nationalists and certain US interests financing them makes for an interesting showdown in the not-too-distant future between the now ascendant Europhiles and the slowly dying europhobes. The former are represented by the cross-party lobby group, "Britain in Europe", which was launched in a high profile blaze of big-tented glory when Blair lined up with Michael Heseltine and Kenneth Clarke of the pro-Euro wing of the Conservative Party. The useful thing about these groups is that they are so fanatically opposed to each other that they spend lots of time, effort and money "exposing" the other for benefit of everyone, including those who would wish a plague upon both their houses. With the appointment of the Aims of Industry/Freedom Association-linked Stanley Kalms as Conservative Party treasurer, it is clear that the new leadership is intent upon following the same path as that of William Hague, and that we can expect, as a consequence, the continuing emergence of the Liberal Democrats as the "official opposition" to New Labour in Britain. From the "Britain in Europe" website: Business for Sterling Business for Sterling purports to be a non-party political campaigning organisation, established to put the economic and business case against Britain's membership of the European single currency. The links between Business for Sterling's leading personnel and a range of anti-EU organisations cast serious doubt on its claim to be pro-EU. BfS was founded on 11 June 1998, a Scottish Business for Sterling (SBfS) was founded on 2 February 2000 and BfS Cymru was launched in October 1999. BfS has a National Council of over 300 business leaders; a national network of Regional Councils in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and in all nine English regions including regional campaign offices and press officers, and a central database of over 20,000 registered business supporters. BfS's President since January 1999 is Lord (Richard) Marsh of Mannington (former Labour Cabinet minister and British Rail chairman). BfS's Chairman since February 1999 is Rodney Leach (Director, Matheson & Co). Leach is a UK Advisory Board member of Bill Cash MP's European Foundation. He was a leading campaigner in the City of London against ratification of the Maastricht Treaty during 1992-93. He addressed a City of London Concern over Maastricht meeting on 28 March 1993 and a City Concern over Federal Europe (CCOFE) meeting on 13 May 1994. Former BfS Chairmen were Lord (Richard) Marsh of Mannington, 1998-99 and Adam Afriyie (Managing Director, Connect Support Services Ltd and current Chairman, BfS London), 1999. BfS's Co-Treasurers are Sir John Craven (Chairman, Lonmin plc, since 1977), Sir Stanley Kalms (Chairman, Dixons Group plc, since 1972) and John Melbourn (Director, 3i Group plc). BfS has twelve full-time members of staff, plus regional organisers and press officers. BfS's Chief Executive is Alex Hickman (who attended a reception organised by the London UK Independence Party (UKIP), where he met candidates on UKIP's London list for the June 1999 European Elections (UKIP Election Bulletin, Spring 1999)) and its former Chief Executive was Nick Herbert (former Conservative candidate at the 1997 general election) from December 1998 until 15 December 2000, when he resigned after BfS overspent its advertising campaign budget by ?150,000 since September 2000; a block on any further spending was imposed until after the 2001 general election. Herbert addressed the annual conference of the Danish anti-EU June Movement in Horsens, Denmark on 26 March 2000. BfS' founder Director of Communications was Michael Horsley (former Conservative candidate at the 1997 general election), June-December 1998. BfS's Campaign Director is Dominic Cummings (who previously worked for the right-wing historian, Professor Norman Stone, who was reported by the Guardian as signing the nomination papers of a UKIP candidate at the 1994 European Elections). The Times reported on 3 November 1999 that Colin Perry, chairman of the CBI's SME Council, alleged that at the CBI national conference in Birmingham on 1 November 1999, "he had been threatened and held against a wall by Dominic Cummings, an official for Business for Sterling, after a heated head-to-head debate on Radio 5 Live's Financial World Tonight programme". Cummings has said: "Our mission is to prevent a referendum" (Advertising Age, 1 March 2001). BfS's Campaign Manager (and former Network Manager since 1999) is George Eustice (former UK Independence Partycandidate for the South West Region at the European Elections in June 1999, whose election address had "Leave the European Union" emblazoned across the front. Eustice is also a member of the Democracy Movement, and inaugural Chairman of its West Cornwall branch since April 1999. Eustice's declared opposition to the EU did not prevent him from applying in 1998 for a grant from the EU's Objective 5b funds for his fruit farm at Connor Downs, near Hayle, Cornwall. George Eustice has described the EU as "an alien imposter which has attached itself to Europe" (The West Briton, 11 March 1999). A BfS spokesman has confessed: "We're very conscious that our image is that of a bunch of outdated, reactionary old people" (The Independent, 31 August 2000). Members of the BfS Council include: Lord Marsh, President Luke Johnson (multi-millionaire Chairman, Belgo Group plc; former Referendum Party candidate who stood down before the 1997 general election and Council member, BfS London) Ruth Lea (Head of Policy Unit, Institute of Directors) Lord Wolfson of Sunningdale (former Chairman, Great Universal Stores plc) Stanislas Yassukovich (Chairman, S.M. Yassukovich & Co. Ltd; former Patron (now defunct) City Concern over Federal Europe and Chairman, BfS City of London). BfS has received the support of the Institute of Directors (IoD) and the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) since its inception. The FSB, which is affiliated to the anti-EU Anti-Maastricht Alliance (AMA), has passed motions in Torquay at its annual national conferences in March 1995 and March 2001 calling for British withdrawal from the EU. BfS has established a network of "Sterling Clubs" since June 1999 designed to recruit support and raise campaign funds from leading members of local communities throughout the country. The Clubs were charged with raising at least ?2 million in 2000. BfS has refused to disclose the sources of its funding or publish a list of donors who have given more than ?5,000. Its funding is mainly provided by leading business people such as Sir John Craven, Chairman, Lonmin plc; Sir Rocco Forte, a hotelier, the Keswicks of Jardine Matheson; Tim Martin, Chairman, JD Wetherspoon plc pub chain; the McAlpines construction dynasty and Lord Wolfson of Great Universal Stores. Conrad Black was reported to have pledged ?50,000 to BfS in 1998. BfS reportedly intend to raise and spend ?40 million ahead of any euro referendum. Despite its claim of political neutrality, BfS has strong links with the Conservative Party. Most of its senior officers are Conservative Party supporters and donors. BfS sponsored the inaugural reception of the Conservative Business Liaison Unit (CBLU) at the Conservative Party Conference in Bournemouth on 6 October 1998. BfS has commissioned over ten opinion polls from ICM (the Conservative Party's pollsters) since March 1999 on the public, business, and trade union members' attitudes to British membership of the European single currency. Its polling methodology and conclusions of its surveys have been widely condemned as statistically flawed and distorted. Two business organisations, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and the British Chambers of Commerce (BCC) have challenged the findings for "biased" weighting towards the views of smaller businesses, which trade less with the EU and are less favourable to the euro than larger businesses (those with more than 250 employees). On 31 March 1999 Bob Worcester, Chairman of MORI, accused BfS of "position bias" in the order of the questions. Several prominent anti-Europeans are among the original signatories in June 1998 who gave their personal endorsement to BfS at its launch: John Gouriet (Managing Director, Chime Consultants Ltd; Referendum Party candidate at the 1997 general election and co-founder in 1975, National Association for Freedom, forerunner of the Freedom Association) Roger Helmer MEP (Vice-President, Conservatives Against a Federal Europe and member, Bruges Group. He addressed the Bruges Group on 7 November 1998). Sir John Hoskyns (former Chairman, Arcadia Group plc and former Director-General, Institute of Directors, 1984-89). Michael Ivens (Consultant, Aims of Industry and Vice-President, Freedom Association) Adrian McAlpine (Director, Robert McAlpine Ltd and Vice-President, CAFE) Tim Melville-Ross (former Director-General, Institute of Directors, 1994-99) BfS Links with anti-EU and anti-EMU organisations Many of the most prominent BfS businessmen and economists are linked with anti-European organisations, which advocate either Britain's total withdrawal from the EU or seek a "renegotiation" of the terms of British membership. Bruges Group 16 members of BfS have links with the Bruges Group, which advocates British withdrawal from the EU unless its founding treaties can be renegotiated: Patrick Barbour (Director, Microgen plc and former Sponsor/Patron, Bruges Group, 1989-98) Jamie Borwick (Chief Executive, Manganese Bronze Holdings plc and Sponsor/Patron, Bruges Group, since 1989) Robert Boyd (Managing Director, EDC Pipework Services Ltd) David Caldow (Chairman, Burndene Investments plc; Sponsor/Patron, Bruges Group, since 1993 and Council member, BfS Yorkshire, since 1999) Professor Tim Congdon (Managing Director, Lombard Street Research Ltd and Academic Advisory Council member, Bruges Group, since 1989) Andrew Cook (Chairman, William Cook Ltd and Sponsor/Patron, Bruges Group, since 1993) Sir Michael Edwardes (Chairman, Strand Partners Ltd and former Chairman, British Leyland. He addressed the Bruges Group on 21 May 1998) Sir Rocco Forte (Chairman & Chief Executive, RF Hotels Ltd and former Sponsor/Patron, Bruges Group, 1989-91) Haruko Fukuda (Chief Executive Officer, World Gold Council. She addressed the Bruges Group on 19 May 1997) Lord (James) Hanson (former Chairman, Hanson plc, 1965-97 and Sponsor/Patron, Bruges Group, since 1993) Roger Helmer MEP Greville Howard (Chairman, Fortress Holdings) Brian Kingham (Chairman, Reliance Security Group plc; Sponsor/Patron, Bruges Group, since 1995 and former Treasurer, Bruges Group, 1989-90) Professor Patrick Minford (Professor of Applied Economics, Cardiff Business School and Academic Advisory Council member, Bruges Group, since 1989) Garfield Weston (Chairman, Associated British Foods plc and Sponsor/Patron, Bruges Group, since 1989. He was a founder signatory of BfS in June 1998. Lord Young of Graffham (Chairman, Young Associates Ltd and Sponsor/Patron, Bruges Group, since 1991) Conservatives Against a Federal Europe The following BfS members are CAFE office holders: Adrian McAlpine (Vice-President, CAFE) Roger Helmer MEP (Vice-President, CAFE) Lord Hindlip (Vice-President, CAFE and Group Chairman, Christies International plc) Lord (Norman) Lamont of Lerwick (Vice-President, CAFE) Lord (Malcolm) Pearson of Rannoch (Joint President, CAFE) Lord Vinson (Vice-President, CAFE and Vice-President, Institute of Economic Affairs) European Foundation The following BfS members serve on the UK Advisory Board of Bill Cash MP's European Foundation: David Caldow (Chairman, Burndene Investments plc) Roger Helmer MEP Rodney Leach (Chairman, BfS) Rodney Leach has openly countenanced British withdrawal from the EU on a number of occasions: "We need an accurate cost-benefit analysis of withdrawal...Europe has become a net negative factor" (City Concern over Federal Europe meeting, London, 13 May 1994), "It is time for businessmen to say publicly what they say privately - Europe is becoming a liability...the time has come to prepare for the prospect of losing that argument [on the nature of the EU]. If we do, far from being an occasion for regret, it should inaugurate an era of renewed self-respect and unprecedented prosperity" (The Sunday Telegraph, 12 June 1994) and "if it ever came to the point of separation [from the EU], which it has not, there is nothing for either side to fear" (The Times, 7 May 1996). On 22 April 1999 Rodney Leach addressed a meeting in Cirencester organised by a member of the Bruges Group, Campaign for an Independent Britain (CIB) and the Freedom Association. European Research Group Sixty-five members and founder signatories of BfS personally endorsed The Euro: Bad for Business, published by the ERG on 3 July 1998. The ERG advocates the "repatriation" of certain powers from Brussels to national governments and parliaments. Freedom Association Professor Patrick Minford and Colin Tickner (Chairman, Nickerson Investments Ltd and BfS North West) are Council members of the anti-EU Freedom Association. UK Independence Party Paul Sykes is reported to have joined BfS Yorkshire in May 1999. BfS literature was printed at free or cost price in 1998-99 by Style Publishing, a company owned by Damian Hockney, a leading figure in UKIP. Hockney was until recently designer of UKIP's promotional material and printer of UKIP's campaign bulletin Choose Democracy, and other anti-EU literature. The company also houses UKIP's London campaign office. Damian Hockney has boasted: "I totally despise the EU and all it stands for...we are currently producing the Business for Sterling Book"(Prospective UKIP European Election Candidates for London leaflet, 1999). BfS published The Case for Keeping the Pound in 1998. It was edited by two prominent anti-EU campaigners: Bill Jamieson (Executive Editor, The Scotsman, and former UK Independence Party candidate at the 1997 general election), and Monima Siddique (former Referendum Party candidate at the 1997 general election). Another BfS member is Idris Francis (member, UK Independence Party). Damian Hockney has said: "There are a number of people in business for Sterling who would like Britain to come out of the European Union, but they feel restrained" (launch of the UK Independence Party manifesto, London, 14 May 2001). Other anti-European links BfS member Peter Carnell (Chairman, Peter G Carnell & Co. and former Referendum Party candidate at the 1997 general election) addressed a meeting of the anti-EU Anti-Maastricht Alliance (AMA) in 1999. Brian Farmer (non-executive Director, Howle Holdings plc and a founder signatory of BfS in June 1998) has attended and spoken at two meetings of the Congress for Democracy in London. Finally, Michael Meadowcroft (President of the anti-EU Liberal Party and former Liberal MP, 1983-87) is a Council member of BfS Yorkshire. See http://www.britainineurope.org.uk/new/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=69 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From sherrynstan at igc.org Fri Nov 16 04:26:00 2001 From: sherrynstan at igc.org (sherrynstan at igc.org) Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2001 06:26:00 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Re: A-List digest, Vol 1 #37 - 14 msgs Message-ID: >>Message: 11 Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2001 18:11:44 +0000 To: A-List From: Mark Jones Subject: [A-List] historical amnesia of the Quadragon Reply-To: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu >>Partial listing examples of generals who led their troops up into the mountains (or similar kinds of strategic retreat) and came down again victorious: Alexander against the Persians; Llywelyn, the Prince of Wales, who took his entire nation up into Snowdonia to avoid King John's superior army in 1211, and went on to help destroy John. (Magna Carta 1215); General Kutuzov who retreated from Napoleon in 1812, then destroyed the Grande Armee; Mao Zedong who went on the Long March in 1927 to avoid Chiang Kai-shek; Gen. Giap who took 10 men into the Vietnamese hills and came down again at Dien Bien Phu in 1954; Fidel Castro who went up into the Sierra Maestra with 26 men and came back to Havana in 1959 with a whole army; Marshall Zhukov who let the Nazis get to the Volga in 1942 then chased them back to Berlin; and most pertinent: Genghis Khan, who in 1204 invented the art of the feigned chaotic retreat and thus trapped in turn the Chinese, Tibetan, Persian, Russian, Polish, Lithuanian and German armies. No doubt there are many others. Mark --__--__-- >>Message: 12 >>From: "Tom Warren" To: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu Subject: Re: [A-List] historical amnesia of the Quadragon Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2001 20:17:33 Reply-To: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu >>No doubt there are many others. >>Mark Hmmmm. You may be correct in the overall assessment, Mark. I seem to remember that in the first battle ever fought by USOFA FORCES (Concord) the Minutemen used the draw play and proceeded to eat the lunch of their opponents (I fergit who, perhaps some other on the list can remind us) But surely that seminal battle is held reverent in the minds of the Quadragon? It would be a hell of a case of amnesia to forget that one! And I do seem to remember some indigenous troops coming down out of the mountains (Green Mountains), Giap-style, and upsetting the party for a certain group of Redcoats ? That history will not be forgotten by USOFA FORCES, certainly. >>But perhaps amnesia is not the issue, perhaps the Quadragon is simply accessing a different data base: I?ll see your eight tactical examples and raise you eight forces (including some indigenous) who came down out of the mountains or utilized the draw play and faced defeat by confronting USOFA FORCES and their allies! Brits in the Mississippi Valley Robert E. Lee (a close thing, granted, and may be disqualified by altering the definition of USOFA FORCES --- and I myself would do so in citing some earlier battles.) The Nez Perce Geronimo Cochise (the less said about Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse, however, the better) Pancho Villa Japanese on Okinawa, Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, Coral Sea, etc. North Koreans (the less said about the PRC and certain reservoirs, however, the better) Uhhhh ? technically the 2nd SS Panzer division came down out of mountains after defeat, regrouping and checking their ideology, but we?ll let that one slide, okay? Let?s just call that a ?draw play? by Patton while Monty dithered. It is my impression that Serbia is fairly mountainous and that Milosovic was regrouping, ? however NATO didn?t really meet them on the ground, just uranium bullets and smart bombs did. We?ll let that one slide too, I guess. Perhaps it?s only superior, visionary Marxists or North-Central Asians who can employ this tactic successfully. Moslem forces have had only limited success historically with it, and in the 20-21st centuries never without the support of US/Brit technology and money and intelligence. Otherwise, they don?t seem to pull it off, (Later campaigns of Saladin and Kurds since come to mind, and the Islamic attempts against my boy Genghis were abysmal failures.) Islamic forces seem to do best ambushing troops acting under muddled orders from absent and/or off-shore command and control. Best, Tom (exercising his outta shape chauvinist pinkys) ?Stop me before I kill again!? ? sign held up for the TV cameras by grinning >>US soldiers in Desert Storm. Here's my response to the LI list on this one: leninist-international at lists.econ.utah.edu wrote: > It is very simple. During the war with SU, Pakistan, USA and other western nations helped the fundamentalist forces. This time there was no one behind the Taliban. I think this is the most simple explanation Partha Goff replies: Don't let the capitalist media herd you into premature conclusions. The present triumphalism does not take into account the real issue here, from a military standpoint. There has never been any doubt that the US would be able to get into Afghanistan, or to force the Taliban or anyone else into tactical withdrawals. If I were the Taliban commander, I would have called for precisely this maneuver. It's foolish to have one's resources exhausted in a futile head-to-head fight with a superior conventional force. The US was never vulnerable on the edges of Afghanistan or in the air. Guerrilla war gains its advantage--initiative and offensive--when the conventional force is battened down in fixed installations with their ever growing logistical requirements, and the eventual complacency/lack of flexibility/lowered morale that implies. The question has never been if the US could get IN to Afghanistan. The question is how does it get OUT! This doesn't even take into account the complexities and contradictions of NA, Pakistan, Saudi, et al. The Bushists needed this little propaganda coup desperately, because even their media was beginning to ask all sorts of embarrassing questions, and because the support for this war was growing alarmingly thin, even as they are using it to accelerate their new population control measures in the US. They allowed the NA to go forward to achieve this "victory", with deep reservations I'm sure, and the costs of letting the NA take Kabul are yet to be calculated. The pressure this creates in Pakistan alone must be horrific. And the NA itself, now that the Taliban has deserted Kabul (never a huge strategic objective), will begin to show its own contradictions, which are substantial and volatile. Now the US is committed to sort things out as these things develop, and every day and every dollar that goes into this effort will exacerbate conditions in the US. From pieinsky at igc.org Fri Nov 16 17:28:30 2001 From: pieinsky at igc.org (Jay Moore) Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2001 19:28:30 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Capitalism in Serious Trouble Message-ID: <000a01c16f1f$7a839e80$a37df2d0@bypass.com> The gathering gloom Nov 16th 2001 >From The Economist Global Agenda Figures published on November 16th showed a larger-than-expected fall in American industrial production, marking the longest period of decline since 1932. This weekend's meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in Ottawa are taking place against a global economic background as grim as anyone can remember. IT'S LIKE reading tea-leaves: that's the verdict of Horst K?hler, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on attempts to produce forecasts of the world economy at present. The immediate cause of Mr K?hler' s frustration is the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, which have sent the world economy into uncharted waters. But the anxiety of world-economy watchers is all the greater because those events made an already bad situation worse. A grim backdrop indeed for this weekend's meetings of the IMF and the World Bank, which were postponed from September. A sharp reminder of how sharp the deterioration has been came on November 16th, when new figures showed that American industrial production fell by 1.1% in October compared with September. This was more than expected, and marked the thirteenth successive monthly fall, the longest such decline since 1932. It would be bad enough if the downturn were confined to America, given that it is the world's largest economy. But in contrast with the last American recession, in 1991, this time the rest of the world is in trouble, too: in most cases largely as a consequence of America's problems. In spite of the special difficulties involved in forecasting global economic prospects at this juncture, the IMF has had a go at producing revised estimates. They make for depressing reading. The IMF's last forecast was published on September 26th. Although that was after the terrorist attacks, the numbers were prepared before and took no account of their possible impact. Now the Fund's economists have had a chance to see how severe the short-term impact has been, and they have revised their figures accordingly. The scale of the downward revisions involved has come as something of a surprise, not least to the American government. Next year, for example, the IMF expects the American economy to grow by only 0.7%, instead of the 2.2% it was projecting only a couple of months ago. Global growth forecasts have been revised downwards both for this year and next: now the Fund expects the world economy to grow by only 2.4% in 2002, as against the 3.5% it expected earlier. At a press briefing on November 15th, Mr K?hler tried hard not to sound overly pessimistic. Neither he nor the Fund's deputy managing director, Anne Krueger, accepted the definition, popular among some economists, that a global growth rate of anything less than 2.5% amounts to a world economic recession. Overall, Mr K?hler insisted that he and his colleagues still think the current downturn will be less severe than those in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Bush administration remains much more upbeat about America's economic prospects. Paul O'Neill, the treasury secretary, says that he has bet Mr K?hler dinner-"a great big one"-that the IMF forecasts would turn out to be wrong. In spite of his optimism, Mr O'Neill has strongly backed President George Bush's calls for Congress to stop arguing and get on with the passage of a fiscal stimulus package for Mr Bush to sign. There are one or two-admittedly faint-signs that have encouraged optimists to hope the American economy might be at or nearing its low point. Most of the statistics published in the past few weeks have been discouraging. But one or two have not been quite so bad. Retail sales rose sharply in October, by 7.1% compared with September. Much of that reflects the particularly sharp drop seen in sales in September, and some of the October rise is also explained by special discounts aimed at enticing people back into shops. But stripping out special factors still suggests October was the best month since January. New unemployment claims seem to be stabilising as well, suggesting that company lay-offs may be easing-though the unemployment rate is expected to carry on rising for a while yet. But, as the IMF figures have again reminded economists, America isn't the only source of bad news. Europe, which started the year so well, has seen its prospects deteriorate rapidly this year. The European Union as a whole still seems likely to escape recession next year, but for Germany, the EU's largest economy, the escape will be a particularly narrow one. There can be no such doubts about the economic fate of large parts of Asia, which are already in deep recession. Taiwan, newly admitted to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on November 11th, is facing its worst-ever year, with the prospect of GDP falling in every quarter. Singapore is currently seeing its economy shrink at an annual rate of 10%. China continues to grow at a rapid rate, if not at quite the breakneck pace it has grown used to; but nearly every other east Asian country, including Thailand, South Korea and the Philippines, is in trouble, as world demand for their exports, especially high-tech products, has collapsed. The impact on developing countries, many of which rely on commodity exports, has been equally severe. Recent figures from the WTO show that world trade will barely grow this year, if at all. If the IMF is right, a global economic recovery could start sometime around the middle of next year. But for the world's second-largest economy, Japan, the prognosis is far worse. Japan is now in its fourth recession in a decade, and a prolonged one at that, with GDP expected to contract both this year and next. Economists agree that Japan's problems are much more serious and will require much more radical policy action than the authorities there have yet delivered. Japan's troubles are uniquely acute. But it would be a mistake to write them off as irrelevant to the rest of the world. There is a growing consensus that one of the country's biggest problems is deflation-falling prices as opposed to falling inflation-and that it has so far failed to grapple with this. But there are those warning that deflation is a risk elsewhere, notably in America, where figures published on November 16th showed a fall in consumer prices. Nobody is yet suggesting America is suffering from deflation, which can trigger a downward spiral of falling prices, shrinking demand and financial distress: a vicious circle America last experienced in the 1930s depression. Wise policymakers will not ignore the risk, however. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Sun Nov 18 03:45:24 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2001 10:45:24 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Russia has much to gain from oil price war Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011118104505.02c69008@pop.tiscali.co.uk> The Globe and Mail (Canada) November 17, 2001 By MICHAEL DEN TANDT From Saturday's Globe and Mail How odd that a global political crisis and a war in one of the world's most unstable regions would drive oil prices down. But that's precisely what has happened. Western consumers have much to gain. Energy companies, and their shareholders, have much to lose, at least in the short term. After Sept. 11, it became immediately clear that Russia and the United States would move much closer toward partnership than they ever had before. Russia retains immense influence in the former Soviet republics neighbouring Afghanistan, and the Russians have their own radical Muslim terrorist problem in Chechnya. But now, for the first time, the extent of the strategic shift in U.S.-Russian relations, and the potential economic benefits to both sides, are becoming clear. The Russians, with American support, are attempting to replace the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries as the world's major supplier of energy. The battle lines were drawn Wednesday when OPEC's meeting in Vienna broke up with no agreement on a 1.5 million barrel-a-day production cut. The cut, much anticipated by the markets, was intended to push the price of crude up toward OPEC's preferred price range of $22 to $28 (U.S.) a barrel. But along came Russia, the world's second-largest exporting nation, as the spoiler. The Russians politely declined to join in any production cut, causing OPEC to postpone its own plans until January, conditional on the Russians jumping aboard. Russia has proved increasingly uncooperative with OPEC's efforts to shore up its monopoly. Chris Edmonds, energy analyst at Realmoney.com and managing director of Atlanta-based Resource Dynamics LLC, pointed out recently that Russia agreed in April, 1999, to help reduce global oil production by 7 per cent. Soon after, the Russians boosted production by 400,000 barrels a day. "It's clear to me that OPEC has lost a significant amount of its pricing power," Mr. Edmonds said in an interview. "Otherwise why would [they] sit around and literally beg countries like Russia to participate? What kind of a cartel is that?" There are several reasons for the Russians' stance. Even before the Sept. 11 attacks on New York and Washington, U.S. President George W. Bush was intent on reducing America's dependence on foreign sources of oil. But in the context of the war on terrorism, and the continuing strife between Israel and the Palestinians, "foreign" actually means "OPEC." That's why crude almost certainly figured large in Mr. Bush's talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin this week. Any large increase in non-OPEC production not only helps keep energy prices down, thus bolstering hopes for a global economic recovery. It also shifts the geopolitical equation in favour of the United States. It makes it possible, in theory, for the Americans to contemplate wider action against Middle Eastern terrorists, with less fear of an Arab backlash. And in future, it might make the Americans less beholden to Israel, which has always served as a forward base protecting the West's access to Arab oil. Russia, for its part, has plenty of political reasons for co-operating with the United States. These include eventual entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, cover for its campaign against Chechnya, and a sympathetic ear on missile defence, among other things. And the potential economic benefits are enormous. "Russia wants a bigger share of the world oil market," Mr. Edmonds said. "And they're willing to buy that share. They're willing to put prices low enough that people buy from Russia, not OPEC." At the end of the day, Russia wants better trade relations with the rest of the world, Mr. Edmonds said, "and that means oil." The key here is that the Russians are the aggressors in this price war. Most analysts estimate that they can profitably extract oil as long as crude remains above $15 a barrel. OPEC officials are threatening to allow the price to drop to $10, but few industry observers believe they'll follow through. More likely, analysts say, is that crude will bottom at between $15 and $17 a barrel in the next few months, after which demand from a rebounding global economy will pull it higher. So, where does that leave the Canadian oil patch? For the near term, in a pickle. Prices of these stocks, as reflected by the Toronto Stock Exchange oil and gas subindex, moved sharply higher after the Sept. 11 attacks, on anticipation that U.S. retaliation would lead to a Middle Eastern conflict. Now, given the outlook for a continuing slide in crude prices in the near term, the stocks have nowhere to go but down. Within weeks, bargains will emerge amid the rubble. But for now, it's best to heed the old market adage: Don't try to catch a falling knife. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Sun Nov 18 09:48:04 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2001 16:48:04 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Russian Oil Firms Block Production Cut Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011118164711.00ab1098@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Washington Post November 18, 2001 OPEC Threatens Price War As Moscow Seeks to Widen Its Share of World Market By Daniel Williams MOSCOW, Nov. 17 -- When the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries appealed to nonmember Russia last week for help in boosting oil prices by cutting production, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov canvassed Russia's leading exporters for their opinion. Of the six top companies, five responded with a resounding no. They did not want to cut production, even though prices are falling because of a slowdown in world consumption. Their resistance was a major factor in Russia's decision to reject OPEC's demands. On a visit to Madrid Friday, Kasyanov said no one should expect an "abrupt move" from Russia. As a result, OPEC's plans to curb production are on hold. The oil cartel has threatened to launch a price war to bring nonmember producers such as Russia to their knees. Russia's position shows the complexities in the oil business that make OPEC a weak actor for the moment. The Russians want to increase the amount of oil they sell abroad. Where OPEC sees disastrous price declines, key Russian producers see an opportunity to increase their share of the world market. They want to pump more and more for export, without regard to the consequences for the cartel. "Russia is spoiling the party," said Peter Boone, an analyst at the brokerage firm Brunswick UBS Warburg. "The Russians seemed more interested in keeping good relations with their customers in Europe and China than with OPEC." It is unusual for Russia -- which controls only about 7 percent of the world market, compared with about 30 percent for OPEC -- to be so influential. But Russia's resistance was unexpectedly fierce, oil analysts here said. If this country, with traditional ties to Arab and developing countries, wouldn't go along, chances for non-OPEC holdouts such as Norway, Britain and Mexico seemed even more remote. OPEC wants to drive prices up to between $25 and $28 a barrel. By Friday, prices had fallen to about $17. With the United States, Europe and Japan all suffering an economic slowdown, demand is unlikely to pick up anytime soon. Russia has long depended on oil exports. In the late Soviet years, oil exports and the substantial hard currency earnings they brought in provided a valuable cushion against the country's other economic woes. Today, oil and gas accounts for more than 60 percent of Russia's export income. The Soviet Union had about 10 percent of the world oil market, but Russia's share declined after the Soviet collapse. In the past four years, Russian producers have moved aggressively to rebuild their country's share, which grew from 6 percent to 7 percent while OPEC's remained steady. The companies that resisted production cuts gave Kasyanov several reasons. They argued that petroleum is the economy's locomotive and reductions would hurt not only oil companies but also industries that supply drilling equipment. They also asserted that shutting down wells would cause the wells to freeze; it is more expensive to open and close wells in cold climates such as Siberia than in temperate regions elsewhere in the world. At least one company, Yukos, argued the case in geopolitical terms. After Sept. 11, Yukos officials believe, the West will want to switch oil purchases to countries outside the volatile Middle East. In addition, Europe will try to further integrate Russia into the continental economy, and that will increase export opportunities if Russia shows itself to be reliable. "We should make a gesture to not drive prices up at a time when the Western economies are suffering," said Hugo Ericssen, a spokesman for Yukos. "Prices will stabilize when the economies stabilize." Yukos increased production 18 percent over the past year, mostly for export, a source of lucrative foreign exchange. The one company among Russia's top six oil exporters that sided with OPEC was Lukoil, Russia's largest exporter, which increased production marginally in the past year. Lukoil has long wooed Middle Eastern oil countries, including Iraq, to win drilling contracts. Lukoil's vice president, Leonid Fedun, chided rivals for planning to increase production at a time of falling prices. "This makes no sense. Russia should coordinate with other producing countries," Fedun said. The Russian government can control exports by limiting access to the pipelines that leave its territory. Nonetheless, private companies have become powerful lobbyists. Oil fell into private hands in the 1990s through virtual giveaways of the Soviet-era state-owned oil industry. Since then, nationalists and Communists have complained that the new owners wield undue and destructive influence. For the moment, the government is siding with the five oil companies that oppose a production cut. Kasyanov said the current oil price downturn should be viewed "calmly" because it represented not a trend but a "market fluctuation." But Russia might suffer if prices nose-dive. If oil drops below about $17 a barrel, the budget will begin to run into the red. Moreover, in the next two years, Russia is due to make foreign debt payments of $40 billion, and Moscowcould have difficulty meeting payments if oil prices hit rock-bottom levels. That could also raise the possibility of another financial crisis. "Oil at below $15 a barrel would mean a disaster," said Sergei Vasiliev, a member of Russia's upper house of parliament. Vasiliev also worried about Russia losing goodwill in OPEC, especially in the Middle East, where Moscow's influence declined markedly in the post-Cold War years. "We have common interests and a common economy. We don't need any hostility," he said. Mikhail Zadornov, a member of the lower house's budget and tax committee, said that OPEC targets were too high. Under current conditions, he said, prices between $20 and $25 a barrel were all that could be expected. He said that Russia could withstand a price war because its currency reserves are high, and that it depends less on oil revenue than either Saudi Arabia or Venezuela, two big OPEC producers. "We don't want this war. Our interests are with the oil producers and the consumers," he said. "But, of course, it's hard these days to be with both." From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Sun Nov 18 22:50:34 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 05:50:34 +0000 Subject: [A-List] more on Russia v.OPEC Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011119054927.00b159e0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> INTERVIEW-Low oil prices could dim Russia growth hopes-Kudrin By Anna Willard OTTAWA, Nov 18 (Reuters) - Russia's economic growth could come in lower than the government's worst estimate of 3.8 percent next year if oil prices stay weak, Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said on Sunday. "If the oil price is lower than $18.50 a barrel, growth could be a little bit lower than 3.8 percent," Kudrin told Reuters in an interview. He explained that the government has an optimistic forecast for next year's growth of 4.3 percent and a pessimistic one of 3.8 percent. The IMF, which released new figures on Saturday, sees Russian growth of 4.2 percent next year, up from a previous estimate of 3.9 percent. Oil prices are crucial for Russia, the world's second largest oil producer, and last year's run-up in prices helped trigger the strongest economic growth since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian economy grew 8.3 percent last year, according to the IMF. But oil prices, which ended at $17.80 a barrel on Friday, have been trading at two-year lows, driven down by slumping demand as the world economy grinds to a halt. The price fall has been exacerbated by Russia's refusal so far to join OPEC's efforts to support substantial output cuts. Russia has made a token offer to the oil cartel to reduce output by 30,000 barrels a day which OPEC says is not enough. Kudin said on Saturday that Russia is open to negotiations on this offer. "I didn't say it (30,000 bpd) was the final word," Kudrin said. "It is a matter of our negotiations." FAREWELL TO THE IMF Kudrin also said Russia's next planned repayment to IMF at the end of December will mean Russia no longer has to take part in an IMF monitoring program. "At the end of December Russia will make an additional payment to the IMF and because of that the debt will be less than Russia's quota at the IMF and in that case Russia will no longer need to have the monitoring program," he said. Russia, struggling to build a capitalist economy on the ruins of the Soviet system, was once the IMF's largest single borrower, with a series of largely unsuccessful IMF-sponsored lending programs. But it has not borrowed new IMF money for some years and has been been repaying old IMF loans. During his visit to Ottawa Kudrin met with Gerard Belanger, the deputy director of the IMF's second European Department. Kudrin said an IMF team will visit Moscow at the end of November or beginning of December to prepare a regular report on the Russian economy and to review the monitoring agreement with the fund. Kudrin also met with U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill. He said that the most important economic help the United States could give Russia, is support for entry into the World Trade Organization. He also met top finance officials from France, Britain, Germany and Saudi Arabia. But in contrasts to the tense debt negotiations that punctuated IMF meetings in the 1990s, there was no discussion on Russia's debt to the Paris Club in these meetings. "We are paying," he said. --------------------------------------------------- Financial Times (UK) November 19, 2001 Russian oil chief rejects calls for export cuts By Andrew Jack in Moscow The head of Russia's second-largest oil company stressed his opposition to Opec demands for export cuts and called instead for the creation of a long-term partnership to boost production and stabilise prices. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, chairman of Yukos, the quoted oil group, said in an interview on Sunday that European Union countries along with the US, Norway and possibly Mexico should develop long-term contracts and agree to managed increases in production levels. His comments came after officials of Opec - the Organisation of Petroleum-Exporting Countries - meeting last week in Vienna threatened a new oil price war, warning that they would not implement planned production cuts unless Russia and other non-members did the same. Mikhail Kasyanov, Russia's prime minister, dismissed a further drop in oil prices on Friday as the result of short-term volatility. He reiterated his opposition to any significant export cuts by his country other than a reduction of 30,000 barrels a day pledged a week ago and dismissed by Opec as symbolic. Alexei Kudrin, the finance minister, said in Canada on Saturday that any final decision on further cuts was open to negotiation, but they would not be "profound". Ernesto Martens, the Mexican oil minister, arrived in Moscow on Sunday for talks with his Russian counterpart, in the latest sign of intensive diplomacy linked to concern about the fall in oil prices since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US. Russia has warned that sustained low prices below $18 a barrel risk jeopardising the assumptions made in its 2002 budget, and could trigger government expenditure cuts and difficulties in meeting debt payments. Oil accounts for 25 per cent of annual export revenues and up to 20 per cent of state revenues. However, Mr Khodorkovsky said that Russia was in a better position economically to sustain low oil prices than Opec countries, and could survive even $12 a barrel for two years if necessary. He argued that sustaining oil prices above $26 a barrel was unrealistic, and said oil companies could live within a range of $17-$19, and should aim to maintain prices within a broader corridor of $16-$22. He argued that it was in the interests of the West to help cultivate Russia as a strategic alternative supplier of oil. He said Russia should be allowed to return to peak late Soviet production levels of 9m barrels, compared with 7m currently, and argued that capping production would lead to job losses. Yukos and two rivals, Sibneft and TNK, are believed to have been angered by plans to impose a "voluntary" production cut of 30,000 barrels a day, arguing that it would discriminate against the three companies that had done most to invest in fresh domestic production. Other Russian oil companies such as Lukoil have proved more favourable, having invested more in production in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Mr Khodorkovsky argued that these countries would not cut output but would simply make good any cuts made by Russia. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Sun Nov 18 22:54:49 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 05:54:49 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Washington's strategic target in Central Asia Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011119055431.02bddf30@pop.tiscali.co.uk> By Cecil Williams "America's new war!" That's what CNN calls President George W. Bush's plans to bomb and invade Central Asia and the Middle East. There's not much new about it, though. U.S. bombs and missiles have killed hundreds of thousands of civilians in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Sudan, Somalia and Afghanistan in the past two decades alone. No doubt many people in those countries have acquired a deep dislike for the United States. When investigators look into a murder, however, their first question is not, "Who disliked the victim?" They want to know who will benefit from the crime. The Sept. 11 deaths of over 6,000 people, many Muslims among them, benefit no one in the Islamic world. But for some rich and powerful people in the United States, the tragedy will pay off quite handsomely. "Since Sept. 11 opposition to increased military spending has evaporated," the New York Times reported Sept. 22. That should make the Pentagon brass quite happy. Just a few months ago they were publicly whining they hadn't gotten the giant budget increase they were expecting after Bush's selection as president. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was complaining he couldn't get funds to build a "21st-century military." Now Congress has not only voted the Pentagon an emergency increase. Democrats say they'll no longer object to Bush's antiballistic missile pork barrel. When generals, admirals and defense secretaries retire from the military, they usually get jobs with giant defense firms like General Electric and Lockheed Martin. These firms are "among the benefactors of the Sept. 11 tragedy," the New York Times wrote. Then there's the trenchcoat gang at the National Security Agency, the CIA, the FBI and Secret Service. Not to mention the new Office of Homeland Security to be headed by Bush's fellow executioner, Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Ridge. They have been promised funding and powers they recently only dreamed of. The CIA actually created Osama bin Laden's organization back in the 1980s to attack Soviet troops and the progressive government in Afghanistan. As vice president, George Bush Sr. oversaw the operation. In the Agency's employ, bin Laden's troops murdered teachers, doctors and nurses, disfigured women who took off the veil, and shot down civilian airliners with U.S.-supplied Stinger missiles. The Afghan people called bin Laden's forces the "brotherhood of Satan." The Afghanistan war was the biggest covert operation in the CIA's history. It was paid for in part by the heroin trade. Many who took part in the operation were recruited by Egyptian, Pakistani and Saudi intelligence services and didn't know they were working for the CIA. In 1990 and 1991 the CIA used bin Laden's's group for operations against Iraq. More recently this group carried out anti-Russian operations in Chechnya and Daghestan and participated in U.S.-backed operations against Yugoslavia. No one has more to gain, however, than the corporate big shots at Exxon, Mobil, Chevron and the other big oil monopolies. For 10 years now they have been scheming to get their hands on the vast oil and gas wealth of former Soviet Central Asia, just north of Afghanistan. How to achieve that goal has been a U.S. foreign policy priority since the fall of the Soviet Union. In a Feb. 12, 1998, report to the House Committee on International Relations, Unocal Corp. Vice President for International Relations John J. Maresca testified on the importance of this region. He said: "The Caspian region contains tremendous untapped hydrocarbon reserves. ... "Proven natural gas reserves within Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan equal more than 236 trillion cubic feet. The region's oil reserves may reach more than 60 billion barrels of oil-enough to service Europe's oil needs for 11 years. Some estimates are as high as 200 billion barrels." Oil, of course, is a commodity in which Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney have a deep personal interest. Now George W. has named his dad's old employees in Afghanistan as the culprits in the Sept. 11 attack. And the Pentagon has demanded the right to occupy the former Soviet republics named above plus Kyrgizia. In other words, right where the oil is. According to the Sept. 25 New York Times, the Putin regime in Moscow is offering the United States broad support in this move. The oil reserves are 10 percent of the world's known supply, under or around the Caspian Sea. That's worth about $5 trillion at today's prices. Maresca testified that since "the Asia/Pacific region has a rapidly increasing demand for oil," it would be useful to have an oil pipeline from the Caspian region to the Indian Ocean--that is, through Afghanistan. An unrecognized Taliban government in Afghanistan is an obstacle to this, he wrote. In May 1998, Time magazine reported that the CIA had "set up a secret task force to monitor the region's politics and gauge its wealth. Covert CIA officers, some well-trained petroleum engineers, had traveled through southern Russia and the Caspian region to sniff out potential oil reserves. When the policymakers heard the agency's report, [Secretary of State Madeline] Albright concluded that 'working to mold the area's future was one of the most exciting things we can do.' " That's just what Washington and Wall Street set out to do. The Pentagon tried to entice the regions' governments into a military alliance linked to NATO's "Partnership for Peace." Oil companies hired Washington insiders like Zbigniew Brzezinski, Lloyd Bentsen, John Sununu and a certain Dick Cheney to lobby for them in the region. As the 20th century ended, it seemed their efforts would be crowned with success. The U.S. bombing of Yugoslavia seemed to block the possibility of Caspian oil and gas reaching Western Europe through Russian-owned pipelines. Meanwhile President Bill Clinton's 1998 bombing of Iraq pushed oil prices high enough to make construction of a U.S.-owned pipeline seem possible. "U.S. is Gaining in Great Game in Central Asia," a Time magazine headline crowed. Then Boris Yeltsin resigned, and Vladimir Putin took office in the Kremlin. The Putin administration offered German banks stakes in Lukoil and Gazprom, Russia's main energy companies. Russia began to actively reassert its influence east of the Caspian, and Central Asian governments began to stall or renege on their deals with U.S. oil companies. Former FBI Director Louis Freeh and CIA Director George Tenet made emergency trips to the region. The potential alliance of German capital and Russian, Caucasus and Central Asian energy resources raised the prospect that Western Europe would no longer have to buy its oil and gas from U.S. firms. Adding to the U.S.-based corporations' problems, China began negotiating to build oil and gas pipelines from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. And Russia brokered a treaty with Iran to divide up the Caspian Sea without U.S. participation. Oil industry journals blasted the Clinton administration for "appeasing Russia" and moaned about losing Central Asia. Caucasuswatch.com bills itself as an intelligence service for the oil industry. In January it wrote: "With the coming of a Sino-Russian pact of mutual assistance and an Iranian acceptance of the Russian proposal to carve up the Caspian Sea, any chance the U.S. had of cementing alliances in the region seemed doomed. The incoming American administration, heavy in oil and related interests, will likely try to reverse this trend. How effective they will be is open to question." A more recent entry on the Web site tied U.S. Big Oil's prospects in the region to "the success of the Central Asian counterstrike." That article was posted on April 24 of this year. - END - (Copyright Workers World Service From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Mon Nov 19 05:30:54 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 12:30:54 +0000 Subject: [A-List] FT: stand-off between Opec and Russia? Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011119122945.02c0b300@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Opec at bay By David Buchan and Andrew Jack Published: November 18 2001 19:34 | Last Updated: November 19 2001 02:24 Chakib Khelil, Algeria's oil minster and Opec's current president, declared last week that "if Opec had not existed on September 11, it would have had to be invented". His line of reasoning was that the cartel's pledges to meet any oil shortages in the immediate aftermath of the attacks had calmed the markets, brought the Brent price down from a spike of $31 a barrel "and saved the world a lot of money". The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries - against its will this time - looks about to save the world a lot more money. It has said it will take no further action to stop the oil price falling unless non-Opec producers, particularly Russia, make big cuts in output. So if the oil price, which hit a 2?-year low of $17.45 last week, continues to slide, oil users cannot help but benefit. This is hardly Opec's first scrap over price or market share. But previous disputes were mainly internal. In 1982-85, in the days when Opec rigged the market by fixing "posted" prices, many members responded to weak demand by giving secret discounts. Saudi Arabia did not and, exasperated at the loss of sales, flooded the market. That brought the rest of Opec to heel and led to the current system of individual output quotas. In 1995-97, Venezuela was the culprit, busting its quota until Saudi pressure and a new government in Caracas prevailed. "Everyone should heed the lessons of the past, that going after market share just creates losses," warned Ali Naimi, the Saudi oil minister, last week. He had Moscow in mind. Russian output is rising faster than any other non-Opec country, by 500,000 b/d this year. Its response to Opec's appeals for co-operative production cuts to match the collapse in demand has been to offer to trim 30,000 from the 7m barrels it pumps daily - a "minuscule" amount, complains Mr Naimi. It is also less than the conditional pledges made by smaller non-Opec producers, Mexico and Oman, to trim their production by, respectively, 75,000-100,000 b/d and 40,000-50,000 b/d. Opec is united, for the moment, in its move against Russia. But it will find the Russians hard to crack. "No one can make any demands of us," Mikhail Kasyanov, Russia's prime minister, said on Friday. Russia faces a difficult dilemma. As the world's second largest exporter, it has had a free ride on the back of Opec reductions. But if Opec precipitates a price war, Russia's fast-growing economy will suffer. Oil means less to Russia than it does to Opec states (see chart), but it still accounts for 25 per cent of export earnings. A further 25 per cent comes from gas, the price of which is indexed to oil. Oil taxes also provide 15-20 per cent of government revenue. If oil prices drop below $18 a barrel, Russian politicians warn they will need to restructure the 2002 budget, cut spending and possibly reschedule debts. Doing Opec's bidding and curbing exports could jeopardise Russia's desire to build on President Vladimir Putin's summit last week with President George W. Bush and to be seen as a stable source of oil to a west uncertain about the Middle East. Yet there is no sign that Washington is urging Russia to weaken Opec. The only help Opec received last week was from Mr Bush, who announced plans to start topping up the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve with government "royalty" oil. This would "effectively increase demand by 100,000 b/d", said Mr Naimi. This plan was already US administration policy and its announcement last week was coincidental. The US, like other industrialised countries, is taking a relaxed, ringside view of the Opec-Russia wrangle. So Russia is on its own against Opec. Moscow can control exports through its system of quotas but its influence is reduced now that the industry is in the hands of influential private businessmen not necessarily willing to obey the government. Russia's oil companies face technical problems in halting production in wells that freeze over and often have to be redrilled. But they also are divided on the desirability of cuts. Some such as Lukoil, the country's largest, favour cuts because their domestic output is flat and they have invested in neighbouring states such as Kazakhstan which are not being asked by Opec to cut production. Others such as Yukos, the second biggest producer, and Sibneft turn a deaf ear to Opec because their production is rising fast. "At $15 a barrel, Russian companies would start to cut capital expenditure and at $10-$13 they would get worried about making money," says Stephen O'Sullivan of United Financial Group in Moscow. So how low could prices go? Opec has not launched a price war in the sense of increasing or discounting its oil sales. But its decision to do nothing, when the market is over-supplied to the tune of 2m b/d, invites a price-slide. Yet the political uncertainties that led Opec to abdicate its usual price-rigging role also provide a floor under the market. Who knows, after all, what may follow the Afghanistan war? This is not a situation, says Robert Priddle, director of the Paris-based International Energy Agency, "in which one would expect the price to collapse". There is an element of bluff in last week's statement by Kuwait's oil minister that the oil price could return to the $10 level it hit in 1998. Still, keeping output steady will prove costly to Opec. Leo Drollas, of the London-based Centre for Global Energy Studies, calculates that, in the absence of any cut, the average price for Opec crudes will fall to under $17 in the first half of next year, and export revenues for the 11 Opec countries will drop from $170bn this year to $121bn in 2002. As the biggest producer, Saudi Arabia stands to lose $16bn in export revenue next year. Only Iran, a prime mover in the confrontation with Russia, has taken insurance against coming hardship. Bijan Zanganeh, its oil minister, said last week Iran had put $10bn of recent receipts in a special oil stabilisation fund. Some analysts believe there is method in Opec's apparent madness. Paul Horsnell of JP Morgan Chase points out that "marginal production comes off stream far faster than it comes back, capital budgets are slashed far quicker than they are re-instated", slowing the growth of future production outside Opec. These "asymmetries" work against nonOpec companies, which have generally higher production costs than Opec producers. Other analysts say these asymmetries would operate only at a price far lower than anyone contemplates. So it is unlikely that Opec can generally disrupt non-Opec production. Yet it is clear that the cartel was helped in its smooth management of the market from Spring 1999 to September 2001 by the way the 1998 price slump caused international energy companies to cut investment. As a result, non-Opec production is only now beginning to surge ahead. But surging it is. Opec ministers were last week advised they could expect non-Opec production to rise 500,000 b/d this year and 1m b/d next year, when they themselves had taken more than 2.5m b/d of their own oil off the market. Small wonder, then, they all chorused about the "unfairness" of non-Opec countries not sharing the burden of market regulation. Opec's basic problem is no one wants to join it any more. Nigeria was the last entrant, in 1971. The cartel has since lost two members, Ecuador in 1993 and Gabon in 1996, when they stopped exporting significant amounts of oil. Many members carry their obligations lightly and cheat on quotas. But membership is a handicap, particularly to countries trying to woo western investors. Eventually, Opec will regain its leverage, because its members hold two-thirds of world oil reserves. But that could be 10-15 years away. In the meantime, Opec may have to compromise. It might do well to settle for any production cut it can squeeze out of Russia and to count the US diversion of oil into the SPR as part of a non-Opec cut in supply of less than 500,000 cut b/d. Opec could then justify to itself a cut in its own output of 1m b/d. The alternative could be a long stand-off between Opec and Russia. According to Mr Naimi, it "behoves all oil producers to co-operate for a period - it could be six months, a year, 18 months - until normal growth resumes". If they do not co-operate, the oil price will suffer. So will Opec and Russia, although the oil-importing world will not weep. www.ft.com/opec From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 19 05:11:59 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 14:11:59 +0200 Subject: [A-List] British imperialism Message-ID: Mugabe 'tall towers' warning DAVID STEELE The Herald, 19 November 2001 ROBERT Mugabe, president of Zimbabwe, last night made thinly veiled references to the atrocities of September 11 in an attack on the British government. In an emotional speech at the funeral of one of his supporters he accused Tony Blair of sponsoring terrorism in Zimbabwe adding: "Let it be heard in the tall towers of London, in their tall towers elsewhere . . . we shall never, ever brook attempts to subject us." He vowed to crack down on the opposition, describing them as the "terrorists" backed by Britain. In London, a Foreign Office spokesman said any suggestion that Britain was supporting any kind of terrorism was "absurd." The spokesman said Britain had helped fund the Zimbabwean opposition, specifically through the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, a government body set up in 1992 to support democracy around the world. Mr Mugabe, who is known for making inflammatory statements, was speaking at the funeral of a ruling party militant whose death he blamed on opposition activists. Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/19-11-19101-0-24-57.html Until reading this article I had never heard of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, an organisation with obvious parallels to the more notorious National Endowment for Democracy in the US. The WFD has its own website, accessible at http://www.wfd.org/ The site describes the WFD thus: The Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) was established in March 1992 to provide assistance in building and strengthening pluralist democratic institutions overseas. It receives a grant-in-aid from the Government which is currently ?4 million. It accounts to Parliament for the resources through the Foreign & Commonwealth Office. It also undertakes selected extra-budgetary technical assistance projects, and seeks contributions from the private sector and other funding organisations. WFD is independent of the Government in setting its priorities and its choice of projects. The three main UK political parties are each represented on the Board of Governors, and are appointed by the Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs after consulting the parties. There is also a representative from the smaller political parties, and non-party figures drawn from business, the trade unions, the academic world and the non-governmental sector. But a look at the personnel overseeing this outfit reveals just how deeply involved are others from political parties other than the "three main UK" ones: WFD's Patrons Rt Hon Michael Martin MP, Speaker of the House of Commons Rt Hon Tony Blair MP Rt Hon William Hague MP Rt Hon Charles Kennedy MP Rt Hon David Trimble MLA MP Ieuan Wyn Jones AM MP AM John Hume MP MEP John Swinney MSP MP MSP Rev Dr Ian Paisley MLA MP MEP How long before we see Gerry Adams here? While the website ought to be updated to include Iain Duncan Smith instead of Hague, clearly, all UK political parties represented in the House of Commons (with the exception of Sinn Fein -- for now) have signed up to this "crusade". How Swinney and Jones square this with their constituencies would be interesting, but, as we know, this autumn the Scottish National Party was due to discuss dropping its longstanding opposition to NATO membership for an independent Scotland. How responsible. Clearly the smell of power is becoming intoxicating. More interesting, however, is the composition of the WFD's board of governors: Chairman: Ernie Ross MP Vice-Chairmen: Gary Streeter MP Archy Kirkwood MP Nik Gowing Governors: Georgina Ashworth Frances D'Souza Nicola Duckworth Timothy Garton Ash Mary Kaldor Gillian Merron MP Richard Spring MP Elizabeth Smith Michael Trend MP Ernie Ross, Labour MP for Dundee West, is an ex-Bennite and born again Blairite whose main claim to fame is having had to resign from the foreign affairs select committee for passing on information to Robin Cook, who, as Foreign Secretary, was being investigated for misleading Parliament over UK involvement in Sierra Leone and the use of mercenaries there (Sandline). Ross has obviously been rewarded for his toadying, although his expertise in "democracy" is anyone's guess. Gary Streeter is a particularly vulgar punk Thatcherite (or at least has been), while Kirkwood is a Liberal Democrat who appears to be fairly ineffectual but is in fact involved in various behind the scenes activities such as this one. Nik Gowing has already appeared in the virtual spotlight. He is also a governor of the Ditchley Foundations (http://www.ditchley.co.uk/listings/index.htm), but A-listers will probably be more familiar with him as a frequent anchor on BBC World, that beacon of impartiality and reputable journalism. No possible conflict of interest between his role at the BBC and his role at the WFD, then. Others can comment on the rest, perhaps especially Mary Kaldor -- what's she doing here? Is Fred Halliday far behind? I daresay ?4m is not a significant contribution to the bill of imperialism, but there is doubtless much under the counter dealing going on, and the involvement of private sector actors (BP and solicitors Mishcon de Reya are acknowledged as supporters of WFD) allows all sorts of book-cooking to go on. Incidentally, Mishcon de Reya was Princess Diana's lawyer, and is the main executor of her estate, which earns it a tidy sum from its proprietorial stance over all and anything to do with her. One recent report estimates that overseeing the Diana Memorial Fund has earned the firm ?1.19m. Interestingly the Sunday Telegraph has been monitoring this, apparently stating that "A conflict of interest of this magnitude would not be allowed in a public company" (see http://www.royalreport.com/newsdiana8.html). The editor of the Sunday Telegraph is Dominic Lawson, son of former Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel, and reputed MI6 agent. The Sunday Telegraph was instrumental in destroying Michael Portillo's efforts to lead the Conservative Party earlier this year. Lawson's wife is the Honourable Rosa Monckton, "Diana's best friend" and sister of Christopher, a confirmed MI6 agent. Time magazine, on 22 January 1996, described Mishcon de Reya as "left-leaning" (!) (see http://www.time.com/time/daily/special/diana/readingroom/9697/12296.html ) and offers as proof of this the fact that the firm had represented Jeffrey Archer. Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From lnp3 at panix.com Mon Nov 19 06:12:15 2001 From: lnp3 at panix.com (Louis Proyect) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 08:12:15 -0500 Subject: [A-List] British imperialism In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.20011119081215.01657a70@popserver.panix.com> > Timothy Garton Ash Ash is a frequent contributor to NY Review of Books, a rightwing social democratic publication. In the latest issue, which is devoted to understanding terrorism, Ash has an article titled, "Is There a Good Terrorist?" at: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14860. The NY Review identifies Timothy Garton Ash as a "Director of the European Studies Centre at St. Antony?s College, Oxford, and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford." Louis Proyect Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 19 07:16:39 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 16:16:39 +0200 Subject: [A-List] New Labour infighting Message-ID: Move to poach aide fuels Blair-Brown rift MICHAEL SETTLE The Herald, 19 November 2001 GORDON Brown's rift with Tony Blair has intensified after the prime minister tried to "head hunt" his key economic aide. The news follows allegations at the weekend that Mr Blair was unhappy with the chancellor's policy of refunding tax to working families. Gus O'Donnell, the treasury's top mandarin, is crucial to the chancellor's strategy on the euro because he oversees the five economic tests; Mr Brown's yardstick on Britain's suitability to join the single currency. However, the europhile Mr Blair, worried his knowledge of economic matters was not up to his neighbour's, attempted to wrest the initiative on the euro timetable from the increasingly eurosceptic Mr Brown by poaching Mr O'Donnell from under the chancellor's nose with the prospect of a ?120,000 a year job in Number 10. He would replace Jeremy Heywood, who was due to leave his job as the prime minister's principal private secretary. Yesterday, although Mr Blair's official spokesman played down a plethora of Blair versus Brown stories as "tittle tattle", claiming journalists were proving they had "imaginations better than JK Rowling's", he conspicuously failed to pour cold water on the row over Mr O'Donnell. When asked about the O'Donnell affair, he simply said: "There was a time when it looked as though Jeremy . . . might be moving on later this year. There were a number of ideas floating around when that was a possibility. Jeremy is currently on paternity leave and is returning to Downing St." Mr Blair ultimately failed to secure Mr O'Donnell's services after Mr Brown supposedly "promised" the aide that he was a frontrunner for one of two top jobs, one of which was the governorship of the Bank of England. However, the relationship is likely to be strained further when this week Mr Blair seeks to advance the cause of Britain's membership of the euro with two keynote speeches in Germany and Birmingham. One report said tensions over the euro between Britain's two leading politicians were so fraught "Gordon has been coming out of meetings with Tony shouting and swearing". Last night, Charles Kennedy, the Lib Dem leader, said the chancellor's determined opposition to Britain joining the euro was worsening his relationship with the prime minister. In a speech tonight to business leaders in Cardiff, Mr Kennedy is expected to say that Mr Brown's "dogged resistance to moving towards UK adoption of the euro has both damaged the economy, particularly the manufacturing sector, and opened up a rift at the heart of government". Yesterday, the chancellor's ambitions were attacked when Frank Field, the former welfare reform minister, suggested Mr Blair could even sack the ambitious chancellor. Mr Field declared: "Gordon Brown ought to be really careful. "When you've been a megastar on the international stage twice, like Tony Blair has, I don't think the prime minister is going to come back to play number two to Gordon Brown for that much longer." Referring to the recent departure from Number 10 of Anji Hunter, one of Mr Blair's key aides, Mr Field told GMTV's Sunday Programme: "If Tony Blair is quite prepared, when those egos don't fit together in Number 10 itself, to say to one of them well you'd better go, he might start thinking the same about Number 11." The comments of the Birkenhead MP followed a raft of reports about a schism between the prime minister and his chancellor and came just hours after Mo Mowlam, the former Northern Ireland secretary, gave a cabinet insider's view of the Blair-Brown relationship, insisting it was "not happy" and was "crippling" government. David Davis, the Tory chairman, said a "personal civil war" was raging in Downing Street. "At a crucial time for Britain, Gordon Brown and Tony Blair's selfish feuding is undermining the government's ability to deliver on its promises. The nation's agenda is schools and hospitals; Labour's agenda is feuding and fighting," he claimed. Another report suggested the chancellor was in "an evil and grumpy mood" and engaged in a series of rows with four Blairite ministers, at least one of whom, David Blunkett, the home secretary, was said to be a serious rival to succeed Mr Blair. One source was quoted as saying: "Gordon is lashing out at the people he sees as his main rivals because he fears he is no longer seen as the man most likely to succeed (Mr Blair)." The latest cause of friction was reported as the chancellor's budget strategy; the prime minister wants more spending on health and education, while his neighbour plans to increase tax credits for working families and pensioners. Last night, Matthew Taylor, the Lib Dems' treasury spokesman, said it was clear there was a "growing distrust between Brown and Blair" and insisted the government's priority should be on public service investment rather than on the chancellor's "further tax complications or fiddles for business". The emergence of the essentially Blairite Jack McConnell as Scottish Labour's leader and his "enthronement" on Thursday as first minister is seen as a direct challenge to Mr Brown's iron grip on Scotland, often referred to as the chancellor's "fiefdom". Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/19-11-19101-0-16-0.html NOTE: Shades of the Westland affair here, with open briefing against one powerful minister by others, all with the covert support of the prime minister. And once again it's Europe preoccupying the British state. Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 19 07:27:33 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 16:27:33 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Norwegian blues Message-ID: Platinum discovery threatens the land of the Lapps Andrew Osborn Monday November 19, 2001 The Guardian A British mining company's discovery of platinum in the Arctic north of Norway, a find potentially worth hundreds of millions of pounds, has angered the indigenous Sami people and raised fears that one of the most remote and unspoilt regions of the world could be dug up for profit. The find has also thrown the spotlight on Norway's treatment of its oldest ethnic minority, about 60,000 of whom eke out a living by fishing and reindeer herding in the harsh terrain inside the Arctic circle. The Cheshire-based exploration company Tertiary Minerals has found "significant quantities" of platinum, which is more valuable than gold, in the Finnmark region of Norway, where it has a licence to prospect. In doing so it has revived a centuries-old dispute over land rights. The Sami, better known as Lapps, have vowed to block further exploration or mining until the ownership of the land, which is also thought to contain reserves of gold and diamonds, is resolved. "The Sami people have not been consulted," the vice-president of the Sami parliament, Ragnhild Nystad, told the Guardian from the remote town of Karasjok. "We have lived in this area for thousands of years... The land is our mother and we don't want to use up all its resources in one generation. We have to leave some for future generations." The issue is highly sensitive since several Norwegian state authorities also lay claim to the land that the Sami say is theirs. Patrick Cheetham, the chairman of Tertiary Minerals, is unfazed by the controversy, arguing that it is too early to say if the discovery will lead to serious mining. "The indigenous people of Norway are always seeking to get more on land rights and there is always a lot of sabre-rattling," he said. "It's understandable. It's an area of great natural value where they have had their traditional land and we're sympathetic to that. We want to work with these people and not against them." The way the Sami people have been treated has at times shrouded Norway's humanist credentials. It wasn't until the 1960s that the authorities allowed Sami to be spoken in schools. There are also claims that Lappish graves were plundered between the 1920s and 1950s by government scientists trying to prove that the Sami were inferior to Norwegians - accusations that are still fresh in the minds of locals. Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,597081,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 19 07:52:41 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 16:52:41 +0200 Subject: [A-List] New economy bull Message-ID: The Long View: >From dealing to reeling By Barry Riley Financial Times, Nov 17, 2001 Optimism is back. Stock markets around the globe have typically rallied by 20 per cent since rock bottom was reached on September 21. Only 9 per cent of global fund managers believe equities will be lower in 12 months' time, according to a Merrill Lynch opinion survey published this week. But the legacy of the late 1990s stock market bubble remains with us. The challenge is, how can we minimise the level of irrationality? Two of the UK's biggest losers from crazy prices reported on Tuesday. Vodafone suffered ?11.45bn of write-downs - but curiously, made no provisions against the sky-high ?13.1bn it paid for third-generation mobile phone licences in 2000. Such payments, argued Sir Christopher Gent, Vodafone's chief executive, were merely what the market demanded at the time. It is interesting to note, too, that Paul Klemperer, the Oxford professor who is an expert in "auction theory" and advised the British government, has defended the disastrous outcome by arguing that the prices reflected the capital market's view of 3G's prospects. The common theme here is it is nobody's fault if crazy prices are paid, because they are legitimised by the stock market. Marconi, which is financially in a much worse state than the mobile phone giant, has written off most of the ?4.1bn paid for US internet hardware companies in 1999. There has also been a great deal of controversy in the US during the past few weeks over the near-collapse of Enron, the power group being rescued by a takeover bid from its smaller rival Dynegy. There was an obvious failure by investors - and by stock market analysts - to assess the true risks at Enron. Smart businessmen will sell at mad prices, but why on earth should they buy? The trouble is, too many academics have developed theories of value based on rational expectations. The real world is unfortunately very different. Some of the distortions had obvious technical origins. The Vodafone bubble of 1999 reflected the cross-border takeover of Mannesmann and the artificial weighting shortages that developed from that transaction as Vodafone ballooned in market capitalisation to reach, at one stage, 16 per cent of the FTSE 100 Index. The market price was driven not by normal corporate fundamentals but by the desire of most fund managers to reach a market weighting, at which point they were "safe" in terms of risk against the index benchmark. That was the period when investment banks exploited the idea of low free float new issues: internet companies, especially, were floated off with only 15 per cent of the stock made available, although anything up to 100 per cent went into the indices, creating serious shortages and bubble valuations. Changes now being made to the main stock market indices have reduced the problem, but there remains a basic irrationality in the concept that investment risk resides in an index rather than in the underlying stocks. Takeovers have always been plagued by irrationality, and indeed this is an area where academics recognise the problem; over many years they have pointed out that all the benefits of deals, and often more than all, accrue to the shareholders of the companies taken over, while investors in the bidding companies suffer dilution. Investors know this, and in normal market conditions news of a takeover will depress the bidder's share price. But in a bubble market these prudent attitudes can be overwhelmed by euphoria, as well as technical factors relating to demand by fund managers so that they can maintain their weightings when a bidder is spraying around large quantities of new equity. Also, it is irrational that many more deals are done when the stock market is high than when it is low. Two years ago, companies like Marconi were engaged in a buying spree at daft prices. Now, when prices are much lower, hardly any acquisitions are being made (and investment banks are laying off thousands of employees). An exception to the deal famine is gold mining, which just happens to have been one of the stock market's strongest sectors this year. Another important source of irrationality has been the domination of stock market analysis by the stockbroking offshoots of the investment banks. Over recent years their earnings per share forecasts for the next calendar year have been on average 8 per cent too high. This has not just been a mistake: they have been paid to be overoptimistic. Admittedly, attempts are being made to restructure the incentives here, as the embarrassed investment banks come under pressure from the regulators and the courts for their errors of judgment during the bull market, but it remains to be seen whether much will really change. The mystery is why anybody would take notice of these forecasts and indeed many professional investors do not: that Merrill survey, incidentally, shows that fund managers on average expect no more than 4 per cent earnings per share growth over the next year, while the stockbrokers' analysts are still clinging to the hope that it will be 15 per cent. A final source of distortion is the tendency of companies to offer their executives the wrong sort of incentives. The ruin of Marconi may appear irrational, when multi-billion-pound acquisitions are being declared worthless after only two years. But executives with lucrative stock option plans, which pay off if their gambles go right, combined with golden goodbye and pension packages that are triggered if things go wrong, may well consider it perfectly rational, from their viewpoint, to take much bigger risks than other shareholders, or employees, would consider acceptable. Moreover, Sir Christopher Gent, shareholders of Vodafone will remember, received a controversial ?10m personal bonus last year for clinching the Mannesmann takeover, a deal that requires ?10bn of write-offs. In normal market conditions the valuation of equities may be tolerably rational, but in a bubble market the rules are thrown out of the window. Many investors certainly like the idea of getting rich quickly. That is why many people subscribe so keenly to national lotteries in which the chance of winning is so small as to be not worth rational consideration. Full article at: http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT3XOLB54UC &live=true&useoverridetemplate=IXL8L4VRRBC&tagid=Variables.tagid Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 19 06:59:48 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 15:59:48 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Turf wars and US forces Message-ID: CIA 'spooks' fight a secret war on al Qaeda IAN BRUCE The Herald, 19 November 2001 AMERICA'S Central Intelligence Agency has been waging a private war inside Afghanistan since late September using paramilitary agents and unmanned, missile-armed Predator robot drones to hunt down senior members of the al Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban. Up to 150 members of the CIA's Special Activities Division, a shadowy group used for covert foreign action, have been operating behind enemy lines to establish links with anti-Taliban tribal leaders and to persuade or bribe them into supplying intelligence on the location of individuals marked for assassination. Working in groups of up to six agents, at least one of whom is fluent in Pashto or Dari, the main local languages, the CIA "spooks" are also credited with providing accurate information for hundreds of bombing strikes on Taliban command and communications centres, arms dumps, and supply convoys, which have helped break the battlefield stalemate. Agents who worked with the Afghan mujahideen through the 1980s to channel Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and other lethal hardware to insurgents fighting the Soviet army have been called out of retirement to support the new operation, using old contacts among the Northern Alliance opposition. Pentagon sources admit grudgingly that the CIA paramilitaries were on the ground before US special forces and paved the way for their insertion into the Taliban's backyard. The division has also made US military history by employing for the first time in combat unmanned Predators fitted with high-resolution cameras and Hellfire guided missiles to carry out attacks on high-value targets, and stage rapid-response covering-fire missions to protect key "indigenous assets", the anti-Taliban leaders infiltrated from Pakistan to stir up revolt among their own tribesmen. The drones, a key future weapon system, have been used in action to date only by Israel. They have now launched at least 40 missiles in Afghanistan, reportedly inflicting serious losses among senior Taliban and al Qaeda commanders. Mohammed Atef, Osama bin Laden's heir apparent, killed at the weekend, may have been a victim of a Predator strike. But the free-wheeling activities of "the Company", as the CIA is known, have upset the US air force, who complain bitterly that agents are working to their own agenda. The air force is already unhappy about the process of target selection and interference by the Pentagon's civilian masters in the defence department and the judge advocate general's office, the legal advisory body responsible for keeping military action within the parameters of US and international law. Senior officers claim the judg advocate's office is over-zealous in trying to avoid "collateral damage", civilian casualties which make for bad public relations and might alienate Muslim countries in the region. At least 10 senior targets have escaped in the last four weeks because strikes were rated as "too risky". The air force is equally unimpressed with the tortuous chain of command running the war in Afghanistan. This extends from a bunker on the outskirts of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where target "sets" are assembled from satellite, spy plane and special forces intelligence, via US Central Command headquarters in Tampa, Florida, to the war room of the Pentagon in Washington and, occasionally, to the White House. Plans and individual bombing missions can be scrapped at any stage after Riyadh presents the options available. One air force source said: "When we have real-time intelligence on the whereabouts of key figures, we have to go up the chain of command for clearance to take them out. The CIA recruits its special activities division personnel from the ranks of former military pilots and experienced former special forces troopers from Delta Force and the US Navy's Seal teams and US Marines elite long-range reconnaissance units. In the field, they operate in civilian clothes or dress in local garb. They have no military status and no diplomatic protection if caught behind enemy lines. Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/19-11-19101-0-20-12.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Mon Nov 19 06:29:12 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 13:29:12 +0000 Subject: [A-List] FT: Opec at bay Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011119132832.02c66dc0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> By David Buchan and Andrew Jack Published: November 18 2001 19:34 | Last Updated: November 19 2001 02:24 Chakib Khelil, Algeria's oil minster and Opec's current president, declared last week that "if Opec had not existed on September 11, it would have had to be invented". His line of reasoning was that the cartel's pledges to meet any oil shortages in the immediate aftermath of the attacks had calmed the markets, brought the Brent price down from a spike of $31 a barrel "and saved the world a lot of money". The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries - against its will this time - looks about to save the world a lot more money. It has said it will take no further action to stop the oil price falling unless non-Opec producers, particularly Russia, make big cuts in output. So if the oil price, which hit a 2?-year low of $17.45 last week, continues to slide, oil users cannot help but benefit. This is hardly Opec's first scrap over price or market share. But previous disputes were mainly internal. In 1982-85, in the days when Opec rigged the market by fixing "posted" prices, many members responded to weak demand by giving secret discounts. Saudi Arabia did not and, exasperated at the loss of sales, flooded the market. That brought the rest of Opec to heel and led to the current system of individual output quotas. In 1995-97, Venezuela was the culprit, busting its quota until Saudi pressure and a new government in Caracas prevailed. "Everyone should heed the lessons of the past, that going after market share just creates losses," warned Ali Naimi, the Saudi oil minister, last week. He had Moscow in mind. Russian output is rising faster than any other non-Opec country, by 500,000 b/d this year. Its response to Opec's appeals for co-operative production cuts to match the collapse in demand has been to offer to trim 30,000 from the 7m barrels it pumps daily - a "minuscule" amount, complains Mr Naimi. It is also less than the conditional pledges made by smaller non-Opec producers, Mexico and Oman, to trim their production by, respectively, 75,000-100,000 b/d and 40,000-50,000 b/d. Opec is united, for the moment, in its move against Russia. But it will find the Russians hard to crack. "No one can make any demands of us," Mikhail Kasyanov, Russia's prime minister, said on Friday. Russia faces a difficult dilemma. As the world's second largest exporter, it has had a free ride on the back of Opec reductions. But if Opec precipitates a price war, Russia's fast-growing economy will suffer. Oil means less to Russia than it does to Opec states (see chart), but it still accounts for 25 per cent of export earnings. A further 25 per cent comes from gas, the price of which is indexed to oil. Oil taxes also provide 15-20 per cent of government revenue. If oil prices drop below $18 a barrel, Russian politicians warn they will need to restructure the 2002 budget, cut spending and possibly reschedule debts. Doing Opec's bidding and curbing exports could jeopardise Russia's desire to build on President Vladimir Putin's summit last week with President George W. Bush and to be seen as a stable source of oil to a west uncertain about the Middle East. Yet there is no sign that Washington is urging Russia to weaken Opec. The only help Opec received last week was from Mr Bush, who announced plans to start topping up the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve with government "royalty" oil. This would "effectively increase demand by 100,000 b/d", said Mr Naimi. This plan was already US administration policy and its announcement last week was coincidental. The US, like other industrialised countries, is taking a relaxed, ringside view of the Opec-Russia wrangle. So Russia is on its own against Opec. Moscow can control exports through its system of quotas but its influence is reduced now that the industry is in the hands of influential private businessmen not necessarily willing to obey the government. Russia's oil companies face technical problems in halting production in wells that freeze over and often have to be redrilled. But they also are divided on the desirability of cuts. Some such as Lukoil, the country's largest, favour cuts because their domestic output is flat and they have invested in neighbouring states such as Kazakhstan which are not being asked by Opec to cut production. Others such as Yukos, the second biggest producer, and Sibneft turn a deaf ear to Opec because their production is rising fast. "At $15 a barrel, Russian companies would start to cut capital expenditure and at $10-$13 they would get worried about making money," says Stephen O'Sullivan of United Financial Group in Moscow. So how low could prices go? Opec has not launched a price war in the sense of increasing or discounting its oil sales. But its decision to do nothing, when the market is over-supplied to the tune of 2m b/d, invites a price-slide. Yet the political uncertainties that led Opec to abdicate its usual price-rigging role also provide a floor under the market. Who knows, after all, what may follow the Afghanistan war? This is not a situation, says Robert Priddle, director of the Paris-based International Energy Agency, "in which one would expect the price to collapse". There is an element of bluff in last week's statement by Kuwait's oil minister that the oil price could return to the $10 level it hit in 1998. Still, keeping output steady will prove costly to Opec. Leo Drollas, of the London-based Centre for Global Energy Studies, calculates that, in the absence of any cut, the average price for Opec crudes will fall to under $17 in the first half of next year, and export revenues for the 11 Opec countries will drop from $170bn this year to $121bn in 2002. As the biggest producer, Saudi Arabia stands to lose $16bn in export revenue next year. Only Iran, a prime mover in the confrontation with Russia, has taken insurance against coming hardship. Bijan Zanganeh, its oil minister, said last week Iran had put $10bn of recent receipts in a special oil stabilisation fund. Some analysts believe there is method in Opec's apparent madness. Paul Horsnell of JP Morgan Chase points out that "marginal production comes off stream far faster than it comes back, capital budgets are slashed far quicker than they are re-instated", slowing the growth of future production outside Opec. These "asymmetries" work against nonOpec companies, which have generally higher production costs than Opec producers. Other analysts say these asymmetries would operate only at a price far lower than anyone contemplates. So it is unlikely that Opec can generally disrupt non-Opec production. Yet it is clear that the cartel was helped in its smooth management of the market from Spring 1999 to September 2001 by the way the 1998 price slump caused international energy companies to cut investment. As a result, non-Opec production is only now beginning to surge ahead. But surging it is. Opec ministers were last week advised they could expect non-Opec production to rise 500,000 b/d this year and 1m b/d next year, when they themselves had taken more than 2.5m b/d of their own oil off the market. Small wonder, then, they all chorused about the "unfairness" of non-Opec countries not sharing the burden of market regulation. Opec's basic problem is no one wants to join it any more. Nigeria was the last entrant, in 1971. The cartel has since lost two members, Ecuador in 1993 and Gabon in 1996, when they stopped exporting significant amounts of oil. Many members carry their obligations lightly and cheat on quotas. But membership is a handicap, particularly to countries trying to woo western investors. Eventually, Opec will regain its leverage, because its members hold two-thirds of world oil reserves. But that could be 10-15 years away. In the meantime, Opec may have to compromise. It might do well to settle for any production cut it can squeeze out of Russia and to count the US diversion of oil into the SPR as part of a non-Opec cut in supply of less than 500,000 cut b/d. Opec could then justify to itself a cut in its own output of 1m b/d. The alternative could be a long stand-off between Opec and Russia. According to Mr Naimi, it "behoves all oil producers to co-operate for a period - it could be six months, a year, 18 months - until normal growth resumes". If they do not co-operate, the oil price will suffer. So will Opec and Russia, although the oil-importing world will not weep. www.ft.com/opec From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Mon Nov 19 08:17:01 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 15:17:01 +0000 Subject: [A-List] FT Editorial comment: The beef at the barbecue Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011119151640.02c6ad98@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Published: November 18 2001 18:59 | Last Updated: November 18 2001 20:46 Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush want to be the best of friends. Of that there can be little doubt after their summit meetings and neighbourly barbecue in Texas last week. But putting solid substance into the cheery style is a tougher proposition. Some original thinking is needed in America, Russia and in western Europe. Closer links call into question a lot of assumptions, especially about the Nato alliance and European security. Mr Bush had been talking about the need for better relations with Moscow for many months. He is seeking ways to overcome Russia's opposition to his plans for missile defence. Mr Putin wants to preserve the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, the last vestige of Moscow's superpower status, which forbids the testing of missile defence. But he also wants to be a welcome guest in Washington. September 11 has greatly accelerated the trend towards accommodation. It confirmed the Russian leader in his turn to the west. His support for the campaign against terrorism has contributed to the swift demise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Apart from warm words, Washington's main response so far has been to delay the planned testing of missile defence, which would have meant unilaterally abrogating the ABM treaty. That was an important gesture but the two sides have yet to find a mutually acceptable way of either amending the treaty to allow testing, or agreeing to scrap it. Mr Putin is not going to be an easy pushover. His military advisers remain suspicious of Washington and its allies. But he has cast his die for the west. It is up to Mr Bush to respond. Going slow on missile defence is part of it. Another way is to bind Moscow more closely to Nato. A third is to accelerate the membership process for Russia in the world economic system - and the World Trade Organisation in particular. The ideas circulated last week by Tony Blair represent a good start. The prime minister would bolster Russia's participation in the political side of Nato, without opening up its military part. A joint Russia-North Atlantic council would consider issues such as Balkan peacekeeping, co-operation in the fight against terrorism and curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as collaboration in defence modernisation. That is certainly in the right direction. But efforts so far to get Russia more closely involved in Nato's political debates have made little progress. Old and new members of the alliance are suspicious of dismantling the old order. In the end, a new European security treaty may be needed. On WTO membership, the problem lies primarily in Russia. Economic reform has not gone far enough to make Russian industry competitive. Nor is the judicial system reliable or transparent. Imposing WTO rules swiftly could cause havoc in the Russian economy. Tackling these questions will require close three-way collaboration between the US, Russia and the rest of Europe. Mr Bush must counter the suspicion that he wants his European allies to embrace Russia more closely - and pay for it - to enable him to go ahead with missile defence at home. He must invite his partners to the barbecue, too. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Mon Nov 19 09:09:48 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 16:09:48 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: Re: Michigan State University Model United Nations (fwd) Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011119160905.02c00500@pop.tiscali.co.uk> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANDRE GUNDER FRANK Department of History Home University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 Fax: 1-402-472 8839 E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2001 13:46:06 -0500 (EST) From: Andre Gunder Frank To: H-NET List for World History Cc: franka at fiu.edu Subject: Re: Michigan State University Model United Nations and the Current Crisis and World History discussion: They must be kidding us, or they are clinically MAD = which means totally out of touch with reality. There is NO UN any more , Model or otherwise - the Gulf War violated 7 different articles of the UN Charter - in re Bosnia, the UN abdicated its responsibility to keep the peace and transferred it to NATO, a MILITARY alliance! - in re Kosovo, the entire UN system was circumvented - and thereby emasculated and in effect destroyed - by NATO and its member states, which [not] incidentally also violated the first three requirements of the FIRST paragraph of NATO's OWN charter; moreover the democratic process was also violated - and if once, why not again in the future, - in that NO single parliament was even consulted about launching and waging that AGRESSIVE war against a UN member state [well, not quite member since that also was in dispute] [In Canada, Prime Minister Chretien said publicly that we cannot afford to submit the NATO war proposal to the Canadian parliament, because there would be some opposition in the parliament and that showing this to the world would play into the hands of Milosevic. In plain english: We MUST abrogate democracy at home to wage war abroad. Later his Minister of ""Defense" stated publicly that Canada reserves the right to so intervene militarily again, NO MATTER what international law --thus including the UN to which Canada is signatory -- may be!!]. Also [not] incidentally, the CONSTITUTIONS and LAWS of many member states were also violated,not the least among them that of the US and of Germany, in the US its own law is violated by violating international treaty obliagations, inlcuding being signatory to the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions etc etc, which become part of US domestic law through ratification by the US Senate]. - in re Afghanistan, the whole kit and kaboodle is dumped into the trash basket of history. - progressively in all of the above, centuries of WORLD HISTORICAL creation, development and use of INTERNATIONAL LAW and of CIVILIZATION [another of our discussion strings!- that is now history, as the saying goes- all history may not be ''bunk'' contrary to Henry Ford, but THIS history of CIVILIZATION has certainly been made ''bunk''] by being abrogated and destroyed by not even by the proverbial stroke of a pen but by the launch of a bomb. How cynical was the Vietnam era of ''we have to destroy it to save it." How MUCH MORE CYNICAL is the ACTION of WE HAVE TO SAVE CIVILIZATION BY DESTROYING IT, including especially its perhaps MOST IMPORTANT achievement, which is the creation of INTERNATIONAL institutions - the UN!- for the prevention of international war!! [Not] incidentally, a [US & UK created] Nuremberg Trials contribution to the canon of international law was the ome that says '' the WORST crime against humanity is that of making war,'' and another of which was that ''those who wage war [eg. Herman Goering in the dock there] are to be held PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE for the war they make''. Cynicism to the cynicism power is the in the case of Kosovo in fact and in the case of Afghanistan proposal is -after emasculating the UN - to use the UN flag [thats about all that remains] as a fig leaf for the ''legitimation'' of the military occupation and government by the very powers that already emasculated the powers of the UN !! At its present session in New York, the UN and its Secretary General Kofi Annan welcomed the very heads of government whose states are today violating and emasculating the very UN itself. QED: A ''model UN''? they must be kidding - or MAD. P.S. A REVEALING MAJOR TRAVESTY, SACRILEGE, AND EMASCULATION is the award of the Nobel Prize for "Peace" to Kofi Annan and the UN - in the good tradition of awarding it among others of the same ilk to Menachim Begin [terrorist], Henry Kissinger [war criminal as documented by Christopher Hitchins in HARPERS] [there is a gunder frank two screen item under the above title on the this Annan/UN "' peacve'' award] there is also a longish QUI BONO? item by gunder frank that documents who really benefits from this war against Afghanistan. Patricia and I have tried several times but for technical reasons we dont understand have failed to post it h-world. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANDRE GUNDER FRANK Department of History Home University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 Fax: 1-402-472 8839 E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Mon Nov 19 08:52:00 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 15:52:00 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Stand-off between Opec and Russia? Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011119123120.02c00500@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Events of world-historical importance are unfolding in the Middle East and Central and South Asia, but this is only the epicentre of a crisis shaping up with dramatic speed and power. At stake is the global architecture of world capitalism in this century and the fate of US hegemony. The Afghan war, which many rightly identify as a battle fought in a larger war for resources and power in Central Asia, has triggered a cascade of change elsewhere including the restructuring of the terms of US hegemony and its relations with Russia in particular. As this global reordering evolves, huge changes in will be triggered in US relations with Europe, Japan and China. If the emerging US-Russian strategy succeeds, then the balkanisation of the Middle East can only accelerate. The West will reassert its control over the social and political destiny of the Islamic world. Other potential rivals may fare no better; China, in particular, will face a grim future. A geopolitical realignment which leaves China effectively encircled by Russo-American power, means that the 21st century will not, after all, be one of Asian renewal, as many had speculated. Right now the Russians are making their play but how serious is current Russian talk about replacing Opec as the west's principal energy supplier? You have to have spent time with Russian oilmen, the so-called 'generali', in order to understand how seemingly normal people can be blinded by avarice. These 'oil generals' sold out the Soviet Union in the name of greed and personal ambition. Men like Viktor Chernomyrdin, the former Prime Minister and currently Ambassador to Ukraine, and Rem Vyakhirev, his successor as Chairman of the Gazprom Board, or Vagit Alekperov the Chairman of the giant LUKoil petroleum company, helped wreck the great Siberian oil reservoirs and ruined the Siberian and Arctic ecology to boot. After the Soviet collapse they continued for example to sponsor crazed plans for pumping so much gas from the Yamal peninsula that even by Gazprom's own calculations the entire peninsula will sink beneath the Barents Sea. Latterly, they have even begun to celebrate the 'positive benefits' of global warming, which by melting off the ice cap has opened a new polar route for tankering out the oil extracted from beneath the Arctic ice shelf. The 'oil generals' are now plotting how to excavate methane hydrates from the seabed, a procedure known to involve the risk of runaway global warming which will turn the earth's atmosphere into that of Venus. For the Russian 'oil generals', the idea that Russia can replace Opec as the main western oil supplier, unlikely though it may seem to the rest of us, is just small potatoes. For their backers, oligarchs like Mikhail Khordokovsky (Putin's favourite 'oilman', who rose to prominence by plundering state assets in the Yeltsin years), this scenario offers new ways to win acceptance. As Gunder Frank has been pointing out, Russian oil has risen again to around 7m/bbls and is second only to Saudi oil. BUT this does not alter the fact that Russian oil is well past its peak; in Hubbert Curve terms it is in irreversible decline, and this is notwithstanding the alleged Caspian oil bonanza. At its 1987 peak the USSR produced ~13m/bbls a day. As with North Sea oil, the Hubbert Curve contains within it a succession of minor peaks and troughs; N Sea oil also 'peaked' twice before entering its present and seemingly terminal decline. The same with Russian and ex-Soviet oil; even with the most optimistic expectations of Caspian output that are publicly available, total ex-SU production will never again exceed the 1987 level. Therefore this is a declining reserve, and we should bear in mind the implication: because the Russians are trying to elbow Opec aside even though Opec production is still a decade or more away from peaking. A huge power-politics is in play and this is the real score of the Putin-Bush love-fest. The bottom line is this: world oil production is peaking, and the relative significance of Opec is therefore on the up once more. The US and its allies are determined to break Opec power. To give Opec a stranglehold on world oil is to breathe new life into the corpse of pan-Arab nationalism, and ultimately to empower the disfranchised Arab masses. This has to be avoided at all costs; it strikes at the keystone in the arch of US imperialism. Revolution in the Middle East would release the genie from the bottle in many other places. This danger must be avoided at any price. But it is indicative of the profound impasse now faced by US hegemony, and the terrible dangers now faced by the whole imperialist system, that the necessary political reconstruction now ongoing in the mid-East must *in any case* be accompanied by a huge transfer of net resources from the West to the oil-producing states. Even if the price is to prolong the recession in the West, oil prices cannot be allowed to slip below $25-28/bbl because a price collapse immediately endangers the political security of client states like Saudi Arabia. Social stability in many Gulf states is already jeopardized. Political unrest is inevitable if oil revenues cannot be sustained. Therefore, US imperialism is caught between a rock and a hard place. It cannot escape its gross over-dependence on imported oil; imperialism has not been able to outgrow the petroleum economy. Imperialism therefore cannot escape the long term consequences of the *decline of world oil*, and it is this accelerating decline which makes the mid-East so important. The decline of oil production in the North Sea, Alaska, Texas, Mexico, Nigeria and also in Russia, makes Saudi and Iraqi oil uniquely significant. After the 1973 oil shock which first brought Opec to prominence, new oil from Mexico, the N Sea and elsewhere later pushed Opec back into the background. But all those reserves are now in sharp decline and this has produced the need for new non-Opec sources. Putin has made his choice, and has pushed Russia into the camp of the West and against what might seem to be Russia's natural allies, the other oil giants which are mostly in Opec. This cynical ploy is covered by a heap of fig-leaves: 'civilisation v. barbarism', the 'war on terrorism' and the mystical values of Russian Orthodoxy. Why has Russia jumped this way? Russia, like any Opec producer, depends on a high oil price. Bulk Urals and Siberian crude (like Caspian crude!) cannot be profitably sold on the world for less than $15/bbl; and the Russian economy faces a repeat of earlier collapses (the most recent in 1998) if the oil price is below $22-25/bbl. Russia and Saudi Arabia are therefore *not* competing on price, even though that is how the press is mostly reporting the issue, ie as a price war between Russia and Opec. In fact, there is a competition, but it is for investment capital, not about price. What Russia wants above all is *investment*. For that to happen, prices must be high. Putin is not selling cheap energy to the hungry markets of 21st century capitalism. What he's selling is energy security. Houston oil banker Matt Simmons has talked of the need for a 'Marshall Plan' for world energy, if what Simmons calls a 'perfect energy storm' is to be avoided. Simmons speaks of the need to invest upwards of a trillion dollars in securing energy supplies, above all, oil and gas but also nuclear (Simmons does not have much faith in renewables, like most who make a study of energy economics). Simmons has noted the need to spend upwards of $500bn on uprating Saudi oilfields and infrastructure alone. You could spend the same in Iraq and not have much change left. But you could also spend this money in Russia, and in Russian-dominated Central Asia, and the pool of available capital is limited. Putin's emerging vision of the 21st century world order is of a Russian-US condominium. This prospect is especially sweet for those in the Russian ruling elite, including Putin himself, who hanker for past glories and who have grown to resent constant disparagement by the West. Russian political and business leaders do not like to be reminded of their own past or of their state's economic weakness and abysmal human rights record. Russians have been made to feel like second-class citizens and they resent it. This is a powerful motivational factor behind the current drive by the Kremlin for respectability, a place at the high table, and above all for recognition of Russia's rebirth as a superpower and a pillar of the safety and stability of the world capitalist system. This hunger for membership of the club is what drove Yeltsin in his day to seek membership of the G-7 and for the oligarchs to parade at Davos arm in arm with western counterparts. This continuing sense of Russian exceptionalism, of a special destiny, makes it easy for Putin to make extravagant gestures such as abandoning Russian espionage facilities in Cuba or the fabled Cam Ranh base in Vietnam, whose special significance in Russian eyes was that this facility was earlier abandoned by the US army which built it. This was the highwater mark in the Soviet struggle against the West. But it is not a sense of Russian weakness or of dependence on American goodwill which makes Russia give up these assets today. On the contrary, it is because Putin senses growing American weakness that he can afford these gestures. Putin is prepared to let US forces base themselves in once-sacrosanct Central Asia, because he has convinced himself that underlying American weakness now makes Russia indispensable to the West: 21st century capitalism cannot survive without full-hearted Russian support and involvement. Who, in the circumstances, is to say this calculation is mistaken? Putin's vision is both simple and clear: future western prosperity is anchored on Russia. There must be a strong Russian state, a vibrant Russian capitalist economy, and a flourishing and well-capitalised Russian resource and energy sector. This new Russia must take its place at the top table along with the other great capitalist powers in Europe, America and Japan. Russia must be a fully-authenticated member of the club, and the Russian people must not fare less well, on average, than those of other developed capitalist states. Russia is not and can never be merely a 'raw materials appendage' of the west. It cannot be a Mexico or a Brasil. It cannot be a third-ranking power. Putin's vision, informed by hisKGB training in Marxism-Leninism, is not much different from the traditional Soviet interpretation of history. The trappings of obsolete ideology have been stripped away, and everything else in this primitive intellectual universe has been 'normalised', above all the social position of the nomenclatura and its legal right to own property. But the great power chauvinism of the true 'Sovok' remains intact. Unlike many western commentators Putin does not see the Russian state as just another branch of Russian robber-capitalism (the branch that takes care of protection). For him, as for any apparatchik trained in Brezhnev's Soviet Union, the state is a special domain unrelated to and above all others. The state is the determining last instance of Russian society, the guarantor of social and property rights and the inheritor of the special mission of the Russian people in history. What Putin now offers is a new social compact between the state, the elites and the masses, one they will all find hard to resist. It includes restoration of great power status and Russia's place as dominant Eurasian power, a social amnesty to the criminal/comprador class of gangster-capitalists who gained power and wealth under Yeltsin; dignity, social peace and improved living standards to the masses, and above all the chance to draw a line under the past. The Soviet era now takes its place as a distinctive, but nonetheless intelligible and even pointful, episode within a broader Russian history: the Soviet state was the rational continuer of a long tradition of reformist strong states which succeeded both in defending the country against aggression and in modernising its institutions and productive assets. The new Russia is the legitimate and rational inheritor of this Soviet legacy and there is no logical or emotional contradiction between Soviet socialism (appropriate in its day) and modern Russian capitalism, which can now be seen as a higher and more progressive historical stage (a notion intuitively appealing to any Sovok). Russia can now join Nato. As the guarantor of stability not only in Central Asia but also in the Arabian Peninsula, Russia will obviously be a dominant member of Nato, second only to the US. Russian industry, especially the extractive and above all the oil and gas industries, can now expect a biblical torrent of investment capital from Europe and America. The rebirth of Russian industry and the vertical ascent of the Russian state to renewed global power and reach ought to set in concrete the 21st century capitalist order. What combination of other powers could possibly resist this American-European-Russian monolith? What possible chance do the broken states of the Middle East have of competing? This grand plan for global reaction will surely snuff out any possibility of social progress, democratic renewal or mass liberation, throughout North Africa and the Middle East. It will guarantee forever the availability of Iraqi and Gulf crude, on Americo-Russian terms. Above all, this grand plan, if it happens, will also ensure that Europe never again challenges US global hegemony, which in a compliant Russia has perhaps found its ultimate guarantor. However, this grand plan for global capitalist renewal is born of adversity, not of opportunity. It is the product of a great and growing world energy crisis. It has arrived together with synchronised recession and the possibility of economic slump. This energy crisis already destroyed the Soviet economy, which collapsed in the early 1990s when Soviet oil production peaked and fell by nearly half in the space of five years, at the end of the 1980s. Since the crisis of 1998, which was followed the devaluation of the rouble, and by higher oil prices in the world market, there has been a partial revival of the Russian economy, with billions of dollars of investment in the oil sector. Nevertheless, oil production in the ex-USSR remains far below its peak. In fact Russian oil is available on the world market today only because of the collapse of industry throughout the Soviet bloc in the 1990s. Russian oil is in longterm decline, and it is not cheap to produce. In short, Russia cannot replace Opec. Gulf oil in huge and reliable volumes remains essential to any future global economic recovery. Moreover Putin's policy contains the seeds of its own downfall. Stabilising the world economy may not make more capital flow into the Russian oil patch. Capital follows profit, not sentiment. If Putin's grand plan succeeds, then the majority of future investment will still flow into the Middle East, above all to Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and not into Russia's decayed and declining oil sector. Central Asia and the Caspian are also too uneconomic and too small in reserves to ever replace Gulf crude. Therefore, the underlying logic of decline and crisis remains in place. Putin's plan is not destined to save capitalism. All it can do is to buy time: in other words, it is an attempt to *manage decline* during the next decade, while hoping that something else turns up meantime. It is not a basis for relaunching world capitalism into a new great upwave of accumulation. Inevitably, therefore, the most pronounced aspects of any new Russo-American realignment will not be any inherent capacity for renewed growth and progress, but on the contrary will be intensified repression, obscurantism and black reaction. It is a recipe for the further militarisation of imperialism, for the shrinking of civil society, for creating societies of total surveillance and lockdown, for intensified racism and social intolerance. This is the era of Exterminism, the highest stage of imperialism. It is also the age of Panopticon. Here too, Afghanistan is a foretaste of the future. Mark Jones From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Mon Nov 19 09:14:38 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 16:14:38 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: US Policy in Central Asia (fwd) Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011119161348.02d0f830@pop.tiscali.co.uk> ANDRE GUNDER FRANK 1601 SW 83rd Avenue, Miami, FL. 33155 USA Tel: 1-305-266 0311 Fax: 1-305 266 0799 E-Mail : franka at fiu.edu Web/Home Page: http://csf.colorado.edu/archive/agfrank -------------------------------------------------------- THE 'GREAT GAME' FOR CASPIAN SEA OIL by Andre Gunder Frank A book OIL AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE CASPIAN SEA REGION [edited by Michael P. Croissant and Bulent Aras, Westport, Conn. & London: Praeger 1999] with a foreword by Pat Clawson of the National Defense University and editor of ORBIS, and dedicated to Ronald Reagan and Turgut Ozal, announces its far-right wing political pedigree and U.S establishment legitimation literally up front. Clawson already explicitly, indeed brutally, lays out the groundwork in his two page foreword: The Caspian Sea region is a world-class oil area with complex econo- and geo-strategic conflicts of interest and corresponding competing policies among surrounding states and the West, particularly the United States. The issues are not only the oil per se, including its low price at the time of publication, but also the related conflicts of interest over pipeline routes and the U.S. intent to deny them to Russia and Iran. The rule of law, democracy and human rights come in at the tail end. In his chapter on the United States, Stephen Blank has done enough of his homework to bring along multiple strategic [in more senses than one] quotations from the horse's mouth in Washington and at NATO headquarters. The background of it all is of course the ongoing American competition with Russia, now also with the regions under review, among which "the Transcaspian has become perhaps the most important area of direct Western-Russian contention today" [p.250 in the book]. Therefore, the author argues, that the new geo-economic competition cannot be separated out from the old but still ongoing geo-political one. That is, the nineteenth century "Great Game" competition for the control of Central Eurasia is still alive and kicking also in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Blank writes that "Washington is now becoming the arbiter or leader of virtually every interstate and international issue in the area" [254] and indeed also "the main center of international adjudication and influence for local issues" [255]. However in the face of the Russian bear, old style gun-boat diplomacy is too dangerous and is now replaced by its "functional equivalent ... peace operations" [256]. Washington is pursuing these with intense "actual policy making on a daily basis throughout the executive branch" [253] in Washington and by a myriad of "Partnership for Peace" programs of which the Strategic Research Development Report 5-96 of the [U.S] Center for Naval Warfare Studies reports on activities of these forces that provide dominant battlespace knowledge necessary to shape regional security environments. Multinational excersizes, port visits, staff-to-staff coordination - all designed to increase force inter- operability and access to regional military facilities - along with intelligence and surveillance operations.... [So] forward deployed forces are backed up by those which can surge for rapid reenforcement and can be in place in seven to thirty days [256-257] -- all as a 'partnership for peace" in - we may understand - Orwellian double-speak. Indeed, U.S. local diplomats and the Clinton administration now regard the Transcapian as a 'backup' for Middle East oil supplies and some insist that the U.S. "take the lead in pacifying the entire area" including by the possible overthrow of inconveniently not sufficiently cooperative governments [258]. The policy and praxis of common military exercises also includes distant Kazakstan. All this and more "reflects a major shift in U.S. policy toward Cental Asia ... coordinated by the National Security Council," as the author quotes from the hawkish U.S. JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION MONITOR. The Security Council's former head and then already super anti-Soviet Russian hawk, Zbigniew Brzezinsky, now promotes a modernized Mackinder heartland vision of a grand U.S. led anti-Russian coalition of Europe,Turkey, Iran, and China as well as Central Asia [253]. This is where the NATO connection comes in. Former U.S. Secretaries of State and of Defense Christopher and Perry stated in 1997 that "the danger to security ... is not primarily potential aggression to their collective [NATO] territory, but threats to their collective interests beyond their territory....To deal with such threats alliance members need to have a way to rapidly form military coalitions that can accomplish goals beyond NATO territory" [252]. Note that this was two years before "humanitarian" NATO aid to 'out of area' Kosovo. Also, U.S. Central Asia experts met at NATO headquarters and discussed extensive U.S. interests in Caspian basin energy deposits. Not to be outdone, Javier Solana, the former Defense Minister in the 'Socialist' Party government of Spain, become Secretary-General of NATO also during its war against Jugoslavia, and now promoted to czar of European Union [EU] foreign policy, pronounced himself at a Washington conference on NATO enlargement to say that Europe cannot be fully secure without bringing the Caucasus into its security zone [250]. U.S. Ambassador Nathan Nimitz agrees: "PAX NATO is the only logical regime to maintain security in the traditional sense... [and] must recognize a need for expansion of its stabilizing influence in adjacent areas, particularly in Southeastern Europe, the Black Sea region (in concert of course with the regional powers...) and in the Arabian/Persian Gulf. The United States must continue to play the major role in this security system" [252]. This statement is not only a guide to policy making in Washington and NATO headquarters in Brussels. The policy is in fact already being implemented on the ground in that the U.S. has been assiduously using economic,diplomatic and military carrots to engage more and more 'regional powers' to play assigned roles in this 'concert' under its own regional direction. These countries include especially Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan on the western wing to distant Kazakstan and Kyrgyztan on the eastern one of this American and NATO PfP concert hall. All of these states, whether in the oil business or not, happen to be former Soviet republics on the underbelly of Russia. All this was written and begun to be implemented already in 1997 and earlier. well before the NATO war against Jugoslavia that was allegedly fought to defend 'human rights in Kosovo,' which along with the new NATO 'out of area' south-eastward projection toward the oil producing countries can now be better seen in the light of the above considerations. Indeed, "NATO's regional involvement, especially through PfP [referring to the above mentioned "Partnership for Peace"] is intensifying on a yearly basis. Military excersizes also already in 1997 were supposed to show that "U.S. and NATO forces could be deployed anywhere" [266]. "The obvious implication of current policy is that NATO, under U.S. leadership, will become an international policeman and hegemon in the Transcaspian and define the limits of Russian participation in the region's expected oil boom" [267]. Now the precedent of "humanitarian defense of human rights" in Kosovo also embellishes the "Partnership for Peace" in the Caspian Sea Basin, where it alone might otherwise not evoke enough popular political support from the folks back home. So now in Orwellian language again, not only "War is Peace," but now it also is highly "humanitarian." Preferably that is also placed under a mantle of 'legitimation' by United Nations, as now is the NATO military occupation of Kosovo after the war ended. But if that is not available to make war itself, as it was not against Jugoslavia, then 'legitimation' may at least sought by the agreement of the "International Community," whose states [mis]represent at most 15 percent of humanity, but whose bombs spoke so eloquently in 1999 over Jugoslavia. Where will they fall next - yet farther south-east ? "It is highly unlikely that Russia will accept such a position 'lying down'," writes Blank, especially in its own Caucasian and Caspian underbelly. Thus, he outlines four main reasons why he regards this U.S. policy not only misguided but also counterproductive: 1. Structural conditions. Military forces will be deployed in the guise of the now sanctioned 'peacekeepers' or 'peace enforcers,' as Kosovo has begun to confirm since he wrote. But that can mean also overextending these forces beyond domestic acceptance. [Contrary to the propaganda, NATO bombs did NOT bring Milosevic to heel and ground troops would have been necessary, had not Russia eventually withdrawn its support from Milosevic, which is what really obliged him to accept Western terms that by then were far less than those for which it had gone to war]. But what if Russia no more plays along at all? U.S. policy and praxis over Jugoslavia and in formerly Soviet Central Asia and the Caspian Sea area has already shifted the Russian political center of gravity towards sharpened nationalism and a renewedly increase in the influence of the military. Yet, already before that, Blank wrote that "Russia will resolutely contest the United States' expanded presence" [263], which can drive Russia into the arms of China and India as "Kosovo" already did, even if it does not threaten a Third World War, as it well may. 2. This U.S. policy also drives Russia to cooperate with Iran, which is certainly not in the interest of current American policy. 3. "It is impossible to discern any strategic context for the Clinton administration's Russia policy...[which] only enhance Russia's sense of regional threat and propensity to reply in kind, while not preventing it from doing so" [262]. 4. For all the power at the disposal of the U.S., Washington "remains singularly unable to use such instruments to obtain a comprehensive and insightful understanding of regional trends and their implications" [262]. Kuwait, Somalia, and Iraq - since then also Kosovo - "suggest that this is a structural failing of U.S. policy" [262]. Thus, the U.S. is enlarging its commitment absentmindedly, Blank writes, in the contemporary continuation of the nineteenth century "Great Game" in Central Eurasia -- with still the same major players, excepting the replacement of erstwhile Great [now small] Britain by the United States. EPILOGUE The US also wants to use NATO's Partnership for Peace alliance, which includes the Central Asian Republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as part of any multilateral force....However, Uzbek sources note the considerable cooling of official Tashkent's relations with Moscow in the sphere of military cooperation and at the same time the unusually extensive plans for joint Uzbek-US actions and projects. from CENTRAL ASIA Online # 109 November 25 ? December 1, 2000 From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Mon Nov 19 09:16:21 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 16:16:21 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: iraq and and and (fwd) Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011119161538.00aa3e80@pop.tiscali.co.uk> From: Andre Gunder Frank Subject: iraq and and and I. For more documentation provided in 1991 to back up what I wrote off the cuff yesterday or whenever, see the long IRAQ piece in the NATO Section 7 of my web page. Would that sanctions were an alternative to war. The US/UK have used both all the way through the last decade. as to selling oil and all that, two facts only here: 1. Iraq has ben allowed to sell very little oil over the period of the 90s - for a reason in # 2 below. but the oil earnings were of little use, since the stuff they had to buy was alos embargoed, and particularly the stuff needed to rebuld the oil faciulities . catch 22. 2. since this is a world hist net, i suggest you all, but especially those on the other side of this matter, go back and make a calender in two columns. A. the temporal ups and downs of the supply/demand price of oil in the world market and the price of gas in the US B. the ups and downs of stricter and '' for humanitarian reasons'' laxend embargo against Iraq. You will note a ''peculiar'' synchronization! when oil/gas price goes down, the sanctions go up, so as to prevent the # 2 [excepting SU/Russia] oil supplier from flooding the market and driving prices down even farther. the 90s were mostly a very low oil price years - and high sanctions! when oil/gas prices rise - and become a political problem in the US - suddenly ''humanitarian '' reasons are discovered for laxaing the embargo and upping the supply of oil to keep a lid on/drive down prices What is the embargo about? the price of Oil! is it worth it? when embargo deaths got to 500, 000 Sect State Albright was asked about that, and answerd '' it has been worth it'' II. try another two columns of dates Col A - recession/recovery cycles in the US since WW II Col B - Pentagon buget ups and downs, matched - indeed led - by ecalation of belligerency/ war etc by the US. Funny thing, you will find that in EVERY recession without fail B went up. of course including the present one III. If ya wanna do world history, it would be useful to look/see what drives it. and not come on with all sort of false morality [not that good morality would not be a good thing] but the stuff I have read in these pages definitely is not - that includes the rise of the west stuff, about which the author and I have been corresponding bilaterally without bathering you all. But when I get REALLY PROVOKED by what I unfortunately read here that is based on no evidence whatsoever, I am driven to reply and supply some. IV. If anyone on this list-serve would [could?] kindly supply some way of figuring out where one civilization/society/culture/nationality/ethnicity ends and the next one begins [both at the same time and/or chronologically]I would bve delighted to be so informed. So far, I have only noted that ya cant tell the civ/soc etc players without a score card. Alas everybody seems to make up their own score cards to suit their conveniance [about other civs etc and about ones own membership in a civ -- ethnicity] which changes from place to place and time to time. Besides, all of these ''things'' are RELATIONAL, one to the other.There could be no one ethnicity--- civ except in relation to another. Another matter, while I am at it, and then I promise to quite. V. I would be even more grateful if somebody on this list - or anywhere - would/could tell me about any single idea/ideology that has ever in the course of WORLD history changed anything of any moment in world history. Please do NOT confuse with or attribute to an idea some REAL thing that itself generated or is manifest in any such idea/ideology. The first one who succeeds is welcome to all of my worldy goods, which I grant you are not many and probably not worth breaking your head about to find something that does not exist. ever curious and anxious to learn gunder frank ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANDRE GUNDER FRANK Department of History Home University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 Fax: 1-402-472 8839 E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Mon Nov 19 09:12:05 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 16:12:05 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: CUI BONO? WHO BENEFITS FROM PUSHING WHAT OWN AGENDA (fwd) Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011119161052.02c6ad98@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Subject: CUI BONO? WHO BENEFITS FROM PUSHING WHAT OWN AGENDA This is a REVISED version of my document CUI BONO: WHO BENEFITS FROM PUSHING WHAT OWN AGENDA? in response to the events of September 11, 2001 Please post or REpost if previously posted in garbled form [eg. a-net] and/or forward for posting as you deem appropriate. This posting consiste of two parts: 1. a short several screen INTRODUCTION by me - Gunder Frank, sent here as ordinary e-mail at the top of this message and 2. a much more extensive documentation ATTACHED BELOW IN MS-WORD FORMAT on WHO is trying to hitch WHAT own agenda to U.S.policy in response to the events of September 11, 2001. Where possible these several dozen documents about particular agendas around the world come from the horse's mouth and/or from other institional sources. INTRODUCTION CUI BONO? WHO GETS TO APPEND AND PUSH FOR WHAT OWN AGENDAS TO THE COMMON AFTER MATH OF SEPTEMBER 11? Introduction and Selection of Documents by Andre Gunder Frank Find short Introduction in e-Mail Message below is by A.G. Frank and Documentation in the following long appended Attachment is from sources indicated [except that appended explanations in brackets [ ...] are also by A.G. Frank PREFACE by Catherine Fitts: CUI BONO? Building a Map to Solve the Crime To understand events such as wars or any of the events on the nightly news, always ask the question "Cui bono?" which translates as "Who benefits?" Cui Bono? Who Benefits? Catherine Austin Fitts [Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and former managing director of Dillon Read. Today she is Director of the Solaris Group] -------------------- INTRODUCTION by Andre Gunder Frank At the beginning of the Cold War, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles threw down the gauntlet : "Those who are not with us, are against us." The same phrase has been invoked again by President Bush after September 11, 2001. In both instances, the self-evident purpose and effect was to throw the weight of the United States around to intimidate as many states and others to make all possible military, diplomatic, political, economic and other concessions to the United States that it demanded of them. Then, it was in the name of fighting the common cold war enemy, and today it is in the name of fighting the common terrorist enemy. However worthy the causes, in both cases the cause then was and now again is used to promote agendas as well that have no visible connection with the cause ? until the United States ?'links'? them, also to invoke the old cold war terminology. Through this simple mechanism, any number of other agendas of the U.S., other states, and a myriad of private interests are conveniently linked to an offer to good- or too dangerous - to refuse. By way of example, particular interest groups saw and took the opportunity immediately to attach ?'riders'? that promote their own agendas to disaster and defense spending bills that were sure fire bets to be immediately passed by the U.S. Congress. That however, is but a tip of the iceberg example of how countless other state and private interests around the world opportunistically saw and cynically and shamelessly sought - and often already succeeded - to turn a monstrous human tragedy to their own particular advantage. Literally first was Israel, waiting no more than a day to launch an expanded military campaign against what it likes to call Palestinian ?'terrorism,'? which with U.S. help it has persuaded much of the non-Arab world to accept as such. NOW CUI BONO? The agendas are without limit, both in number and in the distance and breadth of the ?'link'? to the cause as well as in the cynical ingenuity or ingenious cynicism of establishing making these links. Below are assembled only a tip-of-the-iceberg SHORT list of other agendas that have already been so linked ? mostly as per the horse's mouth testimony of the actors themselves and/or institutional and other observers of the same. Only one major agenda is not represented by their own voices in the items below, although with a bit more diligence in searching them out, it should not be altogether too difficult to document that as well. That agenda of more than a decade's standing and that has now received an enormous new boost: is the further promotion by President George W. Bush [son] of what President George Bush [father] called ?'THE NEW WORLD ORDER ?'that he was constructing with his War against Iraq in 1991. That THIRD WORLD WAR as I then termed it [in which THIRD meant both the 3rd following the 1st and 2nd AND a war fought in and against the THIRD WORLD] put one and all on notice that ?'the bully on the block'? alas now in the world as a whole, was prepared to bomb and maybe even to nuke any country in the Third World, that not being ?'with ?'us, is ?'against'? us. President Clinton made the Bush Doctrine his own and extended it onwards to Europe in the first 'out of area'? war by NATO against Yugoslavia , which not coincidentally was the only country in Europe that refused to knuckle under the US Treasury/IMF line - excepting only Belarus, which for that simple reason is the other bete noire. All of this done always with the loyal support of the world's # 1 cynical hypocrite opportunist Tony Blair, who goes on and on about his latter day mission to ?'save civilization'? with radio-active depleted uranium for refugees in Kosovo and cluster bombs for starving ones in Afghanistan. It may appear as though that represented another innovation as well, namely the invocation of ?'human rights'? to crush human rights. Alas Clinton and Blair cannot legitimately claim originality, for a half century earlier the invasion of Czechoslovakia and then of Yugoslavia as well was also ?'legitimated'? in the name of ?'the defense of the human rights" of the victims ? by Adolph Hitler. This now third war in the series of THIRD WORLD WAR/S promises to advance the NEW WORLD ORDER agenda still further. Today of course that agenda includes first and foremost the oil rich regions of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, which also ?'happen' to be the soft under-belly of Russia, which already fought " The Great Game'? in Central Asia against its British rival in the nineteenth century. Today, of course Britain has been dis- and re-placed by the United States, although formerly ?'Great'? Britain is now satisfied opportunistically still to play at least second fiddle to the American tune. There as in the U.S. and in any number of other countries, not only foreign policy agendas, but also any number of domestic agenda s that are being opportunistically used in the wake of human tragedy. The first and foremost of course is the administration's understandable desire to rally popular political support for and to legitimate itself by catering to public demand for revenge, which the administration and its servants in the media have themselves have been irresponsibly whipping as much as possible with all manner of jingoism. and to do so by military action even without any other visible purpose or definable enemy and target. Both are highly irresponsible and do the American public an enormous disservice in failing to educate it about the causes behind the tragic action by others, and in adding to and accentuating these causes. Instead of seeking to protect the public, the administration and the media are instead knowingly exposing the people of the United States and others in the West to ever more terror and pain. Indeed, the administration, its own cabinet members and other high ranking politicians have even made numerous public statements signifying their lack of concern over how their own actions are certain to incite others to escalate attacks of reprisal. To that effect a recent Strategic Command document recommend a recent revision of U.S. strategy anywhere in the globe: We must understand in advance, to the degree possible, what an adversary values," the paper says, adding that "what a nation's leadership values is complex, since, to a considerable extent, it is rooted in a nation's culture." In addition, it also says that the United States "must communicate, specifically, what we want to deter without saying what is permitted." It also adds, "We must communicate in the strongest ways possible the unbreakable link between our vital interests and the potential harm that will be directly attributable to any who damages, or even credibly threatens to damage, that which we hold of value." To that end, the Strategic Command paper says the United States should not say "whether the reaction would either be responsive or preemptive" and as a result the country should never adopt declaratory policies such as "no first use" of nuclear weapons. The personal characteristics of the U.S. leader, the paper says, play a part. "Fear," the authors say, "is not the possession of the rational mind alone." But they go on to say that deterrence "must create fear in the mind of the adversary -- fear that he will not achieve his objectives, fear that his losses and pain will far outweigh any potential gains, fear that he will be punished." Also high on the list of answers to the question of cui bono is the American domestic right's agenda to roll back civil liberties. Not by accident did the VERY REVERENDS Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson in the United States rush to assure us only days after the tragedy of September 11, 2001 that it was God's punishment of American transgressions, including abortion, gay/lesbianism, and all manner of ?'liberal excesses'? in civil liberties. Still Confederate flag waving Attorney General Ashcroft immediately sent Congress a long laundry list of X with demands vastly to curtail civil liberties. Concomitantly, the dictatorships in Central Asia take advantage of the situation to protect and shore up their own power. Experiance with Saddam Hussein and Dragoslav Milosevic demonstrate the almost certain recurrence of such consequences with Taliban in Afghanistan and the Central Asian dictators inherited from the Soviet ear. The difference is that, excepting Taliban, this time the U.S. and NATO have an interest in protecting and using these known devils for their own purposes in the region instead of running the risk of having to deal with as yet unknown ones. That is the case even in Afghanistan, where the U.S. is loath and Pakistan is completely opposed to letting the ?'Northern Alliance'? replace Taliban, whose ?'moderate'? elements are therefore designated also to have a role in any post-war settlement and government in Afghanistan. To add a historical footnote, it is revealing that nobody seems to have recalled, much less made any connections with, that other Tuesday September 11 when the Presidential Palace in Chile was bombed and a military dictatorship was installed in 1973, which in the course of a decade and a assassinated and disappeared some 30,000 victims, tortured unknown thousands of them and among survivors, and exiled well over 100,000 people ? with the collaboration of the US CIA and at the direct instance of US President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. [Their role was documented in the US Senate hearings of the Church Committee , which resulted in reigning in some CIA excesses with some restrictions in the 1970s that are now being again eliminated and then some in the name of fighting international terrorism. The role of Kissinger was recently documented also in the pages of Harper's Magazine by Christopher Hitchins, who a few months ago called for the indictment of Kissinger for war crimes and crimes against humanity, but now rises in defense of the same in the present War against Afghanistan]. .Instead, the new administration in Washington is now intent to unleash the CIA, and undoubtedly also the much less known but much more important Defense Intelligence Agency, to pursue and push American government policies around the world. Before proceeding to the documentation below of some of the many agendas that are being promoted in the wake of and lugubriously ?'thanks to'? the human tragedy of September 11, we should make no mistake in noting as well how and to what extent one other agenda is being promoted probably more than any of the other by present policies and events: that of Osmani bin Laden, who first and foremost seeks to replace the Saudi regime in his native Arabia, secondly. the corrupt American puppet regimes in neighboring Arab states, and thirdly Israeli colonization of Palestine, whose roots he sees in the neo-colonialist partition of the whole area, especially by Britain, in the 1920s to which refers in his statements about ?'80 years ago.'? Neither of the Holy Warriors bin Laden and Bush , nor the promotion of their respective agendas, could be better served than by the policies and praxis of the other. cui bono2.doc -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: cui bono2.doc Type: application/msword Size: 147456 bytes Desc: not available URL: From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Mon Nov 19 09:18:53 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 16:18:53 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF? BY DEFINITION! (fwd) Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011119161821.02d22df0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> From: Andre Gunder Frank University of Nebraska Lincoln frank at fiu.edu Subject: HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF? BY DEFINITION! ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ THE DEFINITION: THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH sixth edition 1976, page 1196, defines TERROR: 1. extreme fear 2. Person or thing that causes terror TERRORIST: One who favours or uses terror-inspiring methods of governing or coercing government or community; hence or cong[itive]~istic. TERRORIZE: Fill with terror; coerce by terrorism: hence-[terrori]zation. EXAMINE THE THE READILY AVAILABLE AND VIRTUALLY INDISPUTABLE EVIDENCE FOR WORLD AS A WHOLE AND BY WORLD REGIONS TO COMPARE TERROR, TERRORIST, TERRORIZE, TERRORISM by - individual is bad - individual and state harbored is worse - [by] state is still worse - state in region is worse yet - state around the whole world is worst of all THE HISTORY: A letter in today's Independent [London Oct. 9, 2001] Sir: Wow, it's just like when the Spanish bombed our airbases in retaliation for our failure to extradite the terrorist Pinochet, in spite of the fact that we'd been shown the evidence against him. How history repeats itself ... HISTORICAL STATISTICAL APPENDIX Tuesday, September 11, 2001 Bombing of WTC in NYC and Pentagon in Washington DC, USA DAMAGE: Human and Pysical, Economic and Political Dead and Missing 7,000 - more than half NON nationals ofthe USA WTC destroyed, Pentagon damaged existing economic recession deepend,existing political power strengthened RESPONSIBILITY personal : Unknown. Suspected: possibly Osmana bin Laden, but unproven Behind the Scenes [not much] : possibly Al Quata State responsible: None proven, nor even to anybody's knowledge RESPONSE: Massive bombing of Afghanistan by US & UK --------------------------- Tuesday, September 11, 1973 Bombing of Presidential Palace La Moneda in Santiago Chile DAMAGE : Human and Pysical, Economic and Political Dead and Missing - about 30,000, almost all Chileans Thousands tortured, 100,000 plus driven into exile Moneda Palace damaged [by destruction and fire] Economy seriously damaged, unemployment trippled, inflation quadrupled, income vastly lowered and very much more unequally distributed political power changed by military coup and decade and a half military dictatorship RESPONSIBILITY personal:Chilean General Augusto Pinochet and Military Junta, [behind the scenes but very visible] U.S. President Richard Nixon & Secretary of State Henry Kissinger - all self declared and proven, eg. in their files, US Senate Church Committee Hearings, recently summarized by Christopher Hitchins in Harpers Magazine and demanding that Henry Kissinger be indicted as War Criminal to be brought before International Court of Justice or new International Criminal Court Responsible State : Chilean and United States of America RESPONSE: Car bomb in Washington DC, killing ex Chilean ambassador to US and a US national, proven responsibility: Chilean DINA secret police with CIA backup From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Mon Nov 19 07:32:05 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 16:32:05 +0200 Subject: [A-List] New Labour infighting Message-ID: Brown anger at Blair leadership rebuff By Andrew Grice, Political Editor The Independent, 19 November 2001 Tony Blair has angered the Chancellor, Gordon Brown, by refusing to divulge when, or if, he intends to stand down as Prime Minister. While Cabinet ministers expressed fears that relations between the two most powerful men in the Government had sunk to an all-time low, Blair aides said the Prime Minister had no intention of discussing his long-term plans with the Chancellor at this stage. It is understood that Mr Brown asked Mr Blair how long he intended to carry on as Prime Minister after he won a second term at the general election in June. Mr Brown's question was seen by Mr Blair's inner circle as a reference to the agreement believed to have been made in 1994 under which Mr Brown stood aside to give Mr Blair a clear run as the modernisers' candidate in Labour's leadership election. Mr Brown's followers claim that Mr Blair agreed to hand over the reins of power to Mr Brown as part of the deal, but Mr Blair's allies insist no such promise was made. One Cabinet ally of Mr Blair said yesterday: "Tony is not prepared to tell Gordon he is going to stand down or when he might stand down. Why should he? It was a ridiculous question. But the response has made Gordon very angry and upset." Some ministers believe Mr Blair's refusal to discuss his intentions are the underlying cause of the new outbreak of tension between the Prime Minister and the Chancellor. Differences between them over the single currency may surface again this week when Mr Blair makes a pro-European speech in Birmingham. Mr Blair, who is keen to make the case for Britain's membership of the single currency, is frustrated by the Chancellor's more cautious approach. As Mr Brown finalises the pre-Budget report that he will publish next week, Mr Blair is arguing privately that priority should be given to making improvements to health and education rather than to the complex tax-credit schemes that Mr Brown favours. Mr Blair wants the NHS to be given another huge injection of money when a new three-year public spending plan is agreed next summer. One supporter of Mr Blair's approach said: "The morale of the public and people in the NHS would be depleted if, having doubled investment, we then started to scale it back." Mr Blair is also said to have tried to poach one of Mr Brown's most senior and trusted civil servants, Gus O'Donnell, by offering him an important post at Downing Street. A Treasury spokesperson said: "Gus O'Donnell has chosen to remain at the Treasury." Frank Field, the former Minister for Welfare Reform, suggested that Mr Blair should consider sacking Mr Brown. He told GMTV's Sunday Programme: "When you've been a megastar on the international stage twice, as Tony Blair has, I don't think the Prime Minister is going to come back to play number two to Gordon Brown for that much longer." Mr Field added: "When Tony does seem to do well, that also upsets the Chancellor." He said Downing Street was promoting David Blunkett, the Home Secretary, as a possible successor - a claim denied by Blair aides - and was right to do so. Last night, Downing Street dismissed speculation that the relationship was under strain. "However much people may try to pretend otherwise, the Prime Minister and Chancellor have a closer and better relationship than any of their predecessors," a spokesman said. A spokesman for Mr Brown added: "This is the same old malicious, irresponsible and completely unfounded tittle-tattle. There is no division between the Chancellor and the Prime Minister." Mr Blunkett played down press speculation that he was now seen as the favourite to succeed Mr Blair and turned his fire on ministers' aides. "I think those who gave good lunches and good dinners and speak of people should reflect a little before they open their mouths," he said. "We're not in a contest for anything, we haven't got a vacancy ... and we're working together to deliver to those people who worked for us and elected us." Full article at: http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=105645 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Tue Nov 20 03:33:14 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2001 12:33:14 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Afghanistan Message-ID: Special forces guided in hunt for bin Laden IAN BRUCE The Herald, 20 November 2001 GUIDED by turncoat Taliban trackers, a dozen four-man patrols from the UK's Special Air Service and more than 300 US Green Beret commandos are carrying out a foot-by-foot grid-square search of the Afghan mountain valleys near the Pakistan border. Combining low-tech "eyeball" reconnaissance with high-tech input from satellites and hovering surveillance drones, the most intensive dragnet hunt in history is homing inexorably on the final refuge of Osama bin Laden, the world's most wanted man. The military collapse of his Taliban hosts under a combination of US bomb strikes, opposition Northern Alliance ground pressure, and internal desertions has left the Saudi dissident with a rapidly narrowing set of options. The Pentagon and the Ministry of Defence believe he is still inside Afghanistan, holed up in one of the cave complexes which honeycomb the limestone ramparts of the Hindu Kush range. Pro-Western elements of Pakistan's ISI intelligence agency agree. Their agents and paid informers are now refining the margins of the search. Remaining cautious but confident, Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary, said: "He could still escape in a helicopter if it hugged the shadows and valley-hopped over the frontier. It is not a bottle we can cork completely. "We don't yet have his street number, but we do have a handle on the neighbourhood in which he is living. If he moves, the chances are we'll spot him. If he stays put, it is only a matter of time before our ground assets pinpoint his hideout or a disaffected former Taliban turns him in for the reward money." The US has put a bounty of ?18m on bin Laden's head. Until the exact location is determined, the US-led coalition is concentrating on the methodical destruction of known caves and tunnels, dropping 5000lb EGBU-28 "bunker-buster" bombs to collapse the more vulnerable structures and launching Maverick missiles into cave entrances to either kill or entomb. Bin Laden's vulnerability to detection is increased by the size of his permanent entourage. He travels with 20 family members and up to 30 bodyguards drawn from the most fanatical of the holy warriors of his Arab legion. That size of party leaves a clear trail for the array of "eyes in the sky". The Taliban has tried hard to cover his tracks, announcing last week that he had already fled into the Pashtun tribal lands on the Pakistani side of the 1400-mile border near the Khyber Pass. A spokesman retracted that statement two days later, claiming he was still in Afghanistan. Since then, the rumour mill has placed bin Laden in Kashmir, Indonesia, Sudan, and Yemen, his family's ancestral homeland. The Northern Alliance added to the confusion by saying he was in a village east of Kabul. Others put him east of Jalalabad or south-east of Kandahar, the Taliban capital in the south of the country. Pakistan took the precaution of threatening retribution against any chieftain in the tribal lands who offered him sanctuary, and more than 20,000 Pakistani troops were sent to patrol the area to back up the threat. It was also a high-profile signal to the men of the frontier force who normally man the border checkpoints. Most are recruited in the tribal lands, share the same ethnic Pashtun legacy as the Afghans who supported and made up the Taliban, and might otherwise succumb to tribal loyalty rather than obedience to government decrees. Despite the increased security, an estimated 3000 former Taliban fighters have crossed into Pakistan in the last week. Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/20-11-19101-23-41-20.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From jones118 at lineone.net Mon Nov 19 16:32:04 2001 From: jones118 at lineone.net (Mark Jones) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 23:32:04 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: PORTO ALEGRE 2002 SITE UPDATE NEWSLETTER --NOVEMBER 19, 2001 Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011119233117.02cb90e0@pop3.lineone.net> [Let's not forget that other anti-globalisation front...] >PORTO ALEGRE 2002 SITE UPDATE NEWSLETTER --NOVEMBER 19, 2001 >-- No. 16 >---------- > > >SPECIAL > >The Battle of Doha > >The war that may well set the course of the 21st Century is not being waged >in Afghanistan: it began on Friday, in the capital of Qatar > > > >If you are wondering what the conflicts of coming decades will be like, >look to Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif or Washington. Observe "intelligent" missiles >hitting villages full of civilians. Note that the international coalition >led by the USA includes "democracies" that have failed to promote any >debate on the war within their own societies, and dictators convinced by >the strong argument of the greenback. Watch as the Empire meticulously >strives to form a new government in Afghanistan, one over which it will >exercise complete dominion: it will then be an easy task to build the >pipelines that will ensure control over oil and gas from the Caspian Sea. >Consider the attacks on individual liberties perpetrated by the "free" >nations on behalf of the struggle against a foreign foe: arbitrary jailing >of foreigners, admission of torture and political assassination (as long as >it is practiced abroad...), internet and telephone surveillance, news >censorship. Note that the media has held silent on all this, because it has >ceased to be just the (big P) Press to become (big) Business and it too is >pinning its hopes on war as a means to surmount the crisis facing the >system in which its business flourishes. But look beyond that. Try to make >out the interests that are behind this circus of horrors. In doing so, it >is worth turning your eyes towards Doha, capital of the emirate of Qatar, >where the World Trade Organization (WTO) began its fourth Ministerial >Meeting last Friday. > >Emblematically situated in the Middle East, the stage for so many decisive >episodes in our history, Afghanistan and Qatar are the venues where the >Empire is seeking to mould the century to its point of view. In Kabul and >Mazar-e-Sharif, it is showing its claws. Nonetheless, it is in Doha that it >is setting out its world view. What if capitalism can again be saved from >the crisis, as it was in the 1980s, without having to make concessions to >societies, but on the contrary by means of further concentration of power >and wealth? What if the way to do this is to transform what are currently >seen as rights into merchandise? Two texts published over the last few days >by the ATTAC movement, in Switzerland and France (where the document has >been signed by many other groups), understand the Doha meeting as a move in >this direction. The WTO's aim, says the Swiss text, is to make merchandise >of "all human activities: agriculture, services, health, education, >culture, genetic patrimony, water and even air pollution!". > >A round full of traps > >ATTAC-Switzerland goes straight to the point. It reminds us that the >purpose of the ministerial meeting is to launch the round of trade >negotiations that fell through in Seattle two years ago. Using official >documents (particularly the draft Doha Resolution published weeks ago by >the WTO itself), it points to the three major goals of the initiative: > > >> 1. To promote the mercantilization of public services and common assets: > >Coming together in powerful lobbies, large international corporations in >the services sector deem that it is time to eliminate certain "obstacles" >to their activities. They propose to expand the General Agreement on Trade >and Services (GATS), which restricts sovereignty of States to legislate on >this issue. They know that it will then be much easier to dismantle the >free education and health systems designed to meet the social needs of >several European and Asian countries, as well as social security systems >driven not by profit, but by solidarity. They are also casting greedy eyes >on the South of our planet. Here, some countries' laws reserve to local >workers and companies a range of activities that, depending on the country >in question, can include transportation, inland navigation, financial >services, insurance, education, health, the legal profession, sanitation, >power generation and many others. As long as these "barriers" persist, >reason the service sector mega-multinationals, as long as none of these >things can be transformed into merchandise, how can we expand our >businesses and overcome the crisis? > > >> 2. To subordinate the sovereignty of States to the "rights" of investors > >Several agreements on the agenda for a possible fresh round of trade >liberalization are designed to extend the power of the WTO still further >and, consequently, to reduce the power of societies and States. There is >talk of protocols on forestry activities, cultural production and, more >importantly, expansion of the Agreement on Trade Related Investment >Measures (TRIMS), the existing agreement on investments. > >ATTAC-Switzerland warns: in practice, this is an attempt to resurrect the >Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI). Proposed by big business five >years ago and defeated in 1998, after international mobilization that >preceded the major global protests against neoliberalism, it granted >sweeping powers to multinationals to head off democracy and the conquest of >new social rights. It allowed companies to sue States and demand >compensation whenever measures of any type - a shorter working week, >protection for local industry, consumer protection measures, a new >environmental code - meant a reduction in their profit margins. > > How to dominate the South, for peanuts > > >> 3. To open up agricultural markets and put an end to the idea of food >sovereignty: > >To the surprise and horror of neoliberals, not everyone sees the function >of agriculture as to produce food for ever-lower cost and ever-higher >profit. The struggles of common farmers, the memory of great famines, >concern for the environment and efforts to defend regional crops have given >us the concepts of the multi-functionality of land and food sovereignty >These have partially been incorporated into law, especially in Europe and >Japan. States protect peasants interested in ensuring production of staple >foods of the national diet (such as rice, in Japan) and willing to >cultivate them with a respect for nature. They offer these farmers >subsidies. Societies are aware that it is more expensive to produce under >these conditions and without access to the vast expanses of land or >enormous capital available to major agribusiness multinationals. Yet they >are willing to relinquish neither social rights, nature protection, >cultural eating habits or their landscape. > >These agri-business mega-corporations are determined to steamroller small >farmers and seek support in countries of the South to end the subsidies. >They have the support of governments and the media. They claim that opening >the European and Japanese markets would multiply food exports from >countries like Brazil. They neglect to mention the crux of the matter: 1. >Societies that submit their agriculture to the logic of the market will be >unable to develop policies that respect farmers and nature; 2. Only large >landowners, that offer almost no job openings and produce by using massive >quantities of toxic agricultural chemicals, would be capable of exporting >large volumes; 3. If agricultural markets are ever opened up, this will be >merely the crumbs that rich nations will offer the South in exchange for >something far more important: control over the industrial and services >sectors, through the measures mentioned above. As in colonial times, "Third >World" countries will have to content themselves with the role of producers >of primary goods, and surrender the cream of their economies to foreign >companies. > > > >The war set the agenda... > >In every way, the Doha meeting is fruit of the war launched by the Empire >on the pretext of fighting terrorism. In another text also available on >independent news agencies across the Internet, Greg Palast, an American >analyst, reports on the White House's efforts to use the attacks against >New York and Washington as instruments to bolster the new round of World >Trade Organization negotiations. On September 11, the differences among the >big four in the WTO (USA, European Union, Japan, India) were so great that >most observers had serious doubts that the meeting in Doha would ever >actually take place. > >Throughout his article, suggestively entitled Trade Jihad, Palast describes >the machinations of the US trade secretary, Robert Zoellick, after the >attacks took place. Flames were still rising from the World Trade Center >towers when he declared, completely against all logic, that promoting free >trade was the best way to address terrorism. He then launched into a >series of international meetings where he argued that postponing of round >of negotiations would signify an unacceptable defeat to the USA, at a very >delicate moment politically. The White House was so determined to make a >show of force that it went against its own official discourse on security >and terrorism. Doha nestles in the heart of the Middle East, a mere >two-hour flight from both Afghanistan and Iraq. If these were, in fact, >centers for terrorism, would it not be really risky to concentrate so many >diplomats, authorities and business leaders so close to them? Or is no >sacrifice too great on behalf of the Trade Jihad? > > > >... but has not bulldozed certain interests > >In Seattle, two years ago, divergences amongst the rich nations themselves >were the powder keg that helped blow the impending fresh round on trade >liberalization out of the water. Quite likely something similar will happen >at Doha. Despite their solidarity with the Empire, the large corporate >conglomerates based in other nations of the North and the States that >represent them are not in the habit of simply renouncing their interests. > >European technocrats were quite happy to withdraw farm subsidies: in the >long run they are also a hindrance to the advance of agribusiness on their >own continent. There would have to be compensations, however. Would the US, >for instance, allow French multinational sanitation companies, the most >powerful in the world, to penetrate its markets? Would it be willing to >review its anti-dumping legislation, recognized as arbitrary and acting in >practical terms as a barrier to protect local producers when they are >incapable of competing with their counterparts from Europe, Asia and even >the South? > >On October 19, Aileen Kwa, from the Asian studies center, Focus on the >Global South, wrote an excellent report on the status of the negotiations >at that time. It suggests high tensions between two contradictory >movements. On one hand, divergences amongst the most influential countries >in the World Trade Organization were "worse than before Seattle". On the >other, the US and heads of the WTO were leading a frantic effort to reach >some sort of agreement. Aileen stresses that the first draft of the final >declaration of the Doha meeting had been published on September 26; and >that no less than two closed-door international meetings had been held in >the two weeks following one in Singapore, the other in Mexico City. When >it finally convened on November 10, the Doha meeting appears to confirm, as >we close this edition of Other Words, the tensions and nigh impossibility >of forecasting before the conclusion of the sessions, scheduled for >November 15. > > > >Field units holding out > >What kind of attitude should one adopt in light of a fresh round of talks? >Accept it, given the supposed risk of a worldwide recession, if it fails? >Try, from within, once it is under way, to prevent the worst positions from >prevailing? Or fight to stop it getting under way and thus make room for >building public opinion in favor of a possible alternative? > >Over the last few months, the movement in opposition to capitalist >globalization has built a formidable unity around the latter proposal. >Since November 9, hundreds of protests have sprung up across the five >continents, always in opposition to the round which, in the end, would >bring a new shockwave of neoliberal globalization. ATTAC-France has set up >a special webpage to publicize them. There alone, there is news of 130 >rallies in 12 countries. Inevitably, as a consequence of the >counter-offensive launched by the Empire after September 11, these >demonstrations have not been as massive as the one in Genoa on July 20. >Particularly conspicuous by their absence are larger-scale protests within >the US. > >Nonetheless, the will to resist a new round is propagating round the world, >indicating that the recent movement against neoliberalism is still very >much alive, steadfast in its ambition to transform the world, and unwilling >to scale down its demands. Among the many declarations issued on the Doha >meeting, two in particular have demonstrated both how widespread and >radical is the criticism of the WTO. The first is a manifesto prepared by >the Council of Canadians, a well-known studies center in the North, and >signed by hundreds of organizations from around the world. Its final >paragraphs make it quite clear that the signatories, just like many others, >see the current battle as part of a larger struggle towards a different >society: "A socially just international trade system will also require >change outside the WTO. [It] must take prior account of the rights and >welfare of the workers and farmers who produce and provide the commodities >and services.. (...) We commit ourselves to mobilize people within our >countries to fight for these demands and to defy the unjust policies of the >WTO. We will also support other people and countries who do so with >international solidarity campaigns. We pledge to carry the Spirit of >Seattle around the world"... > >The second document has an even stronger symbolic meaning. It is the result >of a meeting in Beirut, from November 5-8, which gathered social movements >and organizations from the five continents but particularly the Arab world. >It is not difficult to imagine how hard it is to turn ones attention to >global issues, in a region so stricken by the violence of the Israeli >State, the reactionary governments supported by the Empire, and >fundamentalist creeds. Nonetheless, the text reveals a far-reaching, >detailed analysis of the role of the WTO, and at the same time a broad >discussion of possible alternatives. It closes tellingly and hearteningly: >"Our world is not for sale and peoples' lives and well being are not a >material for trade". In other words, The world is not a piece of >merchandise, this feeling and this rallying cry are being taken up by more >and more movements and people, some quite close to both Kabul and to Doha... > >To subscribe to Other Words, just visit www.portoalegre2002.net and key in >your e-mail address in the appropriate box, or send a blank e-mail to >. There's no need to write anything >in the subject line or in the body of the message. > >If you want to stop receiving the newsletter, send a similarly blank e-mail >to > > > > >Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service. > > > > > > > >============================================================ >How to Use this Mailing List >============================================================ > >You received this e-mail as a result of your registration on the >world-summit mailing list. > >To unsubscribe, please send an email to listserv at iatp.org. In the body of >the message type: >unsubscribe world-summit > >For a list of other commands and list options, please send email to >listserv at iatp.org. >In the body of the message type: >help > >Please direct content questions about this list to: mritchie at iatp.org > >Please direct technical questions about this service to: support at iatp.org From franka at fiu.edu Mon Nov 19 21:51:14 2001 From: franka at fiu.edu (Andre Gunder Frank) Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 23:51:14 -0500 (EST) Subject: [A-List] US ECONOMIC OVERSTRETCH & IMPERIAL MILITARY/POLITICAL BLOWBACK? Message-ID: IN RE: Jay Moore on The gathering gloom From The Economist Global Agenda ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANDRE GUNDER FRANK Department of History Home University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 Fax: 1-402-472 8839 E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Jay Moore writes in a-list on 16th November and ANDRE GUNDER FRANK <> and comments: >>If the IMF is right, a global economic recovery could start sometime around the middle of next year. But for the world's second-largest economy, Japan, the prognosis is far worse. Japan is now in its fourth recession in a decade, and a prolonged one at that, with GDP expected to contract both this year and next. Economists agree that Japan's [and other ''national'' economies'] problems are much more serious and will require much more radical policy action than the authorities there have yet delivered.<< The IMF forecasters, and also those of the OECD and the U.S. government ARE and HAVE NEVER BEEN RIGHT, as demonstrated by comparison between their published [also their internal un-published?] estimates and subsequent real world events. They have ALWAYS BEEN OVER-OPTIMISTIC, because over-optimism is BUILT IN-to their estimation mechanisms, if only because POLITCAL economic reasons mandate them to AVOID ANY REALISM and make UN-realistic prognoses that are meant to act as self-fullfilling propheses, which are also designed to maintain political SUPPORT FOR THEIR CONTINUED EXISTENCE. The IMF -which de facto is an arm of the US Treasury Dept but is NOT accountable to anyone other than the US Treasury - does have some power to make propheses that are in part self-FULLFILLING FOR AMERICAN and some other BIG BUISINESS INTERESTS by sinking currencies, economies and income especially in the ''Third'' and now also the former ''Second'' world at whose costs the economies in the FIRST world - that yes IS FIRST first but in another sense - rest much of their own relative prosperity [see below]. >> Nobody is yet suggesting America is suffering from deflation, which can trigger a downward spiral of falling prices, shrinking demand and financial distress: a vicious circle America last experienced in the 1930s depression. Wise policymakers will not ignore the risk, however.<< I and James Tobin [ author of the ''Tobin Tax'' proposal] already in the mid-1980s published and predicted DE-flation, and ''wise'' policy makers DID IGNORE this risk [not really risk, but necessary consequence] while continuing their policies designed to fight IN-flation. Nonetheless, since then commodity prices have fallen sharply and consistently. Moreover in WORLD economic terms, high inflation in terms of their national currencies [pesos,rubles, etc.] and their sharp DEVALUATION against the DOLLAR world currency has been an effective de facto major DE-flation in the rest of the world. That has REDUCED their prices and made their exports CHEAPER to those who buy their currencies WITH DOLLARS, primarily of course consumers, producers and investors IN - AND FROM ! - THE UNITED STATES. These additionally, which is hardly ever mentioned!, can and do buy up the rest of the world with dollars that ''cost'' only their printing and distribution, which for Americans have virtually NO COST. [The $ 100 dollar bill is the world's most used cash currency on which runs the entire Russian economy, and there are two to [now?] three times as many of them circulating OUTSIDE as inside the US]. The American boom and welfare and then ''balanced'' federal budget 1992-2000 Clinton adminstration, contrary to its populist claims, only happened to coincide with this boom and the also same 8 year long PROSPERITY OF THE UNITED STATES WAS ENTIRELY BUILT ON THE BACKS OF THE TERRIBLE DEPRESSION, DEFLATION AND THUS GENERATED MARKED INCREASE IN POVERTY IN THE REST OF THE WORLD [during this one decade, life expectancy in Russia DECLINED BY 10 - TEN - years, infant mortality, drunkenness, crime and suicide increased as never before in peacetime. Since 1997, income in Indonesia DECLINED BY HALF and generated itds ongoing political crisis]. All this has among others the following CONSEQUENCES: The US EXPORTS from here to elswhere the INFLATION that would otherwise be generated by this high supply of currency at home, whose low rate of inflation in the 1990s was therefore no miracle result of domestic ''appropriate'' Fed monetary policy. The US has been able to cover twin its balance of trade and budget DEFICITS with cheap money, AND the deflation/devaluation elsewhere in the world has like a magnet ATTRACTED speculative financial CAPITAL from the rest of the world - both American owned and foreign owned - which has BOUGHT US TREASURY CERTIFICATES [ stopping up the US budget deficit] and INTO WALL STREET this feeding and supporting its 1990s BULL MARKET, which in turn has increased, supported and spread wider a speculative and illusory in increase in wealth for American and other stock holders and through this also ILLUSIORY ''WEALTH effect'' has supported higher consumption and investment. The subsequent and present bear market decline in stock prices nonethless is a still a profit boon for enterprises who issued and sold their stocks at bull market high and rising stock prices and are now BUYING back their OWN stocks at what for them are bargain basement low prices, which represent an enormous profit for them at the expense of small stock holders who are now selling these stocks at low and declining prices. The US ''prosperity'' now rests on the knife edge not only of an unstable enormous domestic corporate and consumer [credit card, mortgage and other] debt. The US is also vastly OVER-INDEBTED to FOREIGN OWNERS of US Treasury certificates, Wall Street stock and other assets, which can be called in by foreign central banks who have been keeping reserves in US dollars and other foreign owners of US debt. Indeed, it is the very US POLICY that has contributed so much to DESTABILIZATION elsewhere in the world [eg.through the destabilization of Southeast Asia that undermined the Japanese economy and financial system even more than it would otherwise have been] that now threatens and now soon makes much more likely that especially Japanese and European holders of US debt must cash it in to shore up their own ever more unstable unstable economic and financial systems. Another major consequence is that the US - and world! - economy is now in a bind from which it most probably can NOT extricate itself by resorting to Keynesian pump priming and much less to full scale macro-economic plicy and suypport of the Us and Western/Jpanese economy, as the Carter and Reagan administrations did. Miltary Keynesianism, disguised as Friedman/Volker Montarism and Laffer Curve Supply-Sideism, was begun by Carter in 1977 and put into high gear in 1979, when Carter the Fed was run by Carter appointee Paul Volker, who in October 1979 switched Fed minetary policy from high money creation / low interest price thereof to attempted low money creation / high interest [ to 20 percent monetary! ] to rescue the dollar from its 1970s tumble and attract foreign capital to the poor US. In that he then succeded. At the same time, Carter began Military Keynesianism in June 1979 by un-doing the Nixon-Brezhnev detente and starting the Second Cold War with a NATO member countries' real 3 percent a year [adjusted for inflation] increase in miltary spending [at the same time he began the ''two-track'' policy of stationiung high altitude Pershing missiles in Germany and low altitude Cruise missiles as well to bargain with greater strenght with the Soviet Union. The alleged re-initiation of the Cold war by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 has been a US myth from the beginning, since Carter re-initated the Clld war in June and the Soviets did not invade Afghanistan until December 1979. Personally, I have always argued that the latter was a Soviet response based in part on the - it turned out mistaken - supposition that the US had already escalated about as much as it could. The US super-escalation response was unexpected but desinged - I argued - in part, as was also the new shift to a right wing economic policy strategy, in order to take the wind out of Ted Kennedy's challenge to Carter for the coming Democratic Party nomination. Brzinsky now reveals that HE deliberatly reved up Afghanistan in order to provoke Soviet reprisal and permit a US counter-reprisal, in which he succeeded. In a word, the Second Cold War and Military Keyensianism were launched by Carter [in the UK Thacherism was launched in 1976 by Labour PM Callaghan], and Star Wars Reaganomics were only its continuation/ futher escalation. The former was designed to force the SU into bankrupty and the latter to support not only the US but the entire Western - also European and Japenese - world economy after the 1979-1982 recession. Both policies succeded, but they avoided bankrupting the US as well only because the resulting US twin trade & budget deficits were shored up by capital inflows from forced Latin American debt service [ a result again of Volker''s creation of the Debt Crisis by pushing the interest rate from nothing to 20 percent] and by massive capital inflows from Europe and Japan - especially into Treasury Certificates - after the US switched from b eing the world's largest creditor still in 1985 to becomeing its largest debtor ever since 1986. Otherwise, the US would have gone bankrupt with endless inflation, just as the SU did, which however had no one to bail it out as the US did. Morevoer, the SU external account was wiped out in the 1980s after the 1981 sharp decline in the world price of both oil and gold from which the SU derived 90 percent of its foreign exhange.As a net importer of oil, the US - although not its oil interests - benefited instead. Why do I now recount this ancient history? Because today and tomorrow the US would need to do the same for itself and its allies, now BUT IT CAN NOT do so! The US may [should? must ??] now attempt a repeat performance to spend itself and its allies [now minus Japan but plus Russia?] out of the present and much deeper world recession and threatening depression. The US would then again resorting to massive Keyenesian deficit [ using September 11 as a pretext for probably military] RE-flationary spending. Moreover, to settle its now enormous and ever growing foreign debt, the US may chose also to resort to IN-flationary reduction of the burden to itself of that debt and its also ever growing foreign debt service. But even the latter could - in contrast to the above summarized previous period- NOT avoid generating a further SUPER trade balance particularly if market demand falls further and pressure increases abroad to export to the US demand/er of last resort. But this time, there will be NO capital inflows from abroad to rescue the US economy. On the contrary, the now downward pressure to devalue the US dollar against other currencies would spark a CAPITAL FLIGHT from the US, both from US Government bonds and from Wall Street where significant stock price declines generate further price declines and deflation in world terms even if the US attempts domestic inflation. The price of oil is yet another fly in the political economic ointment, whose dimension and importance is inversely proportional to the health or illness of the ointment itself. And today that is quite sick and deteriorating already. The world price of oil has always been a two edged sword whose double cutting edges can be de-sharpened with the help of successful alternative economic and price policies. On the one hand, oil producing economies and states and their interests need a minimum price floor to produce and sell their oil instead of leaving it underground and also postponing further oil productive investment while waiting for better times. Thus, a high oil price is economically and politically essential for important states like Russia, Iran and especially Saudi Arabia, as well as US oil interests. On the other hand, a low price of oil is good for oil importing countries, their consumers including oil consuming producers of other products, and supports state macro economic policy, eg in the US. These days, the high/low price line between the two seems to be around US$ 20 a barrel - at the present value price of the dollar! But nobody seems to be able to rig the price of oil at that level. The present conflict, long since no longer within OPEC, is primarily between OPEC that now sells only about 40 percent of the world supply and other producers that supply 60 percent, today especially Russia but also including the US itself as both a significant producer and a major market, although that is increasingly shifting to East Asia. Recession in both and the resultant decline in demand for oil drags its price downward. But US Keynesian spending re-flation as well as in-flation can no longer put the floor under the price of oil needed today and tomorrow. Only a recovery generated demand that economic policy can not now provide and a future world economic recovery and limitations in the supply of oil could again raise, or even prevent a further fall, in the price of oil - and of its deflationary pull on other prices. And further deflation in turn will increase the burden of the already vastly over-indebted US, Russian and East Asian, not to mention some European and Third World, economies. Thus the political economy of oil is likely to add to further deflationary pressure. That would - indeed already does - again significantly weaken oil export dependent Russia. But this time it would also weaken US oil interests and their partners abroad, especially in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the low price of oil during the 1990s has already transformed the Saudi economy from erstwhile boom to a bust. That has already generated middle class unemployment and a significant decline in income that has also already generated widespread dissatisfaction and now threatens to do so even more at precisely the time when the Saudi monarchy is already facing destabilizing generational transition problems of its own. Moreover a low oil price would also make new investment unattractive and postpone both new oil production and eliminate potential profits from laying new pipelines in Central Asia. All of these present problems and developments now threaten to [will?] pull the rug out from under US domestic and international political economy and finance. The only protection still available to the United States still derive from its long since and still also only two pillars of the ''NEW WORLD ORDER'' established by President Bush father after ''Bush's Gulf War" against Iraq and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. President Bush son is now trying to consolidate his father's new world order [no doubt with the latter still as a power behind the throne] beginning with the WAR AGAINST AFGHANISTAN [and perhaps once again against Iraq] and the Bush-Putin effort now also to construct a US-Russian Entente -- or is it Axis. The two pillars of this new world order remain the same: 1] the dollar as the international reserve currency and medium of payment and 2] the US military might is right to lord it over the rest of the world. The US does so cover using such pretexts as ''defending humanitarianism'' to trample on and destroy it as in the NATO WAR against Yugoslavia, '' defending civilization'' by destroying two of its most precious achievements, international law and institutions abroad and liberal democracy and civil rights at home, on pretext of ''fighting terrorism'' by using and generating still more terrorism. However, the dollar pillar is now threatening to crumble,as it already did after the Vitnam War but has so far remained standing through three decades of remedial patch work. But as we have seen, the US is now running out of further economic remedies to maintain the dollar pillar upright. It's only protection would be to generate serious inflation in the short run by printing still more US dollars to service its debt, which would then undermine its strength and crack the dollar pillar and weaken the support it affords still more. That would leave only the US military pillar to support US political economy and society. But it and reliance on it also entails dangers of its own. Visibly, that is the case for such as Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan and of course all others who are thereby deliberately put on notice to play ball by US rules in its new world order on pain of eliciting the same fate for themselves. But the political blackmail to participate in the new world order on US terms also extends to US - especially NATO - allies and Japan. It was so excercised in the Gulf War [other states paid US expenses so that the US made a net profit from that war], the US war against Yugoslavia in which NATO and its member states were cajoled to participate, and now by the War against Afghanistan as part of President Bush's policy PRO-nouncement [using the early Cold WAR terminolgy of John Foster Dulles] that ''You Are Either With Us Or Against Us"]. But US reliance on this, the then only remaining, strategy of military political blackmail can also lead the US to bankruptcy as the failing dollar pillar fails to support it as well; and it can come also to entail US ''OVERSTREETCH'' in Paul Kennedy terms and ''BLOWBACK'' in CIA and Chalmers Johnson terms. In summary and plain English, the US has only two assets left to rely on, both admitedly of world importance, but perhaps even so insufficient. They are dollar and its military political assets. For the first, THE ECONOMIC CHICKENS IN THE U.S. PONZI SCHEME PYRAMID OF CARDS ARE NOW COMING HOME TO ROOST EVEN IN THE UNITED STATES ITSELF. The second pillar is now in use to prop up the new order the world over. Most importantly perhaps is the now proposed US/Russia entente against China instead of [or to achieve?] a US defense against a Russia/China[and India?] entente [the NATO War against Yugoslavia generated moves toward the latter, and the US War against Afghanistan promotes the former]. God/Allah forbid that any of these nor their Holy War against Islam blow us all up or provoke others to do so. However that may be, US IMPERIAL POLITCAL MILTARY BLACKMAIL may still BLOWBACK ON THE UNITED STATES ALSO, thus NOT OUT OF STRENGTH BUT OUT OF WEAKNESS. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANDRE GUNDER FRANK Department of History Home University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 Fax: 1-402-472 8839 E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Tue Nov 20 05:00:09 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2001 12:00:09 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Re: Stand-off between Opec and Russia? Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011120115953.00acb758@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 20/11/2001 02:03, Louis wrote: >On Mon, 19 Nov 2001 20:56:16 -0500, jonathan flanders wrote: > >Why would an internal Russian collapse be a > >problem for the US? Imagine the investment > >opportunities! > >Didn't this happen already? I meant to mention before and will now, how obliged I am to Lou for his excavations of the Mahdism and British imperialism. Russia's state-run ponzi scheme collapsed in 1998 but this was a good thing from the point oif view of the Russian economy, such as it was, since it resulted in a 5-fold devaluation of the rouble. This brought the rouble in line with reality and enabled the economy to pick itself off the floor or rather, to disinter itself from the grave where the comprador-oligarchs had left it. What Jon thinks (I guess) is that the US is the world's public enemy no. 1 and principal rogue state, and that US finance and corporate capital knows no limits, not even those of ultimate self-interest, when it comes to the plunder and exploitation of other countries. I understand where this idea comes from but it is wrong. Since Woodrow Wilson first proclaimed America's goal as 'making the world safe for democracy', in about 1917, the US ruling class has never wavered in its concern issues for global governance. That's what makes it an empire; it's not like the Vandals sacking Rome, it's Rome dividing and ruling its colonial possessions. That's surely the US ruling class's well-cultivated self-perception. Of course they wanted to and did plunder ex-Soviet Russia but the ultimate goal was still to make the world safe for democracy, ie US capital. Now they have got a client Russian state which suits this purpose, and by definition this state must function as such, ie must exercise custodial care for 'its own' people, capitalists, frontiers, resources etc. This is how states are constructed, operate and acquire missions in an imperial world-system, and this is how subalternity works. Russia is now a subaltern capitalist state competing on the same more or less level playing field as other capitalist subaltern states, for eg, Britain, Germany, Japan etc. Just as Germany was allowed to recover after WW2 and to become a major competitor for US capital, so ditto ex-Soviet Russia after its defeat in the Cold War. This process of cooperative competition between capitalist states operating within a framework of subalternity and hegemony, *is* the mechanism of regulation and social reproduction of late (exterminist) imperialism; this is HOW the system works, not in contradiction to it. It works this way because there is no historical alternative, other than inter-imperialist wars and revolutions, and because it has served as a successful model of accumulation. If/when it fails, failure will take the form of internal discontents interacting with external geopolitical realities to produces ruptures in the system, open conflict and overt war. This would represent the onset of acute, general crisis. The Western powers under American leadership are right now engaged in a struggle to prevent the outbreak of an open, general crisis with a new and essentially uncontrollable historical logic all of its own. At the same time that the lesser powers overtly support the US in its struggle to retain hegemony, however, they are obviously also involved in the 'Cui Bono?' struggle which Gunder Frank is just now writing about. Who benefit from present American problems and discomfiture? How will they (covertly, secretly) act to *increase* American discomfiture in order to further maximise their advantages? For instance, how much covert support will countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia give to the Taleban to keep their resistance going, and thus to achieve such goals as thwarting Russia, maximising their continued relative importance and influence with the West, etc? What of China, which has greatly benefited in the past from close relations with ObL, who sold China captured Tomahawk cruise missiles and other valuable defence technology? China is overtly part of the 'coalition against terror', but what is happening behind the scenes? China is now a paid-up member of the club of capitalist great powers and therefore it is committed to sponsoring, aiding and materially supporting, US hegemony, like all the other satraps, client states, 'allies' etc of American imperialism. But *some of* China's real interests and goals strongly contradict those of the US. As long as US hegemony remains intact, and the world market continues to function under US protection, then the Chinese capitalist state (because IMO that is what it is, a capitalist state) will continue to seek to benefit from access to markets, from inward investment, from access to cheap food imports etc. This is now the model of Chinese accumulation and *internal social peace* now depends upon the successful functioning and continued growth of the capitalist world-market. But the day when that ceases to be so, because of a slump, or some sharp geopolitical crisis, will also be the day when China's *other* and contradictory state and social interests come to the fore. A collapse in the world market will have severe consequences for the Chinese ruling class, for the Chinese working class and for the Chinese economy. To deal with internal unrest, the Chinese state may have to adopt aggressively anti-American, nationalist policies: just to survive the anger of the Chinese masses, the Chinese capitalist state may be forced to overtly and no longer just covertly, support American enemies, oppose American interests, seek a specifically pan-Asian solution to its problems, seek to cut its own deal with its all-important Middle Eastern energy suppliers, etc etc. Such an open and general crisis will immediately drag out into the open the equivalent latent contradictions between Russian capitalism and the US. It is only last year that Putin, the wandering minstrel of postmodern opportunism, was in Beijing loving up to the Chinese, and all the talk then was of a Russo-Chinese-Indian front against the US. Before that Putin was in N Korea... But what Putin wants, and what the Chinese and the Americans also all want, is a stable, peaceful world where they can do business, screw their workers, and make money. Americans do not seek the internal collapse of Russia in the hopes that this will present investment opportunities. On the contrary, they seek a stable, law-abiding capitalist Russia which is both a junior partner and a competitor of US capitalism. Mark Jones sorry for any typos From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Tue Nov 20 04:13:34 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2001 13:13:34 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Nik Gowing Message-ID: As well as having had a long career with ITN, including being diplomatic editor of the highly regarded Channel Four News from 1989-96, and a subsequent career as anchor on BBC World, Nik Gowing, as we have seen, has some interesting extra curricular activities, involving the sort of behind the scenes talking shops that are the preferred means of communication between national power elites. In Gowing's case, this is a governorship of the Ditchley Foundations. He is also a governor of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, a rather miniscule contribution to western imperialism at present but one with potential. Gowing had specialised in reporting Eastern Europe, and like Mark Jones, has turned his hand to fiction as a means of communicating his insights concerning the disintegration of the Soviet Union. However, I expect that there the similarities end. I haven't read Gowing's titles, but maybe listers with access to a second-hand bookshop or library can case them out: "The Wire", Mandarin, London 1989 Fearing that the Kremlin and the Polish government have not done enough to curb Solidarity, the KGB need a pretext for Soviet invasion. Their mole - the wire - infiltrates the union to discredit both Solidarity and the US government by deposing Jaruzelski and pinning the blame on the CIA. This tense and provocative thriller is based on the author's (as Diplomatic Editor and newscaster for ITN's award-winning Channel Four News, Nik Gowing was their Eastern European correspondent from 1980 - 1983) own fright . "The Loop", Hutchinson 1993/St Martin's Press, 1995 When Nik Gowing writes about the disintegrating Soviet Union, his book may be fiction but his facts are impeccable; the London journalist specializes in Eastern Europe and has more scoops than Haagen Daz. This thriller about a bloody conflict between remnants of the KGB and a powerful gangster in the New Russia will leave you breathless. Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Tue Nov 20 04:01:05 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2001 13:01:05 +0200 Subject: [A-List] BBC World Message-ID: I thought Nik Gowing was looking a little tanned last night. It seems that last week he was in Barcelona attending some kind of international journalism conference. The BBC office next to Al-Jazeera's in Kabul was damaged by the US bomb that obliterated the Qatari news agency premises. But it seems that there are some contradictory elements in this whole mess that are beginning to expose Mr Gowing and chums to the risks to which they, in their relaying of US/UK propaganda, exposed their colleagues in Al-Jazeera. Journalists are not legitimate targets, says BBC man Jessica Hodgson in Barcelona Thursday November 15, 2001 The Guardian The Pentagon must be called to account for the destruction of al-Jazeera's Kabul headquarters on Monday night, according to the BBC's Nik Gowing. Gowing, a BBC World correspondent, said: "It seems to me there is some evidence to be put to the Pentagon about the targeting of news organisations. "It seems people uplinking journalistic material can be targeted legitimately." He said journalists and broadcasters needed to send "a very clear message that this must not be allowed to continue. "Al-Jazeera has been providing some material that has been very uncomfortable." Gowing said the British special forces had told him: "When a war is not declared, journalists are legitimate targets where they are inconvenient." His remarks, which were echoed by other journalists attending the Newsworld conference in Barcelona, came in response to the news the Arab satellite station had suffered a direct hit by a US missile. In 1999 the US attracted similar criticism when missiles struck a Serbian TV station in Belgrade during the Kosovo conflict. Fears are growing for the safety of the al-Jazeera staff. The station's Kabul correspondent, Tasir Alouni, was assaulted as he fled the city yesterday. The BBC and Associated Press offices in Kabul were also damaged on Monday night. Speaking by videophone from the BBC's Kabul base, William Reeve, the BBC World Service correspondent, voiced his concerns about the bombing of the al-Jazeera building. Ron McCullagh, a freelance journalist with the independent production company, Insight News, said he was concerned the BBC may have contributed to the notion that al-Jazeera was biased. At the start of the war the BBC had described al-Jazeera as a "pro-Taliban broadcaster", McCullagh said. "This was a very dangerous thing to do. It could be used as an excuse for bombing them," he added. The conference delegates discussed the other dangers facing journalists in Afghanistan, such as ambush, disease and altitude sickness. Andrew Kain, a former special forces soldier, who now provides logistical training for journalists, warned: "It has yet to be established whether the Taliban have been routed or whether they are in retreat. "The likelihood of an ambush is a serious risk." The delegates also spoke of the importance of protecting local journalists and fixers. Mr Kain said the international news organisations had a responsibility for people "whose lives are often in more danger than our own". John Owen, the former chairman of the Freedom Forum, noted the two fixers who had worked with the Sunday Express reporter, Yvonne Ridley, had still not been found. Full article at: http://media.guardian.co.uk/Print/0,3858,4299923,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Tue Nov 20 03:45:29 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2001 12:45:29 +0200 Subject: [A-List] George Galloway on Iraq Message-ID: Harbingers of death in the Gulf The consequences of a US attack on Iraq would be devastating George Galloway Tuesday November 20, 2001 The Guardian Last Wednesday, an Iraqi Airways Boeing 727 civilian airliner was climbing out from Basra, Iraq's southern port, when the ether crackled at 121.5 megahertz with an unmistakable American voice: "This is the United Nations [sic] no-fly zone enforcement patrol calling Iraqi airliner travelling at 21,000 feet proceeding at 400mph north-west from Basra. I warn you that you are subject to being fired upon - you continue to fly at your own risk." Thus in the middle of a war against terrorism, falsely claiming a UN mandate - the "no-fly zones" are in fact imposed unilaterally by Britain and the US - an allied pilot was threatening 180 civilian passengers with airborne death. That would have created quite a desert storm. I might not have believed this story if an Iraqi official had told me. But as chance would have it for the US pilot, I was on that flight, sitting in the cockpit with Captain Akram, who disdainfully ignored the warning. Also on the aircraft were Lord Naseer Ahmed, Britain's first Muslim peer, and the solidly Blairite MP Kerry Pollard. Together with Sunday's incident in the Gulf, when a tanker carrying Iraqi oil sank after being boarded by US servicemen - with the loss of up to six people, including two Americans - the signs are that US policy towards Iraq is poised on a bayonet point. Bombing, argue the hawks roosting on the Potomac, has achieved two regime changes in a row, in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, without the loss of a single American in action. Time to go for the hat-trick in Iraq, they say, closing the unfinished business left by Bush the father in 1991. Having just returned from the Arab world, I would caution against it. In the first place, the Yugoslav triumph is not what it seems. Almost 65,000 Nato soldiers continue to garrison Bosnia and Kosovo. Albanian nationalism, as the weekend elections in Kosovo showed, is all dressed up with nowhere to go, except secession in Serbia and destabilisation in Macedonia. The soldiers police a protectorate liable to turn nasty at any time. Nor is the Anglo-American "victory" in Afghanistan either remotely final or clear-cut. If possession of Afghan cities were the issue, Leonid Brezhnev would have been a hero. A decade of attrition from the mountains and on the plains cost the USSR much blood and treasure and arguably its very existence. And in those days the so-called Holy Warriors were united. Now the ragtag and bobtail army of the Northern Alliance - for whom, like the KLA before them, we were the airforce - is a powder-keg of ethnic, religious and tribal loyalties waiting to blow up in our face. The alliance, a collection of heroin-dealing cut throats who laid waste to Afghanistan the last time they were in power, have not waited long before reverting to type. British television viewers have been largely spared their penchant for castration, mutilation and massacres of prisoners. Viewers of Arab stations have not. Meanwhile, the network of Islamist terrorists said by Colin Powell to be ensconced in 50 countries can scarcely be expected to fold up their tents and take up Turkish tapestry. Contrary to the predictions of wild-eyed optimists, there is no reason to believe they will be demobilised or demotivated by search-and-destroy operations in the caves around Kandahar. If anything, Bin Laden dead is likely to be a more potent force than Bin Laden alive. And you don't need a redoubt in the Hindu Kush to learn how to be a killer, as the hijackers of September 11 showed. Florida or Hamburg will do just as nicely. The Arab consensus against any widening of the conflict has helped force the first apparent chink of light between the shoulders of the Anglo-American alliance. Mr Blair has let it be known that Britain is opposed to an attack on Iraq. If sincere, that could be significant, for with the exception of Israel, no other country in the world is likely to support such an assault. But, as Bob Monkhouse observed, "once you can fake the sincerity, the rest is easy". On Sunday, our most militant foreign minister, Ben Bradshaw, repeated the mantra about there being no evidence of Iraqi involvement in September's atrocities. But he added ominously that "of course if such evidence were to emerge, that would be a quite different matter". The cooks and spooks may even now be baking it. Both the incidents at sea and in the air and the imminent security council decision on Anglo-American "smart sanctions" - with the demand for the return of weapons inspectors withdrawn before the 1998 Desert Fox fiasco - may be straws in the mistral, harbingers of a whirlwind to come. Iraq is girding itself for massive attack and counting on the political earthquake in the region which would ensue. It would not need to climb high up the Richter scale to topple some of our oldest and most quiescent friends. ? George Galloway is Labour MP for Glasgow Kelvin and a columnist for the Scottish Mail on Sunday. Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Tue Nov 20 03:42:49 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2001 12:42:49 +0200 Subject: [A-List] New Labour infighting Message-ID: Two emperors fighting over clothes that may not be there The Blair-Brown feud is a major factor in the cabinet's terminal decline Hugo Young Tuesday November 20, 2001 The Guardian Mo Mowlam tells us that Tony Blair is presidential. It's not a new thought, nor is it a false one. Mo has witnessed what she's talking about, but so, at scarcely smaller distance, have we all. The evidence has been plain enough in Mr Blair's disdain for parliament, his command-and-control from Downing Street, his explicit relish in power at the centre, his wide-eyed insistence that, these days, there's no other way to rule. He is a mighty, dominant leader. Yet that's not the only message. This leadership style has some interesting limits. One of them lies in its exposure of New Labour's extreme weakness as a breeder of serious politicians. If cabinet government is dead, it's in part because cabinet ministers have seldom been more feeble. Few of the present lot can hack it as politicians who count. No modern government has contained ministers more puppet-like, more politically anaemic, more lacking in self-respect, or more cravenly submissive to the leader who has supplanted - in their minds as much as his - argument or belief with loyalty to himself, as the touchstone of political purpose. On their part, this loyalty has less to do with passionate respect than with the absence of any alternative thing to be. They have no convictions to call their own. New Labour turns out to be a thin cadre of administrators, many of them bad. They wouldn't say boo to a goose, not so much because they don't dare, or because they can't identify the goose, as because they have no basis for deciding what "boo", in any particular circumstance, might mean. In terms of leadership, the Labour party of the 2000s is often likened to the Thatcher Tories of the 1980s. Michael Cockerell's BBC film on Saturday made the point. But there are arresting differences. Mrs Thatcher, though aspiring to dominate, did not always succeed. She was famous for her handbag and stiletto, and for calling her colleagues wets. But many of them stood up to her, as witnesses to her failure to reduce the scale of public spending. She argued all the time with her critics, but had to keep them in the cabinet until, one by one, several resigned on principle. There was a cabinet, it was never united, its members could not be ignored, and eventually they helped to get rid of her. The Blair administration doesn't look like that. It is also different from earlier Labour cabinets. These had many arguments, because enough ministers had the weight to persist in defending positions they believed in. The subordinates of Wilson and Callaghan - Healey, Jenkins, Crosland, Castle, Benn - could not be silenced. It was unimaginable that people of such quality would be without conviction, or the will to express it. The Blair generation, by contrast, are pallid mediocrities without a position to defend. They are not bad people. They do an honest job. Clare Short is an exceptional minister. Derry Irvine tries to protect something, the judicial system, which he believes in. The stories of sleaze are overdone, and trivial by comparison with what happened in the Thatcher-Major time. The alliterative charm of "Tony's cronies" exceeds its basis in reality: are we seriously to suppose that 18 years of Tory rule left no political mark on 20,000 quango jobs? All the same, it's hard to escape the truth that Messrs Byers, Milburn, Morris, Darling, Hoon, and the rest of the latest long list of successor hotshots waiting in the wings, are there because they're there, and wouldn't make a squeak that anyone noticed if suddenly they were not there. During the first term, this prevailing temper - timid, lite, rich only in the jargon of what-cannot-yet-be-done - made a kind of sense. Eighteen years, after all, is a long time out of office. New Labour needed to prove that it would not fall apart. But the second term has begun in the same vein. Ministers continue willingly to reduce their role to insignificance. They trail in and out of cabinet meetings that last only half an hour. They submit to the idea that collective government should be replaced by bilateral relationships with either the prime minister or the chancellor. They're content, in effect, to watch the parliamentary constitution disintegrate. They're the president's agents in his presidentialism. He has one important co-conspirator, the man who is supposedly his worst rival, Gordon Brown. These are the only exceptions to the bloodless passivity that's draining the life out of the cabinet system. It suits Mr Brown as much as Mr Blair that there should be no meaningful collective. He has, if anything, a greater impatience than the prime minister with colleagues whose limitations make them, in his eyes, surplus to requirements: redundant baggage, not wanted on voyage, liable to commit only serious blunders as they grapple, from no position of principle or authority, with the NHS or Railtrack or the myriad other managerial problems politics has been reduced to. There is, however, a paradox eating away at this novel set-up. Like his colleagues, the president is a good man. He sincerely thinks he governs this way for the best. It has always been his habit to sound in private, even more than in public, quite sure that he knows what to do. No conversation passes without conveying the sense of a man confident of his direction, impeded only by other people's blindness or sloth or correctable folly. He's full of certainties. Yet by now the proof that he's always right is hard to find. Five years in power don't show, on the domestic front, that presidentialism has paid off. He knows what he wants, while having, to judge by the state of hospitals and transport at any rate, less - not more - of an idea how to get there. Two-man rule isn't having the desired effect - irrespective of whether the men are friends or enemies. Two things should now be happening to reinvigorate the system we think we live with. One is the intervention of the opposition. The situation should be wide open for them. The system is being perverted and is not delivering. But the Conservatives are part of the problem. They are completely incredible. Presidentialism, while helping Mr Blair to have a successful war so far, seems otherwise to be a curse. It narrows the political pipeline to a single source, and contributes to the cynical anomie that pervades the electorate. Unfortunately, the Tories, whose 18 years were the starting-point for Labour's willingness to tolerate anything as long as it brought power, seem determined to move ever further from where the voters might start to like them. Secondly, the cabinet should begin to insist on collectivising its wisdom. If it has any. But that's the trouble. Ministers have let themselves become atomised, and seem wholly unlikely to develop the critical mass that might produce a creative explosion. That's not the stuff they're made of. New Labour has failed to produce a cohort of heavyweights. There has never been a more formidable political phenomenon with so few leaders - save two emperors fighting over clothes the public are just beginning to suspect may not be there. Full article at: http://politics.guardian.co.uk/labour/comment/0,9236,602241,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Tue Nov 20 05:38:51 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2001 12:38:51 +0000 Subject: [A-List] 'New Germany' faces legacy of French mistrust Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011120123815.03cd7840@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Robert Graham on France's concerns that it risks losing out to a reunified and politically more powerful Germany Published: November 19 2001 20:23 | Last Updated: November 19 2001 22:44 FT book review: La Nouvelle Allemagne Henri de Bresson Stock In towns and villages up and down France the war memorials are impossible to miss. Simple and well tended, they bear the names of those who fell in the Great War of 1914-18 against Germany. Often added are those who lost their lives in the second world war. Less ubiquitous are the monuments to those who died in the Resistance fighting the Nazi occupation. Even with the passing of the years, these memorials remain potent reminders of how much France has suffered from German aggression. They also help explain why the fear of German militarism is so deeply engraved in the French psyche, accounting for such diverse phenomena as the relative indifference of public opinion to events in Germany or the way the country's defence industries have been sited as far away from the German frontier as possible. Henri de Bresson is well aware of these visceral reflexes; but he argues that German reunification and then the advent of the Schroder administration - free of the Nazi-era guilt - has a created a "New Germany". No longer need Germans refer apologetically to their state merely as the "Federal Republic". Making Berlin the capital in 1998 instead of Bonn marked an end to German postwar provincialism. A unified Berlin now offers Germans the opportunity to "show the world that they have learnt the lessons of history and are ready to assume their responsibilities", says de Bresson, one of the newspaper Le Monde's leading European writers and a former correspondent in Germany. A good part of his analysis examines how Germany has seized this historic opportunity under the Social Democrat leadership of Chancellor Gerhard Schroder. Mr Schroder's inheritance from the Helmut Kohl years was not an easy one - a "Germany badly unified, traumatised by its existential problems, desperately aspiring to be a modern country but reluctant to take the risks to do so". Against such a backdrop he finds Schroder still hesitant in the kind of role Germany can and should be playing. All too often, he says, Germany forgets its position as Europe's biggest nation with 82m inhabitants and remains ambivalent on how to behave. It seems caught between pride in regaining a true measure of influence within Europe and the temptation to retreat from any high-profile role should the slightest risk emerge. He likens Germany to a snail that moves forward but constantly resorts to the protection of its shell at the first sign of danger. Hence the fierce debates over the loss of the D-Mark, the symbol of post-war stability. And there is the hot and cold attitude towards taking part in military operations beyond German borders, which has seen the old taboos gradually broken and the anti-militarist constitution being changed. Such hesitancy is not surprising. As de Bresson makes clear, reunification was so rapid that its impact had to be absorbed on the run. With one eye on rebuilding the east, German leaders have had to focus on the simultaneous tasks of reforming the European Union's institutions, enlargement and globalisation, while not forgetting to reassure Europe that the new Germany will not upset its friends and allies. The paradox here is that the combined effect of the single market and the introduction of the euro - even without the poor recent performance of the German economy - has reduced Germany's economic dominance of the EU and eroded the influence of the German economic model. The old adage that Germany is an economic giant and a political dwarf has acquired an un-expected twist. Germany has seen its political weight considerably enhanced with a consequent impact on the balance of power within Europe. De Bresson believes this will be difficult to manage not just for Germany but notably for France. Just as France was the great beneficiary of the diplomatic vacuum in continental Europe resulting from Germany's postwar guilt and politico-military exclusion, Paris now risks being the main loser from the re-emergence of a more assertive government in Berlin. This turnround has been reflected in the awkward relationship between the Schroder administration and France's unwieldy co-habitation of Jacques Chirac, the president, and Lionel Jospin, the socialist premier. Not only did Mr Schroder first flirt with the idea of a closer axis with Britain's Tony Blair, who seemed more on his wavelength than the French leaders groomed in the tradition of clever civil servants running a centralised administration. He also seemed to doubt the continued primacy of the Franco-German relationship in its role as the motor of the EU. The inability of Mr Blair to make up his mind over the UK's membership of the eurozone, however, has left Mr Schroder little option other than to fall back on working closely with France. But now there is an important difference: Germany is no longer willing to play to a French tune. This suggests that unless the French forgo their instinctive mistrust of any initiative in Europe that is not of their own making, the Franco-German relationship will be far from smooth. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Tue Nov 20 14:00:55 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2001 21:00:55 +0000 Subject: [A-List] The Containment Myth Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011120210006.00b16c40@pop.tiscali.co.uk> The Containment Myth US Middle East Policy in Theory and Practice Stephen Hubbell Among those who direct American foreign policy, there is near-unanimity that the collapse of communism represents a kind of zero hour. The end of the Cold War so transformed the geopolitical landscape as to render the present era historically discontinuous from the epoch that preceded it. Policy makers contend that America's mission abroad has had to change to keep pace with these new circumstances. For more than four decades, American intervention around the world was justified by the need to contain international communism. Containment proved to be a versatile and protean doctrine: it could be applied anywhere and tailored to almost any context. In the Middle East, Soviet expansionism was cited as the rationale behind the 1957 Eisenhower doctrine (which authorized backing for conservative rulers such as King Hussein of Jordan and Camille Chamoun of Lebanon, who were besieged by domestic opponents), and for adventures as varied as the overthrow of the Mossadegh government in Iran in 1953, support for Israel in the 1967 and 1973 wars, and the arming of US proxies in the Gulf. It hardly mattered that containment was singularly ill-suited to the specificities of the region. (The Arab states proved to be nearly impervious to Moscow's ideological appeal.) What did matter was Americans' willingness to accept it as a sufficient justification for their government's machinations. The sudden disappearance of the Soviet Union compelled the Bush and Clinton administrations to ponder new rationalizations for future interventions abroad. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake voiced the emerging consensus among the foreign policy elite when he wrote, "[T]he successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement.of the world's free community of market democracies."1 Commercial and economic considerations and the promotion of democracy, he suggested, would henceforth replace military and political factors in guiding foreign policy. The collapse of the Soviet empire has indeed wrought substantial changes in the Middle East. As Simon Bromley and Georges Corm point out in this issue, Moscow's departure from the world stage has considerably freed the United States to impose its will across the region. States that resist the Pax Americana face economic and political isolation and no longer have a superpower sponsor to turn to for support. Those who persist in challenging Washington's diktat can, as always, expect to feel the sting of American military might. Yet no radical break with the past has occurred in US foreign policy toward the Middle East. What is remarkable is the degree of continuity in Washington's objectives in the region during and after the Cold War. Although circumstances have compelled policy makers to replace containment with a patchwork of contradictory and internally incoherent "doctrines," the chief purpose of the new guidelines-like their Cold War-era counterparts-is to obscure the actual motives of US intervention, which remain largely unchanged. The twin pillars of American policy since the Gulf War have been the doctrine of dual containment of Iran and Iraq, and support for the now-moribund Arab-Israeli "peace process." In each case, the new policy conceals a surprising continuity with the perennial project of US interventionism: to secure the maximum possible advantage for American capital as it seeks access to markets and resources abroad. In the developing world, this project has necessitated creating and preserving a political environment friendly to the operation of international capital. To accomplish this, the US-led bloc has had to construct and defend an authoritarian order to resist challenges to its domination, while maintaining Israel's military edge over the collective might of Arab armies. (The promotion of democracy-a central tenet of Lake's vision-was never a goal of US policy in the Middle East, nor is it now.) It is true that the imperatives of globalization and the transnationalization of capital have altered to some degree the form and methods of US intervention. But all available evidence indicates that, whatever doctrine is in favor in the post-Cold War Middle East, the fundamental goals have not changed. The contributors to this issue of Middle East Report address the complex interaction between the professed and the unstated goals of US activism in the Middle East. Steve Niva discusses the conundrum posed by Islam. Although some policy makers cling to the notion of an eternal "clash of civilizations," he notes that pragmatists in the Clinton administration have realized that a policy based on a "clash" with Islam is potentially counter-productive to the globalizing mission of US capital. Sam Husseini traces the media's role in manufacturing consent around foreign policy goals. Using the Gulf mobilization in February as a case study, he finds that under certain circumstances-when Washington's goals are incoherent or contradictory-activists can compel the media to present a more nuanced and honest picture of the true motives behind US intervention. Georges Corm and Volker Perthes offer views of US foreign policy from abroad, where a clearer understanding of the consequences of American actions is often more readily available. >From Rollback to Dual Containment The doctrine of dual containment was first introduced in 1993, two years after the allied victory in the Gulf War. Conventional balance-of-power theory had held that the region's natural leaders, Iraq and Iran, should be pitted against one another to prevent either from becoming dominant and jeopardizing the flow of oil to the West. By choosing to isolate both nations, however, the Bush administration committed itself to an ambitious program requiring an expanded US military and political presence in the Gulf. Dual containment had two immediate consequences, both of which contradicted the president's putative vision for a New World Order: US military force had to be deployed in the Gulf for an extended period to maintain constant pressure against Iran and Iraq; and Saudi Arabia-heretofore a second-tier proxy behind Washington's ally of the moment-had to be transformed, along with its Gulf neighbors, into a credible military counterweight in its own right. Thus, military force remained as necessary under the new dispensation as it was before. The results have been dramatic. In the three years following the end of the Gulf War, new weapons acquisitions by the Gulf states (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE) exceeded those of Iran by nearly 30-to-one.[2] Saudi Arabia has emerged as the world's leading arms purchaser, acquiring weapons systems worth $36.4 billion from the United States alone between 1994 and 1997.[3] (Many of these sales are, of course, financed by loans from American banks.) The number of American troops based in the region has swelled to 20,000; US taxpayers spend a staggering $50 billion annually to maintain and equip them.[4] Cooperation between the domestic intelligence services of the US and Saudi Arabia has reached unprecedented levels, particularly following the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing. The US Fifth Fleet is now permanently based in Bahrain. Moreover, the Pentagon announced in 1997 that it was anticipating a 20-50 year deployment of US troops in the Gulf.[5] The goal of this mobilization has been in part to protect the flow of petroleum by intimidating nations that challenge Washington's prerogative to set the terms of trade in the oil market.[6] The maintenance of military expenditures in the region as the Soviet threat vanished is further evidence that, although superpower rivals may come and go, the thirst for oil is eternal. It would be erroneous, however, to conclude that maintaining the flow of oil at prices favorable to US interests is the sole purpose behind US military mobilization. Of equal significance is Washington's desire to augment the integration of the American and Gulf states' economies. Profits from the sale of petroleum products are increasingly recycled back to the US through arms purchases, as well as through the bank loans such purchases enable. Dual containment was premised on the notion that "rogue states" posed the greatest threat to the West following the Soviet collapse. The priority given to containing the rogue states (whose ranks are rarely enumerated publicly, but presumed to include Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, North Korea and, on occasion, Syria and Sudan) supposedly reflects Washington's growing concern about human rights, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The threat posed by the rogues is hardly imaginary: nearly all of them have chemical, biological or nuclear weapons programs and all have poor human rights records. It is clear, however, that their rogue status reflects not the magnitude of their crimes, but the extent of their dissent from US policy. By any rational standard, nations like Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt should also be listed among the rogues. Israel's failure to ratify the Nonproliferation Treaty and the 1972 biological and toxic weapons convention, which Iran, Libya and Saudi Arabia have all signed, merits no mention in the Defense Department's annual listing of WMD violators.[7] Nor does Egypt's failure to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention. The bleak climate for human rights in these countries is also ignored. What sets them apart, of course, is their continuing usefulness as regional proxies and enforcers of Washington's strategic objectives. The main virtue of the rogue state doctrine from the administration's perspective is that it provides a new pretext to "contain" the same countries whose sovereign rights the US routinely violated during the Cold War. The fact that three of the five rogue states are Middle East oil producers, and that two in particular-Iran and Iraq-are clearly the main targets of the doctrine, points to the continuing centrality of oil in American strategic calculations. Iraq's transgression-invading Kuwait in order to boost oil profits to pay off debts from its war with Iran-flagrantly violated the rules set by the US and Saudi Arabia to maintain price stability. Iraq's crime will not soon be forgotten. Moreover, the embargo on Iraqi oil has provided a windfall for regional producers. Saudi Arabia alone is estimated to have earned more than $100 billion as a result. As one oil expert told the Associated Press, "Saudi Arabia would like the embargo on Iraqi oil maintained as long as possible."[8] (US banks, which hold tens of billions of dollars in outstanding Saudi loans, are also deeply concerned about maintaining Saudi profit levels.) The economic collapse in Asia, on which the oil-producing states had placed much hope for future sales, has further increased the necessity of keeping Iraqi oil off-line and thereby forestalling a glut in the market. The brutal sanctions imposed by the US on Iraq are tantamount to a permanent blockade. Because the US has shown little inclination to lift the sanctions, the purpose behind them must be to marginalize Iraq permanently, rather than induce a change in behavior. As Martin Indyk said in his 1993 speech outlining the dual containment policy, "[T]he current regime in Iraq is a criminal regime, beyond the pale of international society and, in our judgment, irredeemable." [9] Iraq's confrontation with Washington in February of this year was motivated at least in part by Saddam Hussein's desire to force the international community to specify how Iraq could bring itself into compliance with UN Security Council resolutions. Iraqis frequently express fear that the sanctions will not be lifted regardless of what their leadership does. The isolation of Iran, by contrast, is far weaker. Although the administration imposed sanctions in 1996 on foreign companies investing more than $40 million in Iran and forced the cancellation of a lucrative contract between Conoco and the oil ministry, there is considerable business pressure to lift the embargo.[10] Iran's test on July 22 of medium-range missiles acquired from North Korea provoked a sharp rebuke from the Clinton administration, but the evidence suggests that the US-Teheran relationship may not be adversely affected. Secretary of State Albright has gone out of her way to support the new president, Mohammad Khatami, in his rivalry with Iran's religious leader, Ali Khamenei. As Michael Klare points out in this issue, the rapprochement with Iran exposes the inadequacies of the rogue state doctrine, and policymakers may eventually have to discard it. Israel, Palestine and the "Peace Process" The Palestinian-Israeli "peace process" is over. The seductive promise of Oslo has been revealed to be a cruel hoax, a "dying succubus," in Edward Said's phrase. As one observer wrote: "The Oslo process...is less a negotiation between Israelis and Palestinians than an internal Israeli debate about how much territory, authority and sovereignty to offer the Palestinians."[11] It has become clear since last September that, without increased pressure from Washington, the Netanyahu government will continue to stake out a maximalist claim to territory in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. (Gaza is rarely mentioned these days, leaving the impression that Israel regards further withdrawals or "redeployments" of its troops as unnecessary.) Settlement activity continues unabated, as do land seizures, house demolitions, curfews, acts of random violence and the steady, grinding impoverishment of the Palestinian majority. Remarkably, Binyamin Netanyahu's government has flagrantly violated the terms of the accord while managing to preserve the illusion that "peace" is still possible. What accounts, then, for the Clinton administration's tenacious insistence that the interests of the United States, and of the people of the region, are best served by this transparent charade? Phyllis Bennis and Khaled Mansour examine the 50-year history of relations between the two countries and find that the strategic interests of the United States have corresponded neatly with Israel's territorial ambitions for many decades. Ever since Israel proved its prowess in the 1967 Six-Day War, it has been immensely valuable to the US as a "proxy that can fight."[12] Israel provided the front-line troops for the battle against Arab nationalist movements and regimes, whose nationalization programs and advocacy of autarky and import-substitution were anathema to the American business elite. Thus it was thanks largely to rational self-interest that support for Israel became a central tenet of US policy in the region. Yet the end of the Cold War has brought about a re-examination of the strategic partnership. Arab nationalism is no longer a threat to US interests, and the International Monetary Fund's ability to impose austerity on the economies of the region is virtually unlimited. One would expect, then, that Israel's diminishing value as a partner might prompt Washington to take a harder line with Netanyahu in his dealings with the Palestinians in the interests of securing regional stability. The reason this is not so, Bennis and Mansour argue, can be explained by the growing influence of non-rational actors-specifically a millenarian movement of Christian conservatives-in the formation of US policy. The Israeli government's success in nullifying existing agreements without any commensurate cost in security terms or serious reproach from the international community has emboldened the Christian right and its allies in Congress. They argue that a continued alliance with Israel brings greater benefits-both political and spiritual-than would a just settlement of the Palestinian problem. Congressional conservatives, who in decades past were often vulnerable to accusations of anti-Semitism, have realized that demagoguery in defense of Israel will always be rewarded, whereas criticism, no matter how cautiously couched in praise, will always be punished. The Clinton administration, for its part, has adopted a cautious attitude. For the moment at least, it lacks the political capital to oppose forcefully the burgeoning coalition between evangelical Christians, Congress and the Israeli right-wing. The administration is also no doubt aware that the demoralization and disorganization of the Palestinian people will, for the foreseeable future, severely restrict their ability to respond to Israeli aggressions. Thus, there is little pressure on Washington to reconsider its unwavering support of Israel. Moreover, many policy makers view a regional economic order dominated by a conservative, capital-friendly Israeli government as the best long-term prospect for US interests. As we have seen, during the Cold War era, the formation of US foreign policy was cloaked in mystifying, geopolitical rhetoric. The end of that epoch allows a more candid examination of the nature of US hegemony in the region. Washington now possesses more resources than ever before to enforce its will and to punish those states or movements that seek to "go it alone." Through its predominant influence in international lending institutions such as the IMF, the US can virtually micromanage the economies of developing nations and inflict draconian penalties for nonconformity. Through its influence in multilateral forums such as the United Nations, it can impose crushing economic sanctions. If such methods fail, Washington can announce unilateral trade embargoes and penalize countries that violate them. Lastly, of course, US military might can be summoned to restore "order." The lofty promise of a "multipolar" world to replace the bipolar world of the Cold War era was just a mirage. Whatever the future holds for the countries of the region, as well as for the world's only superpower, it is all too clear that the "era of empire" is still with us. Stephen Hubbell, an editor of this magazine, is the former Cairo correspondent for The Nation. Endnotes 1 Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign Affairs 73/2 (March/April 1994). 2 Richard F. Grimmet, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1988-1995 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, US Library of Congress, 1996) p. 53. 3 Scott Peterson, "For Oil and Allies, US Offers a $50 Billion Solution," Christian Science Monitor, August 6, 1997, and Tim Weiner, "Russia and France Gain on US Lead in Arms Sales, Study Says," The New York Times, August 4, 1998. 4 Scott Peterson, op. cit., and F. Gregory Gause, "Arms Supplies and Military Spending in the Gulf," Middle East Report 204 (July-September 1997). 5 Peterson, "For Oil and Allies." 6 See Michael Tanzer, "Oil and the Gulf Crisis," in Beyond the Storm: A Gulf War Reader, Phyllis Bennis and Michael Moushabeck, eds. (Northhampton, MA: Interlink, 1998). 7 Dana Priest, "US Goes Easy on Allies in Arms Control," The Washington Post, April 14, 1998. 8 Charles Hanley, "US-Saudi Web Thickens," Associated Press, April 13, 1997. 9 F. Gregory Gause, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," Foreign Affairs 73/2 (March/April 1994). 10 Lawrence G. Potter, "The Persian Gulf in Transition," Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association. 11 Geoffrey Aronson, "Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories," Foundation for Middle East Peace, 8/1, January/February 1998. 12 See A.F.K. Organski, The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in US Assistance to Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). http://www.merip.org/mer/mer208/hubbell.htm From sherrynstan at igc.org Tue Nov 20 21:32:57 2001 From: sherrynstan at igc.org (sherrynstan at igc.org) Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2001 23:32:57 -0500 Subject: [A-List] The "F" Word Message-ID: The ?F? Word by Michael C. Ruppert [? Copyright 2001, All Rights Reserved, Michael C. Ruppert and From The Wilderness Publications, www.copvcia.com . May be recopied, distributed or reposted on the World Wide Web for non-profit purposes only] Fascism ? 1? a. Totalitarianism marked by right-wing dictatorship and bellicose nationalism. 2. Oppressive, dictatorial control. ? The American Heritage Dictionary. November 20, 2001 My fellow Americans: ?On what legal meat does this our Caesar feed?? wrote New York Times Columnist William Safire as he blasted President Bush?s November 13 emergency order permitting noncitizens the government has ?reason to believe? are terrorists to be tried - inside the U.S - by military tribunals. These trials may be held in secret and the prosecutors do not have to produce evidence if it is ?in the interests of national security.? And the condemned may then be executed ?even if a third of the officers disagree.? Safire categorized this as a ?dictatorial power to jail or execute aliens.? Bush?s proclamation is a nullification of the 6th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. At the same time that Caesar Bush was announcing this edict the Justice Department was announcing ? as reported in the AP on November 15 ? that it will not disclose the identities or status of more than 1,100 people arrested or detained since September 11th, nor will it continue to release a running tally of those detained. As the anxiety level rises in you, you think, ?Well, I?m a citizen so I don?t have anything to worry about.? Try harder to refocus on your Christmas list, Harry Potter and your job. On October 26th ? a date which will live in infamy ? the President signed the USA/PATRIOT act, officially known as HR 3162. And you should well note that, according to Representative Ron Paul (R) of Texas ? as reported on November 9th by Kelly O?Meara of the Washington Times? Insight Magazine ? the bill had not even been printed and members of the House could not read it before they were compelled to vote on it. O?Meara wrote, ?Meanwhile, efforts to obtain copies of the new bill were stonewalled even by the committee that wrote it.? Most of its provisions have nothing to do with fighting terrorism. Under this so-called anti-terrorist measure: ? Any federal law enforcement agency may enter your home or business when you are not there, collect evidence, not tell you about it, and then use that evidence to convict you of a crime; (This nullifies the 4th Amendment to the Constitution). And, says the ACLU, it doesn?t even have to be a terrorism investigation, just a criminal investigation. [Section 213 ? The Sneak and Peek provision]. ? Any federal law enforcement agency may, if they suspect that you are committing a crime, monitor all of you internet traffic and read your emails. They may also intercept all of your cell phone calls as well. No warrant is required. (This violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution) [Section 202 and 216] [See FTW on Carnivore, Vol. IV, No.2 ? April 30, 2001]. ? The FBI or any other federal law enforcement agency may come to your business and seize any of your business records ? if they claim it is connected with a terrorist investigation - and they can arrest you if you tell anyone that they were there. (this violates the First and the Fourth Amendments to the Constitution) [Title II, Section 501] ? The CIA can now operate inside the U.S. and spy on American citizens. And, as directed by AG Ashcroft on November 13, it is also permitted to share its intelligence files with local law enforcement agencies (and vice versa). The CIA has spied on Americans for decades, but the fruits of that spying have never been admissible in court. Now law enforcement will have the ability rewrite the intelligence as a probable cause statement, conduct an investigation and introduce it as evidence. This, from material that was collected outside the rules of search and seizure. (There goes the Exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment). [Titles 2 & 9]. ? The foundation for an international secret political police agency is laid by allowing the CIA to receive wiretap information from any local agency and then share it with the intelligence services of any foreign country. [Section 203] So now a darkness begins to sink over your consciousness. You are mad, first at me, and then you are not quite sure of what to be mad at - but you know you?re mad. Reaching through a guilty conscience you check with yourself and beg of your soul the permission to take the position that you never break any laws. None! You?re a good citizen of the Homeland, a good German ? I mean American. What can you do anyway? Then I arouse your rage at me even further by telling you that Section 802 of HR 3162 defines domestic terrorism as ?activities that ? involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States:? and ?appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;? or ?to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;?? Under this definition the blocking of a driveway at a federal building or defending yourself when attacked by good ?Germans? at a protest march ? while protesting these violations of the Constitution - could instantly make you a ?domestic terrorist? and subject to some of the stiffest penalties ever enacted into law. Next, as you retreat further, covering your ears and mind, shutting out the crime that is being perpetrated by your government ? against you - you will lash out at me and say, ?Look Ruppert, I read the Bill. There?s a ?Sunset Clause? in it. All this stuff goes away after four years. It?s just for the duration of the terrorist emergency.? Not so. Under Section 224 (b) ?With respect to any particular foreign intelligence investigation that began before the date on which the provisions referred to in subsection (a) cease to have effect, or with respect to any particular offense or potential offense that began or occurred before the date on which such provisions cease to have effect, such provisions shall continue in effect.? In other words, if the government says that their desire to burglarize, or wiretap you or search your files is part of an investigation that started before December 31, 2005, there is no sunset clause. This could be for a ?potential? offense. What is a potential offense? Something you thought about? Something you might have thought about? Now thoroughly uncomfortable you reach for more straw teddy bears. And I, like a hunter smelling victory, will close in on you with words that will both reassure you and make you a grown up. Upon reviewing HR 3162 Congressman Paul said to reporter O?Meara, ?Our forefathers would think it?s time for a revolution. This is why they revolted in the first place? They revolted against much more mild oppression.? Mao once said that ?Revolution is not a dinner party.? You squirm in your seat. OK, The Congressman?s noble words stirred you for a moment, made you think of Mel Gibson in ?The Patriot.? But you realize that you?re not Mel Gibson, you?re out of shape, you have bills to pay, a vacation coming soon. Reaching again, you realize something. ?Wait! This is a law. It was passed. It?s proof that there are checks and balances. I?m coming to get you now. Beyond The Law On November 9th, Attorney General Ashcroft announced that he was ordering the Justice Department to begin wiretapping and monitoring attorney-client communications in terrorist cases where the suspect was incarcerated. This was not even discussed in HR 3162. That same day Senator Patrick Leahy (D), Vermont wrote to Ashcroft. He had many questions to ask about what the Justice Department had been doing by violating the trust of Congress and assuming powers which were not authorized by either law or the Constitution. Leahy even quoted a Supreme Court case (U.S. v. Robel): ?[T]his concept of ?national defense? cannot be deemed an end in itself, justifying any exercise of? power designed to promote such a goal. Implicit in the term ?national defense? is the notion that defending those values and ideas which set this Nation apart? It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties? which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.? Leahy asked Ashcroft by what authority had he decided ? on his own and without judicial review ? to nullify the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. He asked for an explanation and some description of the procedural safeguards that Ashcroft would put in place. He asked Ashcroft to appear before the Judiciary committee and to respond in writing by November 13. His answer came a little late. On November 16, Patrick Leahy received an anthrax letter. And, as of this press time, Ashcroft has not responded in writing. I?ve got you now. Moving up the ladder we come to the Vice President, Dick Cheney. The Washington Post reported on November 9 that all summer a major Constitutional clash had been brewing as the former head of oil giant Halliburton refused to surrender to Congress? investigative arm, the GAO, records from his energy task force. The Post story said, ?Comptroller General David M. Walker described the fight as a direct threat to the GAO?s reason for being, a separation-of-powers issue that would determine whether the legislative branch could exercise the oversight role envisioned by the founding fathers.? But the Sept 11th attacks have changed all that. A planned suit by the GAO against Cheney to get the records of his task force on oil has been put on hold. Cheney?s violation of the law goes unchallenged in the goose-stepped march of manufactured polls showing support for the administration. Congressman Henry Waxman (D), CA has blasted Cheney on constitutional grounds but there?s little else he can do in the current climate. And now we come to your President, the guy we started with, by asking what ?legal meat? he eats. Apparently he eats anything he damned well pleases. On November 1st, after several months of delays, George W, Bush broke the law himself by changing an Executive Order and declaring that in this national emergency he was going to prevent the release of papers from the Reagan presidency, even though release is mandated by The Presidential Records Act of 1978. Of what use could these papers be to Osama bin Laden? These papers would probably shed glaring light on the criminality of the Reagan-Bush (the elder) years of Iran-Contra, the savings and loan plundering of American taxpayers and the hand-over-fist drug dealing by the CIA at the direction of G.H.W. Bush. But now, in violation of the law, you will never see them. Nor will you likely ever see the papers from the 89-93 Bush presidency, or the Clinton years ? not to mention those of the current administration. What a convenient way to cover up criminal actions. Representatives Jan Schakowsky (D), Ill, and the ever-brave Henry Waxman rose to the challenge and wrote Bush a letter on November 6th. They said in closing, ?These provisions clearly violate the intent of the law?The Executive Order violates the intent of Congress and keeps the public in the dark. We urge you to rescind this executive order and instead begin a dialogue with Congress and the public to determine the need for clarification of this law.? Any bets as to who gets the next anthrax letter? Have you noticed that only Democrats have been getting them? So now you retreat, your decision has been made. Do nothing. This will all go away. In a last gasp of intellectual, pretzel-bending logic you think, ?Wait! We still have the Supreme Court.? This is the same Supreme Court that illegally handed George W. Bush the 2000 election. This is the court that stopped and delayed hand counting long enough to prevent the final results from being known. Those results ? as buried by the major media in horrendously dishonest stories released last week ? were written as supporting the Supreme Court?s decision to stop the recounts. And based on that decision, the media recount gave Bush the victory. But, as noted by EXTRA! Editor Jim Naureckas in a November 15 Newsday story, the media found that it was quite possible, by examining rejected ballots, to determine the ?clear intent of the voter.? Yet none of these ballots were included in the media recount and all of the media organizations recognized that, had those ballots been counted, Al Gore would have won. As constitutional lawyer Mark H. Levine noted in a December 20, 2000 editorial, what the Supreme Court did was to create a one-case only exception where the ?clear intent of the voter? ? as dictated by Florida law ? was no longer applicable standard. By stopping the hand count and overturning the Florida Supreme Court?s correct reading of its own law, it delayed the recount long enough to force a crisis where it could overrule Florida and deliver the election to Bush while thousands of ballots went uncounted. So much for the Supreme Court. One of the greatest decisions to ever come out the Supreme Court ? when it was one ? was rendered in 1866 after the civil war. The case in question was Abraham Lincoln?s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in arresting protesters and rioters. As recently quoted in an eloquent November 15 article by David Dietman, an attorney and Ph.D. candidate from Erie Pennsylvania, the Court stated: ?The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government.? ? Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). So all you have left to put your faith, or your fear, in ? as you see it ? is the President. You have no faith in yourself, no faith in God, no trust in your fellow citizens and no willingness to experience discomfort. You fail to praise, support and uplift all of the courage that is beginning to reveal itself around you. You draw your blinds and wave your flags hoping for divine intervention before your name or your job comes up on the list. You are a good German, like the Germans who followed Hitler and allowed him to start a war that killed hundreds of millions of people. And when it is all over, when they come for me, when they come for you, when they come for your job - when history sheds it inevitable light on the criminals that today rule our country - you will say, ?I didn?t do anything wrong.? Oh yes you did. Oh yes you did. Mike Ruppert To read Kelly O?Meara?s article on HR 3162 please go to: http:/ /insightmag.com/main.cfm?include=detail&storyid3236 Mike Ruppert "From The Wilderness" www.copvcia.com From franka at fiu.edu Tue Nov 20 20:48:57 2001 From: franka at fiu.edu (Andre Gunder Frank) Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2001 22:48:57 -0500 (EST) Subject: [A-List] Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Both Frank and Jones predict doom and U.S. decline -- Frank's prediction is deflation and economic catastrophe, while Jones' is "entropic fascism." -- far from being alternatives, they are complementary. I must be a lousy reader - or cant get through let alone digest and even less assimilate the 100 msg/day about all this war and all, so i did not find the entropic fascism. however if Mark had not said it [did you? where/how in the oil thing?] ,it would have to be invented and certainly would be if the bottom drops even half way out. for those who know spanish, i can supply a ditty of mine of july vintage on COMO DISIPAR ENTROPIA POR VIA MULTILATERAL. the essence of it is that ''the north'' generates plenty of entropy, but by dissipating/exporting it to the ''south'' - lately especially Russia!- where it is absorbed and creates the social and political dissolution we find there [that is wrongly attributed to some alleged essential/ist characteristics of ''the south''and only part right attributed to direct explitation of thre south by the north -- eg a la AGF mark 1 - ] the dissipation of the north's and most of all of the USA's entropy to elsewhere allows the north/US to escape also the socio-political consequenes of its entropy, that is it can ''afford democracy'' have only 2 million incarcerated but unsafe streets anyway, etc. If/when the dissipation of entropy ceseas to be possible or possible at the recent scale, then those chickens come alos literally home to roost - in the form of neo-fascim among others. my multiatelal thing is to show or at least suggest how this dissipation is organied not so much on a bilateral A>B basis, but on a multilateral one in which ones place in the game of musical charis is more determinant than ones productive etc capacity. hence my attempt to re-look at how the great divergern ce [pomernaz title] emerged in the 19th century is - in its first dfraft not even introduction stage - entitled LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION. thats the name of the game - and thats what Marc and I were writing about. Now i hope that that does not sound insufficiently materialistic - no mention of oil! - because I do want to take advantage of this moment to \rise to apoint of personal priviledge [that's what robert's rules of order used to call it]. being - me AGF - the only remaining historical materialist in this world [and umpteen times more than KM ever was], I am of course not amused by the suggestion that Mark might be moreso than I. agf ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANDRE GUNDER FRANK Department of History Home University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 Fax: 1-402-472 8839 E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Wed Nov 21 00:43:23 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 07:43:23 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Caspian, Russian energy needs major investment-EBRD Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011121074307.00ab6d08@pop.tiscali.co.uk> By Barbara Lewis LONDON, Nov 20 (Reuters) - The Russian and Caspian oil and gas sectors may need investment of more than $300 billion in the next decade to enhance productivity, increase pipeline capacity and develop new fields, the EBRD said on Tuesday. In a report on Energy in Transition, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) also called for an array of reforms to help ensure a "stable and predictable investment environment." Total requirements are difficult to estimate, but they are likely to exceed $300 billion, with perhaps three-quarters of that amount to be spent in Russia. "The cash flow in Russia's hydrocarbon sector should be sufficient to finance modest production growth over the next few years, but as the need to develop new fields increases, Russian energy producers will increasingly have to raise external capital," the report said. It added that investment needs were relatively higher in the Caspian region. In 1989, the Soviet Union was the world's largest oil producer, with an annual output of around 600 million tonnes, writes the EBRD. As output in general fell dramatically with the collapse of the Soviet Union, production of Soviet successor states fell to some 350 million tonnes at its lowest point in 1996. In line with progressive economic recovery, output in 2000 was 395 million tonnes, helped by foreign investment spurred by the past two years of high oil prices. Samuel Fankhauser, senior economist at the EBRD and one of the report's authors, said he did not believe the current fall would hit investment in the Russian region more harshly than elsewhere. Oil was trading at below $17 a barrel on Monday, its lowest level for around two and a half years. Fankhauser underlined the report's calls for improved corporate governance, greater transparency, competition and for the state to change its role from owner and director to regulator. Key conditions, it said, are open and non-discriminatory access to pipelines, which at the moment are largely controlled by pipeline monopoly Transneft and Russian gas giant Gazprom (GAZPq.L). By some estimates, cited by the EBRD, crude oil production in the Caspian region could reach up to 200 million tonnes per year by 2015, up from 65 million tonnes in 2000 -- provided reforms are implemented. Russia's crude production is expected to rise more gradually to around 375 million tonnes a year, up from 325 million. Saudi Arabia, has the world's biggest oil reserves of 262 billion barrels or around 36 billion tonnes. According to figures from the West's energy watchdog, the International Energy Agency (IEA), Saudi Arabian daily oil production in October was an estimated 7.35 million bpd, while Russian production was 6.92. Saudi Arabia says maximum capacity is an estimated 10.5 million bpd. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Wed Nov 21 00:47:22 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 07:47:22 +0000 Subject: [A-List] POST-SOVIET LIVING STANDARDS Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011121074640.035d5790@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Trud No. 210 November 20 (?), 2001 [translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only] POST-SOVIET REPUBLICS HAVE DIFFERENT LIVING STANDARDS By Vitaly GOLOVACHEV, Trud political analyst The Soviet Union's disintegration was announced December 8, 1991, that is, almost 10 years ago. Consequently, 12 Soviet republics became independent states, subsequently merging into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). They had different "jump-off positions" that were determined by economic-development levels, the role of republican economies in the entire system of nationwide co-production arrangements, specific features of the social sphere, minerals, other natural resources, education standards, national mentalities, as well as by local customs and traditions. National-development models also played a really important part in this context. Living standards constitute a veritable indicator, or litmus test, for assessing the social efficiency of specific reforms. They say that statistical records know everything; however, the situation is somewhat different in this particular case. Press releases being issued by the CIS Committee for Statistics imply that Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Georgia don't submit the relevant data dealing with their respective wages and other vital social indices. Therefore we had to find all the required materials on our own. The Georgian statistical service eagerly informed me about average wages being received by local hired workers (90-106 lari), also telling me about the number of Georgians, who live below the official poverty line (approximately 50 percent of the entire republican population). I also learned the size of minimal pensions (14 lari). All these statistics enabled me to compare some aspects of living standards in 10 CIS countries. First of all, I'd like to say a few words about the wages of hired workers. Given real-life inflation, such wages have soared by 7-44 percent in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Moldavia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Russia. Table One highlights that tremendous differentiation in the given sphere. Table One Average Wages in Terms of US Dollars (Official National Exchange Rates) ------------------------------------------------------- September 2001 September 2000 ------------------------------------------------------- Kazakhstan $124 $99 Russia 119 85 Belarus 96 65 Ukraine 61 46 Azerbaijan 57 45 Georgia 46-54 -- Armenia 43 41 Moldavia 43 35 Kirghizia 31 25 Tajikistan 12.6 9.8 ------------------------------------------------------- It turns out that Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus still lead the way here; meanwhile the Tajik situation is worse than anywhere else. The situation with minimal wages is even more contradictory. Such wages account for 36 percent of average Ukrainian wages; meanwhile the break-down for Kazakhstan and Russia is 19 percent and 9 percent, respectively. However, minimal wages tend to differ even more in dollar terms. For example, Tajikistan offers attractive minimal wages to the tune of $1.3, whereas minimal Kazakh wages stand at $23.6. Frankly speaking, per-capita CIS wages or cash incomes are obviously not enough to analyze the overall situation because one should also heed prices and many other factors, too. One should know the number of people living below the official poverty line in every CIS country, the size of the middle class, as well as social-stratification levels for the sake of compiling an authentic survey in the sphere of living standards. However, we don't have any similar statistics being based on a standard methodology. That's why we had to do some simple "homework," which, nonetheless, provides an insight into all the main social trends. How many food packages were bought in CIS capitals for average August 2001 wages? The answer can be found in Table Two, which doesn't list Baku and Yerevan because any data about their respective wages is lacking. A standard food package includes seven staple foods, e.g. one kg of beef, one kg of butter, one kg of granulated sugar, one kg. of wheat bread, one kg of potatoes, one liter of milk and one liter of cooking oil. How can this choice be explained? First of all, such foods constitute an essential part of every person's diet. Second, we know the price of such foods in CIS capitals. A similar 1988-vintage indice should also be examined in order to complete this jig-saw puzzle. Table Two How many packages comprising seven staple foods could be bought in CIS capitals for average August 2001 wages? And how many similar food packages could be bought in former Soviet republics for 1988-vintage wages? ---------------------------------------------------------------- - CIS The number of The number of food packages countries food packages that were bought for (Soviet that were bought average wages in 1988 republics for average in 1988) wages in September 2001 ---------------------------------------------------------------- - Minsk 26 food packages 24 food packages (Belarus) Astana 24 23.6 (Kazakhstan) Moscow 18.5 24 (Russia) Kiev 15.6 22.6 (Ukraine) Kishinev 9.6 20.1 (Moldavia) Bishkek 7.8 19 (Kirghizia) Tbilisi 5.7-6.8 17.4 (Georgia) Dyushambe 3.1 17.7 (Tajikistan) ---------------------------------------------------------------- - Minsk and Astana now offer 1988-vintage wages in terms of their purchasing power. Meanwhile Tajik and Georgian social sectors "boast" the most involved situation of them all. As of 1988, the people of Tajikistan could buy nearly 18 food packages for their average wages; however, only three packages can be bought at this stage. This is seen as an unprecedented slump in the post-Soviet social sector. The purchasing power of Georgian wages has plunged 2.5-3-fold. To my mind, future historians will dot all the i's and cross all the t's. Still one would like to answer quite a few questions already today. Why, for example, have the people of Georgia become so impoverished? Official statistics imply that 50 percent of all Georgians now live well below the official poverty line. Pitifully small and sporadic wages make it well-nigh impossible to support a family in Georgia; huge wage arrears should also be mentioned in this respect. Many Georgians don't have any jobs whatsoever. People are trying hard to find even part-time employment at improvised street labor exchanges all over Georgia. Tiny 14-lari ($7) minimal pensions force Georgia's senior citizens to eke out a miserable existence. The republic's urban residents, who used to prosper during the Soviet period are plagued by regular power shut-offs, also buying gasolene on the black market for their used Lada cars; such gasolene is better than the one being offered at official gasolene stations. All this seems like a never-ending nightmare. The rather involved Tajik situation can be explained by persisting regional tensions, as well as by the least impressive economic potential (among other CIS countries). Tajikistan's per-capita GDP totalled $159 last year (in line with official exchange rates). Meanwhile Georgia boasts a much more impressive per-capita GDP, i.e. $608. So, how can one explain such a drastic decline in living standards? First of all, this can be explained by serious economic problems, which had set in after the disruption of traditional economic ties between former Soviet regions. Such problems were also caused by mistakes in the field of economic development, as well as by the rather involved domestic situation. The Georgian GDP increased by an impressive 4.8 percent throughout the January-September 2001 period; nonetheless, its industrial output (in fixed prices) has even diminished. For example, footwear production has been halved over the same time period. The country's slaughter-houses also receive 7 percent less cattle and poultry for their needs (January-June 2001 estimate). Quite a few products can't be sold on the domestic market and elsewhere. Georgia's foreign- trade deficit (in its trade with other CIS members and other countries of the world) has increased by almost 50 percent throughout the January-August 2001 period (on similar 2000 levels), totalling $293 million. The Soviet Union disintegrated a decade ago, with national living standards plunging virtually overnight in every newly independent state. Russia, for one, used to have 60 million impoverished people (40 percent of its entire population). However, an economic recovery set in some time later, also propping up the social sector. The speed of such processes varies from country to country. Some CIS countries are making remarkable headway, while others still tend to fall behind. Some blunders, which were made during the implementation of economic reforms, hinder the assertion of cost-effective market economics. The same can be said about ill-conceived political decisions, as well as red tape and corruption at every official and administrative level. Those time-tested inter- republican economic ties were also severed, thus hitting national economies real hard. Surely enough, quite a few positive shifts exist. A survey, which was conducted by experts from the CIS Committee for Statistics, shows that most CIS countries managed to retain their economic-growth rates over the January-September 2001 period. GDP volumes have swelled; and industrial production has been expanded (with the exception of Georgia). The same can be said about the swelling retail trade turnover (except Tajikistan). Real-life popular incomes and wages continued to increase; however, Belarus and Ukrainian wages dwindled somewhat this past September. Nevertheless, the financial standing of many legal entities remains rather involved, despite overall positive trends. As a rule, incoming investment is not enough to ensure a sustainable economic recovery. Moreover, low popular incomes serve to impede domestic demand, as well as national production expansion. 26.4 percent of the entire Ukrainian population live well below the official poverty line. 27.9 percent of all Kazakh citizens also fit into this category. The respective Russian share is 31.3 percent. (Such estimates were made in line with national social standards -- Ed.) However, this share is even more impressive in other countries. All of us must consolidate positive trends, subsequently rectifying the current situation. Expanded mutually-advantageous cooperation, more profound integration processes and stable good-neighborly relations meet the interests of all CIS countries. [from JTL] From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Wed Nov 21 01:18:12 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 08:18:12 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011121081520.035d5790@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 21/11/2001 03:48, Andre Gunder Frank wrote: >Both Frank and Jones predict doom and U.S. decline -- Frank's prediction >is deflation and economic catastrophe, while Jones' is "entropic fascism." Did Richard Hutchinson say this? In any case the idea that the laws of thermodynamics have social effects is not new and goes back to at least Justus von Liebig if not to Aristotle. Marx and Engels discussed entropy and its social consequences. Alf Hornborg has recently written good stuff on this, as has Stan Goff on this list. Mark From Arno.Tausch at bmsg.gv.at Wed Nov 21 01:35:20 2001 From: Arno.Tausch at bmsg.gv.at (Tausch, Arno) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 09:35:20 +0100 Subject: [A-List] superb AGF, the Utah a- list and all Message-ID: <4FC0BEA08BA4D51188F20002A5291B2617E579@MAILIX07> This is just to tell you, friends, that I found AGF's recent larger piece really superb. Regarding the a-list at Utah University, a kind of refuge for the active rest of the wsn mail archive (for the outsiders: a real researcher conspiracy to get rid of the largely useless wsn mail archive trash), I would have to say that even there quantitity does not mean necessarily quality, and I simply have no time to digest things that I can read at any rate first hand and much better from the Guardian website or in the Le Monde Diplomatique. Sorry. That also explains my unsubscription from the wsn-mail archive. Arno Tausch PS: I should draw your attention to our forthcoming beautiful pension reform and global capitalism volume, which I hope will be out just in time for the Madrid UN Conference on Aging in April 2002. The three pillars of wisdom? A reader on globalization, World Bank pension models and welfare society. Arno Tausch (Ed) with contributions by John Turner, Robert Holzmann, Franz Rothenbacher, Jeja Pekka Roos, Walter Cadette, Goran Normann, Daniel J. Mitchell, Martin Rein, Gerhard Buczolich, Bernhard Felderer, Reinhard Koman, Andreas Ulrich Schuh, Eva Belabed, Stephen J. Kay, Syed Mansoob Murshed, Gordon Laxer, Frank Stilwell, Ted Wheelwright, Kunibert Raffer, Arno Tausch, The Twelve Theses of New Delhi C Nova Science http://www.nexusworld.com/nova/index.html CONTRIBUTORS 10 FOREWORD 13 INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL SECURITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION. 14 Arno Tausch 14 PART I SOCIAL PROTECTION IN AN ERA OF THE WANING WELFARE STATE 41 SOCIAL SECURITY DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM AROUND THE WORLD 41 John Turner 41 ARTICLE 58 Robert Holzmann 58 THE CHANGING PUBLIC SECTOR IN EUROPE: SOCIAL STRUCTURE, INCOME AND SOCIAL SECURITY 59 Franz Rothenbacher 59 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRISIS OF THE 1990S TO THE NORDIC WELFARE STATE: FINLAND AND SWEDEN 66 Jeja Pekka Roos 66 PART II THREE PILLAR PENSION SYSTEMS 79 SOCIAL SECURITY PRIVATIZATION - A BAD IDEA 80 Walter M. Cadette 80 PENSION REFORM IN SWEDEN: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN POLICYMAKERS 86 Goran Normann and Daniel J. Mitchell 86 PUBLIC-PRIVATE INTERACTIONS: MANDATORY PENSIONS IN AUSTRALIA, THE NETHERLANDS AND SWITZERLAND 102 Martin Rein MIT and John Turner AARP 102 PENSION REFORM IN AUSTRIA 138 Gerhard Buczolich, Bernard Felderer, Reinhard Koman, Andreas Ulrich Schuh 138 ARTICLE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS VOLUME 139 Eva Belabed 139 TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS HEARING ON SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM LESSONS LEARNED IN OTHER COUNTRIES 140 Stephen J. Kay 140 TAX COMPETITION, GLOBALIZATION AND DECLINING SOCIAL PROTECTION 147 S Mansoob Murshed 147 PART III: GLOBALIZATION AND WELFARE SOCIETY 166 SOCIAL SOLIDARITY, DEMOCRACY AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM 167 Gordon Laxer 167 GLOBALIZATION: HOW DID WE GET TO WHERE WE ARE? (AND WHERE CAN WE GO NOW?) 188 Frank Stilwell 188 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND THEIR EFFECTS ON AUSTRALIA 195 Ted Wheelwright 195 ARTICLE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS VOLUME: GLOBALIZATION AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 199 Kunibert Raffer 199 PART IV - EMPIRICAL ANALYSES ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PENSION REFORM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 200 WORLD BANK PENSION REFORMS AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM. MACRO-QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES OF THEIR EFFECTS ON SOCIAL WELFARE 201 Arno Tausch 201 PART V - THE NEED FOR GLOBAL WELFARE 324 GLOBALIZATION, CONFLICT, VULNERABILITY & THE NEED FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 325 S MANSOOB MURSHED 325 FINAL DECLARATION TWELVE THESES OF NEW DELHI 341 JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY, NEW DELHI, International Seminar on Welfare State Systems: Development and Challenges 9 - 11 April 2001 341 PART VI: INTERDISCIPLINARY BIBLIOGRAPHY: GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL POLICY 343 Arno Tausch 343 CONTRIBUTORS John Turner is researcher at the Public Policy Institute of the American Association of Retired People, AARP, in Washington D.C. Jturner at aarp.org Robert Holzmann is professor of economics at Saarbruecken University (Germany) (presently on leave) and is Director of the Social Protection Department of the Human Development Network of the World Bank rholzmann at worldbank.org Franz Rothenbacher is a sociologist at the EURODATA Research Archive at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES) Franz.Rothenbacher at mzes.uni-mannheim.de Jeja Pekka Roos is professor of Social Policy at Helsinki University jproos at valt.helsinki.fi Walter Cadette is a senior researcher at the Jerome Levy Institute of Economics in New York, USA. He is a retired vice president of J.P. Morgan & Co. Cadette at levy.org Goran Normann is associate professor of Economics at the University of Lund, Sweden and President of Normann Economics International based in Stockholm and Paris. goran.normann at norecon.a.se Daniel J. Mitchell is researcher at the Heritage Foundation in Washington D.C., USA mitchelld at heritage.org Martin Rein is professor of social policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Urban Studies and Planning Mrein at MIT.EDU Gerhard Buczolich is a Ministerial Counselor in the Federal Ministry of Social Security and Generations in Austria Gerhard.Buczolich at bmsg.gv.at Bernhard Felderer is Director of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna, Austria felderer at his.ac.at Reinhard Koman is researcher at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna, Austria koman at ihs.ac.at Andreas Ulrich Schuh is researcher at the Department of Economics at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna, Austria schuh at ihs.ac.at Eva Belabed is researcher at the Chamber of Labor in Linz, Austria Belabed Eva[SMTP:Belabed.E at ak-ooe.at] Stephen J. Kay is a researcher at the Federal Reserve Bank in Atlanta, Georgia, USA Stephen.Kay at atl.frb.org[SMTP:Stephen.Kay at atl.frb.org] pierce.nelson at atl.frb.org Syed Mansoob Murshed is a researcher at the Institute for Social Studies in The Hague and at the United Nations World Institute for Development Economics Research in Helsinki Murshed at iss.nl Gordon Laxer is professor of political economy at the University of Alberta, Canada Gordon.laxer at ualberta.ca Frank Stilwell is Associate professor of Economics at Sydney University, Australia franks at bullwinkle.econ.usyd.edu.au Ted Wheelwright is professor emeritus of Economics and Geography at Sydney University and director of the Transnational Corporations Research Project, Sydney, Australia Chris Williams [SMTP:cwilliams at staff.usyd.edu.au] Kunibert Raffer is Associate professor of Economics at Vienna University, Austria Kunibert.raffer at univie.ac.at Arno Tausch is Ministerial Counselor in the Ministry of Social Security and Generations in Vienna, Austria, and an Associate Visiting Professor of Political Science at Innsbruck University Arno.Tausch at bmsg.gv.at -----Ursprungliche Nachricht----- Von: Andre Gunder Frank [mailto:franka at fiu.edu] Gesendet: Mittwoch, 21. November 2001 04:49 An: Richard N Hutchinson Cc: Mark Jones; wsn at csf.colorado.edu; a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu; franka at fiu.edu Betreff: [A-List] Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil Both Frank and Jones predict doom and U.S. decline -- Frank's prediction is deflation and economic catastrophe, while Jones' is "entropic fascism." -- far from being alternatives, they are complementary. I must be a lousy reader - or cant get through let alone digest and even less assimilate the 100 msg/day about all this war and all, so i did not find the entropic fascism. however if Mark had not said it [did you? where/how in the oil thing?] ,it would have to be invented and certainly would be if the bottom drops even half way out. for those who know spanish, i can supply a ditty of mine of july vintage on COMO DISIPAR ENTROPIA POR VIA MULTILATERAL. the essence of it is that ''the north'' generates plenty of entropy, but by dissipating/exporting it to the ''south'' - lately especially Russia!- where it is absorbed and creates the social and political dissolution we find there [that is wrongly attributed to some alleged essential/ist characteristics of ''the south''and only part right attributed to direct explitation of thre south by the north -- eg a la AGF mark 1 - ] the dissipation of the north's and most of all of the USA's entropy to elsewhere allows the north/US to escape also the socio-political consequenes of its entropy, that is it can ''afford democracy'' have only 2 million incarcerated but unsafe streets anyway, etc. If/when the dissipation of entropy ceseas to be possible or possible at the recent scale, then those chickens come alos literally home to roost - in the form of neo-fascim among others. my multiatelal thing is to show or at least suggest how this dissipation is organied not so much on a bilateral A>B basis, but on a multilateral one in which ones place in the game of musical charis is more determinant than ones productive etc capacity. hence my attempt to re-look at how the great divergern ce [pomernaz title] emerged in the 19th century is - in its first dfraft not even introduction stage - entitled LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION. thats the name of the game - and thats what Marc and I were writing about. Now i hope that that does not sound insufficiently materialistic - no mention of oil! - because I do want to take advantage of this moment to \rise to apoint of personal priviledge [that's what robert's rules of order used to call it]. being - me AGF - the only remaining historical materialist in this world [and umpteen times more than KM ever was], I am of course not amused by the suggestion that Mark might be moreso than I. agf ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANDRE GUNDER FRANK Department of History Home University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 Fax: 1-402-472 8839 E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Wed Nov 21 02:13:57 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 09:13:57 +0000 Subject: [A-List] superb AGF, the Utah a- list and all In-Reply-To: <4FC0BEA08BA4D51188F20002A5291B2617E579@MAILIX07> Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011121091041.035f0818@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 21/11/2001 08:35, Tausch, Arno wrote: >This is just to tell you, friends, that I found AGF's recent larger piece >really superb. > > > >Regarding the a-list at Utah University, a kind of refuge for the active >rest of the wsn mail archive (for the outsiders: a real researcher >conspiracy to get rid of the largely useless wsn mail archive trash), I >would have to say that even there quantitity does not mean necessarily >quality, and I simply have no time to digest things that I can read at any >rate first hand and much better from the Guardian website or in the Le Monde >Diplomatique. Sorry. That also explains my unsubscription from the wsn-mail >archive. Yes, there has been too much crossposting to the A-List from the mainstream press, and I too am guilty of this. Less is more! Let us apply the rule about no promiscuous crossposting, friends, please. Mark From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 21 03:19:49 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 12:19:49 +0200 Subject: [A-List] superb AGF, the Utah a- list and all Message-ID: Mark Jones writes: Yes, there has been too much crossposting to the A-List from the mainstream press, and I too am guilty of this. Less is more! Let us apply the rule about no promiscuous crossposting, friends, please. ===== Fair point, but often articles disappear, and the archive that we are building up is a most useful resource that I certainly intend to use for future research purposes. I can exercise greater selectivity, but I hope that listers do not hold back from forwarding interesting, relevant articles that may escape the notice of others. In my own postings I usually append some commentary, for the sake of developing themes that are recurring and which I intend to discuss in greater detail at some later date. Most obviously, this involves the British state, and I believe that by forwarding articles relevant to this theme I can explain my position better now and in future because I have easy access to supporting evidence. When in doubt, there's always the delete button. Michael Keaney From pieinsky at igc.org Wed Nov 21 06:41:10 2001 From: pieinsky at igc.org (Jay Moore) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 08:41:10 -0500 Subject: [A-List] First global recession in 20 years Message-ID: <000b01c17296$e7c51bc0$5b7cf2d0@bypass.com> First global recession in 20 years Mark Tran Tuesday November 20, 2001 The Guardian The global economy appears to be in recession for the first time in 20 years following September's attacks on the US, a leading economic think tank said today. But the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development does forecast a late rebound next year. The findings from the Paris-based agency were in line with those from the International Monetary Fund, which recently slashed its forecasts for the world economy. The UK economy is expected to "slow noticeably" in the coming months, but should pick up at a solid pace in the second half of 2002, the OECD said. Britain emerges as the star performer among industrialised countries in the twice-yearly OECD report. Growth is forecast to slip from 2.9% last year to 2.3% this year and slump to 1.7% next year. However, it would then recover to 2.5% in 2003. While the UK economy is expected to weather the recession better than most, the overall picture provided by the OECD is gloomy. "The terrorist attacks of September 11 ... have inflicted a severe shock to the world economy," said the OECD, which is made up of 30 countries that account for most of the planet's wealth. "OECD-wide output is estimated to be contracting slightly in the second half of this year - for the first time in 20 years - and is projected to remain very weak in the first half of next year," the report said. The OECD forecast growth in the US, the world's largest economy, at 1.1% this year, with growth of 1.2% in the first half offset by a 0.6% contraction in the second half. As for next year, the OECD forecast just 0.7% growth, but sees solid 3.8% growth in 2003. The OECD cautioned against further interest rate cuts to allow the US Federal Reserve's 10 cuts this year to work their way through. At 2%, US rates stand at their lowest level since 1961. As for the eurozone, the OECD said it expected 1.6% growth this year, followed by 1.4% and 3% in 2002 and 2003 respectively, broadly in line with the IMF forecasts. The OECD predicted that the European Central Bank would cut interest rates by another half-point as inflation eased back below 2% in the 12-nation currency zone in 2002 - and that it might need to cut more aggressively if things deteriorated. Its key rate currently stands at 3.25%. As for Japan, the economy was expected to shrink 0.7% this year and by 1.0% in 2002, with a return to growth in 2003 with a modest 0.8% expansion. While Britain is expected to weather the global downturn better than most, the OECD added: "Given the downside risks, further monetary easing may prove necessary." The Bank of England has already cut interest rates seven times this year, from 6% in January to 4% in its last meeting earlier this month. The Bank is expected to "start withdrawing part of the monetary stimulus only from early 2003 onwards", the OECD said. The think-tank also warned its projection was surrounded by a great deal of uncertainty. It said: "While the economic consequences of the September 11 attacks is difficult to fully assess, it could trigger a sharper downturn globally than expected." From franka at fiu.edu Wed Nov 21 07:50:58 2001 From: franka at fiu.edu (Andre Gunder Frank) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 09:50:58 -0500 (EST) Subject: [A-List] superb AGF, the Utah a- list and all In-Reply-To: Message-ID: mea culpa - THIS [exceptional?] time.. agf hisOn Wed, 21 Nov 2001, Keaney Michael wrote: > Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 12:19:49 +0200 > From: Keaney Michael > Reply-To: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu > To: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [A-List] superb AGF, the Utah a- list and all > > Mark Jones writes: > > Yes, there has been too much crossposting to the A-List from the > mainstream > press, and I too am guilty of this. Less is more! Let us apply the rule > about no promiscuous crossposting, friends, please. > > ===== > > Fair point, but often articles disappear, and the archive that we are > building up is a most useful resource that I certainly intend to use for > future research purposes. I can exercise greater selectivity, but I hope > that listers do not hold back from forwarding interesting, relevant > articles that may escape the notice of others. In my own postings I > usually append some commentary, for the sake of developing themes that > are recurring and which I intend to discuss in greater detail at some > later date. Most obviously, this involves the British state, and I > believe that by forwarding articles relevant to this theme I can explain > my position better now and in future because I have easy access to > supporting evidence. > > When in doubt, there's always the delete button. > > Michael Keaney > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANDRE GUNDER FRANK Department of History Home University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 Fax: 1-402-472 8839 E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Wed Nov 21 08:31:45 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 15:31:45 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: Re: The effectiveness of 'air power' (fwd) Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011121153057.00aa3da0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> >---------- Forwarded message ---------- > > Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2001 20:41:11 -0500 > > From: Andre Gunder Frank > > Reply-To: Discussions on the Socialist Register and its articles > > > > To: SOCIALIST-REGISTER at YORKU.CA > > Subject: Re: The effectiveness of 'air power' > > > > Gunder Frank's 2 cents worth in the half way through intermission of the > > movie. If ya wanna ''prove'' the effectiveness of air power, the three > > examples offered are very badly chosen. > > > > Afghanistan: No doubt the bombs killed people, terrorised most others, and > > destroyed infrastructure, thereby putting millions at even greater risk > > of death there this winter. If THAT is the objective, then yes, airpower > > can do that. If the objective is getting rid of Taliban, after having put > > it there in the first place and welcomed it and still negotiated with it > > until very recently, not to mention the 46 millon the US gave to Taliban > > in August, NO airpower has not been very effective -- without gournd > > power, in this case provided by the NA. And if it is to get a different US > > friendly regime -- but it HAS to be Pakistan friendly too! and Russian > > accepted!! - airpower has/can NOT do that, and ground power wont > > either . ''Frinedly '' regimes come and go, and even moreso the same > > regieme goes from friend to foe even faster. No air power there - unless > > you mean firebombing 6,000 people to death in one night in Panama to > > catch one ''narco terrorist'' who recently had been a CIA ''asset'' that > > shook hands - foto to prove it ! - with the same guy who then turned on > > him, but still had to send in US tropps to capture this lone panamanian > > ranger.Now if you mean combatting terrorism of course air power can do > > nothing, other than USE its own terorism to terrorise people [the daisy > > cutters and clusters of cluster bombs were not only used for that but > > deliberatley so accordoing to Pentagon spokespersons],but air power did > > not capture a single Afghani terrorist, non e of whihc incicdentally was > > ever shown to have had even a remote connection with the Sept 11 WTC > > bombing. But if you wanna use airpower for geo-strategic purposes in > > Central Asia, Russia, China etc. well then yes that's useful but e4ven > > then only so-so. > > > > Kosovo. you must be kidding us. When the bombing stopped, the Yugoslave > > army flew out their airplanes and drove out their tanks from Kosovo > > as though nothing had happened other than polishing them while they were > > out of harms way. And why did the bombing stop? because the Milosevic > > regime saw that the jig was up - but not from bombing that was supposed to > > last 1 week but continued on and on and could havce continued still longer > > on and on. It was the Russian back-out/withdrawal of support at the > > Berlin meeting - I grant you themselves giving way to US blackmail, but > > largely economic and not bombing or even nucelar bombish - that obliged > > Milosevic to lay down his cards. But only on the table. Since he not only > > survived but was very much strengthened by the NATO war. His eventual > > political demise was the result of altogether other forces and sources. > > > > > > Bosnia. hardly. Dayton came after yrears of NOT bombing and not > > intervening otherwise, while the Western powers were unable to agree > > among themselves not to mention with Russia, so 300,000 people were > > sacrificed to death while the West failed to implement the Vance -Owens > > Plan [pretty bad in supporting ethnic cleansing and division] until it WAS > > implemented at Dayton. well NO, not quite implmented, only signed for the > > sake of ''democracy'; at a military base [how come the agreement goes by > > the name of the tonw and not of the base?]. Here is the poetic irony: whi > > DID implement the Dayton accords on the GROUND? None other than Milosevic > > who was charge with this task , no one else being available or up to the > > task, by the Westrern [US[ powers. Once he had done his job, he was dumped > > tand then also bombed - alegedly for having dcone in Kosovo what the US > > had given hjim green light to do at Dayton, in whose accored the word > > Kosovo never appeared, and not not by accident! that was the quid pro quo > > for Milosevic's asistance -- not that of air power. > > > > Good thing you did not add Iraq to your bombing list, all the moresor > > since the US and UK are STILL bombing the poor Iraquis and Saddam Hussein > > is also stiull THERE. > > > > Actually the moral of this whole story is not the danger and utility of > > being bombed, but instead of signing on as the henchman of the US. THAT is > > what is so dangerous and 99 percent certian to do you in, or at least to > > be stabbbed in the back. Just ask - not to go back to Papa Doc, Duvalier, > > Somoza et al - Noriega, Hussein fighting for the US against Iran, > > Milosevic guaranteeing Dayton, the KLA butchers and drug runners converted > > from freedom fighters in Kosovo to terrorists in Macedonia, the > > Muhajaddin/Taliban not to mention a certain Mr.bin Laden [he had a chat > > with a CIA guy in July 2001!]. THAT is what is most dangerous ON THE > > GROUND - and there is no vaccine against that - and the most > > useful/useless -ness, not airpower. Of course that is not what the Air > > Froce will tell you or their puppet media people. They would rather have > > and probably will get another Star Wars program thanks to sept 11, since > > that tragedy made the use of airpower, nay even better space power, > > self-evidently the force of choice to ferret out and run down one guy. > > gunder frank > > p.s. what it's really all about you can read in various postings here and > > there on geo politcal economy , and even a bit in one of mine that I now > > make bold to post on this net - thanks to your provocation by air power. > > > > > > > > thereb On Tue, 20 Nov 2001, Joel Harden wrote: > > > > > Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2001 16:34:29 -0500 > > > From: Joel Harden > > > Reply-To: Discussions on the Socialist Register and its articles > > > > > > To: SOCIALIST-REGISTER at YORKU.CA > > > Subject: The effectiveness of 'air power' > > > > > > Second, and more controversially (on this list) the matter of > > > triumphalism. Yes, this tone is very annoying, but let's face facts. > > > After Bosnia, Kosovo and now Afghanistan, it should be reasonably clear > > > that air power works. There may be many reasons to criticise the > > > exercise of air power, but it can no longer be argued plausibly that it > > > is ineffective. Sorry, folks, that's the way it is. > > > > > > -- > > > Reg Whitaker > > > -- > > > > > > Ok, I'll bite: > > > > > > For whom does air power work Reg? What are the short or long term > prospects > > > for the bombed (or us, for that matter) that makes the tactic so > effective? > > > Just who is cowed by this show of force, and for what purpose? Enlighten > > > those of us who feel that the US military might not have the most > sanguine > > > of motives. > > > > > > Joel Harden > > > > > > > > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > > > ANDRE GUNDER FRANK > > Department of History Home > > University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street > > 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 > > P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA > > Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 > > Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 > > Fax: 1-402-472 8839 > > E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ > > > > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > ANDRE GUNDER FRANK >Department of History Home >University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street >612 Oldfather Apt. 107 >P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA >Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 >Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 >Fax: 1-402-472 8839 >E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ > From tomzbox at hotmail.com Wed Nov 21 16:20:31 2001 From: tomzbox at hotmail.com (Tom Warren) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 16:20:31 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: Re: The effectiveness of 'air power' (fwd) Message-ID: >From: Mark Jones >> > Gunder Frank's 2 cents worth in the half way through intermission of >>the >> > movie. If ya wanna ''prove'' the effectiveness of air power, the three >> > examples offered are very badly chosen. I heard something the other day, maybe on Geraldo, maybe on Oprah, maybe on CNN: "It's not that BOMBing is ineffective, it's just that RESTRICTED bombing is ineffective." With which the good citizens of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Dresden will prolly agree. Ya can't blame the tools for the poor workmanship! Tom Warren Pleasant Hill, Oregon _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Wed Nov 21 09:46:25 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 16:46:25 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: Re: The effectiveness of 'air power' (fwd) In-Reply-To: <5.1.0.14.2.20011121153057.00aa3da0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011121164447.02c4bea8@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 21/11/2001 15:31, you wrote: > > that air power works. There may be many reasons to criticise the > > exercise of air power, but it can no longer be argued plausibly that it > > is ineffective. Sorry, folks, that's the way it is. > > Isn't it a little early to assume that the war is won? Mark From lnp3 at panix.com Wed Nov 21 09:51:39 2001 From: lnp3 at panix.com (Louis Proyect) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 11:51:39 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: Re: The effectiveness of 'air power' (fwd) In-Reply-To: <5.1.0.14.2.20011121164447.02c4bea8@pop.tiscali.co.uk> References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011121153057.00aa3da0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.20011121115139.006a2310@popserver.panix.com> >Isn't it a little early to assume that the war is won? > >Mark NY Times, November 21, 2001 THE HARD CORE Defiant Taliban Let Refugees Meet the Press By NORIMITSU ONISHI SPINBALDAK, Afghanistan, Nov. 20 ? A calendar hangs on the office wall of the local Taliban leader here, celebrating the destruction of this country's Buddha statues this year. Before-and-after photographs show the effects of the Taliban's policies, though the biggest picture is of the explosion itself, a brown cloud of dust that the calendar celebrates as a historic image. The Taliban have lost much of the country to the United States-backed Northern Alliance, but here in their stronghold in southern Afghanistan they remain in control. Despite the continued pummeling by the United States that has uprooted many civilians from their homes, the Taliban still talk defiantly. "The fighting will continue until Judgment Day," Najibullah Sheerzio, the Taliban foreign ministry representative here, said today in an interview in his office. "It is a war not only in Afghanistan but everywhere between Muslims and America." Although they have fled several cities, including the capital, Kabul, the Taliban have begun to show some resilience. In Kandahar, the spiritual center of the Taliban, its leaders appear to be in control despite intense bombing, and if they are about to give up power, they seem determined to do so on their own terms. In Kunduz, where Taliban fighters and their Muslim allies have been surrounded for days, the Taliban commanders say they are negotiating a surrender. But the talks are proving protracted. The Taliban still seem to have the time and the organization to put together the trip that brought foreign journalists to this area today to demonstrate what they call the effect of American bombing on ordinary Afghans. This was the second such media trip since the start of the war. full: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/21/international/21TALI.html Louis Proyect Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 21 09:09:45 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 18:09:45 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Die Neue Mitte Message-ID: Blair welcomes the new Germany PM applauds move to send troops into war zone John Hooper in Nuremberg Wednesday November 21, 2001 The Guardian Tony Blair yesterday won a standing ovation from Germany's ruling Social Democrats after he gave a ringing endorsement to the new, more militarily active role assumed by Gerhard Schr?der's government since September 11. Less than a week after the Bundestag voted to send German troops into action outside Europe for the first time since 1945, Mr Blair told delegates to the SPD conference: "It is a time for boldness, courage and strength." In strikingly unequivocal language, the prime minister went on to reaffirm his view that the terrorist attacks on the US had strengthened the arguments for European integration. "New Labour today has no hesitation in viewing the development of European co-operation and integration as having major political benefits", he said. "A Europe that is united can achieve far more as a force for good in the world than any member state can on its own. Post-11 September, the need for enhanced European effectiveness is more urgent still." He is expected to take the argument still further in a speech in Britain on Friday. Speaking yesterday in Nuremberg, a German city with the grimmest of historical associations, Mr Blair said: "For you, in Germany, the militarism of former times has many bitter memories. But today, in the 21st century, as a leader of Europe, with huge economic and political power, it is in your interests and those of the wider world that you play your full part in foreign and defence policy, recognis ing those memories are indeed the past not the present or the future." Though he did not refer to the fact, Mr Blair delivered his message on the anniversary of the start of the Nazi war crimes trial in Nuremberg, 56 years earlier. It was the first speech by a British prime minister to an SPD conference and it earned him a longer and more impassioned standing ovation than the one accorded the day before to the chancellor, Mr Schr?der. Mr Blair welcomed the emergence of what he termed "the new Germany" and several times referred to German "leadership". The chancellor, he said, was guiding his country towards accepting "her full responsibilities in the international community of nations". More than 90% of the delegates yesterday endorsed the Schr?der government's decision to contribute up to 3,900 soldiers in support of the US-led war on terrorism. Opposition within the party melted away after an appeal for unity from the chancellor. Drawing a parallel that prompted laughter from his German audience, Mr Blair said: "For you, Europe is relatively easy as an issue; the commitment of military forces hard. For us the opposite. "Yet overcoming both difficulties are necessary steps in defining our nations' places in the modern world." He added: "Britain can't play its part in developing a more stable and peaceful world but shy away from Europe, its most powerful alliance right on its doorstep. Germany can't play its part in helping lead this new world without accepting its full international responsibilities". Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,602790,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 21 08:56:37 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 17:56:37 +0200 Subject: [A-List] British imperialism Message-ID: Over on the Marxism list Philip Ferguson has been making excellent points about the slow and steady withdrawal of Britain from Northern Ireland, and the collaborative role in all this played by Sinn Fein. Parallels can be drawn with the situation in Gibraltar, where Blair's chummy relationship with Aznar of Spain is yielding significant returns in the continuing "modernisation" of British imperialism that New Labour was brought in to achieve. With resources being concentrated at the centre of Europe, the costs of peripheral and outdated occupations serving antiquarian geopolitical strategy and/or buttressing "national pride" (represented here by the punk Thatcherites in the person of Michael Ancram) are unjustified. Taking command of the European apparatus would be a much more efficient and cost effective means of projecting long term interests. Gibraltar to decide fate next year DEBORAH SUMMERS The Herald, 21 November 2001 BRITAIN and Spain will resolve their feud over Gibraltar by next summer, Jack Straw and his Spanish counterpart declared. The foreign secretary insisted nothing would be agreed without the support of the Rock's 30,000 residents, but this failed to calm fears over sovereignty. Peter Caruana, Gibraltar's chief minister, boycotted the talks in Barcelona yesterday while Michael Ancram, the shadow foreign secretary, accused the government of working to a secret agenda over the colony's future. Gibraltar residents bitterly oppose Spanish rule and demand that they decide their own future. Mr Straw and Josep Pique, the Spanish foreign minister, pledged after talks to reach a "global agreement" on the disputed territory by next summer. This would then result in a referendum for residents. Mr Straw said that if Gibraltar's inhabitants failed to accept the text of any referendum, the position would stay as it is, with Britain retaining sovereignty under the 1713 treaty of Utrecht. "I said to the delegation of Gibraltarians that my overriding interest was the interest of the people of Gibraltar and to secure for them a future where Gibraltar would have greater self-government and a more stable, secure, and prosperous future," Mr Straw said. Earlier he signalled that Spain could have offices on the Rock and fly the Spanish flag there. "The suggestion that somehow there is some deal being stitched up between the Spanish government and the British government and the people of Gibraltar will have no say in it, simply isn't the case," he said. "What we want is for the government of Gibraltar to be represented in these talks alongside the British government." Mr Straw added: "The key point is that any final decision over anything involving any transfer of sovereignty from the UK, under the treaty of Utrecht, will be put to the people of Gibraltar in a referendum. "That was a commitment enshrined into UK law by a Labour government in 1969 and one we are determined to uphold." Mr Pique said the planned agreement would cover co-operation and sovereignty, but Spain would not recognise Gibraltar's right to self-determination nor give up its sovereignty claim. He called those issues "red lines" Spain could never cross. In a goodwill gesture, Spain offered to triple the number of phone lines to Gibraltar and proposed free health care in state hospitals for Gibraltarians. Britain and Spain denied a secret deal was being hatched last month. However Mr Ancram, returning from a two-day visit to Gibraltar, accused the two governments of working to a "hidden and pre-agreed agenda". He said: "The government must come clean and play fair by Gibraltar." Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/21-11-19101-23-56-30.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 21 08:49:14 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 17:49:14 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Britain/US split Message-ID: Short claims US is hindering aid CATHERINE MacLEOD The Herald, 21 November 2001 THE carefully honed semblance of unity within the international coalition was fractured by Clare Short, the international development secretary, yesterday, when she cast doubt on American commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan. As the United Nations hailed a diplomatic breakthrough with the announcement that the Northern Alliance and other Afghan warlords had agreed to meet in Berlin next week, the UK government admitted different priorities from the US. Giving evidence to the Commons international development select committee yesterday, Ms Short coupled revelations of American reluctance to eradicate poverty worldwide with a warning that the US military were hindering the aid effort in Afghanistan. As the prime minister's spokesman was dismissing suggestions of a rift between the UK and the US as "baseless", Ms Short appeared to break ranks from the official position. She said: "The only great power in the world almost turns its back on the rest of the world. It is not that the US is ungenerous. It is just that it is not sharing the insight that other countries have got, and it is very important that we try to get them there." In what could be a signal that Gordon Brown, the chancellor, was well disposed to increase the UK's allocation of international aid, Ms Short revealed that she had lobbied Mr Brown to meet the UN's target on aid. In the first split in the ranks with the US, Ms Short admitted that aid workers in Afghanistan were hampered by breakdowns in communication with the US military. She said: "The civil-military liaison is not working particularly well at all. The communications (with US military head-quarters) are there but they are not being taken seriously enough at a high level." Distinguishing between British and US troops, she said: "I don't think the US military is quite as informed, because it has not had the same experience." Later, Mr Blair's official press spokesman tried to temper Ms Short's remarks while not undermining her position. Asked if the prime minister shared her concerns, he said: "We have always acknowledged that this is a complex situation. When you have a refugee problem of the size that was there before September 11. It is our view that the military and humanitarian co-ordination is working well, but there are always ways it can be improved. "Aid is getting into Afghanistan. We may not have got everything right but it has been a very significant achievement". Earlier, the prime minister's official spokesman disclosed the prime minister had spoken to George W Bush, the US president, for 20 minutes on Monday night. Refusing to reveal specific details of the "ongoing dialogue", he explained the two leaders had reviewed the military, humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. He defended the coalition's failure to deploy any of the 6000 British troops, insisting there was "always a trade-off between speed and getting it right". The decision to hold a meeting in Germany next week as the first step towards forming a post-war government in Afghanistan was announced in Kabul by Abdullah Abdullah, the alliance's foreign minister, Steve Evans, the UK envoy, said yesterday. The difficulties cannot be overestimated. Almost immediately after the announcement, the head of the alliance, Burhanuddin Rabbani, the former Afghan president, insisted that next week's "symbolic" talks would merely be the forerunner for meaningful talks on Afghan soil. In Nuremberg to attend the SDP congress yesterday, the prime minister reasserted his determination to persuade the international community to help Afghanistan post-Taliban. He said: "The Taliban regime were one of the most repressive and savage the world has seen: medieval in their attitudes towards women. They are now collapsing. But let us be clear. We have to show the same urgency in helping to create a broad-based Afghan government and commitment to the long-term reconstruction of Afghanistan as we have done in our military strategy. "It is an obligation to the Afghan people we should not, and will not, run away from. We are right to be tough on terrorism but we have to be equally vigorous in dealing with the conditions in which terrorism breeds." Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/21-11-19101-0-19-25.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 21 08:51:51 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 17:51:51 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Britain/US split Message-ID: Blair insists: We will join euro CATHERINE MacLEOD The Herald, 21 November 2001 Tony Blair shrugged off the shackles of treasury caution on the euro yesterday with an emphatic show of enthusiasm for full partnership in the European Union. In Nuremberg to support German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder at the SDP congress, the prime minister robustly endorsed the necessity for a successful single currency. He said: "Britain under New Labour leadership wants to be a full partner with Germany and others in the development of the European Union. This is our true destiny. "On the euro, if the economic tests are met, whose assessment will be complete within two years of the start of the parliament, we are committed to holding a referendum and joining the single currency. Its success is critical for us all," he added. Later, the prime minister's spokesman insisted the government's policy on the euro remained unchanged, but Mr Blair's words were widely interpreted as a further reassertion of the government's pro-European credentials. Mr Blair's words echo the sentiments he was poised to deliver at the TUC conference in Brighton on September 11, before he abandoned his speech in the wake of the terrorist atrocities in New York. Then, he signalled that membership of a successful euro would be "right" if the economic conditions were met. The prime minister, whose staff have been irritated at counter briefing from the treasury, acknowledged difficulties on the domestic front over Europe. He said: "I was reflecting coming here how much both Britain and Germany live with our own history. For you, Europe is relatively easy as an issue; the commitment of military forces hard. For us, the opposite. To commit our military, relatively uncontentious; to commit to Europe causes deep passions." Mr Blair's hopes for a more "meaningful European security and defence identity, fully compatible with Nato but able to act where the Americans decide not to be involved but where Europe has a clear responsibility" drew only scorn from the Tories. Shadow defence secretary Bernard Jenkin said: "The prime minister's speech reflects a drama that is completely divorced from the reality of European and global security. Europe's common defence policy is a recipe for stagnation and indecision. Its military capabilities remain mythical." Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/21-11-19101-23-55-24.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From dws at scs.howard.edu Wed Nov 21 07:32:07 2001 From: dws at scs.howard.edu (David Schwartzman) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 14:32:07 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011121081520.035d5790@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Message-ID: <3BFBBAE1.E2DF8381@scs.howard.edu> Engels didn't really understand the 2nd law. In any case, this law has been widely misunderstood, with the familar invocation of physical concepts in social prognostication (physics gets some respect from social scientists and the lay public even when it is misinterpreted). Georgescu-Roegen/Jeremy Rifkin/Sarkar are examples. For an extended discussion read my paper Solar Communism: http://www.redandgreen.org Marxism & Ecology (you might like to check out the other posted articles, e.g., "A World Party in Our Future?", written a month before 911). Mark Jones wrote: > At 21/11/2001 03:48, Andre Gunder Frank wrote: > >Both Frank and Jones predict doom and U.S. decline -- Frank's prediction > >is deflation and economic catastrophe, while Jones' is "entropic fascism." > > Did Richard Hutchinson say this? In any case the idea that the laws of > thermodynamics have social effects is not new and goes back to at least > Justus von Liebig if not to Aristotle. Marx and Engels discussed entropy > and its social consequences. Alf Hornborg has recently written good stuff > on this, as has Stan Goff on this list. > > Mark From lnp3 at panix.com Wed Nov 21 13:58:13 2001 From: lnp3 at panix.com (Louis Proyect) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 15:58:13 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011121081520.035d5790@pop.tiscali.co.uk> <3BFBBAE1.E2DF8381@scs.howard.edu> Message-ID: <200111212057.PAA23269@menyapa.cc.columbia.edu> NY Times, November 21, 2001 Russian Oil Production Still Soars, for Better and Worse By MICHAEL WINES and SABRINA TAVERNISE MOSCOW, Nov. 20 ? While nobody was watching, this country's oil producers so dramatically ratcheted up production in the last two years that they now occupy a catbird seat, able to whipsaw oil prices ? and potentially the global economy ? just by turning down the Russian spigot. Trouble is, they only seem to know how to turn the spigot up. Witness last week's remarkable events. In the space of 10 days, the price of a barrel of crude has fallen 20 percent. Saudi Arabia beseeched the Russians to cut oil exports, to no avail. OPEC nations threatened a price war if Russia did not change its mind, again to no avail. Today the Kremlin had to pare back its 2002 economic forecast, principally because of lower oil prices. Meanwhile, the state-owned pipeline company, Transneft, trumpeted the opening of a Baltic Sea terminal that will flood an already saturated market with another 240,000 barrels of oil a day. That is only the beginning. In the next four years alone, according to analysts at Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown, huge sums already sunk into new pipelines and reinvigorated oilfields should boost Russian oil exports by a fifth, to 5.34 million barrels a day. "There's nothing in there that indicates a willingness to cut back either on the part of the oil companies or the government," said Thane Gustafson, the top Eurasian expert at Cambridge Energy (news/quote) Research Associates in Washington. "If Russia were to slam on the brakes now, it would be Ben Hur pulling back suddenly on his chariot while it's going full speed ahead." In that case, other oil-producing nations might have little choice but to go along for what could be, at least briefly, a wild ride. Prospects for a further plunge in oil prices seemed to ebb a bit today as two other big non- OPEC exporters, Norway and Mexico, said they would reduce their output in line with OPEC requests. If, that is, Russia goes along. Even some Russian oil companies are mulling over a temporary cut in exports. But they key word is temporary. No one, including the companies themselves, believes that the explosive growth in Russian output will be restrained for long, even amid a recession that has cut deeply into demand. full: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/21/business/worldbusiness/21OIL.html -- Louis Proyect, lnp3 at panix.com on 11/21/2001 Marxism list: http://www.marxmail.org From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Wed Nov 21 14:03:37 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 21:03:37 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil In-Reply-To: <3BFBBAE1.E2DF8381@scs.howard.edu> References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011121081520.035d5790@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011121203812.02e2cd80@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 21/11/2001 14:32, David Schwartzman wrote: >Engels didn't really understand the 2nd law. In any case, this law has been >widely misunderstood, with the familar invocation of physical concepts in >social prognostication (physics gets some respect from social scientists and >the lay public even when it is misinterpreted). Georgescu-Roegen/Jeremy >Rifkin/Sarkar are examples. For an extended discussion read my paper Solar >Communism: >http://www.redandgreen.org >Marxism & Ecology >(you might like to check out the other posted articles, e.g., "A World Party >in Our Future?", written a month before 911). I just read this article by David Schwartzman and it's an interesting, scholarly and useful summary of some well-known arguments about entropy and the second law of thermodynamics (the one which says that nothing comes from nothing, so the price paid for the emergence of ordered societies, is dangerous external disorder, ie, entropy). It's worth a look, and David's main thesis is this: >>Therefore, like the natural biosphere powered by solar energy, the ordering and maintenance of the material creation of human activity on the Earth's surface can continue far into the future by the export of an entropic flux into space, provided a long term energy source (the sun) is utilized.<< The nub of this argument is that the earth is thermodynamically-speaking an open, not a closed system, and it can import energy (from the sun) and export unwanted waste. In the course of the argument, Schwartzman acknowledges the important role played by the great Russian biogeochemist, Vladimir Vernadsky. I especially welcome that. There are opposing viewpoints however and if you take a look at www.dieoff.org you can find plenty of material arguing that the earth is, in fact, entropically closed. To a layperson like me the ins and outs of this debate sometimes resemble the ins and outs of a cat's backside. However I'm ready to fearlessly enter this terrain, and I can say right off that my money is on the closed-system variant. This is not so much because of the physics involved (the jury is still out even on the basic issue of whether or not entropy will one day lead to the Heat Death of the Universe; we still don't know what will happen at the End of Time). My objection is based on the well-known keynesian idea that in the long run we're all dead. Maybe the earth IS an open system, as David argues, but we won't know for sure in the lifetime of anyone reading this and maybe not in the lifetime of the human species. What we do know is that *for all practical purposes* the earth is a closed system, ie, we can neither export our waste products into outer space, and nor can we convert from the petroleum economy to the visions of a solar-powered future which David shares with many other solar-rollers. This brings the discussion back to earth. Schwartzman's conlusion is that: >>Solarization along with containment of the technosphere are material prerequisites for a global civilization realizing the Marxian concept of communism, while optimizing its relations to nature. These considerations should inform a viable ecosocialist movement.<< Unfortunately this seems to me to be both technically and politically utopian. Nevertheless, altho I disagree with his conclusions, I was very glad to read this article. I hope we can discuss this more in the future. (Someone else worth reading on this kind of thing is Alf Hornborg). Mark Jones From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Wed Nov 21 14:42:03 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 21:42:03 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil In-Reply-To: <200111212057.PAA23269@menyapa.cc.columbia.edu> References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011121081520.035d5790@pop.tiscali.co.uk> <3BFBBAE1.E2DF8381@scs.howard.edu> Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011121212723.00a8e560@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 21/11/2001 20:58, you wrote: >NY Times, November 21, 2001 > >Russian Oil Production Still Soars, for Better and Worse Russian oil production, according to Matthew Simmons, has indeed gone up by ~1.2m.bbls/day, which seems to be what Michael Wines says. But this is a minor peak within a long term decline. Today, oil output in the FSU is 8.5m.bbls/year according to Simmons http://www.simmonsco-intl.com But in 1990 Soviet ouput was ~12m.bbls/year. It is obvious that ex-Soviet oil production is in a steep and irreversible decline, temporary output jack-ups notwithstanding. North Sea ouput has also seen dramatic peaks and troughs, within an overall decline. N Sea output rose 60% between 1990-2000, to 2.5 million barrels per day, ie more than half of the total net 4 million non-OPEC supply growth in the same period. But the N Sea is now in savage decline; as Simmons says, all the vaunted new technology did was to *accelerate depletion*, not find any new oil: "3-D seismic, horizontal and steerable drilling, sub sea completion systems, hydraulic fraccing, FPSO's, and a host of deepwater technology advances became widely used, many assumed we had entered an era in which adding new oil and gas supplies", but it was not so! The same thing in Russia: all the present production increase is doing is to bring forward the day of radical decline. All-out production regardless of any consequences and without any consideration of the long term national interest, or of conservation or the environment, is exactly what Russian oilmen traditionally have done, from Soviet times to the present. Michael Wines, who wrote the NY Times piece, is a notorious over-optimist about Russia, in the mould of Anders Aslund. Neither the Russian people nor anyone else, except for a few Russian oligarchs, have anything to celebrate as a result of this temporarily increased output, which is already doing severe damage to the Russian state budget and the Russian economic outlook. Mark From sherrynstan at igc.org Wed Nov 21 18:44:03 2001 From: sherrynstan at igc.org (sherrynstan at igc.org) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 20:44:03 -0500 Subject: [A-List] panopticon I Message-ID: In War, It's Power to the President In Aftermath of Attacks, Bush White House Asserts Power Rivaling That of FDR By Dana Milbank Washington Post Staff Writer Tuesday, November 20, 2001; Page A01 The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and the war in Afghanistan have dramatically accelerated a push by the Bush administration to strengthen presidential powers, giving President Bush a dominance over American government exceeding that of other post-Watergate presidents and rivaling even Franklin D. Roosevelt's command. On a wide variety of fronts, the administration has moved to seize power that it has shared with other branches of government. In foreign policy, Bush announced vast cuts in the U.S. nuclear arsenal but resisted putting the cuts in a treaty -- thereby averting a Senate ratification vote. In domestic policy, the administration proposed reorganizing the Immigration and Naturalization Service without the congressional action lawmakers sought. And in legal policy, the administration seized the judiciary's power as Bush signed an order allowing terrorists to be tried in military tribunals. Those actions, all taken last week, build on earlier Bush efforts to augment White House power, including initiatives to limit intelligence briefings to members of Congress, take new spending authority from the legislature, and expand the executive branch's power to monitor and detain those it suspects of terrorism. Presidential power ebbs and flows historically and, by necessity, typically heightens during times of war because of the need for a unifying figure in government. Lyndon B. Johnson gained clout under the Tonkin Gulf resolution, as did Roosevelt during World War II. The War Powers Act and other reforms by Congress to limit presidential power after Watergate made for weaker executives, as did the reduced threat from the Soviet Union. Now, in the views of many scholars, Bush has restored the "Imperial Presidency," a term Arthur Schlesinger Jr. used to describe Richard M. Nixon's administration in 1973. "The power President Bush is wielding today is truly breathtaking," said Tim Lynch, director of the Project on Criminal Justice at the libertarian Cato Institute. "A single individual is going to decide whether the war is expanded to Iraq. A single individual is going to decide how much privacy American citizens are going to retain." The White House says an increase in presidential power is the correct prescription for a crisis. "The way our nation is set up, and the way the Constitution is written, wartime powers rest fundamentally in the hands of the executive branch," White House press secretary Ari Fleischer said. "It's not uncommon in time of war for a nation's eyes to focus on the executive branch and its ability to conduct the war with strength and speed." The public -- and Congress -- seem content for Bush to assume as much power as he desires. He had 90 percent approval ratings in polls even before last week's dramatic progress in the Afghanistan campaign, and congressional leaders have mustered little resistance to the administration's bid to increase power in the interests of national security. Even before Sept. 11, the Bush administration has been looking for ways to reassert presidential prerogatives, particularly in its relationship to Congress -- which some in the administration believe grew too powerful during the Clinton and Reagan years and first Bush administration. "Every administration resets the balance with Congress as times change," said Fleischer. "When the executive branch gets itself into trouble, the congressional role, particularly the one on the investigative side, grows. The nation grew weary of endless investigations and fishing expeditions." Thus the administration declined to cooperate with a General Accounting Office probe into Vice President Cheney's energy task force, and cooperated with a Senate request for information on new environmental regulations only after a subpoena threat. Seeking to restore "executive privilege," the administration refused to hand over to Congress many executive papers -- even some from the Clinton administration. David Walker, a Republican who is director of the General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, said: "There's a feeling of some in the current administration that they want to draw a line in a different spot than previously has been drawn in the separation of powers. As a result of Watergate and the challenges [President Bill] Clinton had, Congress has been much more involved in a range of areas they don't believe are appropriate." This pattern of consolidating presidential authority has extended to other areas of governance. Bush issued an executive order allowing a sitting president to block release of a predecessor's records, undermining a law Congress passed about such papers. When an open-meeting law prevented Bush's Social Security commission from meeting privately, the group split into two so the law would not apply. In foreign affairs, the administration has shown a distaste for international treaties that require congressional ratification, recently rejecting amendments to the Biological Weapons Convention in favor of actions that wouldn't require legislative approval. The events of Sept. 11 have accelerated the trend, prompting the administration to pursue an array of new powers to combat terrorism and bolster domestic security. Bush has opposed Congress granting statutory authority to Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge, which has allowed Ridge to refuse congressional requests for him to testify. Bush's Justice Department decided, without the usual waiting period for public comment, that it could listen in on lawyer-client conversations if Attorney General John D. Ashcroft believes it necessary to prevent terrorism; he could do so even if people have not been charged and even in the absence of a court order. That move followed congressional approval of the USA Patriot Act, which makes it easier for the government to monitor, search, detain or deport suspects and gives the Justice Department more power to detain immigrants without charges. Also this month, the government stopped saying how many people it has detained related to the Sept. 11 attacks. In the counterterrorism campaign overseas, Bush ordered sensitive intelligence briefings to be limited to eight of the 535 members of Congress, leading lawmakers to complain Bush had violated the 1947 National Security Act. Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) said Bush "put out a public document telling the world he doesn't trust the Congress." The president backed down after lawmakers promised not to leak information. The administration has had mixed success pursuing more control over fiscal policy. In mid-October, when Bush requested authority for the president, after consulting with the speaker of the House, to extend government funding if Congress could not convene because of a crisis, Congress balked. Lawmakers also objected to an initial administration proposal, after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, for what amounted to a blank check from Congress. As it is, Congress gave the administration $40 billion to spend in response to the attacks with few strings attached. Even so, lawmakers have complained that the administration has not provided, as required, information on how it is spending the money. Some in the legislative branch, particularly in the opposition party, detect a striking departure in public policy. "There's just a philosophy in the administration that the public doesn't have a right to know, which is counter to the trend of the last 30 years," said Phil Schiliro, staff chief to Rep. Henry A. Waxman (Calif.), the ranking Democrat on the House oversight committee. "Now they can justify it with national security, but that's more for convenience." Scholars who follow Washington offer say history offers ample precedent for a wartime expansion of presidential power. "Crisis seeks leadership," said Charles O. Jones, a presidential scholar with the University of Wisconsin. "The only question becomes is the White House prepared to accept it and use it effectively. This team has an above-average record so far." Norman Ornstein, a governmental scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, said the growth in presidential power during the first year of the Bush administration exceeds the clout presidents gained in recent wars, comparing it to the free hand Congress and the judiciary gave Roosevelt to fight World War II. "You always have to worry about people who have this kind of power who don't have the restraint," he said. "I worry about that, but we have such a different kind of threat on the country as a whole that you have to change the way you look at presidential power." From sherrynstan at igc.org Wed Nov 21 18:46:05 2001 From: sherrynstan at igc.org (sherrynstan at igc.org) Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 20:46:05 -0500 Subject: [A-List] panopticon II Message-ID: Military Favors a Homeland Command Forces May Shift To Patrolling U.S. By Bradley Graham Washington Post Staff Writer Wednesday, November 21, 2001; Page A01 The nation's top military authorities favor appointing a four-star commander to coordinate federal troops used in homeland defense, part of a broad reorganization that Pentagon officials say could change some forces' primary mission from waging war overseas to patrolling at home. Although the Pentagon has regional commanders in chief, known as CINCs, who are responsible for Europe, the Pacific, Latin America, and the Middle East and South Asia, none exists for managing the deployment of U.S. forces in the United States. Creating one now, military officials say, would clarify the chain of command for those troops. Any extensive use of federal troops on U.S. soil would come despite a traditional aversion to -- and legal limits on -- the use of military forces for domestic law enforcement. But the Sept. 11 attacks and the Bush administration's declared war on terrorism have blurred the distinction between foreign wars and domestic crimes and prompted a rethinking of the Pentagon's command structure and force assignments. Although Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has yet to make a final decision, senior military officials working the issue say agreement has been reached on establishing a homeland CINC (pronounced "sink"). "There's a consensus of opinion now that a need exists to quickly pin the rose on some four-star commander," a senior official said. Rather than set up an entirely new command, with all the fresh bureaucracy and expense that would entail, officials have focused on which of several commands already headquartered in the United States could be rejiggered to take on the homeland defense mission. Their deliberations appear to have narrowed into a competition between two candidates, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in Colorado and the Joint Forces Command in Virginia. Responsibility for coordinating all federal activities in homeland defense rests with Tom Ridge and the new White House Office of Homeland Security. The purpose of the Pentagon's new four-star assignment would be to consolidate the chain of command running from the president through the secretary of defense to those federal troops enlisted in the defensive effort. Historically, the Pentagon has seen little reason to earmark forces for homeland defense, let alone designate a major command for the job. In the event of a terrorist attack, the Pentagon's response plan has relied heavily on such local and regional organizations as police, firefighters, medics and hazardous material teams to deal with the consequences. Only as a matter of last resort were federal troops to be summoned to help. But after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, military forces have been thrust into new domestic security roles. Air Force jets now regularly patrol the skies over U.S. cities. Thousands of National Guard troops are protecting airports and bridges and assisting at border checkpoints. They also were deployed last week to secure the Capitol grounds after the anthrax scare. Such new responsibilities have strained Pentagon resources and raised questions about some lines of command. The air patrols have been run by NORAD. The Joint Forces Command has charge of the maritime approaches to the United States. And many of the National Guard troops have been pressed into action by state governors. "The chain of command is not as clear in the United States as overseas," the senior official said. "We think it's time to clarify things." Among the most urgent questions confronting the new homeland CINC will be which military units should remain allocated for overseas duty and which need to be tagged for more permanent homeland defense assignments. This question is likely to fall heaviest on the National Guard, which has been struggling since the end of the Cold War to find new roles apart from its traditional one of being ready to augment regular troops in a major war overseas. About one-third of the Guard's 358,000 soldiers still constitute eight heavy armored divisions. At the same time, Guard members have started assuming a larger share of overseas peacekeeping assignments, relieving some of the burden on regular troops. Elements of the Virginia Guard's 29th Division, for example, are serving in Bosnia. "One school of thought says we can still do both" foreign and domestic operations, said Army Secretary Tom White. "But the other side says we can't." Addressing a conference last week on the military's role in homeland defense, Ridge said that the administration would look at whether to shift some Guard units and assets. He also said that regular military troops would be deployed to handle domestic terrorist attacks only as "the last resort," noting that the government had plenty of other options short of that. The idea for a homeland CINC last received high-level Pentagon consideration three years ago, but then-Defense Secretary William S. Cohen quickly dropped it after protests from civil libertarians and right-wing militia groups alike. Critics expressed alarm at the prospect of military forces encroaching on areas traditionally considered the responsibility of civilian emergency response, law enforcement and health agencies. Instead, Cohen sought and received approval from President Bill Clinton to establish a permanent task force headed by a two-star general officer and charged with coordinating the military's response to a chemical or biological attack on the United States. That task force, assigned to the Joint Forces Command, was portrayed as a modest effort to prepare for logistical, medical and enforcement demands likely to be placed on the Pentagon in the event of an attack on the United States. Senior Pentagon officials say times have changed, and at least some of those who were critical of a homeland CINC agree -- up to a point. "We have no objection in principle to the creation of a homeland commander in chief," said Tim Edgar, legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union. "But we're still concerned about the powers he will have, and we'll have strong objections if he's authorized to act in areas better handled by civilian law enforcement." Edgar warned against the danger of "mission creep" and the risk that military forces could end up threatening individual rights. Recent decades offer cautionary tales about the use of the military in domestic law enforcement -- notably in 1957, when the governor of Arkansas employed Guard troops to block black students from entering a Little Rock high school, and in 1970, when Guardsmen opened fire on students at Kent State University protesting the Vietnam War. Legal barriers to sending the armed forces into U.S. streets were imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act in 1878, which was prompted by President Ulysses Grant's use of federal troops to monitor elections in the former Confederate states. The act prohibits military personnel from searching, seizing or arresting people in the United States. Some exceptions already exist, allowing military forces to suppress insurrections or domestic unrest or to assist in crimes involving nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. The bar to military involvement was lowered further in 1986, when President Ronald Reagan directed the Pentagon to assist in the war on drugs. Since Sept. 11, Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.), the ranking minority member on the Armed Services Committee, has led a push to revise the act. "It's a doctrine that's served us very well," he said at a hearing Oct. 25. "But there comes a time when we've got to reexamine the old laws of the 1800s in light of this extraordinary series of challenges that we're faced with today." But congressional opinion on the matter is divided, and several senior Pentagon officials expressed little interest in any fundamental overhaul of the act. The move to establish a homeland CINC, officials said, is likely to be followed by geographical and other adjustments in some of the combatant commands under what the Pentagon calls the Unified Command Plan. Rumsfeld has urged the top commanders to think more creatively about how to organize to fight terrorism around the world. A final recommendation on where to assign the homeland role is due to Rumsfeld next month. Officials cited these considerations: The Joint Forces Command already has responsibility for the maritime approaches to North America, plus land defense of the continental United States. It is located near Washington and has a well-developed relationship with National Guard and reserve components, as well as with federal and state agencies. But if this command were to take on homeland defense, its four-star leader probably would have to shed something -- most likely, his role as head of NATO's North Atlantic region. NORAD already has charge of protecting U.S. skies and is running the combat air patrols over the United States. It has an extensive communications, command and control network, as well as a strategic location in the center of the country. But it lacks much experience with the land and sea components that would be essential to the homeland defense job. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Thu Nov 22 02:34:52 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2001 09:34:52 +0000 Subject: [A-List] counterpunch on USA Patriot Act Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011122093333.029d2008@pop.tiscali.co.uk> The Press and the USA Patriot Act Where Were They When It Counted? By Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair The weekend before Thanksgiving, as the Taliban fled into the Hindu Kush and America's children flocked to Harry Potter, the nation's opinion formers discovered that the Bush administration had hijacked the Constitution with the Patriot Act and the military tribunals. Time magazine burst out that "war is hell on your civil liberties". The New York Times suddenly began to run big news stories about John Ashcroft as if he was running an off-the shelf operation, clandestinely consummating all those dreams of Oliver North back in Reagan time about suspending the Constitution. On November 15 the Washington Post's Richard Cohen discarded his earlier defenses of Ashcroft, and declared the US attorney general to be "the scariest man in government". Five days earlier, The New York Times editorial was particularly incensed about suspension of client attorney privileges federal jails, with monitoring of all conversations. For the Hearst papers Helen Thomas reported on November 17 that Attorney General Ashcroft "is riding roughshod over the Bill of Rights and cited Ben Franklin to the effect that "if we give up our essential rights for some security, we are in danger of losing both." In this outburst of urgent barks from the watchdogs of the fourth estate, the first yelp came on November 15, from William Safire. In a fine fury Safire burst out in his first paragraph that "Misadvised by a frustrated and panic-stricken attorney general, a president of the United States has just assumed what amounts to dictatorial power." Safire lashed at "military kangaroo courts" and flayed Bush as a proto-Julius Caesar. On the same day, November 15, from Britain, whose traditionally appalling emergency laws are now being rendered even more faithful to the vicious tradition of the Star Chamber, the Economist chimed in that Ashcroft's new laws and DoJ rules are "drastic", "unnecessary" and "not the way to fight terrorism". Infringements of civil rights, the Economist declared, "if genuinely required, should be open to scrutiny and considered a painful sacrifice, or a purely tactical retreat, not as the mere brushing aside of irritating legal technicalities. Those who criticized such measures should be given a careful hearing, even if their views must sometimes be overridden." Even mainstream politicians began to wail about the theft of liberty. Vermont's independent senator Jim Jeffords proclaimed on November 19 that "I am very concerned about my good friend John Ashcroft. Having 1000 people locked up with no right to habeas corpus is a deep concern." Jeffords said that he felt that his own role in swinging the Senate to Democratic control was particularly vindicated because it had permitted his fellow senator from Vermont, Democrat Patrick Leahy, to battle the White House's increase of police powers, as made legal in the Terrorism bill. Speak memory! It was not as though publication on November 13 of Bush's presidential order on military courts for Al-Qaeda members and sympathizers launched the onslaught on civil liberties. Recall that the terrorism bill was sent to Congress on September 19. Nor were the contents of that proposed legislation unfamiliar since in large part they had been offered by the Clinton administration as portions of the Counter-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Well before the end of September Ashcroft's proposals to trash the Bill of Rights were available for inspection and debate. At the time when it counted, when a volley of barks from the watchdogs might have provoked resistance in Congress to the Patriot bill and warned Bush not to try his luck with military tribunals there was mostly decorum from the opinion makers, aside from amiable discussions of the propriety of torture. Taken as a whole, the US press did not raise adequate alarums about legislation that was going to give the FBI full snoop powers on the Internet; to deny habeas corpus to non-citizens; to expand even further warrantless searches unleashed in the Clinton era with new powers given in 1995 to secret courts. These courts operated under the terms of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act passed in the Carter years, in 1978. In the run-up to Bush's signing of the USA Patriot Act on October 25, the major papers were spiritless about the provisions in the bill that were horrifying to civil libertarians. It would have only have taken a few fierce columns or editorials, such as were profuse after November 15, to have given frightened politicians cover to join the only bold soul in the US Senate, Russell Feingold of Wisconsin. Now it was Feingold, remember, whose vote back in the spring let Ashcroft's nomination out of the Judiciary Committee, at a time when most of his Democratic colleagues were roaring to the news cameras about Ashcroft's racism and contempt for due process. The Times and the Post both editorialized against Ashcroft's nomination. But then, when the rubber met the road, and Ashcroft sent up the Patriot bill, which vindicated every dire prediction of the spring, all fell silent except for Feingold, who made a magnificent speech in the US Senate on October 25, citing assaults on liberty going back to the Alien and Sedition Acts of John Adams, the suspension of habeas corpus sanctioned by the US Supreme Court in World War One, the internments of World War Two (along with 110,00 Japanese Americans there were 11,000 German Americans and 3,000 Italian Americans put behind barbed wire), the McCarthyite black lists of the 1950s and the spying on antiwar protesters in the 1960s. Under the terms of the hill, Feingold warned, the Fourth Amendment as it applies to electronic communications, would be effectively eliminated. He flayed the Patriot bill as an assault on "the basic rights that make as who we are." It represented, he warned, "a truly breath-taking expansion of police power." Feingold was trying to win time for challenges in Congress to specific provisions in Ashcroft's bill. Those were the days in which sustained uproar from Safire or Lewis or kindred commentators would have made a difference. So the USA Patriot Act passed into law and Feingold's was the sole vote against it in the Senate. Just like Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening in their lonely opposition to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964 he'll receive his due, and be hailed as a hero by the same people who held their tongue in the crucial hours. Instead, as Murray Kempton used to say of editorial writers, they waited till after the battle to come down from the hills to shoot the wounded. >. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Thu Nov 22 02:42:52 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2001 09:42:52 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011122094247.00a934e8@pop.tiscali.co.uk> someone sent me this url: http://www.dmf.bs.unicatt.it/~musesti/pubblicazioni/entropy.pdf which contains some current thinking among mathematical physicists, ALFREDO MARZOCCHI AND ALESSANDRO MUSESTI, about the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics and the proofs of entropy. Mark From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Thu Nov 22 04:15:16 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2001 13:15:16 +0200 Subject: [A-List] British news media Message-ID: This item of news is both significant and troubling. While ITN has had its fair share of establishment toadies (Alistair Burnet, Sandy Gall, Leonard Parkin) it has also housed some very fine, critical journalists (Jon Snow, David Smith, Robert Kee). And Reginald Bosanquet. But with the decision, supposedly made for budgetary reasons, to transform the service into a kind of tabloid entertainment gossip factory, the critical space presently occupied by Channel 4 News is most likely to simply evaporate. Channel 4 itself, once a hotbed of critical commentary and investigation, has scaled down its own commitments in this area, as the formerly weekly "Dispatches" programme has been reduced to an irregular slot averaging approximately once a month, while other programmes, like Bandung File and (if I recall correctly) Euronews have simply disappeared. Thus the emasculation of halfway objective news reporting and current affairs analysis continues, in conjunction with the "mission to explain" (i.e. trivialise) gifted to the BBC by John Birt. Meanwhile the BBC secures greater monopoly power over the terrestrial audience inside the UK, while Sky News, owned and directed by Rupert Murdoch, captures the satellite dishes. As Margaret Thatcher unbelievably said of Jim Callaghan's refusal to join the European Monetary System in 1978, it's a sad day for Britain. ITN cuts jobs and shifts towards lifestyle news ITN sets about restyling its news by getting rid of senior posts Matt Wells, media correspondent Thursday November 22, 2001 The Guardian ITN is to axe its head of foreign news and shed up to 200 jobs in a cost-cutting move that raises questions about its commitment to covering major international events. Fears have been voiced that the news organisation's six foreign bureaus will be starved of resources. A plan to open a new office in Los Angeles has been put back. The painful round of cuts has been forced on ITN after it slashed the value of its contract to provide news programmes to ITV - to ?36m from ?45m - to see off a rival bid from a Sky consortium. Paymasters at ITV, concerned about the general decline in news audiences, want ITN to concentrate more on leisure, consumer and showbusiness news. While ITV insists it still wants ITN to provide substantial coverage of politics and international affairs, the long-term editorial balance is clearly shifting. Some ITN staff are aghast at the timing of the revelations about the cuts - in the middle of the war on terrorism and the conflict in Afghanistan. Unions at ITN have pledged to oppose any compulsory redundancies, and a strike ballot is on the cards. Staff have been told that between 100 and 200 jobs will have to go - up to 10% of ITN's total workforce. A voluntary severance package is on offer until December 10. As part of a management reorganisation revealed to staff yesterday, several senior ITV news posts will go. The head of foreign news, the head of sport, and the head of special projects - who coordinates the plans for big news events such as royal weddings or funerals - will all disappear. ITN insisted that a senior manager would still oversee foreign news, but would share other responsibilities. A new post of managing editor has been created. ITN journalists say they are concerned by the general direction demanded of the programmes for ITV. As part of the new ITV contract, ITN has offered to appoint a leisure correspondent and to beef up its consumer affairs unit. Bulletins will feature "more Geri Halliwell than Gerry Adams", some say. Staff are also worried that political content will be downgraded. Paul McLaughlin, the broadcasting spokesman for the National Union of Journalists, said: "The indications are that ITV wants the ITN news to feature less politics. Our members are concerned about that." The ITN name will practically disappear, with the programmes rebranded "ITV News". Correspondents will sign off as ITV reporters. The central resources department that serviced news programmes for ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5 is being broken up - leading to concerns among staff on the other bulletins, particularly the respected Channel 4 News. ITN points out that no foreign bureaus will be closed, and that a new office is due to be open at some point in Los Angeles. But this was principally to cover the US entertainment industry; in any case the timetable for its opening has been put back. ITN management told the unions at a meeting this week that ITV wanted its news to focus on "high quality and distinctive journalism", avoiding "routine news coverage" and concentrating instead on the big home and foreign stories. Steve Anderson, controller of news and current affairs at ITV, said: "We have now confirmed a level of business with ITN that lasts for seven years. No other news broadcaster in Europe, not even the BBC, has that security. That's a huge vote of confidence in ITN, its commitment to foreign news and to broadening the domestic news agenda." He pointed out that ITV was putting an extra ?100,000 a week into covering the conflict in Afghanistan, with a large team of journalists in the region. Full article at: http://media.guardian.co.uk/broadcast/story/0,7493,603567,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Thu Nov 22 05:05:49 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2001 14:05:49 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Treasury vs. New Labour modernisation Message-ID: One of the perennial complaints of the social democratic left in Britain has been the stranglehold exercised by HM Treasury upon other government departments. Certainly, the historical role of the Treasury and its linkages with City interests is one that has attracted well-observed criticism from the likes of Will Hutton ("The State We're In", 1995). The Treasury has, traditionally, been an enemy of Labour governments, with even mainstream Labour rightwingers like Jim Callaghan and Denis Healey despairing of what they believed was the deliberate obstruction of government policy in the service of City interests. Callaghan in particular is worthy of note, as Chancellor during the "humiliating" devaluation of 1967, and Prime Minister in 1976 when the IMF were finally called in to "rescue" a British economy that was nowhere near sinking, and was soon to enjoy North Sea oil. So it is ironic that under this New Labour government, a man well-versed in the failures of previous Labour administrations, and with sufficient caution to shore up his power base by the occasional parading of his "left" credentials, should now, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, administer greater control than ever before over his Cabinet colleagues. Would it not be ironic if Gordon Brown were the last defender of the last great organ of the British state requiring "modernisation"? This would certainly give the present rift within New Labour a greater material rationale than mere references to personal ambition (valid as that is, it is nowhere near sufficient on its own). Brown needs the Treasury as a power base and launch pad for any future leadership bid. But he has a coterie of advisers and a raft of interests influencing him. Among the former is former Financial Times leader writer and columnist Edward Balls, who has introduced Brown to the much-vaunted "neoclassical endogenous growth theory" that peppered his speeches prior to 1 May 1997. Balls is responsible for the supply-side flavour of much of Brown's policies. Then there are the leftovers of the City to consider, but with so much effectively globalised (i.e. swallowed up by larger overseas interests thanks to the increasing anachronism that was parochial UK finance capital) there is less and less of a constituency to serve here. The Bank of England's operational independence is cosmetic, despite the great fanfare at the time. For instance, the Bank of England cannot now orchestrate a destabilisation campaign as it did from the moment of Harold Wilson's election victory in 1964, when it vigorously opposed the corporatist policies of the Wilson government and helped engineer the devaluation crisis, helped along by the machinations of Lyndon Johnson, of course. Granting the Bank "independence" was largely done to provide "the markets" with the window-dressing so ardently desired in order to shore up confidence in New Labour. There's no guarantee that will last, of course, given the obvious lengths policymakers strived towards when buttressing the embyonic European Central Bank with every last ounce of monetarist credibility they could muster, only to see fashions change and "the markets" now demanding greater transparency (as opposed to the old "rules vs. discretion" debate that was used to ease central banks out of the "democratic" state) as well as a return to Keynesian policies in all but name. But if Britain, or, rather, when Britain joins the single currency, this will represent a significant diminution of HM Treasury's powers, together with the shrunken constellation of interests that the Treasury represents. I don't believe Brown *personally* is anti-Euro -- rather he's more likely to be anti-ECB, but this will play well with entrenched vested interests that, for different reasons, are anti ECB and have no desire to surrender whatever autonomy remains to be enjoyed. Were Brown to become Prime Minister (highly unlikely in my view), it's not at all clear that he would remain so steadfastly opposed to British membership of the single currency. This requires a lot more thought and research, but any comments from the better-informed would be much appreciated. ===== Brown snubs select committee Treasury defies MPs' request for answers on rail funding Keith Harper, transport editor Thursday November 22, 2001 The Guardian Relations between the chancellor, Gordon Brown, and the transport secretary, Stephen Byers, were strained last night when it emerged that the Treasury had embarked on a constitutional conflict with parliament by refusing point blank to answer MPs' questions about rail funding. An "astonished" Gwyneth Dunwoody, chairman of the Commons transport select committee, revealed that Treasury ministers had rejected her request to appear before her committee, insisting it was a matter for Mr Byers's transport department. Transport department officials also expressed surprise at the Treasury's attitude which, they said, simply testified to growing problems between Mr Byers and the chancellor. The Treasury is being forced to underpin Mr Byers's plans after Railtrack was placed into administration. So far ?800m has been given to the administrators from the contingency reserve and a further sum will have to be found over the next few months sim ply to keep the rail network operating. Mr Byers has said that if he believes the rail network needs more money he will ask the chancellor for it. The Treasury's response is that it stands by the 10-year transport plan in which rail will get ?30bn. More than half of this has already been allocated. Mrs Dunwoody said that after consideration by the whole transport committee, it had been decided to refer the Treasury ministers" refusal to appear before it to the powerful liaison committee, which can raise the issue in the Commons. Mrs Dunwoody said: "If the Treasury intends to have a role in transport, it must be prepared to answer questions on it and not hide behind another department." Mr Brown has also refused to allow other Treasury ministers to attend. His defiance was regarded in Westminster last night as an immediate challenge to the parliamentary committee system. The only explicit authority the committees have is to send "for persons and papers". Mrs Dunwoody had asked the Treasury to appear before the committee to answer questions on rail franchising. This key issue is in turmoil because the government has decided to revert to two-year contracts instead of the originally promised 20-year franchises for train companies which offer more stable prospects for investment. Mrs Dunwoody is prepared for a showdown with the Treasury. Whitehall officials said that the Treasury was acting in a high-handed manner. If its ministers were asked to appear before a committee of MPs, they should comply. The Treasury rejected the idea. It said that departmental matters on finance should be dealt with by Mr Byers and not by the chancellor. "We are not responsible for transport policy," said a Treasury spokesman. It knew of no recent examples where the Treasury had been summoned to answer questions from MPs about departmental matters. The spokesman defended the appearance of Treasury ministers before select committees covering Northern Ireland, over an aggregates tax, and Scottish affairs, relating to the Scottish drinks industry. The Treasury said: "In both instances, the Treasury has a clear policy responsibility, unlike rail franchising, which is a matter for the Department of Transport." Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/guardianpolitics/story/0,3605,603461,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Thu Nov 22 08:01:11 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2001 17:01:11 +0200 Subject: [A-List] UK political realignment Message-ID: Another step closer to the Liberal Democrats as HM Official Opposition as the punk Thatcherite domination of the Conservative Party proceeds apace... Tory MP to quit over anti-European policy By Paul Waugh, Deputy Political Editor The Independent, 22 November 2001 A senior pro-European Tory MP has decided to quit the Commons in protest at his party's "lurch to the right" under Iain Duncan Smith. Robert Jackson, MP for Wantage and a former education minister, has told his constituency association he will step down at the next election after nearly 20 years as an MP. Mr Jackson, 55, who supported Kenneth Clarke for the Tory leadership this summer, defied a three-line whip last month by voting with the Government to ratify the Nice Treaty. He had declared at the beginning of the year that he intended to stay in politics for another 10 years, but is understood to have changed his mind after Mr Duncan Smith's victory. He is said to have been particularly upset by the Tory leader's decision to rule out membership of the euro "for ever". The MP, whose wife is a Tory MEP, was also said to be disturbed by the appointment to the Shadow Cabinet of the hardline Eurosceptic Bill Cash. Publicly, Mr Jackson cited business interests for his decision and the need to give a replacement Tory candidate "plenty of time to get to know the constituency", but his choice to announce his retirement so early in a parliament is highly unusual. He was returned with a majority of more than 5,000 at the June election. Full article at: http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=106148 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Thu Nov 22 08:09:15 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2001 17:09:15 +0200 Subject: [A-List] British takeover of Europe Message-ID: The Independent has been a good source of inside information re the British state that, for whatever reason, appears to have slipped the Guardian by, e.g., the review of the security apparatus commissioned by Jack Straw and headed by ex-MI6 chief Sir David Spedding. Less disclosure here, more a confirmation of what many suspect already, but evidence nevertheless of the softening up process required to give this push the legitimacy it needs. Interesting appended comment from "Lord" Simon, ex-BP executive, showing the impatience of certain sections of British state and capital with the European integration project. I plan to write more on BP, whose position in all of this is very prominent and of interest to those concerned with the interests dominant in the permanent government-New Labour complex. Not for nothing is BP one of the few (named) private sector backers of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, for example. If anything, this article confirms what insider Hugo Young was writing in the Guardian a few weeks back about the not-so-hidden agendas at work in this opportune moment offered by the World Trade Center attack. ===== Britain must pool more sovereignty in EU, says Blair By Andrew Grice, Political Editor The Independent, 22 November 2001 Tony Blair will declare on Friday that the case for Britain pooling more sovereignty inside the European Union has been strengthened by the 11 September terrorist attacks. The Prime Minister will step up his attempts to place Britain at the heart of Europe by saying that the united front against terrorism put up by the EU and other countries has rendered traditional arguments about sovereignty out of date. Mr Blair's speech in Birmingham will be seen as preparing the ground for a referendum on joining the single currency and for giving up Britain's right of veto in new policy areas during a review of EU decision-making to be launched next month. Writing in The Independent today, Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, foreshadows Mr Blair's push for further EU integration by saying: "In a world where states and the interests of their citizens are so obviously interdependent, we need to re-think our attitudes to concepts like 'independence' and 'sovereignty'." Mr Straw writes: "In today's world, by sharing sovereignty, a people may end up with more, not less, independence of action; more, not less internal self-government and more, not less, control over their lives." Mr Blair and his ministers believe the new world alliances forged in the past two months can help them to demolish claims by Eurosceptics that further integration and joining the single currency would undermine British sovereignty. This would be a critical issue during a referendum campaign on joining the euro. The Foreign Secretary writes: "We cannot afford to ignore the paramount lesson of the last few weeks since those terrible events of September 11: nations are stronger when working together than they could be alone. Closer co-operation with our friends and closest neighbours in Europe is an essential safeguard as much for our security as our prosperity." Mr Straw argues that Britain has carried much more influence in Washington in recent weeks because it is also a "strong voice" in Europe. He insists: "The EU does not threaten our independence, our sovereignty or our identity. Rather, in today's world, more interdependent than it ever has been, the EU provides the surest guarantee that our voice will be heard in the world." The Foreign Secretary adds: "We have to challenge the false notion that we cannot be British and European at the same time." But he acknowledges that, in playing a fuller part in the EU, Britain would not win every argument. "Of course we have to negotiate, and sometimes we have to compromise," he says. Next month EU leaders will hold a summit in Belgium at which they will begin a review, to be completed by 2004, of which decisions should be taken at EU level and at national government level. Government sources denied last night that Mr Blair was signalling a wholesale transfer of sovereignty to Brussels. They insisted that Britain would give up its veto only when this would be in the national interest. For example, a common policy on asylum would benefit Britain. Tomorrow's speech by Mr Blair will be seen as a clear sign that he is warming towards calling a referendum on the euro before the next general election, even though the Chancellor Gordon Brown is more cautious. Anxious to play down reports of a split between the Prime Minister and his Chancellor, Downing Street insisted yesterday that the speech would not change the Government's policy on the euro. The pressure on Mr Blair to overrule Mr Brown and adopt a more positive stance on the single currency increased yesterday when Lord Simon of Highbury, a former Industry Minister, said there had been a "limp effort" in preparing the British public and business for the launch of euro notes and coins in the 12 "euro-zone" countries in January. But the Prime Minister's spokesman dismissed the criticism, saying: "I think on this occasion we will disagree with him." Full article at: http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=106153 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Thu Nov 22 08:17:13 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2001 15:17:13 +0000 Subject: [A-List] inside Russian capitalism Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011122151657.00aee320@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Argumenty i Fakty No. 47 November 2001 PUTIN'S OBSCURE FOLLOWERS Analysis of President Vladimir Putin's economic team Author: Olga Gladkova [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] VLADIMIR PUTIN HAS EVERYTHING HE NEEDS NOWADAYS TO PLAY HIS OWN GAME. HE HAS TWO TEAMS. THE SECOND ONE SEES TO THE SAFETY OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY FROM THE ECONOMIC FLANK. NOTHING OR ALMOST NOTHING IS KNOWN ABOUT THESE MEN SAVE FOR THE FACT THAT THEY ARE EITHER FROM ST. PETERSBURG OR FROM THE SECRET SERVICES. IT IS THE TEAM THAT MAKES THE PRESIDENT. VLADIMIR PUTIN HAS EVERYTHING HE NEEDS NOWADAYS TO PLAY HIS OWN GAME. HE HAS TWO TEAMS. ONE TEAM IS IN KEY POSITIONS IN THE STATE. THEY ARE BUILDING THE STATE POWER HIERARCHY, AND ARE CONSTANTLY SEEN ON TV. THE OTHER TEAM SEES TO THE SAFETY OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY FROM THE ECONOMIC FLANK. NOTHING OR ALMOST NOTHING IS KNOWN ABOUT THESE MEN SAVE FOR THE FACT THAT THEY ARE EITHER FROM ST. PETERSBURG OR FROM THE SECRET SERVICES. THE MATTER CONCERNS MEN FROM PUTIN'S TEAM WHO MANAGE RUSSIAN COMPANIES GENERATING $7-10 BILLION IN PROFITS A YEAR. Nikolai Tokarev became the president's first representative in big business. Former Transneft vice president who had worked with Putin in Boris Yeltsin's administration, Tokarev became general director of the Zarubezhneft just over a year ago. He replaced Oleg Popov, the man who had managed the company the last ten years and was generally viewed as a creature of ex-minister Kalyuzhny (fuel and energy). The Zarubezhneft extracts oil on the Vietnamese shelf. It brought $440 million to the state treasury in 2000. The company earns approximately the same sum exporting 20 million tons of Iraqi oil or so every year. Staff shuffle took place in the arms export system approximately a month after the reshuffle at the Zarubezhneft. Two state companies Rosvooruzhenie and Promeksport merged to form the Rosoboroneksport. Arms export brings Russian $3-3.5 billion every year. The new structure is headed by Andrei Belianinov, formerly deputy general director at Sergei Chemezov's Promeksport. It is Chemezov who is Belianinov's deputy now. Current top managers of the Rosoboroneksport had worked with Putin long before he was elected the president. Like Putin, Belianinov worked at the Soviet Embassy in East Germany back in the 1980's. Chemezov headed the office of the company Luch in East Germany then and afterwards worked under Putin at the Presidential Affairs Department in Moscow under Yeltsin (he was in charge of foreign economic contacts). Ex-head of Rosvooruzhenie Aleksei Orlov, a man associated with Yeltsin's Family, was dismissed. Belianinov's and Chemezov's past careers resemble each other closely, but the career prospects of the latter are viewed as more promising. It was Chemezov who got an invitation to the First Lady's birthday party. Tokarev was there as well. Staff revolution at the Gazprom took place shortly afterwards with the coming of Aleksei Miller, former head of the St. Petersburg Sea Port and the Baltic Pipelines System. Expansion of men St. Petersburg into the Gazprom began with Miller's appearance. It is men from St. Petersburg who manage the company that reported over $17 billion worth of consolidated dividends (together with subdivisions, that is). Vitaly Saveliev has become one of the most influential managers at the Gazprom. Former deputy to Miller and former head of the MENATEP - St. Petersburg bank, he is said wield even more influence than Pyotr Rodionov, Miller's senior deputy and a representative of Rem Vyakhirev's team. It is Saveliev who signs all important financial documents nowadays. Sergei Veremeenko, another representative of the financial circles and Mezhprombank CEO, was considered one of the candidates for the top position at the Gazprom's financial bloc. He is known as the closest associate of Sergei Pugachev, founder of the bank. Miller's another deputy Sergei Lukash is known at the Gazprom as a man close to Viktor Zolotov, Director of the Presidential Security Service. Zolotov was in charge of Putin's security when the latter was the prime minister. He had been Sobchak's bodyguard in St. Petersburg before that. The ALROSA, the major Russian diamond company, will probably be added to the list of businesses enjoying the attention of the powers- that-be. It reported $405 million dividends in 2000. According to its general plan, the company may earn $4 billion between 2001 and 2005. Rumors on the possibility of power shuffles in the company coincided in time with the presidential race in Yakutia - Sakha where the company operates. There are several men who may replace ALROSA head Vyacheslav Shtyrov. Vladimir Litvinenko of the St. Petersburg Mining Institute is one of them. Litvinenko knows Putin as a politician and as a scientist. It was with Litvinenko's help that Putin defended his thesis. It was Litvinenko who managed Putin's electoral headquarters in St. Petersburg. It is clear that the ALROSA top management will be changed in any case. Perhaps, the new top management will come from the Mezhprombank who are fairly interested in the Yakutian company. Future plans of the economic wing of Putin's team are fairly transparent. The Prosecutor General's Office made everything clear pressing charges against Nikolai Aksenenko. There is nothing surprising in the president's desire to promote his own men to key positions in the economy. Continuity of power costs a lot. Experience of 1996 shows that it is better to borrow money for the elections from the men the president considers his own. When oligarchs are too independent, they demand too much in return. There is another difference between old and new business-tycoons. The ones that surrounded Yeltsin thought in financial terms, they thought in terms of privatization for a song. The ones surrounding Putin have more by way of ideology. As far as they are concerned, Putin is not a moneybag. He is a guarantee of their businesses by the law. And when such a president needs help sometimes, why not offer it? From jones118 at lineone.net Thu Nov 22 22:09:23 2001 From: jones118 at lineone.net (Mark Jones) Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2001 05:09:23 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil In-Reply-To: References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011121125240.00b17698@pop3.lineone.net> Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011123044924.03280d40@pop3.lineone.net> > Richard N Hutchinson wrote: >There is no shortage of oil in nature? Surely it's obvious that oil isn't a 'resource' and has no use value until it becomes a commodity. And qua commodity it cannot ever be in short supply, it can simply be priced out of the market and substituted by other 'resources'. Obvious, no? As an energy-carrier (one among many) its attributes give it comparative utility in some contexts, (eg transport) not in others (eg power generation, bulk heating). It's the political economy of oil which matters. The ultimate goal of analysis (for a marxist like me) remains the production, circulation and distribution of value in capitalist commodity-producing society. The motor of this process is class struggle, not petroleum, also ABC, no? >That seems to be the opposite of all your postings and analysis, and in >any event, I think it's not true. To say otherwise sounds like good old >Julian Simon the conservative economist and "cornucopian." Eh? In what sense am I Julian Simon-like? >I would like to hear your explanation of your alternative to "modern >neomalthusian ricardianism," given your laserlike focus on oil. What centrally interests me is the conjuncture, the functioning of hegemony, the crisis of imperialism and of the state-form, which latter I take to be the determining-last-instance of the conjunctural dynamic. My alternative to "modern neomalthusian ricardianism," is socialism, which however I don't believe can be obtained by the methods you prescribe, ie by reforms however populist or well-intentioned. Contemporary capitalism is in a deep impasse, because of an accumulation crisis resulting from a secualr fall in the profit-rate -- *one of* the explanations for which is the radical contradiction within the technical composition of capital of which petroleum-dependency is one form of appearance. There are no 'oil shortages', and I've repeatedly argued just this: and the current price of oil proves exactly this point. It has collapsed and is tending towards $10/bbl! Why is that? Because of a slump in production and the onset of general crisis. It's the political consequences of *this* crisis which should exercise us, analytically. There *is* an argument which tries to account for endemic crisis in terms which are both physicalist, ie ricardian and/or physiocratic, and also malthusian, and this argument is very popular in certain circles as you know and is also as a matter of fact, well supported empirically. This argument bases itself on the premise that the crisis is not caused by the internal laws of motion of capital, ie by its contradictions, and nor is the crisis is an expression of class struggle, but it is instead caused by a major and critical resource suddenly running out just when we have become completely physically dependent on it. One of the strengths of this argument is precisely its strong empirical basis, ie the overwhelming evidence (a) of our civilisation's critical dependence on petroleum and (b) on the looming facts of rapid and potentially devastating depletion. However this argument, though strong, and though important, is NOT my argument. Why is the neomalthusian argument powerful? There are billions of people who are completely dependent on oil even though they have never made a phone call, never been inside an automobile, do not have electric light and cook with wood. This is because we are even more short of another commodity, water, and this shortage is absolutely critical in large parts of Africa and Asia and they way we have got round it, the way we have managed to support huge urban populations far in excess of any local carrying capacity, is by the export of wheat. There are facts and figures aplenty to show that the huge world trade in wheat is actually a trade in water: wheat is a substitute commodity. But this huge supply of grain is completely dependent on the petrochemical basis of agribiz and on the science and technology of gene modification etc, which is also a product of the complexity which is only possible with superabundant energy inpuits (no previous civilisation, eg the 'advanced organic societies discussed by Jack Goldstone and others, has ever remotely approached this degree of complexity, or of entropy either). And this agribiz is also reliant on the use and exhaustion of such non-renewable water resources as the fossil water of the Ogallala aquifer. So if oil production peaks and declines rapidly and this is out of sync with the expected peak and decline in the world's population, then it means disaster. Now, this neomalthusian view is a powerful argument but nonetheless it ignores the real mechanisms at work, which are more complex and also politically harder for many people to take on board since these are ultimately arguments for social revolution, and for the utopian impossibility of prgrammes of *reform*. The marxist argument says that actually the problems posed by oil peaking are not unresolvable, but they are only resolvable within the context of revolutionary social change. And equally that the form taken by the problem of peaking, and of general energy shortness of supply, will be not be price spikes, gas lines, energy famines etc. It will take the form instead of deflationary cycles compounding into generalised depressions. One effect of recessions is of course to mitigate supply bottlenecks by removing demand; so there may never be a shortage of oil, and the price may never rise very much. The effects of the peak shows itself in other ways, ones which the physicalists (modern physiocrats) do not understand and therefore are not prepared for. The problem, as Henryk Grossmann pointed out, is that there is a simultaneous process of under-accumulation and over-accumulation of capital. Mattick put it this way: "because not enough surplus value has been produced, capital cannot expand at a rate which would allow for the full realization of what has been produced. the relative scarcity of surplus labour in the production process appears as an absolute abundance of commodities in circulation". Another way to put it is to show that general crisis occurs because of a previous and longstanding under-production of surplus-value during which time systemic bottlenecks have appeared and have not been overcome but instead have worsened; production has increased but not sufficiently to develop new technologies which can leapfrog the bottlenecks, so that eventual crisis is extremely sharp, deep and represents a step-change, a political impasse for the bourgeoisie as well as impasse in production. A higher rate of accumulation would have overcome the latent overproduction of unproductive capital. This is precisely the situation you have today. To take one random example, we have tied up huge amounts of capital in trawler fleets which have produced a resource (fish), turning the resource (natural capital) into a revenue stream and depleting it in the process. This process of combined over- and under-accumulation of capital is endemic and the signs of it are visible in every sphere of production. This IS the mechanism which links together the materiality of the world with the process of social reproduction under capitalism. It's not over-population or climate change or resource depletion which is the problem and not even the visible, obvious, painful symptoms of these, but the fact that these processes are only the forms taken by the logic of accumulation itself, and therefore these surface forms, however existentially devastating, are not the real problem, which arises in the sphere of capital accumulation and production, and in its inability to overcome its own logic and its tendency to reproduce itself as ever more intense and explosive contradictions. This is why even (and especially) militant Islamism is a form of class struggle, a very contradictory form, but so what? The Left in the Arab and Muslim world was smashed, closed down, humiliated, disgraced and exterminated. The dream of development was smashed in the same process, and this is the actual history of the postwar period, in which the USSR and the West equally participated and were equally responsible. When the US fostered fundamentalism as a way of controlling the left it also created the only force capable of embodying anti-imperialist aspirations and fighting effectively form them. When imperialism took away the consolatory idea of socialism (opium of the masses) it opened the door for atavistic obscurantism as the only form of social release. Imperialism created its own enemy in its own image. Our attitude must be one of intransigent support for anti-imperialist struggles and equally intransigent propagation of the truth that ultimately liberation from imperialism also entails liberation from theological obscurantism and that freedom and emancipation can only be the creation of a self-conscious militant proletarian awareness, ie creation of a class 'for-itself'. That is exactly what we are doing in the process of these debates and discussions, or contributing to. But it is obvious that this development of a class for-itself requires a whole historical stage and many prerequisites which may not come into existence and therefore it cannot be taken for granted and its creation cannot be by an act of revolutionary will in abstraction from circumstances. Islamic Fundamentalism has found fertile ground for its message because no other message makes sense to people rendered materially completely abject or who may not be abject materially but are completely disfranchised, not only politically, but culturally and historical as is the case with many Arab and Muslim intellectuals. It makes sense to them however not so much because they are abject or disfranchised but because it empowers them and makes resistance possible: the only possible kind of resistance, ie that of martyrdom made possible by clandestinity, terrorism and assassination, the traditional MO of chiliastic and self-sacrificial sects. Individuals thus empowered do not need and cannot anyway have, the mass solidarity of open struggle and do not seek the social solidarity of normal everyday life: the anonymity of their clandestine activity is perfectly complemented by the psychology of personal salvation and entry to paradise via acts of martyrdom. Their brotherhood is projected, not direct, is sublimated, not realised. But it is equally clear that one important sign of their success will be precisely to escalate the level of struggle beyond the stage when such methods (clandestinity, terror etc) are relevant, and they themselves anticipate this, their leaders seek wider wars and a general engulfing of not only the Islamic nations but the whole world, in common struggle. They may get their wish, and they too are conjuring up the enemy they need: a newly vengeful, more militarist infidel. It is this intercalation of material and political processes which is important to analyse; this might help us to see, for example, that the war in Afghanistan is actually neither an 'oil' war no a civilisational conflict, but class struggle. Mark Jones From jones118 at lineone.net Thu Nov 22 23:38:48 2001 From: jones118 at lineone.net (Mark Jones) Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2001 06:38:48 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011123063834.024a5760@pop3.lineone.net> > >From: Richard N Hutchinson >To: Mark Jones >cc: >Subject: Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil > >On Wed, 21 Nov 2001, Mark Jones wrote: > > > At 20/11/2001 22:12, Richard N Hutchinson wrote: > > > > >Mark Jones takes the "ultra-materialist" path of focusing on natural > > >resources, treating the "hard-headed materialism" of economics as > > >epiphenomenal to OIL. > > > > This definitely what I don't believe! This would put me in the camp of > > modern neomalthusian ricardians, where I am not. It is not oil which is the > > issue, but the political economy of oil. There is no shortage of oil in > > nature, and there is not even a shortage of oil qua commodity, and never > > will be IMO. > > >There is no shortage of oil in nature? > >That seems to be the opposite of all your postings and analysis, and in >any event, I think it's not true. To say otherwise sounds like good old >Julian Simon the conservative economist and "cornucopian." > >I would like to hear your explanation of your alternative to "modern >neomalthusian ricardianism," given your laserlike focus on oil. > >RH From Gorojovsky at arnet.com.ar Fri Nov 23 05:39:41 2001 From: Gorojovsky at arnet.com.ar (Gorojovsky) Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2001 09:39:41 -0300 Subject: [A-List] Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil In-Reply-To: <5.1.0.14.2.20011123044924.03280d40@pop3.lineone.net> References: Message-ID: En relaci?n a [A-List] Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil, el 23 Nov 01, a las 5:09, Mark Jones dijo: > As an energy-carrier (one among many) its > attributes give it comparative utility in some contexts, (eg transport) not in > others (eg power generation, bulk heating) I am quite ignorant on this issue. But I have always had the idea that the advantages of oil in transportation are linked to the dominance of road and particularly automobile transportation, a dominance that is by no means inevitable. I have always believed that oil was too valuable a stuff to be burnt in the cylinders of a car's engine or a in a plane's turbines. Widespread usage of rail (and even dirigibles in air travel) would make a difference here, wouldn't it? I am really hungry for answers to the questions above. N?stor Miguel Gorojovsky gorojovsky at arnet.com.ar From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Fri Nov 23 08:06:48 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2001 15:06:48 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Russian aid helped turn Afghan tide Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011123150626.00a7f660@pop.tiscali.co.uk> By RICHARD SALE, UPI Terrorism Correspondent NEW YORK, Nov. 19 (UPI) -- The secret insertion of Russian troops and military experts into the tank and other ground forces of the Northern Alliance played a major role in its lightning victory over the Taliban this month, administration officials have told United Press International. "The Russians are playing a major part in the ground actions," which have been undertaken in conjunction with deadly U.S. air strikes, according to an administration official. He called the cooperation between American and Russian elements in Afghanistan "unprecedented" since World War II. According to U.S. intelligence officials, Russian-equipped Uzbek and Tajik special forces have also entered the ranks of the Northern Alliance and proved effective in clashes with the Taliban. Although the Northern Alliance is able to operate its Russian T-55 tanks independently, a State Dept. official said, "We have reports that the Russian military is in command of many of those (T-55) tanks." Another administration official agreed: "We believe that Russians are operating Northern Alliance tanks, giving guidance to ground units, and providing other specialized forms of assistance." Administration officials said that another key factor aiding the ground-fighting victories was a major influx of Russian weaponry for the Alliance, paid for by the United States. Dimitri Simes, president of the Nixon Foundation for Peace and Freedom, told United Press International that the Bush administration was financing a huge buy of surplus Russian military equipment for the Northern Alliance that included 60 upgraded T-55 main battle tanks, 12 T-62K command tanks, and 30 armored personnel carriers. The vehicles were brought under cover of night across the Amu Darya river from Uzbekistan by ferry at Termez. Other weapons included multiple rocket launchers and advanced communications equipment, U.S. intelligence officials said. The funds for the weapons are being routed through Uzbekistan to "disguise their origin," a U.S. government official said. Simes also said that the Northern Alliance was scheduled to receive Russian Mi-26 gunships, which would be operated by Russian pilots. The gunships have yet to be delivered, an administration official said. The U.S.-Russian agreement to closely cooperate began in mid-October and included contacts between President Bush and Russian President Vladmir Putin, 'along with extensive contacts among their intermediaries," U.S. intelligence officials said. Arrangements were solidified in a telephone conversation between the two leaders on Nov. 7, these sources said. At the end of October, the United States air campaign had been pursuing an "infrastructure-intensive" strategy against the Taliban-- destroying Taliban command and control centers and other targets with little effect: more than four weeks of bombing by U.S. planes across Afghanistan had not advanced the front lines by a single mile. This was not surprising. The Northern Alliance confronted a battle hardened Taliban army 50,000-strong, including thousands of foreign fighters -- Islamic militants from Chechnya and many Arab countries. The alliance forces numbered barely 15,000 -- appallingly badly equipped and supplied and rated by U.S. experts as little more than a ragtag band of rebels. But as Russian military aid secretly moved into place, the U.S. changed its strategy from attacking infrastructure to a "body intensive" strategy that would use U.S. power air to destroy concentrations of Taliban militia facing the Northern Alliance in the belief that large-scale killings of the enemy would demoralize the Taliban forces and soften them up for attack. On Nov. 1, the key change occurred when squadrons of B-52s pounded the Taliban front lines and its positions north of Kabul with increased ferocity while U.S. bombs also rained down on Taliban defenses around Mazar-i-Sharif. By Nov. 2, senior administration officials in Washington were saying privately that an Alliance march on the capital of Kabul was imminent, and that the way was being cleared. Gone was the restraint on air strikes for fear the Northern Alliance would jump the gun and take Kabul, complicating U.S. efforts to first create an ethnically broad-based post Taliban government. Thanks to this help and the Russian equipment, the Northern Alliance finally broke out on two fronts in a vast pincer movement, pressing the attack first on Mazar-i-Sharif and then on Kabul, one objective being to capture airfields near both these towns that U.S. Gen. Tommy Franks believed were necessary for the next stage of the campaign. The Russians have also been assisting U.S. special operations forces in the hunt for suspected terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden and his al Qaida network. "The Russians gave us piles of intelligence," including histories of Taliban and al Qaida leaders, plus detailed knowledge and background of the tribal chieftains in the south, local history, folklore, "down to routes, paths and sources of water," a U.S. government official said. He added that intelligence was shared "to a degree that risked exposure of Russian assets -- the kind of sharing you would only do with a genuine ally." Labeling himself "an old Cold Warrior," one U.S. intelligence source said the transformation of U.S.-Russian cooperation from initial wariness to trusting cooperation "is the most mind-boggling change I've seen in my career." From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Fri Nov 23 08:15:24 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2001 15:15:24 +0000 Subject: [A-List] one of the best websites in the world? Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011123151441.00a8d728@pop.tiscali.co.uk> someone sent me this: >>did you ever run across Dr. Robinson Rojas in London? His URL is: http://www.rrojasdatabank.org/ it speaks for itself, and it is one of the best websites in the world. Perhaps you draw also the attention of the A-List to that superb documentation.<< From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Fri Nov 23 11:07:27 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2001 18:07:27 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: from Jeffrey Sommers Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011123180650.02de1b90@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Management of Russia's oil has been horrible. The Arctic fields in particular have seen huge waste. The late 1980s through 1990s saw undercapitalization of Russia's oil industry with simultaneous over-pumping of oil for quick returns by Russia's oligarchs. The collapse of Russia's economy facilitated this, as domestic oil consumption plummeted by half, along with living standards. This benefitted Russia's oligarchs and the "West" generally as it kept global oil prices down. I wouldn't be surprised if certain US policy makers were fully cognizant of the relationship between opening Russia's economy and the enormous cut in domestic oil consumption, thus freeing this resource (along with many others) to flood into global markets, not to mention the boom to US finance which saw much of this cash (capital flight) flow to itself. Of course, West Europeans also benefitted from capturing the consumer goods market (especially low-end) and lower oil prices. "Free-trade" doctrine among intellectuals and the realpolitik needs of the Western economies, thus found synergy on Russia, with many of the former, perhaps, completely unaware of who they carried water for or why.... Russia's willingness to see oil prices drop suggests it is cooperating with the US against OPEC. This is amazing given how low oil prices are and the estimate that Russia can't make money on anything less than $12-$15 per barrel. No doubt oligarchs will continue pumping oil out fast as a hedge against future government controls on the industry (although this is little threat). At the same time, Russia's government is getting very cozy with the US and getting significant concessions in return, e.g., the US parring down its nuclear arsenal. Regarding oil, also of interest are statements coming from certain quarters on the need to keep H. Chavez in line. The US is counting on Venezuela to increase output by 40% over the next decade and is uncomfortable with Chavez. One might hazzard a guess that this is also in part the reason for the US's increasing interest in Columbia, which produces very little oil, but which reportedly has similar geologic features which contain Venezuela's oil. Nigerian production has past its peak and thus, further puts pressure on DC to keep Caracas disciplined. Although, they probably have little to worry about with Chavez. He won't shut off the spigot, but in the future he may try to kick prices up when decreasing oil output elsewhere will give him the leverage to do so. Probably, among other reasons, why the US is trying so hard to get the Caspian Sea basin oil online and was willing to cooperate with the Taliban, or whoever else they thought could help them get that oil onto global markets.... >could help them get that oil onto global markets.... From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Fri Nov 23 12:21:41 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2001 19:21:41 +0000 Subject: [A-List] (no subject) Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011123192120.00b148c0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Rumor Mill News Reading Room Forum JP Morgan in Early Stages of Crashing Posted By: Boudewijn Wegerif Date: Wednesday, 21 November 2001, 6:47 p.m. THIS MATTERS - JP Morgan in Early Stages of Crashing Date: 11/21/2001 1:02:51 PM Pacific Standard Time From: bw at jak.se (Boudewijn Wegerif) The message from the Central Bank Oversight & Monitor Committee below is clear. JP Morgan is considered to be in the early stages of crashing. http://www.rumormillnews.net/cgi-bin/config.pl?read=15139 From tomzbox at hotmail.com Fri Nov 23 20:03:37 2001 From: tomzbox at hotmail.com (Tom Warren) Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2001 20:03:37 Subject: [A-List] Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil Message-ID: I almost began this response with [ARRRRRRGHG!] but I have modified it to merely: [sigh] You know SO much better, Mark! I can only conclude that you are posting to an audience who needs special speech recognition devices. I will post just a couple of comments (I have to go eat some leftover pumpkin pie). Mark asks: >Eh? In what sense am I Julian Simon-like? You are JS-like in the sense that you demonstrate technological Pollyannaism with the statement "it can simply be priced out of the market and substituted by other 'resources'." There are at present no 'other resources', and you are aware of this. There will NOT BE sufficient 'other resources' on line to feed either capitalism OR social revolution, or ... "the utopian impossibility of prgrammes of *reform*." You are shaking the cornucopia and saying "Just wait a moment, there is more in there, I swear." But I have no doubt that you are correct, that it can be priced out of the market, unless one needs a quart of oil for one's Lexus, or needs to eat. Mark says: >It's the political economy of oil which matters. The ultimate goal of >analysis (for a marxist like me) remains the production, >circulation and >distribution of value in capitalist commodity->producing society. [snip] >.... And we're back to the old catechism of the "Value Theory" and the line it draws around what may be discounted about reality! ... and that's half the reason I put a [sigh] up above. After years of both taking on board the arguments of the 'modern neomalthusian ricardians' and arguing the veracity of their points, we still can't move beyond the possibility of modifying marxist theology even when it is so obviously incorrect and at opposition to the (physicalist) data. Cognitive Dissonance! (Or at least 'faith over reason' ) Please, please, one day attempt to calculate all that non-value nature put into the commodities we're discussing. Just for fun? Mark says: >There are no 'oil shortages', and I've repeatedly argued just this: and the >current price of oil proves exactly this point. It has >collapsed and is >tending towards $10/bbl! Why is that? Because of a >slump in production and >the onset of general crisis. It's the >political consequences of *this* >crisis which should exercise us, >analytically. Uhh, excuse me, but I just went back and skimmed the archives. You know ... the ones where you and Mike K place all those articles about Russian INCREASES in production? (temporary, temporary, merely a blip while the line is still toward depletion. There will be shortages. ) And it's strictly MY opinion, but I think we ought to still analytically exercise the physical consequences, too. Mark says: >>this argument is very popular in certain circles as you >know and is also as a matter of fact, well supported empirically. ...the >strengths of this argument is precisely its strong empirical >basis, >...However this argument, though strong, and though important, >is NOT my >argument. Okay, I will let ya slide, my brother, as long as you quit that Simon-like adherance to discounting the empirical data and find SOME way to incorporate them into your calculations-which-must-be-totally-based-upon-marxism. And take off them rose-colored glasses. Lysenko, oops I mean Mark says: >wheat is actually a trade in water: wheat is a substitute commodity. >But >this huge supply of grain is completely dependent on the >petrochemical >basis of agribiz ... And the prefix "petro" in the above statement moves ALL oil into the status of 'resource' -- permanently -- unless Ol' Julian is right and the cornucopia is rapidly going to produce some Star Trek-like alternative. Transporter Technology? Hey, EYE'm ready ... Oh, no wait, that relies upon energy too. (but at least it ignores the laws of physics. Point for you.) Mark counters: >Now, this neomalthusian view is a powerful argument but >nonetheless it ignores the real mechanisms at work, [snip for >brevity] ... >there is a simultaneous process of under-accumulation and > >over-accumulation of capital. [snip] ...these processes are only the > >forms taken by the logic of accumulation itself, and therefore these >surface forms,however existentially devastating, Ooooooh, NOW I see! Forgive me. You were talking about the realm of the *mind* here, and not any real world we have to deal with in the next 35 years based upon physics and the problems of capital accumulation and production that are already in play. THAT's what allows us to discount the data, and heretics like Ricardo and Malthus and such like! I take it all back. You are of course correct. I was looking at a whole 'nother set of issues. Sorry. My bad. Mea Culpa. Ignore all I wrote above. >It is this intercalation of material and political processes which is >important to analyse; this might help us to see, for example, that the war >in Afghanistan is actually neither an 'oil' war no a >civilisational >conflict, but class struggle. > >Mark Jones 'Kay. I will be totally interested and attentive when you get around to formulating how the class struggle uses the information it gets from such analyses and "seeing" to confront the material issues. existentially yours, tom _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp From franka at fiu.edu Fri Nov 23 13:31:04 2001 From: franka at fiu.edu (Andre Gunder Frank) Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2001 15:31:04 -0500 (EST) Subject: [A-List] Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil In-Reply-To: Message-ID: there is always plenty of hydrogen, and evcen of sunshine On Fri, 23 Nov 2001, Tom Warren wrote: > Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2001 20:03:37 > From: Tom Warren > Reply-To: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu > To: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: Re: [A-List] Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil > > > I almost began this response with [ARRRRRRGHG!] but I have modified it to > merely: > > [sigh] > > You know SO much better, Mark! I can only conclude that you are posting to > an audience who needs special speech recognition devices. > > I will post just a couple of comments (I have to go eat some leftover > pumpkin pie). > > Mark asks: > >Eh? In what sense am I Julian Simon-like? > > You are JS-like in the sense that you demonstrate technological Pollyannaism > with the statement "it can simply be priced out of the market and > substituted by other 'resources'." There are at present no 'other > resources', and you are aware of this. There will NOT BE sufficient 'other > resources' on line to feed either capitalism OR social revolution, or ... > "the utopian impossibility of prgrammes of *reform*." You are shaking the > cornucopia and saying "Just wait a moment, there is more in there, I swear." > > But I have no doubt that you are correct, that it can be priced out of the > market, unless one needs a quart of oil for one's Lexus, or needs to eat. > > Mark says: > >It's the political economy of oil which matters. The ultimate goal of > >analysis (for a marxist like me) remains the production, >circulation and > >distribution of value in capitalist commodity->producing society. [snip] > >.... > > And we're back to the old catechism of the "Value Theory" and the line it > draws around what may be discounted about reality! ... and that's half the > reason I put a [sigh] up above. After years of both taking on board the > arguments of the 'modern neomalthusian ricardians' and arguing the veracity > of their points, we still can't move beyond the possibility of modifying > marxist theology even when it is so obviously incorrect and at opposition to > the (physicalist) data. Cognitive Dissonance! (Or at least 'faith over > reason' ) Please, please, one day attempt to calculate all that > non-value nature put into the commodities we're discussing. Just for fun? > > Mark says: > >There are no 'oil shortages', and I've repeatedly argued just this: and the > >current price of oil proves exactly this point. It has >collapsed and is > >tending towards $10/bbl! Why is that? Because of a >slump in production and > >the onset of general crisis. It's the >political consequences of *this* > >crisis which should exercise us, >analytically. > > Uhh, excuse me, but I just went back and skimmed the archives. You know ... > the ones where you and Mike K place all those articles about Russian > INCREASES in production? (temporary, temporary, merely a blip while the line > is still toward depletion. There will be shortages. ) > > And it's strictly MY opinion, but I think we ought to still analytically > exercise the physical consequences, too. > > Mark says: > >>this argument is very popular in certain circles as you > >know and is also as a matter of fact, well supported empirically. ...the > >strengths of this argument is precisely its strong empirical >basis, > >...However this argument, though strong, and though important, >is NOT my > >argument. > > Okay, I will let ya slide, my brother, as long as you quit that Simon-like > adherance to discounting the empirical data and find SOME way to incorporate > them into your calculations-which-must-be-totally-based-upon-marxism. And > take off them rose-colored glasses. > > Lysenko, oops I mean Mark says: > >wheat is actually a trade in water: wheat is a substitute commodity. >But > >this huge supply of grain is completely dependent on the >petrochemical > >basis of agribiz ... > > And the prefix "petro" in the above statement moves ALL oil into the status > of 'resource' -- permanently -- unless Ol' Julian is right and the > cornucopia is rapidly going to produce some Star Trek-like alternative. > Transporter Technology? Hey, EYE'm ready ... Oh, no wait, that relies upon > energy too. (but at least it ignores the laws of physics. Point for you.) > > Mark counters: > >Now, this neomalthusian view is a powerful argument but > >nonetheless it ignores the real mechanisms at work, [snip for >brevity] ... > >there is a simultaneous process of under-accumulation and > > >over-accumulation of capital. [snip] ...these processes are only the > > >forms taken by the logic of accumulation itself, and therefore these > >surface forms,however existentially devastating, > > Ooooooh, NOW I see! Forgive me. You were talking about the realm of the > *mind* here, and not any real world we have to deal with in the next 35 > years based upon physics and the problems of capital accumulation and > production that are already in play. THAT's what allows us to discount the > data, and heretics like Ricardo and Malthus and such like! I take it all > back. You are of course correct. I was looking at a whole 'nother set of > issues. Sorry. My bad. Mea Culpa. Ignore all I wrote above. > > >It is this intercalation of material and political processes which is > >important to analyse; this might help us to see, for example, that the war > >in Afghanistan is actually neither an 'oil' war no a >civilisational > >conflict, but class struggle. > > > >Mark Jones > > 'Kay. I will be totally interested and attentive when you get around to > formulating how the class struggle uses the information it gets from such > analyses and "seeing" to confront the material issues. > > existentially yours, > tom > > > _________________________________________________________________ > Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANDRE GUNDER FRANK Department of History Home University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 Fax: 1-402-472 8839 E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Fri Nov 23 15:45:17 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2001 22:45:17 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011123221718.01e3b340@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 23/11/2001 20:03, Tom wrote: >You are JS-like in the sense that you demonstrate technological Pollyannaism whoa, hold it right there. Of course there are no substitutes, but what I'm pointing to is the ultimate lunacy of capitalism. There is no shortage of oil in Russia right now even tho production is off by hell knows what from a decade ago, but one reason for this is because the country collapsed, resulting in democide, ie, 10 million people who should be alive in the fSU are now dead, and that's the price paid to help capitalism prove that there is no shortage of oil; meanwhile the press celebrates the return of freedom and human rights in 'reborn Russia'. Where we disagree is that I don't accept the pessimistic neomalthusian view that civilisational collapse and mass dieoff is inevitable. Of course it's possible, but not inevitable. It depends on us. We have to change things. >Mark says: >>It's the political economy of oil which matters. The ultimate goal of >>analysis (for a marxist like me) remains the production, >circulation and >>distribution of value in capitalist commodity->producing society. [snip] .... > >And we're back to the old catechism of the "Value Theory" and the line it >draws around what may be discounted about reality! ... and that's half the >reason I put a [sigh] up above. After years of both taking on board the >arguments of the 'modern neomalthusian ricardians' and arguing the >veracity of their points, we still can't move beyond the possibility of >modifying marxist theology even when it is so obviously incorrect and at >opposition to the (physicalist) data. Cognitive Dissonance! (Or at least >'faith over reason' ) Please, please, one day attempt to calculate all >that non-value nature put into the commodities we're discussing. Just for fun? Here you have a valid point. We haven't yet made the argument empirically strong enough, I concede that. But this is not a reason for giving up. It is the neomalthusians not the marxists who have been consistently wrong about such things as the price of oil. Since this has all sorts of political consequences, understanding the mechanism matters. >'Kay. I will be totally interested and attentive when you get around to >formulating how the class struggle uses the information it gets from such >analyses and "seeing" to confront the material issues. I'm glad to here it. We need all the sceptics we can get. Mark From tomzbox at hotmail.com Sat Nov 24 00:53:13 2001 From: tomzbox at hotmail.com (Tom Warren) Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2001 00:53:13 Subject: [A-List] Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil Message-ID: Writes Mark: >Of course there are no substitutes, but what I'm pointing to is the >ultimate lunacy of capitalism. Well, I have ALWAYS been with you on that one. >Where we disagree is that I don't accept the pessimistic neomalthusian view >that civilisational collapse and mass dieoff is inevitable. Of course it's >possible, but not inevitable. It depends on us. We have to change things. Yep. Absolutely. But you shortchange us neomalthusian curmudgeons. Collapse & dieoff are not inevitable, just probable unless we 'change our ways' immediately. Actually where we disagree is, as Stan has observed, in 'what is to be done'. I have yet to see an argument from either global capitalism or socialism that proposes a remedy for civilizational collapse and dieoff. Both seem willing to continue to avail themselves of "commodities", regardless of the cost to the biosphere. You wish to take the sphere of capital accumulation and production away and prescribe that absence as a remedy. You have yet to describe a mechanism which will 'change things', offering us faith in revolution instead. Your replacement still upholds a viewpoint which relies upon the same manipulation of the biosphere that capitalism does. You *seem* to be relying upon differentleadership but using the same tools to mine the last drop of oil, kill the last whale, and melt the icecaps. I am not sanguine enough to a) wait for a revolution that has not learned the lesson of resource depletion and demonstrates such ignorance in Value Theory; and b) subordinate all efforts to such a revolution and thereby delay any meaningful effort to remedy civilizational collapse and die-off until mass social justice can get around to perceiving the need for a change in attitude about biocentrism. Although, ... I am always willing to listen to any plan you propose, Mark. >We need all the sceptics we can get. > >Mark Ohh, no! I will NOT cop to being a sceptic! I'm just waiting for an explanation I can *understand* well enough to be sceptical of .... Lead On, my friend. tom _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp From tomzbox at hotmail.com Sat Nov 24 01:22:40 2001 From: tomzbox at hotmail.com (Tom Warren) Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2001 01:22:40 Subject: [A-List] Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil Message-ID: Writes Dr. Frank: >there is always plenty of hydrogen, and evcen of sunshine Oh yes, lots and lots! Please do yourself the favor of actually calculating the requirements implied in your statement until you are satisfied that you can rely upon it. Please do not rely upon what someone tells you, (not even me); actually DO the calculations until you are personally and intellectually satisfied with you answer. Here are some questions you might ask: 1)What technologies are available to utilize hydrogen and sunshine to replace petroleum? CAVEAT: Do not use projected technological advances which have not yet been designed. This is Simon's ploy and is intellectually dishonest. You may however, use any technological designs which are designated as "promising". 2) How much petroleum is required to produce and install the new hydrogen and sunshine-based systems? Do we have enough petroleum to do so and still minimally support 'civilization'? 3)How long to replace all petro-based systems with hydrogen and sunshine? How much time do we have to complete such a recommended change-over? (Let's not even attempt projections of who will be in charge of the change-over, nor the forces that might be arrayed against such a change-over.{!!} ) 4) Are there systems which cannot utilize hydrogen and sunshine? ... if such systems exist, are they essential to civilization? 5) What is the cost of replacement and transition? Can we bear the cost? 6) are there any downsides to hydrogen or sunshine technologies comparable to petroleum use? (hint: 'heat'.) See what you think after you've examined the issue a bit more. If you still feel comfortable with hydrogen and sunshine as our saviors, I will certainly respect your conclusions. best, Tom Warren Pleasant Hill, Oregon _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 23 02:14:49 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2001 11:14:49 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Strange bedfellows Message-ID: Russia gives vital maps to CIA IAN BRUCE The Herald, 23 November 2001 Spetznaz experience passed to US troops MOSCOW has supplied maps of cave complexes in south and east Afghanistan to the CIA to help in the intensifying manhunt for Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda terror network lieutenants. The maps were drawn up from surveys carried out by the GRU, the Red Army's intelligence arm, during the 10-year Soviet occupation of the country which ended in 1989, after a bitter, guerrilla war which cost the USSR more than 15,000 dead. Although tunnels and bunkers have been improved and possibly extended since then, bin Laden's organisation and the ruling Taliban regime are still believed to rely on the basic underground infrastructure which provided a degree of shelter, security from air attack and locations for hidden arms caches through a decade of conflict against the Soviet invaders. Russia has also passed on advice based on the combat experience of its own Spetznaz special forces in tackling the Afghan mujahideen in the rugged terrain of the Hindu Kush range, which dominates two-thirds of the country. A Pentagon source, confirming Moscow's cooperation yesterday, said: "We are grateful for the hands-on input from Russia. Intelligence is flooding in from sources ranging from paid local informers to friendly security services to hi-tech electronic assets. "Moscow's contribution is particularly useful. Until we take bin Laden out, this is, essentially, an information war." US and British special forces, guided by former Taliban fighters who have now switched sides, are concentrating the search in mountains east of Kandahar, the regime's political and spiritual stronghold, and around Tora Bora east of Jalalabad, close to the frontier with Pakistan. Both sectors are also under scrutiny by unmanned surveillance drones, orbiting KH11 Keyhole satellites, and reconnaissance aircraft understood to include RAF Nimrods and US Awacs which can detect movement on the ground over a 250-mile radius. In addition, a new Air Force spy plane - the high altitude, unmanned Global Hawk - began flying over Afghanistan this week for the first time, Donald Rumsfled, defence secretary, said yesterday. He said it was being operated as a demonstration model, since the aircraft was still in development and had never before been used in a real operation. Two US Marine amphibious expeditionary units, each consisting of a 600-strong battalion of riflemen supported by Harrier jump jets and SuperCobra helicopter gunships, are standing by on the assault ships Bataan and Peleliu, close to the Pakistan coast and placed on alert for seek-and-destroy sweeps inside Afghanistan. The frigates and destroyers escorting the three US carrier battlegroups in the Arabian Sea have also been ordered to prepare to intercept, board and search any commercial ships in the area suspected of carrying wanted members of either Taliban or al Qaeda. Similar exclusion zones were set up in the Persian Gulf to halt supplies to Iraq in 1991 and in the Adriatic to prevent arms and oil smuggling to Yugoslavia in 1999. On land, US commandos and air force reconnaissance units are using a range of revolutionary sensors for the first time under combat conditions. They include magnetic anomaly detectors designed originally to track submerged nuclear submarines by homing in on the fluctuations in the earth's magnetic field caused by a vessel's passage through the water. This has been adapted on aircraft pods to react to the weak electrical pulse generated by wiring strung between lights in a cave or tunnel. The vibration of a generator used to power the lighting system can be picked up and the location pinpointed even beneath 100 feet of solid rock. Heat sensors mounted on a rifle can single out a human body at a range of 1.5 miles, especially in cold weather, and the presence of a vehicle at up to four miles. Even a sentry's breath in cold mountain air gives off a distinctive heat signature which can betray the location of a cave or defensive position. Other airborne sensors invented to detect chemical or biological agents in the atmosphere can analyse the pollutants from a tank's exhaust pipe and tell the operator whether it belongs to friendly or hostile forces. A US Marines' spokesman said: "Warm air stands out like a beacon in the night. We have sensors which can detect the slightest variation in temperature from up to 30 miles away. "Weapons' sights using scopes which magnify ambient star and moonlight are another war-winner. On a recent test in Virginia, it was possible to read the name tags on the uniforms of guys hiding in pitch darkness 500 yards away. Combined with heat sensors, they leave no hiding place, even through smoke or dust. "The aim is to extend the zone under surveillance well beyond our own forward troops. We are substituting information for armour. If we can see the bad guys before they see us, we don't need as much protection. Like a Wild West gunfight, war has returned to the point where the guy who aims and shoots first is likely to be the winner in a firefight." US mission planners are narrowing bin Laden's options further by concentrating bomb attacks on blocking escape exits tunnelled away from the main limestone rabbit warrens which honeycomb the mountains. Each complex can stretch beneath several square miles of rock. Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/23-11-19101-23-59-25.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 23 02:31:29 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2001 11:31:29 +0200 Subject: [A-List] British takeover of EU Message-ID: Lest any are confused by the subject line, I'm sure that Gerhard Schr?der and others have their own ideas about the future direction of the EU. But for the time being a coalition of interests has formed within the EU (grouped around The Policy Network) which is serving the cause of greater British involvement in the EU very well. Naturally the British state aspires to leadership -- there could be no other role, after all. But the disarray of the French and the new assertiveness of Germany allows Britain to piggy-back on some of its partners. Spain is being bought off by the ultimate prize of Gibraltar, which, all rhetoric to the contrary, is an outdated and expensive piece of land serving no geopolitical purpose whatsoever for the UK. Rather like Northern Ireland. Only misty-eyed punk Thatcherites will shed tears for the loss of these irrelevances. Under New Labour British imperialism is being thoroughly modernised, and the first acquisition is no less than Europe itself. Or so the plan goes. Britain missing euro boat, warns Blair MICHAEL SETTLE The Herald, 23 November 2001 TONY Blair will today warn Britain about missing the boat on joining the euro, decrying the "tragedy" of our "history of opportunities missed" in Europe. With just 39 days to go before euro notes and coins are introduced in 12 EU member states, the prime minister in an eagerly anticipated speech will attack the UK's political record of euro-scepticism. "The tragedy for British politics and for Britain is that too often politicians have consistently failed . . . to appreciate the emerging reality of European integration and in so doing they have failed Britain's interests," Mr Blair will say in a speech at the opening of the European Research Institute in Birmingham. While he will again restate the government's official policy on the euro - passing Gordon Brown's five economic tests and holding a referendum - the prime minister's glowing language about European co-operation and interdependence represents his strongest signal yet that he feels scrapping the pound would be in Britain's best interests. Simon Murphy, Labour leader in the European Parliament, said last night: "Read between the lines and the message is clear: Britain's decision to join the euro is inevitable." Ahead of the speech yesterday, Mr Blair's official spokesman was asked, given the imminence of the euro on the continent, if there was a sense of urgency in the government; the prime minister felt Britain was being left behind. He replied: "The historical case he makes is that Britain has allowed a major series of events, a major project, to be defined in terms largely set by others. We are still paying the price for that." Mr Blair will recount what he regards as Britain's negative post-war attitude towards European integration. "First we said it wouldn't happen, then we said it wouldn't work, then we said we wouldn't need it and Britain was left behind at every step of the way," he will say. The greatest missed opportunity was not joining the then Common Market at the first opportunity in the late 1950s. Mr Blair believes politicians have been hidebound by a belief that the British people are inherently anti-European, which is not necessarily the case, said his official spokesman. "The British public are well able to understand that in today's globalised world working together with our allies gives Britain more protection, not less, more leverage, not less. Since September 11, people believe this more than ever." Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/23-11-19101-23-53-32.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 23 02:24:17 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2001 11:24:17 +0200 Subject: [A-List] New Labour infighting Message-ID: This article is quite useful in that it highlights the continuities between Blair's New Labour and Neil Kinnock's own "modernisation" of the Labour Party during the 1980s. Kinnock is now vice president of the European Commission, in charge of "modernising" that institution, having miraculously survived the fall-out from the Jacques Santer era. But it's also a useful rebuttal to the rubbish put about by Andrew Roth in the Guardian concerning the eclipse of Kinnock's people by Blair. Far from it -- and one other key personality not mentioned here but very much in the frame for having gifted his ambiguous legacy is Robert Maxwell. Meanwhile it's interesting to see that even two resignations from Cabinet in the Parliament does not necessarily finish you as a force. Why should Mandelson's briefing against anyone be worthy of attention? What credibility does he possibly retain? Mandelson is now one bridge between Blair and Kinnock in his role as chief of The Policy Network, the pan-EU social democratic "think tank" which is one of the primary vehicles by which the permanent government-New Labour complex is orchestrating its quiet takeover of the EU. Brown is looking more exposed by the minute, and, finally, but also quite ironically, the Treasury, long the subject of a Labour Party lament, is about to be reformed -- except that it will be "modernised" such that its functions will be more attuned to the furtherance of the interests of UK and European capital, more efficiently so that the Conservatives could ever have achieved. Whatever will Will Hutton say? Brown bristles at Blair backers' gossip CATHERINE MacLEOD The Herald, 23 November 2001 GORDON Brown's attempts to stop press reports of a growing rift between him and Tony Blair faltered yesterday as parliamentary colleagues questioned his judgment over making Westminster gossip a public issue. After a week of damaging stories about personality difficulties at the heart of the cabinet, the chancellor chose the unusual vehicle of a newspaper interview to deny any problems in his relationship with the prime minister. He said: "Tony Blair is the best friend I've had in politics. We have worked together for many, many years." In the interview Mr Brown insisted that any reports of him leaving meetings "shouting and screaming" was merely gossip, emanating from usual sources. Mr Brown, whose friends are convinced he is the victim of briefing from the former Northern Ireland secretary, Peter Mandelson and party chairman, Charles Clarke, dismissed the reports of tensions between himself and his cabinet colleagues. Mr Clarke, whose role includes healing any splits in the party, is unlikely to have briefed against any of his cabinet colleagues. In this week's New Statesman, Patricia Hewitt, the trade and industry secretary and Neil Kinnock's former press secretary, is being talked about as a future chancellor of the exchequer. Mr Clarke is considered a likely home secretary of the future, and Northern Ireland secretary John Reid, Kinnock's former political adviser, is widely tipped to succeed John Prescott as deputy prime minister. The rise of the Kinnockites does not bode well for Mr Brown's prospects. Memories in the Labour party are long, and in the Kinnock camp they still smart from the treatment dished out to Neil Kinnock by the so called intelligentsia of the Scottish Labour party in the 1980s. But whatever speculation fascinates Westminster there is no suggestion Mr Brown is anything but secure while Mr Blair is in No10. Raising eyebrows in the Westminster village, Mr Brown paid tribute to all the spending ministers, including the transport secretary, Stephen Byers, whose friends believe was undermined by the chancellor over Railtrack. Not only did Mr Brown say that Mr Byers had made the right decision over Railtrack he said: "Let me say this: I have got the utmost respect for the hard work and brilliant work that our spending ministers - Estelle (Morris), Alan( Millburn), David (Blunkett), Alistair (Darling) and Geoff (Hoon) - all those ministers have done." Mr Blair rallied to support the chancellor for the second day running yesterday. Mr Brown's decision to go public yesterday was put down to the extent to which he has been rattled by the dismal press reports. Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/23-11-19101-23-50-48.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From ssandron at hotmail.com Sat Nov 24 14:34:16 2001 From: ssandron at hotmail.com (Seth Sandronsky) Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2001 14:34:16 Subject: [A-List] Russia gives vital maps to CIA Message-ID: Leon, Strange bedfellows, no? Seth Russia gives vital maps to CIA IAN BRUCE The Herald, 23 November 2001 Spetznaz experience passed to US troops MOSCOW has supplied maps of cave complexes in south and east Afghanistan to the CIA to help in the intensifying manhunt for Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda terror network lieutenants. The maps were drawn up from surveys carried out by the GRU, the Red Army's intelligence arm, during the 10-year Soviet occupation of the country which ended in 1989, after a bitter, guerrilla war which cost the USSR more than 15,000 dead. Although tunnels and bunkers have been improved and possibly extended since then, bin Laden's organisation and the ruling Taliban regime are still believed to rely on the basic underground infrastructure which provided a degree of shelter, security from air attack and locations for hidden arms caches through a decade of conflict against the Soviet invaders. Russia has also passed on advice based on the combat experience of its own Spetznaz special forces in tackling the Afghan mujahideen in the rugged terrain of the Hindu Kush range, which dominates two-thirds of the country. A Pentagon source, confirming Moscow's cooperation yesterday, said: "We are grateful for the hands-on input from Russia. Intelligence is flooding in from sources ranging from paid local informers to friendly security services to hi-tech electronic assets. "Moscow's contribution is particularly useful. Until we take bin Laden out, this is, essentially, an information war." US and British special forces, guided by former Taliban fighters who have now switched sides, are concentrating the search in mountains east of Kandahar, the regime's political and spiritual stronghold, and around Tora Bora east of Jalalabad, close to the frontier with Pakistan. Both sectors are also under scrutiny by unmanned surveillance drones, orbiting KH11 Keyhole satellites, and reconnaissance aircraft understood to include RAF Nimrods and US Awacs which can detect movement on the ground over a 250-mile radius. In addition, a new Air Force spy plane - the high altitude, unmanned Global Hawk - began flying over Afghanistan this week for the first time, Donald Rumsfled, defence secretary, said yesterday. He said it was being operated as a demonstration model, since the aircraft was still in development and had never before been used in a real operation. Two US Marine amphibious expeditionary units, each consisting of a 600-strong battalion of riflemen supported by Harrier jump jets and SuperCobra helicopter gunships, are standing by on the assault ships Bataan and Peleliu, close to the Pakistan coast and placed on alert for seek-and-destroy sweeps inside Afghanistan. The frigates and destroyers escorting the three US carrier battlegroups in the Arabian Sea have also been ordered to prepare to intercept, board and search any commercial ships in the area suspected of carrying wanted members of either Taliban or al Qaeda. Similar exclusion zones were set up in the Persian Gulf to halt supplies to Iraq in 1991 and in the Adriatic to prevent arms and oil smuggling to Yugoslavia in 1999. On land, US commandos and air force reconnaissance units are using a range of revolutionary sensors for the first time under combat conditions. They include magnetic anomaly detectors designed originally to track submerged nuclear submarines by homing in on the fluctuations in the earth's magnetic field caused by a vessel's passage through the water. This has been adapted on aircraft pods to react to the weak electrical pulse generated by wiring strung between lights in a cave or tunnel. The vibration of a generator used to power the lighting system can be picked up and the location pinpointed even beneath 100 feet of solid rock. Heat sensors mounted on a rifle can single out a human body at a range of 1.5 miles, especially in cold weather, and the presence of a vehicle at up to four miles. Even a sentry's breath in cold mountain air gives off a distinctive heat signature which can betray the location of a cave or defensive position. Other airborne sensors invented to detect chemical or biological agents in the atmosphere can analyse the pollutants from a tank's exhaust pipe and tell the operator whether it belongs to friendly or hostile forces. A US Marines' spokesman said: "Warm air stands out like a beacon in the night. We have sensors which can detect the slightest variation in temperature from up to 30 miles away. "Weapons' sights using scopes which magnify ambient star and moonlight are another war-winner. On a recent test in Virginia, it was possible to read the name tags on the uniforms of guys hiding in pitch darkness 500 yards away. Combined with heat sensors, they leave no hiding place, even through smoke or dust. "The aim is to extend the zone under surveillance well beyond our own forward troops. We are substituting information for armour. If we can see the bad guys before they see us, we don't need as much protection. Like a Wild West gunfight, war has returned to the point where the guy who aims and shoots first is likely to be the winner in a firefight." US mission planners are narrowing bin Laden's options further by concentrating bomb attacks on blocking escape exits tunnelled away from the main limestone rabbit warrens which honeycomb the mountains. Each complex can stretch beneath several square miles of rock. Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/23-11-19101-23-59-25.html _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp From tomzbox at hotmail.com Sat Nov 24 16:56:48 2001 From: tomzbox at hotmail.com (Tom Warren) Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2001 16:56:48 Subject: [A-List] Lomborg debunked Message-ID: Thanks to Steve Kurtz of Ottawa. and Doug Woodard, St. Catharines, Ontario ========================== Various websites debunk Bj?rn Lomborg's anti-environmental book "The Skeptical Environmentalist": http://www.wri.org/wri/press/mk_lomborg.html The World Resources Institute (WRI)'s rebuttal of Lomborg's book, with Nine Things Journalists Should Know About the Skeptical Environmentalist, and a similar version for environmental educators. http://www.au.dk/~cesamat/debate.html University of Aarhus site, where Lomborg's Danish colleagues present scientific arguments on why Bj?rn Lomborg's assertions are wrong. http://www.green-alliance.org.uk/Documents/Reports/ten%20pinches%20of%20salt.pdf Tom Burke's excellent analysis, "Ten Pinches of Salt: A Reply to Bj?rn Lomborg". Mr. Burke was previously adviser to several secretaries of state of the environment of the United Kingdom. http://www.anti-lomborg.com/ A site that presents alternative views to Bj?rn Lomborg, based mostly on his article in The Guardian. http://www.lomborg.com/ Bj?rn Lomborg's personal site where he also corrects some of the errors in his book. -- http://magma.ca/~gpco/ http://www.scientists4pr.org/ Anyone who believes exponential growth can go on forever in a finite world is either a madman or an economist.-Kenneth Boulding _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp From magellan at west.com.br Sat Nov 24 11:27:20 2001 From: magellan at west.com.br (magellan) Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2001 16:27:20 -0200 Subject: [A-List] Big Brother destroys sensitive records Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.20011124162720.0070c504@pop3.west.com.br> http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-111801inform.story The Government Printing Office has begun ordering about 1,300 libraries nationwide that serve as federal depositories to destroy government records that federal agencies say could be too sensitive for public consumption. Rising Fears That What We Do Know Can Hurt Us By ERIC LICHTBLAU, L.A. Times, 11/18/01 WASHINGTON - The document seemed innocuous enough: a survey of government data on reservoirs and dams on CD-ROM. But then came last month's federal directive to U.S. libraries: "Destroy the report." So a Syracuse University library clerk broke the disc into pieces, saving a single shard to prove that the deed was done. The unusual order from the Government Printing Office reflects one of the hidden casualties of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks: the public's shrinking access to information that many once took for granted. Want to find out whether there are any hazardous waste sites near the local day-care center? What safety controls are in place at nuclear power plants? Or how many people are incarcerated in terrorist-related probes? Since Sept. 11, it has become much harder to get such information from the federal government, a growing number of states and public libraries as heightened concern about national security has often trumped the public's "right to know:" * At least 15 federal agencies have yanked potentially sensitive information off the Internet, or removed Web sites altogether, for fear that terrorists could exploit the government data. The excised material ranges from information on chemical reactors and risk-management programs to airport data and mapping of oil pipelines. * Several states have followed the federal government's lead. California, for example, has removed information on dams and aqueducts, state officials said. * Members of the public who want to use reading rooms at federal agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service must now make an appointment and be escorted by an employee to ensure that information is not misused. * The Government Printing Office has begun ordering about 1,300 libraries nationwide that serve as federal depositories to destroy government records that federal agencies say could be too sensitive for public consumption. * Federal agencies are imposing a stricter standard in reviewing hundreds of thousands of Freedom of Information Act requests from the public each year; officials no longer have to show that disclosure would cause "substantial harm" before rejecting a request. Watchdog groups say they have already started to see rejections of requests that likely would have been granted before. The trend reverses a decades-long shift toward greater public access to information, even highly sensitive documents such as the Pentagon Papers or unconventional manifestos such as "The Anarchist's Cookbook," a compilation of recipes for making bombs. The popularity of the Internet has made sensitive information even easier to come by in recent years, but the events of Sept. 11 are now fueling a new debate in Washington: How much do Americans need to know? Attacks Place Internet Content in New Light The swinging of the pendulum away from open records, supporters of the trend say, is a necessary safeguard against terrorists who could use sensitive public information to attack airports, water treatment plants, nuclear reactors and more. In an Oct. 12 memo announcing the new Freedom of Information Act policies, Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft said that, while "a well-informed citizenry" is essential to government accountability, national security should be a priority. "The tragic events of Sept. 11 have compelled us to carefully review all of the information we make available to the public over the Internet in a new light," Elaine Stanley, an Environmental Protection Agency official, told a House subcommittee earlier this month. But academicians, public interest groups, media representatives and others warn of an overreaction. "Do you pull all the Rand McNally atlases from the libraries? I mean, how far do you go?" asked Julia Wallace, head of the government publications library at the University of Minnesota. "I'm certainly worried by what I've seen," said Gary Bass, executive director of OMB Watch, a nonprofit group in Washington that monitors the Office of Management and Budget and advocates greater access to government data on environmental and other issues. "In an open society such as ours, you always run the risk that someone is going to use information in a bad way," Bass said. "You have to take every step to minimize those risks without undermining our democratic principles. You can't just shut down the flow of information." It's a fine line acknowledged by Stanley. "[The] EPA is aware that we need a balance between protecting sensitive information in the interest of national security and maintaining access to the information that citizens can use to protect their health and the environment in their communities." The Sept. 11 hijackers, using readily accessible tools like box cutters, the Internet and Boeing flight manuals, hatched a plot too brazen for many to fathom. It forced authorities to consider whether a range of public sites and sensitive facilities was much more vulnerable than they had realized--and whether public records could provide a playbook for targeting them. Officials acknowledge that there are very few examples of terrorists actually using public records to glean sensitive information, but they say that the terrorist attacks prove the need for extraordinary caution. The first directive by the Government Printing Office, made last month at the request of the U.S. Geological Survey, ordered libraries to destroy a water resources guide. While documents have been pulled before because they contained mistakes or were outdated, this was the first time in memory that documents were destroyed because of security concerns, said Francis Buckley, superintendent of documents for the printing office. Because the water survey was published and owned by the U.S. Geological Survey, the libraries that participate in the depository program said they had little choice but to comply. Some librarians asked if they could simply pull the CD from shelves and put it in a secure place, but federal officials told them it had to be destroyed. "I hate to do it," said Christine Gladish, government information librarian at Cal State Los Angeles, which has pulled the water survey from its collection and is preparing to destroy it. "Libraries don't like to censor information. Freedom of information is a professional tenet." Peter Graham, university librarian at Syracuse University, said: "Destruction seems to be the least desirable option to me. . . . We're all waiting for the other shoe to drop. Are we going to see a lot more withdrawals [of documents]? That's my fear." In fact, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is reviewing publications that it has made available through the Government Printing Office, Buckley said, and it is almost certain to ask for the destruction of some of its titles. Some have resisted the push to limit access, even on such nerve-rattling subjects as anthrax. The American Society for Microbiology's Web site--an extensive collection of research articles, news releases and expert testimony--includes information about antibiotic-resistant anthrax. After anthrax-laced letters contaminated the nation's mail system, members of the society debated whether a determined individual could find and misuse the information on its site. "We . . . decided not to remove it," said Dr. Ronald Atlas, president-elect of the scientific organization. "The principle right now is one of openness in science. . . . If someone wants to publish [a legitimate research paper], we're not going to be the censor." But that position has drawn scorn from some of Atlas' colleagues. "We have to get away from the ethos that knowledge is good, knowledge should be publicly available, that information will liberate us," said University of Pennsylvania bioethicist Arthur Caplan. "Information will kill us in the techno-terrorist age, and I think it's nuts to put that stuff on Web sites." The debate about sensitive information is not a new one. A quarter of a century ago, Princeton University undergraduate John Phillips pointed out the dangers of nuclear weapons when he was able to use publicly available sources to design a crude but functional nuclear bomb. Phillips, who now heads a political consulting firm in Washington, said in a recent interview that cutting off the flow of information after Sept. 11 is merely a "cosmetic" change when what is really needed are better means of securing access to nuclear and chemical facilities and supplies. Members of the public will be the ones to suffer, he said. "Restricting information may make us feel good, but terrorists aren't dumb. They'll still be able to get at this information somehow." In the past, it has taken a tragedy to buck the trend toward more and greater public access. That's what happened in California in 1989 after actress Rebecca Schaeffer was shot to death at her Los Angeles home by an obsessed fan who used publicly available motor vehicle records to find out where she lived. The state quickly cut off public access to such records. Indeed, chemical and water industry groups are lobbying the Bush administration to curtail regulations providing public access to the operations of public facilities, data that environmentalists say are critical to ensuring safety. And nongovernment entities such as the Federation of American Scientists have begun curtailing information. Group Clears Pages From its Web Site The group recently pulled 200 pages from its Web site with information on nuclear storage facilities and other government sites. For a group known for promoting open information, it was "an awkward decision," concedes Steven Aftergood, director of the federation's government secrecy project. "But Sept. 11 involved attacks on buildings, and we realized some of the information we had up [on the Web] seemed unnecessarily detailed, including floor plans and certain photographs that didn't seem to add much to public policy debate and conceivably could introduce some new vulnerabilities," he said. "Everyone is now groping toward a new equilibrium," Aftergood said. "There are obviously competing pressures that cannot easily be reconciled. The critics of disclosure are saying that we are exposing our vulnerabilities to terrorists. The proponents of disclosure say that it's only by identifying our vulnerabilities that we have any hope of correcting them. I suspect that both things are true." From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Sat Nov 24 12:47:29 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2001 19:47:29 +0000 Subject: [A-List] DORNBUSCH on the crisis Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011124194651.023e1460@pop.tiscali.co.uk> World must not ignore two nightmare scenarios By RUDIGER DORNBUSCH MOST economic talk nowadays concerns the depth of the world recession. Is an upturn just around the corner? Will it occur in the second quarter of next year and be V-shaped? Or should we begin to prepare for a worst-case scenario with much of next year spent in the doldrums? There are good reasons to be confident that monetary and fiscal policy will, in the end, deliver us from today's troubles. But in all this worrying about the global economy, we are giving short shrift to the most serious risks to the world's economic health: The fall of the Saudi royal family and a possible Japanese financial meltdown. Both could happen any day; either would be enough to shock world prosperity in ways far more painful than what is happening now. Today, with the world in recession, falling oil prices are a welcome offset to the slump. They add money to consumers' pockets and lower inflation, making central banks more willing to cut interest rates and stimulate demand. View this from the oil-producing side, however, and the darkness becomes visible. In a recent issue of The New Yorker magazine, Seymour Hersh documented the waning legitimacy of the Saudi royal family. The royals have lost the support of the conservative Islamic community and have even been declared infidel by some clerics. Brookings Institution's George Perry has developed various scenarios that predict the impact of a serious contraction of oil supplies. He found that a contraction of one million barrels per day would raise prices to US$32 (S$59) per barrel; an extreme cut of 7.5 million barrels would increase the price of a barrel to US$161. Such a price hike would incite the worst recession in 50 years. While there would be geopolitical responses, the world would be in deep trouble for years even if oil started flowing again. The second global mega-risk is a Japanese financial meltdown. This, too, is something that may happen any day now or that could be a few years away. Two ingredients are at work here: An economy that refuses to turn up and an ailing financial superstructure. Most importantly, Japan's government is bankrupt. Growing your way out of debt is the usual answer for such a condition. Instead, Japan's economy keeps shrinking. Japan's finances will remain stable only as long as Japanese households support the status quo by rolling over their holdings of government debt or by buying even more in the mistaken belief that such bonds remain plausible investments. Having seen their investments in stocks destroyed by the collapse of the bubble 10 years ago, it is not surprising that the Japanese hang on to their government's liabilities as the last remaining hope. This is dangerous. One day, there will be a creditors' strike. Investors will take flight into foreign assets as in any delinquent emerging market, and this will send the yen into a tailspin. When a currency crashes in this way, debt crashes and confidence falls, dragging consumption down with it. Overnight, Japan could descend into a new Great Depression. If Japan goes under, much of Asia will also collapse. Instead of being bottled up in Japan, the economic shock will spread like a tidal wave. A moment of enlightenment might arise in Saudi Arabia so that, in the nick of time, stable government is restored. It is also conceivable that an inflationary strategy might get Japan off the hook. However, even the most hopeful observer must now concede that these dark scenarios are moving towards realisation and that no good prevention strategy is in place. No International Monetary Fund intervention or Gulf War to preserve the Saudi throne will be sufficient if either scenario moves from nightmare prospect to reality. The writer is Ford Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former chief economic adviser to both the World Bank and IMF. Copyright: Project Syndicate From christian11 at mindspring.com Sat Nov 24 19:39:20 2001 From: christian11 at mindspring.com (Christian Gregory) Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2001 20:39:20 -0600 Subject: [A-List] DORNBUSCH on the crisis References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011124194651.023e1460@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Message-ID: <00bb01c1755a$64892320$d27145cf@computer> > Brookings Institution's George Perry has developed various scenarios that > predict the impact of a serious contraction of oil supplies. He found that > a contraction of one million barrels per day would raise prices to US$32 > (S$59) per barrel; an extreme cut of 7.5 million barrels would increase the > price of a barrel to US$161. Does someone know the nuts and bolts of how the Saudis (or anyone else) would constrain production in the short term? Do they just raise price of extraction from the fields (ie taxes and rent) such that for the producers the point at which marginal revenue meets marginal cost (I use this description metaphorically, in scare quotes) cuts way back on production volume? Christian From hliu at mindspring.com Sat Nov 24 21:18:08 2001 From: hliu at mindspring.com (Henry C.K. Liu) Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2001 23:18:08 -0500 Subject: [A-List] DORNBUSCH on the crisis References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011124194651.023e1460@pop.tiscali.co.uk> <00bb01c1755a$64892320$d27145cf@computer> Message-ID: <3C0070FF.9C8B1269@mindspring.com> Opec's current aim is to cut production by 1.5 million barrels/day if non-OPEC producers would cut 500,000 barrels/day. That would put oil price above $30 per barrel. The marginal loss of revenue from 2 million barrels/day at $20 would be $40 million/day. But the rise in price from $20 to $30 in world production of 60 million barrels/day would be $600 million/day. Thus it is to every producers's advantage. But Russia fears that at $30/barrel, most of the market share loss will be borne by Russia. The US is now buying 100,000 barrels a day to replenish the Strategic Reserve at a low price. $161 oil will eliminate Saudi oil from the market as alternative and less politically risky sources and alternative energy sources other than oil would be economic. Oil will stay between $18-$25 a barrel for the forseeable future. There will be no oil crisis. There will however be an economic crisis caused by the collapse of neo-liberal market fundamentalism which will impact the oil market, not the other way around. This may not be the end of capitalism, but it will be the end of capitalism as the 20th century knew it. Henry C.K. Liu Christian Gregory wrote: > > Brookings Institution's George Perry has developed various scenarios that > > predict the impact of a serious contraction of oil supplies. He found that > > a contraction of one million barrels per day would raise prices to US$32 > > (S$59) per barrel; an extreme cut of 7.5 million barrels would increase > the > > price of a barrel to US$161. > > Does someone know the nuts and bolts of how the Saudis (or anyone else) > would constrain production in the short term? Do they just raise price of > extraction from the fields (ie taxes and rent) such that for the producers > the point at which marginal revenue meets marginal cost (I use this > description metaphorically, in scare quotes) cuts way back on production > volume? > > Christian From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Sun Nov 25 02:07:26 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2001 09:07:26 +0000 Subject: [A-List] DORNBUSCH on the crisis In-Reply-To: <00bb01c1755a$64892320$d27145cf@computer> References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011124194651.023e1460@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011125085153.00aa54d8@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 25/11/2001 02:39, Christian wrote: >Does someone know the nuts and bolts of how the Saudis (or anyone else) >would constrain production in the short term? Do they just raise price of >extraction from the fields (ie taxes and rent) such that for the producers >the point at which marginal revenue meets marginal cost (I use this >description metaphorically, in scare quotes) cuts way back on production >volume? It's a good question. They turn off the pumps and shut in wells. They can do it if there is a govt upstream monopoly or state control over the pipelines, as is the case in Norway and Saudi. It seems to be not the case that the Russian govt has much direct control over what is pumped. Britain ditto. There are some misconceptions about what the West collectively is after here. The fact that both Norway and *Mexico* are agreeing production cuts is 100% proof IMO that it is the Bush administration itself which wants prices to be above $20/bbl, and not just to line the pockets of Bush's oil cronies, but more importantly (a) to buy social peace in the middle east and (b) because when the price falls below $15/bbl it puts a lot of Nopec oil out of production, particularly in Russia, and makes future upstream investment go on hold, which in the longer only adds to Opec's cartel power by removing competitive sources. So why is Russia queering the pitch for everyone else by refusing quota cuts? Here's a wrinkle: there has been a lot of illegal Iraqi oil exports, ie UN sanctions-busting, facilitated by the Russians in recent years. When Putin was more pro-Iraqi than pro-American, the Russian state turned a blind eye to this activity, or even tacitly encouraged it. Now it's suddenly become an embarrassment and this extra output is being loudly claimed as production increases from Russian oilfields reinvigorated by new investment. I have no evidence, but something tells me there is a realy murky plot working here, with rival Russian oil gangs, supported by different cliques of bribe-takers in the Kremlin and oil ministry, and those who've raked in huge profits illegally selling Iraqi oil do not want to give up the game. Putin may have problems bringing them in line. And there is also no doubt that Putin's master plan is to replace Saudi Arabia as guranator of Western energy security and producer of last resort. This transforms Russia vis a vis the West and has already brought big broiwnies points to Putin: acceptance by the West of his right to commit atrocities in Chechnya, practically full membership of Nato with the coveted power of veto over nato decision-making; full participation by Russia in the inner counsels of the West. It's acceptance: public, political, social and private. It's what the old Soviet apparatchiks longed for and craved. They'll sell their own mother to win respectability by the West. However, nothing human alters geology and the fact is that Russian oil is in decline. The swing producers are Iraq and Saudia Arabia. Only they have the capacity to lift production substantially. There is a big and murky game going on but in the end it's in the interests of all the producing states, of the Bush regime, and of the oil corps to raise prices to $25-30/bbl so that will happen unless there is such a big economic bust that the market collapses. That can happen too. Mark Jones From sherrynstan at igc.org Sun Nov 25 07:51:44 2001 From: sherrynstan at igc.org (sherrynstan at igc.org) Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2001 09:51:44 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Re: A-List digest, Vol 1 #46 - 13 msgs Message-ID: Tom: Actually where we disagree is, as Stan has observed, in 'what is to be done'. I have yet to see an argument from either global capitalism or socialism that proposes a remedy for civilizational collapse and dieoff. Stan: Since my name is being bandied, I gotta speak. Henry CKL just posted an interesting rant on another list, about prioritizing the destruction of the current system as the revolutionary task. It'll get him flamed, but he has a hell of a point. Implicit in that point is that we simply can not predict the results of radical interventions, like 9-11, or like a peasant who says fuck it and picks up a gun. (no, I'm not assigning moral equivalency, even if it mattered) There is a warfighting doctrine that was nominally adopted by the Marine Corps, but which will never be adopted as doctrine for a number of reasons that we should understand better if we are to wage effective struggles, unarmed or otherwise (this is just theory, guy [a little note to our FBI friends on the list]). It begins with the premise that every engagement is going to result in chaos, like smacking a hornets nest with a stick. What will determine the issue of who prevails (all other things being equal) is something called "agility". That is based on an organizations ability to cycle through something called the OODA loop... that is, Observe, Orient, Decide, Act... Observe again, etc. Each action introduces a new and not entirely predictable development. Thinking about this a little further, the observation capacity is based on information, real time intelligence (like all the data we get from these lists), orientation is the ability to determine what's critical, whe! re the head of this eel is (sorry about the mixing of metaphors), this is our interpretive framework [marxian for some of us], decision (read this as the committment to action, and organizationally as a responsive executive body; also understand that a rapid imperfect action is often better than a plodding perfect one, because it retains the initiative and keeps you inside the the enemy's decision cycle), and action>>>>New situation>>>>Begin OODA Loop again. Putting together organizations with "agility" strikes me as a good first step toward what is to be done. But "socialism" can not look back. The socialisms of the past are a moot point, and I don't understand why we don't get that yet. The "desirability" of Soviet or Chinese or Yugoslav "socialism" is so much mental masturbation. The circumstances these rose and fell within will never exist again. Returning to the laws of unforseen consequences, what socialism will look like will totally depend on what the circumstances look like after whatever particular conflagration kicks the critical card out from under capitalism, AND HOW WE PICK UP THE PIECES. Socialism is not some decree. It is social control over the productive assets of a society, which will be based on a material foundation that we can't forecast yet. Human agency matters here, and I would hope that we can be smart about what we do if and when the opportunity is siezed. At this juncture, there are only three options. Capitalism (with its thuggish twin-fascism), it's opposite--socialism, or anarchy. None of these terms is descriptive in many particulars. The first step in "socialism" is not to construct a new administrative apparatus, it is to pry the cold, dead fingers of the bourgeoisie off of "their" property. This last task... requires struggles in the concrete, and the point of departure in time-space is here-now. With no guarantees. With affection for all, Stan From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Sun Nov 25 08:26:09 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2001 15:26:09 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: On the politics of the Second Law Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011125152113.00a8c400@pop3.freeserve.net> fwd from Sabri Oncu As in all sciences, there are schools of thought also in thermodynamics and the school I felt closer to was the so-called Rational Thermodynamics school. They were mostly some applied mathematicians in the US, who came together in the 1950s with a mathematician by the name of Clifford Truesdell and, after obtaining significant funding from the US Army, Navy and other governmental grant organizations, started a huge project of rigorously rebuilding the foundations of classical mechanics and thermodynamics. They were highly influenced by the great German mathematical physicist Hilbert and, hence, were under the influence of German formalism. They went back to the original works of Carnot, Duhem, Clausius, Fourier, Maxwell and the like to carry out their reformation. They were very upset with the "rigor" the physicists and some intuitionists lacked, as they put it in those days, and openly attacked the physicists and intuitionists in their publications. Their great days were the 1960s and early 1970s, after which their decline started, and current day applied mathematicians don't regard them as highly as earlier generations did. Of course, they had many enemies, including the British intuitionists and their allies, even during their heydays. Although this was mostly because of their fierce attacks on those whom they called intuitionists and of their outright elitism, some traces of megalomania and narcissism visible in some of the writings of a few of their members also played some role. Clifford Truesdell wrote one of his articles in Latin in the 1960s in a journal he was editing but whatever the message he was trying to send, many were not impressed. Although I am seriously discomforted by many of their obsessions, especially with their obsession with mathematical beauty, I am of the opinion that their contributions are monumental, and several journals such as Archive for Rational Mechanics and Analysis or Archive for the History of Exact Sciences they started are of great importance to any serious student of natural sciences even today. The most important of their flaws, in my view, was their obsession with the Second Law, to which I will get later. Firstly, thermodynamics is the study of motion and temperature under the influence of forces and heat. Rational Thermodynamics studies these under the assumption that matter is continuous and invokes a number of additional axioms such as the principles of determinism, objectivity (independence of the motion from the observer) and so forth. This does not mean that Rational Thermodynamicists deny that at the micro-level these principles are not valid but their concern is the macro-level, not the micro-level, thermodynamic phenomena. Note that because Rational Thermodynamics assumes that matter is continuous, whenever I see fit, I will refer to it also as Continuum Thermodynamics, although not necessarily all who work in Continuum Thermodynamics would agree with this. Many Continuum Thermodynamicists do not belong to Rational Thermodynamics school. Secondly, although some physical variables, such as distance, deformations, forces, etc., are directly observable and measurable in the physical sense, certain other variables only exist in our imagination, that is, they are abstract quantities. You can measure them only after you define them, hopefully, in terms of physically measurable variables. Of these abstract quantities, the most important three are the absolute temperature, energy and entropy. Rational Thermodynamicists spent years to prove that these quantities exist/are unique and tried to attach "better" physical meanings to them than they were previously assigned. Well, don't ask me what the physicist were doing as they were watching the Rational Thermodynamicists, although I can safely assert that a few of those who cared to watch were just laughing. One of the major concerns of the Rational Thermodynamicists was formulating the Second Law. At the time they undertook their project, there was no single mathematical expression of the law but a number of expressions that correspond to certain special cases and conditions. I refer you to "New Perspectives in Thermodynamics, Springer, 1986" edited by James Serrin for a detailed history of thermodynamics going back to Sadi Carnot and including their work, as well as for many related dispositions. Clifford Truesdell was the one who expressed the Second Law in the form of the so-called Clausius-Duhem inequality, that covers all the special cases and conditions I mentioned, as far as I recall, in 1960, but if you look at the book below I am sure you will find information regarding the exact time and place of his formulation: Truesdell, C.A., "A First Course in Rational Continuum Mechanics", Part I, 2nd ed., Boston: Academic Press, 1991. In passing, let me remind you that this is a story of the Second Law from the point of view of Rational Thermodynamics, and I have not much idea about its story from the point of view of others, especially from the point of view of physicists. As far as I know, not all schools of thermodynamics universally agree that Clausius-Duhem inequality is "the" mathematical expression of the Second Law and this is my main reason for objecting to trying to make too much out of the Second Law, as what it is and what exactly it says heavily depend on the school you are associated with. It is my expectation that the Second Law will remain an unsolved mystery of natural sciences for many centuries to come, if not longer. Then again, this is my expectation, based on my subjective probability distribution determined by my personal information set. Thirdly, in Continuum Thermodynamics there are more variables than governing equations. That is, the equations of Continuum Thermodynamics comprise an incomplete system. As a reminder, let me mention that these governing equations are the so-called balance of linear momentum, balance of moment of momentum, balance of energy and imbalance of entropy, that is, the Second Law, which in the case of Rational Thermodynamics takes the form of Clausius-Duhem inequality. One major issue is this: if we are going to solve some physical problems, or better said, their mathematical formulations, we need equations in the form of equalities whereas imbalance of entropy is an inequality. The question that arise is what to make of this inequality. Let us leave this question and the inequality aside for a while and continue with the remaining balance equations, which are equalities. To complete the system consisting of these equalities, we need to relate some of the variables to certain other variables. That is, we need to postulate certain relations motivated by the physically observed behavior of the material (solid, fluid, gas, etc) under consideration. These relations are generally referred to as the constitutive relations. For example, Fourier's Law of Heat Conduction, which states in its simplest form for rigid heat conductors that the heat flux is proportional to the temperature gradient, is one such constitutive relation. If we match the number of variables to the number of equations by postulating our physically motivated constitutive relations, then we may have some hope of solving some problems. Let us now go back to the inequality we put aside. Suppose we postulated our constitutive relations, tested them empirically, assigned empirically determined values to the parameters appearing in them, inserted them into the balance equations, specified initial and boundary conditions, and solved a physical problem, which we can again test against the observed behavior. Now, if the imbalance of entropy in the form of Clausius-Duhem inequality is also a law, then these solutions must satisfy this inequality as well, whether they pass the empirical tests or not. If they don't, then there is a problem somewhere. Of course, an alternative route is that after postulating our constitutive relations we can insert them into the imbalance of entropy equation, determine the conditions under which they satisfy this inequality and with this information at hand, go and conduct our empirical tests. Rational Thermodynamicists chose the latter route. And an industry of developing constitutive relations based on the exploitation of Clausius-Duhem started. It worked quite well for a while and many nice properties, such as the positive semi-definiteness of the so-called elasticity tensor necessary for the local stability of elastic equilibria or positivity of the thermal conductivity parameter of Fourier's Law necessary for that heat flows from higher temperatures to lower temperatures, fell out of Clausius-Duhem inequality naturally, until one day, one of them, as I recall, Morton Gurtin, started to look at this so-called paradox of instantaneous propagation of thermal disturbances associated with the classical theory of heat conduction. It was Maxwell who first noticed this paradox although he did not call it so. By the way, I read his original work on this topic some years ago and he is such a good read. After reading his article you get the impression that Maxwell actually surfed these thermal waves. Anyway, I will not get into the details but refer you to a book by Daniel D. Joseph, a sociologist turned applied mathematician, for a not so brief review and some novel results: "Heat Waves, Springer, 1991(?)". Also of interest may be a paper I published in Journal of Elasticity on the fallacies of a theory attempting to eliminate this so-called paradox: T.S. Oncu and T.B. Moodie, "On the propagation of thermoelastic waves in temperature rate dependent materials", Journal of Elasticity, 1992. Well, I don't recall the volume number and the year may be wrong but it is in there. Since then, there have been many modifications to Clausius-Duhem inequality, some of which included the introduction of a number of different temperatures by proving their existence as well as the existence of entropy and all that. Even a new school called Extended Thermodynamics, started by Ingo Muller (if I am not wrong, he was a graduate student of Truesdell), emerged out of this. Ingo Muller is a German applied mathematician and one day he went back to Germany from the US. His school is mostly a European School and I don't know how seriously he is taken here in the US. The paper whose URL I sent you, that is, http://www.dmf.bs.unicatt.it/~musesti/pubblicazioni/entropy.pdf is another attempt along these lines. They are talking about three temperatures, proving their existence along with the existence of entropy and all that, and we are in the 21st century, and when I read what they do, my red flags go up very high in my mind beyond my control. A friend of mine, who passed away at a very young age many years ago said this: there is ideology involved even in pissing. Difficult to explain why he said that but I have never been able to forget it and I have no problem with that because I accept that at some point we all have to choose sides. What the heck are these three temperatures they are talking about and why do we need them are some questions I have never been able to answer. And they don't provide any answers to these questions either. This is why I think they have no idea of the Second Law. Their expertise is measure theory, not thermodynamics. They appear quite good at measure theory but this is another issue. If you noticed, I made no reference to concepts such as "openness/closeness" of systems or "disorder" and the like, although I have been talking about the Second Law and entropy. As far as I am concerned, the Second Law is associated with the observation that in cyclic thermodynamic processes we cannot extract more than what is expended and most of the time what can be extracted is less than what is expended. That is, in most cyclic thermodynamic processes we lose some of what we invest and at best we can break even. How this is related to physical "disorder" is beyond me. I don't even know what "disorder" means in the physical sense. To me, entropy, like internal energy or free energy, is some kind of density whose existence is not at all that obvious but can be deduced from some observations. Does this mean I lost faith in thermodynamics or science in general? Not at all. I just recognize its limitations. After all, science is a human construct and losing faith in science is same as losing faith in humanity, at least for me. And I am not ready to give up hope and don't think will ever be, until that last day comes. Best, Sabri Oncu From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Sun Nov 25 09:08:22 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2001 16:08:22 +0000 Subject: [A-List] =?iso-8859-1?Q?MOSCOW=92S_BID_FOR_INFLUENCE_IN_AFGHANISTAN?= Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011125160757.00ad5e58@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Subject: PUBLICATION- Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 November Issue on Web Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2001 From: "Cornell, Svante" The 21 November 2001 Issue of the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, a subscription free Web journal with over 80,000 visitors to the site since November 1999 is now on-line at http://www.cacianalyst.org/ The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of The Johns Hopkins University-The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies is proud to announce the publication of the 21 November 2001 issue of its biweekly Web-Journal, The Central Asia- Caucasus Analyst. BRIEFING Wednesday/November 21, 2001 MOSCOW?S BID FOR INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN: THE KISS OF DEATH OF A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT? Glen E. Howard AUTHOR BIO: Glen E. Howard is an Analyst at the Strategic Assessment Center for Science Applications International Corporation. He specializes in Caspian defense and security issues and has traveled widely throughout the region. The seizure of Kabul by the Northern Alliance has altered the strategic dynamics of Afghanistan leaving the US-backed coalition in control of 60 percent of the country. However, there has been little discussion of Russian involvement in Afghanistan and its support for the Northern Alliance. Russian President Vladimir Putin has attached high strategic priority to the war, assigning the Chief of the General Staff Victor Kvashnin to oversee Russian military strategy in Afghanistan. These developments underscore a growing determination by Moscow to play a major role in the struggle for power in Afghanistan?s post-war politics by backing the Northern Alliance?s bid for power. BACKGROUND: Besides appointing Kvashnin, Russian President Vladimir Putin assigned his close friend and confidant, Sergei Shoigu, to oversee Russia?s $500 million humanitarian assistance program to northern Afghanistan. Shoigu?s appointment to this position is highly symbolic because it reflects the strategic importance of Afghanistan for Putin. Although Putin made an important choice by acquiescing to U.S. strategic access to military bases in Central Asia, he did so when no other alternative was left, and his government?s support for the Northern Alliance as the legitimate heir to power in Kabul has undermined US efforts to create a broad-based coalition in Afghanistan since the demise of Taliban resistance. Referring to the unexpected seizure of Kabul by the Northern Alliance, President Putin told an audience at Rice University that ?the current developments in Afghanistan are not a surprise to us. It is a goal we set ourselves at the first stage ? the liberation of Northern Afghanistan ? and then of Kabul.? Moscow has maintained close military ties to the Northern Alliance since the late 1990s, and significantly expanded its military assistance after the U.S. launched its attacks on the Taliban. Shortly after General Kvashnin took charge of the Russian military assistance to the NA, he together with deputy Federal Security Service (FSK) head Viktor Komogorov organized a high-level meeting with military representatives of the NA in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan.. By October, Russian military assistance began to flow as approximately forty tanks and twelve military helicopters were delivered to NA forces as part of a $70 million arms package. The arms deal also involved an agreement to provide the Northern Alliance with old Soviet T-55 tanks, military helicopters, submachine guns, as well as anti-aircraft missiles. These arms deliveries appear to have played a key role in the series of military setbacks experienced by the Taliban at the hands of the Northern Alliance. Although Kvashnin is one of the few senior Russian military officers never to have served in Afghanistan, the General plays an indispensable role in plotting NA military strategy. His experience in directing Russian troops in Kosovo in 1999 provided Kvashnin with valuable experience in working with US-backed coalitions ? but also in undermining them. The Russian commander achieved widespread recognition in Russia for his decision to ignore NATO military planning by leading Russian troops in their dash to seize Prishtina airport in Kosovo towards the end of the 1999 Balkan war. Two years later, Kvashnin is participating in yet another U.S.-backed coalition by advising the NA in its military strategy. Nowhere was his influence more visible than in the NA?s recent decision to seize Kabul in spite of its assurances to the United States that it would refrain from capturing the Afghan capital. An important asset of Russian military cooperation with the Northern Alliance is its new military commander, General Muhammad Fahim. The Soviet-trained former intelligence officer was once a member of KHAD (the Soviet-trained secret police) who tarnished his reputation among many Afghans by serving as Communist-backed leader Najibullah?s deputy prior to the 1979 Soviet invasion, but abandoned the Communist government after the fall of Najibullah in 1992. Fahim later joined the insurgent forces led by Ahmed Shah Masoud. Fahim has special appeal to Moscow because of his ties to the Russian Intelligence services and because of his deep hatred of Pakistan. Officials in the Pakistan?s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) believe that Fahim organized the 1996 attack on the Pakistani embassy in Kabul when he served as the chief of security for the Northern Alliance when it ruled the Afghan capital from 1992-1996. IMPLICATIONS: Russian leverage over the Northern Alliance has increased significantly since Fahim became the new military commander of the Northern Alliance. His promotion has enabled Moscow to expand its leverage over the Northern Alliance, enabling Russia to assert its role in the great power dynamics of post-Taliban Afghanistan. This also could explain why the Northern Alliance has been resisting US efforts to participate in a broad-based coalition and has prevented British troops from using the former Soviet air base at Bagram. In fact, the Putin government reacted swiftly to fill the political vacuum created by the demise of the Taliban. A Russian support team, including defense ministry personnel, departed for Kabul on November 19 that will reopen the Russian embassy in Kabul. Another team of Russian diplomats was dispatched to Mazar-i-Sharif to reopen the Russian consulate there as well. These initiatives are designed to bolster Russian support for the Northern Alliance as the legitimate government running Afghanistan. After announcing that Moscow was dispatching a high-level military delegation to Afghanistan, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, referred to the Northern Alliance as the ?lawful government of Afghanistan?, indicating that Moscow has no intention of backing a broad-based coalition. These statements reflect a growing willingness by Russia to become the Northern Alliance?s regional patron as Moscow seeks to solidify its position in Afghanistan following the military defeat of the Taliban. Increasingly, it is becoming evident to western analysts that Moscow is eager to use the Northern Alliance as the cornerstone for a new India-Iran-Russia strategic axis aimed at encircling Pakistan. CONCLUSIONS: The reluctance of the Northern Alliance to participate in a UN-sponsored meeting on the future of Afghanistan is a reflection of Moscow?s wider geopolitical aspirations in Eurasia, that seek to prevent Pakistan from reviving its role as a power broker in Afghanistan. The slowness of American officials to realize this strategy has undermined Afghanistan?s post-Taliban transition to a broader-based government that involves the Pushtun majority population. Russian efforts to bestow international legitimacy on the Northern Alliance promises to alter the strategic dynamics of South Asia in an effort to deny Pakistan strategic depth. In the event that Pakistan and the United States are unable to pry the Northern Alliance from power, the entire spectrum of regional politics will tilt in favor of the Moscow-engineered strategic axis comprising India, Iran, and Russia. The reemergence of the Northern Alliance as a dominant power in Afghanistan?s internal politics also turns back the clock to the early 1990s. Strategically, this creates the conditions for the continued isolation of Central Asia, and prevents the states bordering Afghanistan from gaining access to the Indian Ocean. The demise of the Taliban also risk to alter the energy dynamics of Central Asia by preventing Pakistan from fulfilling its goal of gaining access to Caspian oil and gas supplies - something that Islamabad obviously hoped would be one of the rewards for its cooperation with the United States. It is becoming increasingly evident that if matters continue to develop in the current direction, the real winner in Afghanistan will not only be the Northern Alliance, but also Russia. AUTHOR BIO: Glen E. Howard is an Analyst at the Strategic Assessment Center for Science Applications International Corporation. He specializes in Caspian defense and security issues and has traveled widely throughout the region. From JSommers at ngcsu.edu Sun Nov 25 09:18:46 2001 From: JSommers at ngcsu.edu (Jeffrey Sommers) Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2001 11:18:46 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Russia's oil & US Message-ID: Western intellectuals have got Russia's econ. wrong from the get go. It went bust when the followed the IMF/World Bank ponzie scheme based on monetarism and tight money designed to draw foreign investment, then it expanded when the currency collapsed created domestic demand just as Keynesians and Marxists said it would. Increased oil revenues facilitated the whole process. Now, Russia has gotten its boost from domestic demand and oil revenues, but neither will lead to a transformation of its economy. It could very well go bust again. Putin & Co. are desperately courting the West in order to both cut Russian military expenditures and hopefully to bring foreign investment too. Bush & Co. want stable oil prices, but at prices the energy industries he represents can profit from. Yet, before this happens, they have to discipline OPEC and demonstrate that if they don't play along the US can rely on Russia in a pinch if necessary. This synergy provides both the US and Russia with a powerful quid pro quo that could propel them into an ever tighter embrace in the near term. Jeff Sommers From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Sun Nov 25 09:27:19 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2001 16:27:19 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Russia's oil & US In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011125162232.00adf798@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 25/11/2001 16:18, Jeff wrote: >This synergy provides both the US and Russia with a powerful quid pro quo >that could propel them into an ever tighter embrace in the near term. The terrifying implications of this embrace are clearest for those who know Russia, I think. Moscow's ruling elite is particularly greedy, particularly pitiless and has no love of freedom. The masses would dearly like historical revenge. The common perception is that Europe is a kind of fat goose waiting to be plucked. It is noticeable that the Russians and Americans between them now monopolize military force in Afghanistan and *both* have gone to great lengths to totally exclude European forces from the theatre; even the British have been unceremoniously kicked out. What should that tell us about the future? Mark From bantam at dingoblue.net.au Sun Nov 25 09:17:43 2001 From: bantam at dingoblue.net.au (Rob Schaap) Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2001 16:17:43 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Djakarta: Normal service resumed References: Message-ID: <3C0119A7.D32A1581@dingoblue.net.au> G'day all, A quick bleat from the southern hemisphere. It is quickly becoming clear that the nationalist Sukarnoputri has played her cards well after S11, and that the Indonesian military - many extant units of which have fresh Timorese, Papuan and Acehian blood on their hands, and some of which are involved in the booming people-smuggling business - is regaining its traditional role at the centre of national governance and consolidating its diffuse parasitic presence throughout the economy. The mix isn't quite what it was under Suharto - Islam is a greater presence in the formal institutional mix - but the promise of democracy is on the ebb again, frustrated, as always, by the compradorial military and a Washington blindly bent on short-term buttressing for global military schemes the tenability of which do not even seem to convince Colin Powell (never mind the non-Anglo-Saxon constituents of the grand coalition). Australia and Indonesia seem bound to come to harsh words about the role played by some Indonesian uniforms in smuggling Iraqi and Afghan refugees into Australian waters (Primeminister John Howard has succeeded in infusing dread and loathing of desperately thin middle-easterners into the insecure bosom of the Australian electorate), and it'll be interesting to see how Washington mediates between its most slavering lapdog and its largest Muslem ally ... See article below. Sigh, Rob. FIGHTING TERRORISM, UNDERMINING DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA By John Gershman http://fpif.org/commentary/0109inddem.html An early beneficiary of the new pre-eminence given by the Bush administration to its war against terrorism could be the Indonesian military, the same military behind the ravaging of East Timor in 1999 and continuing grave human rights abuses in West Papua, Aceh, and elsewhere in the archipelago. That possibility emerged from talks this past week at the White House between Indonesian President Megawati and Bush, whose main goal was to enlist Indonesia, host to the world's largest Muslim population, in the fight against terrorism. Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri met this week with President George W. Bush, one of the first heads of state to visit the U.S. since the terrorist attacks on September 11. President Bush had invited Megawati in late July after she assumed office, following the dismissal of Abdurrahman Wahid. The meeting revealed much about how the Bush administration is going to try to consolidate the emerging international coalition against terrorism, especially among developing countries. Indonesia is a critical component of the effort because of its position as the world's most populous Muslim democracy and the growing political role of Islamist organizations within Indonesia since the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998. There are also allegations that some radical Islamist groups in Indonesia are connected with Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda organization. The Bush strategy appears to be a mixture of aid and trade initiatives combined with a strengthening of bilateral military-military ties. President Bush's economic commitments to Indonesia include: at least $130 million in bilateral assistance for fiscal 2002 (mostly for judicial reform), $10 million for assistance to internally displaced peoples, $5 million for reconciliation and reconstruction efforts in the strife -torn province of Aceh, $2 million to assist in refugee repatriation in West Timor, and $10 million for police training. In addition, the Bush administration will make available $100 million in additional benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) by enabling 11 additional products to be allowed duty-free access to the U.S. market. Finally, President Bush announced that the three U.S. trade finance agencies--the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency - have developed a joint trade and finance initiative to help promote economic development in Indonesia. The three agencies will undertake to provide up to a combined $400 million to promote trade and investment within Indonesia, especially in the Indonesian oil and gas sector. The economic initiatives are relatively small, and Indonesia's macroeconomic policy remains firmly under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund. The emphasis on judicial reform is at least aimed at an important target. A recent Survey Report on Citizens' Perceptions Of The Indonesian Justice Sector from the Asia Foundation and AC Nielsen (http://www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/IndoLaw.pdf) revealed some unsettling findings in a country attempting to institutionalize a fragile democracy. More than half of the country's adults can't provide a single example of a right to which they are entitled. More than 60% of respondents said police were apt to demand a bribe to take action over anything, while 30%-35% thought the courts were only for the wealthy and were "risky" places to seek justice. The danger, however, is that efforts to promote the rule of law, judicial reform, and respect for human rights will be undermined by the administration's increasing support for and ties with Indonesia's military. The major issue on the U.S. agenda for the meeting was the issue of bilateral military ties. Recent reports from the Council on Foreign Relations and the Rand Corporation, both issued well before the tragedies of last week, advocated that the Bush administration strengthen ties with Indonesia in general and the Indonesian military in particular. The recommendation was aimed at combating the growing influence of radical Islamic groups, as well as providing a means of forging a strong bulwark against China in the region. The Council on Foreign Relations report, The United States and Southeast Asia: A Policy Agenda for the New Administration, was notable because it was drafted by Dov Zakheim, a Reagan -era Pentagon planner currently serving in the Pentagon. Indonesian military complicity with the human rights violations associated with the widespread carnage in East Timor in the aftermath of its referendum on independence in 1999 had led the U.S. Congress to strengthen already existing limits on bilateral military ties. The new legislation restricted arms sales and military training until a number of criteria were met, including increased civilian control over the military, greater transparency in military spending, and accountability for military officers complicit in committing human rights violations. The Bush administration's own State Department officials acknowledge that the Indonesian military has yet to meet those basic criteria, and in some ways, the situation is worsening. For example, several officers who held command positions in East Timor in 1999 have not only not been tried, but have received promotions. There is also a severe problem with transparency of the military's revenues. Experts estimate that only 25-30% of the military's funding comes from the government budget, with the rest coming from "taxes" on natural resource extraction, bribes, and other forms of "informal" financing. Human rights violations have increased in Aceh and West Papua, regions where secessionist movements are strong. Nevertheless, the Bush administration announced yesterday some easing of restrictions on bilateral military ties. While the administration has not requested that Congress lift restrictions on weapons sales and training, it has some discretion in other areas that it has chosen to exercise, despite the continuing evidence of a military able to act with impunity. Presidents Bush and Megawati agreed to: * expand modest contacts and resume regular meetings between the U.S. and Indonesian militaries to support Indonesia's efforts at military reform and professionalization. Such activities include Indonesian participation in a variety of conferences, multilateral exercises, subject matter exchanges on issues such as military reform, military law, investigations, budgeting and budget transparency, as well as humanitarian assistance and joint relief operations. * establish a bilateral Security Dialogue under the supervision of the two countries' respective civilian ministers of defense in order to promote "increased civilian participation in Indonesian defense and security issues." * ask Congress for $400,000 to educate Indonesian civilians on defense matters through the Expanded International Military Education and Training. * lift the embargo on commercial sales of nonlethal defense articles for Indonesia, with individual applications to be reviewed on a case by case basis, in line with standard practice in America. The common justification for increased engagement is described by the Rand Corporation, which argues that "engagement with the Indonesian military would improve the ability of the United States to promote a democratic model of military professionalism in Indonesia." This claim is clearly problematic - if U.S. engagement with the Indonesian military is so conducive to professionalism, what was the result of three decades of engagement under Suharto's New Order regime? As the International Crisis Group noted in a July 2001 report, "the bilateral military relationship has not been effective to date in producing an Indonesian military that meets the standards of a modern, professional force under civilian control or promoting long-term stability in Indonesia." Megawati's own human rights record is weak. A staunch nationalist, she opposed the referendum in East Timor that lead to its independence, and is closely allied with the military, bringing four retired military officers into her cabinet. She has taken some initial steps to address the demands for self-determination on the part of inhabitants of Aceh and West Papua. One of the first laws signed by Megawati as president was the Special Autonomy Law for Aceh, while a similar law for West Papua is still being considered by the Indonesian parliament. Both proposals are widely viewed as inadequate in their regions, however, and repression has increased in those regions since Megawati assumed office. Prior to September 11 at least, moves toward strengthening U.S.-Indonesian military ties were opposed by key Congressional leaders and human rights groups because of ongoing human rights violations by the Indonesian military, and the continuing impunity of high- ranking Indonesian military officials for their complicity in human rights violations in East Timor and in various parts of Indonesia. The question now is whether the sprit of bipartisanship that has characterized the period since the terrorist attacks will extend to the Bush administration's efforts to strengthen militaries that can undermine the very values of freedom and democracy for which the new war on terrorism is allegedly being waged. (John Gershman is the co-director of the Global Affairs program of the Interhemispheric Resource center and the Asia/Pacific editor for Foreign Policy in Focus.) From bantam at dingoblue.net.au Sun Nov 25 10:02:54 2001 From: bantam at dingoblue.net.au (Rob Schaap) Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2001 17:02:54 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Russia's oil & US References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011125162232.00adf798@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Message-ID: <3C01243F.EEFE4B7B@dingoblue.net.au> Mark Jones wrote: > > At 25/11/2001 16:18, Jeff wrote: > > >This synergy provides both the US and Russia with a powerful quid pro > quo > >that could propel them into an ever tighter embrace in the near term. > > The terrifying implications of this embrace are clearest for those who > know > Russia, I think. Moscow's ruling elite is particularly greedy, > particularly > pitiless and has no love of freedom. The masses would dearly like > historical revenge. The common perception is that Europe is a kind of > fat > goose waiting to be plucked. > > It is noticeable that the Russians and Americans between them now > monopolize military force in Afghanistan and *both* have gone to great > lengths to totally exclude European forces from the theatre; even the > British have been unceremoniously kicked out. What should that tell us > about the future? Interesting question, but I'd be surprised if the wash-up is going to be all that neat for the big boys. If the US wants to do the right thing by Russia, it'd probably have to promote Dostun's mob in any Kabul 'government'. Can't see the Kazaks or the Pakistanis wearing that, meself. Can't see a tidy majority of Russians maintaining their affection for Putin and his circle for long either, if the perception takes hold that he's licking Yancqui bottom - aren't they too proudly nationalist and viscerally anti-US for that? So Washington could be making rods for its own back. Again. And I wouldn't be astonished if the Europeans can live with being distanced from both the continuing military operations since Kabul's fall and any ensuing attempts at putting together provisional governments. It's fraught stuff, replete with much embarrassment potential and considerable blowback possibilities. Or not? Yours sitting up for the Uruguay-Australia match, Rob. From JSommers at ngcsu.edu Sun Nov 25 11:03:59 2001 From: JSommers at ngcsu.edu (Jeffrey Sommers) Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2001 13:03:59 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Russia's oil & US Message-ID: I agree, the potential for blowback is enormous, but not inevitable..... Jeff >>> bantam at dingoblue.net.au 11/25/01 12:02PM >>> Mark Jones wrote: > > At 25/11/2001 16:18, Jeff wrote: > > >This synergy provides both the US and Russia with a powerful quid pro > quo > >that could propel them into an ever tighter embrace in the near term. > > The terrifying implications of this embrace are clearest for those who > know > Russia, I think. Moscow's ruling elite is particularly greedy, > particularly > pitiless and has no love of freedom. The masses would dearly like > historical revenge. The common perception is that Europe is a kind of > fat > goose waiting to be plucked. > > It is noticeable that the Russians and Americans between them now > monopolize military force in Afghanistan and *both* have gone to great > lengths to totally exclude European forces from the theatre; even the > British have been unceremoniously kicked out. What should that tell us > about the future? Interesting question, but I'd be surprised if the wash-up is going to be all that neat for the big boys. If the US wants to do the right thing by Russia, it'd probably have to promote Dostun's mob in any Kabul 'government'. Can't see the Kazaks or the Pakistanis wearing that, meself. Can't see a tidy majority of Russians maintaining their affection for Putin and his circle for long either, if the perception takes hold that he's licking Yancqui bottom - aren't they too proudly nationalist and viscerally anti-US for that? So Washington could be making rods for its own back. Again. And I wouldn't be astonished if the Europeans can live with being distanced from both the continuing military operations since Kabul's fall and any ensuing attempts at putting together provisional governments. It's fraught stuff, replete with much embarrassment potential and considerable blowback possibilities. Or not? Yours sitting up for the Uruguay-Australia match, Rob. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Sun Nov 25 12:19:17 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2001 19:19:17 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Russia's oil & US In-Reply-To: <3C01243F.EEFE4B7B@dingoblue.net.au> References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011125162232.00adf798@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011125191706.0251e288@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 25/11/2001 17:02, Rob wrote: >Yours sitting up for the Uruguay-Australia match, Hmmm. I just watched what Australia did to Wales. Not happy. Not happy at all. Mark From bantam at dingoblue.net.au Sun Nov 25 11:54:40 2001 From: bantam at dingoblue.net.au (Rob Schaap) Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2001 18:54:40 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Russia's oil & US References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011125162232.00adf798@pop.tiscali.co.uk> <5.1.0.14.2.20011125191706.0251e288@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Message-ID: <3C013E6F.C8516AE9@dingoblue.net.au> G'day Mark, > Hmmm. I just watched what Australia did to Wales. Not happy. Not happy > at all. Yeah, I watched that, too. Nice of me not to mention it, I thought. I thought Wales the more enterprising side, too. Just kept giving away needless penalties. Dunno why they didn't close the bloody roof, either. Anyway, unless you're unusually generous of nature, you'll probably be happy to hear a sadly disorganised Oz is 1-0 down against some brilliant, but promisingly fragile, Uruguayans. Cheers, Rob. From jlgulick at sfo.com Sun Nov 25 17:43:01 2001 From: jlgulick at sfo.com (John Gulick) Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2001 16:43:01 -0800 Subject: [A-List] elucidation requested Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.1.20011125162821.00a7d3c0@pop3.norton.antivirus> Sorry for double-posting this ... I accidentally hit "send" before I completed the msg. Mr. Mark Jones posted the following: >MOSCOW'S BID FOR INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN: THE KISS OF DEATH OF A >BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT? >Glen E. Howard >AUTHOR BIO: Glen E. Howard is an Analyst at the Strategic Assessment Center >for Science Applications International Corporation. He specializes in >Caspian defense and security issues and has traveled widely throughout the >region I have a series of questions and comments pertaining to this article, and would be delighted if anyone out there rendered assistance with the former and commented on the latter. 1) This guy appears to be some kind of consultant for the U.S. intelligence apparatus (and probably other intelligence apparati as well, not to mention fossil fuel-biz clients). Is there any sound reason to suspect that he is overblowing the extent to which Russia not only has geopolitical objectives completely autonomous from the U.S. (certainly a valid contention), but also is _effectively exercising_ these autonomous objectives ? I have a hard time buying that there are clear-cut fault lines b/w Russia, Iran, and India -- with the N.A. as a proxy army -- on the one hand, and the U.S., Pakistan, and Pashtuns on the other. And just as I have a hard time buying the idea that Russia is using the U.S. but not the converse, I also have a hard time buying that Russia has marionette-like control over the N.A. Is there any good reason for thinking that the N.A. is any more at the beck and call of the Kremlin circa November 2001 than the seven armies of the muhajidin were at the back and call of the CIA in the 1980's ? 2) Let's suppose that this gentleman's facts and analysis are more or less above board and accurate. If so, it certainly puts to shame the U.S. liberal-left's bleating about the N.A. being just as "bad" as the Taleban, when it comes to plundering, raping, and the arbitrary use of armed might. No doubt this is empirically true. But such bleating presupposed (and presupposes) that the U.S. is backing the N.A., and is not instead trying to install a "multi-ethnic" regime under U.N. and/or NATO auspices, under the sign of "humanitarian intervention." When touring the U.S. recently, RAWA tried to woo the left-liberal crowd by exposing what a dastardly bunch the N.A. is, condemned the U.S. for relying on the N.A. thugs as an occupying army, and implored the crowd to support a loya jirga-style resolution of the conflict, one enforced by the blue helmets. Again, I'm not questioning that the various and sundry N.A. militiamen are a gang of looters and pillagers, but for RAWA to denounce them in front of a U.S. left-liberal audience presupposes that they are instruments of U.S. war aims. If one believes Howard, the N.A. are not tools of the U.S., but tools of the Russians, and the only reason the U.S. "let" the N.A. seize Afghan city after Afghan city was b/c it had to show some kind of victory to a jacked-up and restless U.S. audience. Consequently, U.S. left-liberals were and are wasting their breath exposing the N.A.'s past and present crimes, instead of refining their critique of a U.N.-brokered settlement, with the U.S. playing a senior role and Pakistan (and the U.K. ?) playing a junior role. But then again, this should come as no big surprise, because many among the U.S. liberal-left are predisposed to "humanitarian intervention" in the ungovernable backwaters of the global periphery, as if this can be disconnected from the chess games of inter-imperial rivalry. 3) Reverting back to a dissection of Howard, and how his facts and analysis do not seem to square with the Russia/OPEC struggle that's been chronicled so nicely here on the A-List (so nicely, in fact, that I am hardly capable of absorbing all the nuances, much less writing about them intelligbly). Anyway, if the U.S. is "allowing" the Russian oil oligarchs to flood the world market with cheap western Siberian petrol, and Putin is encouraging this so as to draw more modernizing FDI into the fields, then doesn't it seem a bit fishy to claim that Russia and the U.S. are at total and irreconcilable loggerheads over the N.A. and the end game in Afghanistan ? I know I'm massively vulgarizing the inner dynamics at work here, but Howard seems to caught up in the plot of a Cold War spy novel. I recognize that my queries and remarks are probably a week or two out of date, because I've had a hard time keeping up with the latest developments. The fact that so many juicy posts from the Crashlist's archives are available on-line can be blamed for that. :) John Gulick From jlgulick at sfo.com Sun Nov 25 17:23:52 2001 From: jlgulick at sfo.com (John Gulick) Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2001 16:23:52 -0800 Subject: [A-List] elucidation requested In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.1.20011125153724.00a7a2a0@pop3.norton.antivirus> Mr. Mark Jones posted the following: >MOSCOW'S BID FOR INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN: THE KISS OF DEATH OF A >BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT? >Glen E. Howard >AUTHOR BIO: Glen E. Howard is an Analyst at the Strategic Assessment Center >for Science Applications International Corporation. He specializes in >Caspian defense and security issues and has traveled widely throughout the >region I have a series of questions and comments pertaining to this article, and would be delighted if anyone out there rendered assistance with the former and commented on the latter. 1) This guy appears to be some kind of consultant for the U.S. intelligence apparatus (and probably other intelligence apparati as well, not to mention fossil fuel-biz clients). Is there any sound reason to suspect that he is overblowing the extent to which Russia not only has geopolitical objectives completely autonomous from the U.S. (certainly a valid contention), but also is _effectively exercising_ these autonomous objectives ? I have a hard time buying that there are clear-cut fault lines b/w Russia, Iran, and India -- with the N.A. as a proxy army -- on the one hand, and the U.S., Pakistan, and Pashtuns on the other. And just as I have a hard time buying the idea that Russia is using the U.S. but not the converse, I also have a hard time buying that Russia has marionette-like control over the N.A. 2) Let's suppose that this gentleman's facts and analysis are more or less above board and accurate. If so, it certainly puts to shame the U.S. liberal-left's bleating about the N.A. being just as "bad" as the Taleban, when it comes to plundering, raping, and the arbitrary use of armed might. No doubt this is empirically true. But such bleating presupposed (and presupposes) that the U.S. is backing the N.A., and is not instead trying to install a "multi-ethnic" regime under U.N. and/or NATO auspices, under the sign of "humanitarian intervention." When touring the U.S. recently, RAWA tried to woo the left-liberal crowd by exposing what a dastardly bunch the N.A. is, condemned the U.S. for relying on the N.A. thugs as an occupying army, and implored the crowd to support a loya jirga-style resolution of the conflict, one enforced by the blue helmets. Again, I'm not questioning that the various and sundry N.A. militiamen are a gang of looters and pillagers, but for RAWA to denounce them in front of a U.S. left-liberal audience presupposes that they are instruments of U.S. war aims. If one believes Howard, the N.A. are not tools of the U.S., but tools of the Russians, and the only reason the U.S. "let" the N.A. seize Afghan city after Afghan city was b/c it had to show some kind of victory to a jacked-up and restless U.S. audience. Consequently, U.S. left-liberals were and are wasting their breath exposing the N.A.'s past and present crimes, instead of refining their critique of a U.N.-brokered settlement, with the U.S. playing a senior role and Pakistan (and the U.K. ?) playing a junior role. But then again, this should come as no big surprise, because many among the U.S. liberal-left are predisposed to "humanitarian intervention" in the ungovernable backwaters of the global periphery. I recognize that my queries and remarks are probably a week or two out of date, because I've had a hard time keeping up with the latest developments. The fact that so many juicy posts from the Crashlist's archives are available on-line can be blamed for that. :) John Gulick John Gulick Postgraduate Researcher Institute for Research on World-Systems College Building South University of California, Riverside Riverside, CA 92521 e-mail: jlgulick at sfo.com work phone: (909) 787-4203 home phone: (909) 788-9816 From Gorojovsky at arnet.com.ar Sun Nov 25 18:02:22 2001 From: Gorojovsky at arnet.com.ar (Gorojovsky) Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2001 22:02:22 -0300 Subject: [A-List] Russia's oil & US In-Reply-To: <3C013E6F.C8516AE9@dingoblue.net.au> Message-ID: En relaci?n a Re: [A-List] Russia's oil & US, el 25 Nov 01, a las 18:54, Rob Schaap dijo: > G'day Mark, > > > Hmmm. I just watched what Australia did to Wales. Not happy. Not happy > > at all. > > Yeah, I watched that, too. Nice of me not to mention it, I thought. I > thought Wales the more enterprising side, too. Just kept giving away needless > penalties. Dunno why they didn't close the bloody roof, either. > > Anyway, unless you're unusually generous of nature, you'll probably be happy to > hear a sadly disorganised Oz is 1-0 down against some brilliant, but promisingly > fragile, Uruguayans. > There's some politics and social history in the final 3-0 up for the Uruguayans. The match looked like a 21st. Century rehearsal of what had happened in the early years of the 20th. Century. What distinguished the River Plate football from other styles was the enormous individual ability developed by our players. Maradona did not shoot out from nowhere. But this ability was, in its own turn, the way in which the malnourished or short locals found out how to win over the strong stalwarts of the British companies who brought the game here. So that the "fragile" Uruguayans made use of our old trick. Once again, and in my own opinion right on time. We shall have an Uruguayan, a Paraguayan, a Brazilian and an Argentinean team in Tokyo and Seoul. Too much. The Cup is ours. > Cheers, > Rob. > N?stor Miguel Gorojovsky gorojovsky at arnet.com.ar From franka at fiu.edu Sun Nov 25 16:59:56 2001 From: franka at fiu.edu (Andre Gunder Frank) Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2001 18:59:56 -0500 Subject: [A-List] CUI BONO agendas REVISED & AMPLIFIED TO Nov 25 Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.0.20011125185744.00a1e8c0@mailhost.fiu.edu> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: CUI BONO Nov 25.doc Type: application/octet-stream Size: 200704 bytes Desc: not available URL: From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Mon Nov 26 02:01:56 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2001 09:01:56 +0000 Subject: [A-List] elucidation requested In-Reply-To: <5.1.0.14.1.20011125162821.00a7d3c0@pop3.norton.antivirus> Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011126084830.02ba3140@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 26/11/2001 00:43, John Gulick wrote: >Sorry for double-posting this ... I accidentally hit "send" before I >completed the msg. > >Mr. Mark Jones posted the following: > >>MOSCOW'S BID FOR INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN: THE KISS OF DEATH OF A >>BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT? >>Glen E. Howard >>AUTHOR BIO: Glen E. Howard is an Analyst at the Strategic Assessment Center >>for Science Applications International Corporation. He specializes in >>Caspian defense and security issues and has traveled widely throughout the >>region I agree that this article (from JRL, incidentally, if I didn't make that clear before) seems a little off-base. >Again, I'm not questioning that the various and sundry N.A. militiamen are >a gang of looters and >pillagers, but for RAWA to denounce them in front of a U.S. left-liberal >audience presupposes that >they are instruments of U.S. war aims. But if it is RAWA are instruments of U.S. war aims as some people seem to think, then it sort of confirms Howard's view. Just looking at the way events unfolded on the ground, to begin with the US weren't pushing the NA, but then (a) they began to get desperate and then (b) pushed ahead rapidly with their newfound Russian alliance which involved opening the door to Kabul to the NA. Just as Russian generals are paranoid about the US, ditto pentagon people about Russian long term intentions so whether or not Howard is rright per se, he probably does reflect a powerful current of pentagon/. white house thinking (ie unabated fear and suspicion) about Russia. >3) Reverting back to a dissection of Howard, and how his facts and >analysis do not seem to square with >the Russia/OPEC struggle that's been chronicled so nicely here on the >A-List (so nicely, in fact, that I >am hardly capable of absorbing all the nuances, much less writing about >them intelligbly). Anyway, if the >U.S. is "allowing" the Russian oil oligarchs to flood the world market >with cheap western Siberian petrol, and >Putin is encouraging this so as to draw more modernizing FDI into the >fields, then doesn't it seem a bit >fishy to claim that Russia and the U.S. are at total and irreconcilable >loggerheads over the N.A. and the >end game in Afghanistan ? I know I'm massively vulgarizing the inner >dynamics at work here, but Howard >seems to caught up in the plot of a Cold War spy novel. As the author of one such spy novel I have a vested interested here (my novel, CAVIAR, Gollancz 1997, which I wrote in 1993-1994, was among the first to have a plot based on the struggle for Central Asian oil and gas). Perhaps the bottom line is this: Putin has his grand plan for modernising Russia thru deep long term alliance with US finance capital and the US state, but he does also know, like any ex-Soviet spy knows, just how Central Asia has a habit of going wrong and how behind his forst bottom line (US alliance) is a second, quite different bottom line (not losing control totally over the bakyward and letting imperialists run rampant). Remember, the Russian elite has totally absorbed the Marxist-Leninist ethos that all capitalists are greedy fascist (or jewish!) moneybags who'll stop at nothing. The only thing that ever changed was they they swapped sides; they never changed their opinion about the greed and self-interestr of imperialists. As Howard shows, the wilderness of mirrors is therefore still in place, and both sides are steel peering into it. >I recognize that my queries and remarks are probably a week or two out of >date, because I've had a >hard time keeping up with the latest developments. The fact that so many >juicy posts from the Crashlist's >archives are available on-line can be blamed for that. :) Ah, yes, the good old CrashList. Mark Jones From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Mon Nov 26 03:56:27 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2001 10:56:27 +0000 Subject: [A-List] searchable message archive Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011126105547.00abb9c0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Incidentally, there is a searchable archive of all the Utah lists: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/lists.htm From tomzbox at hotmail.com Mon Nov 26 19:44:43 2001 From: tomzbox at hotmail.com (Tom Warren) Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2001 19:44:43 Subject: [A-List] Re: Stan's post Message-ID: Stan: Since my name is being bandied, I gotta speak. Henry CKL just posted an interesting rant on another list, about prioritizing the destruction of the current system as the revolutionary task ... [snip for brevity].... Returning to the laws of unforseen consequences, what socialism will look like will totally depend on what the circumstances look like after whatever particular conflagration kicks the critical card out from under capitalism, AND HOW WE PICK UP THE PIECES. Socialism is not some decree. It is social control over the productive assets of a society, which will be based on a material foundation that we can't forecast yet. [snip] ... Human agency matters here, and I would hope that we can be smart about what we do if and when the opportunity is siezed. At this juncture, there are only three options. Capitalism (with its thuggish twin-fascism), it's opposite--socialism, or anarchy. None of these terms is descriptive in many particulars [snip] ... pry the cold, dead fingers of the bourgeoisie off of "their" property. This last task... requires struggles in the concrete, and the point of departure in time-space is here-now. With no guarantees. Tom: yes!!! ' cept I think we *can* forecast, and that Henry's 'prioritizing' must be biocentric, with a case to be made for "anarchy" of a sort. Lest ANYone doubt my sympathies are with Stan's observations, here's from MY bible, and what EYE believe: "We must make this an insecure and inhospitable place for capitalists and their projects . . . We must reclaim the roads and plowed land, halt dam construction, tear down existing dams, free shackled rivers and return to wilderness millions of tens of millions of acres of presently settled land." -- David Foreman, Earth First! Tom "The underlying attitude of anti-Malthusians is pre-Darwinian. It baldly assumes that the laws of nature which govern all other species of plants and animals were negated for man by the God of Genesis. Man is saved by the formula, "X will provide", where "X" may be God, Providence, or Science." -- Garrett Hardin: The Feast of Malthus (just hadda throw that in, if the shoe fits ... ) _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp From hellelmer at mediaone.net Mon Nov 26 15:57:01 2001 From: hellelmer at mediaone.net (Jim Devlin) Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2001 17:57:01 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Re: Stan's post References: Message-ID: <004801c176cd$a92a27d0$6501a8c0@AQUEDUCT> Foreman is such a romantic bourgeois. Species-selfish and ruling group-oriented, only "Nature" higher than Cancer Man. Nothing prevents polluted water being ideal for growing food, or polluted air breathable for the next millennium. Engels despised every aspect of the "rural idiocy." Adequate production for every living person will require numerous concessions to development rather than idylls enjoyed by the rich romantics. To support a world population at present or greater size--make way for some serious and badly needed stench and the chemicals that produce it. Think of trebling the manufacturing base, but that will obviously be insufficient. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Tom Warren" To: Sent: Monday, November 26, 2001 7:44 PM Subject: [A-List] Re: Stan's post > Stan: > Since my name is being bandied, I gotta speak. Henry CKL just posted an > interesting rant on another list, about prioritizing the destruction of the > current system as the revolutionary task ... [snip for brevity].... > Returning to the laws of unforseen consequences, what socialism will look > like will totally depend on what the circumstances look like after whatever > particular conflagration kicks the critical card out from under capitalism, > AND HOW WE PICK UP THE PIECES. Socialism is not some decree. It is social > control over the productive assets of a society, which will be based on a > material foundation that we can't forecast yet. [snip] ... Human agency > matters here, and I would hope that we can be smart about what we do if and > when the opportunity is siezed. At this juncture, there are only three > options. Capitalism (with its thuggish twin-fascism), it's > opposite--socialism, or anarchy. None of these terms is descriptive in many > particulars [snip] > ... pry the cold, dead fingers of the bourgeoisie off of "their" property. > > This last task... requires struggles in the concrete, and the point of > departure in time-space is here-now. With no guarantees. > > > Tom: > > yes!!! > ' cept I think we *can* forecast, and that Henry's 'prioritizing' must be > biocentric, with a case to be made for "anarchy" of a sort. > > Lest ANYone doubt my sympathies are with Stan's observations, here's from MY > bible, and what EYE believe: > > "We must make this an insecure and inhospitable place for capitalists and > their projects . . . We must reclaim the roads and plowed land, halt dam > construction, tear down existing dams, free shackled rivers and return to > wilderness millions of tens of millions of acres of presently settled land." > -- David Foreman, Earth First! > > Tom > > "The underlying attitude of anti-Malthusians is pre-Darwinian. It baldly > assumes that the laws of nature which govern all other species of plants and > animals were negated for man by the God of Genesis. Man is saved by the > formula, "X will provide", where "X" may be God, Providence, or Science." -- > Garrett Hardin: The Feast of Malthus > > (just hadda throw that in, if the shoe fits ... ) > > > > > _________________________________________________________________ > Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp > > > From lnp3 at panix.com Mon Nov 26 16:26:28 2001 From: lnp3 at panix.com (Louis Proyect) Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2001 18:26:28 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Re: Stan's post References: <004801c176cd$a92a27d0$6501a8c0@AQUEDUCT> Message-ID: <200111262325.SAA21702@apakabar.cc.columbia.edu> On Mon, 26 Nov 2001 17:57:01 -0500, Jim Devlin wrote: >Foreman is such a romantic bourgeois. Species- >selfish and ruling group-oriented, only "Nature" >higher than Cancer Man. Nothing prevents >polluted water being ideal for growing food, or >polluted air breathable for the next millennium. I take it that pollution must go away first. >Engels despised every aspect of the "rural >idiocy." Adequate production for every living >person will require numerous concessions to >development rather than idylls enjoyed by the >rich romantics. I guess the pollution sticks around. >To support a world population at present or >greater size--make way for some serious and >badly needed stench and the chemicals that >produce it. Think of trebling the manufacturing >base, but that will obviously be insufficient. This was not Marx's view. Where in the hell did you pick up your batty ideas and what are you doing on an email list that takes ecological crisis as a given? -- Louis Proyect, lnp3 at panix.com on 11/26/2001 Marxism list: http://www.marxmail.org From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Mon Nov 26 18:15:24 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 01:15:24 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: entropy Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011127011508.00afea68@pop.tiscali.co.uk> >Envelope-to: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk >Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2001 16:47:35 +0000 >From: David Schwartzman >Organization: Howard University >X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 (Macintosh; I; PPC) >X-Accept-Language: en >To: Mark Jones >CC: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu, rhutchin at U.Arizona.EDU >Subject: Re: [A-List] Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil > >Dear Mark, >Its nice to get some feedback on my paper. Thanks. >A few brief comments. "Wastes" in general do not need to be exported to space, >only waste heat from technological processes, waste heat which is and will >be a >small fraction of the total outgoing infrared flux to space even in a globally >solarized economy. Solarization allows the cleanup and containment of harmful >material waste products without the concomitant insults to the environment >produced by fossil fuels/nuclear energy. In a thermodynamic sense there is no >way the earth surface can be "closed" with respect to entropy precisely >because >of the outgoing infrared flux to space. >Mark Jones wrote: > > > At 21/11/2001 14:32, David Schwartzman wrote: > > >Engels didn't really understand the 2nd law. In any case, this law has > been > > >widely misunderstood, with the familar invocation of physical concepts in > > >social prognostication (physics gets some respect from social > scientists and > > >the lay public even when it is misinterpreted). Georgescu-Roegen/Jeremy > > >Rifkin/Sarkar are examples. For an extended discussion read my paper Solar > > >Communism: > > >http://www.redandgreen.org > > >Marxism & Ecology > > >(you might like to check out the other posted articles, e.g., "A World > Party > > >in Our Future?", written a month before 911). > > > > I just read this article by David Schwartzman and it's an interesting, > > scholarly and useful summary of some well-known arguments about entropy and > > the second law of thermodynamics (the one which says that nothing comes > > from nothing, so the price paid for the emergence of ordered societies, is > > dangerous external disorder, ie, entropy). It's worth a look, and David's > > main thesis is this: > > > > >>Therefore, like the natural biosphere powered by solar energy, the > > ordering and maintenance of the material creation of human activity on the > > Earth's surface can continue far into the future by the export of an > > entropic flux into space, provided a long term energy source (the sun) is > > utilized.<< > > > > The nub of this argument is that the earth is thermodynamically-speaking an > > open, not a closed system, and it can import energy (from the sun) and > > export unwanted waste. In the course of the argument, Schwartzman > > acknowledges the important role played by the great Russian biogeochemist, > > Vladimir Vernadsky. I especially welcome that. > > > > There are opposing viewpoints however and if you take a look at > > www.dieoff.org you can find plenty of material arguing that the earth is, > > in fact, entropically closed. To a layperson like me the ins and outs of > > this debate sometimes resemble the ins and outs of a cat's backside. > > However I'm ready to fearlessly enter this terrain, and I can say right off > > that my money is on the closed-system variant. This is not so much because > > of the physics involved (the jury is still out even on the basic issue of > > whether or not entropy will one day lead to the Heat Death of the Universe; > > we still don't know what will happen at the End of Time). My objection is > > based on the well-known keynesian idea that in the long run we're all dead. > > Maybe the earth IS an open system, as David argues, but we won't know for > > sure in the lifetime of anyone reading this and maybe not in the lifetime > > of the human species. What we do know is that *for all practical purposes* > > the earth is a closed system, ie, we can neither export our waste products > > into outer space, and nor can we convert from the petroleum economy to the > > visions of a solar-powered future which David shares with many other > > solar-rollers. > > > > This brings the discussion back to earth. Schwartzman's conlusion is that: > > > > >>Solarization along with containment of the technosphere are material > > prerequisites for a global civilization realizing the Marxian concept of > > communism, while optimizing its relations to nature. These considerations > > should inform a viable ecosocialist movement.<< > > > > Unfortunately this seems to me to be both technically and politically > > utopian. Nevertheless, altho I disagree with his conclusions, I was very > > glad to read this article. I hope we can discuss this more in the > > future. (Someone else worth reading on this kind of thing is Alf > Hornborg). > > > > Mark Jones From jones.mark at btconnect.com Mon Nov 26 11:22:02 2001 From: jones.mark at btconnect.com (Mark Jones) Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2001 18:22:02 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: ADMINISTRIVIA: VIRUS WARNING! Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011126182138.02b07da8@pop3.btconnect.com> > > >A new strain, called W32.Badtrans.B at mm, of last year's Badtrans >worm was recognized 24 November. This worm masquerades, using >a pair of attachments of various names and extensions. The >tell-tale for Badtrans.B - at least for the present - is that the >two files carry their size: 39 Kb and 29Kb. This worm sends out >mass mailing and its spread has been very rapid. I have received >over a dozen messages carrying Badtrans.B in the past twenty-four >hours. It also installs a key-stroke entry point for a Trojan >intruder, so one should be doubly alert. > >Symantech was a bit slow in recognizing and posting this virus, >but is now offering full data at > > http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.badtrans.b at mm.html > >This might be a very good time to update your anti-virus software >and to do a full system check of your machine(s). From dws at scs.howard.edu Mon Nov 26 09:47:35 2001 From: dws at scs.howard.edu (David Schwartzman) Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2001 16:47:35 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Re: Frank and Jones -- money and oil References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011121081520.035d5790@pop.tiscali.co.uk> <5.1.0.14.2.20011121203812.02e2cd80@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Message-ID: <3C02721E.A57CC0A9@scs.howard.edu> Dear Mark, Its nice to get some feedback on my paper. Thanks. A few brief comments. "Wastes" in general do not need to be exported to space, only waste heat from technological processes, waste heat which is and will be a small fraction of the total outgoing infrared flux to space even in a globally solarized economy. Solarization allows the cleanup and containment of harmful material waste products without the concomitant insults to the environment produced by fossil fuels/nuclear energy. In a thermodynamic sense there is no way the earth surface can be "closed" with respect to entropy precisely because of the outgoing infrared flux to space. Mark Jones wrote: > At 21/11/2001 14:32, David Schwartzman wrote: > >Engels didn't really understand the 2nd law. In any case, this law has been > >widely misunderstood, with the familar invocation of physical concepts in > >social prognostication (physics gets some respect from social scientists and > >the lay public even when it is misinterpreted). Georgescu-Roegen/Jeremy > >Rifkin/Sarkar are examples. For an extended discussion read my paper Solar > >Communism: > >http://www.redandgreen.org > >Marxism & Ecology > >(you might like to check out the other posted articles, e.g., "A World Party > >in Our Future?", written a month before 911). > > I just read this article by David Schwartzman and it's an interesting, > scholarly and useful summary of some well-known arguments about entropy and > the second law of thermodynamics (the one which says that nothing comes > from nothing, so the price paid for the emergence of ordered societies, is > dangerous external disorder, ie, entropy). It's worth a look, and David's > main thesis is this: > > >>Therefore, like the natural biosphere powered by solar energy, the > ordering and maintenance of the material creation of human activity on the > Earth's surface can continue far into the future by the export of an > entropic flux into space, provided a long term energy source (the sun) is > utilized.<< > > The nub of this argument is that the earth is thermodynamically-speaking an > open, not a closed system, and it can import energy (from the sun) and > export unwanted waste. In the course of the argument, Schwartzman > acknowledges the important role played by the great Russian biogeochemist, > Vladimir Vernadsky. I especially welcome that. > > There are opposing viewpoints however and if you take a look at > www.dieoff.org you can find plenty of material arguing that the earth is, > in fact, entropically closed. To a layperson like me the ins and outs of > this debate sometimes resemble the ins and outs of a cat's backside. > However I'm ready to fearlessly enter this terrain, and I can say right off > that my money is on the closed-system variant. This is not so much because > of the physics involved (the jury is still out even on the basic issue of > whether or not entropy will one day lead to the Heat Death of the Universe; > we still don't know what will happen at the End of Time). My objection is > based on the well-known keynesian idea that in the long run we're all dead. > Maybe the earth IS an open system, as David argues, but we won't know for > sure in the lifetime of anyone reading this and maybe not in the lifetime > of the human species. What we do know is that *for all practical purposes* > the earth is a closed system, ie, we can neither export our waste products > into outer space, and nor can we convert from the petroleum economy to the > visions of a solar-powered future which David shares with many other > solar-rollers. > > This brings the discussion back to earth. Schwartzman's conlusion is that: > > >>Solarization along with containment of the technosphere are material > prerequisites for a global civilization realizing the Marxian concept of > communism, while optimizing its relations to nature. These considerations > should inform a viable ecosocialist movement.<< > > Unfortunately this seems to me to be both technically and politically > utopian. Nevertheless, altho I disagree with his conclusions, I was very > glad to read this article. I hope we can discuss this more in the > future. (Someone else worth reading on this kind of thing is Alf Hornborg). > > Mark Jones From franka at fiu.edu Mon Nov 26 16:15:22 2001 From: franka at fiu.edu (Andre Gunder Frank) Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2001 18:15:22 -0500 (EST) Subject: [A-List] In RE: Todd Janke on War in [against!] Afghanistan (fwd) Message-ID: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANDRE GUNDER FRANK Department of History Home University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 Fax: 1-402-472 8839 E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ Colleague Janke poses and answers a number of important questions. - The second one - in his first paragraph - asks whether it is legitimate for a [member of the UN] state to seek and form alliances? Of course it is, and I doubt that anyone has ever challenged that. [It is revealing however that the US refers to a coalition and not an alliance!] - However, colleague Janke's affirmative answer to his opening question [that is really derivative from his second question and answer] is a non-sequitur that in no wise follows or is even related to the one above. If a coalition [and also an alliance] is legitimate, then are it actions also legitimate. His answer is YES. But the legitimacy of a coalition does not thereby legitimate any and all of its actions, as Mr Janke will surely also admit. He could himself, as we can also, think of any number of actions that continue to be ILegitimate no matter by what coalition or alliance, or for that matter by a single state or individual. I hope that colleague will admit that terrorism is one of these. - So are the actions of the US and its coalitions partners among those that ARE illegal under international, and even much national, law ? Yes they decidedly are under several articles of the UN Charter and a according to whole series of other international laws and conventions. I am prepared to cite them chapter and verse but am reluctant to do so here, because I have already done so regarding the NATO violation of the same in its war against Yugoslavia,commonly and erroneously termed [only] "" Kosovo."" Moreover 5 of the articles of the UN charter were already violated in the 1991 War against Iraq, which was erroneously and deliberately been presented to the public as ''sanctioned by a UN resolution.'' Nonetheless, the very UN resolution was illegal under 5 articles of the UN Charter. Suffice it to quote the then UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar that '' this is a UW war, not a UN war." The NATO War against Yugoslavia violated at least 7 articles of the UN Charter, as well as - and the Iraq War also - many sections of the Geneva Convention [they were written and passed in 1949 in the shadow of WW II and ratified soon thereafter by most signatory countries, but by the US not until and by the Clinton administration]. Among these were prohibitions of targeting non-combatant civilian populations and the infrastructure -- eg water and sewage, power supplies, bridges and transport where not primarily of military use - all of which were deleiberately targeted and hit in each of the thhre above named wars. While the use of depleted uranium [which has caused continued cancer and birth defects, not to mention the so called ''Gulf War syndrom'' and of cluster bombs were not specifically prohibited by the Geneva Conventions since they did not then exist, they clearly fall under its prohibitions against targeting civilian populations and even of combatant ones, which these conventions were written to protect against the use of gas. The present War aginst Afghanistan is again definitely in violation of the UN Charter and the same - and it may turn out to be more -of this international law, which as I pointed out in my original note US ratification of the same has made it in violation of US law as well. Regarding the two previous wars, I cited relevant articles of the UN Charter and of Geneva conventions and other international law in analyses of the these two wars at the time of their occurance, and my - as well as those of many professors and pracitioners of international law - are available for inspection in Section 7 on the NATO War of my weg-page csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ that also includes my analysis of the earlier Gulf War against Iraq. - Colleague Janke's third question is in [first] part -to procure support- a repetition of the first [his second] question above, and there is universal agreementfor that- - the second part of this question is, however another non-sequitur. Again the legitimacy of sequring support and forming a coalition does NOT legitimate any and all action by one or more coalition partners [as per also the questins and answers above. Many actions remain ILlegitimate, that is otside the law, and the class of actions to which Mr. Janke refers are commonly called VIGILANTE actions that are themselves beyond the law, no matter how criminal the actions of those against whom they are directed. Indeed, we make and have law precisely to prohibit what outside or beyond it becomes UNlawful vigilante action. - Mr. Janke's following statement that seeking UN permission is not necessary for an action such as going to war against Afgnhanistan if that action is itself legal. In this case, both the premise and the conclusion are wrong, and the latter is another non-sequitur from the former. First of all, as per the above, the action is NOT legal; and one of the articles of law and of the UN Charter that make it ILlegal is the failure to as the per mission of the UN Security Council. But not only does the Charter require a petition to the UN SC, it also requires that the UN SC say YES. Morevover, the UN SC must vote YES by UNANIMITY of its members [the absention of China regarding the Gulf/Iraq War in itself made the resolution without effect under Article 27 of the UN Charter. Then, military action against a member state was undertaken WITHOUT any recourse to the UN whatsoever. However Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter require that all possible means be employed to PREVENTT war BEFORE recurring to war. Moreover, Article 43 provides UN authorization for war ONLY to UN military forces, and NOT to those of any member states or coalition thereof. What the Charter does authorize the UN SC to do is to charge one or several member states to LEND their armed forces to the UN, but only temporarily until a UN force can be created, and then ONLKY UNDER UN COOMAND and not under trhat of any member state/s. All of these wars were therefore illegal in being in violation of each of these 4, but also other, articles of the UN Charter.And any other intervention or UN ''cover''would not be only a ''fig leaf'' as Mr. Janke calls its request, but a gross violation of international law. - However, Mr. Janke's mistaken suppositions raise an additional ticklish question: Even if all of the above conditions were met - and as we see none of them were or are - is it legitimate to intervene in the internal affairs of another state. The UN Charter does NOT contemplate that. Nor does is permit external capture and trial of a citzen of such a state. International law has however recently begun to change by so far only timid steps of precedents, except in the establiment of a couple of international tribunals. The latter however provide for the prosecution only of INDIVIDUALS accudes of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Nuremberg Court and trial provided as the first significant precedent. The SPECIAL UN courts for Yugoslavia and Rwanda followed this precedent and by having been set up by the UN SC themselves became international precedent law [Milosevic and other Yugoslavs only are being prosecuted under that Law and Court, although the jurisdiction of the Court specifically applies,not only to crimes BY Yugoslavs, but also to war crimes IN Yugoslavia, for which prosecution so far been extended to no one outside Yugoslavia who could also be so indicted and brought before that Court. The Spanish - and many other countries' -cases against the Chilean dictator who was responsible for probably 30,000 deaths set another new precedent. The Capture of the Panamanian President Noriega may also have set a precedent, but of course not a legal one in that he was captures through a US invasion, which not incidentally cost 6,000 lives in a single night. The most important new international legislation in this regard is the establishment by the UN of the International Criminal Court [ICC], for which human rights organizations have lobbied for a long time. Significantly however, it was the USA that asked the law to be watered down to virtual ineffectiveness as a condition for US signature -- after which th US refused to sign anyway. President Clinton then signed in the last hours of his presidency in full knowledge that the US Congress would NEVER RATIFY this treaty on the grounds that NO American but yes any other country's citizen shouldbe subject to trial by any international court. Also not coincidentally, when the regular [not to be confused with Yugoslavia] International Court in the Hague found the USA guilty of vilating international law when the US mined the civilian harbor in Nicaragua during its also illegal the Contra action, the US claimed to be OUTSIDE the jurisdiction of the the International Court of ''Justice''. However, Mr Janke also raises still another important question in his very same question, and that question has not yet been answered or resolved in terms of international or UN law: Is outside intervention legitimate against a government that probably violates the human rights under the UN Human rights convention [written and passed after WW I in Paris through the dedication and work of Mrs. Roosevelt]? That is, is UN - but NOT just anybody's - armed] intervention in the INTERNAL Affairs of a member or indeed a non-member state legitimate? Under the UN Charter and INTER national [that is inter-state] law the answer is an unequivocal NO. However there has recently been a move towards international precedent law condoning if not authorizing such intervention in view of widespread violation and worse by many states of the Charter of Human Rights and others [ which incidentally in law also include violations by economic and social means, e.g. by the Dept Trap, especiallly including those of the IMF, for which not even the most timid steps at prosecution have so far been taken]. It may be [ and in the case of the Taliban government surely is] the case that a government is not legitimate under these terms but military intervention to topple and replace it is not thereby automatically legitimated. I may further remind Mr. Janke that litterally countless governments elsewhere in the world - and many allies of the US among them like Saudi Arabia, and Turkey [against the Kurds] a nd not Russia against the Chechens who are and even members of this coaltions against Afghanistand are equally or more illegitimate in Mr. Janke's own terms. Furthermore, the Taliban government was first welcomed by both the US and most of the Afghani population because they liberated them from the terrible yoke of those who now compose the Northern [now euphomised United] Alliance who wantonly killed 50,000 Afghanis during their thankfully only short rule, who have continued to kill,torture and mutilate thousands both in their rule in the North and now with the help of the US and UK and Russia in their southward march, and who promise to do so still in the near future. Another footnote - not to justify or legitimate its rule - the Taliban government collaborated with and pleased the US in prohibiting and erradicatng the production of opium and thereby earning the gratitude of the US government as late as August 2001 to the tune of $ 46 million. Be all that as it may, legal sanction for foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state is however still cloudy to say the least, and Mr. Janke may have SOME point in this regard. I must be self-evidently obvious however that recourse to large scale military force that brings wanton suffering to a people by international force in order to protect or free that same people from the wanton suffering by its own government is a contradiction that can in no wise be acceptable under international law or even plain common sense. It smacks of the now INfamous Vietnam War pretext ''that we must destroy them to save them." by extension and itself multiplication, self-evident and even more absurd and unacceptable is the proposition and pretext that to save civilization we must DESTROY CIVILIZATION. Absurdity to the absurd power furthermore is the proposition that to bring one single individual or even also his coterie to justice we must bring wanton destruction and suffering to a whole people. Not only is that proposition absurd. It cannot possibly achieve its alleged ends of bringing justice to such an individual if the means themselves violate alllegal and other cannons of justice as codified in law, which provides legal procedures to excersise that justice. Violation of such law and canons of justice, no matter what the ends that do not justify the means, ca nNOT itself be just or bring justice nor contribute to the preservation of civilization. Destroy civilization Mr Janke and others may ask? That is,of course, exactly what Vigilante action and ''justice'' does if the sherriff and judge condone, never mind practice, it. That is all the moreso the case if any state or group of states take it upon themselves to defend the law by breaking it. INTERNATIONAL LAW is one of the most important gifts and manifestations of CIVILIZATION designed and available to prevent and save us from Hobbsian ''war of all against all,'' and even moreso of might is right by the strongest power in the world against one of the weakest. Not for nothing that at the end of WW II the civilized victors put the powers AND GOVERNING INDIVIDUALS on trial for their most heineous crimes against humanity and its civilization in Nuremberg and Tokyo, which albeit ex post facto - declared their war crimes to be the WORST CRIMES against humanity and its civilization. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANDRE GUNDER FRANK Department of History Home University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 Fax: 1-402-472 8839 E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ From cburford at gn.apc.org Tue Nov 27 00:27:17 2001 From: cburford at gn.apc.org (Chris Burford) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 07:27:17 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Britain to join euro Message-ID: <4.3.2.7.1.20011127071133.032f8220@pop3.norton.antivirus> Michael Keaney 24 Sept:- British takeover of EU >Lest any are confused by the subject line, I'm sure that Gerhard >Schr=F6der and others have their own ideas about the future direction of >the EU. But for the time being a coalition of interests has formed within >the EU (grouped around The Policy Network) which is serving the cause of >greater British involvement in the EU very well. Naturally the British >state aspires to leadership -- there could be no other role, after all. >But the disarray of the French and the new assertiveness of Germany allows >Britain to piggy-back on some of its partners. Spain is being bought off >by the ultimate prize of Gibraltar, which, all rhetoric to the contrary, >is an outdated and expensive piece of land serving no geopolitical purpose >whatsoever for the UK. Rather like Northern Ireland. Only misty-eyed punk >Thatcherites will shed tears for the loss of these irrelevances. Under New >Labour British imperialism is being thoroughly modernised, and the first >acquisition is no less than Europe itself. Or so the plan goes. FT 30 November: UK economy closer to eurozone http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT3SK7QRIUC&live=true&tagid=IXLB0PYY8CC >UK economy closer to eurozone, says OECD By Ed Crooks and Brian Groom in >London Published: November 26 2001 > > >Britain's economy has become more closely aligned with the eurozone than >many countries that are already members, according to the Organisation for >Economic Co-operation and Development, the Paris-based rich countries' >think-tank. > >The OECD believes the British economy will have grown by 2.3 per cent this >year, compared with 1.6 per cent for the eurozone. For next year it has >forecast growth of 1.7 per cent for Britain and 1.4 per cent for the >eurozone - well within the usual margins of forecasting error. > > >.... > > >Vincent Koen, of the OECD, said: "If you think about Germany, the sick man >of Europe, then it may seem appealing to contrast that with the UK's >strong performance. But in fact the eurozone's average performance is very >close to Britain's." > >Since 1999, average growth in the eurozone has been slightly stronger than >in Britain, he added. > >By 2003, the OECD expects the two economies' output gaps - a measure of >their spare capacity - to be similar. > >The OECD report was generally favourable about the British economy, saying >the credibility of the Bank of England gave it room to cut interest rates >further, and that Mr Brown's projections for public borrowing were >"sufficiently prudent", despite criticism from the European Commission. Much may depend on how Brown and Blair handle their personal skirmishing but the signals seem to be that Blair's ambitions for world historical statesmanship now include taking Britain into the euro. His speech last week attacked and refuted political ans constitutional arguments against. The government must be aware of the trend of analysis expressed for example in this OECD report, and the markets themselves lowered the exchange rate of the pound to the euro in anticipation of Blair making a fuller commitment. But Blair is too clever and not powerful enough to sustain a British takeover of the EU. Gestures like the fact that Germany is hosting the Afghan conference are also part of the management of perceptions and interests. If one of the aims of this list is to look at future developments, I suggest that within 10 years we could see a South East Asia free trade area of 1.8 billion people, revolving around the Chinese economy, and Britain in the euro. Euroland with its surrounding dependent states might still not be as competitive as the USA as a centre of global capital but as a mass of capital it could increase momentum for a more multi-polar world. Chris Burford From Arno.Tausch at bmsg.gv.at Tue Nov 27 01:48:43 2001 From: Arno.Tausch at bmsg.gv.at (Tausch, Arno) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 09:48:43 +0100 Subject: [A-List] new studies on globalization and world economic inequality (for d istribution at Utah a-list and WSN csf colorado edu) Message-ID: <4FC0BEA08BA4D51188F20002A5291B2617E5B2@MAILIX07> Bhagwati, J. and Srinivasan, T. N. (1999), Outward Orientation and Development: Are the Revisionists Right?, paper contributed to the Festschrift in honour of Anne Krueger. Available at: Caldwell, J. C. (2000), Pushing Back the Frontiers of Death , in Castles, Ian (ed), Facts and Fancies of Human Development, Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, Occasional Paper Series 1/2000, Canberra. Available at: Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2000), On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa, World Bank Paper in a project series on the economics of civil wars, crime and violence. Available at: Crafts, N. (2000), Globalization and Growth in The Twentieth Century, IMF Working Paper, WP/00/44, International Monetary Fund,. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp0044.pdf Deaton, A. S. (2000), Counting the World's Poor: Problems and Possible Solutions , Princeton University Research Program in Development Studies Working Paper No 198. Available at: DeLong, J. Bradford (1993), Growth in the World Economy , ca. 1870-1990, in Horst Siebert, ed., Economic Growth in the World Economy , Kiel Institute for World Economics. Available at: DeLong, J. Bradford (1998), Slouching Towards Utopia: What is the Shape of Twentieth Century History ?, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Regional Review, Quarter 3 1998. Available at: DeLong, J. Bradford (2001), The World's Income Distribution: Turning the Corner ?, University of California at Berkeley. Available at: Dowrick, Steve and Quiggin, J. (1997) True Measures of GDP and Convergence, American Economic Review 87 (1, March), pp 41-64. Easterly, W. (2001), Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict? , World Bank Working Paper No 2482. Available at: Friends of the Chair of the United Nations Statistical Commission (2000). An Assessment of the Statistical Criticisms Made of the Human Development Report, 1999, E/CN.3/2001/18 of 1 December 2000. Available at: Gordon, R. J. (2000), Does the `New Economy' Measure up to the Great Inventions of the Past? NBER Working Paper No. W7833, August 2000. Available at: International Monetary Fund (1999), World Economic Outlook, May 1999 . Available at: International Monetary Fund (2000) (a), Globalization: Threat or Opportunity?, Issues Brief 00/01, 12 April 2000. Available at: International Monetary Fund (2000) (b), World Economic Outlook, May 2000 , International Monetary Fund (2001), World Economic Outlook, May 2001 . Available at: Lindert, P. H. and Williamson, Jeffrey G. (2001), Does Globalization Make the World More Unequal? , NBER Working Paper No. W 8228, April 2001. Available at: Maddison, A. (2000), Economic Progress: the Last Half Century in Historical Perspective , in Castles, Ian (ed), Facts and Fancies of Human Development, Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, Occasional Paper Series 1/2000, Canberra. Available at: Mazur, J. (2000), Labor's New Internationalism, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2000. Available at: Melchior, A., Telle, K., and Wiig, H. (2000), Globalisation and Inequality: World Income Distribution and Living Standards, 1960-1998 , Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Studies on Foreign Policy Issues, Report 6B: 2000. Available at: http://odin.dep.no/archive/udvedlegg/01/01/rev__016.pdf Milanovic, B. (1999), True World Income Distribution, 1988 and 1993 : First Calculation Based on Household Surveys Alone , World Bank Working Paper No 2244. Available at: Ravallion, M. (2000), Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Looking Beyond Average s, World Bank Working Paper No 2558. Available at: Sachs, Jeffrey D. (2001), Tropical Underdevelopment, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No W8119, February 2001. Available at: Schultz, T. P. (1998), `Inequality in the Distribution of Personal Income in the World: How it is Changing and Why' , Journal of Population Economics , 11: 3 pp 307-344. Available at: Srinivasan, T.N. (2000), Growth, Poverty Reduction And Inequality, Paper to June 2000 Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, World Bank. Available at: kind regards from Arno Tausch From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Tue Nov 27 06:22:48 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 15:22:48 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Pakistan "defies" US Message-ID: Pakistan makes secret flights to save 'advisers' from Kunduz IAN BRUCE The Herald, 26 November 2001 PAKISTAN defied the United States by sending military aircraft to rescue scores of Pakistani nationals from the besieged Taliban stronghold of Kunduz to prevent their capture by opposition Northern Alliance forces. At least five flights landed under cover of darkness in the last week to airlift up to 300 ex-Pakistan army "volunteer advisers", members of Islamabad's shadowy Inter Services Intelligence agency, and Kashmiri mujahideen trapped in the city by the unexpectedly rapid advance of the US-backed alliance. Several hundred Pakistanis taken prisoner when the north-western city of Mazar-e-Sharif fell are also understood to have been repatriated in a convoy of trucks after Islamabad bribed the Uzbek warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostum, with cash and promises of political support in this week's UN-sponsored Afghan summit. But intelligence sources say the bulk of the 13,000 Pakistani religious militants who crossed into Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban regime in a holy war against America and the estimated 3000 loyal to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terror network are being abandoned to their fate. The International Red Cross has reported finding 600 bodies in Mazar-e-Sharif and up to 200 in Kabul since the offensives forced the regime's troops to retreat. Most appeared to be victims of execution. Many were identified as Pakistanis, hated by alliance because of their country's backing for the Taliban. Washington, whose forces have total control of Afghan airspace, has been evasive about events around Konduz. A Pentagon spokesman yesterday denied knowledge of any Pakistani operation. Pakistan also denied sending aircraft into the war zone. Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/26-11-19101-2-14-36.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Tue Nov 27 06:27:59 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 15:27:59 +0200 Subject: [A-List] CIA investments mature Message-ID: Wolf's lair provides formidable defence for bin Laden IAN BRUCE The Herald, 27 November 2001 ZHAWAR Kili Al-Badr, a limestone warren CIA dollars helped to construct as a mujahideen sanctuary during the Soviet occupation, is typical of a dozen man-made cave complexes which honeycomb the mountains of south-eastern Afghanistan. In Pashto, the local language, it means "wolf's lair" and it stretches beneath the Sodyaki Ghar spur of the Hindu Kush range to within two miles of the Pakistan border. From there, a series of bolt holes worm their way to the surface as extra insurance against attack. The Soviet Red Army stormed the site in 1986 after 57 days of continuous pounding by fighter-bombers and artillery. They used high-explosive, napalm and poison gas. Even then, hundreds of Russian paratroopers and Spetznaz special forces paid with their lives in hand-to-hand fighting for every cavern and bend in the maze of tunnels. Clearing the target became a vicious knife-fight in darkness lit by the muzzle-flash of assault rifles firing on full automatic and the flare of exploding grenades. Viktor Kotsenko, the commander of the Soviet sappers sent in to demolish the tunnels when the battle ended, found 41 separate caverns, including a fully-equipped underground hospital, a local hotel-standard dormitory, a bakery, a mosque, and a library. Despite the pounding, all were intact. In the 1990s, with the Soviets gone, Osama bin Laden used the residue of the CIA funds meant for guerrilla war against Moscow's legions to repair and upgrade the Wolf's Lair. It became a refuge and storage depot for new recruits to his al Qaeda terror network. Bin Laden, a qualified civil engineer back in Saudi Arabia, used his professional skills and the combat experience of the mujahideen to improve the defences. Tunnels were cut with frequent right angles to minimise the effects of blasts from bombs and missiles. Ventilation shafts and escape routes were hacked from the rock and carefully concealed on the surface far above to increase the survival chances of anyone under future siege. At least a dozen more muja-hideen underground strongholds received similar treatment. Many are linked to the ancient karezi irrigation system which lattices the country's mountains and plains. The karezi, a mixture of natural tunnels carved over centuries by underground aquifers and rivers, had been enhanced to take advantage of every drop of water seepage in a land where droughts can least three years. Some of the karezi run 100ft beneath the surface, a constant source of moisture for struggling farmers and an unseen highway for terrorists and fighters seeking shelter from patrolling aircraft. The American air force and naval carrier planes have been bombing known cave entrances for weeks, using 500lb laser-guided weapons, heat-homing Maverick missiles with 1000lb warheads, and fuel-air munitions designed to create pressure waves powerful enough to demolish houses and incinerate everything in a 600-yard radius. Although there have been reports of "enormous secondary explosions", a sign that ammunition or fuel dumps have been struck, most of the caves and their occupants remain intact. A Pentagon source told The Herald: "We are destroying what we can before men with flashlights and guns venture down into the tunnels to flush out or kill the bad guys. The only other way would be to use tactical nuclear weapons. Some of the deepest warrens might survive even that." Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/27-11-19101-0-10-55.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Tue Nov 27 06:31:50 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 15:31:50 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Military options Message-ID: Dusty airstrip plays a vital role IAN BRUCE The Herald, 27 November 2001 BY tomorrow night, poetic justice will reign over a dusty airstrip on the Afghan plains 65 miles south-west of Kandahar, the last bastion of Taliban power in a country fast slipping from its grip. The Dolangi airbase, built with US cash to help the mujahideen defeat the Russians in the 1980s, will be home to more than 1500 US Marines and a springboard for the last phase of a war where double-dealing has largely replaced pitched battle as the currency of conflict. Despite the hype of the seizure of turf in the enemy's backyard two days ago, the Marines are not there to launch the final victorious drive on Kandahar. For a start, they lack the numbers to do so. The Taliban garrison of the city numbers 12,000 hardline Afghans and 5000 Arab and Chechen volunteers. While the Afghans might bargain for their lives and freedom, the foreign militants face death or unconditional surrender and imprisonment. Of the 1500 men who will operate out of Dolangi, only about 600 to 700 are combat troops, a single reinforced rifle battalion. The rest are support elements deployed to fly and maintain the Marines' transport and attack helicopters and to keep the men and machines supplied with food, water, ammunition and fuel. A high proportion of the garrison will have to act as sentries in a perimeter four to five miles out beyond the base in every direction to keep their comrades and equipment out of range of enemy mortar fire. A string of manned observation posts will be supplemented by electronic motion sensors and Cobra helicopter gunship patrols to try to maintain that security. At least one six-gun battery of the Marines' British-designed 105mm howitzers will provide all-round fire support against potential ground attacks from pits dug along the edge of the runway. They will have a plentiful supply of illumination "star shells" to turn night into day for the machine-gunners and riflemen holding the perimeter from two-man foxholes. The main job of the remainder of the heliborne Marine "grunts" is to act as a cordon for search-and-destroy missions in the cave complexes east of Kandahar and close to the Pakistan border. They also represent a blocking force to Taliban and al Qaeda forces who might try to slip away from what can now only be a losing battle and escape to fight another day. Pakistan has moved thousands of its own troops up to the frontier as a second barrier to fugitives. The fact that the force has been committed to holding ground and risking casualties is a clear indication that the coalition has fairly solid intelligence on the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden and Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban leader. If the world's two most wanted men are holed up in a known cave complex, the Marines' task will be to heli-lift teams to cut off escape routes. All of the man-made or man-enhanced caves in the area have multiple exit routes. Squads of eight or nine men or fire-teams of four would be landed near known bolt holes or left in covering positions on ridge-lines, ready to rake fugitives with automatic fire. The caves themselves would be the playground of the "snake-eaters", the US Delta Force troopers and Green Berets, and possibly of Britain's SAS. They would have the unenviable job of moving through the miles of tunnels, risking mines and booby-traps to storm the complex a cavern at a time. Unless Taliban resistance collapses entirely and unexpectedly, it is unlikely that the Marines will try to grab Kandahar directly. If the war comes down to street fighting, the US would lose all technological advantage and inevitably lose men in house-to-house skirmishing. Fighting in a built-up area is the most time and casualty-consuming of all forms of combat. In the rubble of a ruined city, a ragged 15-year-old boy with a vintage Kalashnikov is as deadly as a fully-trained Marine toting the latest laser-sighted carbine. The Marine may actually be at a disadvantage, since defenders already know the street layout and sniper positions. The "armour" airlifted in to support the seizure of the airfield is the light armoured vehicle, an eight-wheeled personnel carrier armed with a small cannon or missiles. It would be highly vulnerable to even the ageing Russian T55 tanks fielded by the Taliban. Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/27-11-19101-0-14-48.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Tue Nov 27 06:37:42 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 15:37:42 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Britain/US split Message-ID: Americans want a war on Iraq and we can't stop them Bush is looking for the next target and his country is right behind him Hugo Young Tuesday November 27, 2001 The Guardian President Bush's prime purpose now is gearing up America for a wider war. "It's not over. It's not over," he told Newsweek, concerned that the people might think otherwise. "Afghanistan is just the beginning," he roared to an audience of soldiers at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. "America has a message for the nations of the world. If you feed a terrorist or fund a terrorist, you're a terrorist." In Newsweek, he amplified this with reference to one man. "Saddam is evil," he declared for the first time. It could take years to catch Osama bin Laden, he allowed. But many other targets are now on notice of merciless aggression. You do not hear a single word of similar intensity from any European leader. Even Tony Blair, while regularly reinvoking the global campaign against terror, seldom talks about the enemy with Bush's slavering passion for specific eliminations. The president is mobilising an American national will such as we have not recently seen. During the cold war it was unquestioning, but static. During Vietnam, it disintegrated. Now the enemy, though invisible, is unmistakable, and the national stirring is deep against him. For the first time, the US was attacked: for the first time, the US doesn't mind if casualties are taken in the name of vengeance or self-protection. For the first time, therefore, public opinion is unambiguously ready to come in behind whatever intervention a president decides he must propose. One proof of this is what encroachments on their liberties Americans are willing to put up with. Protests against the repressive gospel according to the attorney general, John Ashcroft, are few and far between. A country that guards its constitutional freedoms with meticulous passion is prepared to surrender them with pious indifference. So easy is such submission to raison d'?tat that the quiet torture of recalcitrant suspects surely cannot be far behind. Europeans should reflect on this as a measure of the hard-eyed national commitment that differentiates the American mood from that of any other country. This, rather than the diplomatic niceties of coalition building, will mainly determine what happens next. Though a division over policy is not yet visible among the allies, the gulf of perception seems likely to become significant. The temper of the times will remain sternly hot in the US while, barring more terrorism, it eventually cools in Europe. Far from this campaign yielding a new concert of civilised nations, it will emphasise the deafening control of the trumpeter and conductor. The British piccolo, in particular, will find it harder to be heard. The band continues to play in rough harmony, but only on condition that it follows the unilateral beat of the big bass drum. In three theatres, you can see this starting to happen. Afghanistan itself has become an American operation. Sure, they needed allies in all adjoining countries, and worked to get them. There's been a huge amount of transatlantic traffic. When aspiring partners, from Italy to Japan, thirsted to get in on the action and prove their manly commitment, they were nominally accepted, their troops probably never to be used. When even the German Greens, at the weekend, voted to take part, a Rubicon of lasting importance to Germany and Europe was crossed. But Washington remains in unimpeded charge. Behind coalitionist talk, that's how they want it. They speak, moreover, for a different aftermath. Again the verbiage tries to soften this. But when Mr Blair talks about rebuilding Afghanistan and not forgetting it in the peace, it's plain he is sincere whereas Bush's people mouth the words and do not really mean them. There's nothing wrong with nation-building, but not when it's done by the American military," said Condoleezza Rice not long ago, speaking as the president's closest foreign policy aide. Though Washington is pledged to a large chunk of the $10bn aid Kabul has been promised, it's unlikely to stay and oversee the maintenance of a stable, semi-decent regime to spend it. That's not what the new Bush doctrine, a results-oriented, short-vision construct, is all about. Second, the world itself will not, I now guess, benefit from a new internationalism. After September 11, many of us wrote optimistically otherwise. A unilateral foreign policy was surely dead and buried. When it comes to collaborating against terror, that may remain so. Washington's withdrawal from the Middle East peace process is also no longer an option. But the other litmus tests seem likely to be failed. Swift smashing of the Taliban can't plausibly be seen as a platform for reneging on Republican hostility to either the comprehensive test ban treaty or the international criminal court. On the contrary. Seen from Washington, what's being achieved is, among other things, the triumph of an American view of the world that can now be amplified elsewhere. Third, and most delicately, comes Bush's promise that Afghanistan is not the end but the beginning. Again, many countries are signed up to that. Organised commitment to strangle the finances of terrorism should make a difference. But a choice presents itself, in which it's clear where every EU country, not to mention Russia and most of the Middle East, stands: on the slow road of economic and diplomatic action, rather than the fast track of bulldog threats followed by instant bombing. Though Iraq may not be the first place that comes under fire, it's by far the most sensitive, and now the president, talking to Newsweek, gives Saddam his warning: let the UN arms-inspectors back in, or face the consequences. The American mood will tolerate this, perhaps demand it. Not long ago, speculation about the Iraqi option was linked to an anxious need for incontrovertible proof of al-Qaida connections. Now, the test is becoming looser. What looks like a speedy victory in Afghanistan is galvanising US ambitions to be the world's super-enforcer, whatever the problems, for a global cause Americans believe in more clearly than they've believed in anything since the second world war. It's hard to identify a single voice that might be loud enough to stop it. Least of all Tony Blair's. Though Mr Blair has done a good job as a major builder of the coalition, is it credible that he will count for more than the deep-throated thunder from of the Republican right, smarting with rage to complete the job Bush's father failed to do on Saddam? Most Europeans know which side they're on after the criminal obscenity of September 11. But as time passes, they're drawn ineluctably into a campaign over which they will have ever less influence. Their support is an essential token, and their networks are vital to the political and economic effort. But when it comes to calling the shots, Washington cannot be denied, at least by Britain. It's impossible to write the speech one could believe Blair might give to defend his withdrawal of support. Maybe he wouldn't want to. But, helplessly drawn along, we will not walk taller in the world. Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,606685,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Tue Nov 27 06:46:05 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 15:46:05 +0200 Subject: [A-List] British news media Message-ID: And now the news from ITN: job cuts, low morale and a downgraded service ITN, once a pillar of the broadcasting establishment, has fallen on hard times. Chris Blackhurst wonders if it can survive any further belt-tightening The Independent, 27 November 2001 Stewart Purvis, the chief executive of ITN, wants to explain something. There is more, much more, to ITN than providing the news for ITV. So keen is he to get across the message that ITN is not hamstrung by agreeing to service ITV at a drastically reduced rate, that he insists on taking disbelievers on a personal whistle-stop tour of the company's headquarters. We walk at blistering speed through newsrooms, "all state-of-the-art, digitalised", down back stairs, through anonymous doors. "This is the ITV newsroom; over there is Channel 4 News. These are our radio stations. Those people there are working for ITN Archive, a good business in its own right; that bit there is the 24-hour News Channel, and here is Channel 5 News." Finally, we arrive at Purvis's office. To ram home his theme, he produces a chart showing that there is more, much more, to his company than ITV. Sure enough, ITV is shown as just one of several customers of ITN. Later that day, an e-mail arrives from the ITN press office. It is a statement to staff from Purvis, outlining the total number of jobs expected to be lost as a result of the lower-priced ITV contract: 133. That includes the job of head of foreign news, which is to be merged with another post. Make no mistake - ITN is in a hole. For the second year running, it is on course to post an annual loss. As of August, the predicted figure was ?1m - but that was before 11 September and a sharpened advertising downturn, and the unforeseen cost of covering Afghanistan. Two of ITN's five shareholders, Daily Mail and General Trust, and United Business Media, are thought to be keen to get out. They would like the rules to be relaxed so they can sell their 20 per cent stakes to the other three investors: Carlton, Granada and Reuters. At present, no shareholder can own more than 20 per cent of ITN. But in yesterday's media ownership consultation paper, the Government said it will consider raising the bar to 40 per cent - if Carlton and Granada were to merge, say - or may scrap the limits altogether. In terms of output, too, the company is not what it was. C4 News wins regular plaudits, and ITN is producing far more news programmes for more customers than it ever did. But the ITV flagship News at Ten bulletin was once 26 and a half minutes long, allowing in-depth reports and analysis. Now, after a humiliating shunt to an hour later to accommodate the ITV companies' wish to reshape the schedule to sell more advertising, and then a return to something like its old slot, the programme is just 16 minutes. And even then, its position is not guaranteed: it often gives way to live football. Standards, say company old-timers, are not what they were. In their day, ITN was the arm's-length supplier of its news to ITV. These days, ITV calls the shots: ITN bulletins carry puffs for ITV programmes; newsreaders and reporters appear on other ITV broadcasts, blurring the company's traditional distinction from the network. (Mark Austin fronted the reality contest Survivor; Nicholas Owen hosted a questionable exploration of the death of Diana, Princess of Wales; and the star anchor, Trevor McDonald, presents Tonight, the current-affairs programme.) Again, in another blow to independence, Steve Anderson, ITV's controller of news, has called for more show business, sport and "stories about people's lives", giving ammunition to former station chiefs and staff who argue, forcibly, that the newscasts are dumbing down. It is not just the question of content that is causing friction. The tender document for the new ITV contract also made plain that the channel wanted to see a boost in weekend bulletins (traditionally big audience draws, but inexplicably short on substance and lacking star presenters) and the dropping of the ITN logo (the bulletin is to be "ITV News", not "from ITN, the ITV news", and journalists must sign off their reports as working for ITV News, not ITN). On the financial side, the company's condition is no better. ITN has annual sales of ?100m, yet still manages to make a loss. That is because, insiders say, the only seriously profitable client the company has is ITV. The C4 contract just about breaks even; C5 nets a small loss, of around ?100,000 a year; the returns from the archive are small; and the 24-hour ITN News Channel (a Purvis baby) and the cable channel EuroNews eat money. Now, the company has agreed to supply ITV at a far lower price over the six years from 2003. By the end of next year, the current contract will be worth ?49m annually. The new one is priced at ?35.5m, which raises the question: how do you find ?13.5m of savings in a company already making a loss of ?1m a year? To secure the deal, ITN saw off a challenge from the Channel 3 News consortium, which included BSkyB. The consortium tendered ?32.5m, while ITN indicated that it would supply ITV news for ?39.5m. ITN came in with a more acceptable formal bid of ?35.5m. Mr Purvis is annoyed by the suggestion that he was prepared to win the ITV contract at any price: "The people undercutting were BSkyB. They said, 'Whatever ITN does, we'll do it cheaper', so they started it." New digital technology, explained Mr Purvis, means journalists can edit their work. (His critics point out that the equipment is already installed and working, and still the company loses money.) Instead of focusing on the lower price, he said, people should look at the stability that a longer deal provides (originally, the new contract was for five years, but ITN has secured a six-year term). Ratings are also a good barometer. The 6.30pm ITV news has an audience of 5.5-6 million, compared with the 6pm BBC's 6-6.5 million. The later bulletins are about level as well. Then there is the question of value for money. Here, ITV news scores well. The BBC 1 news budget, reckoned Mr Purvis, is over ?100m, with the overall Corporation news outlay reaching over ?200m. "The cost of viewer reach on ITV is one third that of BBC 1 news," said Mr Purvis. The difference should surprise no one who has ever been to political party conferences and witnessed the sea of BBC journalists all covering the same event, but might give Greg Dyke and the BBC governors pause for thought. They may also be interested to learn that, according to Mr Purvis, ITN, historically the higher payer, now pays less than the BBC. Not everyone agrees about the importance of News at Ten. "Whatever the chattering classes think, the peak time for news is early evening. When I was editor, the audience in the old 5.50pm bulletin was sometimes twice that of the 10pm one." The earlier bulletin was short, 10 minutes. The ITV controller wants more lifestyle news, and he will get it, but, Mr Purvis insisted, ITN will still cover the vital stories. "It's a question of balance. We broke the surrender of Kunduz to an audience of 4.7 million; at the same time, 4.6 million were watching the BBC." Veterans may carp at blurring. Let them, said Mr Purvis. "It's been going on for years on C4 and C5. If Jon Snow appears on a C4 debate, nobody complains. ITV has been blighted by sectionalism for too long. It makes sense for the same people to appear in both current affairs and the news." But Mark Austin? "He will not be presenting the next show of Survivor." Enough of ITV. Mr Purvis wants to stress the other things. ITN News Channel "is on business plan", archive sales are "bang on target". The future, though, is uncertain. The prospects of flotation, once being willed by the staff, must have receded, given the company's poor performance. It is hard to see how serious profits will emerge. In the end, that will be Mr Purvis's undoing: ITN is owned by private investors; it has to make a profit. He and his company are trapped. They have demanding shareholders (some of whom happen to be their customers and want to have their cake and eat it) and they have standards to maintain. The price of ITV news has come down by half in the last decade. This is the third time Mr Purvis has negotiated a lower contract. It may well be the last. Full article at: http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/media/story.jsp?story=106944 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Tue Nov 27 07:03:23 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 16:03:23 +0200 Subject: [A-List] UK corporate state Message-ID: Private Eye, No. 1041, 16-29 November 2001 Downing Street's loss, said Tony Blair on the departure of Anji Hunter, is BP's gain. But Hunter is just the latest high-profile figure to join the jobs swap-shop between Whitehall and the oil giant. In April BP CEO Sir John Browne became one of the first raft of "new" Labour's "People's Peers" when he joined the company's former chairman and ex-cabinet minister Lord Simon on the government benches in the House of Lords. Their former colleague, Bryan Sanderson, ex-BP managing director, chairs the government's catch-all training quango, the Learning and Skills Council. Meanwhile Charlie Leadbeater, a former consultant to Lord Browne, is working just up the street in the Number 10 policy unit. When Hunter starts her new job she may spot one familiar face: Jill Rutter, who quit the Treasury press office and went to BP in 1997 in protest at the appointment of Charlie Whelan. But Gordon Brown's current head of communications, John Kingman, tops the lot: he has managed to swop sides twice, leaving the treasury for BP while the Tories were still in charge, before rushing back in 1998 after Whelan's undignified departure. ===== NOTE: Charles Leadbeater, former Financial Times journalist, and author of execrable new economy puff book "Living on Thin Air", was once a member of the CPGB. In addition to his consultancy work and policy advising, he writes prolifically for such New Labour outfits as Demos, another offshoot of the old CP (Geoff Mulgan). Given all the earnest justifications provided for MI5's countersubversion activities during the 70s and 80s by both the MI5 official website and the supposedly off limits Stella Rimington (whose turgid prose bears close similarity to that of MI5's current online material), it is safe to say that the old CP was subjected to a COINTELPRO operation of quite substantial proportions. Who these agents/informers were might be guessed from the subsequent career trajectories of notable ex-CPers who have gone on to greater things, e.g., Charles Leadbeater, Demos/IPPR and the plethora of trade unionists who have retired complete with gongs courtesy of the Queen. Coupled with the evolution of the New Times Network and its slavish devotion to all things New Labour, we have at least one plausible explanation for the sudden and significant evaporation of what was regarded as the backbone of the British labour movement. BP's relationship with the British state remains intimate and worthy of further investigation. Any further info/comment appreciated. Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From hliu at mindspring.com Tue Nov 27 09:10:41 2001 From: hliu at mindspring.com (Henry C.K. Liu) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 11:10:41 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Britain to join euro References: <4.3.2.7.1.20011127071133.032f8220@pop3.norton.antivirus> Message-ID: <3C03BB01.D0DE1765@mindspring.com> For Britian to re-emerge as a global player of serious consequence, she needs to re-examine her "special" relationship to the US. This special relationship is merely an euphemism for subservience toward Washington. The British, in their hour of immiment defeat by Germany in 1940, allowed the US to do to it what Germany could not possibly do: to take over the global British empire by dismantling it. While Nazi Germany's target was domination of Enrope, possibly through a German-British condominium, allowing the British to continue their empire structure, the US was out to replace the British empire with American neo-liberalism and democracy. By supporting US global objectives, Britian forfeited its historical advantage in Asia, Affrica, Mid East and Latin America, even in Australia and Canada. One of the major obstacles in the path of a multi-polar new world order is Anglo-US alliance. British interests in China suffered from US dictation all through the Cold War. Thatcher's handling of Hong Kong was primarily a betrayal of British interest to court US favors. The same missteps are now repeating themselves in Central Asia. Britian can never be an integral part of the EU, nor would it be in British interst to become so. That does not mean that a close identification with the EU is against British interest. If I were running British policy, I would fashion close cooperation with the EU, while at the same time develop a global economic strategy based on British empire heritage before it becomes totally extinct from neglect. Britian, via London, can be the ideologically neutral financial center for global development, instead of an after hour appendix of New York's Yankee capitalism. British commercial and finance law is the preferred venue for all cross border transactions- a regime that traces back to the Napoleonic age. The US market is no longer a market of last resort. The former Third World is, led by China and South East Asia. Henry C.K. Liu Chris Burford wrote: > Michael Keaney 24 Sept:- British takeover of EU > > >Lest any are confused by the subject line, I'm sure that Gerhard > >Schr=F6der and others have their own ideas about the future direction of > >the EU. But for the time being a coalition of interests has formed within > >the EU (grouped around The Policy Network) which is serving the cause of > >greater British involvement in the EU very well. Naturally the British > >state aspires to leadership -- there could be no other role, after all. > >But the disarray of the French and the new assertiveness of Germany allows > >Britain to piggy-back on some of its partners. Spain is being bought off > >by the ultimate prize of Gibraltar, which, all rhetoric to the contrary, > >is an outdated and expensive piece of land serving no geopolitical purpose > >whatsoever for the UK. Rather like Northern Ireland. Only misty-eyed punk > >Thatcherites will shed tears for the loss of these irrelevances. Under New > >Labour British imperialism is being thoroughly modernised, and the first > >acquisition is no less than Europe itself. Or so the plan goes. > > FT 30 November: > > UK economy closer to eurozone > > http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT3SK7QRIUC&live=true&tagid=IXLB0PYY8CC > > >UK economy closer to eurozone, says OECD By Ed Crooks and Brian Groom in > >London Published: November 26 2001 > > > > > >Britain's economy has become more closely aligned with the eurozone than > >many countries that are already members, according to the Organisation for > >Economic Co-operation and Development, the Paris-based rich countries' > >think-tank. > > > >The OECD believes the British economy will have grown by 2.3 per cent this > >year, compared with 1.6 per cent for the eurozone. For next year it has > >forecast growth of 1.7 per cent for Britain and 1.4 per cent for the > >eurozone - well within the usual margins of forecasting error. > > > > > >.... > > > > > >Vincent Koen, of the OECD, said: "If you think about Germany, the sick man > >of Europe, then it may seem appealing to contrast that with the UK's > >strong performance. But in fact the eurozone's average performance is very > >close to Britain's." > > > >Since 1999, average growth in the eurozone has been slightly stronger than > >in Britain, he added. > > > >By 2003, the OECD expects the two economies' output gaps - a measure of > >their spare capacity - to be similar. > > > >The OECD report was generally favourable about the British economy, saying > >the credibility of the Bank of England gave it room to cut interest rates > >further, and that Mr Brown's projections for public borrowing were > >"sufficiently prudent", despite criticism from the European Commission. > > Much may depend on how Brown and Blair handle their personal skirmishing > but the signals seem to be that Blair's ambitions for world historical > statesmanship now include taking Britain into the euro. His speech last > week attacked and refuted political ans constitutional arguments against. > The government must be aware of the trend of analysis expressed for example > in this OECD report, and the markets themselves lowered the exchange rate > of the pound to the euro in anticipation of Blair making a fuller commitment. > > But Blair is too clever and not powerful enough to sustain a British > takeover of the EU. Gestures like the fact that Germany is hosting the > Afghan conference are also part of the management of perceptions and interests. > > If one of the aims of this list is to look at future developments, I > suggest that within 10 years we could see a South East Asia free trade area > of 1.8 billion people, revolving around the Chinese economy, and Britain in > the euro. Euroland with its surrounding dependent states might still not be > as competitive as the USA as a centre of global capital but as a mass of > capital it could increase momentum for a more multi-polar world. > > Chris Burford -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 6406 bytes Desc: not available URL: From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Tue Nov 27 13:00:21 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 20:00:21 +0000 Subject: [A-List] selections from Andre Gunder Frank's ReORIENT Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011127195412.00ac27c8@pop.tiscali.co.uk> The following offers selections from Andre Gunder Frank's forthcoming book ReORIENT: GLOBAL ECONOMY IN THE ASIAN AGE [University of California Press April 1998]. The first two sections of this posting offer additional evidence in support of the assertion that as of 1750 per capita income in Asia was comparable to (or above) that of Europe. The final section offers some hypotheses about the explanation for the subsequent shift in relative economic performance. 1. The Evidence: 1500-1750 So can we test this relative wage level micro - hypothesis and the related long cyclical macro- hypothesis as part of a better world economic theory to account for the industrial revolution taking place in Europe and America and not in Asia -- or Africa? The evidence, it is certainly abundant and some was cited above that wages were much lower in Asia than in Europe, and that for this reason already European production was not competitive. Regarding relative population/resource ratios, Bairoch (1969: 154-155) examined ratios of population to hectares of cultivated land and estimated/ projected them back to about 1800 in Asia. He found Asian ratios to have been three to four times higher, with 3.6 and 3.8 people per hectare in China and India, respectively, and only 1.1 in France and 1.5 in England in 1700 [however the ratio for Japan, albeit for 1880, was 5.0]. ..... Hard data on global production and income are of course also hard to come by for this period, both because they are difficult to find or construct and because few people have been interested to do so. However, a number of scholars have taken the trouble to construct estimates for part of the eighteenth century; since they have wanted to use them as a base line to measure more recent Western and world economic growth, in which there is more interest. So much the better also for us, since these estimates therefore also offer some indication of world and regional production and income for at least the end of our period. Braudel (1992) cites world and regional GNP estimates by Bairoch for 1750. Total world GNP was US $ 155 billion [measured in 1960 US dollars], of which $ 120 billion or 77 percent in "Asia" and $ 35 billion in all the "West," meaning Europe and the Americas, but also including Russia and Japan because of how Bairoch grouped his estimates [to highlight subsequent growth in the "West"]. If we reallocate Japan and Siberian Russia to Asia, its share of world GNP was then surely over 80 percent. Out of $ 148 billion GNP in 1750, Bairoch himself allocates $ 112 billion, or 76 percent, to what is in the "Third World" today, including Latin America, and $ 35 billion, or 24 percent to the countries that are today "developed," including Japan. For fifty years later still in 1800 and after the beginning of the industrial revolution in England, Bairoch's corresponding estimates are a total of $ 183 billion, of which $ 137 billion, or still 75 percent, were in the part of the world that is today underdeveloped. Only $ 47 billion, or still only 33 percent of world GNP, was in the today industrialized countries in 1800 (Bairoch and Levy-Leboyer 1981:5). More than another half century later in 1860, total GNP had risen to $ 280 billion, and the respective amounts were $ 165 billion or almost 60 percent for todays "Third World" and $ 115 billion or still only 40 percent for the now developed countries (re-calculated from Braudel 1992:534). ..... Particularly significant is the comparison of Asia's 66 share of population confirmed by all above cited estimates for 1750 with Asia's 80 percent share of production in the world at the same time. So, 2/3 of the worlds people in Asia produced 4/5 of total world output, while the 1/5 of world population in Europe only produced part of the remaining 1/5 share of world production to which Africans and Americans also contributed. Therefore on the average Asians must have been significantly more productive than Europeans still in 1750! A forteriori, the most productive Asians in China and India, where population had also grown much faster, must have been still that much more productive than the Europeans. In Japan between 1600 and 1800, population increased by only about 45 percent, but agricultural output doubled, so that productivity must have increased substantially (Jones 1988:155). By 1800, wages of cotton spinners, per capita income, life expentancy and stature or height of people was similar in Japan and England, By the early nineteenth century, average quality of life may have been higher in Japan than in Britain (Jones 1988: 160, 158). Indeed, Bairoch's estimate of per capita GNP for China in 1800 is [1960] US$ 228, which compares rather well with his estimates for various years in the eighteenth century for England and France, which range from $ 150 to $ 200. Alas by 1950, China's GNP had declined to $ 170 per capita, and of course India's GNP also declined in the nineteenth century and probably already also in the last half of the eighteenth century (Braudel 1992:534). Indeed, all per capita income estimates also disconfirm the Eurocentric prejudices of those who might wish to argue that the greater production observed above in Asia only reflects its higher population compared to that of little Europe. (Bairoch 1993) reviews estimates of world wide differentials in per capita income by various authors. For as late as 1700 to 1750 he finds a maximum world-wide differential of 1 to 2.5. However he also cites a later estimate of 1 to 1.24 by Kuznets, estimates of 1 to 2.2 and 2.6 by Landes, and 1 to 1.6 and 1.3 or even 1.1 by Maddison. Bairoch also reviews seven other estimates including contemporary eighteenth century views, and himself arrives at an estimate of 1 to 1.1, or virtual parity of incomes or standards of living around the world. Also the perhaps most important standard of living "index," that is the years of expectancy of life itself, was similar among the various regions of Eurasia (Pomeranz 1996: I/8-12). It was certainly not low in China if septugauanarians were common and in 1726 nearly one percent of the population was over seventy years of age, including some of more than one hundred years old (Ping- ti Ho 1959:214). According to estimates by Angus Maddison's (1991:10), in 1400 per capita production or income were almost the same in China and Western Europe. For 1750 however, Bairoch found European standards of living lower than those in the rest of the world and especially in China. Indeed, still for 1800 he estimates income in the "developed" world at $ 198 per capita, in all the "underdeveloped" world at $ 188, but in China at $ 210 (Bairoch and Levy-Leboyer 1981:14). Indeed, Ho Ping-ti's (1959: 269, 213) population studies already suggested that in the eighteenth century the standard of living in China was rising and that peasant income no lower than in France and certainly higher than in Prussia or indeed in Japan. Rozman (1981: 139) also makes "international comparisons" and concludes that the Chinese met household needs at least as well as any other people in pre- modern times. Interestingly, even the per capita consumption of sugar seems to have been higher in China, which had to use its own resources to produce it, than in the Europe that was able to profit from it by importing it from its slave plantation colonies (Pomeranz 1996:II/11-15). For India, Wallerstein (1989:157-8) cites evidence from Habib, Spear, and Desai, all to the effect that in the seventeenth century per capita agricultural output and standards of consumption were certainly not lower and probably higher than contemporary ones in Europe and certainly higher than Indian ones in the early and mid- twentieth century. Pomeranz (1996) however suggests that European standards of consumption were higher than Asian ones. That is, all available estimates of world and regional population, production and income, as well as the section on world trade above, confirm that Asia and various of its regional economies were far more productive and competitive and had far and away more weight and influence in the global economy than any or all of the "West" put together until at least 1800. If this was not due only to Asia's greater population, as its ratios of population to production and its per capita income figures show indirectly and inferentially, how was this possible? The answer lies also in ample direct evidence on Asia's greater productivity and competitiveness in the world economy, to which we now turn in the next section. Moreover, the same was also rendered possible by the technology and economic institutions, to whose examination we will also turn in the final two sections of this chapter. [not supplied here] ..... Of course, data for population and its growth are sparse and uncertain, and on economic growth not to mention their pressure on resources even moreso. However, Tables 4-1 and 4-2 summarized world and regional population data from a large variety of sources, which did reveal a significant pattern. We noted that world population growth recuperated after 1400 and experienced an upward inflection after 1600 and especially from the middle of the seventeenth century onward, probably for the economic and nutritional reasons already outlined in chapters 2, 3 and 4. Yet from 1600 to 1750 Europe continued to account for an only unchanging 18-19 percent of the world's population. Over the same period, the share of the world's population that lived in Asia increased from 60 to 66 percent of the world total. That is because, in the previously already more densely populated Asia, population grew at about .6 percent a year, while in Europe it grew at only .4 percent. According to the later figure of Livi- Bacci (1992:68) the rate of population growth in Europe was only ..3 percent, that is a half or two thirds that of Asia. As a result, while from 1600 to 1750 population grew by 57 percent in Europe, it grew by 87 percent in all of Asia and by 90 percent in China and India. Moreover, the absolute increase was four times greater in Asia on its already scarcer resources, by 110 million from 1600 to 1700 and by 216 million to 1750, compared to increases of only 26 million and 51 million respectively in Europe. Thus, the population/land-resource ratio increased more in Asia than in Europe, as suggested above. This difference by itself gives reason to believe that the availability of cheap labor also increased much more in Asia than in Europe. That would be all the moreso the case if the inequality in the distribution of income also became greater in Asia than in Europe. That was suggested above on grounds both of the more rapid population increase itself and on the basis of a greater increase in production and income in Asia as well. In Africa, population remained stable or declined, with what effect on the distribution of income we do not know. However, we do know that unlike Europe, Africa had no significant inflow of investible capital from elsewhere and also not the same degree of competition with Asia in world markets as Europe had. Therefore, we need not expect any changed incentive to innovate labor saving in Africa. Lee does not mention that reason but suggests that Africa may have been caught in a "low level equilibrium trap" for other reasons as well. 2. The 1750 Inflection How and why did that change especially after 1750? Historians and demographers have noted another as yet unexplained inflection in population growth rates beginning about 1750 in the second half of the eighteenth century. Table 4-1 shows half century world population increases of about 20 percent from 1650 to 1700 and again to 1750, but a higher 23 percent from 1750 to 1800. In Asia however, the corresponding rates were 26 percent before 1750 and only 20 percent from 1750 to 1800, and in India they dropped from 30 percent in the half century before 1750 to 20 percent in the half century after that. For this period, rather different growth rates emerge from Clark (1977), as summarized in Table 4- 2. World population totals increased by 24 percent in the first half century, but only by 14 percent in the second one, and then recovered to 21 percent from 1750 to 1800. In China, population growth rates were about 50 percent in the first and last half centuries but inexplicably only about 40 percent in the intervening one from 1700 to 1750. However, Clark does show a significant decline in Indian population growth already from 33 percent in the half century before 1700 to zero in the half century after 1750 and an absolute decline of 1/2 percent after the Battle of Plassey from 1750 to 1800. Other data suggest even greater relative declines of population growth in Asia and an increase in Europe. According to the estimates by Carr-Saunders (1936) that are still used by the United Nations, world population growth rate declined from about ..3 percent a year in the century before 1750 to .2 or even .1 in the half century to 1800. Most of that was due to the even more rapid decline from .6 per cent a year to .13 or .14 percent a year in Asia from 1750 to 1800. Within Asia, the growth rate, according to more recent estimates, was 1 percent in China but only .1 percent in India, during its above mentioned economic decline, conquest and colonization by Britain (Nam and Gustavus 1976:11). So the eighteenth century reversal from high to lower population growth rates in Asia emerges clearly from all of these population estimates, despite the differences among them. In Europe on the other hand according to Table 4-1, population growth accelerated from 15 percent between 1650 and 1700 to 22 percent between 1700 and 1750, to 34 percent in the half century between 1750 and 1800 and even 41 percent from 1800 to 1850. In Table 4-1 from Clark (1973) the growth rates for Europe are similar, rising from 17 percent in the first of these half centuries and 23 percent in the second one to 33 percent in the third one from 1750 to 1800. That is, in Europe the growth rate of population suddenly took off from the previous annual .3 or .4 percent to 1.6 percent a year for 1750-1800. The latest Livi- Bacci (1992:68) figures for Europe are .15 percent from 1600 to 1750 and .63 percent from 1750 to 1800 [which would make them even lower relative to Asian ones in the earlier period]. Notwithstanding the differences in these estimates, no one disputes that population growth rates took off in Europe, while they did not in Asia and indeed may have reversed in India. Moreover, these same trends continued and indeed accelerated in the first half of the nineteenth century. ..... Does this evidence about the reversal of Asian and European population trends after 1750 tend to dis-confirm the above suggested accounting for the reversal of Asian and European fortunes and the location of the industrial revolution first in the latter? No. Can we have it both ways? Yes. The absolute and relative changes in population growth rates in Asia and Europe after 1750 do not necessarily detract from this explanation and perhaps even offer additional support for the same. To begin with, the lower rates of population growth in Asia are a component manifestation of and confirm the decline of Asia, which is central to my explanation. Similarly, the increase in population and its growth rate in Europe are also a manifestation of the economic "rise of Europe" and the West. Additionally, however, it may be argued that under these new circumstances there indeed was a Boserup effect! Indeed, Boserup (1981) herself suggests that the population/resource ratio in Europe did not favor technological innovation in agriculture or industry before the mid eighteenth century. She emphasizes that European population growth offered this stimulus only after that time and that Europe had no immediately prior increase in agricultural productivity. However especially after 1800, the even faster European population increase could well also have supported innovation in labor-saving technology and less laborious cheaper generation of power and use and handling of materials, as Boserup claims. For that to become possible however, there had to be a marked expansion of the market for European products not only at home, but also abroad. However, Europe also had to have a source of sufficient capital to make these technological investments possible and affordable, as well as the same expanding market to make the investments profitable. Beginning especially after the Battle of Plassey in 1757 and from 1800 onwards, these conditions were met by and in the world economy. The very decline of Asia, not to mention European colonialism, simultaneously offered Europeans the necessary increase in markets and market share as well as an additional inflow of investible capital. Moreover, emigration to the Americas made it possible to drain off much of the new born surplus population from Europe. This population at the European frontier in combination with the additional new resources available in the New World then further expanded the world market for European production and exports. None of this would have been equally possible without the structure and conjuncture in the world economy around 1800, on which I have insisted in this book. Another important aspect of this structure and conjuncture is examined by Pomeranz (1996). He argues that the previous long period of economic and population growth - our long "A" phase which he also finds predominant in China - exerted differential ecological demands and opportunities on the resource base among various regions in the world. By the end of the eighteenth century, according to his analysis, these ecological pressures in turn stimulated and favored the conversion to new sources of power, in Britain and Western Europe, especially from coal instead of wood and through steam instead of mechanical and animal traction. This ecological/economic and the demographic/ economic structure and conjuncture were of course related and require further analysis in relation to each other. 3. Challenging and Reformulating the Explanation This demographic and world marco- and micro- economic explanation of technological change around 1800 can be challenged on some empirical grounds and witth somerelated analytical reservations. However, the same also permit reformulating and strengthening the argument. The evidence and reasoning that follows builds on a tripartite e-mail discussion in August-October 1996 among Ken Pomeranz, Jack Goldstone and myself. It attempts to construct a stronger synthesis of our arguments that is empirically and analytically more acceptable to all of us and better defensible to the reader. The main issue in the respective and combined arguments to account for the technological change around 1800 continue to be premised on WORLD market wide competition in whether and where to invest to reduce comparative of production and to extend markets. 1. The main challenge to the simple demand and supply hypothesis was that the technological innovations of the "industrial revolution" were less labor "saving" than labor "extending" and that they increased the productivity of both labor and capital. 2. Direct wage rates or costs may have been as high [or even higher] in some parts of China, eg. in the Yangtze Valley and the South, though probably not anywhere in India, than in some parts of Europe, especially England. 3. The distribution of income may have been similar - and not more skewed as I contended - in China than in Europe, although it probably was more unequal in India. 4. The problem of absolute, relative and world wide comparative wage costs - in entrepreneurial calculation as in our analysis of the same - is related also to local and regional problems of labor allocation. 5. There were some economic differences in labor allocation especially between agriculture and industry, which were related to some institutional differences. However, it is less clear to what extent these differences were underlying causes or of the observed allocation of labor or whether they were only different institutional mechanisms through which the labor allocation were organized. Particularly important differences were: A. Bonded labor in India. B. Women were tied to the village and their labor was restricted to agriculture and dopmestic industry, eg. spinning, in China. C. Some industrial workers could still draw directly on some subsistence goods produced by women-village-agriculture in China but less so in England without having to aquire these through the market. D. Enclosures [to produce more cheaper wool for textiles on more land - "sheep ate men"] expulsed male and female labor from the land into urban un/employment in England [and elsewhere in Europe?]. 6. The industrial "revolution" was initiated with cotton textiles, but these required both a growing "external" supply of cotton [for Europe - from its colonies] and a "world" market for all in which everybody had to compete [except China, which still had a growing and protected domestic and regional market]. 7. The industrial "revolution" also required and took place in the supply and production of more and cheaper energy, especially through coal and its use in making and using machinery to generate steam power, first stationary and then also mobile. The critical role of coal and its replacement of wood as a source of fuel in Britain is demonstrated by Wrigley (1994). 8. These sources of power technically and economically first required [and permitted] concentration of labor and capital in mining, transport, and production. Then they also permitted faster and cheaper long distance transport via steam powered railway and shipping. 9. Investment in such "revolutionary" industrial power, equipment, organization and the labor necessary to make them work was undertaken wherever, but also only where, it was economically rational and possible to do so, in terms of A. Labor allocation and cost alternatives. B. Location and comparative costs of other productive inputs [eg. timber/coal/animal/human sources of power and transport,as well as raw materials like cotton and iron], which were related to the geographical location of these resources and to ecological changes in their availability. C. capital availability and alternative profitable uses. D. Market penetration and potential. At the turn of the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries the above mentioned factors in world economic competitive and comparative circumstances, changes, and transformation generated the following results: - India continued in but was threatened in its competitive dominance on the world textile market on the basis of cheap and also bonded skilled labor. Domestic supplies of cotton, food and other wage goods continued to be ample and cheap; and productive, trade and financial organization and transport remained relatively efficient despite suffering from increasing economic and political difficulties, as reviewed above. However, supplies of alternative power and materials, eg. from coal and iron/steel, were relatively scarce and expensive. Therefore, Indians had little economically rational incentive to invest in innovations at this time. They were further impeded from doing so first by economic decline beginning already in the second quarter of the eighteenth century or earlier; then by the [resulting?] decline in population growth and British colonialism from the third quarter onwards; and finally from a combination of both decline and colonialism as well as "Drain" of capital from India to Britain. India switched from being a net exporter to being a net importer of cotton textiles in 1816. However India did continue to struggle on the textile market and began again to increase textile production - by then also in factories - and exports in the last third of the nineteenth century. - China still retained its world market dominance in ceramics, partially in silk and increasingly in tea, and remained substantially self-sufficient in textiles. China's balance of trade and payments surplus continued into the early nineteenth century. Therefore China had availability and concentration of capital from both domestic and foreign sources. However, China's natural deposits of coal were distant from its possible utilization for the generation and industrial use of power, so that progressive deforestation still did not make it economical to switch from wood to coal for fuel. Moreover, transport via inland canals and coastal shipping, as well as by road, remained efficient and cheap [but not from outlying coal deposits]. This economic efficiency and competitiveness on both domestic and world markets also rested on absolutely and comparatively cheap labor costs. Even if per-capita income was higher than elsewhere, as Bairoch notes, and its distribution was no more unequal than elsewhere [as Pomeranz and Goldstone claim], the wage good cost of production was low, both absolutely and relatively. Labor was abundant for agriculture and industry, and agricultural products were cheaply available also for industrial workers and therefore to their employers, who could pay their workers low subsistence wages. Goldstone (1996) emphasizes one reason: Women were tied to the villages and therefore remained available for [cheap] agricultural production. Pomeranz [19xx - to be/published or only e-mail?] emphasizes a related reason: Urban industrial workers were still able to draw for part of their subsistence on "their" villages [as in Yugoslavia during industrialization after World War II], which was produced cheaply in part by the women to whom Goldstone refers. In other words from an entrepreneurial industrial employer and market perspective, wage goods were absolutely and relative cheap; because agriculture produced them efficiently and cheaply also with female labor. The "institutional" distribution of cheap food to urban and other workers in industry, transport, trade and other services was functionally equivalent to what it would also have been if the functional distribution of income had been MORE unequal than it was. The availability of labor was high, its supply price low, its demand for consumer goods attenuated; and there was little incentive to invest in labor saving nor alternative energy using production or transport. Elvin (1973) sought to summarize such circumstances in his "equilibrium trap." Even so, China still remained competitive on the world market, maintained its export surplus. Emperor Ch'ien Lung said in his 1793 message to King George III of England "I set no value on objects strnagte and ingenious and have no use for your country's manufactures" (Schurman and Schell 1967, I:108-109). - Western Europe and particularly Britain were hard put to compete especially with India and China. Europe was still dependent on India for the cotton textiles and on China for the ceramics and silks that Europe re-exported and from which it profited in its [economic and/or political] colonies in Africa and the Americas. Moreover, Europe remained dependent on its colonies for most of the money it needed to pay for these imports, both for re-export and for its own consumption and other use, eg, as inputs for its own production and export. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, there was a decline in the marginal if not also the absolute inflow of precious metals and other profits through the slave trade and plantations from the European colonies in Africa and the Americas. To recoup and even to maintain - never mind to increase - its [world and even domestic] market share Europeans collectively and its entrepreneurs individually had to attempt to increase their penetration of at least some markets, and to do so either by eliminating competition politically/militarily or by undercutting it by lowering its own costs of production, or both. Opportunity to do so knocked when the "Decline" began in India and West Asia, if not yet in China. Wage and other costs of production and transport were still uncompetitively high in Britain and elsewhere in Europe. However especially after 1750, rising incomes and declining mortality rates sharply increased the rate and amount of population growth, as noted in Chapter 4 and again above in this chapter. Moreover, the displacement of surplus labor from agriculture increased its potential supply to industry. At the same time, the imposition of British colonialism on India reversed the perennial capital outflow to, and turned it into "The Drain" from, India to Britain, as also obsewrved above. Moreover, a combination of commercial and colonial measures would permit the import of much more raw cotton to Britain and Western Europe. Deforestation and ever scarcer supplies of wood and charcoal and redndered these more expensive. At the same time since the second third of the eighteenth century, first relative and then absolute declines in the cost of coal made the replacement of charcoal [and peat] by hard coal increasingly economical and then common in Britain. The Kondratieff B phase in the last third of the eighteenth century generated technological inventions and improvements in textile manufacturing and steam engines [first to pump water out of coal pits and then also to supply motive power to the textile industry]. At the turn of the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries, the "first" A phase [identified by Kondratieff] and the Napoleonic wars generated increased investment in and the expansion of these new productive and then also transport equipment and the incorporation of ever more of the available but still relatively high cost labor force into the "factory system." Production increased rapidly; real wages and income declined; and "the workshop of the world" conquered ever more foreign markets through "free trade." Yet even then, British colonialism had to prohibit free trade to India and recurred to the export of opium from there to force an "Open Door" into China. - Most other parts of the world still fall through the cracks of our world economic analysis. Yet in brief, we can observe that most of Africa may have had labor/land ratios at least as favorable to labor saving investment as Europe. However Africa did not have an analogous resource base [except the still undeveloped one in Southern Africa], and far from having a capital inflow, Africa suffered from capital outflow. The same was true of the Caribbean. Latin America had resources and labor, but also suffered from colonial and neo-colonial capital outflow as well as specialization in raw materials exports, while its domestic markets were captured by European exports. West, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia became increasingly captive markets for if not also colonies of Europe and its industry, to which they supplied the raw materials that they had previously themselves processed for domestic consumption and export. In the nineteenth century, only the European "settler colonies" in North America, Australasia, Argentina, and Southern Africa were able to find other places in the international division of labor, and China and Japan were able to continue offering significant resistance. But that is another - later - story, which will lead to the Re-emergence of East Asia in the world economy today. In short [conclusion], changing world demographic/ economic/ ecological circumstances suddenly - and for most people including Adam Smith unexpectedly - made a number of related investments economically rational and profitable: in machinery and processes that saved labor input per unit of output, thus increasing the productivity and use of labor and its total output; increasing productive power generation; and increasingly productive employement and productivity of capital. This transformation of the productive process was initially concentrated in selected industrial, agricultural, and service sectors in those parts of the world economy whose comparative competitive POSITION made -- and then continually re-made -- such Newly Industrializing Economies [NIE] import substituting and export promoting measures economicaly rational and politically possible. Thus, this transformation was and continues to be only a temporally localized and still shifting manifestation of a WORLD economic process, even if it is not spread uniformly around the world -- as historically nothing ever has been and as is also still not foreseable. The suggestion is that it was not over-all poverty and still less tradition or failure that handicapped Asia in world economic competition relative to Europe around 1800. Rather, in Marxist and Schumpeterian terms, it was their very success that generated failure. For the competitive handicap of the Asian economies was generated by its previous absolute and relative success in responding to the economic incentives of the long cycle "A" phase expansion that the inflow of American money financed, which that lasted through the eighteenth century. That turns all received theory on its head. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Tue Nov 27 13:02:45 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 20:02:45 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Jim Blaut on Frank v. Landes Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011127200221.05be2df0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> EH.R: Frank versus Landes posted by James M. Blaut on May 17, 1998 Herewith a brief response to two of Brad DeLong's thoughtful, quizzical comments. (1) "[As] Alan Taylor eloquently pointed out, to reduce the European Miracle from a ten-century to a two-century affair makes understanding and accounting for it much, much harder..." I don't think that anyone, and certainly not Gunder Frank, is arguing that you don't have to look for pre-18th-century csauses for 18th-century effects. The problem is: how far back do you have to go? Frank and I argue that you don't have to go back before the 16tth century, because the rise of Europe relative to other civilizations was kicked off initially by the inflow of silver (etc.) from the Americas after 1492. Landes, Jones, & Co. of course argue otherwise. They find saome unique European genius (mentality, culture) in Europe 1000 years ago (Landes, Lynn White, MacFarlane, Weber, et al.) or 5000 years ago (Jones, Mann, Hall, Wittfogel, et al.), something, or some things, that propelled Europe and only Europe forward toward later modernization. This, of course, is the conventional position. I think it has in it a large dose of Eurocentric folklore. For every trait in ancient or medieval Europe that seems to be part of the explanation for Europe's later rise (relative to other civilizations), I think you find either that (1) the trait was also present in non-Europe, or (2) the trait was not really all that progressive, or all that pregnant with implications for later progress, or (3) the trait could be balanced off against some trait of non-Europe which was equally pregnant with implications for later development. The problem here is what I call "tunnel history." You know that Europe in later times had some undeniable superiority or priority. You search for the causes of that superior or prior fact *only* in prior European facts, neglecting the rest of the world. (2) "Where are the self-governing cities of Asia?" There were self-governing cities, city-states or small kingdoms dominated by a single city, along all the coasts of the Indian Ocean from Sofala and Kilwa around to Malacca and beyond. There were man y port cities lying within large empires but enjoying essenmtially complete autonomy in matters relating to the economy. I think the Weberian idea that European cities were somehow uniquely "free" is folklore: everything European was endowed with freedom, everything Asian was unfree, oppressed by Oriental despotism. A similar argument applies to the now-conventional idea that the political fragmentation of medieval Europe allowed for economic development in ways not possible ("blocked") elsewhere by "empire." Note first that the older conventional view held quite the opposite to be the case: the fragmentation of feudal societies was altogether bad, and had to be replaced by central governments before modernization was possible. The newer pro-fragmentation theory seems to me to be more of the Oriental despotism mythology. Empires like China did not fundamentally suppress economic activity in local regions and cities (see Bob Marks' post on his work on South China). Indian Ocean port cities under the Mughals were allowed, even in some ways encouraged, to operate as autonomous economic entities. Centralized polities indeed had specific advantages: a large area serving as labor shed and market (this argument anticipates the modern theory of the "national economy"), a potential for the diffusion of technology uninhibited by political and migration barriers. Etcetera. There is the view that smaller polities somehow mean more individualism. I think this is romantic nonsense. Was a baron more democratic than a king in Magna Carta times? What about all thosemedieval tolls between markets? My guess is that markets were freer under empires, ceteris paribus, than under fragmented feudal semi-polities. Respectfully submitted, Jim Blaut From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Tue Nov 27 13:08:17 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 20:08:17 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: EH.N: ANN: All-Ohio Economic History Seminar presents David Landes LIVE on web Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011127193751.00add340@pop3.freeserve.net> >----------------- EH.NEWS POSTING ----------------- >The All-Ohio group is pleased to announce a seminar by David Landes of >Harvard University on Friday, November 30 from 3:30-5:00 EST. The title of >his talk is "East is East and West is West: Economic Growth in China >versus Europe." Copies of the paper may be downloaded from the Ohio State >Economics Department web page >(http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/events/allohio.htm). > >This page also provides links to the webcast of the seminar (a live stream >should be available by 3:15 EST), to a link to Real Player software that >is needed to view the seminar, and to an e-mail address for submitting >questions during the seminar (steckel.1 at osu.edu). > >Before the seminar, viewers may also want to reread the eh.res forum on >"Rethinking 18th Century China" in Nov-Dec, 1997 >http://www.eh.net/FORUMS/ChinaSum.html. > >Rick Steckel > >============================================================= >Richard H. Steckel Steckel.1 at osu.edu >Economics Department 614 - 292 - 5008 Office >The Ohio State University 614 - 292 - 3906 FAX >410 Arps Hall >1945 North High Street >Columbus, Ohio 43210-1172 > >------------ FOOTER TO EH.NEWS POSTING ------------ >For information, send the message "info EH.NEWS" to lists at eh.net From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Tue Nov 27 13:11:48 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 20:11:48 +0000 Subject: [A-List] 18th Century China Forum Summary Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011127201035.00ad07d0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> http://www.eh.net/Archives/eh.res/nov-1997/Eh.Res-Re-thinking 18th Century China Forum Summary This forum began November 19, 1997 with a summary by Kenneth Pomeranz regarding his recent research on 18th century China. This posting illustrated that 1) China had living standards comparable to Europe up to the middle of the 18th century (especially within the Yangzi Delta) and 2) household and market allocated resources in China were as efficient as in European countries. Although similarities exist, the divergence between China and Europe begs the question: What did Europe have that China did not? Pomeranz suggests that his research provides "an answer based on ecological pressures facing all pre-industrial cores?and argues that England?s unique escape from these problems was as dependent on good luck and global conjectures as on endogenous developments," (November 19, 1997). In essence, Europe had some advantages. First, the location of coal complemented pre-industrial "core" cities. Second, " the New World, which was populated in ways that guaranteed a much greater export orientation than in the Chinese frontiers ." Thus, the "why Europe" (and why not China) question may depend on these European advantages. However, many questions remain, as indicated by the numerous topics raised during this forum. For instance what about the role of technology in China? Greg Clark in a November 24, 1997 message notes that even if living conditions in the Yangzi Delta and England were similar, it does not imply that technologically the two regions were similar. He states "even societies with a very primitive production technology can end up with high living standards if they have adverse disease conditions or fertility control." Brad DeLong responds that "the extremely rapid growth of China?s (and India?s) early modern populations suggests an impressive degree of technological dynamism," (November 24, 1997). Also, what about the role of financial markets in China? Ed Perkins notes the importance of European financial markets during the 17th and 18th centuries in a November 24, 1997 posting, but he wonders how this compares to China? Gunder Frank explains that Asia excelled in the financial sector as well, (November 25, 1997). He states, for instance, that the interest rate in Southeast Asia was the same as in Europe and that "Europeans BORROWED and raised capital on the Asian capital markets ALL the time in the 17th and 18th centuries." Therefore, do these differences explain why the Industrial Revolution occurred in Europe and not in China? George Grantham explains the response of economic history to the question "why are we so rich and dynamic, and they so poor and stagnant," (November 27, 1997). Essentially, everyone was poor due to European colonization or exploitation, and Europe had a special ingredient that everyone else lacked. Referring to Pomeranz?s research, Grantham indicates that "[i]t is the notion that deep-seated differences in civilization explain differences in long-run economic performance that Pomeranz?s findings implicitly challenge." Further, "[t]he work also points up the problem of again thinking about the sources of the remarkable technological breakthrough of the last eighteenth and early nineteenth century." In fact, Pomeranz sees his paper?s contribution "as more a matter of influencing the way we set up the ?Why England? question" (November 27, 1997). Undoubtedly this forum raised questions and promoted discussion on the topic of Chinese and European industrialization during the 18th century. The following is the list of posting for the Re-Thinking 18th Century China Forum. I have indicated which postings are unrelated to the discussion: EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Joshua L. Rosenbloom (Wed Nov 19 1997 - 09:54:01 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Ken Pomeranz (Wed Nov 19 1997 - 10:20:00 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Brad De Long (Wed Nov 19 1997 - 17:52:15 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Joshua L. Rosenbloom (Mon Nov 24 1997 - 10:18:15 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Gregory Clark (Mon Nov 24 1997 - 10:42:00 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Brad De Long (Mon Nov 24 1997 - 11:44:57 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China D. McCloskey (Mon Nov 24 1997 - 12:04:50 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Brad De Long (Mon Nov 24 1997 - 13:09:07 EST) EH.R: Oops... Joshua L. Rosenbloom (Mon Nov 24 1997 - 14:54:05 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Edwin J. Perkins (Mon Nov 24 1997 - 14:54:06 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Michael Perelman (Mon Nov 24 1997 - 14:54:06 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China D. McCloskey (Mon Nov 24 1997 - 14:54:07 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Gunder Frank (Mon Nov 24 1997 - 16:42:10 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Fred Carstensen (Tue Nov 25 1997 - 13:34:19 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Gregory Clark (Tue Nov 25 1997 - 13:34:19 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Gunder Frank (Tue Nov 25 1997 - 13:34:18 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Prof. G. Grantham (Thu Nov 27 1997 - 23:14:42 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Anthony Patrick O'Brien (Thu Nov 27 1997 - 23:14:54 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Ken Pomeranz (Thu Nov 27 1997 - 23:32:05 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Fred Carstensen (Thu Nov 27 1997 - 23:32:10 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Gunder Frank (Thu Nov 27 1997 - 23:32:21 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China D. McCloskey (Wed Nov 26 1997 - 12:53:02 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China D. McCloskey (Wed Nov 26 1997 - 12:53:03 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Fred Carstensen (Wed Nov 26 1997 - 12:53:03 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Edwin J. Perkins (Wed Nov 26 1997 - 16:16:26 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Fred Carstensen (Sat Nov 29 1997 - 17:01:04 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China D. McCloskey (Sat Nov 29 1997 - 17:01:07 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Prof. G. Grantham (Sat Nov 29 1997 - 17:01:14 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Jurrien de Jong (Sun Nov 30 1997 - 22:14:32 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Fred Carstensen (Sun Nov 30 1997 - 22:14:39 EST) EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China -Reply SAARONSON at BROOK.EDU (Mon Dec 01 1997 - 16:42:40 EST) From lnp3 at panix.com Tue Nov 27 13:40:58 2001 From: lnp3 at panix.com (Louis Proyect) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 15:40:58 -0500 Subject: [A-List] The Foster-O'Connor rhubarb Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.20011127154058.006dc348@popserver.panix.com> Last June, James O'Connor opened up the pages of "Capitalism, Nature and Socialism" (CNS) for a hostile symposium on John Bellamy Foster's "Marx's Ecology". There has been a running dispute between these two for some time now. It also involves Paul Burkett, who wrote an attack on O'Connor's "Natural Causes" in the February 1999 Monthly Review. (http://www.monthlyreview.org/299burk.htm) After Foster turned down the opportunity to present a presumably inadequate 3,000 word rebuttal for the September issue, Burkett pinch-hit for him. I want to submit my own rebuttal to all of these folks using the Internet as is my wont. I will not count the words, nor will I worry about alienating any of the principals. I burned those bridges long ago and then dynamited the smoldering wreckage. My interest in ecology began after hearing Joel Kovel speak on the topic over 6 years ago at the Brecht Forum in NYC. His likening of capitalist growth to metastizing tumors stuck with me. Although Kovel has spoken critically of the Frankfurt School (in another presentation at the Brecht Forum), he tends to retain some of their influences, especially around the question of 'spirituality' which was a major bone of contention in his CNS article on Foster. A couple of years later, I took keen interest in a debate that had broken out between Foster and David Harvey, after Harvey had attacked Foster as a kind of neo-Malthusian in "Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference." Because Foster had addressed the question of ecological limits in "The Vulnerable Planet," Harvey concluded that Foster was suffering from the same kind of philosophical parsimoniousness at work in Malthus. But when minesweepers are converted into fishing boats, it is not Malthusian to point out that tuna and other fish at the top of the food chain might disappear at some point. Not only is it scientific to do so, it is a problem that there is no neat "socialist" ribbon-wrapped solution to. During the course of this debate, I communicated frequently with Foster through email, offered him my solidarity and defended his ideas frequently on the Internet. This was at a time when I held Marxist professors in much higher esteem than I do nowadays. After posting a brief critique of Harvey on Doug Henwood's LBO-Talk mailing list, O'Connor, who was subbed there, invited me to expand upon my ideas and submit them to his journal. Although I did not know it at the time, my ideas were moving in the same direction as those that finally took shape in Foster's "Marx's Ecology." Basically, I made a strong case for an ecology rooted in Marxist materialism and even pointed out Marx's interest in classical Greek philosophical materialism, a key element of Foster's study. What I didn't know at the time was that Foster and O'Connor were on a collision course around these very questions. So instead of simply telling me that he disagreed with my approach, O'Connor rejected my submission, telling me that CNS readers would not be interested in my rather obscure critique of Harvey's reliance on Leibnizian metaphysics. One got the impression from his correspondence that his readers were too busy chaining themselves to redwood trees or something to bother with philosophy. In reality, O'Connor was not bothered by the abstruseness of the article, but by the politics. If O'Connor was seeking to weed out abstruseness, his first target would have been Costas Panayotakis's "Nature, Dialectics and Emancipatory Politics," one of the attacks on Foster in the June issue, that contains gems such as: "We have therefore arrived at an expanded conception of totality. In this conception any given socio-ecological totality would be analyzed as the complex and dialectical articulation of the economy and the realm of production, family and the realm of reproduction, politics, culture and this society's mode of appropriating nature. Such a view is dialectical without turning dialectics into a metaphysical, transhistorical guarantee of the inherent dynamism of reality. The degree of stability, the contradictions, and the dynamic tendencies of a society cannot be determined a priori but only emerge from a concrete analysis of this society's dialectical structure." If anybody observes me writing such opaque and elephantine constructions, they have permission to take away my computer and then lobotomize me. The first article in the June symposium is so banal that one wonders why O'Connor bothered to include it. Titled "Failed Promise" and co-authored by Maarten de Kadt and Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro, it makes the startling revelation that Marx's ecological analysis revolved around the problem of soil fertility and failed to address such problems as nuclear weapons or PCB's. One wonders why de Kadt and Engel_Di Mauro did not fault Marx for not living into the 1980s. Too much red meat, cheap wine and cigars, one supposes. Alan Rudy's "Marx's Ecology and Rift Analysis" gets to the heart of Foster's study. For Foster, the question of a "metabolic rift" is key not only to understanding Marx, but in developing ecosocialist solutions for today's world. Basically, the metabolic rift was created as a result of the development of cities under capitalism, when the source of organic nutrients in the form of animal or human waste was separated from the soil. It led to "guano wars" in the 19th century, open sewers in the streets of London and a host of other social problems. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx proposed the abolition of the distinction between town and country as a first step toward mending the metabolic rift. Moreover, in the absence of a socialist transformation of the world, every chemical advance to compensate for the loss of soil fertility has led to further contradictions, including the seepage of fertilizers into bodies of water like the Gulf of Mexico, cancer epidemics due to pesticides, etc. For Rudy, "[T]he concept of metabolic rift has a far greater affinity for natural resource economics than the dialectics of ecological Marxism." In contrast, Rudy would shift the discussion away from scientific considerations of natural resource usage altogether--either Marxist or bourgeois. Why? Because, to put it bluntly, he is committed to the kind of anti-scientific prejudices that characterized the Frankfurt School. Foster supposedly subscribes to the "the Baconian conception of an atomized nature." Such a conception "undergirds the assumption that there is one scientific method because, at root, all of nature is comprised of discrete piles of differently arranged, hierarchically organized, though fundamentally similar things." That's odd. In my reading of "Marx's Ecology," I found a steadfast defense of the kind of dialectical understanding of science that you find in Lewontin and Levins. After having declared his affinity for the kind of science spoofed by Alan Sokal in "Social Text," Rudy attempts to refute the concept of metabolic rift by referring to England at the time of the Enclosure Acts. He writes, "The metabolic rift argument suggests that the movement of human and animal waste from the country to the city leads to the accelerated depletion of agricultural soils. However, the increase in rural livestock suggests that the problem may have been as much related to the maldistribution of rural wastes as the separation of rural from urban wastes. The scientific or cultural or infrastructural incapacity to engage in this redistribution of animal waste then would need to be explained." This distinction is next to useless. Marx's concern was not just with the separation of town and city, but the failure of capitalist farming in general, which tended to put short-term profits over long-term social considerations. Maldistribution of rural wastes simply suggests that the English gentry's verbal commitment to "improvement" was at odds with the mode of production. What else is new? Perhaps Rudy's biggest problem is his tendency to assume that the concept of metabolic rift rests upon some kind of binary opposition that was not present in 19th century Europe at all. He writes: "The imagery of rift suggests a chasm between country and city, nature and society, and agriculture and industry. Yet the 19th century is the era of massive road, canal and railroad construction; of extraordinary scientific and technological innovation (only exceeded by the following century); and of phenomenal introductions and migrations of non-native crops, peoples, diseases, and invasive species all multi-directionally across the increasingly accessible globe." What can one say? Rudy simply doesn't get Marx's argument, nor Foster's very effective presentation of that argument. All of the sweeping changes described by Rudy, and which constitute the first part of the Communist Manifesto as well, are simply mechanisms to facilitate the development of the modern urban-based capitalist economy that is the root of our problem. Railroad construction made and makes it possible to separate livestock from their feed sources. The consequences are pig feces filling the rivers and lakes of North Carolina and monoculture production of corn in the Midwest with all the attendant problems. The idea is to reorganize society, not stand breathless in the face of capitalist transportation "miracles." (Unfortunately, Foster has not explored the connections between metabolic rift and the consequences of farming based on nonrenewable energy. More about that anon.) Turning next to Costas Panayotakis's "Nature, Dialectics and Emancipatory Politics," the less said the better. The opening sentences reveal that Panayotakis was simply using Foster's book as a peg to hang his own preoccupations on: "John Bellamy Foster begins Marx's Ecology with an overview of his 'path to ecological materialism.' In this overview the reader is informed that the theoretical legacy of Lukacs and Gramsci, which I had internalized, denied the possibility of the application of dialectical modes of thinking to nature, essentially ceding that entire domain to positivism." Which I had internalized? God, what ugly prose. In plain English, Panayotakis is trying to say that Lukacs and Gramsci can provide a solid philosophical foundation for ecosocialism. And how? He write, "As Lukacs also pointed out in History and Class Consciousness, the transcendence of the socially generated reified experience of the world is only possible from the standpoint of a dialectically conceived totality." Oh, I see. Who needs to look at the problems of metabolic rift or Marx's life-long commitment to materialist thought when you can wrap yourself in quasi-metaphysical blankets such as this. Panayotakis continues: "Lukacs and Gramsci, the other Western Marxist that Foster repeatedly dismisses, were among the first Marxists to analyze social reality not through the use of a simple, mechanical concept of causality but through an exploration of the complex mediations between the different spheres of social life." All that is well and good. But unfortunately, Lukacs and Gramsci were not engaged with *nature*. Panayotakis's article basically boils down to the need to think dialectically, which for CNS readers is equivalent to reminding Readers Digest subscribers to honor the American flag. The final article in the symposium is by Joel Kovel and is titled "A Materialism Worthy of Nature." Basically it is a defense of spirituality in the following vein: "Foster's errors are grounded in a misconception about the meaning of 'spirit.' We can infer (because, as with the Greens, there is no actual critique of the spiritual) that for him, to be 'spiritual' is synonymous with what is anti-scientific, irrational and superstitious, and is merely a kind of rough congener for the pole of 'idealism' in the classic materialism-idealism debate. He fails here to comprehend the distinction between spirit and religion, that spirit is an elementary property of being human, and that religions are the binding of spirit for the purposes of social cohesion. Therefore he also fails to appreciate that there is much more to spirituality than its religious elaboration, and much more to religions than their spiritual impulse." To the contrary, Foster's book is not an attack on spirituality but on developing an analysis of the ecological crisis on other than a scientific and materialist basis. This is in keeping with the record of Marx and Engels, who both paid close attention to scientific matters throughout their life. While the rigorous attempt to develop a dialectics of nature based on the latest scientific findings was identified most often with Engels, Marx supported and consulted on each of these initiatives. Marx considered the soil chemist Van Leibeg to be more important to understanding European society than a dozen economists--in his own words. Marx's Scientific Notebooks have been published recently and lend support to the notion that Marx was a consummate believer in rigorous scientific methods, both in understanding the natural and social world. There is, of course, another question entirely, which Joel appears confused over--namely, the role of spirit or belief in the supernatural in politics and human survival. Despite vulgar Marxist attempts to depict Marx as an "enemy" of religion, he was in fact not hostile to it at all, but merely described it as the necessary response to the cruelties and insecurities of capitalist society. Only after society was changed could the material conditions allow for a more scientific understanding of existence. Furthermore, when the Taiping rebellion in China broke out in 1851, led by Hung Hsiu-ch'?an who saw himself as the younger brother of Jesus Christ, Engels hailed the movement in a letter to Marx. Finally, the British colonists would get their comeuppance. Much of the rest of the article is an attempt to enlist Marx and Engels as possible recruits to the German mystic Jakob Bohme, which is quite a different matter than seeing Marx and Engels as sympathetic to the spiritual yearnings of the disenfranchised. Kovel bases this on a passing reference to Bohme in "Socialism-Scientific and Utopian": "mystic Bohme puts into the German word something of the meaning of the Latin qualitas; his 'qual' was the activating principle arising from, and promoting in its turn, the spontaneous development of the thing, relation, or person subject to it ...." While Kovel admits that something more than this obscure reference might be required before drafting Bohme into the Marxist tradition, one can only say that there are thinkers who are much more adaptable to these purposes, such as Bacon and other materialists who might alienate the romantic yearnings of our Frankfurtish comrades. We do owe them an apology for offending their poetic sensibilities, but must move forward. Let me conclude with my own take on this grand battle between elderly tenured professors who are largely speaking to their own mandarin circles. Most of this discussion would be utterly arcane to the average anti-globalization activist who is trying to address the ecological crisis through direct action. One young correspondent of mine, who has braved tear gas on more than one occasion, told me that he could not get through "Marx's Ecology." Okay, he said, so Marx's roots are in the Greek materialists. How does that help me fight logging in the Amazon rainforest? Ironically, Foster was on the right track with "The Vulnerable Planet," but much more is needed to create a pole of attraction based on Marxism for the new radicals of today. Foster is correct to state that the analysis of the ecological crisis must be rooted in Marxist materialism, but--after having stated this--it is still a task that remains unfulfilled. Just as the scientists of the early Soviet Union came together in state-sponsored academies to apply ecological thinking to the new society, we need to gather together left-oriented physical scientists and Marxist social scientists today to come to grips with the ecological crisis of capitalism. The Worldwatch Institute is a model for what needs to be done, but the effort I am describing will be rooted in historical and scientific materialism rather than Lester Brown's brand of Malthusian liberalism. For this to begin to take place, it will be necessary for leftwing academics to begin to think collectively, a task that very might well be impossible in advance of a political reawakening of the working class. Given the cataclysmic events that have transpired over the past few months, that day may be sooner rather than later despite the grim appearance. After all, shocks to the system have a way of shaking up modes of thinking. Louis Proyect Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org From sherrynstan at igc.org Tue Nov 27 16:13:47 2001 From: sherrynstan at igc.org (sherrynstan at igc.org) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 18:13:47 -0500 Subject: [A-List] ecology and marxism, NOT OR Message-ID: MY REPLIES CAPPED. STAN Tom: yes!!! ' cept I think we *can* forecast, and that Henry's 'prioritizing' must be biocentric, with a case to be made for "anarchy" of a sort. Lest ANYone doubt my sympathies are with Stan's observations, here's from MY bible, and what EYE believe: "We must make this an insecure and inhospitable place for capitalists and their projects . . . We must reclaim the roads and plowed land, halt dam construction, tear down existing dams, free shackled rivers and return to wilderness millions of tens of millions of acres of presently settled land." -- David Foreman, Earth First! I'M FER IT. I ALREADY GOT SOME DAMS AND ROADS IN MIND. SO WE NEED FOR DAVE FOREMAN TO BE GRANTED THE POWER OF A STALIN, TO BREAK THE POWER OF THOSE WHO WILL DEFEND THE DAMS AND ROADS. TOM, I'D GLADLY NOMINATE YOU HIS EXECUTIVE OFFICER, IF I CAN HAVE JUST ONE BRIGADE TO CLEAN THE PLUTOCRATS OUT OF NORTH CAROLINA. Boolean Network [?]: Foreman is such a romantic bourgeois. Species-selfish and ruling group-oriented, only "Nature" higher than Cancer Man. Nothing prevents polluted water being ideal for growing food, or polluted air breathable for the next millennium. Engels despised every aspect of the "rural idiocy." Adequate production for every living person will require numerous concessions to development rather than idylls enjoyed by the rich romantics. To support a world population at present or greater size--make way for some serious and badly needed stench and the chemicals that produce it. Think of trebling the manufacturing base, but that will obviously be insufficient. WHEW! SUCH A HEAVY TASK TO SAVE MARX FROM THESE MARXISTS! LET'S JUST TAKE ONE CALCULATION TO SEE THE MAGNITUDE OF ABSURDITY HERE. HOW MUCH STEEL WILL IT REQUIRE TO EMPLACE THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR A TREBLED GLOBAL MANUFACTURING BASE? OR HOW MUCH PETROLEUM? OR HOW MUCH WATER? CHOSE ONE, THEN GO BACK AND READ WHAT MATERIALISM MEANS. From franka at fiu.edu Tue Nov 27 16:35:15 2001 From: franka at fiu.edu (Andre Gunder Frank) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 18:35:15 -0500 (EST) Subject: [A-List] Re: Liu re Britain to join euro In-Reply-To: <3C03BB01.D0DE1765@mindspring.com> Message-ID: How about looking at it from the other side? WHY is UK the US lapodog -for a long time now, not only with Tony on the leash? Hypothesis [how to ''test'' it? ]: UK wants/needs/ gets/uses US as counterwheight against France and Germany If UK were in the ring alone, how far would it get? gunder ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANDRE GUNDER FRANK Department of History Home University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 Fax: 1-402-472 8839 E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ From tomzbox at hotmail.com Wed Nov 28 00:14:43 2001 From: tomzbox at hotmail.com (Tom Warren) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 00:14:43 Subject: [A-List] ecology and marxism, NOT OR Message-ID: The header says it all. I guess what made me overreact was Mark?s juxtaposition of ?socialism? VS some of us neomalthusian bordgewahzees. (He really does know that?s not the issue.) It?s an AND, not an either/or, as you so aptly have turned the phrase. WRITES STAN: > >Tom: >I'M FER IT. I ALREADY GOT SOME DAMS AND ROADS IN MIND. SO WE NEED FOR >DAVE FOREMAN TO BE GRANTED THE POWER OF A STALIN, TO BREAK THE POWER OF >THOSE WHO WILL DEFEND THE DAMS AND ROADS. replies tom: I was kinda hoping more for a Zhukov, or Lin Piao ? let the scholarly boys on the list get about their economic and political transformations while we do the dirty work, Uruk-Hai like. STAN: TOM, I'D GLADLY NOMINATE YOU HIS EXECUTIVE OFFICER, IF I CAN HAVE JUST ONE BRIGADE TO CLEAN THE PLUTOCRATS OUT OF NORTH CAROLINA. tom: I?d oblige, ?cept right now Shrub seems to be sending the Oregon National Guard to the Sinai Peninsula, fer chrissakes, for a ?mission? lasting until 2003. But when they get back ?. STAN: >WHEW! SUCH A HEAVY TASK TO SAVE MARX FROM THESE MARXISTS! LET'S JUST TAKE >ONE CALCULATION TO SEE THE MAGNITUDE OF ABSURDITY HERE. HOW MUCH STEEL >WILL IT REQUIRE TO EMPLACE THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR A TREBLED GLOBAL >MANUFACTURING BASE? OR HOW MUCH PETROLEUM? OR HOW MUCH WATER? CHOSE ONE, >THEN GO BACK AND READ WHAT MATERIALISM MEANS. Ya know ol' "boolean" is correct in a way, we *could* adapt the species until we can breathe CO2 and methane residues. There's some new work in gene-splicing. Personal secret: My "home" list was originally the Lord of the Rings NG,(I see nods of non-surprise all over the list!) where we had a sign erected at the cyber-entrance: "Please don't feed the trolls" be well everbody, tom (Near some trees and dams in Oregon.) _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp From franka at fiu.edu Tue Nov 27 17:22:39 2001 From: franka at fiu.edu (Andre Gunder Frank) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 19:22:39 -0500 (EST) Subject: [A-List] selections from Andre Gunder Frank's ReORIENT In-Reply-To: <5.1.0.14.2.20011127195412.00ac27c8@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Message-ID: WHAT IS THIS? Why are you bathering us with this stuff. I already read that long ago - in even newer and better versions - and dont need it no more. neither does anybody else on this list [here we have an example of the problems posed by a NOT referred list]. lets get back to business. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANDRE GUNDER FRANK Department of History Home University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 Fax: 1-402-472 8839 E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ From tomzbox at hotmail.com Wed Nov 28 00:26:11 2001 From: tomzbox at hotmail.com (Tom Warren) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 00:26:11 Subject: [A-List] Jim Blaut on Frank v. Landes Message-ID: Jim Blaut is quoted as: >..... or 5000 years ago (Jones, Mann,Hall,Wittfogel, et al.), something, or >some things, that propelled Europe and only Europe forward toward later >modernization. This, of course, is the >conventional position. I think it has in it a large dose of Eurocentric >folklore. For every trait in ancient or medieval Europe that seems to be >part of the explanation for Europe's later rise (relative to >other>civilizations), I think you find either that (1) the trait was also >presentin non-Europe, or (2) the trait was not really all that progressive, >or all that pregnant with implications for later progress, or (3) the >traitcould be balanced off against some trait of non-Europe which was >equally pregnant with implications for later development. The problem here >is what I call "tunnel history." << Mark, Damn, this would be a really great opportunity to quote large slices of Jared Diamond's "Guns Germs and Steel"; but since I assume everyone has already memorized it, this reminder will have to suffice. There are in fact considerable arguments to be made from a bioregional perspective that Europe was a bit more pregnant than most. Diamond's analysis of Pizarro and the Incas sheds lots of light ... tom _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp From franka at fiu.edu Tue Nov 27 17:43:33 2001 From: franka at fiu.edu (Andre Gunder Frank) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 19:43:33 -0500 (EST) Subject: [A-List] Re: EH.N: All-Ohio Economic History Seminar presents David Landes LIVE on web In-Reply-To: <5.1.0.14.2.20011127193751.00add340@pop3.freeserve.net> Message-ID: I can present my friend DAVID even MORE LIVEly than that in the form of a C-Span video broadcast ''live'' nationwide and now available from them for the royal sum of 30 bucks. Therein dear David makes eminently clear that he does not know the first thing about China, and what he knows about the West is ALL WRONG. What I can say for David is that his showmanship is excellent and charming [as he is himself], so much so that he manages to bamboozle his audience. Happy days. gunder p.s, my review of his book is available on my web page [and his of mine in the Journal of Econ Hist]. And in case you have neither time nor pleasure to tune in on OSU or Landes/Frank, I can offer you a selction of what dear David has to say about China. Let him then speak for himself, Although Landes writes "anyone who wants to understand world economic history must study China," [23] his 'study' finds that [every word hereinafter is a direct quote from his book] the Chinese lacked range, focus, and above all, curiosity; they were a culturally and intellectually homeostatic society that could live with little change; they had indifference to technology, technological and scientific torpor; lacked institutions for finding and learning [in the world's most literate society!]; abhorred mercantile success, and were not motivated by greed and passion. They showed deliberate introversion, isolationism, risk aversion, irrationality, xenophobia, arrogance, haughtiness, stunned submissiveness, self-defeating escapism; were insecure and brittle, and so on and on ------------- QED ! ? Alas, although David's prose about the Rise of the West is less high-flying than it is about China, his rendition of it is equally base-less ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANDRE GUNDER FRANK Department of History Home University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 Fax: 1-402-472 8839 E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ From hliu at mindspring.com Tue Nov 27 18:00:25 2001 From: hliu at mindspring.com (Henry C.K. Liu) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 20:00:25 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Re: Liu re Britain to join euro References: Message-ID: <3C043729.676C315C@mindspring.com> France was not a contender until after she pulled out of Algeria and Vietnam. Germany got the most from the US once its agreed to let the occupation continue into a US base for the Cold War and became contended with being handed in return a manufacturing market that the US no longer needs or wants. Germany was able to demand more precisely because Britian was already in the bag. For a brief moment, after Churchill was dismissed by British voters in 1945, Labour had a chance to become a freind if not the leader of the non-aligned camp, which was composed mostly of former British colonies under Third World statesmen trained by Oxbridge and the LSE. Bevin, who long advocated economic integration of the British Commonwealth, was a hero to most Third World leaders until he bought into NATO. Alas, British Labour was defeated by a electorate that hungered for US handouts which were expected to flow more freely under the Conservatives. The world would have been very different if British Labour were to be able to hold the empire together as a new commonwealth of social democratic states. The Cold War would then be a positive struggle for the hearts of minds of the world's poor, rather than a power struggle between two superpowers in the name of ideology. But instead, Britian became a water boy of US neo-imperialism and turned over her former colonies to the CIA, all for a few truck loads of cheese. The British failure to fulfill her post war destiny allowed Germany to emerged as the leader of a social democratic EU. In place of contiuned greatness, Britian vbecame a purveyor of pop culture. The British Empire, having gone through a century of its initial oppressive phase was ready to enter a benevolent phase for another century. But it disintegrated before the benvolent phase had a chance to blosom and was replaced by US neo-liberal neo-imperialism. Five decades later, with much bloodshed and misery, a new world order may finally emerge from under US hegemony. Henry C.K. Liu Andre Gunder Frank wrote: > How about looking at it from the other side? > > WHY is UK the US lapodog -for a long time now, not only with Tony on the > leash? > Hypothesis [how to ''test'' it? ]: > UK wants/needs/ gets/uses US as counterwheight against France and Germany > If UK were in the ring alone, how far would it get? > gunder > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > ANDRE GUNDER FRANK > Department of History Home > University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street > 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 > P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA > Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 > Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 > Fax: 1-402-472 8839 > E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ > From lnp3 at panix.com Tue Nov 27 19:32:21 2001 From: lnp3 at panix.com (Louis Proyect) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 21:32:21 -0500 Subject: [A-List] From Alan Spector (response to Foster-O'Connor) Message-ID: <200111280231.VAA23036@apakabar.cc.columbia.edu> You are probably quite familiar with this book. Maybe not. Before he went somewhat wacko into the world beyond this world, the physicist David Bohm wrote a short book ("Causality and Chance in Modern Physics") explaining some elementals of quantum mechanics and particle physics as was understood about 50 years ago. While Bohm has since moved into spiritualism, and while some of the particulars of the book might not hold up, it is, in my less than expert opinion, one of the best discussions of dialectical materialism one can find. And it never uses any Marxist language. The inability of so many "Marxianistic" professors to grasp the relationship between contingency and necessity continues to amaze me and convince me that what is operating is often ego rather than ignorance. Even serious mainstream, bourgeois scientists, including those with an elementary understanding of probability and statistics often demonstrate better understanding of these issues than some of the Marxianistic professors. In any case, if you don't know the book, you might check it out.....(with a critical eye, of course)...... Alan S. -- Louis Proyect, lnp3 at panix.com on 11/27/2001 Marxism list: http://www.marxmail.org From franka at fiu.edu Tue Nov 27 21:16:43 2001 From: franka at fiu.edu (Andre Gunder Frank) Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 23:16:43 -0500 (EST) Subject: [A-List] Jim Blaut on Frank v. Landes In-Reply-To: Message-ID: before your proceed with your Diamond is for ever enthusiasm, your better read the Blaut [!] chapter on Diamond in Jim's EIGHT EUROCENTRIC HISTORIANS. funny how even the most BIG/long/globalist [eg also Graeme Snooks - see my review if you wish -] people shed their mantle and return to Eurocentric square 1 the moment they get as far as telling us why the west rose. Diamond alas, as Jim showed, is one of them. On Wed, 28 Nov 2001, Tom Warren wrote: > Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 00:26:11 > From: Tom Warren > Reply-To: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu > To: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: Re: [A-List] Jim Blaut on Frank v. Landes > > > Jim Blaut is quoted as: > > >..... or 5000 years ago (Jones, Mann,Hall,Wittfogel, et al.), something, or > >some things, that propelled Europe and only Europe forward toward later > >modernization. This, of course, is the > >conventional position. I think it has in it a large dose of Eurocentric > >folklore. For every trait in ancient or medieval Europe that seems to be > >part of the explanation for Europe's later rise (relative to > >other>civilizations), I think you find either that (1) the trait was also > >presentin non-Europe, or (2) the trait was not really all that progressive, > >or all that pregnant with implications for later progress, or (3) the > >traitcould be balanced off against some trait of non-Europe which was > >equally pregnant with implications for later development. The problem here > >is what I call "tunnel history." << > > Mark, > Damn, this would be a really great opportunity to quote large slices of > Jared Diamond's "Guns Germs and Steel"; but since I assume everyone has > already memorized it, this reminder will have to suffice. There are in fact > considerable arguments to be made from a bioregional perspective that Europe > was a bit more pregnant than most. Diamond's analysis of Pizarro and the > Incas sheds lots of light ... > > tom > > _________________________________________________________________ > Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANDRE GUNDER FRANK Department of History Home University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 Fax: 1-402-472 8839 E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ From tomzbox at hotmail.com Wed Nov 28 06:21:05 2001 From: tomzbox at hotmail.com (Tom Warren) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 06:21:05 Subject: [A-List] Jim Blaut on Frank v. Landes Message-ID: >before your proceed with your Diamond is for ever enthusiasm, your >better read the Blaut [!] chapter on Diamond in Jim's >EIGHT EUROCENTRIC HISTORIANS. > >funny how even the most BIG/long/globalist [eg also Graeme Snooks - see >my review if you wish -] people shed their mantle and return to >Eurocentric square 1 the moment they get as far as telling us why the >west rose. Diamond alas, as Jim showed, is one of them. Yeah, if one points out that the West rose, that IS prima face evidence of eurocentrism. I've always taken Diamond at his word that New Guinea was where his "centricity" lay. It will be interesting to read Blaut. Can you direct me to your review? Having a bit 'o trouble accessing it via your website. best, tom _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Wed Nov 28 00:47:02 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 07:47:02 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: The Iraqi Klondike Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011128074604.02e509a8@pop.tiscali.co.uk> [forward from Ian Murray] < http://www.merip.org/mer/mer220/220_alkadiri.html > The Iraqi Klondike Oil and Regional Trade Raad Alkadiri (Raad Alkadiri is senior country risk analyst for the Petroleum Finance Company. The views expressed here are his own.) Talk of a "new Middle East" was very much in vogue in the early 1990s. With a seeming Pax Americana reigning over the region after the Gulf war, and with Israel and its neighbors apparently nearing a comprehensive settlement, it looked as if economic interests, not political rivalries, would underpin ties among the states of the Middle East. Shimon Peres, one vocal proponent of the "new Middle East," envisioned that Israel would sit at the center of an integrated economic zone that would include US allies in the Arab east and the Gulf. Meanwhile, the Clinton administration devised "dual containment" to isolate Washington's foes Iran and Iraq politically and economically from the new integrated region. In Iran, the US hoped that "dual containment" would blunt the force of the Islamic revolution. In Iraq, the goal was even more ambitious: regime change. Ironically, today it is not Israel but Iraq that is emerging as a regional trade hub, and using economic relations to normalize relations with former enemies. Cleverly taking advantage of opportunities provided by the UN Oil-for-Food program?while always opposing the system in principle?Baghdad has contributed to the failure of dual containment, and made itself a factor in the economic decision-making of its neighbors. The Iraqi government will not be able to achieve its ultimate goal?lifting the eleven-year old US-led sanctions?purely through fostering trade. But Iraq's deepening economic ties with its neighbors have cooled the Arab states considerably on US efforts to remove Saddam Hussein's regime. Taking Advantage of Little Things If the Iraqi government has learned anything over the past decade, it is surely to appreciate the power of economic persuasion. Despite the most onerous international sanctions in modern history, Saddam Hussein's regime has not only survived, it has used the strait-jacket to its own political advantage. Most of its trade is still carefully monitored, and most of its revenues go into a UN-controlled escrow account, but Iraq has made itself financially relevant to a host of countries in the Middle East and further afield. In doing so, Baghdad has given itself a means of influencing policy to its own advantage in nearby capitals, enhancing the prospects that the regime will survive and that, just possibly, sanctions could one day be lifted on something resembling Baghdad's terms. Iraq's influence was demonstrated quite clearly in the debate over introducing "smart sanctions" through the UN Security Council. A host of strategic calculations were involved in Moscow's threat to veto the US-backed British proposals, many of them not at all related to Iraq. No country will risk its long-term relationship with the US simply on the basis of the promise of contracts that may not see the light of day and debts that will probably never be repaid. Nevertheless, as Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said openly in a letter to the Bush administration, commercial calculations were involved. (1) Moscow was not alone in its thinking. In opposing smart sanctions, Jordan, Turkey and Syria all pointed to the damage their economies would suffer if Baghdad lived up to its threat and responded to a new resolution by suspending trade with them. The UN proposals designed to allay these fears?by compensating the "front-line" states for lost trade?merely reinforced the impression of Iraq's commercial importance in the region. Baghdad's refusal of the new mechanism was a factor that front-line states needed to consider. The reaction of Jordan, Turkey and Syria to smart sanctions seems to vindicate those officials and technocrats in Baghdad who argued in the mid-1990s that the Iraqi government could gradually breach the embargo and ultimately dismantle it, by accepting the Oil-for-Food deal. This logic was a hard sell: senior decision-makers, not least Saddam Hussein, had previously been adamantly opposed to UN proposals for limited oil sales. The regime did not believe that sanctions were sustainable, and saw no reason to accept the UN offer. In fact, they suspected?justifiably?that Oil-for-Food was designed by the US and Britain to blunt progress toward the eventual lifting of sanctions. Only the political backlash that followed Hussein Kamil's defection in August 1995 (which forced Baghdad to reveal the extent of its biological weapons program), combined with the fiscal crisis later that year, convinced the Iraqi regime to accept the UN offer in principle. Even then, it took almost a year of difficult negotiations between Iraq and the UN to work out the details of the new system. Defenders of sanctions claim that Baghdad deliberately hoards humanitarian relief supplies to heighten the suffering of Iraqi civilians and raise international pressure to end sanctions. Whatever the truth of these allegations, it is dubious at best to conclude?as the US State Department does?that the regime is solely responsible for civilian suffering under sanctions. Many UN officials on the ground have said that delays in delivery of goods to Iraq and holds on import contracts contribute significantly to the disruptions in supply.(2) This debate aside, it is true that since finally acquiescing to Oil-for-Food, Baghdad has adroitly exploited the program to promote its political objectives. Manipulating Oil Exports The regime's efforts are most evident in its policies toward trade. On the export side, Iraq has from time to time cut or reduced oil supplies in order to influence UN Security Council decision-making. The first major suspension of oil exports came in November-December 1999, when the government tried but failed to block Security Council resolution 1284, which renewed sanctions.(3) Oil sales were stopped again in December 2000 as a result of a dispute with the UN over Iraq's insistence on imposing illicit surcharges on oil companies with contracts to purchase Iraqi crude. Baghdad's most recent use of the "oil weapon" took place in June and early July of this year, when the Iraqis halted supplies in protest over plans to introduce smart sanctions. The regime has also resorted to partial disruptions of oil sales as a policy tool. In early 2000, it reduced exports in protest at the delayed delivery of spare parts for the oil sector, claiming that previous levels of around 2.2 million barrels per day could not be maintained without permanently damaging its fields. The supply of goods was subsequently speeded up through the introduction of a new UN procedure, and Iraqi exports returned to their previous levels. Whether suspending or reducing supplies, the aim has been the same: to use the threat of higher oil prices or supply uncertainty to influence UN decision-making. As experience has shown, this tactic has not always been successful. For one thing, Iraq cannot always determine the timing of political crises, and consequently has used the "oil weapon" at times when the balance of supply and demand in the market has meant that the impact on prices has not been severe. Further, markets have begun to anticipate the "Iraq risk" in advance, and are aware that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are willing to step in to ensure that oil supplies do not drop too far. Both these factors mean that Iraq has often had less impact on prices that it would have liked; indeed, crude prices actually fell in December 2000 despite the loss of Iraqi exports. In addition to manipulating its exports, Iraq has awarded oil sales contracts with any eye toward politics, giving more and more contracts to companies whose governments pursue policies favorable to Baghdad. Russian, French and Chinese firms have all featured prominently on the list of recognized companies lifting Iraqi crude. Baghdad's recent announcement that Russian companies would get priority in the latest phase of Oil-for-Food comes directly after Moscow played the key role in blocking smart sanctions.(4) By contrast, the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization has for some time refused to sell crude directly to all but a small number of Dutch, British and US companies (although around 700,000-800,000 barrels per day of Iraqi crude still wind up on the US market). Allure of the Iraqi Market Baghdad has manipulated its import policy much like its oil contracts, but arguably with greater long-term success. By being selective with its official purchases under the Oil-for-Food program and its smuggling efforts, the Iraqi government has reestablished important trade relations that have served it well politically. The UN's Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) recently published revealing figures: the lion's share of import contracts over the past four years have gone to French, Russian and Chinese companies, whose governments have been the most sympathetic among the veto-wielding Security Council members to Baghdad's cause. Collectively, these firms accounted for $5.48 billion of the $18.29 billion of import contracts approved by the UN since 1997.(5) More interesting still has been Baghdad's recent strategy of using import contracts to cement its relations with regional states. According to the UN figures, trade with four states in particular has increased significantly over the past few years: Turkey, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt. The value of approved contracts with Egyptian suppliers rose from $105 million in 1997 to almost $1 billion last year. The UAE saw an equally impressive jump, from $24 million in 1997 to over $500 million in 2000.(6) Part of this increase is accounted for by the UN's decision to lift financial limits on Iraqi oil exports in 1999, as well as the gradual expansion of the range of goods the UN has classified as "humanitarian" (two moves that have helped Iraq's trade-driven political strategy). Nevertheless, the trade pattern also reflects a clear Iraqi strategy: last year, companies from these states accounted for almost 30 percent of all approved contracts, compared to just over 20 percent during 1997, the first year of the Oil-for-Food program. Moreover, many of the contracts awarded to these states are on "fast track": they concern humanitarian goods that are approved semi-automatically by the UN Secretariat. Just how much this trade policy, and Baghdad's clever use of smuggling, has contributed to rising support in Cairo, Abu Dhabi and elsewhere for a lifting of sanctions is open to debate. Clearly, other factors have been important, including Washington's failure to quell escalating Israeli-Palestinian violence and the angry reaction of the Arab "street" to Iraqi civilian suffering under the embargo. Latent fears about Iranian intentions in the Gulf have prompted calls from some Gulf states for renewed ties with Iraq. Nevertheless, the allure of the Iraqi market has undoubtedly helped to focus attention on Baghdad. As the volume of trade with Iraq has grown, states in the region have been ever more anxious to maintain the good will of the Iraqi regime.(7) This in turn has reinforced pressure for a normalization of relations with Saddam Hussein's government. Limits of Iraqi Persuasion The Iraqi strategy has not yet succeeded in encouraging any state to disregard completely the international sanctions regime, and resume completely normal relations with Baghdad. Even Iraq's closest trading partners do more than pay lip service to the UN embargo: they may flout certain aspects of the sanctions regime, but none has yet been willing to defy openly and absolutely the Security Council-imposed restrictions. Indeed, much of the unraveling of sanctions that has taken place over the past year, such as the resumption of civilian air flights to Iraq, has been of marginal impact. The restrictions that matter most to Baghdad, and to Washington?namely UN control over Iraqi export revenues and prohibitions on military and dual-use imports?remain in place. The Iraqi government is receiving some direct revenue from smuggling crude and oil products to neighboring states, but the volumes of contraband and the amount of money Baghdad receives for it are probably far lower than many commentators have suggested. Exact figures are unknown, but net revenue may total no more than $1.5 billion annually,(8) particularly as Iraq needs to sell the oil at well below market value to get buyers, and is forced to pay surcharges to ensure safe supply.(9) While significant, this revenue is a pittance compared to the Iraqi oil revenue that ends up in the escrow account (roughly $18 billion in 2000). Given the regime's need to maintain loyalty to survive, smuggling revenue probably gets spread among a much wider circle than is often suggested. The reason that sanctions have survived so long is that, while there is clearly opposition to the embargo in certain countries and an awareness of the commercial gold mine that Iraq represents, no one quite trusts the Iraqi regime. More importantly, Baghdad cannot offer anything worth the cost of openly confronting the US over Iraq. Russia, China, France and even Syria have been willing to take some risks, but these moves are more a signal of overall discontent with US foreign policy than a sign of an imminent shift towards disregarding sanctions altogether. The sanctions-busters, even Russia, have ultimately played it safe. Moscow may have scuppered the first US attempt to introduce smart sanctions, but it has been careful to emphasize that it will not break completely with the international community on Iraq. Nor has Russia guaranteed that it will block a renewed effort to introduce the new system later this year.(10) Floating on a Sea of Oil Baghdad is aware of these limits on its trade strategy, and its frustration is palpable. Nowhere has this been clearer than in the oil sector. Since the end of the Gulf war, the Iraqi government has hoped that the offer of access to its vast oil wealth would induce countries to defy sanctions. The international oil industry regards Iraq as one of the ultimate prizes on offer in the world today. Iraq's 112 billion barrels of proven crude reserves are second only to Saudi Arabia's worldwide. Given that no one has done geological surveys in Iraq for decades, the actual figure could be higher?oil-in-place is estimated to be closer to 250 billion barrels. Much of Iraq's discovered oil remains undeveloped. Of the 70-plus fields that have been discovered, only 15 have been developed to date. The remaining fields include eight with reserves over one billion barrels each. In total, there are almost 5 million barrels per day of estimated production waiting to be developed in discovered fields, most of it "easy oil" close to the surface and cheap to extract. Furthermore, Iraq has large unexplored areas in the Western Desert and the northwest that could be oil-rich. Little wonder that some in the oil industry say Iraq is floating on a sea of oil. Recognizing how attractive its oil sector is to international oil companies, the Iraqi government shifted policy significantly in mid-1991. Henceforth Iraq would offer foreign firms direct investment and crude production opportunities in its previously closed oil industry. Baghdad thought this offer would undermine sanctions quickly. But while a stream of international oil companies have traipsed to Iraq to discuss what is on offer, wariness of the international embargo has prevented many deals from being signed. A Russian consortium led by Lukoil concluded an agreement for the giant West Qurna field (with estimated reserves of 11 billion barrels) in 1997, and the Chinese National Petroleum Company was awarded a deal for the al-Ahdab field the same year. Other than that, international firms have shied away from concluding formal contracts with Baghdad, including France's TotalFinaElf, which has engaged in long negotiations for the Majnoon and Nahr bin Omar fields (which contain combined estimated reserves of over 18 billion barrels). Iraq's Russian and Chinese partners have refused to begin significant work on their fields while sanctions remain in place, much to the dismay of Iraqi officials, who have repeatedly threatened to withdraw the awards. Despite their reluctance, and Iraq's subsequent decision to shift its investment offer from production-sharing agreements to less lucrative "buy-back" service contracts, most foreign oil companies maintain tremendous interest in investing in the country once the UN permits it. Even the most demure oil executive is unlikely to shun dealings with the existing Iraqi government if the embargo on oil investments is removed while it remains in power. The Iraqi oil sector stands to be the great "Klondike" of the early twenty-first century. This black gold rush, when it happens, will only reinforce Iraq's emerging position as a major trade hub in the Middle East. If Saddam Hussein's government is in place, oil development will contribute significantly to its survival?which is precisely why Washington and London oppose unfettered foreign investment in the Iraqi oil industry at present.(11) Merely the prospect of the opening has bolstered the Iraqi regime, providing it with an important political lifeline to the outside world over the past decade. Many countries are forced to ask themselves whether a change of regime will diminish the economic benefits that dealing with the present government presents, and whether they want to pay these costs. In purely economic terms, further normalizing relations with Baghdad, and cementing bilateral economic relations, is an attractive option. A Regime Rehabilitated? Saddam Hussein's regime does not like the Oil-for-Food program, but this has not stopped it from using the deal to its own political advantage, assisted of course by a willing clientele of trading partners. By targeting the award of import and export contracts, the regime has positioned Iraq as an important focus for regional trade and tied its own fortunes to local and international states. This has contributed to the survival of the regime, and ultimately to its gradual rehabilitation. Indeed, by "hard-wiring" itself to its neighbors via regional trade, the Iraqi government has made it much more difficult for the international community to impose sanctions on the country with impunity. Baghdad's opinion is important to a growing number of states. As the volume of trade has grown, so the costs of upsetting the Iraqi government have risen for these countries. The concern for many states in the Middle East is now not whether to deal with Baghdad, but rather whether Baghdad will deal with them. The Bush administration insists that smart sanctions are not dead. This autumn will witness another UK-led campaign to get UN Security Council approval for the new system; talks are already underway behind the scenes in New York. However, in the absence of some major long-term financial aid package to countries like Syria, Jordan and Turkey, their support for the sanctions package will remain lukewarm at best, and the likelihood that they will implement the new embargo is low. Washington's other alternative?regime change?is even less popular with the frontline states, for reasons of both regional public opinion and trade ties. In the longer term, unless Baghdad suspends its cooperation fully with the UN Oil-for-Food program, its economic magnetism is only likely to grow. The more the regime can turn Iraq's lucrative commercial and oil-producing potential into active trade relationships, the stronger its position will be. While the promise of the Iraqi Klondike may not lead to a full and formal lifting of sanctions, and may do little to ameliorate the humanitarian crisis in Iraq, it will certainly make efforts to contain the Iraqi regime more difficult. Endnotes 1 Washington Post, July 26, 2001. 2 See Hans Von Sponeck, "Squeezed to Death," The Guardian, March 4, 2000. This point was stressed in personal communications between the author and numerous officials at UNICEF and the UN's Office of the Iraq Program. 3 The Iraqi pressure was, however, sufficient to ensure that the Security Council mandated a rollover of the Oil-for-Food program separately from 1284. Hence Iraq could resume oil exports without acquiescing formally to the continuation of sanctions. 4 Reuters, July 17, 2001. 5 These figures come from a document listing the full history of Iraq's contract requests that appeared briefly on the OIP website earlier this year. The list, which includes details of which contracts were approved or put on hold, can be found on the Uncoveriraq.com website at: http://home.att.net/~drew.hamre/docUNXLS.htm 6 Ibid. 7 In mid-July, Baghdad announced it would prefer Syrian firms for import contracts under the present phase of the Oil-for-Food program, because Damascus opposed the smart sanctions proposals. The Jordan Times, July 16, 2001. 8 This estimate assumes illicit exports of around 150,000 barrels per day (b/d) via Syria, 70,000-100,000 b/d via Turkey and around 50,000 b/d via Iran and the Gulf, sold at roughly half the market price for Iraqi crude. Exports to Jordan, which total approximately 90,000 b/d of oil and oil products, are part of a deal that has been approved by the UN since 1991, and are not counted here as smuggling. 9 It is not only the Iraqis and the end users that profit from these arrangements. Individuals linked to Masoud Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) allegedly benefit financially from a deal with Baghdad that ensures the secure movement of contraband oil products to Turkey. Companies linked to the KDP are also suspected of receiving legitimate contracts to lift Iraqi oil under the Oil-for-Food program, as a result of the leadership's smuggling relationship with Baghdad. The battle over control of oil smuggling revenue has contributed to periodic internecine fighting between the KDP and its rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which has left the autonomous Kurdish regions of Iraq divided into two cantons. Meanwhile, since September 1999, Turkey has imposed a tax on oil products smuggled across its southern border with Iraq, which earned it a reported $23.5 million in the first four months of operation. Reuters, January 4, 2000. 10 Even the Russian draft proposal put forward in late June during the debate over smart sanctions did not call for an unconditional lifting of sanctions, but rather for a negotiated agreement that would allow UN weapons inspectors to return to Iraq under the formula outlined in UN Security Council resolution 1284. Russia has continued to pursue this approach since smart sanctions were postponed. See the details of a letter from President Vladimir Putin to Saddam Hussein reported by Reuters, July 18, 2001. 11 During the discussions about smart sanctions in June 2001, France proposed a draft resolution that would allow foreign investment in the Iraqi oil industry, as did the aforementioned Russian draft. The Russians proposed that controls over Baghdad's access to its oil revenue be lifted simultaneously, which would be necessary for Iraq to even consider allowing foreign investment while some form of sanctions remain in place. From cburford at gn.apc.org Tue Nov 27 23:58:50 2001 From: cburford at gn.apc.org (Chris Burford) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 06:58:50 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Liu re Britain to join euro In-Reply-To: <3C043729.676C315C@mindspring.com> References: Message-ID: <4.3.2.7.1.20011128063939.030f78e0@pop3.norton.antivirus> At 27/11/01 20:00 -0500, you wrote: >Britian became a water boy >of US neo-imperialism and turned over her former colonies to the CIA, all >for a >few truck loads of cheese. The British failure to fulfill her post war >destiny >allowed Germany to emerged as the leader of a social democratic EU. In place >of contiuned greatness, Britian vbecame a purveyor of pop culture. > >The British Empire, having gone through a century of its initial oppressive >phase was ready to enter a benevolent phase for another century. But it >disintegrated before the benvolent phase had a chance to blosom and was >replaced by US neo-liberal neo-imperialism. Five decades later, with much >bloodshed and misery, a new world order may finally emerge from under US >hegemony. Yes it is not just Tony Blair. The "special relationship" has been a contradictory thing that suited successive British Prime Ministers as a cover for Britain's declining power. As this has progressed Britain is more obviously trying to play off the US versus "Europe" of which it is still not really a part. But I think there is a change. Perhaps the objective cause is the establishment of the euro. Despite its relatively low exchange rate the unification of the currencies of 11(?) has been technically successful. Also the EU politicians are increasingly experienced in coordinating their responses. It may also be subjective factors in Blair who combines a sense of strategy with dedicated attention to short term perceptions. In the first weeks after Sep 11 he was the leader of the capitalist world, shaping perceptions. But his agenda was not the same as Bush's. He knows from Ireland that modern governments must negotiate with "terrorists". So the British used the Coalition against Terror as an opportunity for an initiative in Palestine, and Iran. There were allowed to proceed with Iran. As the war unfolds in Afghanistan however it is clear that Britain is marginalised by the US. I have been surprised by the strength and timing of Blair's statements about moving towards the euro at his Labour conference speech and last week. I think it must be that he is shrewd enough to know that Britain does not in fact have much of a separate role and its ability to play a balancing act will be stronger from within euroland than without. He also partly believes his own ideology that more can be achieved by cooperation than by contest, and like Gordon Brown, he believes that he can be influential on a world stage. He is now cultivating a climate of expectations about how the question of the euro will be addressed in Britain, and I think one has to agree that over at the most a ten year period, it is likely that Euroland will include Britain. This will have an effect on the pattern of global power structures. Chris Burford From cburford at gn.apc.org Wed Nov 28 00:09:58 2001 From: cburford at gn.apc.org (Chris Burford) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 07:09:58 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Market of last resort In-Reply-To: <3C03BB01.D0DE1765@mindspring.com> References: <4.3.2.7.1.20011127071133.032f8220@pop3.norton.antivirus> Message-ID: <4.3.2.7.1.20011128065915.03157cb0@pop3.norton.antivirus> At 27/11/01 11:10 -0500, Henry C.K. Liu wrote: >The US market is no longer a market of last resort. The former Third >World is, led by China and South East Asia. I think this is very interesting and important. From 1997 the pragmatic assumption in western capitalist circles was that the US was the market of last resort. Therefore there should be coordinated reductions in the state interest rates without putting pressure on the USA to alter its hegemonic practices in the global financial system. Yes it is true that China is continuing to grow. Taiwan has just given up all serious efforts to stay out of its gravitational field. Japan remains stalled and is both attracted and fearful of being drawn in to the gravitational field of China. Meanwhile discussions are proceeding on a massive 1.8 billion south east asia free trade area. But in view of the lower standard of living is this large enough in commercial terms to become the new "spender of last resort" for the global economy. Could it become the "engine" for the world economy pulling it out of recession? And if that is technically possible, how long would it take for perceptions to shift to take this fact on board? Because that would be crucial for really undermining the global economic privileges of US imperialism. Chris Burford London From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Wed Nov 28 01:01:58 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 08:01:58 +0000 Subject: [A-List] money-fundamentalists on Inflation or Deflation? 1of3 Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011128075501.00ae3398@pop.tiscali.co.uk> [Intro to 3 articles: while mainstream economists (for this purpose, Greenspan IS the mainstream) worry about deflation, gold-fanatics and other monetarist types, whom often have a good track recordin of predicting what's about to happen to financial markets: are more worried about the resurgence of INFLATION. They point to such things as weird goings on in bond markets, the renewed Wall Street bubble (more irrational than ever!) and above all, the surreally low price of GOLD. They argue this is because of a conspiracy, spearheaded by the so-called Plunge Protection Team consisting of Greenspan and Bushies, to keep the dollar high at all costs. In this view, we have now entered full Alice in Wonderland, where the markets, currency values, the price of gold and long bonds, does not relfect anything in the real economy; the latter is in deep slump, but hovering above it is a vast shimmering city of false money, fraud, and state-back Ponzi schemes, which is what Wall St now is. The future? Look to the past: the last time (the money-fundamentalists argue) that it was this bad was in Germany in 1923, and what happened then was the worst runaway inflation ever in history. Mark] 11/22 David Morgan - Dollar.com Dollar.com Dollar dot com, is the story of the most famous currency in world history. Some of you may be old enough to remember the statements: Good as Gold, or "Sound as a Dollar." These were references to the stability and integrity of the almighty US Dollar. Alas, those days are long gone and it is much more than a pity. It most likely will turn out to be the greatest financial debacle in all of recorded history. In this essay, it will be attempted as always to first get the reader to think, and secondly to question the very basis of their belief system. Most of the readers on this web site will be able to read rapidly past the first several paragraphs because it is subject matter well understood by most here. However, the foundation must be established because my purpose in not to educate or arouse this readership, rather my aim is to write and essay of such substance that it will be sent around the internet to those that at this time do not understand what is happening but have an eerie feeling that all is not right with the world, and in particular the financial system. The purpose of the title is so some will be intrigued by the title enough to read this entire dissertation. Perhaps a good place to start is to give the reader a little human interest. It first became very clear to my logic based training that for man to prosper and establish a process of mutual benefit certain facts had to be acknowledged. Notice, I stated acknowledged not established. In other words, it must be acknowledged that in order to build a house or factory, travel the speed limit, or purchase meat by the pound, all parties involved needed to acknowledge the fact that a constant is involved. A foot remains a foot whether the house was built in 1910 or 2001. Miles per hour remain the same whether riding a horse or driving a Lexus. And a pound of hamburger is identical in weight to a pound of butter. It is important to note that at one time a dollar equaled a dollar! Yes believe it or not, at one time a dollar was a constant. Then a funny thing happened on the way to reality. The international monetary agreements of the 1920's, provided that a nation could count the holdings of redeemable foreign currencies as monetary reserve assets. This meant that such currencies could be used in international payments in place of gold and for sometime was considered "As good as Gold." France decided that if one were as good as the other why not go for reality and take the gold. What happened next is well known, the gold window was closed in August 1971. Mr. Nixon was given the advise, the dollar reserves (read gold) were being drained at a rate unacceptable to the United States. The U. S. could find a way to expand the money supply but not increase the supply of gold at the same rate. Slam shut the gold window and away we go into financial waters tested many times before. The Lessons of Paper Money are legion. China, the French Assignats, Weimar Germany, Italy post WWII, Brazil, Argentina, and on and on. Now however the paper money game was for much bigger stakes. Since the dollar was revered to be as good as gold until that August day, many Foreign banks held dollars as reserves. Now for the first time in world history the reserve currency was backed by the Full Faith and Credit of the Government. In other words, the governments ability to borrow and faith that enough people would never catch on to the ultimate result of a fiat money system run by a private corporation. Since that time the dollar has experienced a good roller coaster ride, at times being beat up in the currency market and at times being the King of the currency market. The most difficult aspect is the extreme price volatility it introduces into markets. Look only as far as the stock market, talk about volatility. The inflation of the past several years poured into the equity market. Hence the inflation was verified as real in stock prices. Just as the buyers of many dotcoms learned that putting faith in something without intrinsic value can lead to disaster, the lesson will become all to clear again. Putting ones faith in governments ability to manage the money supply properly over time, will lead to a dollar dot com! Before continuing, let me address some common arguments. What good is gold, you can not eat it! It is admitted, paper money does have the advantage here, it can be eaten and with the proper amount of seasoning might even taste as good as some of those energy bars. So, now it is time to think, do you really believe that a valueless money is better than a value based money? The Federal Reserve has been pumping up the money supply and lowering interest rates for some time now. Much of the "new" money will initially go toward cleaning up balance sheets on both a corporate and personal level. This will be in place of the consumption, we are told the economy needs. In our modern age, many people have come to think that the health of the economy is government's responsibility. So, any decline in the market, loss of jobs or purchasing power will also be blamed on the government, making it even more unpopular. There is a very small percentage of the world's population that understand personal responsibility even in monetary affairs. In fact most of these people are outside of the U. S. Even to this day money is determined by the totality of the individual choices of people making exchanges. "The concept of money as a creature of Law and the State is clearly untenable. It is not justified by a single phenomenon of the market. To ascribe to the State the power of dictating the laws of exchange, is to ignore the fundamental problems of money-using society...State declarations of legal tender affect only those monetary obligations that have already been contracted. But commerce is free to choose between retaining its old medium of exchange or creating a new one for itself." 1 This is not to ignore the Bond market and the fact it dwarfs the Stock Market. Most "money" is based upon contract and incurs debt. Remember the contract that a dollar was a constant weight of silver was broken a long time ago. Some will feel that the government obligations are above reproach and therefore this type of thinking is more Doom and Gloom. In order to prove my point, let me digress to the Social Security system for a moment, anyone depending upon this Government obligation had better study the facts. See http://www.fff.org/comment/ed0901j.asp Currently, many investors are concerned as to the Inflation vs. Deflation debate. The most important information that can be provided is the same in either case. Check your contract, who is responsible to pay back the money? A government, state, corporation, individual, or foreigner? In all cases it is as if pouring from the empty into the void. In all cases something that is a concept is exchanged for something of value. Consider that in either an inflation or deflation there are defaults. In a hyperinflation the debtor defaults on the lender by paying back the loan in "worthless" money. In a deflation, the debtor is unable to earn enough money to pay back the loan. This is not true of every case of course, it is merely food for thought. A major Creditor ( U.S. Government) recently announced the assassination of the Long Bond. Very recently, a massive decline in the Bond market (and a reciprocal rise in yield) took place. The Bond market is telling us something important here. The Bond traders are worried about inflationary potential. If we see a recovery in the economy, with the huge monetary stimulus recently pushed into the market, it could be inflationary. The outrageous growing trade deficit is increasing at compound rates. Foreigners have been funding U.S. consumption for years. Foreign asset holdings are worth US$9 trillion dollars. The massive U.S. trade deficit holds the key to the stability of the World's financial system. How would you cope with a sudden reversal in the fortunes of the dollar? The most recent warning has come from the International Monetary Fund. In a recent report, it says that 'the widening of the U.S. current account deficit could shake investors faith in the economy triggering a withdrawal of investment that could endanger global markets. So if enough investors sold their Bonds, it might begin financial shocks that could be felt by institutions and markets. The forecasts are there. But they get little publicity and few investors pay attention. It's unfortunate, because it will prove once again, when you can lie about money, you can lie about anything. David Morgan November 22, 2001 http://www.Silver-Investor.com silverguru22 at hotmail.com 1 Ludwig von Mises, The Theory of Money and Credit (pp. 69, 71) From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Wed Nov 28 01:04:46 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 08:04:46 +0000 Subject: [A-List] money-fundamentalists on Inflation or Deflation? 2of3 Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011128080201.02e60538@pop.tiscali.co.uk> 11/27 Franklin Sanders - Havenstein's Choice HAVENSTEIN'S CHOICE The Philosopher's Stone of Monetary Science By Franklin Sanders Editor, The Moneychanger "The whole extraordinary depreciation of the mark has naturally created a rapidly increasing demand for additional currency, which the Reichsbank has not always been fully able to satisfy. But these enormous sums [printed] are barely adequate to cover the vastly increased demand for the means of payment, which has just recently attained an absolutely fantastic [nominal] level *** " -- Dr. Rudolf Havenstein, Reichsbank President, August, 1923, quoted in When Money Dies by Adam Ferguson, p. 173; London: Wm. Kimber & Co., Ltd, 1975. AXIOMS: "Inflation" is an increase in the money supply that eventually causes prices to rise because it cheapens the purchasing power of each and every monetary unit. Inflation is the cause, rising prices the effect. "Deflation" is a decrease in the money supply that eventually causes prices to fall because it enhances the purchasing power of each and every monetary unit. In a deflation money becomes more, not less, valuable. Deflation is the cause, falling prices the effect. Every monetary inflation causes and masks a real deflation and economic contraction. While nominal prices rise, real prices fall as paper (fiat) money loses value relative to all other assets. Inflation makes money appear cheap because it suppresses the interest rate. The lower price of money fools businessmen into making investments that look profitable at the inflation-lowered interest rate. Consumers are not really forcing down interest rates by saving more now to spend more later, so the lower rate sends a false signal about future demand. When the future arrives, those who were fooled go bust. Inflation induces malinvestment that at some point will be liquidated (written off). Inflation always brings on lower commodity prices eventually because it initially induces overproduction. Overproduction will always call out lower prices. When will inflation not be able to raise prices? When the fiat money is debt-based (borrowed into circulation) and the debt is being revalued (written down and off) around the world, i.e., a deflation of debt is underway. New money is not borrowed into circulation because no matter how much money is offered (by increasing reserves), or how low its price (interest rate), borrowers are afraid to borrower and lenders to lend, so the monetary authorities are "pushing on a string." Government cannot cure economic deflation by outright printing and spending money into circulation because the recipients will save and not spend it (the velocity of money drops because demand for cash and safety increases). Hence when the snapping turtle of deflation locks on to the economy's leg, he won't let go until he hears the thunder of (1) the last bankrupt's rubble being cleared off the economy's foundation, or (2) the guns of war. Economic deflations (depressions) last for years and do not respond to government spending or central bank monetary tricks. Gold and silver are money by nature while fiat national currencies are only money substitutes. Formerly gold and silver along with other money substitutes formed one single monetary system, but today they form two parallel and competing systems. If a monetary unit's purchasing power declines, the most likely explanation is a money supply inflation. If a monetary unit's purchasing power rises, deflation is the most likely explanation. Generally falling commodity prices usually mean a deflation is in progress; rising prices point to an inflation. Falling paper money prices for gold and silver cannot foretell a deflation, because gold and silver are not mere commodities among all others. They are money; they are the numeraire; they are the denominator, unlike any other commodity. If their prices are falling in paper money, the fall can only mean (1) the supply of fiat money is falling, or (2) the supply of gold and silver is rising (being inflated). Above our axioms the puzzling quotation reveals an arresting paradox about inflations: increasing the money supply actually shrinks its purchasing power. Throughout the German hyperinflation of 1920-1923 Havenstein contended that his job was to print money as fast as possible. Why? Because the country was suffering a shortage of money. But how was this possible? Wasn't the country already choking on the tidal wave of paper money pouring from Havenstein's presses? Havenstein had a choice: print more money to ease the shortage of purchasing power caused by inflation, or stop printing and bring on a deflationary collapse. Either way, Havenstein's Choice is only Havenstein's Trap. The faster you print money, the faster its value evaporates; stop printing money and the economy collapses into a deflationary depression. It can only end in the death of the monetary unit. THE INFLATIONISTS' FALSE HOPE Inflationists presuppose - in the teeth of all history and logic - that they can increase wealth by increasing the money supply. True, if there were more money there would be more wealth, but only if the money itself is wealth. Money created out of thin air - fiat money, whether bank credit created by bookkeeping magic or by crude printing - has no value in itself. It is not wealth, only an alleged representative of wealth. On the other hand, gold and silver inflations do contribute new wealth, and hence do boost prosperity long term (after initial dislocations). After 1492 new gold and silver pouring into Europe from the Americas laid the foundation for growth lasting centuries. Huge discoveries of gold and silver in the mid-1800s - in the Carolinas, California, Australia, Nevada, and South Africa -- all contributed to the world's wealth and later prosperity. However, all this new money was itself valuable. Every new ounce mined contributed to the sum total of wealth. Conversely, every new unit of fiat money divides the sum total of wealth, impoverishing many to benefit a few. HAVENSTEIN'S CHOICE REMAINS This paradox abides for every inflation. More money ought to makes us all rich, but it never does. It seems contradictory, still holds true. Never mind the enormous volume of paper money thrown into circulation, the actual purchasing power in circulation decreases with every new emission. The faster the money is issued, the faster the total purchasing power declines. Two parallel hyperbolas grapple for supremacy, one graphing the amount of money circulating, the other depicting its rate of depreciation. Depreciation always wins. You can easily see the depreciation by turning upside down the graph of any price index under an inflationary regime. Viewed right side up, the graph shows prices increasing. However, to understand what it truly means, you have to turn the graph upside down: the monetary unit's purchasing power is decreasing. More and more money buys less and less. Nominally increasing fiat money prices mask a real fall in the value of all goods against real money, gold and silver. Check this out for yourself. Look at the price of anything in 1964, the last year that the United States minted silver money and while the dollar was still tied to gold at a rate of $35 to the ounce. As a rule of thumb, you will find that fiat prices have increased by a factor of about ten times. In 1964, a package of cigarettes cost about a quarter. Today, it costs $3.00. (Gasoline is about the only exception to this rule of thumb. It has actually decreased in price, 20? a gallon in 1964, about a dollar today. However, less than a year ago, gas prices were over $2.00.) Until recent years prices in gold and silver had uniformly dropped. Now that no longer holds true. At $4.07 silver that 1964 25? pack of smokes now costs 73?. In gold, it cost 0.0071 ounce in 1964, but today at $280 gold costs 0.0107 ounce. "Aha!" you shout, "That proves your theory wrong!" "Oho!" I shout back, "In a pig's eye! That proves my theory right: they're suppressing the gold and silver prices." WHAT ABOUT THE GOLD/SILVER RATIO? In 1964 the government fixed gold and silver at $35 and $1.2929, a ratio of about 27:1. Today the ratio stands at 68:1. The change in ratio can only mean either (1) silver has become much more plentiful than gold, or (2) the market has been deceived into believing silver ought to be much cheaper than gold. Alternative No. 1 we can reject out of hand, because it is demonstrably false. In the past 35 years mankind has continued to consume (use up) silver in ever increasing amounts and vast silver stockpiles have disappeared while most of the gold ever mined is still in existence. Compared to silver, only miniscule amounts of gold are consumed yearly, like the gold necklace your sister wore on a date and lost. Contrary to the worshippers of the free market mechanism, Alternative No. 2 certainly is possible without conscious and concerted manipulation. Fashion - the change in social mood - rules the investment world as strictly as it rules hemlines. Fashion (social mood) makes bull and bear markets. No matter how attractive some investment's fundamentals may be (silver, for example, after ten years of supply deficits), if it is out of fashion, most investors just won't see it. On the other hand, something more sinister than mere social mood may be at work. Somebody may be actively manipulating the market. Since we can prove from history and from statute that the U.S. government and the Federal Reserve, as well as foreign central banks, all manipulate markets, the manipulation hypothesis cannot be rejected as frivolous or without factual foundation. Indeed, on its face it offers the most logically preferable explanation because it is the most obvious, the simplest, and explains the most things. Occam's Razor, you know. PEOPLE ARE CONFUSED I keep hearing analysts citing the falling gold price as a sign that Gigantic Deflation is coming. In fact, history teaches us that can't possibly be true. Look at Roy Jastram's figures below to prove it to yourself once and for all. People who make this "falling gold price presages deflation" argument have adopted the inflationists' presupposition that gold and silver are mere commodities, and that "money" is whatever government says is money. They believe that gold and silver, along with all other commodities, will drop under a deflation. But gold and silver are not commodities like all other commodities. They are money by their nature. However vociferously tyrants and inflationists may scream that gold and silver have been "officially demonetized," their monetary essence remains. The question is, how hard will the frauds try to suppress that? How many people or nations must they impoverish or shoot before they will give up? Further, the "gold reserve" does not function as a constraining reserve the public can reach by convertibility, but only as an illusion. It gold plates the fiat money system to lend it the illusion of redeemability without the tedious restraint of a genuine anchor. DEFLATION LIKE PROCRUSTES, OR CROOKS LIKE CLINTON? Is that why the prices of gold and silver are falling? Or is a mysterious, disembodied "deflation" stalking the world, chopping off values like Procrustes chopping off his victims at the ankles? Many otherwise astute analysts think this "deflation" is causing the prices of gold and silver to remain low. Their prices, these people claim, foretell a worldwide deflation. But if gold and silver "prices" are falling then it can only be the result of an inflation of the gold and silver money supply, not a deflation in fiat money, or even an economic deflation. That's what Jastram's figures show. Otherwise you have to adopt the inflationists' viewpoint that gold and silver are mere commodities and not money at all. Where can this "gold and silver inflation" be coming from? Inflation with gold and silver money is not only possible, but also a historical fact. Every year the supply also increases as more gold and silver are mined, but normally that happens so slowly that the amount of metals added to the money stock no more than matches the growth of the economy. But what if gold and silver supply suddenly surged? In the past it has only proven beneficial, as I mentioned above. But today no such source of new physical gold and silver underlies the gold and silver inflation (drop in their prices). Still, prices dropping point to supply increasing, but where? If not from the ground, then only from paper gold and silver in the form of derivatives and metal leasing. WHAT ABOUT GOLD AND SILVER PRICES? What you expect to see is not what you do see. How do you explain the contradiction? With verifiably rising fiat inflation (increasing paper money supply) you would expect to see silver and gold prices rising as the realisers edge for the escape hatch. Yet both metals are dropping while the paper dollar strengthens. How do you explain that? Greenspan is inflating the fiat money supply so fast that we should soon, indeed, already see a drop in fiat's value that sends gold and silver soaring. But that is precisely the reaction the Fed must suppress. Rising gold and silver are the safety gauge that alert the world to dangerous inflation. Greenspan needs to wire down that safety valve. What do we need to prove a crime? Motive, means, and opportunity. Greenspan and the Treasury have the means and the opportunity. With stocks collapsing, the dollar threatened, and the US economy fainting, they also have a powerful motive. Can the jury point to the winner? That makes all the talk of gold "forecasting deflation by declining" just so hogwash. ANOTHER KIND OF DEFLATION Because our money is borrowed into circulation our fiat system can cause another kind of deflation: the great writing down of debt, the revaluation of all values. Debt builds and builds, and suddenly some creditor runs for the door with the shout, "I want my money!" That triggers a universal questioning of debt (remember "change of social mood"?). Around the world, the creditworthiness of every debt is scrutinized. Rotten debt is simply written off - the creditor's money "goes to money heaven" (to borrow Doug Casey's happy turn of phrase). Bankruptcies abound as the malinvestment induced by the previous paper money inflation ("easy money") are recognized as failures and written off. But in the very best of times the debt-based fiat money system already lives under a perpetual twofold deflationary threat. New money can only be created by borrowing it into existence. So think about it: If all the money is based on debt, then the writing down of debt must reduce the entire money supply, by definition. A loan written off is bank credit destroyed. The money supply must grow by at least the amount of the interest burden, or bankruptcy is guaranteed for some players. . The less the money supply grows, the more numerous the bankruptcies. What follows from the great debt deflation? It must reduce economic activity as demand for money increases and money becomes harder to get. More companies going bankrupt means fewer companies hiring and more companies laying off workers. Fewer people working means people have less money to spend which means they buy less which means that even for those companies that don't go bankrupt, it's tougher to make a profit. In other words, times get tougher and tougher and the economy sinks into a self-reinforcing depression - for years. WHERE DOES IT END? The whole picture of inflation confuses us because it acts differently as it develops. History, however, does not equivocate about inflation's end: it destroys the monetary unit. Commenting on Havenstein's Choice in a recent newsletter, James Turk wrote, "Within a few short years, the Reichsmark was inflated away; it was destroyed as a currency. What really killed the Reichsmark? Hyperinflation was only the result; it was not the cause. The cause was a `flight from the currency'. No one wanted to hold the currency, and quickly exchanged it for any good or service. That's why the Reichsmark was losing purchasing power in the first place; the demand for Reichmarks was declining. "Interestingly, these same circumstances faced by the Reichsbank are what the Federal Reserve is now facing . . .Unfortunately the governors of the Federal Reserve have learned nothing from the Reichsbank. The Fed is pump-priming like a crazy person. Instead of focussing on building demand for dollars - so that people don't take flight from it - they instead are pumping more dollars into circulation to overcome what are perceived as deflationary forces in the economy, just like the Reichsbank did. And the end for the dollar will be just as brutal." To most people today, a flight from the US dollar sounds crazy - crazier than the Fed's pump priming. But believe me, from a historical or an economic perspective, Greenspan & Co. have put the dollar on the fast track to oblivion. You may toy with Treasury bills for a while, but the only safety against a depreciating currency is gold and silver. The faster Greenspan inflates, the tighter the cabal tries to suppress gold and silver, the more the government manipulates markets, the faster they hasten the day when the dollar dies. If you enjoy Franklin Sanders' commentary, visit The Moneychanger at www.the-moneychanger.com and subscribe to his monthly newsletter. Endnotes: 1. What this contradicts is the inflationists' false presupposition that inflation can create prosperity. It confuses us because what holds true for inflation initially doesn't hold true permanently. True, at first the inflation increases economic activity, but as time goes on larger and larger doses are needed to give the economy the same jolt. And since the inflation actually sends money into bad investments -- investments no one would undertake unless the inflation had fooled them -- then in the long term inflation promises only a depression. 2. "They" means, in this case, the U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the bullion banks or other agents in cahoots with them. 3. E.g., Roosevelt's manipulation of silver, gold, and the dollar in the 1930s, plus the US government and Federal Reserve's never-ending manipulation of interest rates, money supply and exchange rates since then. Add to that various central banks "managing" their currencies' exchange rates. 4. E.g., the Exchange Stabilisation Fund with the stated purpose of manipulating the price of gold and the US dollar, and the secretary of the Treasury's statutory mandate to "protect" the dollar's exchange rate. 5. After all is said and done, since Aristotle's time there have two and only two theories of money. The first presupposes that money must have value in itself. This is the so-called "intrinsic value" theory of money. The second presupposes that money is a social convention or social construct: it makes no difference what we use as money, or that it has any value in itself, only that everybody agrees (or is forced) to receive it as money. It ought to be obvious that the first leads to cultural integrity, honesty, prosperity, security, stability, property rights, and independence while the second leads only to cultural crookedness, institutionalised fraud, poverty, theft, insecurity, instability, influence peddling, socialism, and tyranny. 6. Nominally 15%, because I think that's the number they aim at. That's the goal the Euro Central Bank set for itself when the Fed's rate was the same. Lately their aim has soured, as the chart shows gold reserve against currency amounts to only 12%. 7. It is true that because of the hindrances governments have imposed on the metallic system - difficulty of conversion, tax on acquisition, tax on gains - that in the present short term gold and silver are less spendable than fiat. Therefore in a debt-busting panic the price of both metals might drop as the crowd rushed for paper dollars to stay liquid. However, this would be a temporary phenomenon. 8. For example, you go to the bank and "borrow" $10,000. Five minutes before the bank credited it to your account, that $10,000 didn't exist. Your loan called it into existence. The bank created the $10,000 out of thin air, by double entry bookkeeping magic: the loan to you an "asset" of the bank, the deposit to your account a "liability" of the bank. Neat and clean, money is born from nothing. It makes no difference whether the government borrows from the central bank or the public borrows from a commercial bank, either way the money is borrowed into existence. 9. It's the game of cards explanation. Five men are on a desert island. Four one to play cards, the fifth has a deck. He proposes, "I will loan each of you thirteen cards for one hour, provided you each agree to pay me back fourteen cards at the end of the hour, and I'll take your clothes for collateral." Once the four players agree, they have just guaranteed that at the end of the hour one or more of them must go bankrupt and lose his shirt. There are only 52 cards in existence, so to pay back fourteen cards at the end of an hour, some of the players must lose cards to the others. Anyway you cut it, somebody will end up short at the end of the hour and the "banker" will get his clothes. Thus in a debt-based fiat money system where money must be borrowed into existence, the money supply must always keep on expanding by at least the amount of the interest burden, or some of the players must go bankrupt. 10. Freemarket Gold & Money Report, Box 5002, North Conway, NH 03860. 20 e-letters per year, 24 gold grams or $220. www.fgmr.com. 11/5/01, p. 2. This is one of the newsletters I read very closely. Copyright 1999, 2000 Le Metropole Cafe. All rights reserved. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Wed Nov 28 01:07:34 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 08:07:34 +0000 Subject: [A-List] money-fundamentalists on Inflation or Deflation? 3of3 Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011128080644.02e52b08@pop.tiscali.co.uk> 11/23 Adam Hamilton - Bear Market Rallies Bear Market Rallies "It never was my thinking that made the big money for me. It always was my sitting. Got that? My sitting tight! It is no trick at all to be right on the market. You always find lots of early bulls in bull markets and early bears in bear markets. I've known many men who were right at exactly the right time, and began buying or selling stocks when prices were at the very level which should show the greatest profit. And their experience invariably matched mine - that is, they made no real money out of it. Men who can both be right and sit tight are uncommon." - Legendary speculator Jesse Livermore, "Reminiscences of a Stock Operator" by Edwin Lefevre, 1923 Edwin Lefevre's famous "Reminiscences of a Stock Operator" book, a thinly disguised biography of legendary speculator Jesse Livermore in the early 20th century, is required reading for every serious speculator and trader. Lefevre's masterpiece documents the incredible life of Jesse Livermore and is chock full of amazing market wisdom gleaned through Livermore's hard-won life lessons learned by winning and losing real money. "Worth" magazine once called Lefevre's 1923 book one of the four greatest investment classics of all time. It is one of the ultimate books for speculators to absorb and digest, as Livermore's experiences and candid observations about the markets are totally timeless and will always apply as long as men engage in speculation. I have read "Reminiscences" maybe a half-dozen times in my life, and each time I immerse myself in the incredible world of Jesse Livermore I emerge with a deeper and more fundamental understanding of markets and speculation. I cannot recommend it highly enough! Jesse Livermore started trading in the "bucket shops" (read the book) of early 20th century America at the tender age of 15. He became so adept at trading that he was kicked out by the bucket shop owners (who were on the losing sides of his trades) so he sought his fortune on Wall Street. He grew into one of the most colorful, flamboyant, and respected speculators of the last century, and was eventually known by popular names from "The Wall Street Wonder" to "The Great Bear". In three decades of trading Livermore made and lost several fortunes. His reputation became so notorious that he was blamed for the 1929 crash and for most of the big market breaks between 1917 and 1940! Towards the end of his illustrious career in 1940 he wrote a fantastic book, "How to Trade Stocks", that discusses his philosophy and rules for speculating. He truly was a Wall Street legend and few understood the markets better. In all the great trading wisdom of Jesse Livermore, I continue to marvel at his thoughts on preserving and enhancing capital. In our opening quote above, Livermore is talking about the paramount importance of both patience and courage of conviction for the professional speculator. He claims it was never his thinking that made him money, but sitting tight when he was right. Think about that for a second. One of the greatest speculators of all time emphatically believed that being right on the markets was relatively easy, but sitting tight was the great challenge. Re-read Livermore's opening quote above and digest this crucial speculating wisdom. Like all timeless market wisdom, Livermore's thoughts are at least as applicable today as they where when he first learned the hard lessons of the markets and passed them on many decades ago. Investors today are being psychologically buffeted by the current chaotic frenzy in the equity markets. Stock bulls and bears alike are marveling at today's magnificent rally in US stocks. The bulls, not surprisingly, claim that the stock market is discounting a future recovery in early 2002 and that the ultimate long-term bottom for US equities was laid-in after the attacks in late September. After periodically un-muting Bubblevision to listen to some of the guests over the past week, the popular bullish consensus seems to be that the great gains of the last couple months are the vanguard of a thrilling new bull market in stocks. Investors are being told by Wall Street to buy now or else risk missing the coming recovery and bullish feast. The bears on the other hand, also not surprisingly, claim this current action is little more than a spectacular bear market rally. Although bears don't appear on the mainstream financial media much these days except to be poked at with sharp verbal sticks and ridiculed by the bullish hosts, there are still quite a few surviving in the financial wilds. The bears point out that bear market rallies are by definition extreme and spectacular, just like this one, so the bear market can lure more bulls to their doom as it slowly annihilates bullish sentiment. Both bulls and bears alike are having their patience tested by the current action. Since the great rally is losing steam and has run up so rapidly, the bulls are beginning to feel gnawing fear and doubt at the back of their skulls. Are we due for a serious pullback? The bears are also having a tough time, as they cannot believe, based on dismal fundamentals and the horrible economic news, how far and how fast the market has run. Is this rally the real thing, the end of the bear market? Doubts abound in both camps. Are the bulls right, has the market really turned a corner into a new bull? Are the bears right, will this rally too collapse in flames? Maintaining patience and the courage of conviction to sit tight is becoming increasingly uncomfortable and difficult for virtually all stock speculators. I have a sneaking feeling though, that if today Jesse Livermore was miraculously resurrected and shown the modern tools we use to trade, he would have little trouble seeing through the thick info-chaff and cutting to the heart of the matter to make the right decisions. Livermore had already learned patience and courage of conviction the hard way, by losing a lot of his own money, making subsequent fortunes, and losing some of those. The great Saint Paul of Tarsus noted in his letter to the young Christian church at Rome that patience is only learned through tribulation. Only by going through tough times can the hard lessons of patience and courage of conviction be fully internalized. This ageless truth applies to speculating and trading as well. While there really is no perfect substitute for going through market and financial tribulations and tough times yourself to learn hard lessons, we can all study other people's market and financial tribulations and tough times in history and attempt to learn from their experiences and mistakes rather than making the same ones ourselves. As Jesse Livermore noted how important it is to both be right and sit tight, we want to take a look at historical bear market rallies and compare current stock action to historic markets. If the amazing equity rally of the last two months is really only a spectacular bear market feint, speculators and investors need to be exceedingly careful so they are not crushed in the next brutal downleg. As always, history can graciously provide us with the priceless knowledge and tools to save us from making the old mistakes of the past all over again. The knowledge of market history can help to grant us a proper perspective and help build patience and courage in our convictions on current market behavior. A market perspective and worldview firmly grounded in history can help us make the right decisions now on how to play this current awesome market rally. In order to study great bear market rallies, we chose a period of history that is the most famous bear market ever, the Dow Jones Industrial Average after the Great Crash of 1929. Jesse Livermore was living, trading, and making fortunes during the bear market shown in the graph. It offers some very valuable insights into the curious phenomenon of bear market rallies. While examining the infamous chart shown above, it becomes quite obvious that there were six primary intermediate bottoms before the ultimate bear market bottom in 1932. From the depths of these intermediate bottoms sprang forth great rallies that turned out to be classic bear market rallies. They are marked with the arrows and numbers in the graph, with green showing the intermediate lows marking the beginning of bear market rallies and red showing the intermediate highs marking the end of bear market rallies. While the series of waves oscillating around the primary bear trend appear more severe initially, in percentage terms each bear market rally is remarkably comparable in magnitude. As the DJIA grinded ever lower following the Great Crash, each subsequent false bottom was made at a lower base. With a lower base, the following spectacular bear market rallies could run up in similar large percentage terms even though they were much smaller in point terms as time marched relentlessly on. Today, a bull market is generally defined as a 20% gain in a major stock index. It is provocative to note that in the notorious early 1930s bear market, five of the six major bear market rallies gained more than 20%, allowing market analysts at the time to technically declare them to be bull markets. If the six rallies' gains are averaged, the average bear market rally after the 1929 crash weighs in at a very impressive 29.3% advance! If you had been a contemporary of Jesse Livermore trading during this time, and Wall Street (which was then as bullish or more so than it is today) continually emphatically claimed that a bottom had been reached, would you have been able to discern that the bear market rallies shown above were really just vicious traps for bulls? With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight it is very easy to discern bear market rallies. Imagine holding up a piece of paper to cover the right half of the graph above, so you could not see the future after 1930. Furthermore, in order to make the scenario more difficult, you have to realize that the vast majority of professionals and amateurs of the time were very bullish on stocks and there was occasional good news to goad the market higher. Virtually no one knew that a depression was approaching like a juggernaut. Recognizing bear market rallies in the midst of an actual bear is very challenging, but the rock-solid perspective of history helps tremendously. Remember, there were six major false bottoms after 1929 in the DJIA each followed by an average bear market rally of 29.3%. Investors who "bought for the long haul" in any one of these six great rallies were mercilessly slaughtered and did not make their capital back for many years into the future. Indiscriminately buying into the top half of a bear market rally is a surefire way to quickly and efficiently destroy your capital! In 1929 the speculative market of choice, where the Great Bubble manifested itself most severely, was the Dow Jones Industrial Average. In the Great Bubble of 1999-2000, the speculative excesses were most concentrated in the upstart NASDAQ. The moment the markets rally today, the NASDAQ still seduces much of the remaining speculative capital to flow its way. The NASDAQ is certainly not the most important market today in terms of raw market capitalization, but it is by far the most important in terms of general market psychology. The parallels between the two great bear markets are downright eerie! Since the ugly NASDAQ crash of March 2000 there have also been six primary intermediate bottoms and subsequent rallies. Undisputedly, five of these great rallies were simply deadly bear market rallies that helped lure more unsuspecting capital to its doom as it was utterly destroyed between the razor sharp teeth and gruesome claws of the famished bear. The only open question remaining is whether rally six proves to be yet another deadly bear market feint or the glorious birth of a new bull market. Provocatively, the average gain of the six major rallies we have seen since the NASDAQ crash is 28.5% as of market close on November 20! As you recall from above, the six major bear market rallies in the DJIA after the Great Crash witnessed an average gain of 29.3%. It never ceases to amaze just how close the present tracks history and how little really changes! Why is that? Why does seemingly ancient history matter so much for analyzing current markets? The answer, of course, is that psychology is the single most important driver of short-term market performance. (For comparison, realize that earnings and cashflow fundamentals are the most important drivers of long-term market performance.) The endless ebbing and flowing of market psychology never changes. It was important 100 years ago, is very important today, and it will be important 100 years from now. While the long-term market oscillates around the ability of companies to earn profits for their owners, equity investors, the short-term market is driven by the human heart. Human hearts are just as full of greed and fear today as they have always been in the past. When greed rules the roost, speculative manias such as the 1999-2000 spectacle occur and market prices are driven to nosebleed heights where they completely detach from reality for a short time. As mania psychology peaks, the bubble markets soon stop accelerating upward and are dragged down under their own crushing weight. Following episodes of widespread naked greed, raw fear takes hold, and people sell equities with reckless abandon initiating a downward spiraling vicious circle in which lower prices continually begat even more selling. These greed and fear-driven oscillations of the market are the single most important responsible factor for short-term market action. In bear market rallies, the fear caused by the preceding sharp fall is replaced by powerful, consuming greed. Wall Street, investors, and speculators, most of whom are biased in favor of rising markets, see a small bounce, they assume the bottom is in place, so they start buying stocks, and a mighty bear market rally ensues which quickly feeds on itself and grows larger. Interestingly, the biggest daily rallies in market history in percentage and absolute point terms occur in the midst of raging bear markets. The best performing NASDAQ days in history did not happen before March 2000 while the bubble mania still lived, but during the two massive bear market rallies in the first half of 2001. Bear market rallies are almost always extremely impressive and compelling! Then, typically between three weeks and three months later, the bear market rally runs out of steam as greed once again abruptly morphs into fear. Bulls who bought stocks in the bear market rally realize that earnings and the economy are not providing a sound fundamental foundation for the recent bear market rally and they begin selling. The average bear market rally of the DJIA during the early 1930s lasted about nine weeks. In the turbulent NASDAQ of the last couple years, the average bear market rally only had a lifespan of about six weeks. Since it can be quite challenging to discern bear market rallies in real-time, it is absolutely crucial to maintain a proper strategic perspective of the markets in which the tactical market rally in question has emerged. Is the overall market trend bullish or bearish? Is the market over or undervalued in earnings and cashflow fundamental terms? Are the overall economy and business profits getting stronger or weaker? Obviously, if the primary market trend is bullish, if the market is fundamentally undervalued, and if the overall economy is improving, the odds are that any rally is the real thing and not just a deadly bear market trap. But, on the other hand, if the overall market trend is bearish, if the market is fundamentally overvalued, and if the overall economy is weakening, the odds are very high that any rally is simply another bear market rally playing off short-term market psychology aiming to lure unsuspecting investors to their doom. In the United States right now, primary bearish trends are well established, especially in the nexus of rampant stock market speculation known as the NASDAQ. The US economy continues to weaken dramatically and corporate profits continue to wither. This strategic background vastly raises the probability that the current tactical market action is simply another exciting but deadly bear market rally. Even worse, the US equity markets remain vastly overvalued in fundamental terms. At the end of October, the NASDAQ 100 had a market-capitalization weighted average P/E of 39.8, the DJIA of 28.2, and the S&P 500 of 26.4! (The new November valuation numbers will be available in the upcoming issue of our private Zeal Intelligence newsletter for our clients.) A broad market P/E of 13.5 is considered fairly valued as it is the hundred-year average for US equities. A P/E above 20 or so is considered overvalued while P/Es over 25 or so are historically hyper-dangerous bubble territory. Current extreme broad-index valuations raise the probability to near certainty that we are presently simply witnessing an exciting bear market rally and not a wondrous new bull market. In light of past market lessons, current market action, and the strategic market backdrop, the odds are vastly in favor of the bearish thesis that the current US equity rallies are little more than seductive bear market rallies that will ultimately collapse to new lows. In this extremely dangerous time to speculate, investors and traders must have tremendous patience and deep courage of conviction. They must ignore all the incessant extraneous market noise and make careful and prudent judgments on where to deploy their scarce capital based on fundamentals. Unfortunately, most speculators and investors are not willing to study the past and the great wisdom of men who have been there and done that with real money like the legendary Jesse Livermore. Most market participants, rather than learning from the hard lessons of others, need to go through their own tribulations and lose their own money to gain the critical attributes of patience and courage of conviction. Because of this willful ignorance of how bear markets work, there are always hordes of investors ready to martyr themselves as bear market cannon fodder. Like the unimaginably beautiful Sirens of Greek mythology, bear market rallies are incredibly seductive. But, also like the Sirens, bear market rallies exist solely to lure investors to their doom on the jagged rocks of market fundamental realities hidden just beneath the pleasant azure waves. Bulls, do your fundamental homework and carefully consider in your heart whether you truly believe this is the glorious birth of a great new bull market. Bears, have faith in your historical research and knowledge, patience in your trading, and courage in your convictions during these turbulent market times. As Jesse Livermore wisely noted, the "men who can both be right and sit tight" are uncommon, but they make the "big money". "Markets are never wrong, opinions are." - Jessie Livermore Adam Hamilton, CPA, MCSE aka Zelotes 23 November 2001 Do you enjoy these essays? Please help support Zeal Research by subscribing to Zeal Intelligence today! www.zealllc.com/subscribe.htm Thoughts, comments, flames, letter-bombs? Fire away at zelotes at zealllc.com If you have questions I would be more than happy to address them through my private consulting business. Please visit www.zealllc.com/financial.htm for more information. Due to my staggering and perpetually increasing e-mail load, I regret I may not be able to respond to every comment personally. I WILL read all messages though, and really appreciate your feedback! Mr. Hamilton, a private investor and contrarian analyst, publishes Zeal Intelligence, an in-depth monthly strategic and tactical analysis of markets, geopolitics, economics, finance, and investing delivered from an explicitly pro-free market and laissez faire perspective. Please visit www.zealllc.com for more information, www.zealllc.com/subscribe.htm for a free sample, and www.zealllc.com/subscribe.htm to subscribe. Copyright 2000 - 2001 Zeal Research Copyright 1999, 2000 Le Metropole Cafe. All rights reserved. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Wed Nov 28 01:44:52 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 08:44:52 +0000 Subject: [A-List] bordgewahzees In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011128084339.02e43630@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 28/11/2001 00:14, Tom wrote: >The header says it all. > >I guess what made me overreact was Mark's juxtaposition of "socialism" VS >some of us neomalthusian bordgewahzees. (He really does know that's not >the issue.) It's an AND, not an either/or, as you so aptly have turned the >phrase. I just wasted a whole 5 minutes working out what is the "bordgewahzees". Damn. Mark From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Wed Nov 28 02:54:39 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 09:54:39 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Liu re Britain to join euro In-Reply-To: <4.3.2.7.1.20011128063939.030f78e0@pop3.norton.antivirus> References: <3C043729.676C315C@mindspring.com> Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011128094728.00ac7db8@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 28/11/2001 06:58, Chris wrote: >I have been surprised by the strength and timing of Blair's statements >about moving towards the euro at his Labour conference speech and last week. Like I say, Euroland is a big fat goose ready for plucking, and covetous eyes are on it. If the EU doesn't get its own military together (bottom line) then it will end up under the Kremlin-White House Axis. Tony Blair's panic-stricken conversion to the euro (ie, the new EU money) comes after long and evidently more than fruitless midnight-hour talks with Dubya. One thing especially Tony inistsed on, is that the war must not be extended to Iraq. This is a crucial Rubicon for the EU states which depend for their energy security on the preservation of existing relationship with Middle Eastern oil states. Euroland can only lose from the proposed Russo-American revision of the mid-east architecture. The reason is simple. Oil is gonna be scarce and hard to get, and in the Middle East the Americans are pushing Euroland down on to the hind tit. This is in Russian interests: they want to end up the dominant power in Europe. This gives them still more control over the energy taps into Europe. This is a merciless game of loot and plunder, and now Europe itself has become one of the prizes. Mark From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Wed Nov 28 03:29:57 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 10:29:57 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Japan's bond market gets the jitters over debt Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011128102917.00aeaea8@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Japan's bond market gets the jitters over debt By Gillian Tett and Bayan Rahman in Tokyo Published: FT.com November 27 2001 16:18 | Last Updated: November 27 2001 16:53 The Japanese government bond market was hit by a new bout of jitters on Monday as concern rose that the country's debt could soon be downgraded again - and signs emerged that Japanese banks were selling more JGBs. The unease pushed bond prices to their lowest levels for eight weeks, with the long-term interest rate rising to 1.395 per cent. Though this remains extremely low by international standards, any rise in the long- term rate threatens to deliver a painful blow for Japan, given the size of its debt. Unease in the bond market would also be a painful blow for the government of Junichiro Koizumi, which is trying to convince its trading partners that it is taking measures to offset any severe recession or financial turmoil. It also comes at a time of mounting unease among investors about Mr Koizumi's policy skills, and his commitment to reform. In recent days it has emerged, for example, that the government is considering delaying the introduction of consolidated taxation - a policy step that had previously been considered a key plank of restructuring. The unusually heavy selling of bonds this week began after Fitch on Monday downgraded Japan's rating to AA from AA-plus with a negative outlook. This triggered speculation that S&P, another rating agency, would downgrade Japan by three notches to single A. Many foreign investors and pension funds do not invest in single-A rated assets. S&P is currently implementing a rating review, but it has not commented on when this may be concluded. Since most JGBs are held by domestic investors, credit ratings have in the past been largely ignored. However, in recent days there have been signs that Japanese banks are selling JGBs, even though they have been heavy buyers in the last three years. If any rating agency did push Japan's rating sharply lower this could have strong implications for Japanese investors too. Under Bank of International Settlement guidelines to be introduced in 2005, government debt with a single A standing carries a 20 per cent risk rating, meaning that holders must set aside capital reserves to cover 20 per cent of the assets. Although the local regulator could ignore these guidelines, it would be a serious blow to Japan and its banks' international standing. "There are a lot of questions about the quality of JGBs, such as Japan's worsening fiscal balance and the recession, which is lowering tax revenue. On top of that S&P and Moody's have Japan under credit watch," said Masaaki Mizuno, chief bond strategist at Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein. "Even if they don't lower Japan all the way to single A, the trend is clear. The credit standing is worsening and that prompted liquidation of JGBs against swaps." Overseas investors had built up arbitrage positions between bonds and yen swaps on the assumption swap rates would not fall below JGB yields. But 10-year swap yields were about 1.3 per cent on Tuesday, 9.5 basis points below the 10- year cash JGB yield, implying that the government debt was less secure than Japanese banks. From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 28 05:18:24 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 14:18:24 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Collateral damage Message-ID: Bush appointee linked to terrorism Diplomat tied to anti-Cuba violence Duncan Campbell in Los Angeles Wednesday November 28, 2001 The Guardian One of George Bush's key choices for a major diplomatic role in his administration is almost certain now not to be appointed - because of his links with terrorism. Otto Reich, a Cuban exile, was nominated by the US president this year as under secretary of state for the western hemisphere. This week a source for the Senate foreign relations committee, which has to confirm the appointment, said that Mr Reich's chances of being confirmed were now almost zero. He was already a controversial choice because in 1987, in his previous government role as director the office of public diplomacy, he had been investigated by the comptroller general who found that he had "engaged in prohibited, covert propaganda activities" on behalf of the Nicaraguan Contras then engaged in a guerrilla war against the elected Sandinista government. Mr Reich's nomination was attacked by the former US ambassador to El Salvador, Robert White, who said: "He was part of that team that put into being a policy that was illegal." But it is Mr Reich's relationship with another Cuban American, Orlando Bosch, which now seems certain to derail his appointment. Bosch was first arrested in 1968 for firing on a tanker docked in Miami on the grounds that it was trading with Cuba. He was charged with conspiracy to damage and destroy planes and ships bound for Cuba and jailed for 10 years. Released after four years he went to Venezuela and was arrested there in 1976 after a Cuban plane had been destroyed by a bomb with the loss of 73 lives. He was acquitted and Mr Reich then attempted to help him obtain a US visa. Turning down the request for the visa, Joe Whitley, the associate attorney general, wrote: "The United States cannot tolerate the inherent inhumanity of terrorism as a way of settling disputes. Appeasement of those who use force will only breed more terrorists. We must look on terrorism as a universal evil, even if it is directed toward those with whom we have no political sympathy." Undeterred, Bosch illegally entered the US. In 1990, Bosch was granted a pardon by President George Bush Sr and he still lives in Florida. When Mr Reich was asked by the Senate foreign relations committee if he did not consider Bosch to be a terrorist, he replied: "I do not have sufficient knowledge of Mr Bosch's criminal activities or record of convictions to pass judgment on his legal status." But in the wake of September 11, Mr Reich's position has been deemed untenable as the administration has made it clear that it disapproves of terrorism in all its forms. Having a senior diplomat linked to a man convicted of terrorist offences would seriously undermine such a stance. Yesterday, a Senate foreign relations committee source said that Reich's name had now been sent back to the White House as being unacceptable. The source indicated that Democrat senators on the committee have asked for another name to be submitted. Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,608009,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 28 05:19:26 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 14:19:26 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Echoes of Kosovo Message-ID: Deja vu in Kabul as Russian forces return Troops set up clinic and new embassy Rory McCarthy in Kabul Wednesday November 28, 2001 The Guardian Armed Russian forces returned to Afghanistan yesterday for the first time since their withdrawal in defeat more than a decade ago, as veteran Afghan mojahedin fighters looked on in disbelief. Twelve Ilyushin aircraft from Russia's emergencies ministry flew a dozen military trucks, oil tankers and jeeps into Bagram airport, north of Kabul, late on Tuesday. Four more aircraft flew in yesterday. Under the cover of armed guards yesterday, the men began setting up several tents on a litter-strewn patch of land in the Wazir Akbar Khan district of Kabul. A Russian officer in a blue emergencies ministry uniform, who identified himself only as Vachislav, said medical staff would be flown in today. "We have come here for the emergency to help and we don't know how long we will stay," he said. "If there is peace, we will stay. We are armed only for the purpose of security." His men flew in from Samara in Russia, close to the Kazakhstan border. "When the Russians were last here at that time the regime in Russia was socialist. Now the system has changed and we are here to assist the people." Dozens of armed Northern Alliance security guards also patrolled the area, frequently beating back the crowds. Many men who fought in the mojahedin war of resistance against the Soviets were perplexed at the new arrivals. "We are not happy that they have come back again," said Kochai, a 38-year-old who fought with the Hizb-i Islami mojahedin faction. "The Afghans taught the Russians a lesson and now they have come back once again to their graveyard." Most of the squad of 100 Russians appeared to be setting up a camouflaged field hospital, but there was little sign that Afghans were keen to attend the new clinic. "Their assistance is like a poison to us," said Maulana Qiamuddin Kashaf, the former information minister in the mojahedin government of the early 1990s. Alongside the hospital workers, a small team of men started a discreet but detailed survey of a nearby building frequently visited by a leading Uzbek Islamist who was a close aide to Osama bin Laden. The deserted four-storey building was once a madrassah (mosque school) for the sons of Chechen and Uzbek Islamists. It will now serve as the Russian embassy. Witnesses said that Juma Namangani, the fundamentalist leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), had been a regular visitor to the building until his death earlier this month. Documents in the building seen by the Guardian also show ties with the IMU, which for years has been plotting an Islamic revolt in Central Asia, by Russia's southern borders. Mr Kashaf added: "We are against any foreigners coming here, particularly Russians. If they want another war here we will fight a jihad against them once again." Just a few hundred metres from the tents a handful of Russians were meticulously searching the ruins of a building which was once the Imam Bukhari Islamic Madrassah, and filming everything they found. The floors of the building and the grounds were strewn with documents, many of them Islamic religious pamphlets written in Arabic, Uzbek and Chechen. One book had the name of Namangani's IMU stamped on the back inside cover in Russian Cyrillic script. On the floor were several blank identity cards which belonged to the Jamiat-ul-Uloom Islamiyyah mosque in Binori Town, Karachi, a hardline Deobandi mosque known to have close links with the Taliban regime. Abdul Fatah, who worked in the madrassah as a cook, said 145 Chechen and Uzbek boys aged under 14 studied in the building: "They were the sons of men fighting with the Taliban in northern Afghanistan or in Chechnya. I saw Juma Namangani visit many times. Especially after the American bombing began he was a frequent visitor. The guards didn't leave the building until the fall of Kabul." He said the students packed up and left the day before the bombing began, after a US spy plane flew over the building. Abdullah Abdullah, the Northern Alliance foreign minister, said last night he knew of the Russians arrival several days in advance. They would be providing "humanitarian assistance" and repairing their new embassy, he said. Full article at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,608021,00.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 28 05:24:58 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 14:24:58 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Unattributable sources Message-ID: Taliban smuggled across border pay ?20,000 to reach London IAN BRUCE The Herald, 28 November 2001 MORE than 200 hard-core militants from the al Qaeda terror network have slipped across the porous Pakistani border with Afghanistan in the past seven weeks and some may already have made their way to Europe via a well-oiled "underground railway" which specialises in people-smuggling. The hub of the trade is Peshawar, the lawless capital of Pakistan's wild north-west frontier, where drugs, guns, forged passports and genuine visas are all available at a price as part of an industry which the UN estimates is worth ?3bn a year. There are 500 firms operating in the border bazaars along the ancient routes to and from Afghanistan alone, and business has never been better. War is the engine driving prices up and fugitives out, and it is very much a seller's market. Cave-like shops in the alleys around Peshawar's main merchants' bazaar house an army of counterfeiters and portrait photographers. Bribes to poorly-paid consular staff in Islamabad, the Pakistani capital, guarantee a steady supply of entry visas and blank passports, the basic canvas for the forger's art. A genuine Afghan passport costs ?200, a matching false identity complete with birth certificate and driver's licence another few pounds. A membership card for the Afghan Communist Party, a sure sign of anti-Taliban leanings, is also available on request. Visas can be obtained for Thailand, Dubai, China and the Ukraine. Malaysia is another favourite destination. Muslims need no prior permission to enter the predominantly Islamic state. However, the principal twin staging posts remain the Ukraine and Bosnia. The going rate for the journey is ?20,000. London costs an extra ?12,000. Some penetrate via Albania, with a powerboat ride across the narrow Adriatic courtesy of the Balkan mafia an exciting interlude on the journey. Others simply seek refugee status in Germany, the easiest EU nation in which to obtain sanctuary. All it takes is a change of identity, realistic papers and a sob story about persecution by Taliban or Northern Alliance warlords. Once established, the militants melt into the background, cushioned by a long-established al Qaeda support network with powerful nodes in Germany, northern Italy and Britain. There is even a money-back guarantee for failure to reach the destination of choice. All transactions are based on the centuries-old hawala system of credit transfers based on trust and honour. The fugitive pays a hawala broker in Peshawar. He holds the cash until the customer confirms arrival in his chosen country. The smuggler then receives his fee, also in untraceable cash, from a hawala associate at the other end or waits to settle up back in Pakistan. No-one cheats. The honour system is unforgiving and lapses of trust are invariably fatal. A US intelligence source said: "Hawala is the weak link in the international crackdown on terrorist money transfers and laundering operations. It leaves no paper or electronic trail and is almost impossible to monitor beyond the use of informers and occasional blind luck. "We are also coming to view people-smuggling as a major terrorist threat. Some have already escaped the net. We believe between 150 and 200 have slipped away via Pakistan. We can only hope to minimise the outflow and catch the main players." Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/28-11-19101-0-3-11.html Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 28 05:47:38 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 14:47:38 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Plunge Protection Team Message-ID: Mark Jones writes of the market "fundamentals-ists" belief in "a conspiracy, spearheaded by the so-called Plunge Protection Team consisting of Greenspan and Bushies, to keep the dollar high at all costs." ===== Weakening the yen Depreciation could help Japan escape a deflationary spiral that would threaten global recovery. Some in Washington want Tokyo to entertain the idea, say Stephen Fidler and Krishna Guha: Financial Times, Nov 23, 2001 By STEPHEN FIDLER and KRISHNA GUHA It is, on the face of it, a remarkable turnround at an unusual time. With the US fighting its own recession and its manufacturing industry facing its longest period of contraction since the Great Depression, a senior US official suggests that the US would be willing to tolerate a weakening of the yen. That Washington would be open to a policy of yen weakness suggests growing alarm at the state of the Japanese economy. Tokyo this month cut its growth forecast for this year, projecting that the real economy would shrink by 0.7 per cent together with deflation of 1.2 per cent. If Japan is unable to escape a deflationary spiral, it threatens to jeopardise recovery around the world. The idea of engineering a devaluation of the yen - to introduce inflation into the economy - has at last begun to enter the policy debate in Japan. Having come to power promising not to repeat its predecessor's habit of lecturing Japan, the administration of President George W. Bush wants to find a way of helping those within Japan who are promoting the devaluation option. The suggestion is that Washington would not stand in the way if Bank of Japan set out to weaken the yen through the purchase of US Treasury bonds. Japan in fact does not need US permission to buy US Treasuries but the framing of the invitation to buy US government assets allows the administration to argue that the policy is a "wash" for the US economy. True, the dollar strengthening would be damaging for US manufacturing, but the reduction of US long-term interest rates that would result from Japanese purchases of Treasuries would offset that. Admittedly, some economists find this reasoning debatable: the net impact of the US economy from these two countervailing influences is in fact difficult to predict, they say. Yet the implication of this week's comments by a senior US official, who did not want to be named, may be that Washington now feels that the risk posed by deflation in Japan to the US economy trumps other concerns. The comments nonetheless raise many questions. One being posed in Tokyo yesterday was whether they really represent US policy. Two weeks ago, another senior US official indicated the US was satisfied with the approach the Japanese were taking but indicated some frustration with the slow pace of the reform proposed by Junichiro Koizumi, the prime minister. Mr Koizumi's programme - with its broad agenda of public sector restructuring deregulation, fiscal consolidation and banking reform - appears to be running into the sand. "It is difficult politically. And as we look at what's happening internally we just have to recognise that these things take time to work through the political system," that US official said. Moreover, he appeared to suggest that Washington was comfortable with Japanese monetary policy. "Many, many years of experience in different countries show that the way to end deflation is to increase money growth, so they're emphasising increased money growth." If this week's comments therefore do represent a shift in US thinking, the question they raise is whether the US is dropping its insistence that yen depreciation should accompany economic reform. US tolerance for yen weakness has in the past always been accompanied by the proviso that Japan should address the many structural deficiencies of its economy. Some Japanese insist anyway that the question of structural reform is a red herring. "Only 20-30 per cent of the problem is structural," says Richard Koo, chief economist at Nomura Research Institute and a long- standing critic of government. "The rest is lack of demand." Japan's government has on several occasions indicated that it would be happy to see the yen a little weaker. Last month Masajuro Shiokawa, minister of finance, told parliament: "It may be better for the yen to be somewhat weaker than now." There is already an unofficial policy bias in this direction. "We would not want to see the yen appreciate from current levels," said a top ministry of finance official. "Perhaps we would not stop a depreciation of the yen if it was a reflection of economic fundamentals." But this is far less radical than the notion gaining ground, mainly among foreign economists, that a substantial devaluation may be necessary to slash the real value of its massive corporate debts, provide a huge stimulus to exports, and break the deflationary spiral. Though it is far from an officially accepted policy proposal, the idea of active intervention to depress the yen - as opposed to allowing it to weaken as a result of expansionary monetary policy - is beginning to be discussed in the corridors of power. Last week, Nobuyuki Nakahara an independent member of the Bank of Japan's policy board and consistently out of step with his peers, put the proposal for active intervention before the board. It was voted down 8 to 1. There is in Tokyo profound disbelief that the US government might be in favour of driving down the value of the yen. "With the US running the biggest trade deficit in the history of mankind and its economy weakening, do you really think they would want Japan to devalue the yen?" asks Mr Koo at Nomura Research Institute. Some Japanese note the launch this summer of an investigation into alleged dumping by foreign steelmakers. They also recognise that Andy Card, Mr Bush's chief of staff and a loyal friend, was a lobbyist for the car industry and pressed the Clinton administration for a dollar devaluation to boost car sales. Even if the Japanese accept that depreciation is a real policy option, the question is how much would be acceptable. Most economists believe that for depreciation to have any real impact on price levels in an economy the size of Japan's, the yen would have to fall by a huge amount - to anywhere between Y150 to Y170 to the dollar from about Y123 now. This is because trade accounts for a relative small proportion of the Japanese economy - 20 per cent, roughly the same as the US. Tokyo remains fearful that a sharp fall in the currency would trigger a round of competitive devaluations across Asia, probably including China, that would wreak havoc on the region's fragile economies and provoke a bitter backlash against Japan. It would put paid to the idea of creating a yen-block in Asia led by Japan - which is still cherished by top officials such as Huruhiko Kuroda, vice-minister of Finance. And it could lead to Japan being further isolated from the formation of an Asian regional free trade zone, recently proposed by China and the Association of South-East Asian Nations. Most outsiders recognise, however, that the real problem in Japan is the fact that the Bank of Japan and Ministry of Finance are at loggerheads - as they have been for years. The government demands the BoJ does more to ease monetary policy, and the BoJ insists on more action on structural reform of the economy first. "The collapse of the (1980s economic) bubble explains why Japan had an economic crisis. But it does not explain why it is still there a decade later," says Richard Jerram, chief economist at ING Barings Japan. "There is no shortage of readily available plans that would make things better. They are not being implemented. You have to come to the conclusion that this is not an economic problem - it is a political problem." This may be the real significance of the US stepping into the debate. If the Bush administration shares the belief that Japan is unable to come up with the right policies because of institutional stalemate, it may have decided that external pressure is the only way to get the world's second-biggest economy moving again. Full article at: http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.html?print=true&id=01 1123001539 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 28 05:59:54 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 14:59:54 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Military-industrial complex Message-ID: Jaw-jaw not war-war at work Michael Skapinker on a flawed argument for greater democracy in US industry Financial Times, Nov 28 2001 After Capitalism, from Managerialism to Workplace Democracy Seymour Melman Alfred A. Knopf If you find yourself in conversation with someone who, while clasping your wrist a little too tightly, tells you that the US economy is a Pentagon-controlled conspiracy that bears a strong resemblance to Soviet communism, the temptation is to mumble an excuse and slip away. I almost abandoned Seymour Melman and his hugely detailed book on several occasions. I kept going, however, dragged along not only by Professor Melman's vast experience and dogged application but also by a sense that his arguments for workplace democracy were too weighty to ignore. Prof Melman is a US academic insider and an industrial dissident. A professor emeritus of industrial engineering at Columbia University, he has spent years detailing how American management's skill and ingenuity have been sapped by its ties with the military. These links were initially forged during the second world war and deepened with the cold war. The number of US civilians involved in military manufacture fell in the decade after the Berlin Wall came down but the Department of Defence remained US industry's biggest single customer. This military dominance has severely damaged US management, Prof Melman argues. The "cost plus" ethos of many defence contracts has left managers with few incentives to become more efficient. Companies have little need to go in search of new customers. The result, in his view, has been a catastrophic US decline. Its machine tool companies have been eclipsed by German and Japanese competitors. The US shipbuilding industry, dedicated to the requirements of the navy, has lost the ability to build cruise ships. The end of the cold war should have put a stop to all this but the defence establishment was reluctant to give up its power. Prof Melman has been a campaigner for turning military manufacture to civilian use in the US and Russia. By his own account he failed in both because too many people had an interest in arms continuing to be manufactured. He could not have known that the publication of his book would find his country at war. One US newspaper said it was an awkward time to hear his arguments. Yet America's vulnerability has come not from a deficiency of new weaponry but from a lack of intelligence and linguistic skills. What is to be done? Workers need to take control of their lives, says Prof Melman. He is a great admirer of General Motors' Saturn car plant and of Harley-Davidson. In both companies, trade unions have acquired a high degree of control over the design of work and company strategy. There is a problem with this. While 44 per cent of US private sector employees wish they belonged to unions, only 14 per cent do so. Nor are unions always a force for progress. Prof Melman is enthusiastic about unions that prefer workplace promotion by seniority rather than ability. He says it is less arbitrary. But the same could be said for promoting workers in alphabetical order. There is also an unpleasant whiff of America First to this book. The author does not like US jobs going abroad. He does not seem to approve of the developing world's skilled workers coming to the US, either. Yet some of his best ideas come from abroad: from the Mondragon network of co-operatives in Spain's Basque region; from the small enterprises of the Italian region of Emilia-Romagna; and from two Israeli kibbutzim that have turned themselves into world-class manufacturers. Prof Melman gives us little idea how US management might be persuaded to end its military dependence and share power with its workers. But there is one nugget. Co-operative enterprises, such as the kibbutzim, boast high productivity. Modern manufacturing is increasingly capital intensive. Highly involved workers appear to get far more out of their machines. This is not far removed from the current preoccupation of many in industry with "knowledge management". Managers might be persuaded that worker co-operation is in their interest, too. This is a flawed book. It is not clear, for example, how Prof Melman measures companies' success. But it provides much to chew on. An economy that recently poured billions into fly-by-night businesses with little prospect of ever producing a profit does not have all the answers. Full article at: http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT3ISK80KUC &live=true Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Wed Nov 28 06:50:15 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 15:50:15 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Liu re Britain to join euro Message-ID: Mark Jones writes: One thing especially Tony inistsed on, is that the war must not be extended to Iraq. This is a crucial Rubicon for the EU states which depend for their energy security on the preservation of existing relationship with Middle Eastern oil states. Euroland can only lose from the proposed Russo-American revision of the mid-east architecture. The reason is simple. Oil is gonna be scarce and hard to get, and in the Middle East the Americans are pushing Euroland down on to the hind tit. This is in Russian interests: they want to end up the dominant power in Europe. This gives them still more control over the energy taps into Europe. This is a merciless game of loot and plunder, and now Europe itself has become one of the prizes. ===== I've been struck by the lengths to which the British government has gone to rebuild ties with Iran. Straw made his second visit this autumn to Tehran last week. Doubtless BP (the former Anglo-Iranian Petroleum Company) is involved in all this somehow, given the revolving doors between the company and the New Labour-permanent government complex. The strategic issues re Russia and Europe are interesting, and how quickly these have changed. I wonder how much leverage German interests have over Russia given the level of lending and investment that German capital has undertaken in the past decade. Put all this together and it's no wonder that the triumvirate backing "The Policy Network" (Blair, Schr?der, Persson) and assorted networkers (Prodi, D'Alema) and hangers on (Chirac) are desperately trying to engineer some sort of EU unity. Given that the defence issues could have been resolved in 1985 courtesy of Michael Heseltine, the British and European state apparatus may yet have yet another reason to rue the day Mrs Thatcher swept to power on the coat-tails of the IMF and its British secret state collaborators. Michael Keaney From lnp3 at panix.com Wed Nov 28 07:44:37 2001 From: lnp3 at panix.com (Louis Proyect) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 09:44:37 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Northern Alliance as Russian tool? Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.20011128094437.01708704@popserver.panix.com> Los Angeles Times, November 28, 2001 COMMENTARY Russia Checkmated Its New Best Friend By ERIC S. MARGOLIS, Eric S. Margolis is a foreign affairs columnist for Canadian and Pakistani newspapers and author of "War at the Top of the World--The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tibet" (Routledge, 2000) Many Americans, grown cynical of government pronouncements, have been asking whether the real war goal of the United States in Afghanistan is to gain access to Central Asia's oil and gas. The answer: no and yes. The U.S. attacked Afghanistan to exact revenge for the Sept. 11 attacks. But it must have quickly occurred to former oilmen George Bush and Dick Cheney that retribution against the Taliban and Osama bin Laden offered a golden opportunity to expand American geopolitical influence into South and Central Asia, scene of the world's latest gold rush--the Caspian Basin. The world has ample oil today. But, according to CIA estimates, when China and India reach South Korea's current level of per capita energy use--within 30 years--their combined oil demand will be 120-million barrels daily. Today, total global consumption is 60million to 70million barrels daily. In short, the major powers will be locked in fierce competition for scarce oil, with the Gulf and Central Asia the focus of this rivalry. Central Asia's oil and gas producers are landlocked. Their energy wealth must be exported through long pipelines. He who controls energy, controls the globe. Russia, the world's second-largest oil exporter, wants Central Asian resources to be transported across its territory. Iran, also an oil producer, wants the energy pipelines to debouch at its ports, the shortest route. But America's powerful Israel lobby has blocked Washington's efforts to deal with Iran. Pakistan and the U.S. have long sought to build pipelines running due south from Termez, Uzbekistan, to Kabul, Afghanistan, then down to Pakistan's Arabian Sea ports, Karachi and Gwadar. Oilmen call this route "the new Silk Road," after the fabled path used to export China's riches. This route, however, would require a stable, pro-Western Afghanistan. Since 1989, Iran has strived to keep Afghanistan in disorder, thus preventing Pakistan from building its long-sought Termez-Karachi pipeline. When Pakistan ditched its ally, the Taliban, in September, and sided with the U.S., Islamabad and Washington fully expected to implant a pro-American regime in Kabul and open the way for the Pakistani-American pipeline. But, while the Bush administration was busy tearing apart Afghanistan to find Bin Laden, it failed to notice that the Russians were taking over half the country. The Russians achieved this victory through their proxy--the Northern Alliance. Moscow, which has sustained the alliance since 1990, rearmed it after Sept. 11 with new tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, helicopters and trucks. To the fury of Washington and Islamabad, in a coup de main the Russians rushed the Northern Alliance into Kabul, in direct contravention of Bush's dictates. The alliance is now Afghanistan's dominant force and, heedless of multi-party political talks in Germany going on this week, styles itself as the new "lawful" government, a claim fully backed by Moscow. The Russians have regained influence over Afghanistan, avenged their defeat by the U.S. in the 1980s war and neatly checkmated the Bush administration, which, for all its high-tech military power, understands little about Afghanistan. The U.S. ouster of the Taliban regime also means Pakistan has lost its former influence over Afghanistan and is now cut off from Central Asia's resources. So long as the alliance holds power, the U.S. is equally denied access to the much-coveted Caspian Basin. Russia has regained control of the best potential pipeline routes. The new Silk Road is destined to become a Russian energy superhighway. By charging like an enraged bull into the South Asian china shop, the U.S. handed a stunning geopolitical victory to the Russians and severely damaged its own great power ambitions. Moscow is now free to continue plans to dominate South and Central Asia in concert with its strategic allies, India and Iran. The Bush administration does not appear to understand its enormous blunder and keeps insisting that "the Russians are now our friends." The president should understand that where geopolitics and oil are concerned, there are no friends, only competitors and enemies. Louis Proyect Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org From tomzbox at hotmail.com Wed Nov 28 14:48:05 2001 From: tomzbox at hotmail.com (Tom Warren) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 14:48:05 Subject: [A-List] bordgewahzees Message-ID: ">I just wasted a whole 5 minutes working out what is the >"bordgewahzees". > >Damn. > >Mark Oh, c'mon, I daresay you eventually had a laugh. That's always worth 5 min. Plus, it's surely payback for all the special case definitions EYE've had to ferret out in order to understand the foriegn language of socialism. (must have spent hours unsuccessfully trying to understand the definition of "value", alone! ) Language is hard for us bordgewahzees, obviously. love, tom "I made no attempt to be inaccurate, but I want to be clear I was not attempting to be precise." -- Ex-Treasury Chief of Staff Josh Steiner _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Wed Nov 28 08:54:41 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 15:54:41 +0000 Subject: [A-List] bordgewahzees In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011128155358.02fd8008@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 28/11/2001 14:48, Tom wrote: >must have spent hours unsuccessfully trying to understand the definition >of "value", alone! This alone makes you a paid-up Marxist. Mark From bantam at dingoblue.net.au Wed Nov 28 09:53:29 2001 From: bantam at dingoblue.net.au (Rob Schaap) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 16:53:29 +0000 Subject: [A-List] bordgewahzees References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011128155358.02fd8008@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Message-ID: <3C05168A.57C475B8@dingoblue.net.au> G'day Tom, > >must have spent hours unsuccessfully trying to understand the > >definition of "value", alone! And did you arrive at the conclusion that value is abstract labour? ie. labour performed according to the dictates of commodity exchange? ie. where society allocates labour indirectly, through the market? ie. where the allocation of social labour is executed in a society based on private labour? ie. where the common element that allows the commodities produced to be exchanged is therefore indirectly social (abstract) labour? ie. where it seems that, while value allows exchange, it is that production is for exchange that produces value? ie. that value is realised when the market recognises as social the apparently private act of production in the moment of exchange? ie. that the value of a commodity is the sum of the labour time socially necessary to produce it? If this is what value is, if it is the grand relation that constitutes and drives us in this day and age, might it be said that the radical environmentalist is obliged to be a radical economist? Mebbe even a (gulp) Marxist? Waddya reckon? Cheers, Rob. From hliu at mindspring.com Wed Nov 28 10:52:18 2001 From: hliu at mindspring.com (Henry C.K. Liu) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 12:52:18 -0500 Subject: [A-List] 18th Century China Forum Summary References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011127201035.00ad07d0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Message-ID: <3C052450.75F054AB@mindspring.com> The main obstacle to China's quest for industrialization is Confucian culture which effectively keeps China in a feudal straitjecket. Chinese political ideology has a history of protracted contest between the vision of Da'tong (General Harmony) and the pragmatism of Xiao'kang (Individual Contentment). In contemporary political terms, it is a struggle between the noble grandeur of communal socialist vision and the utilitarian efficiency of individual private enterprise. Feudalism has evolved long before the advent of modern mass communication technology. The appearance of newspapers, the first form of mass communication resulting from the invention of printing, would make public opinion important in political disputes and eventually win freedom of the press from direct poltical control of the rulers. Freedom of speech, amplified by mass circulation in printed form, would since render popular support an increasingly critical prerequisite for political power. Prior to the era of prerequisite popular support in liberal politics, feudalism has evolved from the logic of power politics. Its authority has been imposed from the top down, resting on the local strongman's ability to maintain law and order necessary for local stability and his promise of protection against external threat. The agrarian peasants under the local lord's rule have needed both for a productive life. As the agrarian economy expands, the provision of security and order, under the nomadic tribal rules of primitive kinship loyalty and clannish vendetta, has gradually been institutionalized by an evolving hierarchical feudal order, buttressed by agrarian societal values of morality and justice. Free men no longer enjoy the freedom of movement inherent in a nomadic life because their agrarian livelihood is tied to immobile land. They then barter away their own individual freedom and labor, as well as those of their descendants, often willingly but at times under coercion, in exchange for protection from their local lords and the lords' heirs. The local lords in turn offer loyalty and obedience to the Emperor and his heirs in return for more powerful imperial protection against other neighboring local lords. The Emperor's authority has been derived from it's ready recognition by the collegiate regional lords and, to a less direct but more fundamental degree, from peasant expectation of him as a higher authority to whom the peasantry can appeal for justice against the frequent abuses of the local lords. The Emperor's role under feudalism is twofold: to arbitrate the disputes among local lords; and to protect the peasants from the oppressive aristocrats. In feudal politics, a wise Emperor is, by definition, a liberal Emperor. Economic prosperity naturally results from peaceful stability and established social hierarchy. Material prosperity in turn provides a pragmatic validation for feudalism. Direct popular support through universal suffrage has been immaterial and impractical before the advent of the age of individual freedom of speech and mass communication. But while universal suffrage does not exist, it does not follow that popular support has been unnecessary as a mandate of political power under the feudal political system. Until the 20th century, whenever widespread political unrest should occur in China, it would generally be against an abusive ruling monarch and sometimes his morally bankrupt dynastic house, rather than the feudal system itself. The fall of feudal monarchies over the course of scores of centuries and the flowering of liberal democracy in the West would usher in a rising expectation around the modern world on respect for human rights and for the concept of political equality for all individuals, regardless of social rank and class affinity. The consent of the governed as expressed through universal suffrage would become a modern global prerequisite for a mandate to govern. Since then, three competing political systems: socialism, fascism and capitalistic democracy, would dominate the unfolding of modern history. Socialism would attract popular support by promising the masses that the welfare of the people is the responsibility of the state, while fascism would demand power over the people by asserting that the welfare of the state is the responsibility of each individual. Both socialism and fascism would exact from the people total obedience to state control as the price for fulfilling each of their separate and opposing social philosophies and political visions. However, the difference in ideology would not prevent a similarity in methodology. Both political systems would be required by their internal logic to be similarly authoritarian and totalitarian, as a moral justification and as an operational necessity, though toward opposite ends. Both socialism and fascism, in the quest for guaranteed material welfare for the people, would strip them of their individual will, and in the process rob them of their creativity and initiative. Unfortunately, material welfare, even if absolutely guaranteed, is always a poor compensation for loss of individuality. Fascism, because of its contempt for equality as an ideal, would not hesitate to enslave the masses to create an efficient state that would deliver glory to the nation and an improved living standard to the dutiful masses. Socialism, on the other hand, obsessed by its belief in the myth of equality, would willingly suffer inefficiency in wealth-creatiing processes, even if it should result in less income either for use by the state or for distribution among the people. In practice, albeit history to date would only permit imperfect models, the history of radical socialism would be frothed with examples of attempts to achieve equality by making the rich as poor as the poor. Capitalistic democracy would base its mandate on the individual's acceptance of responsibility for his own welfare through the exercise of private property rights. Since it would promise only equal opportunity to a good life rather than a good life itself, its ideology would require neither authoritarian moralization nor totalitarian control, because individual failures would not imply dysfunction of the system. Rather, such failures would be deemed necessary in the selection process to keep the system healthy, the concept of the survival of the fittest being the foundation of capitalistic social Darwinism. Capital formation requires inequlity of wealth. Social welfare safety nets would be tolerated in capitalistic democracies merely as humanitarian compromises, a decadent liberal concession of the theoretical sanctity of market efficiency. For the true believer of capitalism, economic efficiency should ideally be maintained with social euthanasia of the economically unfit. Charity is bad economics, except when charity contributes in the short term to reducing other high costs of preserving law and order, of preventing crimes of the poor, social unrest or revolution, though not crimes against the poor. The most efficient method of eliminating poverty is to let the poor die with natural obsolecence. It is the fear of poverty that provide the psychological fuel for economic initiative. Making poverty sufferable through social welfare programs would erode the vitality of the economic system. The power of the state in a modern capitalistic democracy would be restricted to that of maintaining national security, preserving basic human rights as defined in the liberal tradition of the Enlightenment, which would not include the right of economic security, of protecting the sacredness of private property rights in order to insure the efficient functioning of the market mechanism and upholding the principle of return on capital as the driving force in human society. Within the rules of market economy, the individual in a capitalist democracy would enjoy broad freedom as long as the exercise of which is consistent with the security interest of the state, compatible with the preservation of capitalism and compliant with the traditional moral standards of its local community. The trouble is that truly free markets, like absolute equality, is a myth. Markets in a complex global economy in modern time would in reality be shaped by factors external to national borders and functional industry boundaries. The so-called unseen hand of the market would constantly require national governmental policies and regulations to prevent it from sub-optimization and to protect it from manipulation by powerful special interests domestically, by policies of other national governments and by business strategies of transnational, multinational and international enterprises. Capitalistic democracy would appear to be materialistically efficient due largely to its shedding of the costly burden of social responsibilities. It would operate with clear purpose, because material gains are stimulated by material incentives, relatively unencumbered by metaphysical morals. Capitalism is paradoxically tied to the perpetuation of poverty, because it needs the fear of poverty as an negative incentive for the invidual to work. Even if capitalism should succeed in eliminating material poverty, it would do so only at the price of a poverty of the spirit. It is when questions of responsibility to one's fellow men and the higher purposes of life are asked that the purpose of economic efficiency in a capitalistic democracy faces it's most serious challenge. While an ample supply of bread may prevent political revolutions, it is necessary to remember, as Christ pointed out: "Man lives not by bread alone." Feudalism in China has aspects of what modern political science would label as fascist, socialist and democratic. As a socio-political system, feudalism is inherently authoritarian and totalitarian. However, since feudal cultural ideals have always been meticulously nurtured by Confucianism to be congruent with the political regime, social control, while pervasive, is seldom consciously felt as oppressive by the public. Or more accurately, social oppression, both vertical, such as sovereign to subject, and horizobntal, such as gender prejudice, is considered natural for lack of an accepted alternative vision. Concepts such as equality, individuality, privacy, personal freedom and democracy, are deemed anti-social, and only longed for by the deranged-of-mind, such as radical Daoists. This would be true in large measure up to modern time when radical Daoists would be replaced by other radical political and cultural dissidents. Feudalism in China takes the form of a centralized federalism of autonomous local lords in which the authority of the sovereign is symbiotically bound to, but clearly separated from, the authority of the local lords. Unless the local lords abuse their local authority, the Emperor's authority over them, while all inclusive in theory, would not extend beyond federal matters in practice, particularly if the Emperor's rule is to remain moral within its ritual bounds. Confucianism (Ru Jia), through the code of rites (li), seeks to govern the behavior and obligation of each person, each social class and each socio-political unit in society. Its purpose is to facilitate the smooth functioning and the perpetuation of the feudal system. Therefore, the power of the Emperor, though politically absolute, is not free from the constraints of behavior deemed proper by Confucian values for a moral sovereign, just as the authority of the local lords is similarly constrained. Issues of constitutionality in the U.S. political milieu become issues of proper rites and befitting morality in Chinese dynastic politics. Confucian values, because they have been designed to preserve the existing feudal system, unavoidably would run into conflict with contemporary ideas reflective of new emerging social conditions. It is in the context of its inherent hostility toward progress and its penchant for obsolete nostalgia that Confucian values, rather than feudalism itself, become culturally oppressive and socially damaging. When Chinese revolutionaries throughout history, and particularly in the late 18th and early 19th century, would rebel against the cultural oppression of reactionary Confucianism, they would simplistically and conveniently link it synonymously with political feudalism. These revolutionaries would succeed in dismantling the formal governmental structure of political feudalism because it is the more visible target. Their success is due also to the terminal decadence of the decrepit governmental machinery of dying dynasties, such as the ruling house of the 3-century-old, dying Qing dynasty (1583-1911). Unfortunately, these triumphant revolutionaries would remain largely ineffective in re-molding Confucian dominance in feudal culture, even among the progressive intelligentsia. Almost a century after the fall of the feudal Qing dynasty house in 1911, after countless movements of reform and revolution, ranging from moderate democratic liberalism to extremist Bolshevik radicalism, China would have yet to find an workable alternative to the feudal political culture that would be intrinsically sympathetic to its social traditions. Chinese revolutions, including the modern revolution that would begin in 1911, through its various metamorphosis over the span of almost four millennia, in overthrowing successive political regimes of transplanted feudalism, would repeatedly kill successive infected patients in the form of virulent governments. But they would fail repeatedly to sterilize the infectious virus of Confucianism (Ru Jia) in its feudal political culture. The modern destruction of political feudalism would produce administrative chaos and social instability in China until the founding of the People's Republic in 1949. But Confucianism (Ru Jia) would still appear alive and well as cultural feudalism, even under Communist rule. It would continue to instill its victims with an instinctive hostility towards new ideas, especially if they are of foreign origin. Confucianism would adhere to an ideological rigidity that would amount to blindness to objective problem-solving. Almost a century of recurring cycles of modernization movements, either Nationalist or Marxist, would not manage even a slight dent in the all-controlling precepts of Confucianism in the Chinese mind. These precepts of cultural feudalism are the same ones that have so adamantly opposed the rise of Wu Zhao some 13 centuries prior to modern time. In fact, in 1928, when the Chinese Communist Party would attempt to introduce a soviet system of government by elected councils in areas of northern China under its control, many of the peasants would earnestly think a new "Soviet" dynasty is being founded by a new Emperor by the name of So Viet. During the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution of 1966, the debate between Confucianism (Ru Jia) and Legalism (Fa Jia) would be resurrected as allegorical dialogue for contemporary political struggle. On the eve of the 21st century, Confucianism would remain alive and well under both governments on Chinese soil on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, regardless of political ideology. Modern China would still be a society in search of an Emperor figure and a country governed by feudal relationships, but devoid of a compatible political vehicle that would turn these tenacious, traditional social instincts towards constructive purposes, instead of allowing them to manifest themselves as practices of corruption. General Douglas MacArthur would present post-war Japan, which has been seminally influenced by Chinese culture for 14 centuries, with the greatest gift a victor in war has ever presented the vanquished: the retention of her secularized Emperor, despite the Japanese Emperor's less-than-benign role in planning the war and in condoning war crimes. Thus General MacArthur, in preserving a traditional cultural milieu in which democratic political processes could be adopted without the danger of a socio-cultural vacuum, would lay the socio-political foundation for Japan as a post-war economic power. Of the 3 great revolutions in modern history: the French, the Chinese and the Russian, each would overthrow feudal monarchial systems to introduce idealized democratic alternatives that would have difficulty holding the country together without periods of terror. The French and Russian Revolutions would both make the fundamental and tragic error of revolutionary regicide and would suffer decades of social and political dislocation as a result, with little if any socio-political benefit in return. In France, it would not even prevent eventual restoration imposed externally by foreign victors. The Chinese revolution in 1911 would not be plagued by regicide, but it would prematurely dismantle political feudalism before it would have a chance to develop a workable alternative, plunging the country into decades of warlordism. Worse still, it would leave largely undisturbed a Confucian culture while it would demolish its political vehicle. The result would be that 8 decades after the fall the last dynastic house, the culture-bound nation would still be groping for an appropriate and workable political system, regardless of ideology. Mao Zedong would understand this problem and would try to combat it by launching the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution in 1966. But, even after a decade of enormous social upheaval, tragic personal sufferings, fundamental economic dislocation and unparalleled diplomatic isolation, the Cultural Revolution would achieve little except serious damage to the nation's physical and socio-economic infrastructure, to the prestige of the Party, not to mention the loss of popular support, and total bankruptcy of revolutionary zeal among even loyal party cadres. It would be unrealistic to expect the revival of imperial monarchy in modern China. Once a political institution is overthrown, all the king's men cannot put it together again. Yet, the modern political system in China, despite its revolutionary clothing and radical rhetoric, would be still fundamentally feudal, both in the manner in which power is distributed and in its administrative structure. When it comes to succession politics, a process more orderly than heriditary feudal tradition of primogeniture would have yet to be developed in China in modern time. Since, as Seng Huai'yi has insightfully understood, attitude toward money being often more indicative of a person's true worth than the mere possession of it, the same might be even more true for societies. This explains why modern societies, whose members would be obsessed with a single-minded quest for material wealth, would be constantly faced with recurring crises of value. The pursuit of maximization of wealth leads inevitably to the betrayal of human values that would otherwise forbid unconscionable exploitation of and impersonal disregard for others. Maximization breeds abuse. The Confucian doctrine of the Path of the Golden Mean (Zhongyong zhi Dao), a concept of avoiding extremes, is instructive on this point. More is not necessarily better; most is seldom best, and best is the mortal enemy of good, as Voltaire has insightfully pointed out. A rich man amid masses of poverty will not find himself a paradise on earth. A society that celebrates only the best will waste the good. The relentless pursuit of absolute beauty will result in ugliness, which explains why the art world is often infested with revolting characters. The fact that the historical record of socialist politics is littered with betrayals of the humane ideals of theoretical socialism should not diminish the valor of those who have placed their hopes on the noble vision, just as the materialistic efficiency of unregulated capitalism is no testimony on the moral validity of greed. It is telling in the manner modern economics treats the trade-off between return on capital and compensation for labor: an increase in return on capital is viewed as economic efficiency while a rise in pay for workers is viewed as non-productive inflation. What moral rules enable the pampered corporate executive to receive a generous bonus for firing thousands of workers in a recession? Maximization of shareholder value through cost reduction is an euphemism for robbing the workers to enrich the owners. It is a very sick society that views as progress the depreciation of human workers in favor of the appreciation of material assets. In a money economy, it is a basic truism that those who have money are the only ones who can pay the bills at the end. If the poor are to pay their share, ways must be found for them to earn sufficient money to constructively participate on a healthy financial level, without permanent subsidy from the economic order to which they have become burdensome wards. In a bountiful world, poverty is seldom caused by someone else's having more money than others. This is particularly true in a society in which both greed and envy are constrained by moral precepts. One does not have to be the world's richest man in order to avoid feeling poor. Poverty is the result of underdevelopment in relation to the production and consumption norms in a particular socio-economic order. It is only when some singular segment of society fails extensively to receive sufficient economic opportunity, or sufficient value for its labor to maintain its fair share of consumption, as normatively prescribed in the socio-economic order, that poverty is born. Social cohesion will be threatened when poverty is perceived as the result of institutionalized mal-distribution of wealth, reflecting unfairness in the sharing of the fruits of co-operative endeavor among different socio-economic groups. Poverty, however, cannot be defined by absolute income levels alone, because poverty is actually a social problem with an economic dimension. Only because it is most conveniently recognizable in a money-based economy by its financial aspect that poverty is often mistaken as a simple matter of income deficiency. Poverty is in reality a phenomenon of social despair. The unemployed, the unemployable, the underemployed and the working poor in developed countries have higher absolute incomes than the middle class in other less developed countries, whose members nevertheless do not consider themselves poor because they have not lost hope in themselves or self-respect for their lot. Poverty is a symptom of economic inefficiency and social dislocation in society. Its existence in an economy hurts the rich as well as the poor, and its pervasiveness in society alienates its members from one another. Aside from being dehumanizing to those suffering from it, it is destructive to the society tolerating it. Poverty becomes a political issue when the poor is structurally excluded from contributing to the economic process at a level that enables its constituents to support a dignified life in a healthy environment consistent with the cultural tradition of their society. While there would always be those who enjoy higher income than others, there is no socio-economic necessity for the poor to exist. Life without growth will become a zero sum game in which winners will gain only from the losers. In such a game, eventually all would lose because the game is self-terminating. Wealth redistribution without growth always leads to social conflicts, the final phase of which is generally settled with violence, the organized form of which is war and the unorganized form is revolution. But growth cannot be defined simply in quantitative terms. Quality of life and the range of available options are often more revealing measures. Chinese society during the time of Wu Zhao, in the early part of the Tang dynasty (618-907), is fortunate in that its economy enjoys long periods of continuous growth. Along with material growth, cultural development and social mobility also accelerate. Poverty in the form of pathological social despair is not prevalent in Tang time. To be sure, there are chronic hardship and upheavals caused by war, particularly in the border regions, by policy errors and religious fanaticism, by natural disasters and even by personal misfortune. There are also recurring incidents of governmental abuse and corruption. There are even periodic regional famines caused by natural calamities exacerbated by inadequate transportation, despite government-sponsored relief efforts. But these events are generally perceived by people as transient anomalies or force majeure, and not as structural defects of the social system. In other words, such calamities are caused by nature or personal failings of the individuals who run the system rather shortcomings of the social order itself. People readily accepted periodic disasters, the prevention of which is beyond the people's expectation of the scope and ability of the political system. However, the occurrences of natural disasters are sometimes interpreted as retribution for the immoral behavior of the ruling sovereign. This connection between the moral image of the sovereign and the fortune of the empire requires the ruler to ensure the well-being of the people. The flowering of Tang culture has its roots in the high quality of life enjoyed by all her citizens, regardless of their social positions and income levels, and the high standard of the efforts of their labor, manual or intellectual, regardless of their commercial values. Since money is only one of the determinants of a good life rather than the all consuming ingredient, the pleasures of life are not denied to those who do not aspire to financial wealth, or those who are unable to achieve it because they do not care to surrender to society's financial rules. The inner peace preached by Daoist and Buddhist precepts are verifiable by the individual's direct personal experience in the socio-economic realm of the Tang era. The rejection of materialistic concerns does not necessarily reduce one to abject poverty, nor earned society's scorn. On the contrary, hermits are respected by society and donations toward their upkeep are considered as enlightened expressions of the donors' own sagacious insight rather than ostentatious acts of charity. Generally, an imbalance exist between donors and recipients, the number wishing to give frequently exceeding the number prepared to receive. Whenever a seng (Buddhist monk) or a dao'shi (Daoist priest) or a wandering free spirit should show up in a village, his presence would be celebrated by an spontaneous outpouring of generous giving by the villagers that would resemble an instant festival. Even in modern time, sengs in Southeast Asian societies would still receive daily meals by simply walking through villages, without begging, while the pious lay population would await their habitual schedule with the finest food in the house ready to give with eagerness, the way bird-lovers would feed their ornithic idols. Chinese royalty and aristocrats cultivated respectful relationships with hermits, many of whom they offered sponsorship in their favorite retreat, Songshan, and their generous gifts were often graciously declined by the pure souls. The Selected Biographies (Lie zhuan) section of the Old Book on Tang (Jiu Tang Shu), compiled in 945, would contain a chapter on hermits, with 21 entries, prefaced by a statement that the cultivation of hermitage traditionally encourages the virtue of humility and self-restraint while discouraging vulgar trends of competition and greed, although its Confucian authors would fail to realize that a celebrated hermit is an oxymoron. By comparison, the chapter on virtuous women, prefaced by advice to them of obedience to father, husband and son, urging suicide before dishonor and if not possible, at least after dishonor, would have 30 entries and would be placed behind the chapter on hermits, but in front of the chapter on barbarians, indicative of the esteem for women by the Confucian value system. Even among the royal family members, young men voluntarily elect to decline aristocratic luxury to follow ascetic lifestyles of hermitage. Tang poet Wei Yingwu would write a famous poem expressing his admiration for the ascetic life of a nameless hermit, entitled: Remembering the Daoist in Chuanjiao Mountain (Ji Chuanjiao Shanzhong Dao'shi). It reads as follows: "Now that court and province are neglecting fasting, Suddenly I remember the guest from the mountain, Who gathers thornbushes under waterfalls, Returning to cook white pebbles. Wishing to bring him a gourd of wine, As relief for distant stormy nights; Fallen leaves having fully covered empty hills, Where can one find his tracks?" Hermits without employment are not outcast of society because the socio-economic concept of employment does not exist in Tang time. People do not have jobs, which are personal contracts in an modern industrialized economy to sell time and labor to an impersonal organization for money. The job as an economic notion would be an artificial phenomenon born of the industrial society, a necessary evil of modern life, through which money rather than personal satisfaction would be the primary reward for impersonal, piecemeal work, made tolerable by the promise of desirable non-job-related consumption to be purchased with money earned. Boredom with job-related work would be an accepted given, particularly for factory and office workers, the majority of the modern work force. Boredom at work would create the modern need for management, an euphemism for antagonistic supervision of bored workers and uncaring labor and for preemption of individual decision-making at the job site. The difference in value between the payment for work and the market value of work's productivity, less payment to management, operation and materials, would is return on capital. The high pay for management would be justified by its ability to keep wages low and production high, an aim that would create work conditions that would requires more supervision, thus creating a self-perpetuating vicious circle of more management and its seeming indispensability. It would be similar to the circular phenomenon of poverty resulting in increased crime rate which would create the need for more police which would increase public expenses paid by higher taxes which would exacerbate further poverty. In modern life, activities that are pleasurable would be considered hobbies, and only disagreeable activities would be considered work. The pain of a job, as much as its productivity, would be compensated with money. Money would be made indispensable for even basic consumption in a modern money economy. To keep workers working, prices for food and housing are artificially kept at a level to absorb most of the workers' income. In sectors of surplus productive capacity, production would be cut and workers laid-off to keep supply scarce to maintain prices. Frequently, surplus basic commodities such as grain and milk are bought up at artificially high prices, kept in storage or allowed to be destroyed or rot, so that the horrible prospect of free food destroying the incentive to work would not materialize. So all who do not have unearned income from capital would have to work for a living, thus sustaining the value of money and insuring a steady supply of workers. Leisure would be defined as the hours after the workday and as the much-awaited annual vacation, during which the pleasures of life would be pursued. Excess of leisure beyond paid vacations would be called dropping-out, or if involuntary, would be classified as unemployment, an unpleasant and disgraceful predicament, except for those lucky enough to own capital. Instead of impersonal jobs, people in Tang time have livelihoods which are functional categories of work in the socio-economic order based on each individual's own calling. The purpose of work and the purpose of life are congruent, and pride in the product of one's labor is identical with pride in one's existence. There is no need for management, which would be a sanitized euphemism in modern time for supervision of depersonalized and forced labor. This happy condition experienced by all in Tang time would still occur in modern society, but unfortunately, it would be enjoyed increasingly only by the economic and cultural elite. Leisure as an escape from the drudgery of work is an unknown concept in Tang time. Neither is the concept of vacation. Skills are developed by workers in Tang society not as a mere bargaining chip in the impersonal labor market, but as an expression of their own existential essence. The concept of junk, in the form of shoddy products, does not exist in the economic culture of the Tang dynasty, as no one is prepared to renounce his pride of personality by making artifacts below his ability. The people of Buddhist Bali have a saying: "we have no art; we do everything well." It is a Daoist concept and it applies also to Tang culture. Western imperialism in the 19th century would do more than just reducing China to material poverty by its illicit drug trade, war indemnities, and unequal treaties that imposed territorial concessions, extraterritoriality, foreign control of customs, unilaterally imposed most-favored-nation trading status for the invading countries, and a wide range of other dishonorable impositions on China's economic and political sovereignty. As damaging as these material impositions would be, they would remain less corrosive than the role played by the imposed precepts of Western imperialism in impoverishing Chinese culture, by destroying the indigenous socio-economic ideals that had once aspired toward personal and collective perfection as a purpose in life, and replacing them with a blind marathon toward maximizing productive efficiency to satisfy the thirst of alien economies across the seas. The claim made by apologists of Western imperialism of the 19th century that it would contribute, despite its other evils, to the spread of the benefits of modern civilization to an underdeveloped area of the world would not be justified by fact in China, if anywhere else. Fear of alien cultural pollution, often exploited by xenophobic fanatics in revolutionary politics, would have a substantive historical base in Modern China. The segment of the Chinese population that would achieve success in this new 19th-Century semi-colonial socio-economic environment would find it necessary to suppress its own traditional cultural ideals and to embrace the crass mercantile values that had been shunned previously by self-respecting citizens of the traditional culture, as exemplified in Tang time. The modern bourgeois class in China, not much different than its predecessor of past centuries in its basic values and outlook, would be largely uncultured. The difference is that they would be the elite of society in modern time, whereas in Tang time, they have been at the bottom of the social structure, ranking below prostitutes. The two centers of recent bourgeois prosperity in China: pre-war Shanghai and post-war Hong Kong, despite decades of financial success, would fail to produce any significant cultural achievements. Unlike historical Florence, Venice, Amsterdam, London, or Chang'an during Tang time, where the success of trade achieved by the bourgeoisie would nurture the flowering of culture enjoyed by the ruling class, the modern bourgeoisie in 19th-Century China would contribute only to the transfer of wealth from its own incompetent ruling class to the western imperial powers. Such transferred wealth would greatly enhance the cultural flowering of the ruling classes of London and Paris, and to a lesser degree Boston. Traditional Chinese culture considers merchants who buy and sell for profit, bankers who lend other people's money as a livelihood and speculators who profit from the needs of others in adversity, little better than social parasites. With its elite class in continuous decline for much of the past two centuries, Chinese culture naturally would suffer eclipse in modern time from which it would yet recover. In modern time, rare traces of traditional ideals would be found only in remote Chinese villages, untouched by the destructive influence of Western imperialism, where pride of workmanship would still show in peasant handicraft, and the quest for social harmony had not been compromised by disjointed individual initiatives. In these village societies, it would remain inconceivable that the betterment of the individual could be achieved independent of the betterment of the whole village, let alone at the expense of it. What would be bad for the village as a whole could not possibly be good for the individual villager. The revival of this focused pursuit of symbiotic union of personal fulfillment and collective ideal would be considered by many serious thinkers as a fundamental prerequisite for the renaissance of Chinese culture in modern time, as it is prevalent in Tang time. Many historians would credit this social cohesion of Tang culture, in a society of spiritual piety, ordered hierarchy, ethnic diversity, cultural assimilation, political cohesion, if not continuous stability, and social mobility, to the effectiveness of Confucian emphasis on self-restraint and the calming effect of Buddhist acceptance of fate. They would cherish the Confucian notion of natural hierarchy, balanced with the Buddhist view of all things being fundamentally equal in essence, that have permitted the pursuit of perfection to flourish at all social levels rather than being concentrated at the top. The struggle between the aims of Xiao'kang (Individual Contentment) and the vision of Da'tong (General Harmony) takes place not only during Tang time, but also throughout Chinese history, and in many ways, the same struggle would still continue in modern time after some 13 centuries. It takes place under the mantle of Chinese feudal society which has modeled its social and political structure as an extension of its basic unit: the family. Confucian ethics imprints this codified world view in the collective consciousness of the Chinese people. It regards the Chinese nation as one extended family. Filial submission is an universally aspired virtue in Chinese culture that, by definition, demands blind obedience to the patriarch father-figure, the ultimate extension of which is the ruling personality. In fact, an overly reasonable parent runs the risk of depriving his offsprings of opportunities to show their potential filial viryue. Reasonable demands only elicit behavior within the bounds of logic and normal expectancy, the satisfaction of which does not constitute virtue. It is in the blind obedience to unreasonably demanding parents that filial virtue can best be recognized. Considerate Chinese parents often wisely contrive petty eccentric demands for the benefit of their eager children. Many Chinese political leaders also understand this paradox of filial virtue and provide demanding but humanly achievable opportunities to the people for the display of loyalty and patriotism. Office is inseparable from personality in the Chinese social system where personality cult is a natural appendage to high office. As observed before, Chinese history is replete with myths of superhuman feats being attributed to the founder of every dynasty. The Confucian world view requires that the Nietzsche/Wangerian concept of the hero, who rises above the herd instinct of conventional morals and reaches for great destiny beyond good and evil, be placed above human dimensions. Only superhumanity is permitted to defy Confucian ethics, the subscription to which, because of its emphasis on moderation, would normally preclude heroic deeds. The birth and death of great leaders are frequently punctuated with supernatural events. Even the biological conception of the super-child would usually be billed as a union of a supernatural spirit in mythical form and a human mother, sometimes with the redundant earthly father bearing witness to the sacred act. Earthquakes have often been hailed as Heaven's foreboding expression of impending dynastic changes, and they are duly recorded in political court documents. Despite official discouragement, the devastating earthquake at Tangshan on July 29, 1976 would be widely and mystically associated with the death, on September 18, 1976, of Mao Zedong who, despite 4 decades of radical socialist revolution, would be an Emperor figure to many in modern China. Confucian ethics is based on a system of reciprocal duties and obligations. The ruler has the obligation of benevolence toward the people who, in return, acquiesce to the sacred duties of loyalty and obedience. The mutual acceptance by sovereign and subjects of this symbiotic ethical code is the binding force of all social and political hierarchy of China all through the ages. This ritual relationship between the benevolent ruler and the compliant subjects is so ingrained in the collective consciousness through generations of cultural conditioning and behavioral reinforcement that it has almost become a Lamarckian instinct, controlling the mentality and behavior of a quarter of the world's population for 4 millennia. Just as relative gravity binds the solar system, Confucian ethics binds the Chinese social order. The magnificence of the sun comes from the dependence of its planets for its energy, and the well-being of the planets in turn rests on the sun's life-giving rays. The same symbiosis holds true ritualistically for the Emperor and his subjects in dynastic China. Every epoch that manages to transform this conflict between Xiao'kang and Da'tong into a constructive concord needs a symbol that personifies social harmony. Henry C.K. Liu Mark Jones wrote: > http://www.eh.net/Archives/eh.res/nov-1997/Eh.Res-Re-thinking > 18th Century China Forum Summary > This forum began November 19, 1997 with a summary by Kenneth Pomeranz > regarding his recent research on 18th century China. > This posting illustrated that 1) China had living standards comparable to > Europe up to the middle of the 18th century (especially within the Yangzi > Delta) and 2) household and market allocated resources in China were as > efficient as in European countries. Although similarities exist, the > divergence between China and Europe begs the question: What did Europe have > that China did not? Pomeranz suggests that his research provides "an answer > based on ecological pressures facing all pre-industrial cores?and argues > that England?s unique escape from these problems was as dependent on good > luck and global conjectures as on endogenous developments," (November 19, > 1997). In essence, Europe had some advantages. First, the location of coal > complemented pre-industrial "core" cities. Second, " the New World, which > was populated in ways that guaranteed a much greater export orientation > than in the Chinese frontiers ." Thus, the "why Europe" (and why not China) > question may depend on these European advantages. However, many questions > remain, as indicated by the numerous topics raised during this forum. > For instance what about the role of technology in China? Greg Clark in a > November 24, 1997 message notes that even if living conditions in the > Yangzi Delta and England were similar, it does not imply that > technologically the two regions were similar. He states "even societies > with a very primitive production technology can end up with high living > standards if they have adverse disease conditions or fertility control." > Brad DeLong responds that "the extremely rapid growth of China?s (and > India?s) early modern populations suggests an impressive degree of > technological dynamism," (November 24, 1997). > Also, what about the role of financial markets in China? Ed Perkins notes > the importance of European financial markets during the 17th and 18th > centuries in a November 24, 1997 posting, but he wonders how this compares > to China? Gunder Frank explains that Asia excelled in the financial sector > as well, (November 25, 1997). He states, for instance, that the interest > rate in Southeast Asia was the same as in Europe and that "Europeans > BORROWED and raised capital on the Asian capital markets ALL the time in > the 17th and 18th centuries." > Therefore, do these differences explain why the Industrial Revolution > occurred in Europe and not in China? George Grantham explains the response > of economic history to the question "why are we so rich and dynamic, and > they so poor and stagnant," (November 27, 1997). Essentially, everyone was > poor due to European colonization or exploitation, and Europe had a special > ingredient that everyone else lacked. Referring to Pomeranz?s research, > Grantham indicates that "[i]t is the notion that deep-seated differences in > civilization explain differences in long-run economic performance that > Pomeranz?s findings implicitly challenge." Further, "[t]he work also points > up the problem of again thinking about the sources of the remarkable > technological breakthrough of the last eighteenth and early nineteenth > century." > In fact, Pomeranz sees his paper?s contribution "as more a matter of > influencing the way we set up the ?Why England? question" (November 27, > 1997). Undoubtedly this forum raised questions and promoted discussion on > the topic of Chinese and European industrialization during the 18th century. > The following is the list of posting for the Re-Thinking 18th Century China > Forum. I have indicated which postings are unrelated to the discussion: > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Joshua L. Rosenbloom (Wed Nov > 19 1997 - 09:54:01 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Ken Pomeranz (Wed Nov 19 1997 - > 10:20:00 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Brad De Long (Wed Nov 19 1997 - > 17:52:15 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Joshua L. Rosenbloom (Mon Nov > 24 1997 - 10:18:15 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Gregory Clark (Mon Nov 24 1997 > - 10:42:00 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Brad De Long (Mon Nov 24 1997 - > 11:44:57 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China D. McCloskey (Mon Nov 24 1997 - > 12:04:50 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Brad De Long (Mon Nov 24 1997 - > 13:09:07 EST) > EH.R: Oops... Joshua L. Rosenbloom (Mon Nov 24 1997 - 14:54:05 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Edwin J. Perkins (Mon Nov 24 > 1997 - 14:54:06 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Michael Perelman (Mon Nov 24 > 1997 - 14:54:06 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China D. McCloskey (Mon Nov 24 1997 - > 14:54:07 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Gunder Frank (Mon Nov 24 1997 - > 16:42:10 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Fred Carstensen (Tue Nov 25 > 1997 - 13:34:19 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Gregory Clark (Tue Nov 25 1997 > - 13:34:19 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Gunder Frank (Tue Nov 25 1997 - > 13:34:18 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Prof. G. Grantham (Thu Nov 27 > 1997 - 23:14:42 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Anthony Patrick O'Brien (Thu > Nov 27 1997 - 23:14:54 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Ken Pomeranz (Thu Nov 27 1997 - > 23:32:05 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Fred Carstensen (Thu Nov 27 > 1997 - 23:32:10 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Gunder Frank (Thu Nov 27 1997 - > 23:32:21 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China D. McCloskey (Wed Nov 26 1997 - > 12:53:02 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China D. McCloskey (Wed Nov 26 1997 - > 12:53:03 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Fred Carstensen (Wed Nov 26 > 1997 - 12:53:03 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Edwin J. Perkins (Wed Nov 26 > 1997 - 16:16:26 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Fred Carstensen (Sat Nov 29 > 1997 - 17:01:04 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China D. McCloskey (Sat Nov 29 1997 - > 17:01:07 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Prof. G. Grantham (Sat Nov 29 > 1997 - 17:01:14 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Jurrien de Jong (Sun Nov 30 > 1997 - 22:14:32 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China Fred Carstensen (Sun Nov 30 > 1997 - 22:14:39 EST) > EH.R: FORUM: Re-thinking 18th Century China -Reply SAARONSON at BROOK.EDU (Mon > Dec 01 1997 - 16:42:40 EST) From CharlesB at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us Wed Nov 28 12:33:20 2001 From: CharlesB at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 14:33:20 -0500 Subject: [A-List] is War supposed to be personal???? Message-ID: is War supposed to be personal???? From: www.tomjoyner.com breezing is War something that is supposed to be personal or something that is viewed as necessary? this War on Terrorism seems to be something that resembles a personal vendetta. i will feel this moreso if the U.S. continues to bait Iraq into a showdown over its War making ability. please help a fella understand a little better! SpiritualONE ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Breezin, >From all the research I've done, this war is about BUSINESS. Since the beginning of this nation, power through wealth; control through fear; and domination by killing has been its pattern of thinking. breezing Member posted November 28, 2001 07:57 AM -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- byDesign & S1, thanks to both of you for helping a fella understand a little better. byDsign, i think a lot of folks are feeling confused about just where this War on Terrorism is going to go. S1, i think a lot of this War on Terrorism is about business. i have yet to see General Powell or Franks or Scharkaup (sp) or any military folks actually behave like they enjoy the fact that they have to order folks to kill the enemy. they simply speak on strategy and the need to win this War mostly. Prez and Rumsfeld seem to relish in the fact that all this killing is going on. these 2 remind me of the folks they had on T.V. who were rejoicing in the fact that the Great Satan had been hit! if it is necessary to win this War and keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of despots; i can agree with that. i will never relish in the fact that folks are being killed! xonstructacles -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ->something that resembles a personal vendetta How so? ------------------ "To err is human. Ignorance? That's your own damned fault" I deebad1 You must understand the the US economy thrives on the the War=Boom=Bust=War=Boom=Bust ad nauseum. Let's face it, this is Bush's prayers answered. He gets to ram through a lot of controversial laws, He gets to reward his cronies (airlines bailout) Defense spending rises. as Marvin would say "What's Going On?" So is war personal? Is your pockets personal? you be the judge. Sofine - War is personal it is about money and power and always planned........... ------------------ KNOWLEDGE IS IN THE HANDS OF THE FEW AND THE REST ARE KEPT IGNORANT. THE CLASSIC STRUCTURE FOR MANIPULATION AND CONTROL REDBONE ----- So, I guess we are supposed to just sit back and chill after 5,000+ are taken off the planet. I thank God I didn't lose a loved one to that dreadful day, 911. ------------------ Fear knocked on the door, Faith opened it, and there was no one there! Oneway This war is about dismantling the Taliban who previously made laws banning "poppy" farms (where heroin is made), and with the Taliban gone these poppy farmers are all but ready to grow new batches. You just keep observing, and soon there will be a resurgence of heroin on the streets------keep watching!!! From tomzbox at hotmail.com Thu Nov 29 04:36:17 2001 From: tomzbox at hotmail.com (Tom Warren) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 04:36:17 Subject: [A-List] bordgewahzees Message-ID: Hullo Rob! you ask: >And did you arrive at the conclusion that value is abstract labour? Nah. I've concluded that value is whatever the writer intends it to be in any email, there is no agreement individual to individual, certainly not among Marxists I have read. >ie. >labour performed according to the dictates of commodity exchange? I've concluded value is dictated by the biosphere, which also allows commodity exchange to exist -- temporarily. > ie. where >society allocates labour indirectly, through the market? I've concluded that society is unable to allocate the labor of nature directly or indirectly. The market you speak of exists inside of nature (or the biosphere, take yer pick) and is therefore subject to the laws of nature; however this is overlooked by economists (ALL economists) because nature has not recently produced a comprehensive bill for labor, services rendered, materials expended, and shop clean-up. >ie. where the >allocation of social labour is executed in a society based on private >labour? I've concluded that social labor is but a component of value added to any "commodity". Whether the labor is private or social has little relation to the true value of commodities or resources; however, societies (and economists) are temporarily able to ignore this because the biosphere is slow to "execute" its allocations. Excuse them, it is hard for societies (and economists) to deal with a market that produces calls on true commodity value only every 10000 years or so; or daily in amounts usually too small for econometrics to calculate, transaction by transaction. >ie. where the common element that allows the commodities produced to be >exchanged is therefore indirectly social (abstract) labour? This is where I usually begin to be unsuccessful in understanding concepts of "value", since most who present their economic models exclude the primary/fundamental/basic/original (take your pick of adjectives)commodity producer and ignore --or are unaware of -- the laws of the unique market of the first exchange of any commodity. THAT first market does not conform to the laws or concepts of 'the marketplace' as they are taught to (all) economists. Since all subsequent markets exist within the laws/framework/'universe' of the original market, they are subject to what the original market will allow or not allow, ... only those subsequent markets don't know it and behave dysfunctionally as a result. >ie. where it seems that, while value allows exchange, it is that > >production is for exchange that produces value? Yes, you put your finger on a common element, coexisting with Darwinian Evolution. Generally speaking (although often not), production IS for exchange that produces value. However the biosphere controls all exchanges, not the markets, and the biosphere defines (and produces) "value" in a very much more inclusive and intensive way than is generally perceived by (all) economists. >ie. that value is realised when the market recognises as >social the apparently private act of production in the moment of exchange? Nah. I've concluded that actual value is something more than "social", but this can be widely perceived, apparently, only at the moment when the biosphere refuses any longer to produce the commodity, i.e when it becomes very difficult to realize value due to the laws of the original market. (Think of breathable air being withheld by the original producer (biosphere), or water, or agricultural land. We won't mention petroleum -- we just won't go there.) >ie. that the value of a commodity is the sum of the labour time socially >necessary to produce it? My conclusion is: absolutely not. This is the point where most of those defining value make their fatal misstep. Remove the word "socially" from your definition, and substitute something like "naturally" and you approach understanding the concept. .. or so I have concluded. >If this is what value is, if it is the grand relation that constitutes and >drives us in this day and age, might it be said that the radical >environmentalist is obliged to be a radical economist? Mebbe even a (gulp) >Marxist? > >Waddya reckon? Ahhh. That's certainly the question *I* have been considering. So far I have been led to conclude that a) this day and age is not sufficiently differentiated from other days and ages in the past 10,000 or so years; and b) the question is rather "Might it be said that the radical economist* is obliged to be a radical environmentalist? Mebbe even a (horrors) Biocentric Leftist?" [Apologies to David Orton. ] *Not to put too fine a point on it, but I have yet to meet a "radical" economist who has been able to free himself from the shackles of his 'education' long enough to listen to the approaching thunder of the biosphere as it prepares to present its long overdue bill ... Thanks for your attempt to explain value to me, Rob. (really) My bordgewah economics clearly have been unable so far to adequately present an understanding of value acceptable to many, or to lead me to conclusions other than those above, unfortunately. I'll keep at it. I keep listening. Tom "The man who does not read good books has no advantage over the man who can't read them." -- Mark Twain _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp From soncu at pacbell.net Wed Nov 28 22:54:47 2001 From: soncu at pacbell.net (Sabri Oncu) Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2001 21:54:47 -0800 Subject: [A-List] bordgewahzees In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Merhaba Tom, > Ahhh. That's certainly the question *I* have been considering. So far I have > been led to conclude that a) this day and age is not sufficiently > differentiated from other days and ages in the past 10,000 or so years; and > b) the question is rather "Might it be said that the radical economist* is > obliged to be a radical environmentalist? Mebbe even a (horrors) Biocentric > Leftist?" [Apologies to David Orton. ] Hey, not only many radical economists but also many radical mathematicians already became radical environmentalists and we have been waiting you radical environmentalists to become, who knows, mebbe, Marxists! > *Not to put too fine a point on it, but I have yet to meet a "radical" > economist who has been able to free himself from the shackles of his > 'education' long enough to listen to the approaching thunder of the > biosphere as it prepares to present its long overdue bill .. Mebbe you have a circle of acquaintances that does not include the right kind of economists. How would I know? A few of those I know think differently though. Where are you from by the way? USA? Hosca, Sabri Oncu From tomzbox at hotmail.com Thu Nov 29 06:41:43 2001 From: tomzbox at hotmail.com (Tom Warren) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 06:41:43 Subject: [A-List] bordgewahzees Message-ID: Merhaba Sabri, (is 'Yassu' an improper greeting?) you wrote: >Hey, not only many radical economists but also many radical mathematicians >already became radical environmentalists and we have been waiting you >radical environmentalists to become, who knows, mebbe, Marxists!< I'm tryin' Sabri, just gotta cut through these misapprehensions o' mine. I assume you wish an honest conversion. BTW, I do know a bunch of rad enviros who ARE Marxists, ... many on this list. You quoted my a) and b) back at me, what did you think of a)? >Mebbe you have a circle of acquaintances that does not include the right >kind of economists. How would I know? A few of those I know think >differently though.< Yes, I think I got carried away by hyperbole in responding to Rob,(it simply was too much fun -- turning the phrase around). I have in fact encountered a small number of economics speakers who do think differently. There are several very good economists on this list who are the 'right kind', er, ... I mean the 'left' kind, er .. whatever. It's not the failure of them or my circle of acquaintances; I think it's chiefly a language difficulty, coupled with my obtuseness. However, I think I've had my 15 minutes on the list this week, so I am gonna try to listen awhile rather than continue to beat this particular dead horse. I suspect I'm in over my head, anyway. You are a radical mathmetician, I am guessing? best, Tom Warren Pleasant Hill, Oregon, USofA _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp From cburford at gn.apc.org Thu Nov 29 00:35:38 2001 From: cburford at gn.apc.org (Chris Burford) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 07:35:38 +0000 Subject: [A-List] USA - Europe - Russia [was "Britain to join euro"] In-Reply-To: <5.1.0.14.2.20011128094728.00ac7db8@pop.tiscali.co.uk> References: <4.3.2.7.1.20011128063939.030f78e0@pop3.norton.antivirus> <3C043729.676C315C@mindspring.com> Message-ID: <4.3.2.7.1.20011129063416.033717f0@pop3.norton.antivirus> At 28/11/01 09:54 +0000, Mark wrote: >At 28/11/2001 06:58, Chris wrote: > > >>I have been surprised by the strength and timing of Blair's statements >>about moving towards the euro at his Labour conference speech and last week. > >Like I say, Euroland is a big fat goose ready for plucking, and covetous >eyes are on it. If the EU doesn't get its own military together (bottom >line) then it will end up under the Kremlin-White House Axis. >Tony Blair's panic-stricken conversion to the euro (ie, the new EU money) >comes after long and evidently more than fruitless midnight-hour talks >with Dubya. One thing especially Tony inistsed on, is that the war must >not be extended to Iraq. This is a crucial Rubicon for the EU states which >depend for their energy security on the preservation of existing >relationship with Middle Eastern oil states. Euroland can only lose from >the proposed Russo-American revision of the mid-east architecture. The >reason is simple. Oil is gonna be scarce and hard to get, and in the >Middle East the Americans are pushing Euroland down on to the hind tit. >This is in Russian interests: they want to end up the dominant power in >Europe. This gives them still more control over the energy taps into >Europe. This is a merciless game of loot and plunder, and now Europe >itself has become one of the prizes. > >Mark This is a three way battle of power between USA - Europe - Russia, all under the umbrella of the Coalition against Terror. (I think it is undoubtedly clear that Britain is getting squeezed and the only future for Blair and Brown is to play world politicians.) In the bigger question that Mark focusses on here, I would say that Western Europe is more powerful economically than Russia and has opportunities to play Russia off against the USA. It could build some geographical economic collaboration with Russia, including eastern European countries, which would strengthen its economic power versus the USA. I agree it is militarily weak, and that war against Iraq (as well as some sort of Palestinian peace settlement) is a crucial issue for Europe. Chris Burford From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Thu Nov 29 02:21:38 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 09:21:38 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: THE BUSH DOCTRINE: 2,3 MANY WARS Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011129092010.00aa7dd0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> To: Recipient list Subject: THE BUSH DOCTRINE: 2,3 MANY WARS The following article will appear in the Dec. 1 issue of the email Mid-Hudson (N.Y.) Activist Newsletter & Calendar. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- THE BUSH DOCTRINE: 2, 3, MANY MORE WARS By Jack A. Smith The Bush administration appears to be near completion in its process of transforming the Sept. 11 terror attacks into a gift from the political gods to pursue any right-wing course of action it deems necessary to further the new "war on terrorism." Number one on the ultra-conservative agenda is for the U.S. empire to continue striking back at countries throughout the world long after the government of Afghanistan has been dispatched--regardless of whether they had any connection to the September tragedy. Iraq will be next on President Bush's retaliatory hit list if the influential far-rightists within the administration, the key Republican think-tanks and the private sector conservatives have their way. After that, targets may include the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) or Iran or Syria, Sudan, Lebanon, Somalia, Libya and others of up to 50 countries Vice President Dick Cheney alleges engage in, or support, terrorism. Indeed, even countries such as Cuba or left liberation movements in Colombia or the Philippines may be included in White House designs. Number two on the agenda of reaction is to utilize the "war on terrorism" as a pretext to impose repressive restrictions on civil liberties and vastly increase police and government surveillance powers, as well as demanding massive increases in war spending for such projects as a missile defense network, the passage of tax breaks and giveaways to big business, and for further destruction of the natural environment. In this article we will concentrate on the Bush administration's intention to spread its wars to other countries. >From the first days after the hijacked airliners crashed into the Pentagon and World Trade Center, President Bush and the right wing recognized the creation of a unique opportunity to attain geopolitical objectives heretofore discussed among the initiate only in hushed tones. "Why not," they whispered, obviously in effect, "get rid of the whole damn bunch of 'em?" All, that is, who cause grief to the most powerful state in history by disobeying orders, by opposing Washington's plans, by acting independently, or like "rogues," or socialists, or revolutionaries. "All of 'em--when we can get away with it." And now, suggest the ultra-conservatives, the political constellations are approximating alignment. The citizenry--traumatized, fearful, and misled by a jingoist mass media--at this stage appears to support whatever action the Commander-in-Chief dictates. The abject Democratic Party, draped in the national flag as it kneels before White House, can hardly assume the posture of a political opposition. Some politicians may later join the antiwar forces when the public mood inevitably changes -- but now is when the strategic war decisions are being made. President Bush evidenced sophisticated political savvy by choosing to interpret the attacks by a small, amorphous private network of fanatical suicide soldiers as an act of war against the United States. That decision automatically transfigured the leader of a weakening administration into an avenging wartime president of the world's only superpower, with all the prerogatives associated with this elevated status, not the least being a circling of the popular, political and patriotic wagons around his singular leadership. Since history suggests an act of war can only be perpetrated by another country, the White House decided to incriminate poor and bedraggled Afghanistan. After all, its government--the Taliban, which took power in Kabul as a consequence of U.S. interference in the Afghan civil war--remained friendly with the expatriate Saudi billionaire, Osama bin Laden, a couple of years after Washington decided to excoriate this right-wing former "freedom fighter" as the "Evil One" because of his alleged leadership of the Al Qaeda fundamentalist holy war network. Describing him as the "mastermind" behind the Sept. 11 assault, Washington seeks the capture of the presently cave-dwelling bin Laden "dead or alive," most preferably dead. A court trial, actually, might prove embarrassing to the prosecution since the U.S. has refused to provide any proof of the suspect's guilt. In another example of political acumen in pursuit of his real objectives, Bush announced soon after the terror strike that he was launching a "war against terrorism" that would last several years and involve an undetermined number of countries. He asked for general approval of his plan without ever revealing specific details. The national chauvinist response of a submissive Congress was a hearty "so be it." The bipartisan congressional authorization Bush received to launch his vague, all-encompassing "war on terrorism" conferred upon the president an authority unparalleled in the nation's history to wage war when and where he sought fit. The quickly forming antiwar movement and the small political left, immediately comprehending the fearsome political implications of what just transpired, howled warnings that were either suppressed by the corporate media or dismissed as unpatriotic. Even many nominal progressives, after watching the World Trade Center crumble, intimated that it was inappropriate to oppose Bush's impending wars during this period of remorse and national unity. Bush may have concealed the details but he was frank about his broad objectives. "From this day forward," the president postulated in his Sept. 20 address to Congress, "any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." He then indicated formally that his war will at first be directed against Al Qaeda, but "it will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated." Well before his speech, the State Department had already identified Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan, Cuba and the DPRK as "countries that support terrorism." In subsequent weeks, high administration officials added scores more countries to a list of those "where global terrorist networks operate." Congress (including all our Mid-Hudson representatives) essentially remained mute as the White House publicly planned for a multiplicity of wars intended to crush any remaining opposition to U.S. imperial domination. By Nov. 21, wearing the Screaming Eagles jacket of the 101st Airborne Division, Bush was telling the assembled troops in Fort Campbell, Ky., "Afghanistan is just the beginning of the war against terror. There are other terrorists who threaten America and our friends, and there are other nations willing to sponsor them. We will not be secure as a nation until all of these threats are defeated. Across the world, and across the years, we will fight these evil ones, and we will win....America has a message for the nations of the world. If you harbor terrorists, you are terrorists. If you train or arm a terrorist, you are a terrorist. If you feed a terrorist or fund a terrorist, you're a terrorist, and you will be held accountable by the United States and our friends." This was later termed by the White House the "Bush Doctrine." Bush named no particular country, or time when the U.S. would attack, or precisely what he meant by a terrorist. The definition keeps expanding. By Nov. 26, in a harsh warning to both Iraq and the DPRK, Bush was saying that "If they develop weapons of mass destruction that will be used to terrorize nations, they will be held accountable." The next day the New York Times reported, "Mr. Bush insisted that he had not widened the definition of what his administration considers terrorism, even though he did not mention weapons of mass destruction in his speech to Congress. 'Have I expanded the definition?' Mr. Bush said [in answer to a question]. 'I've always had that definition, as far as I'm concerned." His obvious contempt of Congress virtually passed unnoticed. The Bush administration, as had the earlier Clinton regime, maintains that that the Iraqi government is bent on developing weapons of mass destruction, even though former UN Special Commission chief inspector Scott Ritter disclosed two years ago that "Iraq today possesses no meaningful weapons of mass destruction," nor has it the means to produce or deploy such weapons. On Oct. 19, Ritter--once a staunch critic of Iraq--wrote in the Guardian (UK) that "Fears that the hidden hand of [Iraqi president] Saddam Hussein lies behind these attacks are based on rumor and speculation that...fail to support the weight of the charge.... Iraq's biological weapons programs were dismantled, destroyed, or rendered harmless during the course of hundreds of no-notice inspections." Bush also declared that "I made it very clear to North Korea that, in order for us to have relations with them, that we want to know, are they developing weapons of mass destruction and they ought to stop proliferating." Under a previous agreement with the U.S. the DPRK agreed to inspections in 2005, but Bush appears to be demanding immediate compliance -- or else. Pyongyang, which emphatically denies constructing such weapons, has never retreated after previous U.S. threats and--poor as it is these days--is hardly expected to do so now. A day after Bush's comments about the DPRK, Under-Secretary of State John Bolton declared in Geneva at a conference convened to strengthen the 1972 Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (see Nov. 17 newsletter for background) that five countries, all so-called "Rogue States," are developing germ weapons--Iraq, the DPRK, Iran, Libya and Syria. He offered absolutely no proof for his vague accusations. The New York Times reported, the allegations "are intended to deflect criticism of the Bush administration from those who say it is Washington that has undermined the treaty...for rejecting an agreement that was meant to strengthen compliance by establishing an inspection system." The White House has thus set the stage for attacking both countries, among others. Whether it does so is a matter that has been under discussion within the administration since the concept of an open-ended, several-year war against various countries was broached. A division on this question within the ruling class is reflected in a factional struggle between moderate warhawks, evidently led by Secretary of State Colin Powell, and extreme warhawks led by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Powell's main concern is that an attack on Iraq will result in the collapse of his carefully constructed diplomatic house-of-cards, the "Partnership of Nations" coalition supporting the "war on terrorism." Powell is reported to be of the opinion that the coalition will disintegrate if its Moslem members withdraw. For example, Saudi Arabia--which is hardly a friend of the Baghdad government--has made it publicly known that its intelligence operatives in the Middle East have found absolutely no link between Iraq and the terror attacks or bin Laden and his apparatus. Several other Arab and Muslim countries have hinted that they would not support an attack on Iraq. To the charge made by the anti-Iraq faction that Iraq is the source of the anthrax traces found in the U.S., Powell points out that no evidence has been uncovered to substantiate the charge. Indeed, scientists, the Justice Department and FBI all seem to think the anthrax spores that killed a handful of Americans were produced in the United States and were probably disseminated by the extreme right. The recent implied threats against Iraq and the DPRK are evidence that the far-right pressure on the Bush administration is beginning to produce dividends. Soon after Bush announced his "war on terrorism," Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz emerged as the front-man for his boss, Rumsfeld, in leading a coterie of high-ranking ultra-conservative Pentagon officials in a crusade to crush a virtually crippled Iraq and destroy the Saddam Hussein government. They were quickly joined by an impressive conglomeration of conservatives from right-wing think tanks, publications and organizations. A Wall St. Journal editorial in October suggested Iraq should be attacked because of alleged involvement in the anthrax scare. Writers such as William Safire of the New York Times have devoted several columns to insisting on extending the war to Baghdad. He also suggests that the Palestine Liberation Organization is a terrorist group that should become a Bush target. Leading conservatives, including such luminaries as Midge Decter, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Richard Perle, William Kristol and Norman Podhoretz distributed an open letter in late September insisting that "even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the [Sept. 11] attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power." Conservative Democrats, such as Sen. Joseph Lieberman, his party's candidate for vice president in last year's election, are demanding that Iraq become the target after Afghanistan. They are joined by old war-horses from previous Republican regimes such as former Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger who announced Sept. 29 that after Afghanistan, "you have to be ready to proceed against Saddam Hussein." Obviously speaking for the president, White House National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice told CNN Nov. 18 that "We didn't need Sept. 11 to tell us that he [Hussein] is a threat to our interests. We'll deal with that situation eventually." A day earlier, Reuters reported that the Pentagon "will send an extra 2,000 troops to Kuwait as a deterrent to Iraq." Some 5,000 U.S. soldiers have been stationed in Kuwait, a former province wrenched from Iraq by British imperialism, for a decade. In recent days a number of administration officials have been identifying possible targets for "phase 2" of the "war on terrorism." The CIA indicated that terror cells exist in Syria, Yemen and the Sudan. Others have pinpointed Lebanon for harboring Hezbollah, one of 22 alleged "terrorist organizations" on the White House target list. The Beirut government maintained that Hezbollah is waging a legitimate campaign against the Israeli occupation of Arab land, arguing that a distinction must be made "between terrorism, which we condemn, and people's right to struggle for the liberation of their occupied territories." Rumsfeld evidently has selected the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a target in the "war on terrorism" if extreme warhawks get their way. After a recent Washington news conference, the Associated Press reported that Rumsfeld said "North Korea poses a 'very real' threat to the United States through its missile development, export policies and attempts to produce weapons of mass destruction." Exceptionally few U.S. newspapers have taken a stance in opposition to Bush's war proliferation plans. The New York Times, which appears to support the moderate warhawk faction led by Powell, cautioned the White House that it would "make a serious mistake by moving to wage war in Iraq," principally because this would "almost certainly shatter" the Partnership of Nations coalition. At this stage, the Bush administration simply refuses to reveal the location of its next targets. Since the faction fighting over Iraq is evidently continuing, an interim enemy may be attacked first. Asked at a press conference Nov. 19 whether the U.S. would be waging war on another country after Afghanistan, Rumsfeld stated unambiguously, "I have no doubt in my mind." Meanwhile, the war against Afghanistan continues apace. At this writing, U.S. warplanes are carpet-bombing alleged Taliban strongholds while Washington's surrogate rightist army, the Northern Alliance, occupies the cities as they fall, often massacring government soldiers and foreign volunteers even when they surrender. An intense manhunt is underway for bin Laden and operatives of the Al Qaeda network said to reside in Afghanistan. Simultaneously, the Bush administration is attempting to construct a client puppet government in Kabul to replace the Taliban, relying on the elderly, discredited monarch deposed in 1973 to function as the symbolic ruler. Only the incredibly naive believe such a coalition--composed of competing right-wing factions and war lords--will long exist before the resumption of internecine warfare. The White House has made certain to exclude any of the remaining progressive forces which supported the besieged 1978-92 left-wing government which the U.S. played a major part in eradicating. The despicable terror attacks of September, and the grief and pain thus engendered, now appear to be on the brink of transmutation into a dream-come-true for the far right, the militarists and all who support U.S. world hegemony. This is precisely what peace advocates were opposing at the Sept. 29 demonstration in Washington when they chanted, "Our Grief Is Not A Cry For War!" There's still time in the next weeks and months for sufficient public pressure to force the Bush administration to alter and perhaps reverse course, but this will require a large migration of public sentiment into the antiwar camp, supported by at least a substantial minority in Congress. Considering that most liberals and too many progressives still remain lashed to their flagpoles, along with virtually all members of Congress and just about the entire mass media, this is obviously a tall order. In time, however, when the scabrous reality of Bush's "war on terrorism" overpowers the jingoism and confusion of the moment, the antiwar movement may once again be presented with an opportunity it hasn't enjoyed since the '70s--to oblige the government to end its wars and bring the troops home where they belong. (end) From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Thu Nov 29 02:43:34 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 09:43:34 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Enron faces ruin as Dynegy rescue collapses Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011129094120.02b7ae88@pop.tiscali.co.uk> [while working in Russia I had dealings at a high level with Enron management and found them to be the best to work with among the managmennt of western oil corps I came across. I find it extraordinary that Enron has now gone bust, and the cirucmstances--the tales of corruption and intrigue, the JP Morgan connecxtion--still more so. Mark] Richard Wray in New York Thursday November 29, 2001 The Guardian Enron, formerly one of America's leading power companies and owner of Wessex Water in the UK, last night stood on the brink of bankruptcy after the collapse of a rescue merger with smaller rival Dynegy. Dynegy said it has been forced to abandon its merger after receiving fresh information about the trading position of its heavily indebted target. However, it added that it had used a $1.5bn (?1bn) loan from ChevronTexaco, which owns a 26% stake in Dynegy, to buy out Enron's North American pipeline assets. Dynegy chairman and chief executive Chuck Watson said yesterday the company had invoked the "material adverse change" clause in its merger agreement with Enron in order to get out of the merger. "Sometimes a company's best deals are the ones they did not do," he said. "We knew when to say no and this morning we said no." Analysts expect Enron to seek bankruptcy protection and several banks on both sides of the Atlantic could find themselves out of pocket. The greatest risk is likely to be felt by JP Morgan Chase and Schroder Salomon Smith Barney. According to analysts Fox-Pitt Kelton in London, European banks involved include Barclays - with the largest exposure - Dutch bank ABN Amro, Credit Suisse of Switzerland and Royal Bank of Scotland. Shortly before the deal collapsed, credit ratings agencies Moody's and Standard & Poor's downgraded Enron to junk status. The news sent shares in Enron and Dynegy into freefall before they were suspended. Enron was also forced to halt trading on its online energy platform, once seen as the company's key asset. Fox-Pitt Kelton raised the possibility of "material disruption" to the US financial system if Enron fails to maintain its promises in the energy derivatives market. The move by S&P and Moody's means Enron, already struggling under $13bn worth of debts, must find a further $3.9bn to pay off bondholders and faces an additional bill of $7bn relating to a series of bad investments made over the past few years. Dynegy initially announced plans to buy out Enron earlier this month for about $10bn. But it was forced to return to the negotiating table last week, after Enron announced it needed more cash than originally thought to stay in business. The original deal, announced in early November, valued Enron at $10.41 per share. Over the weekend Dynegy was looking to cut the price in half. However, yesterday's news from the rating agencies left Enron shares trading at just over $1. At one point the New York Stock Exchange's trading system was unable to keep up with the number of sell orders as investors rushed to get out of the company before its collapse. A year ago the company's shares changed hands at $85. It was unclear last night what will happen to the remaining parts of Enron, not being bought by Dynegy. In 1998, Enron's Azurix business bought Wessex Water, which supplies water to around 1.5m households and businesses in the west of England. Ofwat, the water regulator, has been keeping a close watch on Enron. The water company remains "ring-fenced" from other parts of the energy group and although Wessex could come under new ownership as a result of Enron's demise its ability to continue providing water and waste water services will not be affected. From CharlesB at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us Thu Nov 29 08:02:10 2001 From: CharlesB at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 10:02:10 -0500 Subject: [A-List] bordgewahzees Message-ID: There's exchange value and use value ? Charles >>> bantam at dingoblue.net.au 11/28/01 11:53AM >>> G'day Tom, > >must have spent hours unsuccessfully trying to understand the > >definition of "value", alone! And did you arrive at the conclusion that value is abstract labour? ie. labour performed according to the dictates of commodity exchange? ie. where society allocates labour indirectly, through the market? ie. where the allocation of social labour is executed in a society based on private labour? ie. where the common element that allows the commodities produced to be exchanged is therefore indirectly social (abstract) labour? ie. where it seems that, while value allows exchange, it is that production is for exchange that produces value? ie. that value is realised when the market recognises as social the apparently private act of production in the moment of exchange? ie. that the value of a commodity is the sum of the labour time socially necessary to produce it? If this is what value is, if it is the grand relation that constitutes and drives us in this day and age, might it be said that the radical environmentalist is obliged to be a radical economist? Mebbe even a (gulp) Marxist? Waddya reckon? Cheers, Rob. From lnp3 at panix.com Thu Nov 29 09:12:25 2001 From: lnp3 at panix.com (Louis Proyect) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 11:12:25 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Ben Cashdan films on South Africa and globalization Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.20011129111225.006e40ec@popserver.panix.com> Last night I saw two documentary films by Ben Cashdan, a South African comrade who works with Debate magazine. (Schedule below) The first film dealt with apartheid, gold and Swiss banks. The second is a work in progress that addresses the question of globalization and South Africa. During Ben's running commentary throughout the second film, audience reactions were so intense that shouting matches nearly made it impossible for the film to continue. In the brief q&a period following the film, long-time anti-apartheid activist Danny Schechter criticized what he perceived as the "didactic" and strident quality of the second film. Speaking after Danny, I not only defended Cashdan's questioning of Thabo Mbeki's "new" South Africa, but also suggested that the questioning probably did not go far enough. I want to elaborate on my comments, as well as providing some context for the films and the current situation. The first film, titled "Apartheid Gold," lasts 20 minutes and was first presented on Swiss television. It draws a vivid contrast between a black gold miner named Samson, who was disabled in an underground accident, and the Swiss bankers who did business with South Africa during the period when sanctions were in effect. For people who have never seen these bankers in operation before (including myself), it is a real eye-opener. They are utterly ghoulish. Ben's style, which is influenced by 60 Minutes, allows these people to dig their own graves through statements to the effect that by buying South African gold, they--rather than protests--were responsible for the end of apartheid. Meanwhile, Ben follows Samson around in his wheelchair in a township near Welkom, where he lives in a corrugated tin shack with his six children. Anticipating the second film, the narrator (Ben) states that nothing has changed in Welkom, a gold-mining center. The blacks still live in township shacks and the whites still live privileged lives. To set up the second film, Ben showed a brief interview of another Swiss businessman whose construction company operated in South Africa during apartheid and who had the same cynical line as the bankers in the first. Thabo Mbeki has just named this creep honorary consul. The second film, untitled as yet, focuses on the new social movements in South Africa in defense of squatters' rights, etc. It includes footage of the recent Conference on Racism in South Africa and the World Economic Forum in Zurich, both of which serve to dramatize the difficulties facing post-apartheid South Africa as well as the temporizing quality of its leaders, especially Thabo Mbeki, who never met a neoliberal policy that he didn't like. In contrast to Mbeki, we see Fatima Meer--official biographer of Nelson Mandela--at the head of demonstrators pressing demands on a sheepish ANC representative, who tells them that Mbeki is too busy to see them. Cashdan told us that Meer is planning to resign from the ANC because of its rightward drift. She is ten years younger than Mandela and also spent years in prison. The first footage we see at the World Economic Forum consists of some European guy in a thousand dollar suit quoting Karl Marx to the largely white audience of government officials and bankers. In making some point about the need to "lift up" the Third World, he stresses the need to relate time and money--as "Karl Marx often did." One is reminded of Doug Henwood's speech to Zizek's Essen Conference where he fretted over the unpopularity of Karl Marx among Wall Street movers and shakers. Perhaps there's hope after all. When a member of the audience suggests that global inequality might be relieved through a redistribution of wealth that might leave the first world a little bit less well off, Mbeki once again makes cynical use of Karl Marx. Stating that the stomach must be full before the mind can be expanded, Mbeki sets forth a scenario that would enable the average South African to live like Westerners. VCR's, cars, etc. should be available to everybody, not just the citizens of the USA or Western Europe. Implicit in this argument is the notion that private property can deliver such goods, when in fact private property has robbed people of clean water and electricity throughout his country. There is no sense in talking about cars and VCR's when nearly half the country is unemployed. Cashdan made the point that during apartheid South Africa was the second most equal society in the world after Brazil. Now it is the first. Ben has an extended interview with George Soros in Zurich, where he tries to do the same number as he did with the Swiss bankers in the first. Don't you feel some responsibility for the misery in the third world, Ben asks? With all the money Soros has accumulated through financial speculation, surely he can pitch in with the rebuilding of South Africa. Soros turns out to be much more cagey than the Swiss. Not only does he explain that he is trying to return vast quantities of his fortune through philanthropy (largely true), he also tells Ben that he is a defender of the Tobin Tax, which is a primary demand of ATTAC, the official European anti-globalization movement. In fact, the Soros Documentary Fund has backed courageous documentaries like Ben's. Go to http://www.soros.org/sdf/document.htm and you will discover that among them is: --- "T-Shirt Travels, The Story of Secondhand Clothes & Third World Debt" by Shantha Bloemen. The story of how secondhand clothes, given away as charity in the western world, end up in Zambia, Africa, ultimately exploring the underlying reasons why so many Africans remain in poverty. --- This is a subject that Ben's comrade Patrick Bond has spoken about eloquently on occasion. Furthermore, Soros has lately emerged as a critic of globalization in the style of John Gray and Edmund Luttwak, two conservatives who have grown uneasy about the consequences of globalization. Perhaps they anticipated 9/11. The final segment features interviews with Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela, who come across as pathetic figures who have no alternative vision for South Africa today. Tutu urges white people to thank god that their black servants don't kill them. He can't seem to understand why with all the obvious patience of South Africa's disenfranchised majority, the whole thing doesn't blow up. Perhaps it is because people like him and Mandela have told them that There Is No Alternative. When Danny Schechter chastised Ben for being critical of Mandela and company, Ben answered that he did not say anything against them. He only allowed them to speak for themselves (as anybody trained in the 60 Minutes school of investigative journalism would). Schechter, who started out as a producer for ABC television, produced the trail-blazing South Africa Now tv show during the struggle against apartheid. Now he is involved with a website at www.mediachannel.org that is tied to Globalvision, an independent media production company he also heads. Although I have deep respect for Schechter's long career of media activism, his remarks deeply angered me. He started off by saying that Cashdan's film does not take 9/11 into account. To put it bluntly, he believes this attack necessitates a de-escalation of militancy on the part of the anti-globalization movement and the left in general. We have to be more "reasonable" not only because there has been such a frightening display of unreasonableness from terrorists who are just as bad as the US government, but because elements of the establishment seem to be moving in our direction. Soros's embrace of the Tobin Tax was evidence of this. Why alienate them with strident attacks on capitalism? Schechter's conciliatory mood was not just prompted by the deepening polarization post-9/11. It has been gestating for some number of years apparently. He reminded us that 9/11 was also the date of the coup against Allende in Chile, which he apparently interprets as a sign of what can happen when you try to push a radical agenda too rapidly. Joe Slovo, who Schechter met with in 1990, drew similar lessons as well from the defeat of the FSLN that year. The defeat of the Popular Front in Chile and the Sandinistas turns into a yellow go-slow caution light for the radical movement. Meanwhile, our enemies are going full steam ahead. In any case, that's the lesson I tried to draw for the audience in my rebuttal to Schechter. The problem is not that we are being too radical, but just the opposite. South Africa's impasse is a function of the class collaborationism of the ANC and its junior partner, the South African Communist Party. In contrast to the militant class consciousness of the Swiss bankers and the South African gold and diamond bourgeoisie, we have national liberation and socialist movements that can't make elementary class distinctions. In Mandela's interview with Cashdan, he refers repeatedly to working with the white community or white people. Isn't he aware that South Africa is a class-divided society? With people like Mbeki bending over backwards to attract foreign investment, it is no surprise that the new South Africa differs little from the old system. Their own version of Jim Crow might have disappeared, but de facto segregation and economic injustice deepen apace. Part of the problem with the Ben's film is that it focuses almost exclusively on anti-globalization and local "social movement" type initiatives, which have almost an exclusively redistributive character. For example, while reparations are absolutely worth supporting, they don't address the underlying mode of production which is an obstacle to true redistribution--namely, production based on social good rather than private profit. For such a transformation to take place, there will have to be the construction of a Marxist organization in South Africa that can win the allegiance of the Samsons of that country. While the Samson of Ben's first film might have been confined to a wheelchair, the working class as a whole--a true Samson--can bring the pillars of capitalist society crashing down and build a new, more equitable one in its place. While the emergence of new social movements in South Africa is encouraging, a way must be found to the big battalions of the trade unions, who alone have the social power to liberate the country and spearhead the transformation of the continent. The alternative is continuing mass immiseration and death. ==== "You just don't know how lucky you are that black people can still tolerate living in shacks and go and work for white people in beautiful homes, and not kill those white people." ARCHBISHOP DESMOND TUTU, JULY 2001 At the Durban anti-racism conference, 20 000 people marched for reparations and against globalisation. Then five days before the Sept 11 attack the US government walked out of Durban. This new film from South Africa asks why so many in Africa blame northern governments and corporations for their poverty. Includes exclusive interviews with Tutu, Mandela, Soros, Mbeki and others. Screenings are FREE and presented interactively by the filmmaker! Wed 28 Nov - NEW YORK, NY - New School 8:00pm, Swayduck Auditorium, 65 Fifth Ave Contact Timo Lyrra: LYYRA at newschool.edu 212-229-5580 Thur 29 Nov - NORTHAMPTON, MA - Smith College 7:30pm, Neilson Library Browsing Room Contact Tandeka Nkiwane (TNKIWANE at email.smith.edu) Fri 30 Nov - WORCESTER - Clark Contact Laila Smith: LSmith at clarku.edu Sat 1 Dec - BOSTON - MA Coll of Art 2pm, 621 Huntington Avenue Longwood Stop on Green E Line Contact Rajiv Rawat: rrawat at hsph.harvard.edu Mon 3 Dec - BALTIMORE - Johns Hopkins 7.30pm, AMR1 Multipurpose Room Johns Hopkins University, Homewood Campus 3400 No. Charles St. Contact Chris powers: powers at jhu.edu Tue 4 Dec - WASHINGTON DC To be finalised Contact Carole Collins: collinsc at igc.org --------- "South Africa is in the hands of Global Capital. That's why it can't meet the legitimate aspirations of its people" GEORGE SOROS, FINANCIER "We can't wait 40 years like the holocaust victims. We want reparations now!" ARCHBISHOP OF CAPE TOWN NJONGO NDUNGANE "The gentlemen in Davos are in the minority in the world today. The future lies here in Porto Alegre." TREVOR NGWANE, SOWETO ACTIVIST The film includes an inside view of the racism conference in Durban, the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland and the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil. Louis Proyect Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Thu Nov 29 11:34:26 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 20:34:26 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Malvinas "update" Message-ID: UK was ready to give up Falklands JAMES McKILLOP The Herald, 29 November 2001 Britain was within three weeks of signing a memorandum of understanding that would have led to the UK ceding sovereignty of the Falklands to Argentina 14 years before the nations went to war, secret Foreign Office papers released yesterday reveal. A draft memorandum of understanding, drawn up by the Argentinians and accepted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, recognised Argentine sovereignty of the islands on a date to be agreed. At the same time, the 1968 Harold Wilson Labour government planned a statement to the House of Commons declaring that there would be no transfer of sovereignty against the wishes of the islanders. Lord Chalfont, a junior minister in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, was despatched to the Falklands to sweeten the pill. His visit, the first to the Falklands by a UK minister, was meant to coincide with the announcements. However, his mission was made almost impossible by a delay in the negotiations with Argentina. He carried with him a copy of the memorandum, which he insisted had to be read alongside the unilateral statement to the House. The minister could only reveal their contents to Sir Cosmo Haskard, the-then governor, and the islands' executive council. According to the papers released yesterday, hostile reaction to the government policy and perceived problems in putting the measure through parliament were paramount in leading to the Wilson government abandoning its plan to hand the Falklands over to the Argentinians. The junior minister told the islanders that because of overseas visits by Michael Stewart, the-then foreign secretary, the memorandum would not be signed for three weeks. Lord Chalfont's secret report on his six-day visit to the Falklands concluded: "I now have serious doubts about the possibility of resolving the problem on the lines of the proposed memorandum of understanding. "I believe therefore that we should find some way to disengage from the present discussions . . . and that we should examine new ways of approaching the problem." Full article at: http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/archive/29-11-19101-23-50-58.html NOTE: I lost an earlier message to which I had appended a long note on this subject earlier today, thanks to a %!?*ing network problem. Lucky you, I guess. Still, some points to note: Michael Stewart was, at the very least, a CIA informer, if not an active agent. He seems to be implicated in the administrative mess leading to the collapse of this initiative. Another interesting player, however, is "Lord Chalfont", formerly Arthur Alun Gwynne Jones. I dug up lots of info on him, given his subsequent career as a punk Thatcherite since his ministerial days. It's a good bet he was part of the permanent government set up that set out to sabotage many of Wilson's initiatives, including this one. Stephen Dorril and Robin Ramsay place great emphasis on the psychological effect of Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Rhodesia in 1965, accelerating the efforts of many within the UK permanent government apparatus to bring down Wilson. Nasty networks involving Rhodesian state personnel (intelligence, civil service, police), South African BOSS and MI5 and MI6 were cemented, leading to all sorts of dirty tricks that unfolded during the 1970s administrations of Edward Heath and Wilson. Chalfont's connections here are interesting, too -- since 1997 he has been non-executive chairman of the Johannesburg based Southern Mining Company, currently in the news for securing a vast titanium deposit in Corridor Sands, northern Mozambique. Patrick Bond, are you out there? I've got more on Chalfont, but he is less interesting than the networks in which he appears to move with ease. For instance, he was a director of the Committee for a Free World, set up by Midge Decter in 1981 and chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, no less. Chalfont sat alongside the usual luminaries of such outfits: Kirkpatrick, Perle, Irving Kristol, Melvin Lasky, Sir James Goldsmith, as well as the rather oddly placed Tom Stoppard (!). Chalfont's predilections are very punk Thatcherite it seems, and his movements offer some element of continuity between past UK state shenanigans and present rightwing US-sponsorship of the punk Thatcherite cause. More to follow. Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Thu Nov 29 11:39:24 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 20:39:24 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Fisk on Afghanistan Message-ID: Robert Fisk: We are the war criminals now 'Everything we have believed in since the Second World War goes by the board as we pursue our own exclusive war' The Independent, 29 November 2001 We are becoming war criminals in Afghanistan. The US Air Force bombs Mazar-i-Sharif for the Northern Alliance, and our heroic Afghan allies - who slaughtered 50,000 people in Kabul between 1992 and 1996 - move into the city and execute up to 300 Taliban fighters. The report is a footnote on the television satellite channels, a "nib" in journalistic parlance. Perfectly normal, it seems. The Afghans have a "tradition" of revenge. So, with the strategic assistance of the USAF, a war crime is committed. Now we have the Mazar-i-Sharif prison "revolt", in which Taliban inmates opened fire on their Alliance jailers. US Special Forces - and, it has emerged, British troops - helped the Alliance to overcome the uprising and, sure enough, CNN tells us some prisoners were "executed" trying to escape. It is an atrocity. British troops are now stained with war crimes. Within days, The Independent's Justin Huggler has found more executed Taliban members in Kunduz. The Americans have even less excuse for this massacre. For the US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, stated quite specifically during the siege of the city that US air raids on the Taliban defenders would stop "if the Northern Alliance requested it". Leaving aside the revelation that the thugs and murderers of the Northern Alliance were now acting as air controllers to the USAF in its battle with the thugs and murderers of the Taliban, Mr Rumsfeld's incriminating remark places Washington in the witness box of any war-crimes trial over Kunduz. The US were acting in full military co-operation with the Northern Alliance militia. Most television journalists, to their shame, have shown little or no interest in these disgraceful crimes. Cosying up to the Northern Alliance, chatting to the American troops, most have done little more than mention the war crimes against prisoners in the midst of their reports. What on earth has gone wrong with our moral compass since 11 September? Perhaps I can suggest an answer. After both the First and Second World Wars, we - the "West" - grew a forest of legislation to prevent further war crimes. The very first Anglo-French-Russian attempt to formulate such laws was provoked by the Armenian Holocaust at the hands of the Turks in 1915; The Entente said it would hold personally responsible "all members of the (Turkish) Ottoman government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres". After the Jewish Holocaust and the collapse of Germany in 1945, article 6 (C) of the Nuremberg Charter and the Preamble of the UN Convention on genocide referred to "crimes against humanity". Each new post-1945 war produced a raft of legislation and the creation of evermore human rights groups to lobby the world on liberal, humanistic Western values. Over the past 50 years, we sat on our moral pedestal and lectured the Chinese and the Soviets, the Arabs and the Africans, about human rights. We pronounced on the human-rights crimes of Bosnians and Croatians and Serbs. We put many of them in the dock, just as we did the Nazis at Nuremberg. Thousands of dossiers were produced, describing - in nauseous detail - the secret courts and death squads and torture and extra judicial executions carried out by rogue states and pathological dictators. Quite right too. Yet suddenly, after 11 September, we went mad. We bombed Afghan villages into rubble, along with their inhabitants - blaming the insane Taliban and Osama bin Laden for our slaughter - and now we have allowed our gruesome militia allies to execute their prisoners. President George Bush has signed into law a set of secret military courts to try and then liquidate anyone believed to be a "terrorist murderer" in the eyes of America's awesomely inefficient intelligence services. And make no mistake about it, we are talking here about legally sanctioned American government death squads. They have been created, of course, so that Osama bin Laden and his men should they be caught rather than killed, will have no public defence; just a pseudo trial and a firing squad. It's quite clear what has happened. When people with yellow or black or brownish skin, with Communist or Islamic or Nationalist credentials, murder their prisoners or carpet bomb villages to kill their enemies or set up death squad courts, they must be condemned by the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and the "civilised" world. We are the masters of human rights, the Liberals, the great and good who can preach to the impoverished masses. But when our people are murdered - when our glittering buildings are destroyed - then we tear up every piece of human rights legislation, send off the B-52s in the direction of the impoverished masses and set out to murder our enemies. Winston Churchill took the Bush view of his enemies. In 1945, he preferred the straightforward execution of the Nazi leadership. Yet despite the fact that Hitler's monsters were responsible for at least 50 million deaths - 10,000 times greater than the victims of 11 September - the Nazi murderers were given a trial at Nuremberg because US President Truman made a remarkable decision. "Undiscriminating executions or punishments," he said, "without definite findings of guilt fairly arrived at, would not fit easily on the American conscience or be remembered by our children with pride." No one should be surprised that Mr Bush - a small-time Texas Governor-Executioner - should fail to understand the morality of a statesman in the Whitehouse. What is so shocking is that the Blairs, Schr?ders, Chiracs and all the television boys should have remained so gutlessly silent in the face of the Afghan executions and East European-style legislation sanctified since 11 September. There are ghostly shadows around to remind us of the consequences of state murder. In France, a general goes on trial after admitting to torture and murder in the 1954-62 Algerian war, because he referred to his deeds as "justifiable acts of duty performed without pleasure or remorse". And in Brussels, a judge will decide if the Israeli Prime Minister, Arial Sharon, can be prosecuted for his "personal responsibility" for the 1982 massacre in Sabra and Chatila. Yes, I know the Taliban were a cruel bunch of bastards. They committed most of their massacres outside Mazar-i-Sharif in the late 1990s. They executed women in the Kabul football stadium. And yes, lets remember that 11 September was a crime against humanity. But I have a problem with all this. George Bush says that "you are either for us or against us" in the war for civilisation against evil. Well, I'm sure not for bin Laden. But I'm not for Bush. I'm actively against the brutal, cynical, lying "war of civilisation" that he has begun so mendaciously in our name and which has now cost as many lives as the World Trade Centre mass murder. At this moment, I can't help remembering my dad. He was old enough to have fought in the First World War. In the third Battle of Arras. And as great age overwhelmed him near the end of the century, he raged against the waste and murder of the 1914-1918 war. When he died in 1992, I inherited the campaign medal of which he was once so proud, proof that he had survived a war he had come to hate and loathe and despise. On the back, it says: "The Great War for Civilisation." Maybe I should send it to George Bush. Full article at: http://argument.independent.co.uk/commentators/story.jsp?story=107292 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Thu Nov 29 11:42:19 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 20:42:19 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Black day for New York Message-ID: Black set to launch paper in New York By Chris Gray The Independent, 29 November 2001 Conrad Black, the owner of The Daily Telegraph, is launching a daily newspaper aimed at an upmarket readership in New York City. The paper, to be called the New York Sun, aims to woo "well-educated, intellectual" readers away from the broadsheet market leader The New York Times. Reviving the name of a New York newspaper of 150 years ago, the new venture from Black's Hollinger group is intended to build a readership by concentrating on Manhattan news, politics and arts and offering quality writing. "It is not to be confused with The Sun in Britain," Hollinger's chief executive and deputy chairman, Dan Colson, said last night. "This will be a niche market product for an upmarket, intellectual readership and heavy on good writing." Hollinger group has been rumoured for some time to be interested in acquiring a metropolitan newspaper in the United States after it sold most of its Canadian newspapers for ?1.4bn last year. Mr Black was said to have made an offer for the tabloid New York Daily News and last year he reportedly tried to buy The New York Observer, an upmarket weekly. Hollinger is one of 10 investors launching the paper in the first quarter of next year with a total budget of $15m (?10.5m). It is a minority shareholder, taking a 15 per cent share and contributing about $2m cash. Mr Colson said the new newspaper would be similar to The New York Observer but on a daily basis. He said Manhattan's relatively small number of newspapers meant there was a market for a new title despite the media recession. "One of the great things about London is the number of newspapers," he said. "In New York there is one quality, two tabloids and that's it. "There is always room for something better and The New York Times is trying to be all things to all people." Full article at: http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/media/story.jsp?story=107394 NOTE: Black is worth keeping an eye on. He assiduously courts punk Thatcherites in Britain and their US backers, staffing his Hollinger organisation with various has-beens and still-ares who compete with each other to be the most rightwing ghastly individuals to have ever walked God's earth. Robert Maxwell once tried to set up shop in New York, "saving" the NY Daily News and coming a cropper in the process. Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Thu Nov 29 11:47:37 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 20:47:37 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Fisk on Lebanon Message-ID: Another war on terror. Another proxy army. Another mysterious massacre. And now, after 19 years, perhaps the truth at last... The eyes of the world are on Afghanistan, but today a Belgian appeals court is due to consider a case with disturbing contemporary parallels. Robert Fisk reveals shocking new evidence that the full, horrific story of the Sabra and Chatila massacres of 1982 has not yet been told The Independent, 28 November 2001 Sana Sersawi speaks carefully, loudly but slowly, as she recalls the chaotic, dangerous, desperately tragic events that overwhelmed her just over 19 years ago, on 18 September 1982. As one of the survivors prepared to testify against the Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon - who was then Israel's defence minister - she stops to search her memory when she confronts the most terrible moments of her life. "The Lebanese Forces militia [Phalangists] had taken us from our homes and marched us up to the entrance to the camp where a large hole had been dug in the earth. The men were told to get into it. Then the militiamen shot a Palestinian. The women and children had climbed over bodies to reach this spot, but we were truly shocked by seeing this man killed in front of us and there was a roar of shouting and screams from the women. That's when we heard the Israelis on loudspeakers shouting, 'Give us the men, give us the men.' We thought, 'Thank God, they will save us.'" It was to prove a cruelly false hope. Mrs Sersawi, three months pregnant, saw her husband Hassan, 30, and her Egyptian brother-in-law Faraj el-Sayed Ahmed standing in the crowd of men. "We were told to walk up the road towards the Kuwaiti embassy, the women and children in front, the men behind. We had been separated. There were Phalangist militiamen and Israeli soldiers walking alongside us. I could still see Hassan and Faraj. It was like a parade. There were several hundred of us. When we got to the Cit? Sportif, the Israelis put us women in a big concrete room and the men were taken to another side of the stadium. There were a lot of men from the camp and I could no longer see my husband. The Israelis went round saying 'Sit, sit.' It was 11am. An hour later, we were told to leave. But we stood around outside amid the Israeli soldiers, waiting for our men." Sana Sersawi waited in the bright, sweltering sun for Hassan and Faraj to emerge. "Some men came out, none of them younger than 40, and they told us to be patient, that hundreds of men were still inside. Then about 4pm, an Israeli officer came out. He was wearing dark glasses and said in Arabic: 'What are you all waiting for?' He said there was nobody left, that everyone had gone. There were Israeli trucks moving out with tarpaulin over them. We couldn't see inside. And there were jeeps and tanks and a bulldozer making a lot of noise. We stayed there as it got dark and the Israelis appeared to be leaving and we were very nervous. But then when the Israelis had moved away, we went inside. And there was no one there. Nobody. I had been only three years married. I never saw my husband again." Today, a Belgian appeals court will begin a hearing to decide if Prime Minister Sharon should be prosecuted for the massacre of Palestinian civilians at the Sabra and Chatila refugee camps in Beirut in 1982. (Belgian laws allow courts to try foreigners for war crimes committed on foreign soil.) In working on this case, the prosecution believes that it has discovered shocking new evidence of Israel's involvement. The evidence centres on the Camille Chamoun Sports Stadium - the "Cit? Sportif". Only two miles from Beirut airport, the damaged stadium was a natural holding centre for prisoners. It had been an ammunition dump for Yasser Arafat's PLO and repeatedly bombed by Israeli jets during the 1982 siege of Beirut so that its giant, smashed exterior looked like a nightmare denture. The Palestinians had earlier mined its cavernous interior, but its vast, underground storage space and athletics changing-rooms remained intact. It was a familiar landmark to all of us who lived in Beirut. At mid-morning on 18 September 1982 - about the time Sana Sersawi says she was brought to the stadium - I saw hundreds of Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners, probably well over 1,000, sitting in its gloomy, dark interior, squatting in the dust, watched over by Israeli soldiers and plain-clothes Shin Beth (Israeli secret service) agents and men who I suspected were Lebanese collaborators. The men sat in silence, obviously in fear. From time to time, I noted, a few were taken away. They were put into Israeli army trucks or jeeps or Phalangist vehicles - for further "interrogation". Nor did I doubt this. A few hundred metres away, inside the Sabra and Chatila Palestinian refugee camps, up to 600 massacre victims rotted in the sun, the stench of decomposition drifting over the prisoners and their captors alike. It was suffocatingly hot. Loren Jenkins of The Washington Post, Paul Eedle of Reuters and I had only got into the cells because the Israelis assumed - given our Western appearance - that we must have been members of Shin Beth. Many of the prisoners had their heads bowed. But Israel's Phalangist militiamen - still raging at the murder of their leader and president elect Bashir Gemayel - had been withdrawn from the camps, their slaughter over, and at least the Israeli army was now in charge. So what did these men have to fear? Looking back - and listening to Sana Sersawi today - I shudder now at our innocence. My notes of the time, subsequently written into a book about Israel's 1982 invasion and its war with the PLO, contain some ominous clues. We found a Lebanese employee of Reuters, Abdullah Mattar, among the prisoners and obtained his release, Paul leading him away with his arm around the man's shoulders. "They take us away, one by one, for interrogation," one of the prisoners muttered to me. "They are Haddad [Christian militia] men. Usually they bring the people back after interrogation, but not always. Sometimes the people do not return them." Then an Israeli officer ordered me to leave. Why couldn't the prisoners talk to me, I asked? "They can talk if they want," he replied. "But they have nothing to say." All the Israelis knew what had happened inside the camps. The smell of the corpses was now overpowering. Outside, a Phalangist jeep with the words "Military Police" painted on it - if so exotic an institution could be associated with this gang of murderers - drove by. A few television crews had turned up. One filmed the Lebanese Christian militiamen outside the Cit? Sportif. He also filmed a woman pleading to an Israeli army colonel called "Yahya" for the release of her husband. (The colonel has now been positively identified by The Independent. Today, he is a general in the Israeli army.) Along the main road opposite the stadium there was a line of Israeli Merkava tanks, their crews sitting on the turrets, smoking, watching the men being led from the stadium in ones or twos, some being set free, others being led away by Shin Beth men or by Lebanese men in drab khaki overalls. All these soldiers knew what had happened inside the camps. One of the members of the tank crews, Lt Avi Grabovsky - he was later to testify to the Israeli Kahan commission - had even witnessed the murder of several civilians the previous day and had been told not to "interfere". And in the days that followed, strange reports reached us. A girl had been dragged from a car in Damour by Phalangist militiamen and taken away, despite her appeals to a nearby Israeli soldier. Then the cleaning lady of a Lebanese woman who worked for a US television chain complained bitterly that Israelis had arrested her husband. He was never seen again. There were other vague rumours of "disappeared" people. I wrote in my notes at the time that "even after Chatila, Israel's 'terrorist' enemies were being liquidated in West Beirut". But I had not directly associated this dark conviction with the Cit? Sportif. I had not even reflected on the fearful precedents of a sports stadium in time of war. Hadn't there been a sports stadium in Santiago a few years before, packed with prisoners after Pinochet's coup d'etat, a stadium from which many prisoners never returned? Among the testimonies gathered by lawyers seeking to indict Ariel Sharon for war crimes is that of Wadha al-Sabeq. On Friday, 17 September 1982, she said, while the massacre was still (unknown to her) underway inside Sabra and Chatila, she was in her home with her family in Bir Hassan, just opposite the camps. "Neighbours came and said the Israelis wanted to stamp our ID cards, so we went downstairs and we saw both Israelis and Lebanese Forces [Phalangists] on the road. The men were separated from the women." This separation - with its awful shadow of similar separations at Srebrenica during the Bosnian war - were a common feature of these mass arrests. "We were told to go to the Cit? Sportif. The men stayed put." Among the men were Wadha's two sons, 19-year-old Mohamed and 16-year-old Ali and her brother Mohamed. "We went to the Cit? Sportif, as the Israelis told us," she says. "I never saw my sons or brother again." The survivors tell distressingly similar stories. Bahija Zrein says she was ordered by an Israeli patrol to go to the Cit? Sportif and the men with her, including her 22-year-old brother, were taken away. Some militiamen - watched by the Israelis - loaded him into a car, blindfolded, she claims. "That's how he disappeared," she says in her official testimony, "and I have never seen him again since." It was only a few days afterwards that we journalists began to notice a discrepancy in the figures of dead. While up to 600 bodies had been found inside Sabra and Chatila, 1,800 civilians had been reported as "missing". We assumed - how easy assumptions are in war - that they had been killed in the three days between 16 September 1982 and the withdrawal of the Phalangist killers on the 18th, that their corpses had been secretly buried outside the camp. Beneath the golf course, we suspected. The idea that many of these young people had been murdered outside the camps or after the 18th, that the killings were still going on while we walked through the camps, never occurred to us. Why did we not think of this at the time? The following year, the Israeli Kahan commission published its report, condemning Sharon but ending its own inquiry of the atrocity on 18 September, with just a one-line hint - unexplained - that several hundred people may have "disappeared" at about the same time. The commission interviewed no Palestinian survivors but it was allowed to become the narrative of history. The idea that the Israelis went on handing over prisoners to their bloodthirsty militia allies never occurred to us. The Palestinians of Sabra and Chatila are now giving evidence that this is exactly what happened. One man, Abdel Nasser Alameh, believes his brother Ali was handed to the Phalange on the morning of the 18th. A Palestinian Christian woman called Milaneh Boutros has recorded how, in a truck-load of women and children, she was taken from the camps to the Christian town of Bikfaya, the home of the newly assassinated Christian president-elect Bashir Gemayel, where a grief-stricken Christian woman ordered the execution of a 13-year-old boy in the truck. He was shot. The truck must have passed at least four Israeli checkpoints on its way to Bikfaya. And heaven spare me, I realise now that I had even met the woman who ordered the boy's execution. Even before the slaughter inside the camps had ended, Shahira Abu Rudeina says she was taken to the Cit? Sportif where, in one of the underground "holding centres", she saw a retarded man, watched by Israeli soldiers, burying bodies in a pit. Her evidence might be rejected were it not for the fact that she also expressed her gratitude for an Israeli soldier - inside the Chatila camp, against all the evidence given by the Israelis - who prevented the murder of her daughters by the Phalange. Long after the war, the ruins of the Cit? Sportif were torn down and a brand new marble stadium was built in its place, partly by the British. Pavarotti has sung there. But the testimony of what may lie beneath its foundations - and its frightful implications - might give Ariel Sharon further reason to fear an indictment. Full article at: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/story.jsp?story=107100 Michael Keaney Mercuria Business School Martinlaaksontie 36 01620 Vantaa Finland michael.keaney at mbs.fi From JSommers at ngcsu.edu Thu Nov 29 11:51:59 2001 From: JSommers at ngcsu.edu (Jeffrey Sommers) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 13:51:59 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Russia/US cooperation on oil Message-ID: US and Russia move closer on energy The United States and Russia have given further signs of moving their energy policies closer together. US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, and his Russian counterpart, Igor Yusufov, said after talks in Moscow that the price of oil must be fair and dictated by market conditions. The two countries are setting up a new joint working group for closer consultations on energy. The move comes amid speculation of a looming confrontation between Moscow and the oil producers' body Opec, which wants Russia to make larger cuts in oil exports to support the price of the commodity. A BBC correspondent in Moscow says the strength of US-Russian energy cooperation will be tested early in December when Moscow decides how much oil it will export next year. From the newsroom of the BBC World Service http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid_1682000/1682116.stm From hliu at mindspring.com Thu Nov 29 10:31:06 2001 From: hliu at mindspring.com (Henry C.K. Liu) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 12:31:06 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Inequality Message-ID: <3C0670DA.7CB32A40@mindspring.com> The World's Income Distribution: Turning the Corner? by J. Bradford DeLong is dated February 2001, a month before the official date of the currnet recession in the US. Still, his blind optimism can only be explained that perhaps news of the collapsed of globalization since 1997 has yet to reach his Berkley campus. Delong claims that global income distribution has been trending towards equality. This claim flies in the face of World Bank data on the gini coefficient in both developed and devloping economies. Although international markets for goods and capital have opened up since World War II and multilateral organizations now articulate rules and monitor the world economy, economic inequality among countries continues to increase. Some two billion people still earn less than $2 per day. The number subsisting below the poverty line in India, nearly 400 million in 1992 (World Bank, 2000), is greater than India's total population was at the time when independence was proclaimed in 1949. Despite spectaular growth in the past two decades, I have calculated that at current rates of growth, it would take China five centuries to catch up with the US in GDP. The gap between per capita GDP in the two economies is actually widening. In the US, a Congressional Budget Office study shows that the average after-tax income of the richest one percent of Americans grew by $414,000 between 1979 and 1997, after adjusting for inflation, while average after-tax income fell $100 for the poorest 20 percent of Americans and grew a modest $3,400 for those exactly in the middle of the income spectrum. In percentage terms, after-tax income grew an average of 157% over this period for the top one percent of the population, rose a modest 10% ? about one-half of one percent per year ? for the 20 percent of Americans in the middle of the income spectrum and was effectively unchanged for those in the bottom fifth. In America, the average real income of the poorest fifth fell by 3% during 1979-97. Still, DeLong may be able to point to, with a facade of intellectual honesty, some statistical basis for his claim. In some economies, such as China and India, the absolute income have risen nominally and sufficiently to yield comforting conclusion of increased equality on a global scale. But this is accomplished by drastic domestic increases in income inequality. Even in absolute terms, the case for improvement is not convincing. True, some consumers in neo-liberal market economies tied to globalization have seen their nominal income rise. But it is controversal to argue that the aggregate purchase power of these consumers has increased. What has happened is that neo-liberal market systems force a trade off in consumption. Workers the world over are forced to reduce their take of social services and benefits, such as healthy care, education, job security and pension, safety from crime and environmental pollution, in exchange for meager increases in income which they spend on electronic gadgets and designer fashion that they themselves produce at low wages, while the rich buy cars and high rise apartments, restaurants meals and vacation travel. The symbols of prosperity in these emerging economy urban centers are not affordable by 99% of the population. When it comes to health services, the increase in inequality worldwide is undeniable even to the casual observer. Neo-liberalism asserts that inequality is the result of poverty, that as poverty is relieved, inequality recedes. This assertion neglects the possibility that inequality itself causes poverty, not as calculations in a zero sum game, but as a damper on consumer demand in an overcapacity global economy. Globalized trade has been hailed nu neo-liberals as the solution to inequality and poverty. Opposition to globalization is described as misguided. Last week, as trade ministers from 142 countries met in Doha, the capital of Qatar for the latest round of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Bank estimates that the trade barriers maintained by the developed world cost developing countries about $100 billion a year. That's twice the amount poor countries receive in aid. What makes it even worse is that it is goods such as textiles and garment and shoes that are hit hardest - the very industries that employ the poorest people in the poorest countries at the lowest wages. At the end of the 1990s, farm subsidies accounted for almost 40% of the value of OECD farm output, precisely the same as it was 10 years earlier. The total value of subsidies to farmers in the rich northern countries is a colossal $ 252 billion a year. These two items alone add up to a direct annual transfer of $352 billion from the poor of the world to the rich. For years the United Nations target for aid from rich countries to poor has stood at 0.7% of their GDP. Today it stands at 0.22%. The Harrod-Domar model of economic growth had argued that unequal distribution of income should promote economic growth and greater employment because the rich save more than the poor; a greater volume of domestic savings will increase the supply of resources available for investment; and accelerated capital formation will raise gross domestic product and resulting incomes, a virtuous cycle feeding back into greater savings. Thus, income inequality, even that reflecting widespread poverty, was regarded as good for development. This is essentially the IMF model of market fundamentalism. Notwithstanding that this model may not be operative in a world plagued by overcapacity from over-investment, the model neglects the fact that under globalized finance capitalism, the savings of the rich are siphoned off to US capital markets, draining the local economy of needed captial. This increases the cost of capital for the poor economies which have to offer returns drastically higher to induce their own capital to return, putting these economies in a perpetual competitive disadvantage. By the mid-1960s, the theory equating development with GNP growth were already not empirically supported by evidence. But such evidence was systemically ignored by mainstream economics because it went against the prevailing paradigm, which seemed so intellectually logical and ideologically correct. Moreover, it went against established economic interests. If development was regarded as depending almost entirely upon capital as the scarcest, and thus as the most valuable factor of production, this justified the owners of capital receiving the largest share of the benefits from development. About this time (1967), President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania presented in "The Arusha Declaration" a conceptual, not just empirical, challenge to the prevalent mainstream view. If poor countries have little capital and an abundance of labor, he asked, why not use whatever capital is available to make the most abundant resource, labor, more productive -- rather than use labor, often wastefully and certainly with poor remuneration, to make the resource they had least of, capital, particularly foreigners' capital, more productive? Why should the poor seek to fight their war against poverty with the weapons of the rich? Nyerere asked pointedly. This was dismissed as ideology rather a legitimate question by economists serving the interest of capital. With the end of the Cold War, an unregulated global capital market was forced on the world, with free movement of capital to exploit globally the lowest labor cost and weakest environmental protection. Globalization frees capital from national borders but not workers who are still restricted by national immigration laws. Mainstream economics never questions the dominant capital-favoring paradigm. The case of the Asian tiger was held up as empirical proof, until 1997, when the mirage evaporated with the Asian financial crises. The Asian tigers, as it turned out, were merely hunting dogs for global and mostly Western capital. Skepticism about capital formation as the cause of economic growth is long overdue. Classical economic theory views capital formation as a consequence of growth. It was neoclassical economics that puts capital formation as a prerequisite for growth. This reversal distorted the neutrality of capital, projecting capitalism from an ideologically neutral economic process to the status of a religious dogma. The market was elevated to the status of a sacred institution and market prices as an infallible equalizer of values, obeying the :natural" law of marginal utility. Market prices reflect unequal distributions of income which distort the forces of demand and supply. The price system serves to maximize profits rather than to maximize human value or welfare. It also fails to reflect adequately the needs and interests of future generations who have yet to participate in the market. Inequality is the cause of underdevelopment. Inequality produces and perpetuates poverty. The most harmful inequality is that between capital and labor. It is both immoral and dishonest to claim that inequality is receeding in the world when it is increasing everywhere. Henry C.K. Liu The World's Income Distribution: Turning the Corner? J. Bradford DeLong delong at econ.berkeley.edu http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/ February 2001 Twenty five years ago you could indeed powerfully argue that on a fundamental level the world economy was not working. It was generating better technology and more output, yes, but was it making good use of that output to advance social welfare? It seemed as though the answer was no, at least not for the poorer half of the people on the globe. As time passed the world was becoming richer, but it also became a massively more unequal place. The difference in living standards, productivity levels, and life chances between rich and poor parts of the world was greater in 1975 than it had been in 1925, and vastly greater in 1975 than it had been in 1800. Since 1975, however, we have turned a very important corner. As Yale economist T. Paul Schultz was the first (to my knowledge) to point out, since 1975 global inequality in personal incomes has not been rising but falling. Since 1975 the world has not only become a richer place, but the world's poor have seen their incomes grow faster than the world's rich. From this perspective, therefore, the world economy has been performing a lot better in the last quarter century than in the previous two hundred years. Two hundred and fifty years ago the world economy was a relatively equal place. Everyone was very poor by our standards today--even by third world standards today. But the differences between the standards of living of the average peasant in the Yangzi delta, the average peasant in the Rhine valley, the average peasant in the Nile valley, and the average peasant in the Ganges delta were small: a factor of two at most. Malthusian population pressure kept populations high enough to push average standards of living worldwide close to subsistence, and more natural resources or better technology showed up much more in higher population densities than in higher standards of living. Then the world changed, and the industrial revolution came. Technological progress accelerated to become fast enough to outstrip population growth and generate rising standards of living. As standards of living rose, death rates fell and birth rates fell as populations underwent the demographic transition to low fertility and low rates of population growth even when very rich. The world became an enormously richer place. However, over the past two centuries the world also became a much more unequal place. Economic growth in the industrial core vastly outstripped economic growth at the periphery, so that the gulf between rich and poor worldwide widened to an almost unbelievable extent. The purchasing-power-parity gulf beween per capita income in the United States and in India today is not a factor of two but a factor of twenty. It is not that Indians are poorer than their predecessors of two centuries ago: today in India almost no one dies of famine; there is one television for every four households, and one radio for every two households. But standards of living and levels of material productivity in India have grown only a tenth as fast as standards of living in the developed industrial core. That was the pattern of worldwide growth up until 1975: increasing wealth but also increasing inequality on a global scale. That was the pattern that has changed since because the 1980s and 1990s were very good decades for economic growth in the world's two largest-population countries: India and China. As best as we can estimate, India's real GDP per capita at constant prices has grown at an average of four percent per year over the past two decades--a pace at which per capita income doubles every eighteen years. As best as we can estimate, China's real GDP per capita at constant prices has grown at an average of seven percent per year over the past two decades--a pace at which per capita income doubles every decade. Today's inhabitants of China have about four times the material standard of living of their predecessors of only two decades ago. Nearly two and a half billion people in these two countries have seen their material standards of living and productivity levels increase remarkably. China has achieved such rapid growth by dismantling the Maoist regime of economic central planning and by focusing on building a market economy, encouraging exports, accelerating education and technology transfer from abroad, and also by using local governments as decentralized engines of entrepreneurship. India has achieved less rapid but still impressive growth by following a policy of what can only be called "neoliberalism": try hard to shrink the size of the state, try hard to shrink the magnitude of the state's bureaucratic intrusions into the economy (abandoning the requirements that investments be licensed, for example, and that private enterprise be forbidden from entering certain sectors), reduce tariffs, and encourage increased international economic integration. Stanford economist Charles Jones pointed out in the early 1990s that for most of the Nehru-Gandhi era India's internal structure of prices had been such as to make investments to boost economic growth very expensive, thus there was plenty of room for policy reform not to "get prices right" but just to get prices less wrong. In both countries these shifts in economic policy in the past quarter century have been extraordinarily successful, although in China more successful than India. It is this growth in these two countries--the transformation of China from desperately poor to poor, and the transformation of India from desperately poor to extremely poor--that has for the first time in at least two centuries narrowed the proportional gap between rich and poor. It has for the first time in at least two centuries made the world a more equal place. Why, then, has no one noticed? Why are our newspapers full of reports of growing economic gulfs between rich and poor in our world? And why are they full of reports of the crisis of a model of economic development that does not serve the interests of the world's poor? I believe that no one has noticed--or rather, surprisingly few in the first world have noticed--for two reasons. First, first-world newspapers focus on the first world. Widening income and wealth gaps between silicon plutocrats and industrial and service workers within the first world attract much more coverage and ink than does anything happening outside the boundaries of the industrial core. Widening income and wealth gaps within the first world are indeed important. But they are not the only thing worth focusing on. Second, China and India are only two countries. At international meetings their nearly 2.5 billion people get only two voices. There are 49 other countries classified by the World Bank as "low income." They, collectively, have less than half of the population of India and China. But they have 25 times the number of delegates. And many of these other low-income countries' economies have been doing very badly indeed over the past two decades. Their poor performance and their troubles thus get much more attention than the dual successes of India and China. The typical experience of a person in a poor developing country over the past two decades has been much better than the typical experience of a country, because the typical person lives in China or India. Whether we assign China and India to their proper place plays a key role in how we assess world economic progress over the past quarter century. No one disputes that the liberal world market economy delivers faster productivity and total output growth than alternative systems. Centrally-planned states have managed to invest more and grow faster for short periods only, and at immense and unacceptable human cost. But the Achilles' heel of the liberal world market economy has always been the sense that it fails massively when it comes to distributing the fruits of better technology and higher investment--and the steady widening of world income inequality before the mid-1970s was powerful evidence that this critique could not be readily dismissed. But now it is much harder to argue that the world economy is permanently bound to produce slower economic growth in poor countries than in rich countries. The economic growth record of many poor countries--nearly an entire continent's worth in Africa, many in Latin America, some in south Asia--over the past quarter century has been awful. The success of Indian and Chinese growth over the past two decades makes the failure of economic growth to take hold in other very poor countries even more heartbreaking. Most of their people have not yet found a place on the escalator that leads to modernity. But cast your mind back a generation and remember how poorly India's and China's economic growth prospects were then viewed. It should be no more difficult to spark economic growth in the next generation for this final group of about one billion people who have not shared significantly in world economic growth. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: text/html Size: 22395 bytes Desc: not available URL: From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Thu Nov 29 13:41:39 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 20:41:39 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Russia v. Opec Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011129204105.00ae1258@pop.tiscali.co.uk> OPEC chief calls for cooperation to stave off oil price collapse By the OGJ Online Staff HOUSTON, Nov. 26 -- A collapse of world oil prices is likely unless both producers and consumers take "adequate measures" to stabilize the market now, said Sec. Gen. Ali Rodr?guez Araque of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Addressing delegates from the US Energy Council in Vienna, Rodr?guez said Monday the sharp drop in oil market prices since Sept. 11 is already curtailing industry investments and forcing producers to shut in wells in many countries. He blamed a drastic reduction in world demand for oil, coupled with a build-up in world oil inventories from increased non-OPEC production. The average price for OPEC's basket of seven crudes dropped 19?s to $17.71/bbl Friday. For the full week, however, OPEC's basket price averaged $16.87/bbl, down from $18.43/bbl the previous week. That price has remained below OPEC's target level of $22-28/bbl since Sept. 24. So far this year, the OPEC basket price has averaged $23.72/bbl., compared with averages of $27.60/bbl for all of 2000 and $17.47/bbl in 1999. In three moves earlier this year, OPEC members reduced their production quotas by a total 3.5 million b/d in a fruitless effort to shore up falling oil prices. However, non-OPEC producers increased production by 500,000 b/d to capture some of OPEC's former market share. Russia accounted for most of that increase, officials said. At their recent meeting in Vienna, OPEC ministers agreed to reduce production quotas by another 1.5 million b/d in January, but only if major non-OPEC producers also curb their output by 500,000 b/d. The combined cuts of 300,000 b/d offered so far by Russia, Norway, Mexico, and Oman is "insufficient," said Rodr?guez. Although Russia has increased its proposed curtailment of oil exports to 50,000 b/d from 30,000 b/d initially, the offer still falls far short of what OPEC is demanding. OPEC members such as Saudi Arabia, the world's biggest oil producer, have threatened a price war that would drive down oil prices and trash Russia's economy if it does not support the cartel's efforts to reduce production and shore up prices. Still, Rodr?guez expressed hope Monday that such meetings with the US Energy Council would produce "a workable solution" to unstable world oil markets. Adnan Shihab-Eldin, OPEC's director of research, told the group that if the cartel can enlist cooperation from non-members in reducing oil production and can get a favorable oil tax regime from consuming countries, world oil prices could return to the level of $20-25/bbl. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Russia fails to support Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries By the OGJ Online Staff LONDON, Nov. 23 -- Oil prices have again retreated below what London traders describe as "the psychologically important " $20/bbl mark, as Russian surprised the market by announcing production cuts far below those expected by the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) in support of the cartel's planned output cuts. Brent North Sea crude for January delivery rallied $1.32 to $20.05/bbl shortly after Norway said it would cut output by 100,000-200,000 b/d, but now it has dropped to $18.91, and further falls are now being predicted with some trades already taking place at $18.60. OPEC said officially that it would not proceed with its production cuts unless the group receives the full 500,000 b/d supply cut it has demanded from non-members. Initial reports from Moscow indicated that cuts of around 100,000 b/d would be announced, three times more than had originally been offered and rejected as derisory by OPEC. The decision by Russian producing companies now increases the likelihood of a further slump in prices while OPEC digests what it will inevitably interpret as a rejection of its call for cooperation from non-member exporters. The Russian prime minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, met the leading Russian producing oil companies to discuss a decrease in output or export cuts today. Russia previously said it would curtail production by 30,000 b/d, an offer dismissed as derisory by OPEC. The cartel, in turn, threatened to flood the market with cheap oil in a move that would hurt all producers. It had been expected that at today's meeting Russia would voice concern about the effect on its own economy of a price war and was expected to announce a reduction of around 100,000 b/d. Taking part in today's meeting were all Russia's major oil producers, OAO Lukoil, OAO Yukos Oil Co., Rosnett Oil Co., Surgutneftegaz Co., OAO Sibneft, and Tyumen Oil Co. However, the official announcement, when it came, was that cuts would only be in the region of 50,000 b/d, equal to 10 min of Russia's total daily output. Leonid Fedun, Vice-Pres. of Lukoil said that the government and companies plan to draft an agreement on the cuts by Dec. 10 and they will come into effect in 2002. He said that Lukoil faced a difficulty in closing down Siberian production as cutting flows increased flooding in the reservoirs involved. The fact that none of Russia's top six producers is state-owned makes it more difficult for the government to control their output, even though it has some leverage over their exports through the state-owned Transneft pipeline network. Neverthless, with Russian output running at 7 million b/d, cuts of such a small size would be difficult to monitor. The companies had said before today's meeting they would obey any government order for cuts. OPEC had asked Russia to cut by as much as 300,000 b/d. Otherwise, OPEC said it won't pursue its own reductions, threatening to start a price war. Russia's deputy prime minister, Viktor Khristenko, has dropped broad hints this week that Russia is ready to take such action and several oil companies have also said reductions could be made. Reports within Russia suggested that the expected increased export cuts by Russia were to be described as "due to technical factors," associated with meeting increased winter domestic demand, rather than being described as direct support for OPEC. Earlier this month, OPEC said it would cut production by 1.5 millionb/d, but only if non-OPEC countries cut production by 500,000 b/d. OPEC has already reduced production by 3.5 million b/d this year to try and meet oil price targets of $22-28, but analysts consider a target of $20-25 more realistic in the current economic conditions. Mexico has already offered a reduction of 100,000 b/d and Norway on Thursday said it was ready to cut by between 100,000 and 200,000 b/d. One effect of lower prices is that oil-consuming countries are seeing lower transport costs for the crude they buy. London tanker broker Galbraiths said in its latest monthly report on the outlook for the tanker market that it is seeing tanker charter rates lower than at any time since 1993-94 for Arabian Gulf loadings. The report says, "Rates tell a sad story of limited new business and zero confidence." The cost of transporting oil to the US has fallen to $1/bbl, and to half of that to the Asian market. This means that since mid-September the US oil transport bill has fallen by around $3.5 million/day for delivery from the Arabian ports. --------------------------------------------------- Analyst says weak Asian economy may drag down global oil demand Paula Dittrick Oil & Gas Journal HOUSTON, Nov. 28 -- Asia is pivotal to global oil demand, and Asia's economy was weak before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the US rocked the overall world economy, said Fereidun Fesharaki. A senior fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu, Ha., Fesharaki spoke Tuesday night to a joint gathering in Houston of the Asia Society and the International Association for Energy Economics. He warned, "We are in for a period of (economic) difficulty worldwide.... As far as the energy sector is concerned, the impacts are going to be quite severe." Asia is experiencing economic weakness because of recent high oil prices and a strong US dollar, he said, adding he is particularly concerned about a declining Japanese economy. Although many economic observers assumed Asia had recovered from the economic crash of 1998, Fesharaki said the region is experiencing a "hiccup" that started last year. "There is a time bomb in Japan," Fesharaki said. "Japan has a curve called the L curve. It came down and stayed down. The L curve we can live with, but what we can't live with is if the bottom of the L falls down." He expects third quarter data will show a 3-5% drop in Japan's gross domestic product vs. last year. "For the past 20 years, Asia has accounted for 50-100% of the global incremental oil demand," Fesharaki said. "If you don't have growth in Asia, you won't have growth in the world oil market. Asia is the linchpin of the global oil market, and to a lesser extent, the gas market." Meanwhile, he also foresees an economic slowdown in China. "A sudden slowdown in China's economy as a result of the World Trade Organization entry or restructuring is a source of grave concern, although such a slowdown might be short lived," Fesharaki said. The consequences could be large, Fesharaki said, adding China already has a huge domestic debt with "tens of thousands of companies bankrupt." He said that long before Sept. 11, it already was clear that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries was overshooting the market and that the recent high oil prices could not be sustained. The terrorist attacks and subsequent economic slump merely accelerated by 2-3 months an inevitable drop in oil prices, he said. "Demand is not there. If you don't have the demand, then you have to reduce the prices; $25/bbl was unsustainable. What is sustainable is probably $15-20/bbl." Meanwhile, the Asia-Pacific market is growing increasingly dependent upon Middle Eastern oil exports, he said. "The imports (to Asia) will always be very high," given the region's high oil demand coupled with low reserves. "This year, 11 million b/d of oil was exported from the Middle East to Asia. In the future, the dependence becomes higher and higher," he said. Fesharaki said the strong relationship between Asia and the Middle East is likely to continue, presenting future challenges to US foreign policy. "China and India frankly care more about their own national interests than what anybody else thinks," he said, adding US foreign policy should resist trying to impose US values on the Chinese. "The foreign policy apparatus should be implemented in a constructive manner," he said. From jones118 at lineone.net Thu Nov 29 13:32:31 2001 From: jones118 at lineone.net (Mark Jones) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 20:32:31 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: pipelines Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011129203118.00a90388@pop3.lineone.net> [fwd from Ian Murray] BUSINESS & ECONOMICS November 29, 2001 OIL EXECS INCREASINGLY CONFIDENT ON BAKU-CEYHAN CONSTRUCTION Tim Wall: 11/29/01 Oil executives are increasingly confident that the long-awaited Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline can be built according to schedule and within current cost estimates. The project's general manager, Michael Townshend, said he expects new partners to join the BTC consortium soon, adding that there is growing awareness that Caspian Basin oil and gas reserves are sufficiently large to warrant the operation of multiple pipelines. BP, the operator of both Azerbaijan's proven large-scale offshore fields, Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli and Shah Deniz, is the primary backer of the BTC project. In recent years, the project has been dogged by doubts about its construction and operational costs. In addition, some observers have questioned the pipeline's viability, given that it would run through what has proven a volatile region during the last decade. Azerbaijan has yet to reach a deal with neighboring Armenia that would settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and Georgia is currently consumed by economic and political turmoil. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archives]. Townshend, in his first interview since assuming the BTC position, insisted that the BTC route would be cost competitive. "We intend to have the pipeline ready before the beginning of 2005 and to achieve that we have to get financial approval of BTC in the middle of next year," he said. "I have every expectation that the pipeline cost will remain under $3 billion. BTC compares favorably with other pipelines around the world. We've compared it with pipelines in Colombia, Alaska and CPC [Caspian Pipeline Consortium] and it's a competitive price." Discussions have been ongoing with many different companies interested in evaluating the project, Townshend said. "These have ranged from other Caspian producers to those that don't have any oil but hold exploration licenses. Two of these companies are ChevronTexaco and LUKoil," he said. Along with Italian energy group Eni, whose subsidiary Agip Azerbaijan bought a 5 percent stake in BTC from SOCAR in early November, other majors' involvement would indicate a significant commitment by north Caspian producers in the project. "There is a growing recognition that BTC is not in competition with the CPC pipeline - they are complementary systems," Townshend said. A response from ChevronTexaco is expected after completion of its merger reorganization. As for LUKoil, Townshend points out that "ultimately this is a choice that LUKoil has to make. We can only provide information to demonstrate that BTC is economic." For the BTC manager, now is clearly the right time for potential partners to commit as deals would be "more difficult" next year. "If investors come in next year, they can still invest but they would have less influence on agreements that are being worked on for the pipeline's operation and design," Townshend said, adding that companies would have to book a place for their oil. "It's a question who has the capacity priority for it - if the pipeline's full, who has first pick." New sponsors are expected to buy into SOCAR's current 45 percent stake, and join Eni in the consortium that now comprises: BP (25.41 percent); Unocal (7.48 percent); Statoil (6.37 percent); TPAO (5.02 percent); Itochu (2.92 percent); Ramco (1.55 percent); and Saudi Delta Hess (1.25 percent). The BTC project is currently in the midst of a 12-month, $150 million detailed engineering phase. Part of the detailed engineering phase, due for completion by the end of June 2002, involves BTC putting tenders out for the major equipment packages including the steel pipe, pump-stations, block-valves and metering stations. Tenders will also go out for work at the Ceyhan terminal, which is covered by BTC's agreement for the pipeline's Turkish section, whereby the Turkish government will underwrite any pipeline costs in excess of $1.4 billion for its section. The tenders will be awarded "straight after the project has been financially approved by the owners," Townshend said. He explained that the construction work for the pipeline would entail the use of both large-scale, multinational contractors and smaller, local firms. But the BTC manager stressed that those international contractors - however big - must fully utilize local contractors and labor to win tenders. "The tender documents make it very clear that the international contractors must make every possible use of local contractors, and not just contractors that are Baku-based," Townshend said. Townshend hoped that the World Bank would provide micro-finance loans to local contractors along the route, enabling them to acquire the skills required for the pipelay operation. Townshend dismissed out of hand suggestions raised recently by pro-Armenian lobbyists in the United States that a change in the pipeline's route, involving re-routing through Armenia, could be considered. He explained that a key factor in determining the pipeline's route had been the "commercially attractive" terms offered by the governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. "It took several years to negotiate those terms and they are now enshrined in law in all three countries," he said. On the exact route the 1,745-kilometer pipeline will follow, Townshend said that BTC had "just in the last few weeks" narrowed down the pipeline corridor to 100 meters. "To get down to this fairly narrow corridor has been a lot of work that nobody has seen," he said. In narrowing down the route, BTC says it has taken account of several factors, such as pipeline security and protecting the environment. "Security to me is about how each country feels it is part of this pipeline. If we can do that, I think a lot of the concerns that you can read in the press would disappear, as has happened with the Baku-Supsa pipeline, which has been operated risk-free." As part of the route choice, BTC had also held environmental and social impact surveys, Townshend said. "The surveys have covered flora and fauna, birds, water tables and environmentally protected zones. They have also included searches of former munitions dumps and have taken account of possible land subsidence and seismically active zones," he added. Editor's Note: Tim Wall is a freelance correspondent in Azerbaijan. A version of this article originally appeared in the Baku Sun. Email this article Posted November 29, 2001 ? Eurasianet http://www.eurasianet.org From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Thu Nov 29 13:57:42 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 20:57:42 +0000 Subject: [A-List] RUSSIAN PLANNERS REEXAMINING "GREAT GAME" CONCEPTS Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011129205656.03b17908@pop.tiscali.co.uk> EURASIA INSIGHT November 29, 2001 RUSSIAN PLANNERS REEXAMINING "GREAT GAME" CONCEPTS FOR CLUES ON FUTURE POLICY Igor Torbakov: 11/28/01 The attempt to stabilize Afghanistan is sure to spawn new geopolitical challenges for countries in the region. With Russian diplomats and military "advisors" now returning to Kabul for the first time since 1992, strategic planners in Moscow are looking to the past for guidance on current policy making. Many are coming to the conclusion that, based on historical patterns, a large Russian presence in Afghanistan is needed to defend Moscow's national security interests. One influential Russian strategist being rediscovered is General Andrei Evgenievich Snesarev. Snesarev, whose life spanned the reigns of Alexander II to Joseph Stalin, was an outstanding Russian military geographer and traveler in Central Asia. Endowed with fantastic linguistic skills, Snesarev served at the headquarters of the Turkestan military district, where he became a leading figure in the Great Game in Afghanistan and Northern India, played out between the Russian and British Empires during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Snesarev in the early 1900s, in the words of his contemporary biographer, "was not only a specialist in geopolitics, but had himself become a geopolitical factor. His reconnoitering and visits to Khans and Rajas were a serious headache of the Anglo-Indian government." He summed up his vast experience in the region in two geopolitical treatises: "India as the Key Factor in the Central Asian Question" and "Afghanistan." Recently, Russkii Geopoliticheskii Sbornik, a publication close to the Russian military, reprinted a portion of Snesarev's book on Afghanistan, which was first published in Moscow in 1921. The book was developed out of a lecture course he delivered in 1919 to Russian troops on high alert and waiting orders to invade British India via Afghanistan. The invasion didn't happen, but Snesarev nevertheless was instrumental in organizing the rebellions of the Pashtun tribes in the rear of the British army, and in helping to defeat the British near Merv, now in Turkmenistan. As the anti-terrorism campaign continues and efforts to forge a broad-based provisional government in Afghanistan commence, Russian analysts are finding some of Snesarev's ideas very pertinent. First, the recent events in Afghanistan demonstrate the high level of interdependence of the larger region surrounding this country. This wouldn't be a novelty for Snesarev. Focusing on the southern part of what Halford Mackinder termed the "Heartland," Snesarev introduced the notion of the "Greater Central Asia." It comprises, he wrote, "our [Russian] Turkestan, Khiva, Bukhara, Tibet, Kashgaria, Pamir, Afghanistan, Eastern Persia, Baluchistan, [northern] India." This "heart of Asia," he believed, is a "key to world politics." Snesarev may well prove to be right. "Even the Great Oil Game of the 21st century is far less significant than the global geopolitical role of the 'Greater Central Asia,'" Oleg Zotov, a scholar at the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, wrote in the most recent issue of the journal Vostok. Snesarev's vision of Afghanistan's significance seems to be quite topical as well. He never regarded this poor land as a valuable asset per se. Yet in his opinion, Afghanistan was a very important transit territory, an ideal bridgehead for an attack against British India. Present-day Moscow regional analysts have somewhat transformed Snesarev's idea. For example, an analytical article in the Moskovskie Novosti weekly recently explored possible reasons for all the geopolitical jockeying in Afghanistan during the past decade. "There can be only one answer," the newspaper said. "Afghanistan is not important in itself but as a transit country for shipping the landlocked energy resources of Central Asia." The Russian general can also be considered a precursor of Zbigniew Brzezinski, who once labeled the region of Central Asia "Eurasian Balkans." In the early 1900s, Snesarev argued that, historically, Central Asia is an extremely unstable and volatile region. Politically, he noted, the region was often located on the periphery of great empires, including those established by Alexander the Great and the Mongols. The lone major exception to this rule came in the 14th century, when Timur established is his empire with Central Asia at its center. In the 19th and 20th centuries, Snesarev contended, the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union acted as the de facto legitimate successors of Gengiz Khan and Timur. As one contemporary Russian scholar notes, Russian imperial and Soviet dominance together amount to 120 years - a "world record of control over such a turbulent region." Drawing on Snesarev's geopolitical teaching, Russian analysts assert that outside control over the Greater Central Asia is needed to fight the "historic forces of anarchy." Otherwise, argues the historian A.I. Fursov, a lack of foreign involvement enables the type of turmoil that has recently plagued Afghanistan. Under such circumstances, Fursov contends in Russkii Istoricheskii Zhurnal, "the developments and changes within the region may negatively affect the neighboring countries, for example Russia or China." If left to its own devices, Greater Central Asia will turn into a "self-perpetuating fluctuation," a "gray area" that "will destabilize its neighbors and the world as a whole," Fursov contends. In its present state, points out the Oriental Studies scholar Zotov, "the region of [Greater] Central Asia is under a constant risk of turning into a semblance of the Wild Steppe of the past." This scenario, says Zotov, is fraught with grave danger for Russia's security interests. The total length of Russia's borders with the Central Asian region is about 6,500 kilometers, or over 4,000 miles. As the Colonel S.V. Vostrikov lamented in his recent book, The Crises in the Post-Soviet Asia, "the newly formed borders of the Russian Federation are so 'transparent,' if not to say 'chimerical,' that they simply cannot play their basic defensive role." Seeking to bolster Russia's sense of security, Moscow analysts are embracing Snesarev's idea of two types of frontier -- namely a state border and a so-called strategic border. "It is already a hundred years ago that General Snesarev pointed out that Russia's security frontier - whether some one likes it or not - runs not along the Aral or Amu-Darya, but along the Hindu-Kush [mountain range]," wrote the influential web publication Russkii Zhurnal. Editor's Note: Igor Torbakov is a freelance journalist who specializes in CIS political affairs. He holds an MA in History from Moscow State University and a PhD from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. He was a Regional Exchange Scholar at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, 1995; Research Scholar at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1988-1997; and Kiev correspondent for the Paris-based weekly Russkaya mysl, 1998-2000. Email this article Posted November 28, 2001 ? Eurasianet From CharlesB at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us Thu Nov 29 14:34:27 2001 From: CharlesB at cncl.ci.detroit.mi.us (Charles Brown) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 16:34:27 -0500 Subject: [A-List] This war is not just Message-ID: The Boston Globe 11/27/2001 This war is not just By James Carroll In recent days, sage editorial writers, religious leaders, politicians, liberal pundits, and admired columnists have joined in the Donald Rumsfeld-Condoleezza Rice chorus praising the American war in Afghanistan as ''just.'' The Taliban are described as all but defeated. The ''noose'' around bin Laden grows ever tighter. Afghans are seen rejoicing in the streets, and the women among them are liberated. All because the United States turned the full force of its fire power loose on the evil enemy. Anyone still refusing to sign onto this campaign is increasingly regarded as unpatriotic. Next, we will be called ''kooks.'' Not so fast. The broad American consensus that Bush's war is ''just'' represents a shallow assessment of that war, a shallowness that results from three things. First, ignorance. The United States government has revealed very little of what has happened in the war zone. Journalists impeded by restricted access and blind patriotism have uncovered even less. How many of those outside the military establishment who have blithely deemed this war ''just'' know what it actually involves? It is clear that a massive bombardment has been occurring throughout Afghanistan, but to what effect? And against whom? Is the focus on the readily targeted Taliban, in fact, allowing a far more elusive Al Qaeda to slip away? The crucial judgment about a war's ''proportionality,'' central to any conclusion about its being ''just,'' simply cannot be made on the basis of information available at present. And how is this war ''just'' if the so far unprovoked war it is bleeding into - against Iraq - is unjust? Second, narrow context. The celebrated results that have so far followed from the American war - collapse of the Taliban, liberation of women - are welcome indeed, but they are relatively peripheral outcomes, unrelated to the stated American war aim of defeating terrorism. And these outcomes pale in significance when the conflict is seen in the context of a larger question: Does this intervention break, or at least impede, the cycle of violence in which terrorism is only the latest turn? Or, by affirming the inevitability of violence, does this war prepare the ground for the next one? By unleashing such massive firepower, do we make potential enemies even more likely to try to match it with the very weapons of mass destruction we so dread? Alas, the answer is clear. This ''overwhelming'' exercise of American power has been a crude reinforcement of the worst impulse of human history - but this is the nuclear age, and that impulse simply must be checked. This old style American war is unwise in the extreme, and if other nations - Pakistan, India, Israel, Russia? - begin to play according to the rules of ''dead or alive,'' will this American model still seem ''just''? Third, wrongly defined use of force. This war is not ''just'' because it was not necessary. It may be the only kind of force the behemoth Pentagon knows to exercise, but that doesn't make it ''just'' either. The terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 could have been defined not as acts of war, but as crimes. That was the first mistake, one critics like me flagged as it was happening. As perhaps the most savage crimes in history, the terrorists' acts should have been met with a swift, forceful response far more targeted than the present war has been. Police action, not war. The criminals, not an impoverished nation, should be on the receiving end of the punishment. Instead, a massive war against a substitute enemy leaves the sprawling criminal network intact - perhaps in Afghanistan, certainly in major cities elsewhere. Meanwhile, because of the war, the rule of law at home is being undermined. Because of the war-driven pressure to be ''united,'' the shocking incompetence of US domestic security agencies goes unchallenged. Early in the war, the highest US officials, including the president and vice president, encouraged the idea that the anthrax attacks were originating with the bin Laden network. The understandable paranoia that consequently gripped the public imagination - an enemy that could shut down Congress! - was a crucial aspect of what led both press and politicians to accept the idea that a massive war against an evil enemy would be both necessary and moral. Now, the operating assumption is that the anthrax cases, unrelated to bin Laden, are domestic crimes, not acts of war. But for a crucial moment, they effectively played the role in this war that the Gulf of Tonkin ''assault'' played in the Vietnam War, as sources of a war hysteria that ''united'' the nation around a mistake. In such a context, the more doubt is labeled disloyal, the more it grows. The more this war is deemed ''just,'' the more it seems wrong. James Carroll's column appears regularly in the Globe. From Gorojovsky at arnet.com.ar Thu Nov 29 15:07:00 2001 From: Gorojovsky at arnet.com.ar (Gorojovsky) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 19:07:00 -0300 Subject: [A-List] Malvinas "update" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: En relaci?n a [A-List] Malvinas "update", el 29 Nov 01, a las 20:34, Keaney Michael dijo: > UK was ready to give up Falklands > > JAMES McKILLOP > The Herald, 29 November 2001 > > Britain was within three weeks of signing a > memorandum of understanding that would have > led to the UK ceding sovereignty of the > Falklands to Argentina 14 years before the > nations went to war, secret Foreign Office > papers released yesterday reveal. This was known here in Argentina. The second half of the 60s was the time of hasty retreat of Britain from the River Plate, her last stronghold in South America. The Labour cabinet was really hurried, and they were very wary at the possibility that the Americans would support the Argentinean military in 1968 against London. But the caveat "with proper care for the wishes of the residents" shows that this was not a honest move. This caveat would prove to be the granite stone on which any negotiation would stumble. By the same time of the draft agreement, Argentina provided full support to the residents of Malvinas, oil, gas, and even an air link with Comodoro Rivadavia in South-Central Patagonia. This did not move the British position a single bit, but of course it made it easier for London to rule and supply the forlorn islands. N?stor Miguel Gorojovsky gorojovsky at arnet.com.ar From jlgulick at sfo.com Thu Nov 29 19:43:43 2001 From: jlgulick at sfo.com (jlgulick at sfo.com) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 18:43:43 -0800 (PST) Subject: [A-List] Market of last resort In-Reply-To: <4.3.2.7.1.20011128065915.03157cb0@pop3.norton.antivirus> Message-ID: Just a crude thought-experiment on paper, interested in any comments and kibbitzing: The U.S. needs Russia's diplomatic and logistical help to conduct its war in C. Asia. Via its N. Alliance proxy army (and its own ground forces as well), Russia parlays this opening into securing more geopolitical leverage over C. Asian natural gas and oil fields (to the partial chagrin of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus, apparently). Mark Jones points out that one of the upshots of this is Russia also secures more control over EU energy supplies, since pipelines transitting Russia (as opposed to Afghanistan and Pakistan) are destined for W. European markets. (And apparently Russian attempts to undercut OPEC oil exporters is part of this game as well, though it is bound to be unsuccessful). OK, that covers shifting balance of power b/w Russia and the EU. But what about shifting balance of power b/w Russia and the "market of last resort" mentioned by Chris Burford, E. Asia (notably the PRC) ? Among others, things to take account of: 1) No C. Asian-Afghani-Pakistani pipelines means PRC and E. Asia will have to source more of their (non-coal) energy supplies elsewhere. 2) Possible alternatives include natural gas (and oil ?) in Far East Russia -- trans-Baikal area, in and around Sea of Okhotsk, etc. 3) Will Russian state (GazProm) and private (LukOil, etc.) energy firms (maybe in joint ventures with TNC's) sell Far East Russian oil and natural gas to anybody as long as there's a market for it, i.e. the PRC, Japan, S. Korea, etc. ? Or would delivering energy inputs to any or all of these markets in some way rub against the aims of the uneasy alliance b/w U.S./Russia ? For example, despite the fact that the "market socialists" at the helm of the CCP appear dedicated to total and complete global K'ist integration, does or would a U.S./Russian alliance, taking a long view of the coming hydrocarbon crunch, have an interest in squeezing PRC access to Far East Russian energy inputs (and other natural resources as well -- cropland, timber, precious metals, etc.) ? And what of Japan ? Where do they fit into all of this ? Japanese creditors still hold a big bundle of U.S. T-bills, but so what ? Does the banking crisis in Japan mean that the U.S. does not have to coddle Japan as a potential source of world liquidity, and does the U.S.' new "alliance" (perhaps too crude and strong a term) w/Russia mean that U.S. no longer needs Japan as its junior partner in E. Asia ? If so, Japan is really fucked, b/c in all likelihood Japan cannot turn to the PRC for closer security ties, economic integration on privileged terms, and so on, b/c of this inconvenient historical matter of Japanese fascist occupation of the PRC. I dunno, maybe some kind of Japan-EU "alliance" in the works. Another piece in the puzzle, I think, is how much oversight does Moscow exercise over regional governors in Far East Russia, who may be inclined to cut deals with both "legitimate" and "illegitimate" (in the bourgeois legal sense) interests who extract and ship natural resources to the PRC and E. Asia, despite the potential future antipathy of the Kremlin, the Duma, Putin's gov't, etc ? In any case, the whirlwind of events over the last few months, I think, is setting the stage for geopolitical conflict over Far East Russian fossil fuels and raw materials, if not today (like C. Asian oil and natural gas), then tomorrow, if there is a tomorrow (and as Mark Jones has shown, one possible "no tomorrow" scenario involves the very landscape of the Russian hinterland, namely the self-perpetuating melting of the northern permafrost). John Gulick From cburford at gn.apc.org Fri Nov 30 00:40:56 2001 From: cburford at gn.apc.org (Chris Burford) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 07:40:56 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Malvinas "update" In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4.3.2.7.1.20011130073624.02dfea80@pop3.norton.antivirus> At 29/11/01 19:07 -0300, you wrote: >En relaci?n a [A-List] Malvinas "update", >el 29 Nov 01, a las 20:34, Keaney Michael dijo: > > > UK was ready to give up Falklands > > > > JAMES McKILLOP > > The Herald, 29 November 2001 > > > > Britain was within three weeks of signing a > > memorandum of understanding that would have > > led to the UK ceding sovereignty of the > > Falklands to Argentina 14 years before the > > nations went to war, secret Foreign Office > > papers released yesterday reveal. > >This was known here in Argentina. The second half of the 60s was the time of >hasty retreat of Britain from the River Plate, her last stronghold in South >America. The Labour cabinet was really hurried, and they were very wary at >the >possibility that the Americans would support the Argentinean military in 1968 >against London. But the caveat "with proper care for the wishes of the >residents" shows that this was not a honest move. This caveat would prove >to be >the granite stone on which any negotiation would stumble. > >By the same time of the draft agreement, Argentina provided full support >to the >residents of Malvinas, oil, gas, and even an air link with Comodoro Rivadavia >in South-Central Patagonia. This did not move the British position a single >bit, but of course it made it easier for London to rule and supply the >forlorn >islands. > >N?stor Miguel Gorojovsky >gorojovsky at arnet.com.ar British imperialism would have had divided interests about the Malvinas, and conflict between their representatives - foreign office, navy, army, exchequer. It will be interested to see whether the suspicions of the inhabitants of Gibraltar about Jack Straw's talks with his Spanish opposite number, are confirmed. New Labour is suspected of trying to smooth away the sovereignty issue with agreements about access to hospital beds. Which, considering the pressures on the British National Health Service and that they intend to buy hospital beds from other countries anyway, is an example of New Labour's dedication to financial planning within an international context. Chris Burford From bantam at dingoblue.net.au Fri Nov 30 01:08:47 2001 From: bantam at dingoblue.net.au (Rob Schaap) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 08:08:47 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Malvinas "update" References: <4.3.2.7.1.20011130073624.02dfea80@pop3.norton.antivirus> Message-ID: <3C073E96.77F46876@dingoblue.net.au> G'day Nestor and Chris, > British imperialism would have had divided interests about the > Malvinas, and conflict between their representatives - foreign office, navy, > army, exchequer. Don't I remember something about the Falklands/Malvinas' main importance to Britain being to do with maintaining what credibility its Antarctic claims might still possess? Southampton is not an ideally situated base camp, after all. > It will be interested to see whether the suspicions of the inhabitants > of Gibraltar about Jack Straw's talks with his Spanish opposite number, > are confirmed. New Labour is suspected of trying to smooth away the > sovereignty issue with agreements about access to hospital beds. Do you think the 'I remember when the whole world map were pink' brigade (not yet an insignificant proportion of the great British electorate) would swallow Euro-integration, the handing back of Gibralter and the Malvinas, and the forfeit of their claim on Antarctica all in one hit? Britain would have to have changed an awful lot since I was last there ... Cheers, Rob. From bantam at dingoblue.net.au Fri Nov 30 03:10:51 2001 From: bantam at dingoblue.net.au (Rob Schaap) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 10:10:51 +0000 Subject: [A-List] JPMC References: <3C043729.676C315C@mindspring.com> Message-ID: <3C075B33.1A5A92AF@dingoblue.net.au> G'day all, , Just on that goss about JPMC (it was JPMC wasn't it?). I'm having a peek at the latest public numbers on the business and, while it's taken an almighty hit over the year since the merger, I have to admit, I don't see incipient disaster in the numbers on offer. What am I missing? See http://research.businessweek.com/spreports_files/report_free.asp?Symbol=JPM Cheers, Rob. From bantam at dingoblue.net.au Fri Nov 30 04:39:57 2001 From: bantam at dingoblue.net.au (Rob Schaap) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 11:39:57 +0000 Subject: [A-List] bordgewahzees References: Message-ID: <3C077015.44467201@dingoblue.net.au> The first thing I ever said in English was to a pink-and-white dotted little thing called Vanessa, who was trying to be nice to the class wog on his first day; 'I like George more' I unforgiveably informed the daughter of a mum who'd obviously been up half the night festooning exercise books with pictures of Paul. Never was very good at saying the right things to pretty girls ... Anyway, it's not quite 38 years later. Not nearly long enough for a chap who could write 'Something' and call Marcos a twat on ABC TV. Sez Tom: > Nah. I've concluded that value is whatever the writer intends it to be > in any email, there is no agreement individual to individual, certainly > not among Marxists I have read. Well, what do they say? > I've concluded value is dictated by the biosphere, which also allows > commodity exchange to exist -- temporarily. Yeah, well, it's no good saying we can't do anything about stuff. I'm putting the case that we're organising our societies in ways that need fixing if we're going to give our species a shot at a tolerable home for a couple of generations. It was meant as a constructive point of departure rather than the gratuitous proselytising it may have seemed. > I've concluded that society is unable to allocate the labor of nature > directly or indirectly. The market you speak of exists inside of > nature (or the biosphere, take yer pick) and is therefore subject to the laws of > nature; however this is overlooked by economists (ALL economists) > because nature has not recently produced a comprehensive bill for labor, > services rendered, materials expended, and shop clean-up. Marx was a critic of economists more than he was an economist in my book. And if, in capitalism, we carry in our bosoms an unremarked agent that does not adequately respond with adequate urgency to physical limits, well, then we need either an agentectomy or a ameliorative surgery. > Whether the labor is private or social has little relation to > the true value of commodities or resources; It has some relation to what we might labour at, Tom, and how we do it. > Yes, you put your finger on a common element, coexisting with > Darwinian Evolution. Generally speaking (although often not), production IS for > exchange that produces value. However the biosphere controls all > exchanges, not the markets, and the biosphere defines (and produces) "value" in a > very much more inclusive and intensive way than is generally perceived by > (all) economists. Yeah, but Marx was on about the conditions that limit human capacity to do things like democratically determine what we produce, how much of it we produce and how and where we produce it. Convincing people that an awful lot of tenable projections are pointing at global environmental crisis has been difficult, but evidence exists that such efforts have resonated with millions. After that, well, what? > We won't mention petroleum -- we just won't go there.) Don't bet on it, Tom. I can here the Cambrian Cassandra stirring even now ... > Ahhh. That's certainly the question *I* have been considering. So far > I have > been led to conclude that a) this day and age is not sufficiently > differentiated from other days and ages in the past 10,000 or so > years; If a band of homo erectii, a tribal patriarch, or even a feudal lord, thought the waterhole was getting a bit murky, something could be done. At issue is the question 'can the market, rampaging blindly behind our backs, do what they were able to do?' > b) the question is rather "Might it be said that the radical > economist* is obliged to be a radical environmentalist? Mebbe even a (horrors) > Biocentric Leftist?" [Apologies to David Orton. ] Not too biocentric, I hope. What society perceives and is able to do about what it perceives are tolerably relevant issues. > *Not to put too fine a point on it, but I have yet to meet a "radical" > economist who has been able to free himself from the shackles of his > 'education' long enough to listen to the approaching thunder of the > biosphere as it prepares to present its long overdue bill ... It's one thing to hear approaching thunder; it's another to build shelter or get out of the way. > Thanks for your attempt to explain value to me, Rob. (really) My > bordgewah economics clearly have been unable so far to adequately present an > understanding of value acceptable to many, or to lead me to conclusions other > than those above, unfortunately. I'll keep at it. I keep listening. You do do that, Tom, I know. I can but cheer you up with the thought that just because I come the broken record at times, it's not because I'm not listening. Repeating oneself with different words is not always a sign of deaf religious zealotry. Some times it's just because the repeater reckons its relevant to precisely what you're thinking about. > "The man who does not read good books has no advantage over the man > who can't read them." -- Mark Twain Try reading one and then not being able to convince people it was any good. And try that in the same week Australia gets knocked out of the World Cup. On the same day poor George checks out. Sigh, Rob. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Fri Nov 30 06:10:06 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 13:10:06 +0000 Subject: [A-List] JPMC In-Reply-To: <3C075B33.1A5A92AF@dingoblue.net.au> References: <3C043729.676C315C@mindspring.com> Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011130130221.00a982a0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 30/11/2001 10:10, you wrote: >G'day all, >, >Just on that goss about JPMC (it was JPMC wasn't it?). I'm having a peek at >the latest public numbers on the business and, while it's taken an almighty >hit over the year since the merger, I have to admit, I don't see incipient >disaster in the numbers on offer. What am I missing? What trust do you place in the public numbers? It's only a month since S&P gave enron a more or less clean bill of health. Now look at it. In fact, people are even saying that S&P got it so wrong that they must have been in on the scam themselves. Well, if you can't believe even S&P any more, which is just downgrading Japanese bonds to junk status, so they are ready to bite on that apocalyptic bullet, then who *do* you believe? The word of the Plunge Protection Team? And look at the FT today on the enron-jpmc link. Since Wall ST, bonds, gold and the dollar are all now just one big ponzi scheme, all prices will on rising until the whole thing vanishes like the famous Invisible City of Kitezh in Rimsky-Korsakov's opera. The important thing is how we are *focussed*. If we are going to be looking at Wall St at all then we need to focus on how and when the bubble will burst and what the numbers will be *then*, not on whether there even is a bubble. There is a tendency to go in for a kind of phony skepticism along the lines of 'we've-all-been-here-before-and-it-never-happened-yet'. That's wrong. Incidentally, Bob Brenner has a new book coming out any time now on the bubble. I'd like to see the last chapter. Mark From bantam at dingoblue.net.au Fri Nov 30 05:31:43 2001 From: bantam at dingoblue.net.au (Rob Schaap) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 12:31:43 +0000 Subject: [A-List] JPMC References: <3C043729.676C315C@mindspring.com> <5.1.0.14.2.20011130130221.00a982a0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Message-ID: <3C077C37.8043FD68@dingoblue.net.au> G'day Mark, > The important thing is how we are *focussed*. If we are going to be > looking at Wall St at all then we need to focus on how and when the bubble > will burst and what the numbers will be *then*, not on whether there even > is a bubble. There is a tendency to go in for a kind of phony skepticism > along the lines of 'we've-all-been-here-before-and-it-never-happened-yet'. > That's wrong. Incidentally, Bob Brenner has a new book coming out any time > now on the bubble. I'd like to see the last chapter. Well, the chartbears (the ones who remember the 1929-32 curves) reckon we're on the sixth and last bear rally. And I remember putting to Daniel Davies (an LBOster, a trader, and one who impresses me as a seriously clever chap) the proposition that the Dow seems typically to boom to the tune of 350% before it gives back the lot (and then takes many years to pull it back). He seemed impressed with the observation, especially in light of the fact that the NASDAQ went promptly on to hand back the theorised amount in a few weeks flat, off which bottom it's climbing more quickly than theorised, but that counts for nought on the sucker-rally theory). If that happens on the Dow, we're looking at about 2500. Even if the Nasdunk has helped pre-empt a large chunk of that carnage, we'd still be talking carnage beyond imagination, given the unprecedented debt levels of our oh-so-synchronised day. We've all forgotten why those sombre suits ever met at Bretton Woods, and we daren't bring the matter up now ... Cheers, Rob. From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Fri Nov 30 06:29:29 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 13:29:29 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Frank v. Landes update Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011130132035.00b0e3e0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> This thread hasn't ended, it's just in abeyance. I was reproached for citing old stuff, but that was what the OHio people themselves were doing: and the paper Landes is speaking to dates from 1996! So where is his attack on Pomeranz, whose book was only last year, or his response to the 'Asiatic' thesis advanced by Gunder in reOrient? According to my spies there isn't going to be any response! Landes will not be answering his critics at his seminar or responding to Pomeranz and Frank. His approach will be more Olympian than that, so I hear. We shall see. All I know is that this is a topic we have not finished talking about, because like capitalism itself, the question of the *origins* of capitalism still won't go away. Mark From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Fri Nov 30 06:36:12 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 13:36:12 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Fwd: [globalization] Network 2002 - December 2001 Issue Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011130133516.00a982a0@pop3.lineone.net> [useful links at end] Subject: [globalization] Network 2002 - December 2001 Issue To: jones118 at lineone.net Globalization (globalization at iatp.org) Posted: 11/30/2001 By mritchie at iatp.org ============================================================ Network 2002 - December 2001 Issue Contents World Trade Organisation Ministerial Editorial News West Asia Regional Prep. Com. Latin America & the Caribbean Regional Prep. Com. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, COP 7 Implementation Conference The Johannesburg Summit after September 11th Putting Freshwater Supply and Sanitation on the Political Agenda Diary Dates, Conferences & Events What's in Next Months Network 2002 Trade rules: It's d?j? vu all over again Ten years ago, the Earth Summit finished with a long laundry list of promises from governments. High on the list were reforms to make rules on the global economy fairer and more sustainable. But the promises were forgotten a year later when the same governments signed the Uruguay Round trade agreements. The aspirations of the Rio Principles, Agenda 21 and the Convention on Biological Diversity were trumped by enforceable rules on agriculture, services and intellectual property rights. Ten years later, governments have set a new agenda for WTO negotiations. The outcome will provide a straightjacket for the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg. Again, the principles of equity, social justice, and environmental sustainability are set to be relegated to the realms of rhetoric and exhortation. If WSSD is to make a difference, it must influence the outcomes of WTO negotiations. After the Seattle debacle, developing countries and civil society groups went to the Doha Ministerial meeting last month with expectations of reform. The speeches of politicians have been positively dripping with the importance of making trade rules fairer and more sustainable. The reality was depressingly familiar. The outcome resulted from four major failings in the trade system. Firstly, trade rules are deeply unfair to the poor. The World Bank calculates that rich countries' tariffs on imports from the developing world are four times higher than tariffs on imports from other rich countries. One key reason is that the rich countries broke their promises made in the Uruguay Round. For example, agricultural subsidies in the rich countries have actually increased since 1994 and few textile quotas have been phased out. These broken promises are set to continue. In Doha, the aim of phasing out export subsidies for agriculture, responsible for wrecking farming systems and the lives of millions of rural communities in developing countries, was strongly resisted by the EU. Even though the Common Agriculture Policy is clearly unsustainable in the EU as well as to developing countries, the EU's negotiator inserted a get-out clause at the last minute, to say that this aim is "without prejudging the outcome of negotiations." The scene is set for more broken promises. The second failing is that governments do not give priority to aims such as sustainable development in trade talks. The clear priority is to gain advantages for their companies. This strong influence of corporate lobbying was expressed eloquently by the former Director of the WTO's Services Division, David Hartridge: "without the tremendous pressure generated by the American financial services sector, particularly companies like American Express and Citicorp, there would have been no services agreement". The General Agreement on Services (GATS) is one of the most important examples of the elevation of corporate rights above sustainable development. It aims to remove "barriers to trade". However, these barriers may be environmental laws or regulations to ensure that essential services such as water are affordable to the poor. GATS is developing a "necessity test" on whether domestic regulations are "necessary". To date, ten out of eleven WTO cases have ruled in favour of unrestricted trade over public health or environmental restrictions. Much is made of the voluntary commitments that countries make under GATS. But even though most countries have made commitments to open up tourism to foreign companies, few countries have reserved the rights to limit new development that threaten ecosystems, to impose conditions related to environmental impact or to require sharing of benefits with local communities. These core environmental principles could be prohibited as "unnecessary barriers to trade". Moreover, when countries make commitments, it is for keeps. The WTO has described GATS as "effectively irreversible". There has been no proper assessment of the impact of GATS on the poor and the environment, as called for in the agreement. The third failing is that efforts to deal with conflicts between trade and the environment are likely to result in even further undermining of environmental agreements. The apparent success in Doha to starting talks on the relationship between WTO rules and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) includes a dangerous get-out clause: "the negotiations shall not prejudice the WTO rights of any member that is not a party to the MEA in question." This provides an escape route for the US on the Kyoto Protocol and the Bio-safety Protocol. It also fails to give environmental and trade agreements equal status - the wording makes it clear that trade rules take precedence. Furthermore, it undermines future MEAs by ensuring that those who do not sign can 'free ride' on those who do. The final failing is that the WTO remains a power-based system, unaccountable to most of its own members let alone to civil society. Despite calls in Seattle for "radical and fundamental reform" from Stephen Byers, then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, the WTO's process remains chaotic and deeply unfair to the poorer countries. Before Doha, a draft agenda was planned by exclusive group of countries, ignoring the proposals from developing countries. The powerful facilitators of informal groups were handpicked in Doha, all of them supporters of US and EU positions. They ran a process with no agenda, minutes or clear decision-making procedures. The rich nations compounded the injustice by using threats to aid budgets and trade preferences in negotiations. On the final night, twenty negotiators were kept in a room from 9 pm to 5 am. The resulting Declaration was given to other countries on a take-it or leave-it basis. Concerned about a second failure of the WTO, they had little choice but to acquiesce. This abuse of power by the rich nations to get their own way should never happen again. These failings have become even more important as the WTO becomes the most powerful global body. In Doha, the EU took the negotiations to the brink of collapse in order to start negotiations on foreign investment and government procurement. Both cover economic activity greater than all of world trade. It was only after a courageous stand by India that the decision on whether to launch negotiations was delayed until the next Ministerial in late 2003. International rules on investment are urgently needed, but the liberalisation approach pushed by the EU is the wrong solution to the wrong problem in the wrong forum. The shape of a relevant WSSD agenda begins to take shape. Firstly, specific commitments by rich nations to make trade rules fairer to the poor, with no get-out clauses or loopholes. Secondly, systematic reforms to WTO agreements so they promote sustainable development, not trade as an end in itself. Thirdly, a strengthened system of other international institutions to ensure that trade respects international environmental, development and human rights agreements. Fourthly, involving the UN system in enacting strong regulation of international companies to prevent monopolies, tax avoidance, unfair competition and abuse of power, and to ensure that companies abide by internationally agreed standards on the environment, core labour rights and human rights. This is an ambitious agenda for WSSD. But the mounting crisis of increasing inequality, poverty, climate change, AIDS and instability demands a bold approach. We need the WSSD to aim high and start to address the most pressing problems of the global economy. Barry Coates - Director of the World Development Movement Barry at wdm.org.uk - www.wdm.org.uk Editorial With just one regional preparatory meeting to go we are starting to get a clear picture of what the Earth Summit will be. Despite each meeting to date adopting its own very unique form - the West Asia meeting lasted a staggering 4 hours - a reasonably consistent picture is emerging. The list includes poverty, debt, globalization, trade, various aspects of environmental degradation, financing of sustainable development., the WTO Ministerial Conference, with issues of security and conflict dominating the African and Arab Region meetings. Although this list is perhaps unsurprising, from the perspective of recognising the 3 columns of sustainable development, the weight given to economic and social concerns are encouraging signs. However, cynics could counter that we've heard it all before. More reaffirmations, more recognition, more waffle. Fair point. For although floating in the air we may have heard increasing calls for 'an action orientated agenda', until the global preparations get under way, that's all they are - floating in the air. Until substance is put on the bones, these affirmations will fall on unsympathetic developing country ears. Here the much talked about 'Global Deal' could play a pivotal role. Having said that though, no one seems to have extended any imagination about what such a deal could contain. This despite most regions having such a clear and cohesive idea of the agenda issues for the summit should be. Not that I would suggest for a moment that anyone is reluctant to commit to actually doing something. That, clearly, is the purpose of the global preparatory process. We wait and see. Ironically, outside of the official preparatory process, others are forging ahead. Recently we had the Reykjavik Fisheries conference, the WTO Ministerial and the continuation of the Kyoto Climate Negotiations. Over the next 2 months we have the UNESCO Oceans and Coastal Areas Conference, the International Freshwater Conference and the much prepared for Financing for Development Conference. What do these meetings have in common? All have featured to varying, but significant, degrees consideration of their impacts on Earth Summit 2002. Everyone, it seems, wants to play a part. No doubt you have already read our WTO lead article which speaks for itself. Suffice to say, we have to find a balance of interests to make sustainable economic, social and environmental development viable. We round of this issue with a couple of contributions to the process of our own. First up is the introduction of our Implementation Conference. I won't spoil the surprise here, but suffice to say, if you're a stakeholder you will licking your lips in anticipation. Next up is the summary to our recent online debate, hosted in partnership with the Heinrich Boell Foundation, concerning the impacts of the September 11th attacks on the Earth Summit. This one really helped focus minds on the true breadth and depth of multi-lateralism. T. Middleton, Editor News, News, News Oceans & Coasts at Earth Summit 2002 It has been almost a decade since many important new agreements on oceans and coasts were adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit, including chapter 17 of Agenda 21, and the oceans-aspects of the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Framework Convention on Climate Change. Since that time, too, the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas has come into force, and several modifications to the convention - relating to Straddling Fish Stocks and to deep seabed mining - have been adopted. There has been much investment in the management of coastal and marine areas by national and international donors. The Global Conference on Oceans and Coasts at Rio+10, to be held at UNESCO headquarters in Paris on December 3-7th, is intended to provide an overall assessment of progress achieved on oceans and coasts since the Earth Summit. The Conference will also provide input to the discussions by governments which will take place at Earth Summit 2002. Specifically the Conference will: ? Provide an assessment of progress achieved in all aspects of the post-Earth Summit agenda on Oceans & Coasts; ? Identify continuing, persisting challenges that need to be addressed with renewed commitment; ? Identify new challenges that are arising and need to be addressed; ? Examine cross-cutting issues among various ocean and coastal sectors; ? Consider options for concerted action on outstanding cross-sectoral issues; ? Provide input to the oceans and coasts agenda of Earth Summit 2002. Drawing from recent related meetings, the Conference agenda is divided into a series of Panel Sessions addressing issues including: Implementing international agreements and their harmonisation; Donor investments in oceans and coasts; Results of major oceans research programmes; Biodiversity, critical habitats and species at risk; Integrated coastal management; Fisheries and aquaculture; Marine protected areas; Improvements in global and regional ocean governance. There will also 9 Working Groups running parallel to the Panel Sessions to assess the information presented at the Conference. Their work will feed into the Conference's outputs. The Conference has 2 major planned outputs: The publication of a Conference Findings Volume that will summarise the findings and recommendations for each major Conference topic, which will be distributed to all government delegations involved in Earth Summit 2002; the other is the publication of a book associated to special issues in several international journals bringing together various clusters of papers and commentaries presented at the Conference. More information is available online at: www.udel.edu/CMS/csmp/rio+10/ International Conference on Freshwater The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is to host the International Conference on Freshwater. The conference will take place from 3-7 December in Bonn, Germany. The Conference aims to build on the freshwater-related objectives identified in chapter 18 of Agenda 21. The urgent need for action in the area of freshwater has been emphasised in the UN Millennium Declaration, adopted by the UN Millennium Assembly, September 2000. The Millennium Assembly set out one of the targets for poverty alleviation as follows: 'We resolve...to halve, by the year 2015...the proportion of people who are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water'. And further, as a first step: 'to stop the unsustainable exploitation of water resources by developing water management strategies at the regional, national and local levels, which promote both equitable access and adequate supplies'. The Conference serves as a preparatory step on freshwater issues for the upcoming Earth Summit 2002. The main objective of the Conference is to develop recommendations for the Summit on water and sustainable development issues. Building on the progress achieved in the implementation of Agenda 21, the Conference will identify remaining obstacles and define necessary actions. The Conference further aims to contribute to the fulfilment of the water related International Development Target established by the UN Millennium Assembly. A key consideration will be how to combat negative effects of the water crises on people's livelihood. Emphasis is put on recommendations which show the way forward to implementation and necessary action to overcome the water crises. The Conference is structured into Ministerial Sessions, followed by Working Groups then Plenary Sessions before the Conference is drawn to a conclusion. The Ministerial Sessions are titled 'Equitable and sustainable use of freshwater resources' and 'Mobilising financial resources for infrastructure investment'. The Working Groups will follow this with more focussed discussion on governance, finance, capacity building and technology transfer. The Conference will result in action orientated recommendations regarding political and forward-looking measures to improve and facilitate implementation of agreed goals and programmes in the water-related fields of sustainable development. These recommendations will be captured in a document which is expected to be the main substantive outcome of the Conference. A draft of these recommendations will be made available to Conference participants in advance. During the first 2 days of the Conference there will be 2 a Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue sessions. These will seek Stakeholder perspectives on 'Equitable access to and sustainable supply of freshwater resources for the poor' and 'Developing strategies for sustainable and equitable management of freshwater resources'. Other outcomes of the Conference will include the report of the Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue (see the November issue of Network 2002). Also reports of the Working Group Sessions will be included in the Conference report. Regional Preparatory Conferences for Earth Summit 2002 West Asia Regional Prep. Comm. Written by Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 22 No. 07 Monday, 29 October 2001 The West Asia (Arab Region) Preparatory Committee meeting (PrepCom) takes the record for the shortest of the four regional meetings to date. Initially planned for two days, and later rescheduled to two half-day sessions, the PrepCom concluded in under four hours. The opening ceremony suddenly turned into a closing plenary following the Chair's announcement that business was finished and he would close the PrepCom. Confusion ensued as representatives of regional and intergovernmental organizations scrambled for the floor to make their statements, scheduled for delivery the following day. Some dignitaries were still in transit and thus did not make it to the PrepCom at all. As in the other regional preparations, the Arab Region PrepCom lacked synchronization between the international, national and regional preparatory processes. At the opening of the PrepCom only 3 of the Arab Region's 22 countries had concluded their national reports. Fewer still were able to provide feedback on the documents circulated before the 21-22 Oct. Joint Committee on Environment and Development in the Arab Region (JCEDAR) meeting, calling into question the effectiveness of the "bottom-up" approach that the exercise was intended to achieve. However, as the PrepCom outputs are to be circulated to members for comment, national-level efforts could still determine the effectiveness of the process. The challenge for efforts at the national level extends to other aspects of the process. Institutional memory is an important ingredient in any negotiating process. Whereas participants at the Cairo meeting were mainly drawn from capitals with little apparent participation or feedback from UN missions, the Arab Region's representatives to the UN in New York are likely to drive the Region's input when the WSSD agenda is negotiated at PrepCom II. Also, the 8 representatives from North Africa at the Cairo meeting were different from those who attended the African Prep Com in Nairobi. The level of coordination and communication required to ensure harmonization within country positions, let alone in interregional negotiations, may be difficult to resolve and, in the long run, affect implementation of the Johannesburg outputs. With 1 regional preparatory meeting - the East Asia and the Pacific Region in late November - to go before WSSD PrepCom II, the challenges ahead and potential areas for convergence are beginning to emerge. Recurring themes in Europe, Africa, Latin America and the Arab Region include poverty, debt, globalization, trade, various aspects of environmental degradation and financing of sustainable development. Participants at all but the Latin America and Caribbean Regional meetings referred to the recent WTO Ministerial Conference, and issues of security and conflict dominated the African and Arab Region meetings. These convergences suggest prima facie that the identification of themes for the Summit may not be too daunting a task, although many challenges remain on the road to Johannesburg. One of these challenges is how closely PrepCom II will draw on the regional outputs to identify themes. Unlike the European and North American preparations, many of the developing region participants were national rather than New York-based delegates, who will also likely follow the process. Given that the developing regions' preparations will feed into the G-77/China negotiation process, perhaps the Arab Region approach of preparing an Address of "talking points" for their members to emphasize may prove the most valuable asset from the regional preparations. Developing country emphasis that the Johannesburg Summit is about sustainable development, a leap from the Rio legacy of environment and development, has emerged loud and clear during the preparations to date. Yet, the lack of integration - or deliberate marginalization of the economic and social pillars in the regional meetings - suggests the need first to resolve this sectoral compartmentalization at the national level in order to achieve implementable Johannesburg outputs. However the WSSD agenda is eventually frosted, the divergent opinions emerging from regional preparations, while providing some of the necessary ingredients, offer a taste of the challenge to come in New York when delegates attempt to reach agreement on anything but the broadest of goals. Latin American Regional Prep. Comm. By Liliana Hisas, Fundaci?n Ecol?gica Universal (Argentina) The Latin American and Caribbean Regional Preparatory Conference for the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) took place at the historic Rio Centro (same location as the 1992 Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 23-24 October. The need for a sustainable globalization, on the one hand, and partial civil society involvement, on the other, were some of the key outcomes. Meeting of Civil Society Networks A Meeting of Latin American and Caribbean Civil Society Networks was held convened as a preparation to the official meeting, held from 18-20 October. Some 60 representatives from civil society networks and organizations attended. The issues discussed included: the regional context towards the WSSD, biodiversity, forests, climate change, globalization and trade, financing and vulnerability. Some of the key issues emerged from the civil society discussions were: economic globalization, as a main factor for environmental degradation; the need for a participatory democracy, in order to achieve sustainable development; poverty and lack of equity, as an indicator of social unsustainability. Two documents were produced, based on these discussions: 1. Declaration of the Regional Networks, which was read during the official meeting, after the official Plan of Action was agreed by governments; 2. Platform for Action, which sets the guidelines for Latin American civil society into the WSSD process. This document is still open for input and comments, as all participants committed to circulate it to its Networks; There was little interconnection between the official draft of the Platform for Action and the civil society documents, as non-governmental actors were not involved in the official drafting process. Most of the civil society representatives that attended this meeting, were not present during the PrepCom, as they were only invited by UNEP to participate of the Civil Society meeting. Platform for Action Delegates from Latin America and the Caribbean adopted the "Rio de Janeiro Platform for Action on the Road to Johannesburg 2002". The Platform consists of four sections on: 1) reaffirmation of principles and commitments; 2) obstacles and lessons learned; 3) present considerations; and 4) future commitments. 1) Reaffirmation of principles and commitments: recalls the commitments at UNCED, as well as the Rio Conventions and subsequent legal instruments. 2) Obstacles and lessons learned: ? Considers the WSSD an opportunity to evaluate progress since UNCED, noting deteriorating trends; ? Believes that developments related to democracy and peace have helped incorporate environment into development processes and make people-centered sustainable development a priority; ? Recognizes the importance of civil society participation; ? Emphasizes that unsustainable production and consumption patterns and some trade and financial mechanisms in developed countries jeopardize the achievement of sustainable development; ? Regrets the lack of measures to ensure technology transfer from developed countries; ? Recognizes the need for a stable, predictable, open and inclusive international economic system; ? Rejects policies that distort international trade, and urges the elimination of export subsidies and improved market access; ? Expresses concern regarding possible environmental conditionality and an abusive interpretation of the precautionary principle; ? Renews commitment to the GEF and other multilateral finance agencies. 3) Present considerations: includes paragraphs on international cooperation to improve the living conditions of present and future generations, on efforts to reinforce sub-regional and regional cooperation and meet the needs of the most vulnerable, and on making globalization sustainable. 4) Future commitments: includes three subsections on: a) The institutional structure for sustainable development, formulating the commitment to develop local, national and regional capacities, to strengthen institutions to promote integration of environmental, social and economic policies, b) Financing and technology transfer: ? Stresses the need for a sufficient and predictable level of new and additional resources for the implementation of Agenda 21; ? Reiterates the 0.7% of GNP for ODA target for developed countries; ? Calls for support to the GEF; ? Recognizes the burden of debt and debt-servicing and underscores the need for debt relief for highly-indebted developing countries; ? Recommends that the Financing for Development conference address financing for national public goods with global benefits; c) Formulation of action: ? Calls for universal ratification of the CBD, equitable access to the benefits afforded by the use of genetic resources, protection of traditional knowledge and the entry into force of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety before the WSSD; ? Underscores the importance of assessing vulnerability and defining indicators in this regard, reducing vulnerability to natural disasters, and recognizing the vulnerability of SIDS; ? Promotes integrated water resource management and international cooperation schemes for water management; ? Supports international cooperation for sustainable forest management; ? Underscores the need to diversify the energy supply and foster energy efficiency; ? Calls for the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol by the WSSD, and for climate change adaptation programmes; ? Calls for the ratification of the chemicals conventions, and underscores the links between environment and health; ? Stresses the need for effective urban planning and land management, recognition of the relationship between population and the environment; ? Suggests the cross-sectoral issues of finance, science and technology, capacity building and vulnerability as agenda items for the WSSD, and, as its central theme, "Towards a new globalization that ensures equitable, inclusive and sustainable development." Outcomes and challenges for Latin American and the Caribbean Some nine years after the Earth Summit, the dynamics between civil society and government in Latin America and the Caribbean has not changed much. Only for the exception of a few governments which included civil society representatives in their delegations (Nicaragua, Colombia and Venezuela), the dialogue and interaction among governmental and non-governmental actors is still limited, and in some cases even difficult. This situation certainly poses one of the main challenges for civil society. As for the outcomes of the Plan of Action proposed by governments, it focuses primarily on the economic situation of the region, highlighting themes such as the debt crisis, debt-for-environment swaps and biodiversity, financing for sustainable development and the concept of a new, more sustainable globalization -a key concept to be presented and discussed at PrepCom II. On the civil society side, the burden is even greater. As key actors in the sustainable development equation, the challenges include: 1. To strengthen the role of civil society regarding effective involvement in sustainable development decision-making process, dissemination of information and awareness raising. 2. To promote local, national and regional capacity building, increasing consensus mechanisms between governments and civil society. 3. To promote flexible and adequate mechanisms to address sustainable development in multilateral forums. Climate agreement now ready for Earth Summit 2002 Following on the heels of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change's 6th Session meeting (COP 6) in July this year, governments reconvened their discussions in Morocco from October 29th to November 9th. Dealing with the teeth behind the Kyoto Protocol the meeting was charged with making the Climate Change process work. Matthias Duwe, Climate Network Europe, reports. In stark contrast to the enormous coverage that the UN climate talks had received in July at COP 6, this time the world's media only started taking notice when the deal was finally done. Following a three-day showdown at ministerial level, the early morning of November 10th saw a successful end of the latest round of international talks on climate change in Marrakech, Morocco. The good news first: the seemingly endless wrangling over the details of the Kyoto Protocol is over. The text is agreed and the last formal obstacle in the path of its ratification gone. Government delegations and observers welcomed the compromise, despite environmentally harmful concessions wrung out of the process by major developed countries. The Marrakech Accords, some 250 pages long, clarify nearly all of the questions left unresolved when the Kyoto Protocol was adopted four years ago. While it will take time to assess the consequences arising from the text to their full extent, here is a brief initial account of the trouble spots during the November talks. Most problematic was the disruptive behavior of a group of four countries: Australia, Canada, Japan and Russia. While the Australians are still reluctant to declare their full participation after the US pulled out of the treaty earlier this year, Canada was mainly after even more leeway in achieving its emission reduction target. Japan and Russia had the most powerful cards to play, as the American withdrawal has made their consent indispensable for the treaty's entry into force. One of the most contentious issues was the character of the mechanism that will ensure a country's compliance with its treaty obligations. Japan won its way in postponing a decision on whether consequences will be legally or just politically binding. However, Parties settled on a formulation which integrates the compliance section into the Accords instead of requiring a separate agreement, thus making it part of the overall package. The criteria that will allow developed countries to participate in the Protocol's so-called flexibility mechanisms also presented opportunity for serious rows. Japan again sought to ease the rules in order to ensure eligibility by Russia from which it hopes to buy excess emission permits. The clause which limits such trading initially to ten percent of a country's allowances was also challenged, but remained in the text. How credits from climate projects and trading would be dealt with in the crucial accounting bit of the Kyoto rules was another difficult agenda item. Accounting for credits acquired from domestic forests, which qualify as carbon sinks, was particularly controversial. The European Union, along with developing countries lost most of their demands to limit the extent to which such credits could be exchanged for another or even be saved for future commitment periods. Worse still, a phrase included in the Accords that bans the "banking" of forest credits will probably be easily circumvented through clever accounting. The political agreement struck in Bonn in July, which provided the basis for the Marrakech conference, stipulates the maximum amount of such sink credits which a country is allowed to count towards its target. Still, the arguably rather generous figures it was allotted was not enough for Russia, which felt sidelined in the negotiations, despite the importance of its ratification. Therefore, they asked for and in the end received agreement by other countries to a doubling of its sinks capacity. Yet, the extra tons won't alter the balance significantly, as Russia already has plenty of emission credits at its disposal due to economic decline. Crucial for sound implementation of the treaty are transparency and public participation. Access to information has been limited in some sections (such as compliance) under the cover of confidentiality. Moreover, the provisions for stakeholder involvement under the project-based mechanisms of the Protocol fall short of international standard practice of other institutions including the World Bank. Non-governmental organizations have already declared their intention to monitor these developments closely. They announced the establishment of a new initiative called CDMwatch (Clean Development Mechanism), even before the mechanism became reality with the first meeting of its newly appointed Executive Board right after the negotiations had ended. The conference closed on the note that it was time to move ahead. Much attention was focused on the Earth Summit in Johannesburg. Along with the climate accords ministers adopted a political declaration heralded as the official input of the Kyoto talks to the 2002 summit. Unfortunately, the tone of this document remained vague and lacked the progressive demands fought for by NGOs in particular. Still, the Earth Summit may become a major milestone for the evolution of the climate regime. Developed country governments led by the EU have declared repeatedly their will to have the Kyoto Protocol enter into force by the Johannesburg meeting. Reactions from Japan and Russia indicate that the renewed concessions have finally won their much needed ratification. After all the talk, now is the time to turn words into action. The last decade may seem like lost time towards more sustainability. One fool-proof way that governments can give the account of the ten years since Rio a positive start is to present Johannesburg with a climate treaty that is finally up and running. For more information contact: www.unfccc.int Matthias Duwe, Climate Network Europe (CNE), mduwe at gmx.net Implementation Conference Stakeholder Action for Our Common Future Preparations are well underway for this event, which UNED Forum is planning to facilitate in Johannesburg in August 2002. It is intended to bring together leading representatives of the Agenda 21 Major Groups to work on 5 key issues and to agree action plans for each one. The objective is to show how stakeholders, working in partnership, can help implement the Sustainable Development Agreements. The IC will be focusing on those areas where stakeholders need to play key roles and take responsibilities for action and change. More specifically, it will focus on those areas where collaborative stakeholder action offers the best strategies for sustainable development. UNED Forum has conducted a consultation process with its International Advisory Board members from June to August 2001, and the following five issues have been agreed: ? Freshwater; ? Renewable Energy; ? Food Security; ? Public Health and HIV/AIDS; and ? Tools for Corporate Citizenship (which is developing into "stakeholder responsibility"). Under these broad issues, specific focus areas for joint action will be identified through consultations. All will be addressed with a particular focus on: social inclusion and poverty eradication; governance; the impacts of globalisation; and gender. Work on these issues affects a multitude of stakeholders, can build on previous stakeholder dialogues, and benefit from the involvement of an active, enthusiastic core of leading stakeholder representatives. The IC is not just a conference - it is a process of collaboration that is quickly picking up speed, and will continue after Johannesburg when action plans will be put into practice and monitored, replications of successful activities will be sought, and larger networks will be built. It is important to understand that as the facilitator of the process, UNED Forum is creating a space for participants to fill: to shape the agenda and the process itself. The design of the IC process is based on UNED Forum's work on multi-stakeholder processes over recent years and the practical guidelines we have developed (www.earthsummit2002.org/msp). The guiding lines for the IC endeavour are the key principles of stakeholder collaboration, such as: effectiveness; equity; flexibility; inclusiveness; learning; transparency; partnership and collaboration. Each conference issue has its own preparatory process, which is handled by the Project Coordinators and Issue Coordinators at UNED Forum; international multi-stakeholder Issue Advisory Groups with equitable representation of relevant stakeholder groups; Issue Authors to provide background documents and keep track of developments, and professional Facilitators from around the globe. We are building on existing good practice and partnership models, drawing upon the rich expertise and experience gained by stakeholders in recent years. We also aim to organise pre-meetings, eg around the upcoming global PrepComms and in South Africa. A key idea is to make the preparatory process as direct and interactive as possible: meetings, phone conversations, telephone conferences, CD ROMs with audio and video - rather than 'piles' of documents to be produced and commented on. We are aiming to create a space of creativity and collaboration, of enjoyable interaction aiming to find the common ground without brushing over differences, and allowing everybody to express their ideas and needs in an open, appreciated manner. All of the desired outcomes will have the form of Action Plans: Who? What? When? How? Financed how? Facilitated by whom? Outcomes will depend on how far the process of dialogue and identifying joint action has come by the time of the IC itself. This in turn depends on the issues addressed, and on the relationships between stakeholders. Therefore, desired outcomes can include: ? Agreements on continuous dialogue between stakeholders; ? Agreements on stakeholders engaging with governments and intergovernmental bodies; ? Agreed work programmes to develop concrete projects; ? Agreed concrete projects. Some of the actions that emerge through the preparatory process may be actions to which many stakeholders will want to agree. Others may be action plans that only 2 or 3 organisations or networks will want to pursue. The process is open for both kinds of outcomes, and those in between. We will also work with a group of people to advise on financing models for potential outcomes so that at the IC there are ideas on how to resource action plans that stakeholders agree. The IC does not aim to develop stakeholder position papers aiming to impact the Summit outcome documents. However, comprehensive stakeholder thinking will be developed on the 5 IC issues and we will make these available to the Summit process throughout the preparations. We also aim to present the IC outcomes at a side event and exhibition at the Summit itself. This will be a strong message of stakeholders taking their responsibility, supporting the international agreements through their demonstrated actions and powers. We hope that such action-oriented messages will support the spirit of the Summit process and help to make it a success with a strong legacy, benefiting those who are most in need. UNED Forum is seeking to work with partner organisations on the IC as a whole or individual issue strands. We are engaged in discussions with stakeholder networks and organisations; intergovernmental bodies, and governments. Such partners will input into the process and the issue developments. If you are interesting in becoming involved in this exciting process, please contact us. You will find further information and a downloadable brochure at www.earthsummit2002.org/ic. Minu Hemmati, minush at aol.com, and Robert Whitfield, rwhitfield at earthsummit2002.org The Road to Johannesburg after Sept 11th The Heinrich Boell Foundation and UNED Forum joined forces to create a space for a global debate on the impact of the September 11 attacks and subsequent war on the Earth Summit 2002 process. The online debate was held November 19-24 with more than 400 subscribers from all over the globe participating in this forum. Jasmin Enayati, who facilitated the debate reports. "One is tempted to say that we must now focus all our energies on the struggle against terrorism, and on directly related issues. Yet if we should do so, we will be giving the terrorists a victory of a kind. Let us remember that none of the issues that faced us on 10 September has become less urgent. The number of people living on less than one dollar a day has not decreased. The numbers dying of HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and other preventable diseases have not decreased. The factors that cause the desert to advance, biodiversity to be lost, and the Earth's atmosphere to warm have not decreased." UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the UN General Assembly on November 10. The terrorist attacks of September 11 seem to have changed world politics dramatically. New and unexpected alliances are forged, the priorities of governments are reassessed, public attention is focused on the threat of terrorism. There was a wide range of opinions as to whether we are experiencing a new climate of international co-operation between nations after September 11. Some believe that the terrorist attacks will eventually lead to enhanced cooperation and a stronger commitment by the US to multi-lateralism which would provide a fertile ground for a "global deal" between North and South, based on genuine collaboration between all stakeholders. The attacks of September 11 cannot in itself be the source or the catalyst for more cooperation, they only heighten the urgency for cooperation which has been in the making since the end of the Cold War. The agenda of the Johannesburg Summit will have to reflect the new realities after September 11 and put more emphasis on poverty eradication and social equity: "We have to reach beyond easy rhetoric like "poverty reduction", and "development," and talk instead about "inequality," and the need for the global redistribution of wealth as the precondition of any real turn towards sustainability culture." The hope was expressed that September 11 may drive people to rethink the concept of economic liberalisation and the global free market. Many commentators agreed that the Johannesburg Summit must provide a platform by which we intensify our focus on governance structures, social development and global economic disparities. In this regard, the Financing for Development Conference that will take place in March next year will be of utmost importance for the Johannesburg Summit. Another promising sign is the recent agreement to launch a new World Trade Organisation (WTO) Round. Trade needs to be made fairer and freer and we need to ensure access for developing country products to OECD markets, while respecting the environment. However, another issue under discussion were the consequences of a weakened European Union that is falling back on the foreign policy of nation states and which will not be in a position to show the strength for confronting unilateral US environmental policies. Governments have to show the political will and invest the necessary political capital to turn the Johannesburg Summit into a success. In this regard, the climate change negotiations are critical and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol before the Summit would be crucial. Considering the role the UN was playing after September 11, it was found imperative that the UN be properly resourced, genuinely representative, have sufficient authority and be efficiently run to act on the world stage when needed. It is the mandate of the world community to establish a global rule of law. The role of NGOs has also been affected: the challenge for NGOs lies in creating and promoting a vision effectively without alienating public support. This also means that all stakeholders need to be engaged in the process. As one commentator puts it, "there is a need to show what violates democratic practice based on universal truths and the rationality of the mind to decide according to such criteria that are just to mankind. For the changes ahead there are needed such measures that can mediate between the needs for sustainable development and what is possible in the given situation, including the institutional arrangements of United Nations, WTO, national governments, European Union, etc. Any development will lead to violence if people abhor non violent ways of resolving conflicts." One commentator raised the concern that the losses of political accountability due to the justification of being at war against terrorism will make transparency of governmental procedures almost impossible. Another concern was that an intensified religious divide will lead to a setback in development in Islamic countries. It was suggested that the Summit should change its emphasis profoundly to deal primarily with issues of social and economic development in all Third World and Islamic countries. As one contributor suggests, peace has to be considered as the primary focus at environmental and social for a around the world including the Johannesburg Summit, with the anniversary of September 11 being an ideal time to promote the message through the mass media. Think-pieces and contributions can be accessed at www.worldsummit2002.org Jasmin Enayati - UNED Forum Email: jenayati at earthsummit2002.org Putting Water & Sanitation on the Political Agenda International Conference on Freshwater Side event: Roundtable Panel and Public Debate Bonn, Germany 3 December 2001, 14h00 - 17h00 Invited panelists: ? His Royal Highness the Prince of Orange ? Mr. Ronnie Kasrils, Minister for Water and Forestry, South Africa ? Mr. Macky Sall, Minister for Mines, Energy and Hydrology, Senegal ? Mr. Venkiya Naidu, Federal Minister for Rural Development and Rural Water Supply and Sanitation, India, ? Ms. Carmina Moreno, Director General de Agua Potable, Colombia ? Mr. Jan Pronk , Minister for Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment, The Netherlands ? Mr. Michael Meacher, Minister for the Environment, United Kingdom, ? Mr.Nitin Desai, Under-Secretary General for Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York ? Dr. Klaus Toepfer, Executive Director, UNEP, Nairobi ? Ms. Margaret Catley-Carlson, Chairperson, Global Water Partnership, Stockholm ? Mr. Gerard Payen, CEO of ONDEO, Paris ? Sir Richard Jolly, Chairman, Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council, Geneva ( facilitator) Summary: According to the Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council and the Global Water Supply and Sanitation Assessment Report 2000 published jointly with WHO and UNICEF, today there are still over a billion people without access to an acceptable supply of drinking water and some 2.4 billion without hygienic means of sanitation. The poor pay a terrible price for their poverty: squalor, disease and death in and around cities in the developing world are daily reminders of the societal divide that condemns more and more people to a marginal and undignified existence. Why do politicians, the media, civic leaders and other opinion-makers in society stand by while some 6,000 people die every day from diarrhoeal disease? Why do nations continue to pay the heavy price in health care, lost productivity and environmental degradation, rather than opt for the less costly alternative of improving health and hygiene through sustainable water and sanitation services? Can "people-centred approaches" bring about a sanitation revolution and transform the lives of billions of people in a generation? Growing numbers of individuals are confident that such a revolution is indeed and indeed possible. Vision 21 - Water for People - is an initiative that was launched by the Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council during the Second World Water Forum and Ministerial Conference in The Hague in March 2000. The panel will discuss how people-centred strategies can help solve the global water and sanitation crises. They will raise critical issues to the top of the political agenda and will address the lack of an international development target for sanitation that was overlooked by the Millennium Summit Declaration 2000, so that world leaders and their citizens can make improvements in the lives of the billions of unserved poor. They will discuss needed changes in attitudes and behaviour, policy and practices of those working in the water and sanitation sector as well as in related sectors of health, environment, education, nutrition, poverty alleviation and human rights, that will be needed to bring about institutional and legislative reforms. The event will be open to all participants of the Conference and to media representatives. The Council's Regional and National co-ordinators will also be present to share their experiences from the ground. A Video News Release on people-centred approaches featuring urban and rural examples will be screened to help focus the discussions. A question-and-answer portion will involve the audience and panelists in a real dialogue in the quest for practical solutions and exchange of ideas and experiences. The outcome of the discussions will be presented to the Ministerial part of the Conference (4-5 December 2001.) and conveyed to the World Summit for Sustainable Development to be held in Johannesburg, South Africa in September 2002. For more information on this event, please contact: Mr. Gourisankar Ghosh, Executive Director, WSSCC, c/o WHO, 20 avenue Appia, CH 1211 - Geneva 27, Switzerland. Tel: +41 22 7913517; Fax:+ 41 22 791 4847; E-mail: ghoshg at who.ch Or: Ms. Eirah Gorre-Dale, Advocacy and Media Adviser, WSSCC, in New York, c/o UN OPS-ENVP Room GWP-5128, 405 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017, U.S.A. Tel: +1 212 457-1862; Fax: +1 212 457 4044; E-mail: EirahGD at unops.org Web : www.wsscc.org Diary Dates, Events & Conferences 1 December Intergovernmental Group of Ministers on International Governance. Berlin, Germany. Contact: www.unep.org/IEG 3-4 December GEF Replenishment Meetings. Edinburgh, Scotland. Contact: www.gefweb.org/Replenishment/Schedule_of_Meetings/schedule_of_meetings.html 3-7 December International Conference on Freshwater. Bonn, Germany. Contact: www.water-2001.de 3-7 December International Conference on Oceans & Coasts at Rio+10 - Assessing progress, addressing continuing and new challenges. Paris, France. Contact: www.udel.edu/CMS/csmp/rio+10/ 6-7 December Global Environment Facility Council Meeting. Washington DC, USA. Contact: www.gefweb.org 11 December UN Official launch of the International Year of Mountains 2002. New York, USA. Contact www.mountain.org 6-11 January Rio 02 - World Climate & Energy Event. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Contact: www.rio02.de 14-25 January Financing for Development Final Prep. Comm.. New York, USA. Contact: ffd at un.org 29 Jan. - 8 Feb. World Summit on Sustainable Development Prep. Comm. II. New York, USA. Contact: www.johannesburgsummit.org/web_pages/second_prepcom.htm February 2nd Meeting on the UNCCD Panel of Eminent Personalities in Preparation for the WSSD. Niger. Contact: www.unccd.int 9-11 February Delhi Sustainable Development Summit 2002. New Delhi, India. Contact: www.teriin.org/dsds/index.htm 20-22 February Local Government International Prep. Comm. Meeting. North Vancouver, Canada. Contact: www.iclei.org/johannesburg2002 4-15 March 2nd Session of the UN Forum on Forests. San Jos?, Costa Rica. Contact: www.un.org/esa/sustdev/forests.htm 18-22 March International Conference on Financing for Development. Monterrey, Mexico. Contact: www.un.org/esa/ffd What's in next months Network ~2002 ? Earth Summit 2002 Prep. Comm. II - Preview ? International Freshwater Conference - Outcomes & Analysis ? Financing for Development Prep. Com. - Preview ? Global Environment Facility Council Meetings - Outcomes & Analysis ? International Conference on Oceans & Coasts at Rio+10 - Outcomes & Analysis ? ============================================================ How to Use this Mailing List ============================================================ You received this e-mail as a result of your registration on the globalization mailing list. To unsubscribe, please send an email to listserv at iatp.org. In the body of the message type: unsubscribe globalization For a list of other commands and list options, please send email to listserv at iatp.org. In the body of the message type: help Please direct content questions about this list to: mritchie at iatp.org Please direct technical questions about this service to: support at iatp.org From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Fri Nov 30 07:14:35 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 14:14:35 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Market of last resort In-Reply-To: References: <4.3.2.7.1.20011128065915.03157cb0@pop3.norton.antivirus> Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011130134416.00aea050@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 30/11/2001 02:43, John wrote: >Just a crude thought-experiment on paper, interested in any comments and >kibbitzing: I was just reading Edward Said in this week's Al-Ahram and he seems as much at sea as most of us. Since events are out of control and since anyway the people in the locomotive are stupid, irrational and self-destructive, prediction is almost profitless, but nonetheless we should try. First, previous experience suggests that there will be more terrorist outrages regardless of what happen in Afghanistan or to ObL. Second, the US ruling elite and the Bush regime (not quite the same thing, tho overlapping) are still on a very dismal learning curve. It took the British ruling class several decades to learn that the only way to stop the City of London's banks and exchanges being blown up was to talk with the IRA, because it was impossible to stop them by military and secret police methods alone. An enlightened White house (oxymoron!) would attempt to deal with the underlying social-justice issues, as Blair suggested from the start. They are not doing so, therefore, the war will go on and get worse. Third, even if Bush underwent some Damascene experience and did try to follow Tony's advice, would he be able to? In practice, is there ANY set of policies capable of implementation, which might defuse the social causes of terrorism and deal with underlying problems? Such policies, to be effective, must surely entail very large resource transfers from the West to the Rest. How could such policies have any chance of success, given the present mindset of western elites, and given the fact that long before an enlightened White House could do anything for the Arab masses, Palestine etc, it would have to implement a New Deal for its own underclass, since social inequality in the US itself is a major and unsustainable reality and must be dealt with just to create the preconditions for the proposed global Marshall Plan, ie to cerate political support internally. I simply don't believe this is possible, therefore the impasse which locks in the Bushies to the present a catastrophically dangerous course, is caused by objective political and social realities and not just to the ideological impedimenta in their own muddled heads. Fourth, in any case, even if both the political will and the social support existed in the US and other western countries to deal with 3rd world poverty and global inequality, the idea that this is enough for a replay fo some kind of Rooseveltian New Deal on a global scale is still wrong. Political will and social support are necessary but not sufficient conditions. There is still the underlying and IMO fatal crisis within the sphere of production itself, and acts of will cannot jump over this. The second half of the last century was about the relaunching of accumulation on a world scale on the basis of new and potent technologies: electric power, the automobile, mass production, fordism, taylorism, informatics, pharmaceuticals, plastics, computers, petrochemicals, agribiz etc. That was the material basis for the New Deal and the postwar boom. In 1938 the global human population was ~2bn. Today we face the obvious exhaustion of many--most--of these technologies, and a population heading for 7bn. 70% of Iranians and Saudis and Egyptians are under 20 years old! This crisis and the West's 'solution' to it simply robs these multimillioned masses of any hope in the future. They will not live long or healthy lives, will not have much education or security. But they are surrounded everyday and everywhere with the broadcast imagery of western lifestyles which they can only envy and never hope to achieve. What do they have to lose? World capitalism is a gigantic tinderbox, a dynamite mountain which any spark can detonate. And since the West appears to have no remedy left but the naked use of force and terror, it can only continue to use this method until some superior force finally stops it, is there another way? The path which the West has now embarked upon is that of the open, unbridled use of of military power and state terror; it seems to mean applying to '50 or more countries' the lessons learnt by Israel in their oppression of the Palestinians. The ongoing revision of geopolitical realities must therefore surely involve, at some point soon, a 'revision' of the numbers of humans currently alive in the 'terrorist nations'. Finally, how long can the Wall St Ponzi scheme continue? The politics of exterminism (the highest stage of imperialism) will surely be once again inflected by the circumstances following a major economic crash. Mark Jones >The U.S. needs Russia's diplomatic and logistical help to conduct its war >in C. Asia. Via its N. Alliance proxy army (and its own ground forces as >well), Russia parlays this opening into securing more geopolitical leverage >over C. Asian natural gas and oil fields (to the partial chagrin of the >U.S. foreign policy apparatus, apparently). Mark Jones points out that one >of the upshots of this is Russia also secures more control over EU energy >supplies, since pipelines transitting Russia (as opposed to Afghanistan >and Pakistan) are destined for W. European markets. (And apparently >Russian attempts to undercut OPEC oil exporters is part of this game as >well, though it is bound to be unsuccessful). > >OK, that covers shifting balance of power b/w Russia and the EU. But what >about shifting balance of power b/w Russia and the "market of last resort" >mentioned by Chris Burford, E. Asia (notably the PRC) ? Among others, >things to take account of: 1) No C. Asian-Afghani-Pakistani pipelines >means PRC and E. Asia will have to source more of their (non-coal) energy >supplies elsewhere. 2) Possible alternatives include natural gas (and oil ?) >in Far East Russia -- trans-Baikal area, in and around Sea of Okhotsk, etc. >3) Will Russian state (GazProm) and private (LukOil, etc.) energy firms >(maybe in joint ventures with TNC's) sell Far East Russian oil and natural >gas to anybody as long as there's a market for it, i.e. the PRC, Japan, >S. Korea, etc. ? Or would delivering energy inputs to any or all of these >markets in some way rub against the aims of the uneasy alliance b/w >U.S./Russia ? > >For example, despite the fact that the "market socialists" at the helm of >the CCP appear dedicated to total and complete global K'ist integration, >does or would a U.S./Russian alliance, taking a long view of the coming >hydrocarbon crunch, have an interest in squeezing PRC access to Far East >Russian energy inputs (and other natural resources as well -- cropland, >timber, precious metals, etc.) ? > >And what of Japan ? Where do they fit into all of this ? Japanese >creditors still hold a big bundle of U.S. T-bills, but so what ? >Does the banking crisis in Japan mean that the U.S. does not have to >coddle Japan as a potential source of world liquidity, and does the U.S.' >new "alliance" (perhaps too crude and strong a term) w/Russia mean that >U.S. no longer needs Japan as its junior partner in E. Asia ? If so, Japan >is really fucked, b/c in all likelihood Japan cannot turn to the PRC for >closer security ties, economic integration on privileged terms, and so on, >b/c of this inconvenient historical matter of Japanese fascist occupation >of the PRC. I dunno, maybe some kind of Japan-EU "alliance" in the works. > >Another piece in the puzzle, I think, is how much oversight does >Moscow exercise over regional governors in Far East Russia, who may be >inclined to cut deals with both "legitimate" and "illegitimate" (in the >bourgeois legal sense) interests who extract and ship natural resources >to the PRC and E. Asia, despite the potential future antipathy of the >Kremlin, the Duma, Putin's gov't, etc ? > >In any case, the whirlwind of events over the last few months, I think, >is setting the stage for geopolitical conflict over Far East Russian >fossil fuels and raw materials, if not today (like C. Asian oil and >natural gas), then tomorrow, if there is a tomorrow (and as Mark Jones has >shown, one possible "no tomorrow" scenario involves the very landscape >of the Russian hinterland, namely the self-perpetuating melting of the >northern permafrost). > >John Gulick From lnp3 at panix.com Fri Nov 30 07:20:23 2001 From: lnp3 at panix.com (Louis Proyect) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 09:20:23 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Enron In-Reply-To: <5.1.0.14.2.20011130134416.00aea050@pop.tiscali.co.uk> References: <4.3.2.7.1.20011128065915.03157cb0@pop3.norton.antivirus> Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.20011130092023.006ea544@popserver.panix.com> (This morning's NY Times discusses the Enron assets that will have to be liquidated. Among them is a fiber-optic network of some magnitude apparently. I wonder if Enron's troubles are partially the result of the dot.com collapse, among other things? This article from last April details Enron's investment in fiber-optics.) The Houston Chronicle, April 15, 2001, Sunday 2 STAR EDITION THE NEW POWER; Enron; Making of the Market-maker; With ups and downs, Enron Broadband is a work in progress TOM FOWLER IN LATE 1999, when Enron announced it would pioneer trading of a "new new" commodity - Internet bandwidth - analysts and investors were only a little skeptical. Nevermind that buying and selling time on the vast, unruly tangle of the Internet on a big scale was unheard of. Enron's reputation for making a profit trading almost everything from pulp to plastics made this venture look like a sure thing. When entertainment giant Blockbuster Video signed a deal with Enron last summer to provide video-on-demand service to consumers, creating content to fill that giant data pipeline, investors bid up the stock to show their confidence in its broadband vision. But when the Blockbuster deal was canceled on March 9, Enron stock fell back to earth. Things got worse when Wall Street got reports that Enron Broadband Services was reducing its staff by more then 20 percent - which have since been confirmed by the company. That news took a bit of the high-tech shine off the company at a time when Enron also was getting some bad news from its international operations and the market was losing its taste for high flying stocks. Suddenly, Enron's broadband business, which helped fuel the stock's rise last year, had become a drag. The potential for broadband services and trading isn't being disputed, but Andre Meade, head of U.S. utilities research for Commerzbank Securities, said many analysts were too quick to accept Enron's estimates on the value of the business when it was first announced. "The market priced in an excessive valuation on the broadband business, overreacting on something that was still relatively unknown," Meade said. "Now it's overreacted somewhat to the Blockbuster news. I think it's dropped lower than it should." The trading side of the business appears to be exceeding expectations, but Enron Broadband is still expected to remain in the red for the next couple of years as it builds business. "I think we realize it's still a work in progress," Meade said. Enron Broadband first used its network for broadband hosting, letting a few large customers, such as TV networks or financial services companies, buy data line access on an as-needed basis for such things as Web broadcasts or shipping large amounts of data across the country, said Ken Rice, chief executive officer of Enron Broadband Services. In the past, if a company wanted to do a Web broadcast between two cities, for example, it had two choices: just do the broadcast and hope regular Internet traffic wouldn't slow it down or interfere with the quality, or reserve time on a data line months in advance and pay for several months worth of service, instead of just the time needed. "It seemed to be a business about the same size as natural gas, but growing by 15 to 20 percent per year," Rice said. "By 1998, we decided that telecom could be the company's core business." Enron's bold predictions were embraced by investors and analysts who had learned to give the company a lot of credit for its ability to successfully execute its business plan. That faith helped keep Enron's stock buoyant in the past year even as other companies with broadband businesses, such as Williams Cos. and Global Crossing, saw their operations lose more than half their value. Enron built its own fiber-optic network, which now runs about 18,000 miles. It used that to connect many other large networks around the world. To facilitate those connections, the company has created more than 25 "pooling points" where Enron's network interconnects with others, much like the Henry Hub in Louisiana connects many natural gas pipelines. It's at these pooling points where Enron can flip the switches on increasingly short notice to turn on a section of the network dedicated to a customer's needs. That lets Enron buy and sell just what the customer wants. Enron also created software that allows customers to reserve and schedule bandwidth and pick the quality of service. The company has seen trading grow quickly, jumping from 236 broadband trades in the fourth quarter of 2000 to more than 500 trades in the first quarter of 2001. Enron also is moving closer to having the one tool that could really let trading take off - standardized contracts. That can be a hard sell. "Just as with the electricity and natural gas industries, a lot of the market says it can't start trading until trading standards are set, but that's bogus," Rice said. "We've come up with a couple of standard contracts ourselves and believe the industry will adopt standards over time." Meanwhile, the deal with Blockbuster to provide online delivery of movies was supposed to be the cornerstone of a business in which Enron would deliver a wide variety of content to homes and businesses. The companies had tests of the new service running in four cities, which appeared to be a success, but in early March the 20-year deal came to an abrupt end. Blockbuster was the first to announce the breakup, but Enron issued its own release a few hours later, saying Blockbuster was unable to secure the quality or quantity of movies from the studios needed to make the service a success. "Blockbuster had some relationships with the studios complete, but the studios ultimately weren't too excited about giving them control of the digital rights to films," Rice said. Enron Broadband now is working directly with the studios and other content producers to secure movie deals and expects to announce some of those relationships soon. The company also announced a new content deal to offer hundreds of video game titles online by June. For investors and analysts, however, the misstep with Blockbuster took the shine off Enron's apple. "They really sold the Blockbuster deal as an anchor tenant for broadband and as proof of their idea's success," said Jeff Dietert, vice president of research at Simmons & Company International. "So when it fell through, the one major item we could point to as a sign of a successful execution was gone." While Enron Broadband works toward earning its keep, Rice predicts broadband will become a bigger and bigger part of Enron's overall business. The group has started to trade online data storage - effectively offering companies an alternative to buying more storage hardware - and is even beginning to trade broadcast advertising time. "I think eventually it will be on par with natural gas retail and wholesale," Rice said. "A lot of the guys in that division will say 'no way,' but there's no doubt to anyone it will be big." Louis Proyect Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org From JSommers at ngcsu.edu Fri Nov 30 07:50:51 2001 From: JSommers at ngcsu.edu (Jeffrey Sommers) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 09:50:51 -0500 Subject: [A-List] US Ambassador to the Russian Federation Message-ID: US Department of State 28 November 2001 Text: U.S. Ambassador Vershbow on the New U.S.-Russian Relationship (Nov. 23: Moscow State International Institute for Int. Relations) The United States and Russia can look forward to "a close and mutually beneficial partnership -- and perhaps, an alliance ... that provides lasting security and well-being for both countries," said U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow November 23. Speaking at the Moscow State International Institute for International Relations, Vershbow acknowledged continuing differences despite "the spirit of warmth and trust that now exists." "But disagreements between partners do not alter the common values and beliefs that unite them," he said. "Indeed, the unprecedented nature of the new threats, and the mutual interest we share in defeating those who seek to destroy our civilization, allow us to view other issues in the broader perspective of our new partnership." In Vershbow's view, the most significant accomplishment of the recent summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Bush was the agreement to reduce dramatically each country's arsenal of nuclear warheads. Differing points of view on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the urgency of developing missile defenses matter less than the determination of both presidents to develop a new strategic framework for the long term, he said, adding, "The new framework should enable our two countries to meet future threats together, including through collaboration on missile defense." Regarding Russia's relationship with NATO, Vershbow noted that Bush and Putin "declared that Russia and NATO are increasingly acting as allies against terrorism and other new threats, and that the NATO-Russia relationship should reflect this alliance. "Our common task is to devise new mechanisms for cooperation, coordinated action, and joint decisions that can integrate Russia more closely in NATO's work." He said he believes that the NATO Allies will be "increasingly prepared to engage Russia as a full and equal partner" as a result of cooperation in the war against terrorism. Such engagement would mean "working with Russia from the earliest stage -- that is, before NATO members have taken their own decision. The goal should be implementation of a common strategy that NATO and Russia have developed together, just as the NATO Allies do now. For this to be effective, Russia needs to develop the ability to work toward and achieve consensus." Vershbow also cautioned that recent battlefield successes in Afghanistan do not mean that the war against terrorism is over. "We will not rest until we have defeated al Qaida and other terrorist networks -- and our highest priority will be to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. "This will be a long, difficult struggle; but it is one that unites Russia and the United States and one which we are determined to win." Following is the text of Vershbow's speech as prepared for delivery: (begin text) Moscow State International Institute for International Relations (MGIMO) November 23, 2001 The New U.S.-Russian Relationship Alexander Vershbow U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation (as prepared for delivery) I last spoke at MGIMO two years ago when I was the U.S. Ambassador to NATO. This was just after the Kosovo campaign, and our relations were still somewhat tense. It's a great pleasure to return here today, just one week after our two presidents held their historic summit in the United States, with U.S.-Russian relations on the upswing. I studied Russian and Soviet Affairs in the early 1970s and first served here as a diplomat from 1979 to 1981, during the height of the Cold War. As I look around this audience today, I think that I can safely say that for most of you, the Cold War is only a dim memory. You are less encumbered than my generation by the prejudices and habits of the past. You are more open to new ideas in international affairs and innovative approaches to our diplomatic relations. Your work as diplomats and experts in international relations will help shape Russia's future during the coming century. I am interested in hearing your thoughts about our two countries, and, for my part, I would like to share with you some observations about U.S.-Russian relations, having returned a few days ago from last week's summit. The meetings between Presidents Bush and Putin last week marked a dramatic redefinition of the relationship between our two countries as we begin the 21st century. By their words and actions, the two leaders made clear that Russia and the United States now share a determination to enter this new century on the basis of common interests and a shared commitment to the values of democracy, the free market and the rule of law. They stated unequivocally that the Cold War is behind us. In its place we can look forward to a close and mutually beneficial partnership -- and perhaps, an alliance -- between Russia and the United States that provides lasting security and well-being for both countries. There is no question that the terrorist attacks of September 11 lent urgency to both sides' efforts to build a stronger, more solid partnership between the United States and Russia. After missed opportunities and false starts, our two countries have finally taken the necessary steps to overcome the legacy of the past and to understand each other as partners, and not as rivals. The terrible events of September 11 were an attack on the entire civilized world, and helped bring our two nations closer. President Putin was the first foreign leader to speak with President Bush after the attacks and to express his sympathy and solidarity. And he backed that up with an unprecedented offer of political, military and intelligence support. Moreover, the Russian government and ordinary citizens of this great country extended the hand of friendship to the United States after one of its darkest days. We now realize more than ever before that the new challenges of the 21st century demand that the United States and Russia stand together, not apart. This does not mean that there are no differences between us. Our national interests will not always coincide and our viewpoints will diverge on significant international issues. But disagreements between partners do not alter the common values and beliefs that unite them. Indeed, the unprecedented nature of the new threats, and the mutual interest we share in defeating those who seek to destroy our civilization, allow us to view other issues in the broader perspective of our new partnership. The meetings last week between our two presidents in Washington and Crawford confirmed that our two countries have embarked on a truly new relationship. I participated in many of the meetings that took place and I can testify to the spirit of warmth and trust that now exists. Perhaps the most significant accomplishment of the Summit was the agreement to reduce dramatically our arsenals of strategic nuclear warheads -- and to do so without the years of negotiations that used to precede such decisions during the Cold War. President Bush declared that the United States will reduce to a level between 1700 and 2200 warheads over the next decade (down from over 7000 today). President Putin announced that Russia will make comparable reductions. In the coming months, we will codify these reductions, to include measures for verification. The Summit also highlighted our cooperation to prevent or counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This includes continued efforts to improve the physical security and accounting of nuclear materials so that terrorists and those who support them can never acquire such weapons. Of special importance was a joint statement on "bioterrorism" -- very timely after the recent anthrax incidents in the United States. Russian and American officials and experts will work together to prevent terrorists from acquiring biological weapons and on related health measures to protect our populations. We continue to have different points of view about the ABM Treaty and the urgency of developing ballistic missile defenses. But we have agreed to keep working on the issue. The Treaty prohibits the testing that the United States must conduct in order to develop effective, but limited missile defenses against rogue-state threats who are acquiring the technology for long-range ballistic missiles. Whether or not we find a solution to the short-term question of the ABM Treaty, both Presidents made clear their determination to develop a new strategic framework for the long term. The new framework should be more in keeping with our new relationship and take account of the changes in the strategic situation since the ABM Treaty was signed 29 years ago. The new framework should enable our two countries to meet future threats together, including through collaboration on missile defense. The two Presidents devoted considerable time to Russia's relationship with NATO. They declared that Russia and NATO are increasingly acting as allies against terrorism and other new threats, and that the NATO-Russia relationship should reflect this alliance. Our common task is to devise new mechanisms for cooperation, coordinated action and joint decisions that can integrate Russia more closely in NATO's work. We both are determined that Russia -- as a democracy -- should be part of a Europe that includes all democratic nations and that respects the sovereignty and independence of all nations. As a former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, I can assure you that the United States is committed to improving and strengthening the NATO-Russia relationship. Today's talks by the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, with President Putin have advanced that goal. I believe that the NATO Allies, as they tackle new threats such as terrorism, will be increasingly prepared to engage Russia as a full and equal partner. This would mean working with Russia from the earliest stage -- that is, before NATO members have taken their own decision. The goal should be implementation of a common strategy that NATO and Russia have developed together, just as the NATO Allies do now. For this to be effective, Russia needs to develop the ability to work toward and achieve consensus. The new partnership between the United States and Russia goes beyond agreements on nuclear weapons and stronger relations with NATO. It encompasses trade, assistance, space cooperation, law enforcement and a whole range of matters affecting the well-being of the citizens of the Russian Federation and the United States. At our Embassy, I coordinate the work of 28 different U.S. Government agencies, all working on some aspect of the bilateral relationship. Presidents Putin and Bush have pledged to improve contacts and exchanges between our people, to increase prosperity through trade and investment, and to strengthen further the integration of Russia into the world economy. An important element of our efforts to forge closer economic ties is our support for Russia's membership in the World Trade Organization. The United States is committed to working with Russia to accelerate its accession to the WTO, based on the conditions that other member countries have had to meet. Most important, in this regard, is that Russia improve market access for other countries' firms and products, and provide a level playing field for all firms, Russian and non-Russian. President Putin's government has committed itself to an impressive legislative agenda of structural reforms, including those to bring Russia's laws into conformity with WTO standards, and we urge this process to continue. The successful trade mission led by Secretary of Commerce Don Evans last month demonstrated the renewed interest on the part of U.S. companies in doing business in Russia. And the new strength of our economic relations was reinforced by the recent completion of the Caspian Pipeline, the largest U.S.-Russian joint investment to date, which delivers oil from the Caspian Sea region to international markets. We look forward to other U.S.-Russian projects, including the Sakhalin I oil and gas project, and joint ventures in the high-technology area. To support Sakhalin I -- which could represent $12 billion in capital investment and 10,000 new jobs -- and other Far East projects, the United States intends to request permission to open a branch office of our Vladivostok Consulate in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. To further develop our economic relationship, a private-sector Russian-American Business Dialogue, established last July, will present recommendations to our governments early next year concerning ways to eliminate obstacles to future trade and investment, strengthen the rule of law, and increase commerce between our two countries. At the Washington Summit we agreed on an additional initiative to help an area of Russia's reform program that is lagging behind the rest, namely, banking. The Russian-American Banking Dialogue will begin meeting this winter in order to support efforts to reform the banking sector in Russia, to sustain economic growth, and to give more Russian individuals and businesses -- especially small and medium-sized businesses -- access to private capital. The United States and Russia speak with a common voice today not only about political issues and the need for economic progress but also about the principles and values that form the basis of our societies: human rights, religious freedom, free speech and independent media, and the rule of law. In this context, we welcome the launch of a Russian-American Media Entrepreneurship Dialogue. This new initiative will help build a competitive media sector in Russia and improve the conditions necessary for media to flourish in Russia as a business. This dialogue will bring together information executives, journalists and NGO representatives who will work together to develop ways to put independent media on a solid financial basis while upholding the highest journalistic standards. The gravest threat today to our national existence, to our economic prosperity and to our freedom is, of course, from terrorists who have declared war on the civilized world. The heartless attacks in New York and Washington on September 11 that took the lives of so many innocent people -- not only Americans but also hundreds of citizens of other countries, including Russia -- have no justification. These terrorist attacks had nothing to do with a clash of civilizations or religions -- in fact, they were attacks against civilization and religion. The United States and Russia now stand shoulder-to-shoulder in a united front against all forms of international terrorism, including the use of biological agents. And we agree on the need to undertake joint efforts against nuclear proliferation, organized crime and drug trafficking. Together we will defeat all those who would undermine the foundations of civil society that all of us now cherish. Both our countries are committed to the reconstruction of Afghanistan when hostilities cease and the Taliban has been completely defeated. We support efforts by the United Nations to make possible a multi-ethnic post-Taliban government that respects human rights and exports neither terror nor drugs. Recent dramatic gains on the battlefield do not mean that the war against terrorism is over. And indeed, that war will not end in Afghanistan. This is a long-term struggle to eradicate global terrorism wherever it exists. In President Putin's words: "We have to fight the war against terrorism do kontsa (to the very end)." We will not rest until we have defeated al Qaida and other terrorist networks -- and our highest priority will be to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. This will be a long, difficult struggle; but it is one that unites Russia and the United States and one which we are determined to win. Russia and the United States -- working together as close partners with other freedom-loving nations of the world -- have the opportunity to make the decades ahead an era of peace and progress. This is the challenge for all of you here today -- a new generation of Russians growing up in a new era of freedom and democracy. It is up to you to work together with your counterparts in America, Europe and in other countries to build a world safe, free and prosperous for the generations that will come after you. From Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi Fri Nov 30 07:16:58 2001 From: Michael.Keaney at mbs.fi (Keaney Michael) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 16:16:58 +0200 Subject: [A-List] Malvinas "update" Message-ID: Rob Schaap writes: Don't I remember something about the Falklands/Malvinas' main importance to Britain being to do with maintaining what credibility its Antarctic claims might still possess? Southampton is not an ideally situated base camp, after all. Do you think the 'I remember when the whole world map were pink' brigade (not yet an insignificant proportion of the great British electorate) would swallow Euro-integration, the handing back of Gibralter and the Malvinas, and the forfeit of their claim on Antarctica all in one hit? Britain would have to have changed an awful lot since I was last there ... ===== A lot has changed, and still is changing, thanks to the destruction of much of the infrastructure supporting the *traditional* British state by those whom it brought to power -- namely, Thatcher and her crew. They were necessary for the destruction of the labour movement, which was never going to be challenged properly by even Jim Callaghan, whose trade union background was something he held dear and could not countenance reneging on, even though he was a Labour rightwinger. The complete destruction of the labour movement was something that both wings of the Conservative Party (Thatcher/Atlanticist, Heseltine/European) were pretty much agreed was necessary, not least as revenge for the embarrassment of the Heath premiership. A few corporatists (from whom Heseltine drew much support as a fellow-traveller) hankered after Macmillan/Wilson-type tripartism, but in the main a smashing-the-labour-movement agenda was a done deal for the Conservatives. However, having unleashed an unprecedented and untrammelled force of capitalist development via the privatisation/deregulation/liberalisation structural adjustment, they sealed the fate of their original sponsors: the true blue British Empire brigade, whose increasing irrelevance became sorely apparent as Thatcher's reign went on. And she never understood what it was she was doing, *really*, as evidenced by her little Englander "we made Britain grate again" (sic) refrain and jingoistic anti-Europeanism. She it was, after all, who signed the Single European Act in 1986 paving the way for all that she subsequently opposed. And it was Europe that tore her party apart, and the permanent government apparatus supported the European faction until the Conservative Party was too incapable of governing. It should really have lost the 1992 election -- that it staggered on for another 5 years is really remarkable. But the permanent government got its preferred "natural party" in the form of New Labour, whose precise form may never have taken shape had Kinnock won in 1992. Mark Jones posted a message on PEN-L way back last April/May or thereabouts detailing the social changes wrought by Thatcherism, including the increased emphasis on self-interest and short-termism. Gibraltar and Northern Ireland are anachronisms for most people. The latter especially is something the vast majority of "mainlanders" would dearly love to be rid of, and there are many within the state apparatus who feel the same. It's a costly investment, and where is the return? What geopolitical advantage is there? None whatsoever. What economic advantage is there? None whatsoever. Only national pride could justify its perpetual retention, and there are bigger fish to fry in that department these days. And in any case, conducting a fairly miserable and dirty counter-terrorist operation hardly adds to national pride. Gibraltar is of use only for the gaming industry, which can avoid paying taxes in the UK. These can easily be rescinded, as with so many other taxes inconvenient to business. What geopolitical advantage does Gibraltar serve? None whatsoever. What economic advantage is there? None whatsoever -- it's a tax haven for goodness sake, and there's plenty of them to go around, not least the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. Both Gibraltar and NI are within the EU regardless of the nominal sovereign, and the UK's current preoccupation involves acquiring greater influence over the trajectory of EU development. The Malvinas, alas, is made more difficult by the jingoistic legacy of Thatcher. Imperialist uproar could be whipped up by the punk Thatcherites, who could very easily accuse Blair et al of betraying the dead, those who gave their lives for Blighty, etc. (Never mind the poor conscripts aboard the Belgrano.) In addition to the Antarctic claims, there is also a matter of possible oil and gas extraction, but little is heard of that just now. In any case, there's still Ascension Island. Nestor notes that the Wilson government's proposal "was not a honest move". In this case I think Chris has it right when highlighting the different viewpoints represented within ruling circles at that time. Someone like Chalfont, who was a "junior" minister at the Foreign Office for the lifetime of both Wilson 1960s administrations, would represent, it has become clear subsequently, what could now be called the punk Thatcherite tendency. So, for him and those he represented, it was most certainly not an honest move. The Foreign Office from the top down appears to have deliberately sabotaged the whole thing: note the pointed reference to Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart's busy diary as the reason negotiations fell through. Wilson, however, and many around him, were desperately trying to regenerate the British economy in order to get out from under US domination and the perpetual difficulty of balance of payments problems that gave the US one significant form of leverage over any British government. Withdrawing UK military forces from East of Suez (as the policy was called) was difficult because LBJ regarded this as a clear indication of criticism of the Vietnam war (which, to his eternal credit, Wilson never joined in, all pressures notwithstanding). Wilson was not an imperialist either, and saw no geopolitical advantages in colonial possessions. The problems with Ian Smith in Rhodesia arose not because UDI snubbed Britain, but because UDI involved minority rule and effective apartheid. Those who would otherwise be apoplectic about the loss of Gibraltar, Malvinas, NI or anything else were quite satisfied that Smith's Rhodesia would serve a number of useful purposes, not least as a source of trouble for Wilson who was beset by other difficulties spanning the permanent government-City of London-military nexus. Hence the problems posed by BOSS agents in Britain during the early to mid-1970s. Wilson himself accused BOSS of acting to undermine his premiership. Meanwhile the punk Thatcherites like the ghastly McWhirter brothers -- effectively the political wing of BOSS, Unison Committee for Action, and MI5 -- conducted a legal campaign against anti-apartheid campaigners like Peter Hain (!), now at the Foreign Office in charge of leading the charge into Europe, while BOSS and other fanatical anticommunist elements in the British secret services (Peter Wright et al) conspired to bring down Wilson and his circle via a strategy of tension that involved the smearing of and even attempted kidnappings and assassinations of anti-apartheid campaigners, among other nefarious deeds. Michael Keaney From hliu at mindspring.com Fri Nov 30 09:42:57 2001 From: hliu at mindspring.com (Henry C.K. Liu) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 11:42:57 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Afghanistan and Kosovo Message-ID: <3C07B711.D477CC3C@mindspring.com> Morgenthau's "Realpolitik" and the war on terrorism Bernard Baruch coined the Cold War in 1947, the same year that Hans Morgenthau published his classic Politics Among Nations, which defines foreign affairs, national interest, national security, deterrence, balance of power and other key notions of international relations that deeply influenced American thinking. Morgenthau observed that nations have interests which are furthered through the use of power to accumulate more power (military, economic and political alliances) to further new interests regionalization, globalization). The world system constantly faces the threat of an imbalance of power, with some nations trying to maintain the status quo, and others trying to alter it. Morgenthau defined national policies that aim at changing the status quo as imperialistic - a meaning very different from Lenin's. Morgenthau wrote: "The balance of power and policies aiming at its preservation are not only inevitable, but are an essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations.'' Extending Machiavellian principles on politics to international relations, Morgenthau rejected that foreign policy could ever be based solely on moral principles or idealism. Realpolitik is the game in international relations. While this notion is well accepted in the US foreign policy establishment, the American public still requires American policy to be based on the enhancement of American values before they give it their full support. This is particularly true when issues of war and the risks of American lives are involved. >From Acheson to Dulles to Kissinger to Albright and now Colin Powell, Morgenthau's realpolitik has generated a fairly consistent foreign policy to support US national interests, while it survived several changes in the identity of the enemies of American values by alternatively demonizing and resurrecting them. Morgenthau saw clearly that mass communication is an essential element of foreign policy for a democracy or even a totalitarian state. He wrote: "One might almost be tempted to say that there are no longer any purely domestic affairs, for whatever a nation does or does not do is held for or against it as a reflection of its political philosophy, system of government, and way of life.'' "The statesman must take the long view, proceeding slowly and by detours, paying with small losses for great advantage. ... The popular mind wants quick results; it will sacrifice tomorrow's real benefit for today's apparent advantage.'' "A government may have a correct understanding of the requirements of foreign policy and of the domestic politics to support them, but if it fails in marshaling public opinion behind these policies, its labors will be in vain.'' Despite the advocacy for realpolitik, it can be argued that Morgenthau's theory of international politics is fundamentally concerned with a normative morality, and that his moral theory is rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Morgenthau adopts an Augustinian moral framework: that the Church's authority is the guarantee of the Christian faith (or a nation's authority is the guarantee of its values), rather than Hobbesian Machiavellian, in which fear of violent death propels men to create a state by contracting to surrender their natural rights and to submit to the absolute authority of a sovereign. Morgenthau reconciled universal principles (human rights) with a recalcitrant reality (national sovereignty) by representing their relationship as a dialectical tension. He developed a practical morality which emphasizes the continued application of moral imperatives to action, mitigated by a consequentialist orientation which demands that they be applied cautiously and always adapted to circumstances. This generates a political morality which reconciles the imperatives of morality and national survival by asserting that, while the national interest must be protected, it must always be subjected to strict moral limitations. The same goes for its corollary: while universal principles (human rights) must be respected, its protection can only be effective by respecting a recalcitrant reality (national sovereignty), since national sovereignty remains the basic building block of international relations. I submit that the war on terrorism via attacks on Afghanistan, as well as talks of elimination of "failed states", as with NATO's attack on Yugoslavia, lacks the political morality that Morgenthau stipulated as necessary for a sound foreign policy for its member nations in that not only does it violates the principle of national sovereignty upon which the anti-terroism coalition, or the NATO alliance, itself derive its legitimacy, but also, in attempting to prevent changes in the post Cold War status quo, the attacks actually will accelerate those changes, and that the domestic stability in member nations will be threatened by the coalition or NATO actions rather than enhanced by them. And by violating the sanctity of national sovereignty, it weakens the international system in which the protection of universal human rights can only be effectuated through national authority. Operationally, when a strong force attacks a weak one, an extended duration of the conflict works against the stronger side - classic military doctrine. If the war on terrorism has not won after a few months, the game is essentially over. All involved, except the US, are now frantically seeking political ways out. Further attacks are now fulfilling only bargaining chip functions in anticipation of a political settlement. If NATO had play a war game on Kosovo, this outcome would have been predictable, without the tragic loss of innocent lives. NATO, having been conceived 5 decades ago as a defensive alliance against invasion in a political crisis in a bi-polar world, is predictably revealing its limitations as an offensive force in a premeditated action in a multi-polar global scenario. The political structure of the alliance presents a serious misfit to its new mission. The same applies to the coalition behind the war on terroism. Thus we have in Afghanistan a situation in which: the moral imperative is controversial and unbalanced, the geopolitical objective are unfocused, the mismatch of a problem that requires a political solution with a military approach, the military tool does not fit the tactical needs of the mission, and the sure prospect of a protracted engagement in which the passage of time dilutes the prospect for victory. On the broader front, the Afghan attack, as with NATO's Kosovo intervention, has reshaped the geo-political framework and discouraged post-Cold War disarmament or pacification arguments in all government deliberations. It has in fact become a foreign policy abyss. Henry C.K. Liu From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Fri Nov 30 09:45:41 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 16:45:41 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Landes seminar cancelled anyway Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011130164122.024dc5b8@pop3.freeserve.net> [The fog, the fog, the fog, has caused Landes to cancel. As Benjamin Franklin said: 'Like a man traveling in foggy weather, those at some distance before him on the road he sees wrapped up in the fog, as well as those behind him, and also the people in the fields on each side, but near him all appears clear, though in truth he is as much in the fog as any of them.' Autobiography, ch. 8 (1771?90). Mark ] Fwd: EH.N: POSTPONED: All-Ohio Economic History Seminar presentation of David Landes on web >----------------- EH.NEWS POSTING ----------------- >Dear Seminar Participants: > >We regret to announce that today's seminar has been cancelled because >dense fog in Boston has stopped all air travel, and therefore David Landes >cannot get here to present. We plan to reschedule in the spring, perhaps >April 12. > >Regards, Rick Steckel > >============================================================= >Richard H. Steckel Steckel.1 at osu.edu >Economics Department 614 - 292 - 5008 Office >The Ohio State University 614 - 292 - 3906 FAX >410 Arps Hall >1945 North High Street >Columbus, Ohio 43210-1172 > >------------ FOOTER TO EH.NEWS POSTING ------------ >For information, send the message "info EH.NEWS" to lists at eh.net From tomzbox at hotmail.com Fri Nov 30 18:15:09 2001 From: tomzbox at hotmail.com (Tom Warren) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 18:15:09 Subject: George [wasRe: [A-List] bordgewahzees] Message-ID: Rob writes eloquently: >The first thing I ever said in English was to a pink-and-white dotted >little >thing called Vanessa, who was trying to be nice to the class wog on his >first >day; 'I like George more' I unforgiveably informed the daughter of a mum >who'd >obviously been up half the night festooning exercise books with pictures of >Paul. What a wonderful memory to possess! It puts the background noise of Afghanistan and Enron in perspective to realize the gravity of this sad news to our real lives. That George?s death can strike such a deep well of emotion among so many of us gives me hope for our collective ? and planet-wide -- humanity. Thanks for sharing your memory, Rob. I?m sure that some will call us whiney children for our sentiments, but whadda they know? I remember watching Harrison play that Rickenbacher, marveling that it seemed to be bigger than he was. Yet he could PLAY it. (His virtuosity always was underrated). I went home to my Martin knock-off Harmony guitar, the one with which I thought the words of Dylan, Guthrie and Seeger would help me change the world, and put it away in its case. ?There is no way,? I said, and went out to purchase that first Beatles album, ?and later a Fender Strat to play Harrison?s chord changes. I don?t want to continue this Bordge thread, you and I agree pretty much about the direction in which we must move. I put these words up in the shop today: ?Life goes on within you and without you.? Be well, friend Tom _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Fri Nov 30 11:29:16 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 18:29:16 +0000 Subject: [A-List] "Human rights ... are truly revolutionary" Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011130182658.00ab6280@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Human Rights and Global Civilisation 2nd Annual BP Lecture by Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The British Museum, London 29th November 2001 Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is an honour to have been invited to deliver the 2nd annual BP Lecture here at the British Museum. It is always a pleasure to visit this renowned institution and discover something new about the histories of the world's cultures - the world's vernaculars - through the collections in the Museum's care. Nelson Mandela remarked during his lecture here a year ago that by bringing together works of art from all parts of the world - works which have influenced and interacted with each other across the centuries - the Museum reminds us that we are all part of a larger whole. May I pay my own personal tribute to him as a friend and ally of human rights and a great support to me in this job. Last year he willingly agreed to be patron of a vision declaration on tolerance and diversity which we launched as part of the preparations for the World Conference against Racism, and which reminded us of our common membership in "the one human family". Even as we celebrate the diversity of human expression, we are also invariably drawn towards the familiar - towards home. I am very impressed by the Museum's exhibits from my native Ireland. The Londesborough Brooch, for example, is typical of the finest Irish work of the eighth century. Combining Celtic, Germanic and classical elements, it is but one example of how the best of human creation not only draws on the roots of local traditions, but on interaction with other cultures. The importance of cultural interaction and shared learning was what UN Member States had in mind last year when they proclaimed 2001 the "International Year of Dialogue among Civilisations". They signalled the need for greater understanding and mutual respect in achieving the primary and interrelated objectives of the United Nations - peace, human development, human rights and the strengthening of international law. No one could have imagined a year ago just how urgent that dialogue would be today. One of the many lessons we are learning since the horrific events of 11 September is that great gulfs of understanding exist between the world's cultures, religions and civilisations. Commentary on recent events gives the impression that we are witnessing the clash of civilisations foretold by Samuel Huntington. This, however, is not the case. Amartya Sen has, in a recent article, termed the categorisation of the people of the world by civilisation as "crude and inconsistent", ignoring other ways of seeing people, linked to politics, language, literature, class, occupation of other affiliations. "Each of us has many features in our self-conception. Our religion, important as it may be, cannot be an all-engulfing identity. Even a shared poverty can be a source of solidarity across the borders. ... The main hope of harmony lies not in any imagined uniformity, but in the plurality of our identities, which cut across each other and work against sharp divisions into impenetrable civilisational camps". As he concludes, "the robbing of our plural identities not only reduces us; it impoverishes the world". Global Poverty and Global Civilisation Yet there is another issue, perhaps even more divisive and threatening to global sustainability, than conflicts between cultures. I am often asked: "what do you think is the worst problem in human rights in our world today?" I reply "extreme poverty". Extreme poverty means a denial of the exercise of all human rights and undermines the dignity and worth of the individual. And yet, even in situations of extreme poverty, the human spirit triumphs in fighting back. Earlier this month, while in India, I was invited to visit a small project in the worst slum in New Delhi. The conditions were appalling, and the place was known for drug dealing, violence and trafficking in children. I met local men and women - mainly women - who were supported by an NGO called STOP in providing three things: some education for the children, basic health care, and a small income from making candles. As I listened, I was struck by their caring for each other and for the many orphaned children, by their determination not to be moved by some slum clearance scheme, and by the sense of community in such terrible squalor. When I came out of the small room they used as a centre, I was told the children wanted to sing for me. About 50 of them had gathered in the narrow, pot-holed street and they sang in Hindi "We Shall Overcome". They held the note and I found it difficult to hold back the tears. Extreme poverty is the life long experience of millions and millions of people in our world today. The numbers are growing. What reflection does this cast on what we call our civilisation at the beginning of the 21st century? Recently the President of the World Bank in discussing world poverty said: "Poverty remains a global problem of huge proportions. Of the world's 6 billion people, 2.8 billion live on less than US$ 2 per day, and 1.2 billion live on less than 1 dollar a day. Six infants of every 100 do not see their first birthday and 8 do not survive to their fifth. Of those who do reach school age, 9 boys in 100 and 14 girls do not go to primary school". If we are speaking of global civilisation, we must accept that it has not yet emerged. If it is defined, as I shall argue, in part by its commitment to certain values - including the elimination of statistics such as these - we have a long way to go. But at the least, we know in which direction we must go. This is not to say that we do not face a challenge in seeking to avoid the eventuality of a clash. Although we are exposed to 'the other', do we yet fully understand and respect that other? And what of the millions of people, who want nothing to do with the violence of 11 September, yet feel left behind by the modern world, or without a voice in shaping a future that reflects on their lives? What can we do to improve our knowledge and understanding of one another? How can we gain a more profound awareness of our common destiny? The title I have chosen is "Human Rights and Global Civilisation", and what I would like to do tonight is put before you an alternative to divisiveness and conflicts in our world. I would like to suggest that human rights hold out the possibility of a world in which the divides between North and South, rich and poor, secular and religious can be bridged. I am convinced it is possible. But bringing it about will require more dialogue, more political will, more resources, and more involvement from every part of society. In short, human rights can provide the ethical foundations of a more just, equitable and peaceful global civilisation. Three essential elements stand out in the development of this shared civilisation: - unwavering commitment to the achievement in reality of all human rights as well as the full equality and non-discrimination agenda - continuous and ever-deepening dialogue between peoples and nations in order to promote true understanding and respect - and the development of new cross-national partnerships embracing all actors - governments, civil society, and business. Global Civilisation Last year, the largest ever public opinion poll was undertaken in preparation for the UN Millennium Assembly. It provided opportunities for the public to express their views on what should be the core priorities for the United Nations in the new century. The survey revealed that an overwhelming majority of people from all countries, from all backgrounds, ages and walks of life consider the protection of human rights to be the most important task for the United Nations. Significantly, the younger the respondents, the greater the importance assigned to this goal. These views were echoed at the Millennium Summit, the largest gathering of world leaders in history. The final document from the Summit, the Millennium Declaration, states that the central challenge the community of nations faces today is to ensure that the irreversible reality of globalisation becomes a positive force for all the world's people. It recognises that globalisation offers great opportunities, but that at present its benefits are very unevenly shared and its costs are unevenly distributed, with developing countries and countries in transition facing special difficulties in responding to this central challenge. What is encouraging is the Millennium Declaration's recognition that only through broad and sustained efforts to create a shared future, based upon our common humanity in all its diversity, can globalisation be made fully inclusive and equitable. It sets out a clear programme for action based on humanity's values of freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibility. What then is the nature of this global civilisation we seek? In the lead-up to the Durban World Conference, the Secretary-General spoke of and stressed the link between the Dialogue on Civilisations and the World Conference. He too looked forward to a global civilisation that we would seek to defend and promote. He isolated a number of its elements: "It is a civilisation defined by its insistence on universal human rights and freedoms, its tolerance of dissent, and its belief in the right of people everywhere to have a say in how they are governed. It is a civilisation based on the belief that diversity is something to be celebrated, not feared." To be enriched by and respect the culture of the other, is not to abandon your own. Rather it protects the familiar from distortion through fear, through exaggeration, through ignorance. When we cease to define ourselves in opposition to an imagined 'other', we are freed from caricatured representations of ourselves. Universality A major fallacy of the past - that universal human rights are a western ideal only - is being refuted in our interdependent world. Developed and developing countries alike increasingly understand that the balanced approach to human rights, embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which places equal emphasis on all human rights - civil and political, economic, social and cultural and the right to development - makes sense. In the past, the example of civil and political rights being resisted in Eastern European states and elsewhere, while the Western countries espoused these rights (sometimes more in theory than practice), was offered as evidence against the universality of rights. But by the same token, discrimination and racism presented a major challenge to the western countries, and continue to do so. And everywhere, in developed and developing countries, there has been a continuing failure to fully accept the implications of economic, social and cultural rights. The truth is that divisions and ranking of rights is artificial. When President Roosevelt spoke of the famous 'four freedoms', freedom from want stood equally alongside freedom from fear. Human rights will not be truly achieved until all accept economic, social and cultural rights as rights that deserve and require equal attention to civil and political rights and freedoms. This imperative was endorsed by over 170 states at the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, 1993: "All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis". (Paragraph 5, Vienna Declaration) Vienna also established a consensus on the linkage between human rights, development and democracy. These building blocks of a new future were confirmed in the Millennium Summit. Their collective role in peace is only now being explored. In a sense, nothing short of such a grand project could feed into the creation of a truly global civilisation respecting diversity. Indeed what is behind anti-globalisation protests, if not cries against a system which to many is inaccessible, opaque, and somehow alien. The protestors can look to the international human rights framework for support. The end to discrimination is a core part of the human rights agenda. The lessening and elimination of the obscene disparities between rich and poor is part of the human rights agenda. And the claim to participate in decision-making is part of the human rights agenda. Regional initiatives, such as the New Partnership for African Development, are essentially about balanced participation. The partnership is a pledge by African nations to take the responsibility of leadership, to speed up development and to consolidate democracy, good governance and sound economic management on the continent. The role of the UN and of bilateral partners is to support this African led initiative. In support of the Partnership, my Office recently hosted a dialogue with African governments to assist them in developing the strategies needed to "promote democracy and human rights in their respective countries and regions, by developing standards of accountability, transparency and participative governance at the national and sub-national levels". Equality, Non-Discrimination and Dialogue Just three days after the close of the Durban World Conference, the appalling terrorist attacks on the United States took place. I have characterised those attacks as a crime against humanity, because of their scale and because they were primarily directed at a civilian population. There is no question but that many aftershocks of those horrendous acts have been felt in the international system. Indeed the full implications are not yet clear, and will take time to emerge. I have a number of immediate concerns - for example the consequences for civil liberties in the manner of implementation by states of Security Council Resolution 1373 on terrorism, and the worsening environment for refugees and asylum seekers. But I wish to emphasise that the anti-discrimination agenda of the World Conference against Racism has become even more crucial today than before 11 September. Fulfilling that agenda, the elimination of racism, discrimination and xenophobia, while deepening our mutual understanding through a continuing dialogue, must be the human rights movement's response to terror. Whether on the individual or the international level, we must work together to provide this chance of getting to know the other. Positive steps are being taken. For example, last week in Madrid, a Conference took place in which the UK, together with representatives of 80 other states and many NGOs took part. It addressed the sensitive, but crucial subject of what our children learn at school about religious and other beliefs. It was a valuable addition to global dialogue and understanding, which I hope will be built on in the future. Broadening the human rights coalition This leads into the third element necessary for a global civilisation. Along with more opportunities for dialogue, we need more voices around the table. The Durban Conference emphasized the importance of voices from the margins-indigenous peoples, migrants, those of African descent, minorities such as the Roma and Kurds, refugees and asylum seekers. The many challenges to human rights will not be fully addressed without mobilising the energies of all parts of society. Working in coalitions of common cause is the only way we will make real progress on achieving the Millennium Declaration goals. Today, under the leadership of Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the United Nations is interacting vigorously with non-governmental organisations, foundations, academic and cultural institutions and, increasingly, with the business community. The growing influence of the private sector in today's world has been a subject of much debate. Statistics help explain why. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development estimates that there are now over 60,000 transnational corporations, compared with 37,000 in 1990. These transnational corporations have around 800,000 foreign affiliates, compared with some 170,000 foreign affiliates in 1990, and millions of suppliers and distributors operating along their supply chains. At the current session of the UN General Assembly, a special agenda item entitled "Towards Global Partnerships" was included for the first time. The Assembly has recognised the need for increased efforts to enhance cooperation between the United Nations and all relevant partners, in particular the private sector. The UN Global Compact initiative, which was formally launched in July of last year, is becoming an overall framework through which the UN is pursuing its engagement with the private sector. The Compact calls on business leaders, trade unions and NGOs to join forces behind a set of core values in the areas of human rights, labour standards and the environment. Allow me to outline briefly these three areas. With respect to human rights, corporations should ensure that they uphold and respect human rights as reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and are not themselves complicit in human rights abuses. In the area of labour standards, businesses should uphold freedom of association and collective bargaining and make sure that they are not employing under-age children or forced labor, either directly or indirectly, and that, in their hiring and firing policies they do not discriminate on grounds of race, creed, gender or ethnic origin. And in relation to the environment, companies should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges, promote greater environmental responsibility and encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies. Several hundred companies, labour unions and civil society organisations are now engaged in the Compact, working together to make its principles part of the strategic vision and everyday practices of companies in all regions. The Global Compact is a voluntary initiative to promote good corporate citizenship. But I should stress that it is not, and must not be, a mere public relations exercise. A commitment to the Global Compact must lead to concrete actions in support of the core principles. BP was one of the first companies to take on the Global Compact challenge. I think Lord Browne would agree that being a good corporate citizen is becoming a business necessity. I think he would also agree that being a good corporate citizen isn't easy. Consider some of the difficult challenges companies face today: - We expect that companies will engage in open dialogue and consultation with local communities and their representatives, non-governmental organisations and government at all levels to ensure that potential issues arising from operations are identified and the risks addressed. But what should we expect of a company when there are disagreements between local communities and the national government over the use of revenues or land? - We expect that companies will ensure that there are no "unintended consequences" of their activities which may indirectly lead to human rights abuses. But what more should we expect companies to do than avoid such complicity and speak out against persistent and wide-spread human rights violations in countries where they operate? - We expect companies to play a constructive role in sustainable development. But how far can we expect companies to go in taking on the role of ensuring access to education, to affordable health care, to a functioning judicial system? We have seen aspects of this debate recently around the issue of access to HIV/AIDS medicines in developing countries. Much work remains in finding the right balance between public and private interests. There are no easy answers to any of these issues. But we do need to find the answers - together. It must be stressed that the United Nations does not ask or expect business to assume the responsibilities of government. It does ask businesses to act in a responsible way in their sphere of activities and join with government, civil society and international organisations in promoting respect for the core values of the Global Compact and in achieving the Millennium Declaration goals. Conclusion Let me conclude by posing a challenge. I would hope that part of our human journey is learning from the mistakes or shortcomings of those who have gone before, while attempting to secure something better for those who will follow. That is what the founders of the United Nations hoped to do more than half a century ago. Human rights, when fully implemented, are truly revolutionary. In the promotion of equality - both material and in parity of esteem - and real dialogue involving all, we even now hold the tools to advance a global civilisation. It is a civilisation based on shared ethical values and one which potentially provides for lasting peace in our troubled world. This challenge is for all - not merely governments, not merely the UN. Through the need for new alliances and the insistence on participation rights, implementation both requires and ensures a voice for the voiceless. The just and peaceful future we seek may not be so far off. Allow me to end with the words of Va?lav Havel, taken from his open letter on 'The Power of the Powerless': "For the real question is whether the brighter future is really always so distant. What if, on the contrary, it has been here for a long time already, and only our own blindness and weakness has prevented us from seeing it around us and within us, and kept us from developing it?" Thank you. From lnp3 at panix.com Fri Nov 30 11:59:09 2001 From: lnp3 at panix.com (Louis Proyect) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 13:59:09 -0500 Subject: [A-List] Feedback from Joel Kovel on the Foster-O'Connor rhubarb Message-ID: <3.0.1.32.20011130135909.006868b4@popserver.panix.com> As expected, no reply was received from James O'Connor who probably regards any communication from me as about as welcome as an anthrax letter. Somebody forwared Alan Rudy a copy of my post. This prompted an anguished, rambling letter from him that was rather skimpy on the political and theoretical side. I expect that Costas would as soon punch me in the nose as reply to my post. Can't say I blame him. Sometimes I even get on my own nerves. Kovel did respond. In deference to his desire to not continue the thread, I will not cc him now. I will only say that the notion of Foster/Burkett wanting to impose an orthodoxy is patently absurd. Me and Mark Jones are the only people around who want to impose an orthodoxy, so you'd better mind your p's and q's. ======= Hi Louis, For a number of reasons, I do not care to continue this thread, and so will confine myself just to this: that while "spirituality" is an important category in my reasoning, this was subsidiary to the main points, which were twofold--that Foster/Burkett seek to impose an orthodoxy, which is a bad thing; and that the view of science--and of Marx--offered by Foster is very limited. The matter of spirituality, Boehme, etc are introduced to make these points. You might find my forthcoming The Enemy of Nature (ZED) of interest. Should be available early next year. It has been strongly endorsed by Meszaros, Maria Mies, O'Connor and Walden Bello, among others. Regards, joel Louis Proyect Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org From sherrynstan at igc.org Fri Nov 30 14:48:08 2001 From: sherrynstan at igc.org (sherrynstan at igc.org) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 16:48:08 -0500 Subject: [A-List] rant from nancy oden, eco-terrorist Message-ID: Who is an "Eco-Terrorist?" Is it someone who struggles to protect Earth's gene pool against mad scientists who mix all sorts of creatures' genes, including human genes with mice, pigs, cows, sheep, to create a mutant life form they might be able to sell? Nancy Oden, recently detained in the Bangor Airport, and refused the right to board her plane, because she showed up on someone's list. November 30, 2001 Mexico's GM Corn Shocks Scientists Researchers baffled as ancient variety of maize tests positive for modified organisms in area where no engineered crops are grown by John Vidal One of the world's oldest varieties of maize has been "contaminated" by genetically modified organisms, say US researchers who have had their work confirmed by the Mexican government. The findings in the Sierra Norte de Oaxaca region will stoke the row about whether it is possible to control GM crops and their potential threat to genetic diversity. The group of researchers from the University of California, Berkeley, detected the contamination in October last year while working with a biological laboratory in the region. They compared indigenous corn with samples known to be free from genetic engineering, as well as with genetically modified varieties. Their results, published yesterday in the science journal Nature, showed that four of six samples of native criollo corn taken from fields contained a genetic "switch" commonly used in GM crops, and that two of the samples were found to have another DNA segment commonly inserted by genetic engineers. A further sample contained a commonly inserted gene that prompts the plant to produce a poison. The researchers alerted the Mexican government which did its own tests in 22 communities. They confirmed in September this year that transgenic DNA had been found in 13 of them, with contamination of between 3% and 10%. The results are surprising because Mexico, which is the genetic home of maize, has banned the growing of GM maize since 1998, and the last known GM crops grown in the region were almost 60 miles from where the contaminated maize was found. It was not clear yesterday when the contamination took place, but the scientists speculated that it originated from GM maize bought from the US as food aid for the impoverished region in central Mexico, and had progressed over time via multiple pollinations. It is not thought that that the cross-pollination happened over long distances, because corn pollen is heavy and does not travel far on the wind. "I repeated the tests at least three times to make sure I wasn't getting false-positives," the lead author of the report, David Quist, said. "It was initially hard to believe that corn in such a remote region would have tested positive." "This is very serious," said Ignacio Chapela, assistant professor of microbial ecology at Berkeley's College of Natural Resources, "because the regions where our samples were taken are known for their diverse varieties of native corn, which is something that absolutely needs to be protected. We can't afford to lose that resource." But Luis Solleiro, director of the Mexican biotechnology trade association, denied that the country's rich genetic diversity was threatened. "The data suggests that any transgenic corn is at a very low level," he said. "This level, or even greater presence, would not adversely affect the genetic diversity of native strains." Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and other groups that oppose GM crops argued yesterday that even a low level of genetic contamination was highly significant in a center of diversity and origin. "The genetic contamination is likely to multiply through pollen flow and spread further to other traditional varieties and wild relatives growing in the area", Doreen Stabinsky, from Greenpeace USA, said. "This is likely to be only the tip of the iceberg, as plants in other parts of Mexico have not yet been investigated." The UN Food and Agriculture Organization is concerned that GM crops may pollute the gene pool of conventional relatives in the same area or nearby, depending on wind and insects. "If there is no barrier to pollination, you get this potential hazard," said Ricardo Labrada Romero, the FAO's plant protection officer. The research adds to concerns that GM crops may be out of control. The Canadian government's agricultural department last month reported that stray pollen and seed from genetically modified oilseed rape crops was now so widespread that it was difficult to grow conventional or organic strains without them being contaminated. More than 100m acres [33m hectares] of GM crops have been grown, mostly in the US and Canada. ? Guardian Newspapers Limited 2001 Letter to the Editor: Who is an "Eco-Terrorist?" Is it someone who struggles to protect Earth's gene pool against mad scientists who mix all sorts of creatures' genes, including human genes with mice, pigs, cows, sheep, to create a mutant life form they might be able to sell? Is an "eco-terrorist" someone who finds needless and heedless mutation of Earth's naturally diverse creatures morally and ethically repulsive? Or are the eco-terrorists the "scientists" working for the big drug and chemical corporations who are playing with genetic material, mixing species at will, hoping to create a "thing" that will make money for them? And, please, let's not bring in the old "well, they might just possibly, someday in the future, after billions and billions of taxpayer-funded grants, find a clue as to what causes cancer." Cancer is caused by many things - one of which is exposure to pesticides and other toxic chemicals, which we can hardly avoid these days, thanks to these same corporations. Now that wild corn in the mountains of Mexico has been found to be contaminated with pesticide genes from Monsanto's genetically-mutliated corn, scientists are "surprised" that the wind, as it has always done, carried the alien corn pollen that far. Oops! Too late now, they admit, to perhaps grow pure corn as it evolved through the millenia. It may be that nowhere on Earth is safe from the winds bearing pollen from genetically mutiliated corn. Why should you care? When you eat corn (and soybeans and canola oil, etc.) you are likely already eating the toxic chemicals inserted into the genes of the corn plants - toxic materials which humans have not heretofore eaten, and which then gets taken up by our bodies' cells. No one knows what this will do to us or our children in the short or long term, but many more allergic reactions are being seen all over Earth. The corporations are in control here, and they want to prosecute people such as myself who speak out against their destruction of nature with their disgusting experiments. We are all guinea pigs. Pesticides, genetically mutiliated food, meat in the supermarkets possibly containing human genes, but definitely containing growth hormones and antibiotics - the list goes on. Time to get more self-sufficient again. Grow some of your own food, don't buy packaged, processed food, buy organic produce (yes, it costs more right now, which is why you should grow your own), write letters to your reps and senators and supermarkets and anyone else you think might have some power. What we need, of course, is the power for we the people to make the decisions that affect our lives. Corporations do not care about any life on Earth except as it can make money for them. There is no ethical or moral oversight whatsoever - and corporations have huge influence over our children through TV, video games, schools, and in everyday life. Have you seen those feel-good ads about biotechnology? Yes, corporations have the money and the power to poison us without our knowledge or consent. For example, if people knew that caffeine was a natural pesticide evolved by plants to disrupt the central nervous systems of the creatures that feed on them, how many parents would allow their children to drink those highly-profitable caffeinated sodas, or coffee, or any other caffeinated product? Not many, I'm sure. We need to make the decisions about what life forms are created, what substances are allowed into our foods, how our natural resources are used - and even if we were to make a mistake now and then, at least we could fix it. As it is now, we have no say, and this will lead us the way we are going - into a slow, perhaps faster and faster, degradation of our lives, more sickness, more intrusions by government and corporations, less freedom. Please re-read the Bill of Rights, the first Ten Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Then, if you'd like to help fight for our right to not be poisoned by the real "eco-terrorists," and not lose our freedom to speak the truth, contact me at cleanearth at acadia.net. We've formed a new group, Bill of Rights Defense Committee, which will fight for everyone's right to speak out, no matter their politics. The ruination of Earth is not complete; I believe we can save much of it, but it won't be long before there will be no turning back. We need to act now for our children and all Earth's diverse and beautiful life forms. Please help. Nancy Oden Bill of Rights Defense Committee Jonesboro, Maine -----------------Nancy Oden, PO Box 186, Jonesboro, Maine 04648 434-6228 cleanearth at acadia.net From franka at fiu.edu Fri Nov 30 15:42:19 2001 From: franka at fiu.edu (Andre Gunder Frank) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 17:42:19 -0500 (EST) Subject: [A-List] Frank v. Landes update In-Reply-To: <5.1.0.14.2.20011130132035.00b0e3e0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Message-ID: Landes does not reply in general so far as i know. however in a round table on his book at some meets - SSHS? - in chicago in 98 [that is where at lunch we set up oour own public C-span debate] the critics agreed with the whole thesis and just quibbled abvout this and that, except for one critic who did more. David wiped the floor with them , in part again because of his good showmanship. In the Landes/Frank email debate tast lasted 2 mohths with about 100 partcipants on 4 nets simultaneously, he did not say a word, at the begining he was in europe [in fact he told me he does not use e-mail at least still then;and assistant sometimes tells him whart going on! thats how in footnote he lambasted the h-net discussioin]. the Pomeranz one on Cnina was similar to the Landes/Frank one on e-mail and both had overlap of participants. Dsavid put 2 footnotes into hais book lambastiung me - they are quoted in my review. my review of landes [last time i copied the quoted poearsl of wisdom on china from my review] is on my webpage under --on-line- subsectin reviews, and mine on Pomeranz is there too, along with some others. good thing about the capitalism origins debate. i dont weanna be provoked. i long since cut the gordina know on how/wne/where/why capitalism arose. it didnt cause it never existed, nor does it so now. its just an ideological label - that explains the wrong thing, eg misplaced concreteness- and it was on the anti-cap banner of the left, but has also recenlty/long ago been inscribed on the Thacherist/Reaganite right whoi wave it for all it is worth, drowingn oout the left use of the same flag that the right appropriazted as it own. best thing is to never mind the whole thing. cheers gunder ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANDRE GUNDER FRANK Department of History Home University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 Fax: 1-402-472 8839 E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ From franka at fiu.edu Fri Nov 30 15:48:19 2001 From: franka at fiu.edu (Andre Gunder Frank) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 17:48:19 -0500 (EST) Subject: [A-List] Market of last resort In-Reply-To: <5.1.0.14.2.20011130134416.00aea050@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Message-ID: mark- you must know some other mythical blair if you can say An enlightened White house (oxymoron!) would attempt to deal with the underlying social-justice issues, as Blair suggested from the start blair was the greatest cheerleader,indeed maker, of the NATO was, and he is obviosly cheerleading this one too, so where is his suggestion to go after underlyimg or any othr issues - he is just now dragging his feet about iraq, but then so are some in US who can see that that is goann bust the arab/us colation wide open. that a long ways from studying underlying social justice issues , let alone ding something about thmoem gunder ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANDRE GUNDER FRANK Department of History Home University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 Fax: 1-402-472 8839 E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ From mstainsby at tao.ca Fri Nov 30 15:52:09 2001 From: mstainsby at tao.ca (Macdonald Stainsby) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 14:52:09 -0800 Subject: [A-List] Fisk on Afghanistan References: Message-ID: <040f01c179f1$a519df60$5b075318@vc.shawcable.net> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Keaney Michael" Robert Fisk: We are the war criminals now *snip* > And yes, lets remember that 11 September was a > crime against humanity. Based on what? We seriously need to stop genuflecting behind this nonsense. I find that this is pretty much just as racist as some of the other statements that Fisk so rightly slams on other issues. A) if this is indeed third world Islamics, then they have a right to use any means at their disposal just as surely as the Warsaw Ghetto uprisers did. Stating that is no more to be an Islamic apologist now than it was to be a Zionist then. B) Calling it a crime against humanity is atrocious. Are we to now call the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Beograd a crime against humanity? What was wrong with it there? These terms- "crime against humanity"- are to place the events in a seperate sphere entirely, calling it beyond the pale. It isn't even the worst act of the 21st Century, for Christ's sake! No more empty rhetoric to soothe the frightened North American. They are now a party to re-conquering the entire world. Let them fear the results of that. It is now nearly 3 months since the action took place. It is time for us to stop- completely- tipping our collective hats towards the racist sensibilities of the North American psyche. Effectively, much of this apologia takes place in a fashion so as to allow ourselves to coddle ethno-centrism of the worst sort, then combat the reactions to it (bombing the snot out of small impoverished states). There must cease the idea that we should: A) blame anyone, even as a rhetorical device, for 9-11, B) we must stop talking as if the world started then. We will certainly not use the "even if it was horrible..." line to defend against and oppose the bombing of Iraq. We must take risks. We must begin NOW to talk about Iraq. It is clear this is where they are going. I don't gamble (except on hockey), but we need to roll the dice. Are we not playing to win? Let us only stand on what we know, and construe from that the need to speak openly that they *will* attack Iraq. Let us make no mention of 9-11 until it is mentioned to us. Let us stop allowing the US state department to write our script. The time is coming we will write our own history or perish- and we must now begin to think and act accordingly. Macdonald From franka at fiu.edu Fri Nov 30 16:25:55 2001 From: franka at fiu.edu (Andre Gunder Frank) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 18:25:55 -0500 (EST) Subject: [A-List] Malvinas "update" In-Reply-To: Message-ID: there were two long range matters, oil in the ocean around there, and the south pole, but the immediate reason was loud and clear: MAGGIE WAS FAST LOISING TOO MUCH POLITICAL SUPPORT [RECESSION] AND NEDED THE WAR TO PROP HESELF UP, WHIHC IT DID AND GALTRIERI WAS ALOS LOOSING TOO NMUCH POLITICAL SUPPOT FCOR THE SAME REASON. SO BOTH AHD THE SAME INCENTIVE TO GO TO WAR WITH EACH OTEHR. BUT SAD FR THEM, ONLY ONE COULD WIN - AND STYAY IN OFFICE, THE OTEHR AHD TO LOSE AND GO HOME. THAT WAS GALTIERI. A COuPLE OF FOOTNOTES dont remember if i said ThE first one on THIS net - i get confused with toooo many of thjem!: 1.the Lima negotiations wee about to defuse the war, whic Maggie deearly wanted/needed so she had the royal navy/airforce sink the Belgrano and thereby torpedo less the ship than the intended target, the lima compromise 2. Fidel supported th Argie [Brit language!] militsry dictator 3. the Us supported the Brits, but not just with words like Fidel;, but with satellite information gatherin passed on to the Brits. 4. Davis Owen came out AGAINST the war [he had already been labour foreign minister and so should hacve knoiwn something avbout what wasd going on] - i rembver vividly seeing hjim saying so on TV the first evening. by 36 - mayve 24 - hours later he had changfed '' his mind'' and supported it like all the oteh Brits - i hope excluding Mark! respectfully submitted by the colelctive memory and conscience IS one On Fri, 30 Nov 2001, Keaney Michael wrote: > Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 16:16:58 +0200 > From: Keaney Michael > Reply-To: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu > To: a-list at lists.econ.utah.edu > Subject: [A-List] Malvinas "update" > > Rob Schaap writes: > > Don't I remember something about the Falklands/Malvinas' main importance > to > Britain being to do with maintaining what credibility its Antarctic > claims > might still possess? Southampton is not an ideally situated base camp, > after all. > > > > Do you think the 'I remember when the whole world map were pink' brigade > (not > yet an insignificant proportion of the great British electorate) would > swallow > Euro-integration, the handing back of Gibralter and the Malvinas, and > the > forfeit of their claim on Antarctica all in one hit? Britain would have > to > have changed an awful lot since I was last there ... > > ===== > > A lot has changed, and still is changing, thanks to the destruction of > much of the infrastructure supporting the *traditional* British state by > those whom it brought to power -- namely, Thatcher and her crew. They > were necessary for the destruction of the labour movement, which was > never going to be challenged properly by even Jim Callaghan, whose trade > union background was something he held dear and could not countenance > reneging on, even though he was a Labour rightwinger. The complete > destruction of the labour movement was something that both wings of the > Conservative Party (Thatcher/Atlanticist, Heseltine/European) were > pretty much agreed was necessary, not least as revenge for the > embarrassment of the Heath premiership. A few corporatists (from whom > Heseltine drew much support as a fellow-traveller) hankered after > Macmillan/Wilson-type tripartism, but in the main a > smashing-the-labour-movement agenda was a done deal for the > Conservatives. However, having unleashed an unprecedented and > untrammelled force of capitalist development via the > privatisation/deregulation/liberalisation structural adjustment, they > sealed the fate of their original sponsors: the true blue British Empire > brigade, whose increasing irrelevance became sorely apparent as > Thatcher's reign went on. And she never understood what it was she was > doing, *really*, as evidenced by her little Englander "we made Britain > grate again" (sic) refrain and jingoistic anti-Europeanism. She it was, > after all, who signed the Single European Act in 1986 paving the way for > all that she subsequently opposed. And it was Europe that tore her party > apart, and the permanent government apparatus supported the European > faction until the Conservative Party was too incapable of governing. It > should really have lost the 1992 election -- that it staggered on for > another 5 years is really remarkable. But the permanent government got > its preferred "natural party" in the form of New Labour, whose precise > form may never have taken shape had Kinnock won in 1992. > > Mark Jones posted a message on PEN-L way back last April/May or > thereabouts detailing the social changes wrought by Thatcherism, > including the increased emphasis on self-interest and short-termism. > Gibraltar and Northern Ireland are anachronisms for most people. The > latter especially is something the vast majority of "mainlanders" would > dearly love to be rid of, and there are many within the state apparatus > who feel the same. It's a costly investment, and where is the return? > What geopolitical advantage is there? None whatsoever. What economic > advantage is there? None whatsoever. Only national pride could justify > its perpetual retention, and there are bigger fish to fry in that > department these days. And in any case, conducting a fairly miserable > and dirty counter-terrorist operation hardly adds to national pride. > Gibraltar is of use only for the gaming industry, which can avoid paying > taxes in the UK. These can easily be rescinded, as with so many other > taxes inconvenient to business. What geopolitical advantage does > Gibraltar serve? None whatsoever. What economic advantage is there? None > whatsoever -- it's a tax haven for goodness sake, and there's plenty of > them to go around, not least the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. > Both Gibraltar and NI are within the EU regardless of the nominal > sovereign, and the UK's current preoccupation involves acquiring greater > influence over the trajectory of EU development. The Malvinas, alas, is > made more difficult by the jingoistic legacy of Thatcher. Imperialist > uproar could be whipped up by the punk Thatcherites, who could very > easily accuse Blair et al of betraying the dead, those who gave their > lives for Blighty, etc. (Never mind the poor conscripts aboard the > Belgrano.) In addition to the Antarctic claims, there is also a matter > of possible oil and gas extraction, but little is heard of that just > now. In any case, there's still Ascension Island. > > Nestor notes that the Wilson government's proposal "was not a honest > move". > > In this case I think Chris has it right when highlighting the different > viewpoints represented within ruling circles at that time. Someone like > Chalfont, who was a "junior" minister at the Foreign Office for the > lifetime of both Wilson 1960s administrations, would represent, it has > become clear subsequently, what could now be called the punk Thatcherite > tendency. So, for him and those he represented, it was most certainly > not an honest move. The Foreign Office from the top down appears to have > deliberately sabotaged the whole thing: note the pointed reference to > Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart's busy diary as the reason > negotiations fell through. Wilson, however, and many around him, were > desperately trying to regenerate the British economy in order to get out > from under US domination and the perpetual difficulty of balance of > payments problems that gave the US one significant form of leverage over > any British government. Withdrawing UK military forces from East of Suez > (as the policy was called) was difficult because LBJ regarded this as a > clear indication of criticism of the Vietnam war (which, to his eternal > credit, Wilson never joined in, all pressures notwithstanding). Wilson > was not an imperialist either, and saw no geopolitical advantages in > colonial possessions. The problems with Ian Smith in Rhodesia arose not > because UDI snubbed Britain, but because UDI involved minority rule and > effective apartheid. Those who would otherwise be apoplectic about the > loss of Gibraltar, Malvinas, NI or anything else were quite satisfied > that Smith's Rhodesia would serve a number of useful purposes, not least > as a source of trouble for Wilson who was beset by other difficulties > spanning the permanent government-City of London-military nexus. Hence > the problems posed by BOSS agents in Britain during the early to > mid-1970s. Wilson himself accused BOSS of acting to undermine his > premiership. Meanwhile the punk Thatcherites like the ghastly McWhirter > brothers -- effectively the political wing of BOSS, Unison Committee for > Action, and MI5 -- conducted a legal campaign against anti-apartheid > campaigners like Peter Hain (!), now at the Foreign Office in charge of > leading the charge into Europe, while BOSS and other fanatical > anticommunist elements in the British secret services (Peter Wright et > al) conspired to bring down Wilson and his circle via a strategy of > tension that involved the smearing of and even attempted kidnappings and > assassinations of anti-apartheid campaigners, among other nefarious > deeds. > > Michael Keaney > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANDRE GUNDER FRANK Department of History Home University of Nebraska Lincoln [UNL] 4440 North 7th Street 612 Oldfather Apt. 107 P.O. Box 880327 Lincoln, NE 68521 USA Lincoln, NE 68588-0327 Tel: 1-402-742 7931 Tel: 1-402-472 3251=direct 2414=Dpt Fax: 1-402-742 7932 Fax: 1-402-472 8839 E-Mail: franka at fiu.edu Web Page: csf.colorado.edu/agfrank/ From mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk Fri Nov 30 16:28:48 2001 From: mark.jones at tiscali.co.uk (Mark Jones) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 23:28:48 +0000 Subject: [A-List] Frank v. Landes update In-Reply-To: References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011130132035.00b0e3e0@pop.tiscali.co.uk> Message-ID: <5.1.0.14.2.20011130231959.00ae43e8@pop.tiscali.co.uk> At 30/11/2001 22:42, AG Frank wrote: >i long since cut the gordina know on how/wne/where/why capitalism >arose. it didnt cause it never existed, nor does it so now. its just an >ideological label - that explains the wrong thing, eg misplaced >concreteness- and it was on the anti-cap banner of the left, but has also >recenlty/long ago been inscribed on the Thacherist/Reaganite right whoi >wave it for all it is worth, drowingn oout the left use of the same flag >that the right appropriazted as it own. best thing is to never mind the >whole thing. I used to be averse to this argument but I'm not any more. Isn't it obvious (a) that since Marx talked all the time about the *transient* nature of the cap mode of production that he had a clear conception of historical communities (ethnoi, nations, tribes) which transcend capitalism both historically and spatially? Once you accept that then it's possible to move right along to a coherent theory of nation-alism which permits you not merely to deconstruct the nation a la Stalin's concept of ethnoterritorialitiy but also to rethink the nation as a political subject, one that sits alongside notions of political internationalism (ie proletarian internationalism). This is very important when thinking thru political tactics and movement-building and all the great leaders of 20th century revolutions and wars of national liberation--all of them without exception, including the great 'defeatist' (in WW1) V I Lenin--understood this and were and have been able to make a political appeal to 'the nation' as well as to 'the working class' without any shred of cynicism, ie without being *only* politically calculating. In short, we can recalim patriotism without being national bolsheviks or national-socialists and without collapsing into racism and chauvinism. (b) the idea that capitalism was a discrete and somehow transcendental stage in history was actually a way of smuggling back the idea of the permanence of capitalism, of TINA and of Kautskyan-Benrsteinian political ideas, into the discourse of revolutionary working class parties, ie the social democracy of the marx-influenced 2nd international. It's quite obviously wrong and we shoud look again at Gunder's idea here. Mark From soncu at pacbell.net Fri Nov 30 22:15:10 2001 From: soncu at pacbell.net (Sabri Oncu) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2001 21:15:10 -0800 Subject: [A-List] bordgewahzees In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Tom wrote: > Merhaba Sabri, > (is 'Yassu' an improper greeting?) No, it is perfectly alright. Can you tell the difference between a Turk and a Greek until the start to speak? I guess when you said this: > You quoted my a) and b) back at me, what did you think of a)? You meant this: > a) this day and age is not sufficiently differentiated from other days and ages in the past 10,000 or so years; There are many historians on this list so you may be better off if you ask this question to them but here is my two cents: Why do you think there were no radical environmentalists, say, 200 years ago? Best, Sabri Oncu